Fundamental Powers and Bill of Rights

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THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

A state comes into being accompanied by certain powers that go along with it. These inherent and fundamental powers are essentially and theoretically limitless and BILL OF RIGHTS comes as a measure to balance these powers. Absolute power leads to tyranny; absolute liberty leads to anarchy. The State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property provided that there is due process of law and there is an equal protection of the laws. The Bill of Rights is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the powers of the state (Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222) While certain government programs deserve everybodys support, the same should not be pursued in violation of the Bill of Rights. The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and people from vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice; but this does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. (Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192) The Bill of Rights is the Bedrock of Constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power. (People v. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142) The Bill of Rights might be indeed very important and vital to a democratic and republican government, but this does not mean that governmental powers are subordinate at all times to the rights and freedom it protects. In any exercise of governmental power, there are other considerations that must also be taken into account in resolving the conflicts between liberty and authority. CALALANG V, WILLIAMS, 70 Phil 726 FACTS: Commonwealth Act 548 promulgated that animal drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along certain streets in Manila during specified hours. It intended to control the use of and traffic on national roads. Calalang assailed its constitutionality on the ground that the law was an unlawful interference with the legitimate business or trade and it contravened the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
HELD: The law was enacted as an exercise of Police Power. It aimed to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions in national road for the convenience of the public. The National Assembly was inspired by considering the general welfare and public convenience when it desired to relieve congestion of traffic and ensure public safety. The state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property and with business.
*Outlined from Constitutional Law: Notes and Readings on the Bill of Rights, Citizenship and Suffrage, 2006 Edition, by Atty. Rene Gorospe.
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Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. To this end, rights of individuals are subordinated over the powers of the government. Liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy, neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because it is slavery.
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE Police Power, Power of Eminent Domain and the Power of Taxation. Common Characteristics : (a) Inherent and independently exist of the constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. They are inborn in the very fact of statehood. (B) They are indispensable (C) They constitute methods wherein the State interferes with private rights. (D) They are primarily exercised by the legislature. Police power maintains healthy economic standards of society; curtailment of life, liberty or property for the promotion of general welfare (salus populi est suprema lex the general welfare is the supreme law). Taxation levying income for governmental expenses and operations Eminent domain Taking of property for just compensation Differences:
POLICE POWER Subject Who May Exercise Liberty and property Government
EMINENT DOMAIN Property Rights Government; Private Sector
TAXATION Property Rights Government
Property Taken
Taken Destroyed
and
Utilized for public use
Utilized use
for
public
Compensation
(See the next bullet)
Just
Compensation
Immediate
in
the
(market value) -
form of protection
The compensation for police power is not immediate and laws or regulations enacted pursuant to police power may even lead to financial loss, leaving the reward to be reaped through his altruistic recognition that he has done something for public good.
POLICE POWER (The Law of Overwhelming Necessity) Most pervasive, essential insistent and comprehensive and least limitable power It is the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481)
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It consists of : 1 an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property 2 in order to foster to the common good. It does not have a precise definition to underscore its comprehensive embrace (Basco, 197 SCRA 61) It aims to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare Police power must adjust to the demands and realities of changing times. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the State, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. (People v. Pomar, 46 Phil 440) The power of the State to regulate rates to be charged by public utilities comes as well with the ambit of the Police Power. It seeks to protect the public against arbitrary and excessive charges without prejudice to the quality of electric services the company gives and the companys right to investments. (Republic v. Manila Electric Company, 391 SCRA 700) Nevertheless, the State does not have the right to declare as public utility private businesses not intended for public use because the same is taking property without just compensation (JG Summit Holdings v. CA, 412 SCRA 10 May be delegated to the President, administrative boards, law making bodies of municipal corporations / local governments. Once delegated the agents can only exercise such legislative powers conferred on the by the national law making body. Requisites for the exercise of police power : 1. Within lawful subject and lawful methods (in deference to the due process and equal protection clauses as these two are the most important rights in Article III) 2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while 3. Not being unduly oppressive (Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534) US V. TORIBIO, 15 Phil 85 FACTS : Act 1147 was enacted to regulate the branding and slaughter of large cattle. Before these cattle may be slaughtered or killed for food a permit must first be secured before the municipal slaughterhouse to declare the same as fit for agricultural work or draft purposes. Toribio sought the nullification of the law because it deprived any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
HELD: The law aimed to protect large cattle in the Philippines against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed or stolen. Several years before the enactment of the law, a ravaging disease infected most of the carabao in the country which resulted to famine on the part of the farmers and detriment to the agricultural industry. The increased statistics in fatality led to an increase in the prices of carabao and until such time that the supply of the said animal would equalize to the demand, prices would remain enormous. The same incident caused increase in the incident of cattle stealing which necessitated the enactment of special law to penalize the theft of carabaos.
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The enactment was an exercise of the states police power. Under the circumstances, the promulgation of the law was justified by the exigent necessities of the existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming incident to further reduction of the supply of animals fit for work or draft purposes. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self protection, and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified by reasonable restriction placed upon the by the provision of the law, the same exercise of police power can be allowed.
YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, 148 SCRA 659 FACTS: Ynot was apprehended by certain policemen when he transported six carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was prosecuted for violation EO 626-A which provided for an absolute ban in slaughtering of carabaos and prohibited the interprovincial transportation of carabao and carabeef. In violation of said provision, the carabao and carabeef would be confiscated and would respectively be distributed to charitable institutions as the chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may deem appropriate, and to the deserving farmers according to the discretion of the Director of Animal Industry
HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restrains and is restrained by the due process. In order that the exercise of the same be considered valid, the measure of the law must have a lawful subject, a lawful method and a reasonable connection between the means employed and purposes sought to be achieved. Accordingly, the law sought to avoid indiscriminate killing of carabaos. The subject might be lawful but the reasonable connection between the means employed and purposes sought to be achieved was lacking. The retention of carabaos in one province would not prevent their slaughter there. The element of lawful method was also lacking. EO 626-A was a penal law in nature, nevertheless, the outright violation the law would warrant any police to confiscate the carabaos and carabeef without trial and these carabao and carabeef would be distributed to their respective beneficiaries by the mandated executive officials. This act would constitute an encroachment on the part of the judiciary who is authorized to hear penal restraints. Furthermore, when the law granted the executive officials the authority to determine who the beneficiaries of the confiscated carabao and carabeef would be gave them undue delegation of legislative power as their own generosity would matter without any legal infirmity.
BINAY V. DOMINGO, 201 SCRA 508 FACTS: The Municipality of Makati issued Resolution 60 which would grant burial assistance to the bereaved families with gross monthly income of P2000. The Commission on Audit disapproved the same claiming that it was an invalid exercise of police power due to lack of perceptible connection
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between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged general welfare of the people of Makati. It further claimed that the resolution would only benefit few individuals and not the whole or majority of the inhabitants of the municipality.
HELD: Municipal corporations may validly exercise police power that arises from express delegation or on the creation of the corporation itself (Sec 7, BP 337). It (the police power does not have an exact definition to underscore its broadness. Its scope must expand to meet the exigencies of the times or even to anticipate the future. The drift is towards social legislation geared towards the policy of the state to provide adequate social services, the promotion of general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity. The care for the poor is generally recognized as public duty and the support for the poor is now an accepted exercise of the police power in the promotion of common good.
Municipal corporations may exercise police power under the general welfare clause (See Sec 16, RA 7160). This has two branches : (1) municipal corporations may not enact ordinances which are repugnant to the law and (2) municipal corporations may enact ordinances to promote health, safety, morality, comfort, etc.
VILLACORTA V. BERNARDO, 143 SCRA 480 FACTS: The Municipal Board of Dagupan City issued Ordinance 22 which sought to regulate subdivision plans by requiring proposed subdivision plans in the City Hall to be submitted first before the City Engineer before the engineer could endorse the same to the Bureau of Lands. The ordinance aimed to regulate zoning, as well as non encroachment on the lands of public domain. Furthermore, the said ordinance required that before the registration of these plans, a fee must first be paid before the Register of Deeds. The trial court nullified the ordinance to be repugnant with Sec 44 of Act 496, thus this petition. HELD: To sustain the ordinance would be to open floodgates to other ordinances amending and violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Practically, everything a person does has an affect the society which gives rise to the ubiquity of the Police Power. While deference must be accorded to these ordinances in light of the said power, the right to be left alone must also be countenanced. Proper care must attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into purely private affairs of the individual and as well as the functions of the national laws.
The power of a city mayor to issue business permits and licenses and to suspend, revoke or deny issuing the same must be complied with in view of the due process. He therefore has no authority under the Local Government Code to issue an order to close down these establishments, nor is
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he authorized to order the raid on these establishments in the guise of investigating them (Lim v. CA, 387 SCRA 140) While police power may be identified with the promotion of positive values, it may also be an instrument which could regulate vices, i.e. gambling, within the purview of promoting general welfare. Regulating, instead of prohibiting them may be resorted especially if it gives beneficial effects such as raising revenues.
BASCO V. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
FACTS: PAGCOR was created pursuant to PD 1067 A and was granted franchise to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines by PD 1067 B. PD 189 was further created to enable the government to regulate and centralize all games of chance. Basco, et al challenged the constitutionality of PD 1869 because alleging that it Immediate in the form of protection would be a contravention to morals, public policy and public order
HELD : Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But this does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in the exercise of police power. PD 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. The creation of PAGCOR was beneficial, not just to the government but to the society in general. It was a source of revenue. It provided for funds in social impact projects and subjected the gambling to close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the government. Evil practices and corruption that go with gambling would be minimized if not totally eradicated.
The legality of gambling is merely an exception rather than the rule. Any grant of authority to conduct activities tantamount to gambling must not be expansively construed. Any doubt regarding the legalization of similar activities must be resolved against it. (Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 364 SCRA 485, 526)
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN Highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government. Inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private property after paying just compensation. Otherwise known as the power of expropriation. Must be applied with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
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CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759 FACTS: The Quezon City Council passed Ordinance 6118 s-64 which regulated private cemeteries and burial grounds to allocate 6% of their total land areas for paupers and residents of the city for at least five years. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc reacted and filed a petition to nullify the ordinance before the CFI of Rizal. The city went to the SC and claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power. Ericta on the other hand claimed that it permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Likewise, the general welfare clause as the source of promoting the taking of property is not available because properties taken in view of the sae are generally destroyed and not for public use, the sae being an exercise of police power. HELD: The ordinance not only confiscates, but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park. It is not merely a police regulation but an outright confiscation because violation of the ordinance warrants imprisonment and revocation of the permit to operate. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law even without just compensation. There is no reasonable relation between setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries and the promotion of health, orals, good order, safety or the general welfare of the people. Sec 177 of BP 337 provides that the burial of the dead is to take place in such by buying or expropriating private properties to buy cemeteries. Expropriation however requires the payment of just compensation.
This power may be exercised by entities other than the government itself. Private corporations essentially serving the public (such as public utilities) may validly be delegated the power.
May be delegated to: the President; the legislative bodies of the local governments; and private entities with quasi-public functions
The exercise must be sanctioned must not violate any law. Expropriation by local government units for the purpose of socialized housing must be done in accordance with RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) private lands for purposes of socialized housing, rank last in the order to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of the owners of private property against the violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken for public use. (Estate of Heirs of Ex Justice JBL Reyes v. City of Manila, 422 SCRA 551) Eminent Domain Destruction by Necessity Condemnation of a property for self-defense Self Preservation
Taking of property for public use
With Just Compensation
None; the property is destroyed as a way of promoting the greater welfare of the populace who might be endangered or placed in harm
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Exercised by the government Exercised individuals by the government or private
POWER OF TAXATION Power to Destroy; Strongest of all the powers of the government Refers to the power of the State to impose a charge or burden upon the person, property or property rights for the use and support of the government. Since taxation is a destructive power which interferes with personal and property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the support of the government, tax statutes must be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favour of the taxpayer. Since tax is the lifeblood of the nation, statutes granting tax exemptions are liberally construed in favour of the State and against the taxpayer. TAXES Revenue purposes Onerous and Comprehensive LICENSE FEES Regulatory Purposes For Police Power and regulated for Regulatory scheme
In any event license fees cannot be imposed in a manner that is unreasonable and burdensome to citizens.
Originally lodged in the Legislature, but local governments are granted by the constitution the taxing power. However, the national legislature provides for guidelines and parameters on how municipal corporations will exercise the power to tax.
Limitations on the Power to Tax 1. Due Process 2. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation (Art. VI Sec. 28 [1], Constitution) Uniformity persons or things of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Equality taxes should be strictly proportional to the relative value of the taxable property. Equitable Burden falls on those better able to pay Progressive Rate goes up depending on the resources of the persons affected Proceeds of tax be for public purpose
REYES V. ALMANZOR, 196 SCRA 322 FACTS: RA 6359 was enacted prohibiting for one year from its effectivity an increase in the monthly rentals of dwelling units where such rentals do not exceed P300 a month, but increase would be allowed a year thereafter. It also suspended Art 1673 of the Civil Code which disallowed Reyes, et al to eject their
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lessees. In 1973, PD 20 was enacted making absolute the prohibition to increase monthly rentals and suspending indefinitely Art 1673 of the Civil Code. The petitioners were then prohibited from raising the rentals and from ejecting their tenants. The Assessor of the City Manila reassessed the market value of the properties using Comparable Sales Approach claiming that using the method would reflect the true market value of the property. Reyes contested claiming that income approach should be implemented and the tax due computed on the basis of comparable sales approach was excessive, unwarranted, inequitable and unconstitutional because the tax due exceeded the sum total of the yearly rentals paid or payable by the tenants.
HELD: Both methods of tax assessments are acceptable. Hence, in fixing the value of the property, we have to consider all circumstances and elements of value and must exercise a prudent discretion in reaching conclusions. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and collection should be made in accordance with law and fairness that arbitrariness will negate the very reason for the government itself.
TAX EXEMPTIONS 1. Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, covenants, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, all lands buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes are exempt from taxation 2. No law granting tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
PARTNERSHIP AMONG THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS Fundamental powers may cooperate and collaborate to bring about desired government objectives, i.e. promoting morals of the community, satisfying the demands of social justice, to equitably diffuse land ownership, or in advancing the interests of the society or a segment thereof. The taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Tax measures are but enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions and clearly imposed for public purpose i.e. social justice, public welfare and the equitable distribution of wealth. The granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens is a form of eminent domain for which just compensation has to be paid in the form of tax credit. (CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, GR 159647, April 15, 2005)
ERMITA MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION, INC V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, 20 SCRA 849
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FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance 4670 regulating the operations of motels and hotels. The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the said act because of the increase in the annual license fees (150% for hotels and 200% for motels); it restricts the freedom of hotel and motel operators to rent more than twice every 24 hours; and because it is vague and uncertain in view of the requirements which would require guesswork (giving of information regarding the companions of the guest, the maintenance of restaurants and the meaning of full rate of payment)
HELD: This particular manifestation of a police power aimed to safeguard public morals is immune of any constitutional attack because the argument rests purely on conjuncture unsupported by anything of substance. The police power is inherent and plenary in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Councillor Astorga explained the value of the ordinance that hotels and motels provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry and they become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The challenged ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harbouring of transients and guests by requiring them to fill up a registration form. License fees on the other hand were intended to discourage the establishments from operating other than for legal purposes. In the leading case of Lutz v. Araneta, the SC affirmed that taxation (imposition of taxing fees) may be made to implement police power. The taxing authority conferred by Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax levied must be for public purpose, just and uniform.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC V. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 175 SCRA 343
FACTS: PD 227 was enacted to provide for compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant farmers. EO 228 was signed by President Aquino which vested full ownership in favour of the beneficiaries of PD 227. Congress enacted RA 6657 (CARP). Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the laws invoking violation of due process and just compensation.
HELD: The petition must fail. There were initial and traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time over the same subject. Recent trends however would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of both the police power and the power of eminent domain with the latter being used as an implement of the former (like the power of taxation). To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever land they may own in excess of the maximum area
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allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. This is not an exercise of police power but of eminent domain.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS A CHECK ON GOVERNMENT POWERS ONLY The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not itself concern with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and the latters agents. The Bill of Rights only tepers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies (People v. Hipol, 47 SCRA 179). Equal protection clause erects no shield against private conducts. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. (Duncan Association of Detailman v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, 438 SCRA 343) In effecting service disconnections, certain rights by public utilities may be required to comply with the requirements of due process (Quisumbing v. MERALCO, 380 SCRA 195)
PEOPLE V. MARTI, 193 SCRA 57 FACTS: Appellant Marti engaged the services of the petitioner forwarding company. One of the companys proprietors asked if she could inspect the contents of the package. Marti refused and claimed that the package merely contained books, cigars and gloves. Said proprietor didnt insist, however, another proprietor, before sending the item to Bureau of Posts inspected (as a form of SOP) the contents of the package which yielded several dried marijuana leaves. Marti was convicted of violating RA 6425. On appeal, he assailed the admission of evidence claiming that what transpired when the second proprietor checked the package amounted to an illegal search and seizure.
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of constitutional right be invoked against the State?
HELD: NO. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation among individuals themselves. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The Constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellants
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rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant, then, is indispensable.
A vessel security officer conducting search is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. (People v. Bongcarawan, 384 SCRA 525)
Private individuals intrusions on interest rates protected by the impairment clause are governed not by the Constitution, but by the statutes like the Civil Code (New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc v. PNB, 435 SCRA 565)
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS YARDSTICK AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Given the fact that not all rights and freedoms or liberties under the Bill of Rights and other values of society are of similar weight and importance, governmental regulations that affect or burden them would have to be evaluated based on standards of review.
Determining whether there is sufficient justification for the governments action depends on levels of scrutiny used.
STRICT SCRUTINY (Rational Based Test) is applied when the challenged statute either (1) classifies on the basis of inherently suspect class; or (2) infringes constitutional rights. Suspect classes are saddled with disabilities or subjected to purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to political powerlessness on accounts of, among others race, alienage, religion or national origin. Fundamental rights contemplate right to procreate, right to marry, rights to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, etc. The burden of proof lies on the government that is compelled to introduce evidence that the classification and the infringement is based on compelling national and welfare interests advanced by the government.
INTERMEDIATE OR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY statute classification based on gender and illegitimacy. The burden of proof still lies on the government that must show at least that the statute serves an important purpose and that discriminatory means employed is substantially related to the achievement of governmental objectives.
INTENSIFIED MEANS TEST the Court should accept the legislative end, but closely scrutinizes its relationship to the classification made. These classifications are not covered by the classification made by the first two tests. Examples of these are quasi suspect classifications or those based on gender and legitimacy with regards legal residency, preference of civil service, the availing of free public education, etc.
The use of test is dependent on the facts of the case. Hence, to the extent that a particular liberty interest is considered more important and more valuable to society, to that extent must the courts
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utilize a more demanding and exacting standards with which to measure governmental intrusions into protected spheres.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE 1896 INTERREGNUM
Period of interregnum February 25, 1986 to March 25, 1986
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 407 SCRA 10 FACTS: Maj. Genreral Josephus Ramas was investigated by PCGG through its Anti Graft Board for alleged ill gotten and unexplained wealth. Elizabeth Dimaano, Ramas clerk, was implicated as Ramas witness. The residence of Dimaano was raided on March 3, 1986, although with the benefit of warrant, but several items recovered (including cash, jewelry and several ammunitions) were not specified in the search warrant. Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint on the ground that PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position without showing that they were subordinates of President Marcos. It ordered the return of the yielded items. Republic (aggrieved that its case would be mooted out due to the absence of evidence) interposed claiming that the privilege of exclusionary rule and the proscription against illegal search and seizure brought about by the sequestration was not working during the time the search was made because the 1973 Constitution was not operative after the institution of a revolutionary government, and that the 1987 Charter was merely ratified on February 2, 1987.
HELD: The EDSA Revolution took place and was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations, except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under the international law. Although unprotected by the Bill of Rights, nevertheless, during the interregnum, the Filipino people continued to enjoy the principles laid down by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines was a signatory. These pacts were not deemed abandoned nor abrogated by any pronouncement by the revolutionary government. Under these pacts, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. Furthermore, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Separate Opinion, Justice Puno natural, civil, political and human rights are based on natural law. Therefore, rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and the exclusionary rule are available in the absence of the Bill of Rights or any international covenant for that matter.
POLITICAL, CIVIL ECONOMIC AND OTHER RIGHTS
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Bill of Rights deal with Civil and Political Rights. National Economy and Patrimony deals with economic rights. They, together with other rights, are under the umbrella term, Human Rights. The coverage of Human Rights includes social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. Human Rights are inherent from the persons from the fact of their humanity. I.e. integrity of the person and equality before the law. Nevertheless, uniformity of human rights is not accepted as the human rights in one jurisdiction may not be the same to that of other countries. (Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117) Civil rights rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. These include the right of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political rights the right to participate, directly or indirectly in the establishment or the administration of government, the right to suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition, the rights appurtenant to citizenship, vis a vis, the management of government.
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS THE FIRST TEN AMENDMENTS Philippine Bill of Rights is patterned with the first ten amendments with the US Bill of Rights In view of Philippine reliance and reference every now and then to American case law on certain constitutional issues relative to Bill of Rights, parallel citations to the US Bill of Rights must be occasionally made. Nevertheless, reliance on American Case Laws must not overlook the fact that there are differences between RP and US which some of the interpretations of American Case Laws may not be relevant in our jurisdiction.
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS The Bill of Rights is not the sole repository of rights. The Court also considers the pertinent international conventions and declarations in trying to determine if there are violations of human rights. The most prominent covenants are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted in the same year, and the protocol of the last covenant mentioned. Tecson v. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child as part of its decision.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, VIGILANCE AND GOVERNMENT AS TEACHER
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It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen against any stealthy encroachment thereon (Boyd v. US, 116 US 616) The Rights and guarantees may exist. But it takes some vigilance on the part of the people in order that those guarantees may come to life and become part of the human spirit.
DUE PROCESS
ART. 3 Sec. 1, Constitution: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .
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Guarantee of reasonableness and fairness. Often associated with the Police Power Thus, while the State through its police power may regulate persons, liberties and freedom, acts, relationships and properties, the due process hovers closely by to monitor whether the exercise is within the bounds by reason of fair play and substantial justice. It negates state power to act in an arbitrary, whimsical, capricious and oppressive manner
DUE PROCESS OF LAW No exact definition May be indefinite and vague but the mode of ascertainment is not self willed. Continues to develop through time Flexible enough that it needs balance between the interest of private citizens as to their lives, liberties or properties, vis-a-vis with any governmental action Simply means (1) there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operations; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedures prescribed; (4) that it shall be applicable to all citizens of the state or to all class (People v. Cayat, 68 Phil 12) Extends to both substance and procedure. Substance free from arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unjust and whimsical exercise of power. Procedure the right to be heard before once could be deprived of life, liberty or property Nowadays, substantive and procedural encompass the general definition of due process of law
PERSON Extends to both natural persons, whether a citizen or an alien; and to juridical persons (JM Tuason & Co, Inc v. Land Tenure Adminstration, 31 SCRA 413; People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182) Fetus is not a person Prisoners are still persons entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all of the requirements of due process
LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY The governmental act must conform to the law and the procedures outlined therein, but the same should be done in a manner that would not offend the notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the clause.
LIFE Encompasses the right of person to live and make life enjoyable and worthwhile
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Includes the right of individuals with special skills, expertise or talent to offer their services (Sonza v. ABS-CBN, 431 SCRA 583)
LIBERTY Includes attributes of ones being to make life fruitful Freedom to do the right and never the wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honourable conscience of the individual (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660) Right to exist and to be free from arbitrary restraint; It is deemed to embrace the right to enjoy faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for common welfare (ibid)
ROE V. WADE, 410 US 113 FACTS: Jane Roe challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal Abortion Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on Medical Advice for the purpose of saving the mothers life.
HELD: The Right of Privacy (found in the concept of personal liberty) is broad enough to encompass a womans decision WON to terminate her pregnancy. However, the womans right is not absolute that some state regulations are needed. The State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards and in protecting potential life. a. For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician b. For the stage subsequent to the end of the first trimester, the State in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. c. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may choose to regulate and even proscribe abortion except when it is necessary in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life of the mother
CAUNCA V. SALAZAR, 82 Phil 851 FACTS: Estelita Flores was recruited maid by Salazar, and was not allowed to leave without first paying the amount advanced by her for her fare and other transportation expenses. Caunca filed a petition for habeas corpus.
HELD: Not allowing Flores to go with her cousin Caunca is a violation of freedom or liberty. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed or to the unhampered exercise of the will. The fact that Flores was indebted is not a valid reason for the respondents to obstruct with her desire to leave the house of Salazar.
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LUPANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 848 FACTS: PRC released Resolution 5 prohibiting takers for accountancy licensure examination, three days before the said examination and on the day of the examination itself, to attend review classes from any institution and to accept review materials or tips from any reviewers. Lupangco went to the Supreme Court to assail the validity of the said resolution.
HELD: The said resolution aimed to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations. However, it is unreasonable that any person who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking the future examinations. It also infringes the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on how the reviewees should prepare for the examination. The term liberty means more than freedom from mere physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the rights of others, as his judgment for the promotion of his happiness to pursue callings and vocations may be suitable to develop his capacities. It also infringes the Academic Freedom of the schools or centers affected. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of those schools on what they think as effective measures for their enrolees to meet the required standards before becoming full-pledged public accountants.
PROPERTY Under the aegis of the Due Process Clause, it is anything that can be possessed or owned or that those within the commerce of man. Includes the right to acquire, use and dispose these properties (Blo Umpar Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712) Doctrine of Vested Rights rights are deemed vested when there is enjoyment to the usage of property, to enforce contracts relative to the same, and enjoy rights of property vested by law when the property is no longer open to controversy. The Due Process Clause ay limit the exercise of such rights, except the exercise of police power (16 CJS 1177) Public office, license and privileges may not be considered property in the Due Process Clause except in a very limited sense only
AYOG V. CUSI, JR, 118 SCRA 492 FACTS: Binan Development Co Inc, a private corporation, bought an agricultural land with the Bureau of Lands under the mandate of the 1935 Constitution which allowed the same. The said bureau allowed the sales, nevertheless, resistance became apparent with the occupants of the subject land. An ejectment case was instituted but it only became final in 1976. The 1973 Constitution prohibited Private
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Corporations from owning public lands, thus Ayug went to the SC to question the ownership of the corporation.
HELD: The constitutional prohibition has no retroactive effect to the Sales Application by Binan Development Co because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied at the the 1973 Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected and could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Ayugs petition is barred by the Doctrine of Vested Rights. A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as present interest. It is the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts and to enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law; or some right or interest in property which has become fixed and is no longer open to doubt or to controversy. The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights, except when the same is done in view of the police power.
PUBLIC OFFICE Not intended as property in view of the due process clause. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards to salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (National Land Titles Registration Administration v. CSC, 221 SCRA 145) SK Membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time or even withdraw the statutory right (Montesclaros v. COMELEC, 384 SCRA 269) Pledge to run for public office is not actionable. It cannot be a subject of an agreement among individuals, it not being within the commerce of man (Saura v. Sindico, 107 Phil 336
LAYNO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 136 SCRA 536 FACTS: Mayor Layno was charged with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith when he suspended the Vice Mayor and three Sangguniang Bayan members from exercising their official functions. He was charged as well with violating RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), thus Sandiganbayan suspended him. Layno went to the SC to assail the said statute as violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
HELD: A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. His right to hold office in the meantime would be nullified. The constituents of the mayor were deprived of the public service due them. The Local Government Code provides that indefinite suspension should run only for 90 days. Indefinite suspension is tantamount to a penalty without finding of guilt after due hearing.
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The 90 day limit is not applicable where the law, as in the case of RA 6975 specifically provide that the suspension shall last until the termination of the case (Sanado v. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 546) LICENSES Traditionally not considered property within the context of the due process clause as they are mere grants or privileges which the government may withdraw at any time as may be dictated or demanded by tie and changing circumstances. The license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right but a privilege granted by the State which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of police power (MMDA v. Garin, GR 130230, Apr 15, 2005) Licensed plates are generally not a property right, but it does not follow that it may be removed without lawful causes (Metropolitan Traffic Command v. Gonong, 187 SCRA 432
CORONA V. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, 283 SCRA 31 FACTS: Philippine Ports Authority issued PPA- AO 04-92 ordering all appointment harbor pilots would only be valid for one year, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation depending on rigid evaluation or training. PPA claimed that the order was to promote discipline among harbor pilots and improved service for port users. Respondents averred that it was violative of their right to exercise professions which is equivalent to unlawful deprivation of property right without due process of law.
HELD : There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken the nature of a property right. A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act without such license is illegal. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at 70. It is readily apparent that the order unduly restricts the right of the pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.
RIGHT PRIVILEGE DICHOTOMY The right- privilege distinction has increasingly been eroded such that protection attaches whether the matter is one of right or privilege. They (privilege) cannot be arbitrarily revoked without causing collision with the constitutional call that there must be due process before anybody can be denied of his right to property (Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. Ongpin, 141 SCRA 437) Right- privilege dichotomy came to an end when courts realized that individuals should not be subjected to the unfettered whims of the government officials to withhold privileges previously given to them. Indeed to perpetuate such distinction would leave citizens at the Mercy of the State functionaries and would threaten the Bill of Rights (ibid).
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HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS Whenever rights founded on life or liberty clash with rights founded on property considerations, the proper allocation of weights would have to be undertaken, Even as the rights to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation, when this right is joined by liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable (Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712) Religous scruples prevail over the need to maintain labour union membership (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Right to unreasonable search and seizure is at the top of the hierarchy, next only if not on the same plane as the right to life, liberty and property protected by the due process clause (People v. Tudtud 412 SCRA 142) Care must be taken in assigning values to the constitutional rights for the purpose of calibrating them on the judicial scale Company has right to guard trade secrets and other confidential programs and information from competitors, when it does not allows its employees to marry the employees of its competitors (Duncan Association of Detailman PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., 483 SCRA 343)
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION V. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO, INC, 51 SCRA 189 FACTS: PBMEO intended to stage a rally for alleged abuse of Pasig Police. It informed its employer, the respondent company, hence, a day before the actual rally, the company talked to the union that although their right to freedom of speech is recognized, the operations of the company cannot be jeopardized so it pleaded that those whose shifts are that of 6-2 pm report to work and the remaining two shifts may proceed to the rally as usual. The union still proceeded with their plans, the company filed with the CIR dismissal of the union members on the ground that they violated the no strike no lock out company.
HELD: The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security against the assaults of opportunism. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only civil rights, but also political rights essential to mans enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his complete fulfilment. Thru these freedoms, the citizens can participate in the administration of public affairs as well as the discipline of abusive officers. The citizens are accorded these rights so that they can appeal to the government for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and
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of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. On the ground that the rally is violative of Collective Bargaining Agreement, the demonstration held by petitioners was against alleged abuses from Pasig Police and not against the respondent. The court admonished the respondent when it failed to advance the interests and rights of its employees when unduly vexed by government authorities.
COMPONENTS OF DUE PROCESS SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook and forget that due process was INITIALLY concerned with fair procedures (Azul v. Castro, 133 SCRA 271) The Clause, however has been understood to contain substantive components as well, regardless of fairness of the procedures used to implement them (Daniels v. Williams, 474 US 327) PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS method or manner by which a law is enforced addressed to those who adjudicate the law the right to be heard SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS that the law is fair, reasonable and just directed to lawmakers notion of fairness and justice
Substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the governments action (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr, 455 SCRA 308)
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Associated with the right to be notified or heard. One has been adequately and meaningfully informed of a case or matter in which his rights are involved and that jurisdiction has been validly acquired over him. Before a tribunal can hear, it is necessary that it has acquired jurisdiction over the person or persons affected. Being heard is not fixed, immutable and identical for all types of proceedings and situations. Classical procedural due process concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing are required for a particular action. The procedural due process in judicial proceedings differs from those of administrative proceedings. And the right to be heard does not always mean trial type hearings, the same may be perfected by means of pleadings. However, an administrative body e.g. Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, may require a trial type hearing when credibility of the complainants is at stake (Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr, 401 SCRA 622)
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The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Rules of Procedures may be modified at any time to become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested rights. Moreover, it is axiomatic that there are no vested rights to the rules of procedures. (Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc, 354 SCRA 100) Judicial Proceedings Conditions : (1)There is a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it (2) Jurisdiction is lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant (3) Defendant is given the opportunity to be heard (4) Judgment is rendered after lawful hearing In Rem against the property In Personam against the person Quasi in Rem proceeding with a purpose of affecting the interest of the defendant in specific real property within the state, which at the outset of the proceedings has been brought within the control of the court e.g. foreclosure proceedings
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO V. PALANCA, 37 PHIL 921 FACTS: Engracio Palanca entered into mortgage with the petitioner bank and went to his hometown in China and never returned to the Philippines. The bank instituted foreclosure proceedings of the various parcels of real property. Publication was made since Palanca was non resident of the Philippines. The court also instructed its clerk to deposit summons via registered mail in the post office of Amoy, China although it wasnt clear whether the clerk complied with the instruction. The lawyers for the bank however contested that they deposited a registered mail in Manila Post Office addressed to Engracio. Since he did not appear, the court placed him and default and awarded the foreclosure proceedings in favour of the bank. The administrator of the state filed a motion seeking to nullify the decision contending that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Jurisdiction has reference to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties or over the property which is subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and fixes its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by voluntary appearance of a party in court and submission to authority, or it is acquired by the coercive action of the court. Jurisdiction over the property is acquired either by seizure of the property under the legal process or from the institution of the legal proceedings wherein under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The jurisdiction of CFI in deciding the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is derived in the law. Since the Engracio is non resident, did not voluntarily appear and therefore the process cannot be
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served to him, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over his person. It only acquires jurisdiction over his property. Any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. Considerations and conditions upon which the object property are made within the jurisdiction of the court are: (1) the property is located within the district, (2) The purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by mortgage, and (3) the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into its custody and to subject it to sales for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. Regarding the courts jurisdiction to Engracios person, the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the process from the tribunals in one state cannot run into the other states. Proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a non resident who is not served personally within the state and does not appear, the relief must be limited to the res. In judicial proceedings four requisites must concur before due process can be claimed: (1)There is a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it (2) Jurisdiction is lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant (3) Defendant is given the opportunity to be heard (4) Judgment is rendered before lawful hearing. The fourth element is lacking in this case, nevertheless, in situations of this kind, notice may be necessary because publication or mailing do not assure that the subject person will be properly notified. Furthermore, the service of notice might be dispensed with if the residence of the person is not known.
MULANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER TRUST CO, 339 US 306 FACTS: New York established a common trust fund in order to protect the fiduciaries of small trusts and that donors of moderately sized trusts would not be denied service by the corporate fiduciaries. The gains, losses and expenses of collective trusts are shared by constituent trusts in proportion to their contribution. Each participating trust shares in the common fund but the exclusive management and control belongs to the trust company. Central Hanover Trust Co established a common trust fund and 14 months later, it asked the surrogate court the settlement of its first accounts. The record did not show the number of residents and the beneficiaries although it is clear that many are non New York residents. It complied with the minimum requirements of the NY Banking Law that publication be made indicating the name of the common trustee, the name of participating estates, and the date of establishment of the common trust fund. Mulane contended that the notice and statutory provisions for notice were inadequate to afford due process.
HELD : Due process requires, at minimum, the service of notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case involving deprivation of life, liberty or property. An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding is notice reasonably calculated under
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all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature to convey the required information and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. Publication of names in newspaper is generally acceptable, but it is idle to state that the publication alone, as prescribed by the NY Banking Law, is a reasonable mean of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the court. The trustee has on its books the names and addresses of the income beneficiaries and the court finds no tenable ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform them of the accounting at least by ordinary mail to the record of the addresses. Notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach the interested parties. The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances, it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand. The publication of a COMELEC Resolution stating that the administrative inquiry of the COMELEC on the eligibility of candidates starts from the date they filed their certificates of candidacy does not translate into constructive notice to the candidates. COMELEC, 416 SCRA 650) Minimum Contacts Doctrine a court may validly summon and assume authority over a nonresident defendant of an in personam proceeding provided there is sufficient basis for extending jurisdiction over him which would not be offensive to due process notions of fairness and justice. (International Shoe v. Washington, 326 US 310) (Saya-ang, Sr v.
CLASS SUITS A number of persons, in regard to controversy of common general interest to them and others, sue or defend for their benefit and those of other members of the class (Rule 3 Sec 12, Rules of Court) Due process extends even to those who are not present in the court: (472 US 808) a. Could be bound by judgment in personam unless one was made fully a party in traditional sense b. Plaintiff is not required to fend himself c. Does not afford much protection for courts jurisdiction
d. Forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over the defendant e. A participant in a class suit may remove himself by executing a request for exclusion
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS Demands less stringent application of procedures and adduction of evidence Subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them Right to be notified is present but not that strict compared with the requirements of judicial bodies Hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings; It is enough that the litigant is given the reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right and introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favour (PAL v. Tongson, 413 SCRA 344) Absent to cross examine a witness does not run afoul the procedural due process guarantee Substantial proof is enough reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is responsible for misconduct Hearing is only necessary when statute so requires (RCA Communications v. PLDT, 110 Phil 420) Administrative hearings may be delegated to subordinates (67 SCRA 287) In an estate administration, notice must be sent to the administrator of the Estate (Republic v. De la Rama, 124 Phil 1493) Mailing in tax assessments must be done although it is not a requirement that the same be received by the taxpayer (Diez v. CIR, 128 Phil 19) ANG TIBAY V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 69 PHIL 635 FACTS: Some members of the union of Ang Tibay were laid off and the union sought reconsideration on the ground that the factual bases for the action of the employer were not proven.
HELD: The transcript of proceedings conducted in the respondent court merely shows arguments of the counsels both for the company and that of the labour union. The CIR is a special court created under CA 103 and is more opt to consider the same as an administrative board rather than a part of the judicial system. It both exercises executive and judicial functions. In the conduct of its proceedings, the CIR is not bound by strict technicalities of the rules of procedures; nevertheless, it must abide by the principle of justice and fair play, to wit: 1. The observance to the right to hearing by allowing parties to present their cases 2. It must consider the evidence adduced by the parties 3. It must substantially support its decision 4. Evidence must be substantial, as well (a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion) 5. Decision must be rendered based on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record 6. Judges of the court must act on their own considerations of laws and facts
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7. It must render its decisions in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
GLOBE V. NTC, 435 SCRA 110 FACTS: Globe and Smart have franchise to operate Cellular Mobile Telephone System in the Philippines using GSM Technology. One of the services offered by CMTS is SMS. Smart filed a petition before the NTC claiming that Globe acted in bad faith when it did not comply with the interconnect system that it needs to procure with smart. NTC ordered Globe to respond and in view thereof, Globe claimed that Smart needs to submit certain documents. Smart responded and claimed that it already submitted the needed documents and the interconnect system can be expeditiously perfected by mere agreement of the parties. In 1999, NTC averred that both Smart and Globe didnt have the authority to operate SMS because SMS was part of Value Added Services. Instead of adjudicating the interconnect issue, it ordered the two Telecoms to abide by the requirement of SMS within 30 days and to pay a fine. Globe contested claiming that the order is null and violative of due process since neither it nor smart was given the opportunity to be heard; it violated its own rules and procedures concerning the efficacy of SMS as VAS; and that it has been operating the SMS since 1994, thus license is dispensable, invoking NTCs decision in the case of ISLACOM.
HELD: SMS cannot be considered as VAS because no regulation qualifies SMS as VAS. PTA authorizes NTC to define what value added services are, but NTC failed to give precise enumerations of VAS when it promulgated its own IRR. However, such failure cannot be ascribed to NTC because that time, it was unaware of the possible ambit of VAS. When NTC tried to expand the meaning of VAS by including SMS as such, it violated the Due Process Clause in the following manner: 1. NTC order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decisions rendered. It as well did not explain why it granted Islacom an authorization to operate SMS in a less stringent anner. 2. Globe and SMART were denied the opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS 3. The imposition of fine is void and violative of due process since hearing is an indispensable measure in effecting the implementation of fine, being punitive in character In addition to the doctrine pronounced by Ang Tibay (supra), an impartial tribunal must also be
attendant thereto, thus the Judge who was called to adjudicate the matter cannot be called as well to settle the matter on appeal (GSIS v. CA, 296 SCRA 514)
An employee cannot be charged administratively for an act which was not alleged in the formal charges as the same violates the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation and the right to adduce evidence to controvert the said charges (Bernardo v. CA, 429 SCRA 285
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Finding of guilt based on documents not included in the charge sheet is violative of the right to be informed of the charges against him (CSC v, Asensi, 447 SCRA 356)
LAZO V. CSC, 236 SCRA 469 FACTS: CSC received a letter containing that Lazo manoeuvred his CSC eligibility stating that he merely paid the regional offices of Manila and Tuguegarao to make his score that of the passing. CSC acted upon it by asking the regional office of Tuguegarao to conduct an investigation, but the same office recommended the dismissal on the ground that no link can be found implicating Lazo with that of irregularity. It asked for the rechecking of Lazos paper and it was found out that 34% was his original score, not 76. Thus, the regional office still recommended for the dismissal of the complaint. CSC heeded to the recommendation but it nullified his eligibility. Lazo claimed that the action of CSC was violative of his right to due process laid down by Ang Tibay that he was not given the opportunity to a formal investigation or an opportunity given to him and go over his answer sheet
HELD : CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, charged with the duty of determining the questions of qualifications of merits and fitness of those appointed to CS. Its power is to issue certificates of eligibilities which carry with it the power to revoke a certificate for being null and void. The attendant circumstance in the present case was merely rechecking of papers and it was found out that the real score was 34% instead of 76%. Lazo failed to introduce evidence that would contradict the findings of the CSC, particularly when it filed for an appeal, and what it was merely claiming was the right to recheck it. Res ipsa loquitur applies (the thing speaks for itself. While it s true that there has been no evidence implicating Lazo with alleged grade fixing, the fact remains that he is not eligible to government service, therefore no rights have been conferred to him.
LACHANCE V. ERICKSON, 522 US 262 FACTS: Respondents were charged with misconduct with the agency to where they were connected. Consequently, the agency investigator charged the additionally after the respondents made false statements. The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge, but not the one with false statements.
HELD: The Due Process Clause does not preclude an agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. A citizen may decline to answer questions, but he cannot with impunity, knowingly and wilfully answer with falsehood. A criminal defendants right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. If answering an agencys investigatory question could expose an employee to criminal prosecution, he may exercise his right against self incrimination.
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CSC V. LUCAS, 301 SCRA 560 FACTS: A woman in the Department of Agriculture complained Lucas of grave misconduct after he touched the leg of the lady employee. The woman admonished her but he still continued with the act. A commotion ensued that the ultimate event led to Lucas employment of force upon her. The lady employee complained with the Board of Personnel Inquiry which penalized Lucas of suspension due to simple misconduct. He went to CSC and he was penalized of dismissal because of grave misconduct. He went to CA and the decision of CSC was set aside.
HELD: The basic requirements of due process are : (a) the person must be unduly informed of the charges against him, (b) a person cannot be convicted of a crime which he was not charged. Thus, CSC deprived him of due process when Lucas was convicted of grave misconduct, when charged with simple misconduct.
PEFIANCO V. MORAL, 322 SCRA 439 FACTS: DECS suspended Moral due to with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the public after pilfering 41 historical documents to whom she was in charge. Moral did not appeal, instead she sought for the production of DECS Investigation Committee report that she claimed would guide her to take the most appropriate steps. She went to the trial court to enjoin DECS from her whims. It was granted. CA affirmed.
HELD: She is merely entitled to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record; and, a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during her hearings. The alleged report is part of the internal communications of DECS and it is not the ministerial function of DECS to divulge the same. The remedy available to her is appeal before CSC.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION, 322 SCRA 160 FACTS: US, pursuant to its extradition treaty and PD 1069 sought for the extradition of Jimenez, including the endorsements of certain documents relevant to the case of Jimenez. DFA sent those to the DOJ pursuant to PD 1069. Counsel of Jimenez wrote to DOJ requesting a copy of the letter from US, including the involved documents, and that the extradition treaty is for the mean time held in abeyance. DOJ Sec denied on the ground that it would be premature to divulge the same since he would have access of the documents in court, and that the subject documents were covered by strict secrecy rules. Counsel of Jimenez was able to get a TRO from the lower court.
HELD: The evaluation process of extradition is sui generis, but akin to an administrative proceeding. The executive authority has the power to (a) make a technical assessment on the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers, (b) out rightly deny the request if the act is not extraditable, and (3)
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make a determination whether the request is politically motivated or under the subject offense is a military one. The right to notice and hearing cannot be plainly dispensed with considering that there is an imminent curtailment of liberty as early the moment the request for extradition is filed in court up to the endorsement of the extradite to the requesting State. (Motion for Reconsideration, 343 SCRA 377) HELD: 1. PD 1069 which implements the extradition treaty provides that the right to notice to hearing and trial will be done once the petition is already in the court. There is no provision in the law that provides that the accused may demand from the secretary of Justice the aforesaid documents and letter request from US. 2. All treaties should be interpreted in light of its intent. RP and US intended the extradition treaty to extend the arm of the law to those crimes which are beyond despicability and not to allow those who are guilty of such crimes to escape in an expeditious manner. 3. Although the interpretation of treaties is tantamount to a question of law which is judicial in nature, it must be understood that when DFA, DOJ and the US government intended that no notice of hearing will be permitted, US and RP agreed upon the same. Furthermore, all countries with the same extradition law with that of RP and US observe the same principle. 4. Contrary to the claim of the counsel of Jimenez that the evaluation stage is akin to Criminal Procedures, the court says that it is akin to administrative proceedings.
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS NATURE OF TRIAL QUANTUM REQUIRED DISPOSITION OF CASE OF EVIDENCE Full Blown Proof of guilt beyond
EXTRADITION TREATY Summary Existence of a prima fascie case Dependent upon the will of the President of RP
reasonable doubt Executory when final
5. Jimenez fear of curtailment of liberty is merely hypothetical and not imminent. The moment the decision was promulgated, no warrant of arrest has yet been issued nor requested by US. 6. Liberty and Life may be dispensed with for the general welfare of the people
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ELECTIVE OFFICIALS Administrative proceedings against elective officials are more stringent than those of appointed officials. Trial type hearing may be required.
JOSON V. TORRES, 29 SCRA 279
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FACTS: Allegedly, while the legislative meeting in Nueva Ecija was being conducted, Joson, the governor of the province, entered the room where the same was being held, kicked the chairs, uttered threatening words while armed men were with him. The respondents claimed that it was a retaliatory move since the council didnt approve Josons request to secure a loan with PNB amounting to P150M. Respondent Torres and a Sangguniang Bayan member went to the President, who in turn endorsed the matter to the executive secretary. The adverse parties were summoned for an amicable settlement which failed. Several summonses were issued, but Joson kept on asking for extensions. Acting DILG Secretary issued an order declaring Joson in default and that he has waived his rights. Reconsideration was sought and it was denied. Joson filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the DILG had no jurisdiction over his case. However, the Executive Secretary preventively suspended him for 60 days. He went to CA for a remedy, it was denied. In DILG meanwhile, parties were asked to submit petition paper, after which, the paper was already deemed submitted for resolution. Joson sought for a formal investigation pursuant to the Local Government Code, but it was denied. DILG, as approved by the Executive Secretary, then adopted a resolution suspending Joson for 60 days. TRO was issued by the SC but it was found out that the suspension was already served and Torres was already the Acting Governor of the Province.
HELD: The rejection of petitioners request for a formal investigation denied him procedural due process pursuant to Section 5 of AO 23. The provision does not give the investigating authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation needs to be conducted. An erring elective official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of the accused as part of procedural due process, to wit: (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him; (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence. Collaterally, the due process observed for appointive local officials is different. The submission of position paper required by the DILG pertains to appointive officials and not to elective officials. The disciplining authority of appointive officials belongs to the CSC, although the heads and secretaries of their respective offices are also given the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against the officers and employees. Moreover, the investigation is conducted without adhering to technicalities of procedures, and they may be summarily dismissed if : (1) the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable, and (3) when the respondent is recidivist.
STANDARDS OF PROOF AND THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES
MANALO V. ROLDAN CONFESOR, 215 SCRA 808 FACTS: Petitioner spouses signed an employment contract with Career Planners Specialist International Inc as driver and tutor/ baby sitter in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, they had to pay P40,000, but spouses only paid P30,000 and made a promissory note that they would pay the balance. Before departure, the
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couple was asked to sign their employment contract, however, it was stipulated that Gloria Manalo would work as Domestic Help instead of tutor. The agency assured her that the same was merely for the sake of their departure, however, when the spouse reached Saudi, Glorias work was really that of a Domestic Helper and not of a tutor. The two went back to the Philippines because of their onerous working situation. They filed complaints against the agency for its alleged illegal exaction, false advertisement, violation of other pertinent laws, with damages. POEA initially gave the favour to them; however on a motion for reconsideration, it reversed its decision on the ground that the seriousness of the allegations warrants the presentation of clear and convincing evidence and corroboration of witnesses. Undersecretary of Labor sustained POEA.
HELD: The requirement of clear and convincing evidence to establish the charge of illegal exaction is violative of due process. In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction substantially proven. Clear and convincing proof is more than preponderance of evidence, but not to the extent as is required by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial Evidence is a scintilla but less than preponderance of evidence. Consequently, the hierarchy is: beyond reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, substantial evidence. The proceedings are administrative in nature and the suspension revocation of license does not make the proceedings criminal.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies must be respected, as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or preponderant (Floralde v. CA, 337 SCRA 371)
Self serving affidavit of a clerk charged in the preparation of plantilla is insufficient to constitute substantial evidence (Reyno v. MERALCO, 434 SCRA 660)
Evidence which relied solely on the affidavits of witnesses with questionable veracity did not make up the standard (Zogada v. CSC, 216 SCRA 114)
Substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality (Gonzales v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169)
TRIAL TYPE PROCEEDINGS Trial type proceedings are not necessary for summary proceedings. But Summary proceedings do not mean ex parte proceedings. They might simply mean with dispatch, with the least possible delay. Position papers, affidavits and memoranda may suffice in certain proceedings and a party cannot insist on holding prolonged trials (St. Michael Academy v. NLRC, 275 SCRA 717)
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Although summary in nature, the right to be notified of the nature and purpose of the proceedings cannot be dispensed with (Velayo v. COMELEC, 327 SCRA 713)
RICHARDS V. AYSOY, 152 SCRA 45 FACTS: Richards complained Aysoy, a lawyer, for not attending the court hearings that were due hi. Aysoy was required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be given to him, but the service wasnt served to his addresses and to the required chapters of IBP. Supreme Court suspended him, the same was circulated with the notice that in case he appeared before lower courts, he be requested to appear before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidante of the Supreme Court. Ayson, appeared, and sought that the suspension be lifted. He said that his failure to appear was due to the fact that Richards went to Australia, he had the burden of paying the fees required of expert witness, her child had an attack of CP, and that his suspension was in violation of Rule 138 Sec 30, vis a vis Rule 139 Sec 1 of the Rules of Court. Richards replied that he paid a civil engineer to inspect the subject house and that said engineer would be the only expert witness and that he had informed him of his address in Australia
HELD: The facts as disclosed, require no further evidentiary hearing and speak for themselves. The Orders of the Trial Court dismissing the civil case by Ayson and respondents excuse that he can no longer recall them is feeble. Respondents side has been fulfilled in the pleadings he filed before the SC. A trial type hearing is not de rigeur. The requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The lack of verification in the complaint formulated by the bar confidante is not a fatal defect since the original letter complaint was forwarded to the Courts Chief Legal Officer after being sworn and subscribed to by complainant.
NOTICE, SILENCE, WAIVER The right to be heard may be waived and informed waiver presupposes that there was a meaningful and effective notification. Ex-parte hearings are made in the absence of the other party, such as when he refuses or fails to show up for no justifiable reason, or in certain exceptional circumstances, as when there is an urgent action, or the nature of the proceedings requires an ex-parte proceedings. The same must not be done in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
GONZALES V. CSC 226 SCRA 66 FACTS: Gonzales has been in government service for 36 years. Due to certain problems, he had to go o the US and Agricultural Training Institute granted him leave for 5 months. On the 6 month, he wrote a letter to the Director ATI, the same was delivered by her wife, asking if he could extend his stay as the
th
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problem wasnt resolved yet, and he wished to take advantage of a check up for free. The director didnt respond to the letter. Three months later, ATI declared Gonzales AWOL and sent him a letter stating that if he wouldnt report to work within five days from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped from the rolls. The letter was as well published in a newspaper of general circulation. When he returned to the Philippines, another person was already appointed to his position. He complained with CSC MPSB, it affirmed the decision of ATI. On appeal, it was denied. Gonzales averred that it was violative of his right to due process and security of tenure.
HELD: Notice of publication might have been proper if the address of the petitioner were unknown. Records of the case showed that that Gonzales was not in his Philippine address but was in US. This was evident by the letter that he sent when he sought for an extension to leave. Furthermore, ATI officials inaction to the request of Gonzales was violative of due process. It was no less a duty on the part of the officials to acct immediately on the request.
GO V. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, 271 SCRA 447 FACTS: Go was a member of Olongapo Police who was dismissed due to alleged involvement in illegal gambling when his residence was raided by several members of the police. He claimed denial of due process since no copy of the complaint with supporting affidavits had been served to him and that he was simply ordered by radio to appear before the summary dismissal board for investigation. The hearings were postponed for several times due to the absences of the witnesses, and as well as the board on one occasion.
HELD: Petitioners case was under Sec 8-A of PD 1707. Summary dismissal can be allowed provided that the evidence of guilt is strong and charges are serious. Nonetheless, it gives the respondent the right to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and to file answer within three days. The filing of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to respondent to answer the charges constitutes the minimum requirements of due process. It is mandatory that charges be specified in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the respondent can be brought to his knowledge. The formal investigation is dispensed with summary dismissal proceedings and not the requirement that the respondent in the administrative case be notified of the charges and given the chance to defend himself.
IMPARTIAL MAGISTRATES AND TRIBUNALS It is indispensable that the judge must be impartial. The mere fact that the court gave more weight to the evidence of one party does not mean that there is a denial of due process (Planters Product Inc v. NLRC, 169 SCRA 328)
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The Solicitor General who used to represent a party should beg off from any participation in the decision process in solving the said case. The judge should not preside his own case (Oktubre v. Velasco, 434 SCRA 636)
TUMEY V. OHIO, 273 US 510 FACTS: Tumey was prosecuted for unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor in violation of the Prohibition Act of the state. He was brought to the mayor of North College Hill who imposed a fine of $100 and imprisonment until the same be paid. Under certain statutes in Ohio, village Mayors may try persons accused to violate the said prohibition. Tumey contested the qualification of the mayor but it was reversed by the court of appeals.
HELD: That officers acting in judicial or quasi judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided, is of course the general rule. The degree to be ascertained as to that interest must revolve around the fact that in respect to the effect of the membership of a judge in a class of taxpayers or others to be affected by a principle of law, to be applied in a case between other parties in which the judge has no interest. Kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters of legislative discretion. But certainly it is violative of the constitution and it deprives defendant in a criminal case due process of law if his liberty or property is subjected to the judgment of a court where the judge has direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him. The Mayor of North College Hill Ohio has direct pecuniary interest amounting to $12 should he find a person guilty of Prohibition Act. The amount is on top of his monthly salary, and he cannot get such amount unless he convicts people guilty of Prohibition Act.
MACALINTAL V. TEH, 280 SCRA 623 FACTS: Judge Teh issued a resolution against the client of Atty. Macalintal, whom Macalintal questioned before the COMELEC. Pending the motion before the COMELEC, Judge Teh continued to participate with the proceedings although his participation should not be active but merely nominal, unless directed by the court. Macalintal filed a motion of inhibition and sought Teh to inhibit from acting on the said case, but Teh hired his own lawyer and filed his answer to his own court, dismissed the motion and required Macalintal to pay P100,000 instead of automatically stopping the proceedings.
HELD: Decisions of the court need not only be just, but must be perceived to be just and completely free fro suspicion or doubt, both in fairness and integrity.
ANZALDO V. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353 FACTS: The position of Science Research Supervisor II became vacant when Dr. Kintanar was promoted Director of Biological Research Center of NIST. He recommended Dr. Venzon but Dr. Anzaldo protested
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and was affirmed by the Reorganization Committee. Dr. Afable became the OIC of NIST and he recommended Dr. Anzaldo for the position and the same was approved by CSC. Venzon protested, was endorsed to CSC Chair Clave and was later on appointed to the said position. Anzaldo protested before the Office of the President, was endorsed to Presidential Executive Assistant, who was the chairman of CSC when Venzon was appointed to NIST as Science Research Supervisor II. Said Presidential Executive Assistant affirmed the appointment of Venzon.
HELD: Due process of laws means fundamental fairness. Common sense and propriety dictate that the Commissioner of CSC, who should be consulted by the President, should be a different person in the Office of the President who decide the appeal of the protestant in contested appointment.
SINGSON V. NLRC, 274 SCRA 358 FACTS: Singson was employed by PAL as Traffic Representative. He was responsible for checking the passengers and their baggage. He was once assigned to man the check in counter of JAL where he allegedly extorted $200 to a certain passenger. When commotion ensued, the security officer searched him and the post he was manning and found that $265 was in his area. PAL conducted an investigation and he was dismissed from work. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino deemed his dismissal illegal. Aquino was subsequently promoted as the Commissioner of NLRC. NLRC which included Aquino overturned the decision. On motion for reconsideration, NLRC denied on the ground that Aquino this time inhibited. Singson now assailed the participation of Aquino in the NLRC.
HELD: In addition to the doctrines laid down by Ang Tibay, due process also entails (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favour; (c) a tribunal constituted to give reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Aquino, who decided the case under view, should have inhibited himself from any participation in the case.
If no other courts or tribunals can perform the function involved in a certain controversy (e.g. impeachment of a Chief Justice / election protests of members of SET) the courts or tribunals should continue discharging its functions and that it must not inhibit (Francisco v. HRET Abbas v. SET)
If the court inhibits and it is the sole adjudicator of a certain dispute, the same is tantamount to abandoning its duty (Estrada v. Desierto, 415 SCRA 44)
SUBSEQUENT NOTICE AND HEARING
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There are instances where the evidentiary hearing may be had after the action has been instituted (Magsalang v. Ople, 63 SCRA 508) What the Court merely prohibits is the actual or total absence of such notice. Ynot identifies instances when action may be taken without prior notice and hearing: a. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se b. Mad dog on the loose c. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs
d. Passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing e. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of public health f. Bawdy houses to protect public morals
There are certain instances when a judicial proceeding is not always necessary Student whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and hearing should follow as soon as possible. (Goss v. Lopez, 419 US 565)
The enforcement of the subsidiary liability of an employer for the civil liability of his insolvent employee who was convicted in a criminal case, the Court has ruled that execution must not issue just as a matter of course and an a priori hearing must ensue (Yonaha v. CA, 255 SCRA 397
But it does not mean that the conviction of an employee ipso facto grants civil liability to employer. AN employer cannot appeal the civil liability independent of the employee, such that when the employee has jumped bail (Philippine Rabbit Bus Line v. People, 427 SCRA 456)
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS One affecting the whole body politic or the internal affairs of an agency may not demand a prior hearing but one which adjudicates on the rights and obligations of certain individuals invariably requires a prior hearing before action is taken.
SANDOVAL V. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 403 FACTS: Sandoval was proclaimed winner in a congressional despite the order of the COMELEC chairman because the respondent was seeking the correction of allegedly manifest errors in a municipal certificate of canvass. Respondent sought the nullification of Sandovals proclamation. COMELEC granted on the ground that it was pursued based on an incomplete canvass.
HELD: Quasi judicial functions involve the doing of work which is judicial in nature and character but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge. In proclaiming the petitioner, COMELEC exercised judicial and not administrative functions. Administrative functions are those relevant to the conduct of a peace and orderly elections, and supervision of its personnel. However, the exercise of the power of COMELEC
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was tainted with illegality. Procedural due process demands prior notice and substantial evidence to support its ruling. Petitioner cannot be deprived of his right to office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Sec 1 of the BIlll of Rights, it is nevertheless a protected right. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING Discharge both quasi legislative and quasi judicial functions. Generally hearing is required only with regards to the latter. In the exercise of administrative functions, rules and regulations may be regulated by them even without prior hearing. However, it is more prudent and advisable to hold hearings as such administrative determinations may have wide ranging repercussions which necessitate public awareness and participation even before the promulgation of rules.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC V. DECS SECRETARY
FACTS: DECS promulgated a resolution involving the increase of tuition fees in from 15 to 20%. Petitioner sought reconsideration and it was decreased to 10 to 15%. It sent a letter to the Office of the President seeking to suspend the resolution ordered by DECS but received no reply. Petitioner went to the court in order to assail the constitutionality of the order, claiming that it was violative of the due process since it was not accorded prior notice and hearing before the said department order was released.
HELD: The rates prescribed by administrative agency may either be legislative or adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards to rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi judicial agency, hearing and notice are essential. The government agency is said to perform quasi judicial function when merely binding to parties. But if it applies to all, it is a legislative function. When DECS regulated the rates prescribed by private schools, it was performing a legislative function.
COMMISSIONER ON INTERNAL REVENUE V. CA FACTS: Fortune Tobacco has the patent of Hope, More and Champion Cigarettes. The CIR passed a letter to PCGG classifying those cigarettes as foreign brands. Fortune Tobacco changed their names instead to Premium More. It submitted proof that under the NIRC, these cigarettes are locally owned. CIR issued RC 37-93 reclassifying the cigarettes as local brands subject to 55% ad valorem taxes. Fortune then incurred tax deficiency amounting to P9M. Fortune Tobacco went to CTA to question the said circular on the ground that no notice and hearing was made. CTA affirmed Fortune. On appeal, CA, affirmed CTA. CIR averred that RMC 27-93 is merely an interpretative ruling or opinion.
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HELD: There is a distinction between quasi legislative and interpretative rule. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details therof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required before a legislative rule is adopted, there must be hearing in connection with the Administrative Code of 1998. An interpretative rule needs nothing but bare issuance for it gives no real consequences more than what the law itself has prescribed. But when it increase the burden of those governed, it behoves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
ACADEMIC DUE PROCESS AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS Sanctions to teachers and students should be imposed in accordance with some procedural guidelines which assure compliance with the mandate of the due process. Every teacher before demotion or dismissal is entitled to have the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms, and to have a fair trial on these charges against him before a special or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. Teacher should have the full opportunity to present evidence. Students may also avail of the rudiments of fair play and justice but not those of teachers.
GUZMAN V. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, 142 SCRA 699 FACTS: Petitioners were students who were expelled by the university. While the students claimed that they were expelled because they participated in a peaceful staging of rally within the schools premises, NU contested that one of them was not allowed to enrol because enrolment was already closed and the two because of poor academic standings because they were staging boycotts of classes. A criminal action was already instituted against one of the petitioners for an alleged destruction of school property.
HELD: NU did not present any evidence to show that it conducted investigation relative to the staging of demonstration within the school premises or the implication of two petitioners to the school properties destruction. The school may refuse admission of students based on the following grounds: (a) academic deficiency; (b) students failure to comply with published rules and regulations. Procedural Due Process is still present in erring students. It needs not to be in a hearing type and may be summary and cross examination is not necessary in view thereof. The minimum requirements of due process, therefore are: 1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against him 2. They shall have the rIght to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel 3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them 4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
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5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by school authorities to hear and decide the case
INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT, 430 US 651 FACTS: Florida regulated an act which prescribes slight corporal punishment to students and proscribes infliction of severe punishment. Junior high school students of the respondent school went to the court to assail the constitutionality of the said act.
HELD: Petitioner cannot avail of due process requirement of notice and hearing because it would run corporal punishment into futility considering that hearing must first be conducted before allowing such action to ensue. (Read the decision in full)
UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 313 SCRA 404 FACTS: An Indian student of UP was taking her doctorate degree in Anthropology. During her dissertation, one of her panellists noticed that there were portions of her thesis which were lifted from foreign authors but were not properly cited. After her defense, she was instructed to make necessary revisions, which she failed to do. One of her panellists charged her with plagiarism and recommended that her doctoral degree be withdrawn. Several meetings were scheduled between the Board and the responded. Nevertheless, at one instance, she questioned the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents to her case and claimed that another committee was supposed to be in charge of her case. She also averred that it was violative of her right to due process since the doctoral program was first stripped of her before she was afforded the chance to defend herself.
HELD: The private responded was accorded due process since several committees were formed in order to afford her to impugn the charges of plagiarism against her. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceeding similar to those in the courts of justice. UP is entitled to its academic freedom granted by the constitution. It is the freedom granted to institutions of higher learning to give them a wide sphere of authority to choose their students. It also empowers these institutions to decide who can and cannot study in it, and to confer honor and distinctions to their students. When it is shown that the conferment of honor or distinction is tainted with fraud, the university can certainly revoke or withdraw the rights which it has conferred.
EMPLOYEMENT DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL An arbitrary or capricious act on the part of the employer could not be allowed whether in effecting suspensions, demotions or even transfers where the same partakes disciplinary actions. In effecting dismissals, it has been consistently held that due process requires compliance. It should be in procedures and in substance. Substance provides that dismissal shall be with valid
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cause; procedural due process states that it requires that two notices must be given. Once is to apprise the defendant of the acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The second one requires that the employer informs him of the decision to dismiss him (Loadstar Shipping Co, v. Mesano 48 SCRA 478) Requirements of due process include: (Gonzales v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169) a. Ample opportunity to defend himself either personally or with a representative b. To know the nature of his offense c. To cross examine and confront witnesses against him
d. Decision must be based on established facts on a sound legal foundation. The legal requirements of notice and hearing cannot be supplanted by notice and hearing in labor proceedings. The due process requirement in dismissal process is different from the due process in labor proceedings, and both must be observed separately (Lawrence v. NLRC, 25 SCRA 737)
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND PRIVATE DUE PROCESS Constitutional Due Process protects individuals from the government and assure him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings Statutory Due Process i.e. Labor Code which protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause
SERANO V. NLRC, 323 SCRA 445 FACTS: Serano was hired by Isetann as a security checker. He became a regular employee a year after and was promoted within a certain span of time. The company as a cost cutting measure decided to abolish its security department and outsource the service security agency instead. Respondent company gave the notice of termination the same day of its effectivity.
ISSUE: WON the respondent companys action violate due process in light of the 30 day notice required by the Labor Code
HELD: Violation of the notice requirement is not a denial of due process. 1. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation of governmental powers. It does not apply to exercise the private power. Only the State has authority to take life, liberty or property of the individual. 2. The reason for the 30 day notice is not to invite him to an adversarial proceeding or to inform him of the charges against him, but to give him ample time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job 3. Employer cannot be expected to be a judge against his own cause Terminating employment with just cause but in violation of the notification requirement merely makes the termination ineffectual and will subject the employer to damages.
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AGABON V. NLRC, 442 CRA 573 FACTS: Petitioners Agabon were employed by Home Improvements Inc. They were dismissed due to abandonment of work.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal was legal in view of the 30 day notice requirement of the Labor Code
HELD: Serano doctrine is abandoned. If an employee is terminated for a just cause, and the twin notice was dispensed, said termination will not be held ineffectual. The employer should not be compelled to continue hiring employees who perform acts inimical to the company, BUT employer should be asked to pay for damages.
DUE PROCESS AND APPEALS Appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is merely a privilege of statutory origin and its requirements must be complied with One cannot claim denial of due process because he was not allowed to appeal. The definition of due process merely provides that one is given the opportunity to be heard But if the right to appeal is available, and one is deprived of the same, due process is then violated Provided that vested rights are not impaired, the manner on which appeal is conducted may be changed or altered Remedies available for grave abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious exercise of power or lack or excess jurisdiction of a lower court, tribunal or agency : judicial review by certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, even though no right of review is given by the statute Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought up in the trial court will not be considered by a reviewing court as the same will be offensive on the principles of fair play, justice and due process
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BUCK V. BELL, 274 US 200 FACTS: The State of Virginia enacted a law which provides for the sterilization of mentally defective citizens, calculated for public welfare. The State claimed that if sterilized, these citizens would become productive, self supporting citizens, unlike if not, who would become the menace of society. Furthermore, heredity has been a cause of transmitting these mental defects. Buck, a feeble citizen, was to be sterilized. She questioned the validity of the law considering that it was violative of her right to due process.
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HELD : It is not violative of due process. Public welfare may call upon best citizens for their lives. It is better if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let the starve for their imbecility; society can prevent those who are manifestly continuing their kind.
MICHAEL H V. GERALD D, 491 US 110 FACTS: Gerald and Carol were married. Carol had an adulterous affair with Michael and they begot Victoria. Michael sought that the court grants him visitation rights and paternity rights. Gerald intervened invoking the California Law which states that if a child was born to a valid marriage and the spouses are not sterile, the presumption is that the child belongs to the marriage. It may be impugned by blood test by either the husband, or the wife if the natural father of the child would acknowledge in affidavit the filiation of the child. Michael assailed the validity of said Californian Law on the ground that it violated his right to PROCEDURAL due process as he was not afforded the right to evidentiary proceedings to prove his filiation with Victoria and SUBSTANTIALLY, the fact that Michael and Carole were wed should not impair his filiation with her daughter.
HELD: Such presumption granted by law not only expresses the State substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the childs paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy. Allowing persons other than the huband and the wife to ipugn the filial relationship of the child undermines the integrity of marital union; In allowing a child to press on his filial relations, may disrupt the presumption of legitimacy.
KANSAS V. HENDRICKS, 521 US 346 FACTS: Kansas promulgated an ordinance which would place sexually violent predators to civil commitment when the commission of sexual molestations would be predicated to mental illness mental abnormality or personality disorder. Hendricks was one of those incarcerated in view of the said provision. He assailed the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that it was violative of his right to due process.
HELD: Although freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the same has not been absolute especially if the measure is designed to inure public good. The same may be upheld, provided, it does not run afoul proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Thus, the challenged act requires finding of dangerousness to self or others as a pre requisite to involuntary confinement. Before sending to civil commitment, proceedings can be initiated to persons charged with sexual perversity who suffer from mental abnormality or personality disorder.
WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG, 521 US 702
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FACTS: The State of Washington enacted a law which states that withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment at a patients direction shall not for any purpose constitute suicide. Four physicians assailed the constitutionality of the law on the ground that the liberty to life also includes the choice to terminate the same, especially when suffering from terminal illnesses.
HELD: The said law is the states commitment to the protection and preservation of all humans. Due process clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are objectively rooted in the nations history and tradition, therefore careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest must be observed. Although the right to refuse receiving medical treatment and undergoing abortion are conferred by the laws, these two cannot be equated with the right to commit suicide. The same act is not a fundamental liberty protected by the due process clause, and the State may properly decline to make judgments about quality of life when common good requires. Allowing physician assisted suicide also undermines the ethics that are due to physician because the allowed act is apparently incompatible with a physicians role as a healer. Furthermore, the law is also a protection against societal indifference because physician assisted suicides may be resorted to spare families from the substantial financial burden of end of life and health care cost.
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, 539 US 558 FACTS: While performing a homosexual act, Houston Police apprehended and arrested Lawrence and his partner in violation of the Homosexual Conduct Law. Said law penalizes deviate sexual intercourse to include any contact between any part of the genitals one person and the mouth or anus of another; or the penetration of genitals or the anus with an object. At point is whether the same violates the right to privacy as guaranteed by the due process, and WON the law violates equal protection clause
HELD: Adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity a free persons. Liberty gives substantial protection to adults in deciding how to conduct their private live in matters pertaining to sex. Equality of treatment and due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interest. When homosexual conduct is made criminal, that declaration in and on itself is an invitation to discrimination, both in public and private spheres. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. The petitioners right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them full right to engage in the conduct without government intervention.
CHURCHILL V, RAFFERTY, 32 PHIL580 FACTS: Act No. 2239 was enacted which authorized the Collector of Internal Revenue, after due investigation, to cause the removal of signboards or billboards displayed if offensive to the sight or
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otherwise nuisance. Petitioners, who were operators and owners of said billboards, challenged the law on the ground that the sae was tantamount to deprivation of property without just cause.
HELD: Property may be regulated in the interest of general welfare and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to sight. The government spend an enormous amount in order to beautify the roads and thoroughfares; therefore, it also has the right to remove billboards or signs which are not appealing to the eyes.
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO, 104 PHIL 443 FACTS: The Mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur issued an ordinance which sought to enjoin his constituents to secure permit with his office in case of need to establish houses or buildings. Furthermore, if the said buildings would obstruct the view of the plaza or would be constructed in a public place, the sae would be removed at the expense of the owner thereof. Herein appellants were prosecuted for violating the sae act, for building a house that distorted the beauty of plaza.
HELD: The ordinance failed to establish the policy to which it was based, and gave the mayor a wide platitude of legislative authority to grant or deny building permits at his own whims. The contested ordinance was unreasonable and oppressive, and it operated to deprive the appellants of their right to use property. While property may be regulated in the interest of general welfare and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to sight, the State may not under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of their beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate the solely to preserve the aesthetic appearance of the community.
DE LA CRUZ V. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569 FACTS: The local government of Bocaue issued an ordinance prohibiting the operation and establishment of night club, cabarets and dance hall in the area, as well as hiring of hospitality girls, dancers and hostesses in the said establishments. Petitioners were operators and owners of said bars. They assailed the constitutionality of the said act on the ground that the ordinance would prohibit a lawful business, exercise of a profession or calling and violative of the due process and equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The municipal council shall enact ordinances which are both not repugnant to law, but fair and reasonable, as well. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass a too wide field. The reason sought to be achieved by the ordinance at point should have been reasonable if it was calculated to regulate and not to prohibit. Furthermore, Art. 149 of the Local Government Code provides implicitly that night clubs may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
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CITY OF MANLA V. LAGUIO, JR, 455 SCRA 308 FACTS: Manila Tourist Development Corporation is engaged in the operation of motels, hotels, inns and lodging houses. One of its establishments is the operation of Victoria Court, whom DOT considers as a hotel, although registered as motel. The city of Manila issued Ordinance 7783 which prohibits the operations of motels and inns in Ermita Malate area where prostitution was rampant. MTDC assailed its constitutionality on the grounds that the city council had no power to prohibit the operations of motels, that it violated PD 499 which classified the Ermita Malate area as a commercial zone, the ordinance is an improper exercise of police power as it takes property without just cause, and an ex post facto law. City council however maintained that it had the power to control the same thru the general welfare clause in RA 7160, as well as in the police power charter of RA 409. It also maintained that the power of control would include restraining places of exhibition and amusement, and the ordinance simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed Ermita Malate area to remain a commercial zone.
HELD: The test of a valid ordinance are well established: (1) must not contravene the law or the constitution; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and; (6) must be reasonable. 1. The ordinance contravened the constitutional provision on the protection of life, liberty and property, and the role of women in nation building, and those of due process and eminent domain provisions under the Bill of Rights. In light of substantive due process, the same connotes that the government must have sufficient justification when executing its action. 2. Requisites for the valid exercise of police power are not met, to wit: (1) the interest of the law affects the public in general, and; (2) a reasonable relation must exst between the purposes of police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into allowed business will not per se protect and promote the welfare of the society; it will not eradicate the social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication, nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. Sexual immorality may take place anywhere in the area. If the city government wishes to eradicate the ill effects of prostitution, regulation, and not prohibition, must be employed. 3. Modality employed is unlawful taking and practically permanent deprivation of property without just compensation. 4. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Only motels and inns are prohibited in the area, but not pension houses, hotels and lodging houses. Similar objects must not be treated differently so as to give undue favour to others. The Court believes that there are no substantial differences among these establishments. Furthermore, the standard that women are used as means of amusement, men are women have the same propensity to engage in prostitution.
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5. The ordinance is ultra vires; repugnant to general laws particularly PD 499 and the city charter of Manila.
BALACUIT V. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, 163 SCRA 182
FACTS: The City of Butuan passed an ordinance which provides that only of the usual adult price will be given to movie tickets for children 7 12 years old. Managers of theatres of said city assailed its constitutionality on the ground that the law was an invalid exercise of Police Power.
HELD: To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. There must be a public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance. The ordinance, nonetheless, is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of mothers by giving them due savings, but the same cannot be executed at the expense of the owners of these movie houses. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of health, safety, morals and the general welfare. In the past, government had the chance to intervene with the prices during periods of emergency by limiting the net profit of its public utilities as regulating rentals of residential apartments for a limited period, as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety. But the same could not be said of theatres. In no sense could these businesses be considered public utilities railroaded towards public welfare, health and safety.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 329 SCRA 314 FACTS: Acebedo was granted business permit to operate in Iligan City under conditions that he would not put up an optical clinic, examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses, or selling eyeglasses without a prescription from an independent optometrist. The Samahan ng Optometrist sa Pilipinas lodged a complaint against the petitioner, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions and that his business permit had to be cancelled.
HELD: The authority of mayors to issue or grant licenses is provided by law. Thus, the grant or denial of licenses or business permits must be exercised in accordance with law. The grant or denial of licenses or business permits is in the nature not of a contract but of special privilege.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS, OVERBREADTH AND FACIAL CHALLENGES
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Void for Vagueness doctrine a law which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in ters so vague that people of ordinary and common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is considered invalid since it does not adequately and fairly inform or warn its subjects as to what are expected of them Manifestations of fair notice or warning requirement (US v. Lanier, 520 US 259): a. Vagueness Doctrine b. Canon of strict construction of criminal statutes or rule of lenity c. Rule barring courts from applying novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be with its scope Overbreadth doctrine delimiting rule which confines certain regulatory acts affecting fundamental rights to those which are only necessary for the purpose sought to be remedied, and with a narrow scope as not to unduly sweep under its terms protected acts or activities A law is void on its face if it does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of control, but sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise of protected expressive or associational rights. Facial challenge asserts that a challenged statute or regulation is invalid in every circumstance or that no set of circumstances exist under which the regulation would be valid. Normally the last two are associated with freedom of speech regulation, but they sometimes find themselves invoked in some other contexts like abortion, parental visitational rights or loitering
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 394
FACTS: Estrada was charged before the Sandiganbayan of having amassed more or less P4B. Estrada moved to the unconstitutionality of the Anti Plunder Law on the ground that it was vague and overbroad, and the general terms combination, series and pattern would render the entire law null.
HELD: Nothing is vague or ambiguous from the provisions of the Plunder Law that will confuse the petitioner in his defense. The use of the general terms does not render the proviso void on its face. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein. The vagueness doctrine simply requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. Flexibility, rather than specificity is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. The doctrine of void for vagueness has been formulated in various ways, but is commonlystated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
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statute. Lastly, the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.
CHICAGO V. MORALES, 527 US 41 FACTS: The State of Illinois enacted Gang Congregation Ordinance which prohibits criminal street gang members from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member, he may order his dispersal. The said law was assailed on the ground that it was vague and therefore violative of the citizens right to due process.
HELD: The law is deemed unconstitutional and vague on its face. The law infringes on constitutionally protected rights and liberty and vagueness permeates the text of such law. Vagueness may fail to provide the kinds of notice that will enable ordinary citizen to understand what conducts are prohibited; it may also encourage arbitrary enforcement of the laws. The term loitering may have a common and an accepted meaning to remain in one place with no apparent purpose. Apparent purpose is a state of mind and it cannot be delineated by speculating on certain circumstances which are merely incidental. The law provides that no person will be sanctioned by the law if he abides by the dispersal order of the police. Such encourages arbitrary enactment of the law and may even affect the innocent loiterers liberty to remain in one place. The law also provides, the officer shall order such persons to disperse and remove themselves from area. This provision is ambiguous in the sense that it does not delineate the distance how long loiterers must remain apart within the purview of area.
DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with the applicable provisions of the constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid at one time may become void at another because of altered circumstances.
LAWYERS AND DUE PROCESS Right to counsel is a basic requisite of substantive due process. Rights to counsel and due process of law are two of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Salaw v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7) This is so because lawyers possess the knowledge in dealing with the law which is not expected to an ordinary person. Hence, a person who was represented by a fictitious lawyer in trial may be granted with another trial even though conviction has already been decided (Delgado v. CA, 145 SCRA 357) The presence of a lawyer is desirable, but not indispensable
NERA V. AUDITOR GENERAL, 164 SCRA 1
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FACTS: Nera retired from the AFP but during the computation of his retirement pay, his longevity pay was not added. He went to the Auditor General based in the General Headquarters of AFP but his petition was denied. Unaided with counsel, he went to the General Auditing twice but the same was denied. A few months later, Nera went back to the General Auditing Office this time with the assistance of Counsel, but the Office claimed that the decisions already became final.
HELD: The right to due process is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or by law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime who may not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. During trial, the accused also has the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This is so because he has to protect his liberty against the vast authority of the State. In other proceedings, like the one here which is done in an administrative body, the right to counsel is desirable but not indispensable. Nothing in the Constitution says that a party in a non criminal proceeding has also the right to counsel.
ZOSA V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Zosa, a lawyer, was sued for libel by his aunt. He represented himself during trial. The court decided against him and a writ of execution was issued in order to satisfy the decision of the court for the award of oral damages to his aunt. Nine years later, he appealed contending that during the pendency of the trial, he was afflicted with insanity (schizophrenia, paranoid type), and that he wasnt able to intelligently defend himself as he was not aware of what was going on.
HELD: Zosa failed to adduce evidence to prove his sanity during the trial. In case of doubt, the presumption is on sanity. For proprietys sake, it seems to be next to impossibility that a period from time B which is nine years past time A, knows his state of mind during the latter time. If lawyers are subjects to administrative proceedings, particularly that conducted by IBP, the level of procedural standards must not be lessened. IBP is not exempt from the duty to promote respect of the legal process and for the law and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance or eroding the legal system, thereby impairing the confidence due to it. A lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law if there is a concurrence of the following (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voing, and (3) a vote of at least five members of the board (Malonzo v. Principe, 447 SCRA 1)
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EQUAL PROTECTION
ART. III Sec. 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
People or things similarly situated shall be treated alike An element of due process against class legislation (legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending) [Executive Secretary v. CA, 429 SCRA 81] Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operations on merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees EQUALITY not IDENTITY of rights (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54) Guarantee includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow discrimination directly or indirectly. (Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 Classifying people and properties in order to give disparate rights must be substantial, reasonable and free from arbitrariness (Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298)
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In response to the argument of under inclusiveness, the legislature, in perfecting the constitutional guarantee, may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. It is not necessary that the prohibition should be couched in all embracing terms (Miller v. Willson 236 US 373) REQUISITES FOR VALID CLASSIFICATION The classification is based on substantial distinction which makes no real differences It is germane to the purpose of the law It applies not only to the present but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of present It applies to everyone or every member belonging to the same class. PEOPLE V. CAYAT, 68 PHIL 12 FACTS: Act 1639 was enacted which prohibited any native of the Philippines who was part of non Christian tribes to purchase and drink non native wines. Cayat, a native of Baguio and a member of non Christian tribe, was prosecuted in violation of said enactment. He challenged the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it was violative of the due process clause, the equal protection of the laws, and an invalid exercise of due process.
HELD: Since the Spanish regime, the government had been constantly vexed with determining measures in order to advance the civilization and material prosperity of the Non-Christian Tribes. Act 1639 was enacted to secure for these tribes the blessings of peace and harmony and to facilitate their rapid and steady arch to civilization and culture. It is an established principle in constitutional law that the equal protection clause be observed when (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class. 1. Counsel for Cayat argued that the classification was not substantial because he who hailed from an accident of birth parentage should not be discriminated. The term non Christian tribe however refers not to religious beliefs, but to geographical and to native attributes of a low grade of civilization living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. 2. The act is germane to the purpose of the law. It is designed to inure peace and order among NonChristian Tribes. Free use of intoxicating liquors has often resulted to lawlessness and crimes which hampered the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. All measures adopted in the promotion of public policy are geared towards recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges enjoyed by Christian Citizens. If
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incidentally, a non Christian denizen should suffer the stiffness of the law, it is in heeding to the principle The General Welfare is the supreme law.
ORMOC SUGAR CO V. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, 22 SCRA 603 FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed an ordinance which imposed tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the petitioner. The company challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause because it was singled out when the ordinance was implemented and it violated the rule of uniformity of taxation HELD: The ordinance is unconstitutional. The requisites for valid classification are: (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class.It is true that at the time it was enacted, OSC was the only sugar company in Ormoc. Nevertheless, it shall look at future possibilities when another company will be established and will not be subjected to tax because the law only levies taxes to the petitioner, being singled out. JM TUASON & CO, INC V. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, 31 SCRA 413 FACTS: RA 2616 was enacted to expropriate Tatalon Estate in Quezon City which would be divided into small lots and would be sold to several individuals. Owners Gregorio Araneta and Company and Florencio Deudor assailed the unconstitutionality of said law on the ground that it contravened the equal protection clause since said statute only applied to Tatalon Estate and not to any other lands. HELD: To assure that general welfare be prompted, which is the end of a law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection ONLY if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Quezon City government intends to expropriate the property in order to address the increase in the population of the city which poses a serious housing problem, and that the same measure will implement the land for the landless program. Clearly, there is no sufficient refutation of the seriousness of the acts of Congress. It could indeed determine the subject of expropriation. Another incident which compelled the Congress to enact the said law was when petitioners owners induced the occupants to believe that Veterans Subdivision was the owner of the property, thus, the occupants bought the said property in good faith. When the area was already developed, owners
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came to light asserting their ownership over the subject property. In order to cure the said defect, Congress was prompted to enact the law GENDER The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men (Art II Sec 14) The view that women belong to the weaker sex has been disregarded (Villegas v. Subido, 109 SCRA 1) If gender is not material to any particular question, then it should not be dispositive of the issue. Special concern for the welfare and advancement of women should not be taken as a valid basis for stereotyped or prejudicial thinking about the role may play in traditionally areas associated with the distaff. BRADWELL V. ILLINOIS, 83 US 130 FACTS: Colyby Bradwell passed the Bar Exams, but the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application because she was a MARRIED WOMAN. The court was reluctant that she would not be available to her husband because of the contingencies that the law profession demands. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court denied her admission on the grounds that the law was silent about women entering to legal profession, allowing women to practice would warrant the civil offices to be populated by women, there are cases which are brutally not compatible with women and that the court was reluctant about the capacity of women to administer justice. Subsequently, a law was enacted stating that no person shall be precluded from any profession on account of sex. HELD: (Majority Opinion): There are privileges and immunities that belong to citizens of the US in that the relation and character, and that in there alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. But the right to be admitted to the practice of courts do not depend upon these immunities, including citizenship. (Separate Opinion, Justice Bradley) The real issue is WON a married woman can be admitted to practice as an attorney which is based upon the supposed right of every person, a man or a woman, to engage in any lawful employment. IT was left to the discretion of the court to establish rules by which admission to the legal profession should be determined using the following a bases (1) the person should the proper administration of justice, and (2) the court may not admit persons not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by the statute. Civil law has always recognized the wide difference between a man and a woman, viz: (1) the man i the protector of the woman; (2) The delicacy of a woman disqualifies her to several occupations by the society; (3) the constitution of a family is founded on the context that the domestic sphere belongs to woman; (4) the idea that a woman has an independent career is repugnant to the idea of a duly instituted family. The paramount destiny and mission of a woman are to fulfil her offices as a wife and as a mother according to
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the law of the Creator and the rules of civil society. It is not contrite to say that a woman has been endowed by the law as a fundamental right to enter any profession or calling. MICHAEL M V. SUPERIOR COURT, 450 U 464 FACTS: Michael, 17, was prosecuted for statutory rape which defines having sexual intercourse with a female, not the wife below 18. Michael challenged the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it was prejudicial to male genders alone. HELD: The equal protection clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons r to things which are different in fact be treated in law as the same. Substantially, there is a difference between a male and a female, and therefore they are not situated on equal footing. Only women can become pregnant and they suffer profound holistic consequences of sexual activity. Because virtually, all significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, the legislature acts within its authority when it elects to penalize the participant who suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. The risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young female. On the petitioners contention that gender neutral statute is effective and that both male and females can be criminalized will held the law in futility since female will then fear reporting any incident which in turn will incriminate them. On the petitioner argument that males are regarded as culpable aggressors, The statute seeks to prevent the occurrence of teenage pregnancies which normally lead to abortion. GOESAERT V. CLEARY, 335 US 464 FACTS: A Michigan law forbade any female to act as bartenders unless she is the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. ISSUE: WON the classification as to wives and daughters violate the due process of non wives and daughters HELD: Michigan could forbid all women from working in a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal position of women. The fact that women may now have the achieved virtues tht en have long claimed as theirs does not preclude the State from drawing a line between sexes, certainly in such matters and regulation of the liquor traffic. While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for bartending, it cannot play favourites. Since bartending by women may, in allowable legislative judgment, give rise to oral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need not to go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of females, other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce moral and social problems calling for prohibition. Evidently, Michigan believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaids husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront barmaid without such oversight. Collaterally, the
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petitioner argued that the reason behind the law was to bolster the desire of male to dominate the profession but the US SC decided not to delve with it. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTER, INC V. DRILON, 163 SCRA 386 FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of DOLE D.O. which suspends the temporary deployment of female Filipino domestic helpers and household workers on the ground that it was a discrimination against males or females and that it was only inimical against the mentioned workers and not to all Filipino workers, alike. HELD: It is well settled that equality before the law does not mean identity of rights, but: (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers are the compelling motives for urgent government action. In the case of men, there is no evidence presented that men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. The court is not impressing with male chauvinistic notion but the ruling of the court is dependent on the evidence presented. Furthermore, the order is germane to the purpose of the law to enhance the protection for Filipino female workers. On the petitioners contention that it does not apply to all Filipina workers alike the court ruled that doing so would be unreasonable and arbitrary for all of them are not similarly situated. TUAN ANH NGUYEN V. IMMIGRATON AND NATURALIZATION SCIENCE, 533 US 53 FACTS: Nguyen, born to a Vietnamese mother and an American father, was ordered to be deported after pleading guilty of two counts of sexual assault of a child. His father obtained a parentage order from the state court but the Immigration Board that deported him rejected the sae because the US law provides that the acknowledgment of a child to a citizen father and a non citizen mother should be done when he was still 18, not when he was 28. Consequently, a different rule applies if the citizen parent is the mother. HELD: For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. A citizen other expecting a child and living abroad has the right to enter the US so that the child can be born in the US and be a citizen there. This equivalence ensures expectant mothers who are citizens of the US to reenter. This equivalence is not available for fathers because they do not have control where the child will be born. Although the immigration law requires certain conduct to be perfected by citizen fathers, once that the citizenship has been completed, the protection given to children of citizen mothers and those of citizen fathers are the same. Sec 1409 requires either of these to be accomplished by a citizen father: legitimation; a declaration of paternity under oath; court order of paternity. The imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not of a maternal one is justified, to wit:
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1. The government is interested to assure biological parent child relationship. In case of other, the relation is verifiable from birth itself. In case of father the incontestable fact is that he needs not to be present at birth. Neutral face rule will have to lie on this case because the mother is always present since the day of the conception; furthermore, her name appears on the birth certificate, while such is not the case for fathers. 2. The government is also interested to the full potential of development between parent and child; a relationship which is not just a matter of law, but a matter of substance. Mothers are accorded these opportunities starting the moment the child has been conceived. The same will lie with fathers who, in one point, may not be aware of the conception of child within the span of 9 mos, nor, will the mother be certain that the father (whether putative or not) is truly the father of the child. STANLEY V. ILLINOIS, 405 US 645 FACTS: The State of Illinois passed a law stating that children born of unwed parents, upon the death of the mother, will be declared dependents and be placed on guardianship even without proof of neglect or hearing on paternal fitness, although such hearing are required before the State assumes custody of the children. HELD: All Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. Denying them such is tantamount to denying them due process and equal protection of the laws. The interest of the state in promulgating the same act is to protect the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community and to strengthen the family ties whenever possible, removing them from parents only when their welfare and safety cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal. Although the state guarantees this interest, if in the case at bar, the same is not apparent, the state has to spite its own articulated goals. The state insists that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents, but all unmarried fathers are not in this category. Some are wholly suited to maintain custody to their children.
Prostitution can be perverted by both men and women and it should not be ascribed to the latter gender alone. (City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308)
MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY There is a substantial difference wither to the status or the succession rights of legitimate and illegitimate children In terms of marriage, distinctions are sometimes made between marriages on the time when they contracted specially in regard to benefit accruing to the surviving spouse GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS, 434 SCRA 441
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FACTS: Nicolas and Milagros got married. Almost two years passed and Nicolas was about to retire, he indicated Milagros to be his sole beneficiary under PD 1146. When Nicolas died and Milagros filed for a survivorship pension, GSIS denied her request because pursuant to Sec 18 of PD 1146, those who would contract marriage three years before a pensioner would qualify for his pension would be disqualified for the same. RTC granted Milagros claim citing the property as part of labor and therefore part of the conjugal property. CA affirmed. HELD: The proviso is unduly oppressive as it out rightly denies a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage within three year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of property without due process of law (opportunity to be heard). The requisites for the application of equal protection clause are: (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class. The proviso in question discriminates against dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualifies for the pension. The provision is vague because even if the dependent contracts marriage more than three years before the pensioners death, if the same has been contracted within the banned period, the same will be void a well. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose it seeks to avail. If the reason of the prohibition is to prevent deathbed marriages, the reckoning point should be the time when he died. The law must not presume that contracted marriages within three years before the retirement or death of a member are sham marriages. LABINE V. VINCENT, 401 US 532 FACTS: When Ezra died, Labine, the guardian of the illegitimate daughter of Ezra, contested the constitutionality of a certain Louisiana law which bars an illegitimate child from equally sharing with the legitimate children in the fathers estate on the ground that the law was an invidious discrimination and therefore violative of Due Process and Equal Protection Laws. HELD: Under the Louisiana law, children born out of wedlock and who were never acknowledged by their parents have no rights to take property by intestate succession from their fathers estate. Illegitimate children acknowledged by their fathers are natural children and can take by intestate succession to the exclusion of only the state. The parents may bequeath 1/3 or of their properties, provided that their father is not survived by legitimate children. Finally, children born out of wedlock may be legitimated or adopted to protect their rights to intestate succession or by operations of wills. The law may be unconstitutional on the part of the illegitimates, but declaring it unconstitutional will also prejudice the legitimates. Ezra could have availed any of the remedies mentioned in order to further the succession rights of his illegitimate daughter.
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AGE One could be disqualified on a certain subject by reason of age Age is required for the exercise of suffrage, for the contract of marriage, for compulsory retirement and effective bar for further employment beyond a certain age. DUMLAO V. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 FACTS: Dumlao assailed the constitutionality of BP 52 Sec 4 which prohibits retired elective official from municipal to provincial or city, who has received payment of their retirement benefits and has been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to run for the same elective local office for which he has retired. Petitioner claimed that the law was designed to frustrate him any bid to make a political comeback that it was a form of class legislation and the same was calculated in furtherance of arbitrariness. HELD: For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective officials because there may be retirees below 65 or there may be good officials who are beyond 65. But such is not the case when an elective official who has retired from his local position. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. METHOD OR MODE OF DYING The law frowns upon suicide, but not necessarily on the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment which may similarly lead death.
VACCO V. QUILL, 521 US 793 FACTS: Petitioners are physicians who assail the constitutionality of a New York law which proscribes suicide. Although in their profession as doctors, they are allowed to prescribe lethal medications to terminally ill patients, they are deterred to do so because of the said prohibition. HELD: The distinction between assisting suicide; and withdrawing life sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions; is both important and logical. The distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent. When a
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patient refuses life sustaining medical treatment, he dies as a result of it; contrary to a patient who ingests lethal medication prescribed by the physician. A physician, who honors a patients refusal to have life sustaining treatments, purposely intends only to respect the patients wishes. A doctor who assists a suicide must necessarily and indubitably intend that the patient be made dead. Similarly, the state legislatures have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted life saving medical treatment by prohibiting the former and allowing the latter. The principle behind this holding is not predicated on the persons right to hasten death but on well established rights to integrity and freedom from unwanted touching. New Yorks reason for the distinctions are: prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; preventing suicide and maintaining the physicians role as healers; protecting the vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia. ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE Sometimes, changes are made in passing rates such that there is a difference between and among examinations given on different occasions. TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ, 152 SCRA 730 FACTS: Tablarin, et al were seeking admission to several medical schools, however, they were not able to take the NMAT successfully. They sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, the BME and CEM from proceeding with the said examination and they assailed the constitutionality of RA 2382 on the ground that it would violate the equal protection clause because of the yearly changes in the cut off scores for successful applicants. HELD: Different cut off scores may be dictated by differing conditions obtained during those years. To establish a permanent and immutable cut off score regardless of changes in circumstances annually may result in an unreasonable rigidity. The language of the questioned provision of law leaves the BME with measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change. NATIONALITY AND ALIENAGE ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL 1155 FACTS: RA 1180 was enacted to prohibit persons, associations, partnerships or corporations, the capital of which are not wholly Filipino owned, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade unless such aliens have actually been engaged in the said business on May 15, 1954. The aliens exempted from the prohibition will continue to engage in the retail business unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement.
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HELD: 1. The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national trader. The aliens aim or purpose is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country or that spirit of regard and consideration to Filipino customers. An alien never makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. The practices resorted by aliens in the control of distribution, their secret manipulation of stocks, commodities and prices, their utter disregard for the welfare of their customers are justifying reasons for classifying aliens and national retail traders. The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens are sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the efficacy of the law but it is the prerogative of the Congress to promulgate such as part of its law making power. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes as a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. OFFICE AND EMPLOYMENT There are substantial differences between employees of public and private sectors, i.e. the restrictions on the right to strike by government employees Elective and appointive officials may be treated differently with respect to the effect of the filing of their candidacies; while the latter may be deemed resigned, the former may still hold on to their positions (Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 417 CRA 503) NUNEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433 FACTS: Nunez was charged with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. He assailed the law establishing the Sandiganbayan as it would violate the equal protection of the laws. Pursuant to PF 1486, no intermediate review by the CA which is otherwise available to those who prosecuted before the ordinary courts. HELD: As a response to the urgency in suppressing dishonesty in public service, the Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD 1486. It follows that those, who would be tried pursuant to the enactment of the new constitution and that of the stated law, would follow a different procedure, whether private citizens or public officials. The court ruled that the guarantee of Bill of Rights which includes due process and equal protection must give way to specific provisions to meet current contingencies. The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation. INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING, 333 SCRA 13
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FACTS: Respondent school was established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. It was empowered by PD 732 to hire teachers both from the national and international spheres. Its faculty members were classified either as local hires or foreign hires. The latter types of employees receive additional 25% remuneration ON TOP OF THEIR ALLOWANCES because of dislocation factors and limited tenures and to bolster the schools adaptive measures to maintain a competitive line up of faculty members on an international level by enticing them to maintain their employment. Petitioner labor union assailed its constitutionality on the ground that it was violative of the equal protection clause. HELD : Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned by the Labor Code. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shores up the maxim equal work for equal pay. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skills effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. In discharging additional pay for its foreign hired teachers, the school failed to prove that such teachers function 25% more efficiently than local hires. The local hires perform the sae services as foreign hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. In view of the dislocation factors the SC rules that foreign hires are already accorded with housing, transpo, shipping costs, taxes and home travel allowances which are enough. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS Commission of the same offense does not necessarily have to be sanctioned with the same punishment without regard to any attendant circumstances and considerations. It would not be justifiable to impose a more severe penalty upon mere followers than that inflicted upon their leaders (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) Adjustments have to be made for the penalty to fit the crime and its peculiar circumstances without prejudice to the equal protection clause, provided there is enough justification for different treatment SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA, 316 US 535 FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of stealing chickens, and two separate counts of robbery with firearms. Consequently, he was subjected to sterilization pursuant to Oklahomas Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. A habitual criminal in Oklahoma is a person who has been convicted twice or oftener for crimes involving moral turpitude. Exception to the rule is the commission of certain offenses like embezzlement. Skinner assailed its constitutionality. *Embezzlement appropriation of the property of an employer by an agent *Larceny Unlawful taking and carrying away of personal property without right, with intent to deprive the rightful owner of the same *If A, an employer of B, entrusts $100 to the latter, and B misappropriates the same, B is guilty of Embezzlement. If B does it thrice, he will not be subjected to sterilization *If C steals $20 from D, he is guilty of Larceny. If he does it thrice, he will be subjected to sterilization
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HELD: The nature of Larceny and Embezzlement are the same. But only those guilty of larceny; and thrice have been convicted of such would be subjected to sterilization no matter how habitual his proclivities for embezzlement are. When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense, and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination if it had selected a particular group for the oppressive treatment. PEOPLE V. CHING KUAN, 74 PHIL 23 FACTS: Ching Kuan was penalized to pay a fine of P150.00 after pleading guilty of constructing a 297 square meter building of strong materials in the district of Tondo without securing a permit from the city engineer. He appealed before the CFI and he was penalized a fine of P175.00. He went to the SC and challenged the constitutionality of Art 66 of the RPC which permits the courts to take into consideration the wealth and the means of the culprit in the imposition of the fines WHICH ACCORDING TO HIM IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE RICH AND FAVORABLE TO THE POOR. HELD: The codal provision in question aims precisely at equality before the law. Since the lightness or severity of the fine depends upon the culprits wealth or means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the amount. To impose the same amount of a fine to the same person who are differently circumstanced would mete out a penalty of unequal severity and therefore discriminatory. Equality before the law is not literal nor mathematical, but relative and practical. The perpetuation of rape against a 5 year old girl does not absolve or exempt any person from the imposition of death penalty by fact that he is poor, uneducated, jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction (People v. Mijano, 311 SCRA 81) PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, 324 SCRA 689 FACTS: Cong. Jalosjos, convicted of statutory rape and two counts of acts of lasciviousness filed a motion before the SC to allow him to discharge the functions of his office as a congressman, including attendance to legislative sessions and committee meetings. His argument centered on the mandate of the sovereign will. ISSUE: Is being a congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused as a prisoner from the same class of persons validly confined under the law? HELD: The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excused to free a person validly in prison. The accused is only one of the 250 members of the House and 24 of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the absence of one or a few of its members. The importance of a function depends on the need of its
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exercise. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of a congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift hi from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public defense. The accused states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. PEOPLE V. VERA, 65 PHIL 56 FACTS: Mariano Co Unjieng was convicted of a certain case in the CFI of Manila. On appeal, he filed motion for reconsideration, and motion for new trial but the same was denied. He elevated it to US SC via certiorari but it was denied. The Philippine SC came to said findings and the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment. Unjieng filed a petition for probation. It was denied twice by two CFI judges. The fiscal of Manila came to the court to make the judgment of Unjieng material. Furthermore, the assailed the constitutionality of the probation law on the ground that it was constitutive of undue delegation of powers and violative of the equal protection laws because its application in the entire country was not uniform. HELD: The counsel for the petitioner claimed that there some provinces appropriate funds for probation officers, some do not. Some apply the probation law and some do not. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from unwarranted delegation of legislative power. A law may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. Statues may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effects in operation. CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BSP, 446 SCRA 299 FACTS: RA 7653 established BSP. Sec 15(c) Art II of the said law provides for exemption to the application of the salary standardization law, except those employees with a salary grade of 19 and below. The seven charters of the Government Financial Institutions subsequently exempted their employees to Salary Standardization Law, a well. Several years after its enactment, petitioners assailed the Constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the questioned law created classes of employees in BSP, the same being a case of class legislation; and it was not germane to the purpose of the law which is professionalism and excellence at all levels.
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HELD: 1. Under the present standards of equal protection, Sec 15 of Article II of RA 7653 is valid. It is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of Officers SG 20 and above was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It is not based on palpable and entirely arbitrary legislative sense. 2. The enactment, however of subsequent laws which exempt all other rank and file employees of GFIs renders the continued application of the challenged provision a violation of the equal protection clause. The Rank and File employees of seven GFIs were granted exemption from the application of Salary Standardization Law that was specifically denied to the rank and file employees of BSP. The charters creating seven GFIs significantly changed and altered the reasonability of continued operation of the proviso of Art. 7653. In fine, the policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank and file and officer of BSP, but not the rank and file employees of BSP and GFIs who are similarly situated. If a law has the effect of becoming unconstitutional either directly or indirectly, the law must not be countenanced. 3. The BSP is the central monetary authority and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions. It supervises banks, quasi banks, including GFIs. Before the SSL was enacted, PD 995 was at force. Its policy is to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no peculiar characteristics pertain to the GFIs and their rank and file employees and those of the BSP. Thus, the argument that GFIs employees were exempted because of the importance of their institutions mandate cannot stand. 4. (Discussions revolve on international implications of equal protection). The same not included because of the proclamation of the ponente himself not to rely with these international rulings. 5. The Court uses deferential test for the executives and officers of BSP and strict scrutiny test to those employees of GFIs and BSPs. *Dissenting Opinion Justice Carpio Morales Judicial restraint must be applied; the majority decision is akin to a law which the 13 Congress intends to enact. Furthermore, double standards must not be used in declaring the law unconstitutional *Dissenting Opinion Justice Panganiban since the executives are not suspect classes in the case at bar, deferential test must then be used and abandon the strict scrutiny test INVERSE EQUAL PROTECTION The law cannot provide for artificial or fictional parity by having those that are not really equal or similar become equal
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Requiring an equal amount of fee for employment permit without taking into account differences in the situation of those covered would be violative of the clause (Villegas v. Hiu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270) Putting on equal footing secured and unsecured creditors in regard to their claims against an insolvent debtor is inverse (National Development Co v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257) PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO, 227 SCRA 703 FACTS: RA 7354 Sec 35 withdraws the franking privilege of the members of SC, CA, RTC, MTC, McTC, LRC, RODs along with certain government offices, without withdrawing the same to the President, VP, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, widows of former Presidents, NSO and the general public in filing complaints against public officers or employees. HELD: Similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favour to some and unjustly discriminate against others. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care was given to its repealing clause, resulting in unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary. There is no question that if there is any major branch of government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department as the respondents themselves point out. In the comments of the respondents, it states that the Judiciary uses P73M for frank mail. The respondents aver that due to the volume of mail from the Judicary that franking privilege must be withdrawn. This in itself is self defeating. Heeding to the arguments of the respondents is similar to saying that those who need the service badly must be deprived of the same, while those who do need it must use it. If the problems of the respondent are loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it to all offices who take advantage of the same. EQUALIZING ILLEGALITY What is illegal is plainly against the law and the fact that others were able to get away with it is no justification to provide equal chances for others under the Equal Protection Clause. The guarantee must be understood to refer only to matters which are within the bounds of law. ALUNAN III V. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA 501 FACTS: RA 7160 provides that the first SK election after the bill took effect on Jan 1, 1992 would be 30 days after the next local election. The first local election was held on May 11, 1992. COMELEC issued a resolution stating that the SK election would be on September 30, 1992 under the direct control and supervision of DILG. Then DILG Secretary issued a resolution exempting the City of Manila from the said elections because the said city just had their first local elections on May 26, 1990. It averred that the Local Government Code intended to exempt from the first SK elections those elected under the
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Kabataang Barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections from 1988 to 1992. Respondents claimed violation of the equal protection of the laws because several barangays who held previous elections from 1988 to 1992 were also allowed to conduct their elections. HELD: What other barangays did was against the law. Therefore no discrimination took place.
DELEGATED DISCRIMINATION In some instances, violation of the equal protection clause does not appear on the face of the law itself but on the manner in which it is implemented. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered with an evil eye or an unequal hand, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356) A violation of the guarantee of equal protection may be seen on the face of the law itself or perceived and felt in the manner in which what pretends to be a just and fair regulation is actually utilized as tool to camouflage a discriminatory act AFFIRMATIVE ACTION A CASE OF COMPENATORY DISCRIMINATION In the United States, where racial discrimination had been prevalent in the past, affirmative actions were taken in order to compensate for the injuries brought by the past. Some of these actions include preference in employment and lay off, as well as admission to certain educational institutions. US Supreme Court affirmed one of these actions (Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US 244) but invalidated the other (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306) In a world of great diversity, it is always a challenge to find the appropriate balance between acceptable classification and invidious discrimination. Classifications necessarily mean making distinctions, and grouping people or things always raises the issue as to whether Equal Protection has been applied to it. There should be no hesitation in using equal protection as a major cutting edge to eliminate irrational discrimination in the society. (Central Bank Emplyees Association v. BSP, supra)
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III Sec 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any other purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A liberty safeguard that rules against unreasonable searches and seizures while providing for the guidelines for acceptable conduct on the part of the government authorities in regard to any intrusion or invasion of the peoples right to be secure in their persons, papers and effects. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1)
Declares that people must be left alone unmolested by the government until and unless sufficient cause exists which justifies any impairment of that right. Very essence of constitutional liberty; the guarantee of which is as important and imperative as the guaranties of other fundamental rights of the individual citizen. (Ker v. California, 374 US 23) Does not impose obligations to citizens, but provides rights against the government The best way by which rights and liberties are assured is through the requirement that any intrusion be under the authority of a warrant issued by a disinterested person who could be
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trusted to act with sufficient discretion to weigh the competing demands of personal liberty and those of governmental interest in law enforcement (Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388)\
The finding of evidence cannot be the immediate reason for issuing a search warrant. To use a search warrant for this purpose would be an unreasonable use of the remedy, which is prohibited by law (Uy` v. Villareal, 42 Phil 886)
The right extends to all persons, including aliens (Harvey v. Defensor- Santiago, 162 SCRA 840); so are corporations though at a lesser extent (Bache & CO v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823). Juridical persons being mere creatures by sufferance of the State, they may be required to have their books, records and papers open to government inspection and to regularly submit certain papers and documents for government record keeping and monitoring (Oklahoma Press Publishing v. Walling, 327 US 186)
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS Search warrant or warrant of arrest Probable cause supported the issuance of such warrant Such probable cause had been determined personally by a judge The judge personally examined the complainant and his witnesses The place to be searched and he persons to be seized have been particularly described A judge must merely issue search warrant based on probable cause predicated on his personal knowledge and not just hearsay. (People v. Tee, 395 SCRA 419) The true test of the sufficiency of an affidavit is whether the affiant or the witnesses may be held for perjury should their statements be deemed to be false (Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33) The Bill of Rights does not make it a requirement that depositions be attached to the search warrant. It is already enough that there is evidence on the record showing that the testimony was presented (People v. Tee, supra) NATURE OF SEARCH WARRANTS PROCEEDINGS Not a criminal action; the proceeding is not against any person but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. (United Laboratories v. Isip, GR 1638958, June 25, 2005) A search warrant is a police weapon. It must issue in the name of the People of the Philippines Has no relation to civil processes. It concerns to public at large and not involving rights of private persons. May only be applied in furtherance of public prosecution Private parties may appear during the proceedings to corroborate with law enforcement agencies like NBI and PDEA. The other party may file a motion to quash the search warrant issued; or a motion for reconsideration for the granting of such motion to quash.
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DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE Probable Cause a justified belief regarding the commission of a crime; the whereabouts of the property or articles to be searched and seized; or the malefactor to be arrested. Search warrant shall be issued only in connection with one specific offense (Rule 126, Rules of Court) A judge can be administratively held liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law upon issuing a search warrant on the ground that there was allegedly failure to pay the purchase price of the vehicle, contrary on the averment that the ground is violation of a law and regulations involving tax. Thus, probable cause does not exist (Dizon v. Veneracion, 336 SCRA 241) ROAN V. GONZALES, 145 SCRA 687 FACTS: Petitioner challenged the admission of one revolver and 18 bullets which were not listed as subjects in the search warrant issued by Judge Gonzales, which he also wanted to assail. The officers claimed that these items were found in the premises and they confiscated the same. HELD: To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Probable cause was described as facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and objects in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Judges, in determining probable cause, must personally examine on oath or affirmation, the complainant and witnesses; and takes their depositions in writing and attach them to record. It is axiomatic that the examination be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinely or pro forma. By Judge Gonzales own account, all he did was question the applicants of the search only to ascertain if he knew and understood the application and only because the application was not yet subscribed to. Furthermore, the applicant was merely asking for the issuance of a warrant based on mere hearsay and not on the information personally known to him. On the issue of admitting the confiscated things as evidence, the confiscation was not valid because there was no valid search warrant and the right of the petitioner regarding search was not waived. Exclusionary rule applies. It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum as the act is penalized by PD 1866, the subject is illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita crimes, but items subject of the said crime type may not be summarily seized. A search warrant is still necessary. BACHE & CO V. RUIZ, 37 SCRA 823 FACTS: CIR went to the sala of Judge Ruiz with the application of search, depositions already signed but not yet subscribed, and a search warrant already filled out without Judge Ruiz signature. While hearing on a certain case, he asked the Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions. When done, he asked the stenographer to read her notes and the clerk for the deposition. He warned Logronio, without propounding any question, that in case his depositions are found false, he could be charged with perjury.
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CIR proceeded with the search and they were able to yield several boxes. Lawyers of the petitioners argued that neither formal complaint nor transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. HELD: Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complaint and his witnesses. Examination enables him to determine the existence or non existence of probable cause. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and the witnesses, it was conducted by the clerk of court. The action of Judge Gonzales was insufficient because he wasnt able to observe the demeanour of the complainants or to propound questions to them. The applicant must present copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films was necessary for the validity of search warrants against establish probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant (20 Film, 164 SCRA 655) But the case was overturned by Columbia Pictures v. CA, 261 SCRA 144: There is no law which requires that the existence of probable cause is determined by a specific kind of evidence.
th
Century Fox
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION AND GENERAL WARRANTS General warrant, or one which practically authorizes search or seizure, a roving authority for the officers serving it to look everywhere and get anything associated with what is being sought, authorizing search in any place for anything, is illegal and unconstitutional (Boyd v. US, 116 US 616) Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human rights and liberty (Henry v. US, 361 US 98) To obviate and prevent avenue for abuse and arbitrary exercise of power, the Constitution, specifically requires that particularity of description of things or people to be searched and seized. Such description must not be broad and expansive nor too narrow and constricted as to be impractical. The test of adequate description : when the description expresses a question of fact by which warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure, or when things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. In warrants of arrest, if the name of the person cannot be identified, the best descriptio personae must be indicated include personal appearance; peculiarities; occupation; place of residence and other circumstance by means of which he can be identified and singled out.
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STONEHILL V. DIOKNO, 20 SCRA 383 FACTS: Respondent judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against the petitioners and/or corporations where they are officers to search persons and seize properties, (in their offices and residences) and documents showing all business transactions as the subjects of the offenses; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense; or used or intended to be used a means of committing offenses against the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, NIRC and the RPC. Petitioners assailed the issuance of the search warrants on the ground that they do not describe with particularity the documents, books, and things to be seized. HELD: 1. Searches and seizures conducted in the offices of the petitioners are to be upheld because corporations have their respective personalities separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. Seizure in these places can only be contested whose rights have been impaired, and such rights belong exclusively to the corporations. 2. With respect to the documents, papers, things and effects seized in the residences of the petitioners, two points must be stressed, viz, (a) no warrant shall issue but on probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth by the law, (b) warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with. No specific offense had been alleged in the application of search; therefore, it is impossible that a probable cause has been determined. It would be a legal heresy to convict or find a probable cause against anybody without reference to any determinate provision of law or code. To uphold the validity of the warrants would wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Those evidences obtained in contravention of this pronouncement are therefore deemed not admitted within the purview of the exclusionary rule. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective : elimination of general warrants. Separate Opinion, Justice Castro - Assuming arguendo that the petitioners do not have locus standi to question the constitutionality of the search, the same does not affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made there under. CENTRAL BANK V. MORFE, 20 SCRA 507 FACTS: The Central Bank circulated an announcement to the effect that organizations similar to First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization Inc are not authorized to engage in banking business. The
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intelligence division of the Central Bank, after recognizing the practice of unauthorized banking (as evidenced by receiving deposits of money; disbursement; safekeeping) by respondent company, sought for a search in the companys premise; alleging violation of RA 337, and; describing the specific papers to be searched (annotated a Annex A books of original entry, books of final entry, accounting records, financial statements) and others. Petitioner assailed the issuance of warrant on the ground that it is a roving commission general in its terms and the use of others in the search warrant permits unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation to any specific criminal act. Judge Cancino granted the motion, but Judge Morfe denied the validity of the warrant. HELD: Judge Morfe denied the validity of the warrant on the ground that on the affidavit issued by the Central Bank, the deponent knows specific banking transactions of specific persons. He deduced that if such is the case, the search should be limited only to book or records and not to any other document. Failure of the witness to mention a particular individual does not necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the organization, for the witness might be acquainted with such specific transactions, even if the names of the individual were unknown to him. The questioned order would seem to assume that an illegal banking transaction must always be accompanied with a victim. The law requiring compliance with certain requirements before anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to protect the public against any injury. If this term is used to denote a party whose interests have been actually injured, then the assumption is not necessarily justified. The line of questioning of respondent Judge might be justified if acts imputed to the organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct and detached from the type of business in which it is engaged. The records however suggest that the business transactions sought to be objected by the bank is general pattern. The wording of a warrant may make it assume the character of a general warrant, in another context it may be considered perfectly all right. Scatter shot warrant or those predicated to two or more offenses is void (Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184) however, illegal possessions of shabu, marijuana and paraphernalia are deemed to be placed merely on one warrant as the acts presuppose the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (People v. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174) A search warrant may be partially void when it is provided for the search and seizure of items that have not been testified during the application of search warrant. (People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683) The use of the term undetermined amount of marijuana is not objectionable. It is not required that technical precision of description be required particularly where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must rather general since technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. The purposes of constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized are (1) to readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
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seizing the wrong item, and (2) leave said officers no discretion regarding the article to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizure. Characteristics of a description : (1) specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) express a conclusion of fact by which peace officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The phrase and the like does not make the search warrant general What if the address indicated in the search is different from the actual address? The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. If it was not shown that Hernan Cortes St is also located in the place mistakenly written in the warrant contrary to the real address, the inconsistency does not warrant invalidation in this case (Uy v. BIR, 344 SCRA 36) If a property subject to a warrant does not belong to the person whom the same will be served at, it is sufficient that the property is under his control or possession as of the moment (People v. Dichoo, 223 SCRA 174)
JOHN DOE WARRANTS The names of the persons subjected to warrants need not be ascertained if the description of such persons contains enough details so that the officers serving the warrant would have no difficulty identifying the person. The same can withstand any constitutional attack. PEOPLE V. VELOSO, 48 PHIL 169 FACTS: Armed with a search warrant, several policemen went to the building located at 124 Calle Arzobispo, Manila, on account that the said building which was occupied by Parliamentary Club managed by respondent Cong. Veloso as a gambling den. Upon penetration and serving the warrant to Veloso, he resisted the search on account that his name was Rep. Veloso and not John Doe. The resistance led to an altercation. Veloso was charged with violation of Resistance to Agents in Authority. He however countered by claiming that the warrant served upon him was illegal, therefore the resistance was justifiable. HELD: The affidavit for search warrant and search warrant itself described the building to be searched as 124 Calle Arzobipo, Manila. This was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. It is undeniable, a well that the affidavit for search warrant, and the warrant itself failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso, instead, they used the pseudonym John Doe. Further, John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control,
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namely in the building numbered 124, Calle Arzobispo, Manila, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law. As a general rule, warrant for apprehension of an unnamed person is void, except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly and properly person upon whom the warrant is to be served. It must be stressed that the place searched was to be used for club purpose. It was not the home of Veloso which the law carefully protects with sanctity. PANGANDAMAN V. CASAR, 159 SCRA 599 FACTS: A shooting incident took place although what precisely happened was unclear. A lawyer claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims sent a letter to the Provincial Fiscal asking for a full blown preliminary investigation on the account that some innocent men might be implicated by the gruelling parties. He sent a letter to Judge Casar but no case had yet been filed until a few days from the shooting incident which was filed by the police. Judge Casar examined personally all the witnesses under oath thru closed and direct supervision. The Judge thereafter released a warrant of arrest against 14 petitioners and 50 John Does. An ex-parte MR was filed seeking to recall such warrants on the ground that the initial investigation made by the Judge was hasty and manifestly haphazard with no searching questions having been propounded. HELD: Petitioners contended that the witnesses who came under the sala of the Judge were inadequately scrutinized as the judge merely utilized the 8 am to 1 pm schedule of the court on Saturday. Such is merely an allegation that nothing on record shows that the questioning made by the judge is impossible to be completed within that specific time frame. Furthermore, nothing in the record belies or discredits those affirmations which have the benefit of legal presumption that the official duty has been regularly performed. The record must therefore be accepted as an accurate chronicle of the questioned proceedings that the respondent Judge had personally examined the witnesses to the complaint, and a consideration of the latter sworn answers to hi questions satisfies the SC that the finding of probable cause against petitioner is neither arbitrary n\or unfounded. The three witnesses, in fact, corroborated with how the incident transpired. Insofar as said warrant is issued against 50 John Does, not one of whom the witnesses could identify is of the nature of a general warrant, one of the class suits long proscribed as unconstitutional and anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.
SERVICE OF WARRANTS TIME, PLACE AND MANNER The time must not be one which is intrusive or violative of ones privacy, like at the middle of the night. Depending on locality, what may be reasonable time in one place would not be in some other areas. As for the place, the warrant limits the area that may be searched and the warrant could not be utilized as authority to search everywhere until the items or articles sought are to be found. The manner of service should not also be oppressive or otherwise abusive
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Valid for 10 days and could be served anytime within that span of time After articles for which the warrant was issued have been seized the same warrant cannot be utilized as authority to make another search. PEOPLE V. COURT OF APPEALS, 347 SCRA 453 FACTS: Ortiz was arrested for carrying a shabu and a pistol. Following his arrest a search warrant was applied for and obtained from MTC by two policemen who claimed had knowledge that Ortiz was keeping several firearms in his house. MTC ordered the search to\ be made at any reasonable hour of the day or night. Armed with the said warrant, the police and representatives of the court and the barangay went to the house of Ortiz at 7:30 pm. They were entertained by his wife, and their childs nanny who refused to be witnesses of the search. The search resulted in seizure of several unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, thus Ortiz was prosecuted for violation of PD 1866. HELD: The general rule is that search warrants must be served during daytime. However, the rule allows an exception under Sec 8 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, namely a search at any reasonable hour of the day and night, when application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the Judge cannot be indicted for grave abuse of discretion as he relied on the accounts of two police officers who applied for the search. On the question, what is reasonable time of the night? Petitioner and the court states 7:30 pm because in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila, such time is an hour at which the residents are still up. To hold the said hour as unreasonable would not only hamper law enforcement but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities at night. The policy behind prohibition of night time searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. A night time search is a violation of right to privacy. But in the case at bar, such legal philosophy does not apply. PEOPLE V. COURT OF APPEALS, 291 SCRA 400 FACTS: A police officer applied for a search warrant before QC RTC against Azfar Hussain who had in possession of firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F, Sapang Palay, SJDM, Bulacan. A search warrant was served not on the said address but on Apt 1, adjacent to Apt 1207. Several Pakistani nationals were arrested and several items not listed on the warrant were also seized, including a piece of dynamite stick, two pieces of plastic explosives, grenade, cash and receipts. On arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty and filed an urgent motion to quash search warrant and to declare evidence obtained inadmissible. RTC and CA granted the motion. HELD: The government insists that the police officers who applied to the QC RTC had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and things to be seized. That may be so, but the place they had in mind was not what Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, and was ultimately described in the search warrant. The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. In their application, they wrote a particular and a restrictive place which was copied by Judge himself. Despite personal knowledge of the physical configuration of the store (subject of warrant)
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and the apartment, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment 1 (the subject of actual search). Petitioner claimed the doctrinal value of Burgos which issued two search warrants pursuant to search of two distinct places, but the same does not apply in the instant case. Burgos perfects a second search warrant to correct an obvious typographical error in the first issued search warrant, and the case revolves searching a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity defined in the search warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument as there has been no meeting of minds between the police officers and Judge Bacalla. What was done to correct the ambiguity was to substitute the place written down in the warrant with the place the executing officers had in their minds. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow the police to search a place different from that stated in the warrant. It would open the door to abuse of the search process and grant officers that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization must be made by the judge and it cannot be left to the discretion of the public officers conducting the search. WILSON V. LAYNE, 526 US 603 FACTS: Several federal marshals, in executing a warrant of arrest to Wilsons son, went to the petitioners house at 6:45 am aided with media crew from Washington Post even though the warrant does not specify the inclusion of media ride along. While the officers entered the petitioners house, petitioners were still in bed. When Wilson discovered the presence of five armed men in their home, he demanded the men to explain their business. Thinking that Mr. Wilson was the son, and his act was retaliatory and resistive, the officers quickly subdued him on the ground. Mrs. Wilson entered the living room to investigate on the incident and she discovered that her husband was on the floor. Upon learning that the son was not in the area, the officers left. HELD: 1. Officers in the case were armed when they entered the house of the Wilsons to execute the arrest for Dominic. But it does not necessarily follow that they are entitled to bring newspaper reporter and photographer with them. If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character or the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, seizure is unconstitutional without more. Certainly, the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. It is true that officers should be able to exercise reasonable discretion in furtherance of their law enforcement mission but the same does not run in counter with the residential privacy. It is an accepted norm that the media play an important role in combating crime by publicizing governments effort to impair the same, but the same must also be balanced with the protection of individual rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. While it is true that police officers can videotape home entries as part of quality control to avoid police abuse, the same is not true with the presence of media personality. 2. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted qualified immunity and are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
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established statutory or constitutional right. In so doing, government officials must know that in view of his action, he is violating a right. The US SC holds that it was not unreasonable for a public officer to have believed that bringing media observers during the execution of an arrest was lawful. Accurate media coverage of police activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the general principles of the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the said principle. During the time of the arrest in 1992, there were no judicial decisions which rendered media coverage unlawful. Given such undeveloped state of law, the officers in this case cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law. Knock and announce rule an officer executing a warrant must knock and introduce himself and announce his purpose and only in exceptional circumstances may he dispense with the same, as when the safety is at stake or there is a danger of the evidence being destroyed (See Sec 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 US 927)
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Search incident to a lawful arrest Evidence in plain view Search of moving vehicles Customs search Stop and frisk Exigent and emergency circumstances Consented Search Section 9 of RA 6235 (People v. Canton, 394 SCRA 478) In the United States, open fields doctrine and special needs exception
SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST Ensures the safety of the arresting officer against any possible harm arising from the use by the arrested individual of any weapon which he might have concealed in his person or within immediate reach or control, as well as the need to preserve the evidence that might otherwise be destroyed. (Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 The search inside the house following the arrest of the accused in a buy bust operation conducted outside his house was not within the contemplation of this type of arrest, even though the accused told that the marijuana was inside his house (People v. Lua, 255 SCRA 539) A search of a nipa hut two meters from where the accused was seated during the arrest does not constitute search incident to a lawful arrest (People v. Estella 395 SCRA 553)
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A police officer who has perfected an arrest to a passenger of a vehicle may also search for items in its compartments, the same being justified that infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have had. (New York v. Belton, 453 US 454) NOLASCO V. PANO, 139 SCRA 152 FACTS: Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group for rebellion and subversion. At noon of the same day the arrest was made, the CSG searched at 239 B Mayon St which resulted in the seizure of certain documents, 431 items all in all. Consequently, Tolentino, the person in charge of the premise was also arrested. Earlier that day, Col. Virgilio Saldajeno of CSG applied for a search warrant from Judge Ernani Pano to be served at the same address in order to correct the possible legal predicament. Judge Pano ruled that the seized documents shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case. Aguilar Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino were then charged with Rebellion/ Conspiracy to commit rebellion/ and subversion. CSG prayed that the 431 items seized be allowed to retain. Aguilar Roque however argued that the evidence is inadmissible. Petitioner also questioned the validity of the search warrant issued on the ground that the same is a general warrant. HELD: Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of Search Warrant, there may searches be made without a warrant. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as a proof of the commission of the offense (Sec 12 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court). As an incident of the arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without the need for warrant. In such cases, the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Considering Aguilar Roques charges and circumstances attendant thereto, the search need not be attended by a search warrant in the interest of public order. Dissenting and Concurring, Justice Teehankee The crime of rebellion is patently against the constitutional proscription and settled law. Suffice it to state that the arresting CSG knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception under Rule 126 Sec 12 of the Rules of Court which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to the search of his person at the time of the incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as a proof for the commission of the offense. It cannot be made in place other than the place of the arrest. In other words, it cannot be made in the dwelling of the petitioner. To hold that her dwelling could later on the same day be searched without search warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification Motion for Reconsideration, 147 SCRA 509 Due to certain circumstances that transpired and with the advent of new administration, the judgment made by Judge Pano is hereby made annulled and the TRO of the respondents from introducing certain evidence are hereby made permanent. The personalities seized by virtue of the illegal search warrant are hereby ordered returned.
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PEOPLE V. LEANGSIRI, 252 SCRA 213 FACTS: Leangsiri was arrested in NAIA for bringing 8.2 kg of Heroin that was about to be delivered to CERTAIN individuals in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. An entrapment operation planned by NARCOM was perfected against other respondents Amidu, Omogbalohan and Bhola. The said entrapment operation was to be conducted in Leangsiris room. After the entrapment operation was done, NARCOM proceeded to the respective hotel rooms of the private respondents, (Amidu in the same hotel, while the two were with Royal Palms), with the help of hotel personnel to continue the search. In the room of Amidu tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was found a paper with the name Suchinda Leangsiri written on it. HELD: In the case at bar, the arrest made against the appellants are unconstitutional. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper found must not be admitted as evidence. The established rule is a strict application of the exception provided that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of an incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Such warrantless search cannot be made in other place than the place of the arrest. It has to be reiterated that the Nolasco case has adopted the immediate control test enunciated in Chimel v. State of California. The warrantless search can be made not only on the person of the suspect but also on a permissible area within his reach. Nevertheless, the other documents not affected by the illegality of the search must be appreciated in order not to exculpate appellants. JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES, 333 US 10 FACTS: Detective Belland received information from an anonymous source that there was a smell of opium coming from a certain hotel room. In response to it, Belland together with other personnel expert of narcotic works went to the hotel where the incident took place, proceeded to the room occupied by petitioner and where the opium was coming from; and there conducted a search. Petitioner objected the admission of the evidence on the ground that it violates her right to unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD: The government contends that the search without warrant must be held valid because it is an incident to an arrest. The argument presupposes that the arrest must be lawful. Since the arrest was without warrant, it could be valid only if a crime is committed in the presence of an arresting officer or for a felony which he had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty. Before entering the room, it was uncertain WON the room was being occupied as an opium den or WON the room was
occupied by other persons who might be guilty of the offense as well. But when the officers entered the room, only the petitioner was present, therefore, on the part of the government, they had reasonable basis for believing that she had been smoking opium and thus illicitly possessed the narcotic. An officer gaining access to private living quarters under the color of his office and of the law which he personifies must have some valid basis in law for the intrusion.
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PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE A contraband in plain view of officers who have a right to be in the place where they are and see the contraband have the right to seize the same without the need of securing a warrant. Requisites a. Prior justification for the entry or intrusion b. Inadvertent discovery of the evidence c. Immediate apparent illegality of the item as evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure d. Plain view justifies mere seizure of evidence without further search. PEOPLE V. MUSA, 217 SCRA 597 FACTS: Musa was arrested in a buy bust operation for marijuana. When the narcotics command asked for the location of the marked money, he said that he already gave it to his wife. Police officers searched his domicile but nobody was inside the house. When the house was searched, a cellophane (white and stripe in color) hanging at the corner of the kitchen was seized containing several marijuana leaves. The admissibility of the bag was challenged; nevertheless, the trial court still admitted the same as evidence for Musas conviction of selling marijuana. HELD: Objects in plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The contraband musr be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In the instant case, the plastic bag was not within the plain view when the agents moved from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. In gratia argument, the plastic bag was their plain view and not its contents. The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of the defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. PEOPLE V. DORIA, 301 SCRA 668 FACTS: In a buy bust operation, PO3 Manlangit acted as a buyer poseur gave the marked money to Doria; and was asked to wait as DOria would get the marijuana leaves from a colleague. When Doria returned and handed the marijuana to Manlangit, the latter arrested the former together with other members of NARCOM. When asked where the marked money was, Doria told that it was with Neneth. Doria accompanied the NARCOM members to Neneths house. Manlangit looked over Neneths house
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and was able to find for a box containing several leaves of Marijuana. As her defense, Neneth claimed that it was her first time to see the box subject to the prosecution. HELD : An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty raises when the item is enclosed in a container. However if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration or transparency or its contents are obvious to an observer then the contents are in plain view. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents. Each brick of marijuana is even wrapped in newspapers and placed inside plastic bags, white, pink or blue in color. The testimony of the police officer on cross examination made it apparent that he was not aware of the contents of box seized.
PEOPLE V, SALANGUIT, 356 SCRA 683 FACTS: Salanguit was arrested in a search operation in his residence which yielded shabu and bricks of marijuana wrapped in newsprint. A police poseur buyer conducted the search by virtue of a warrant. In the application of the warrant, the accused claimed that he had previous encounter with Salanguit and that the shabu was located in a certain cabinet inside a certain room. During the actual search, police knocked at the room where Salanguit, et al was apprehended, and when nobody immediately opened the door and panicking sounds were apparent, he forced to open the same and he was able to find 12 small heat sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance and two bricks of dried leaves wrapped in the newspaper suspected to be marijuana. Salanguit was convicted. On appeal, he questioned the issuance of warrant and the seizure of the bricks of marijuana. HELD: The search warrant authorized the seizure of shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug was done because of the plain view doctrine which was misapplied in the instant case. 1. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of shabu first. Once that portion of the warrant has been satisfied, the justification of the polices stay already ceases as fishing cannot be allowed to further incriminate the accused. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found. 2. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no immediate nor apparent illegality to justify their seizure. SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES The mere fact that the thing to be searched is a moving vehicle does not necessarily mean that there could be indiscriminate stopping and searching without reasonable basis or probable cause or reasonable suspicion for doing so. In checkpoints, only visual searches or inspections may be made, unless there is justifiable reason for conducting a more extended search.
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PEOPLE V. BARROS, 231 SCRA 557 FACTS: Two police officers rode a bus going to Mountain Province. A passenger rode with a box and sat at Seat 18. When the bus reached its destination, the two policemen called a colleague to inspect the box and it was found out that the box contained marijuana. Accused and the driver were invited to the detachment for investigation and it was found out that the accused owned the same. He was found guilty of violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, he claimed that the act violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD : Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a judicial warrant. In carrying out the same, the peace officers are limited merely to routine checks. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, a warrantless search would be permissible only if the officer has if the officers have reasonable or probable cause to believe that extensive search is necessary, to wit: (1) the motorist is a law offender or (2) the contents of the cargo have been instruments or subject matters of the proceeds of the crime. In the case at bar, the court is unable to find in the record any circumstance which would have constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the box. Nothing in records also show that Barros commits or attempts to commit a crime or a reasonable belief that a crime perpetuated by Barros has been committed.
CABALLES V. COURT OF APPEALS, 373 SCRA 221 FACTS: The petitioner was apprehended by two policemen because his passenger jeep was unusually covered with kakawati leaves. When asked what was in the cargo, Caballes wasnt able to reply. When the police checked the cargo, it was found out that the vehicle contained high voltage wires amounting to P55k. Caballes was convicted of theft. CA affirmed. He assailed the admissibility of the evidence obtained thru warrantless arrest on the ground that mere suspicion that it might contain smuggled goods does not constitute probable cause. HELD: Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense which he is charged. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the public officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with Kakawati leaves. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered does not constitute probable cause as would justify the conduct of a search warrant. The police authorities do not claim to have received any report or tipped information that the petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires. The jurisprudence is replete that were tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest.
VALMONTE V. DE VILLA, 178 SCRA 211
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FACTS: AFP and the NCR District Command was activated with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and order and providing an atmosphere conducive to social, economic, and political development of the NCR. In view thereof, several checkpoints have been installed in Valenzuela. Petitioners seek the nullification of the same on the ground that they might be subjected to whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their vehicles are being subjected to regular searches without the benefit of search warrant. HELD : Check points are not illegal per se. No proof has been presented before the court to show that in the course of their routine checks, the military committed specific violations of petitioners right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense (against NPA sparrow units who kill police and military men) and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Motion for Reconsideration, 185 SCRA 665 Nowhere in the questioned decision did the Court legalize all checkpoints at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is that checkpoints are not illegal per se. WON effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in the illegal trade. These checkpoints have been attacked by movants as a warrantless search and seizure and therefore violative of the Constitution. For as long as vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search and the inspection is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection. If vehicles are flagged down, and searched extensively, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief that the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are instruments of some offense.
ANIAG JR, V. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424 FACTS: Pursuant to the holding of 1992 synchronized elections, COMELEC issued a resolution banning the transport of guns. Petitioner- congressman was asked by a colleague in Congress to surrender certain type of gun so he asked his driver to bring the same from his residence to Congress. The driver was apprehended a few meters before the House of Representatives. The City Prosecutors Office exonerated him but the COMELEC wishes to make him part of the complaint. Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the said act, for him, without a warrant and without informing the driver of his fundamental rights violates the constitution.
HELD : Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach. They were significantly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Officers
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should have just conducted a routine check. An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist is a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In the case at bench, there was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so, on account of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished were engaged in gun running, transporting of firearms or in organizing special strike forces.
PEOPLE V. USANA, 323 SCRA 754 FACTS: A certain car was apprehended at the corner of Gil Puyat Ave and SLEX in Makati City. Usana, et al was apprehended and when extensive search was conducted, two firearms and hashish were recovered from their vehicle. All of them were convicted of violating RA 6425. Present appeal pertains to the conviction of Usana and Lopez to the illegal sale; distribution, and; transportation of hashish on the ground that the manner by which checkpoint was conducted in an unreasonable manner and the search was violative of their constitutional right.
HELD: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by exigencies of public order are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. On the second issue, even though there was an ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, Escano (the owner of the car) made no apparent objection as he seemed to have freely accompanied the police officers in searching the car. On the third issue, the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425 cannot be countenanced due to the following reasons: (1) the car belonged to Escano; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened with the consent of Escano without the presence of Usana and Lopez; (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the trunk, the car was in possession and control of the police authorities. The two, having been with Escano in the latters car before the finding of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate the to the offense of prohibited drug.
ALMEIDA SANCHEZ V. US, 413 US 266 FACTS: Petitioner, a Mexican Citizen, assailed the Constitutionality of the acts of the Border Patrol when her car was extensively searched on State Highway 78 in California, 20 miles North of the Mexican Border, without any warrant, probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.
HELD: Since there is no jurisprudence to resolve the petitioners dispute, US SC used the legal provision in order to settle the controversy. Undoubtedly, it is within the power of the Federal Government to
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exclude aliens from the country, and this can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals seeking to cross the national borders. But the search of the petitioners automobile that lies 20 miles north of the Mexican Border cannot be equated with the logic of the law. In the absence of probable cause or consent, the search violated the petitioners right to Fourth Amendment. Those lawfully within the country are entitled to use public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search.
When an officers observation lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally residing in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke his suspicion. However, the stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. (US v. Brignoni Ponce, 422 US 873)
Stops for brief questioning need not to be bolstered by warrant (US v. Martines Fuerte, 428 US 543)
CUSTOMS SEARCHES Items which are imported and which are to be subjected to payment of customs duties are not considered as properly within the territory of the taxing authority if the appropriate taxes havent paid yet. Customs authorities who have jurisdiction to collect revenues from imported articles have custody over said articles and if they are withdrawn or moved without the corresponding duties and taxes having been paid, they may be recovered, seized and forfeited. Searches and seizures of aircrafts and vessels in violation of the customs laws constitute no violation of constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures because these modes of transportation can easily move out of the jurisdiction (Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336) PAPA V. MAGO, 22 SCRA 857 FACTS: The head of the counter intelligence unit of MPD received information that certain undervalued and effects will dock at the customs zone of the port of Manila. Papa, acting on the said report, ordered the conduct of surveillance within the customs zone. When the effects have arrived, the police intercepted them. The owners of the effects were intercepted; hence, they sought to enjoin the customs authorities from seizing their effects WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANT, and in turn asked the RTC to return their properties to them. RTC granted the petition of Mago, hence, this petition. HELD: Under Sec 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code, persons with police authority may enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house, and to inspect, search, examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines, contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant. Collaterally, however, when the performance is to be perfected at the dwelling, a warrant may therefore be necessary.
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STOP AND FRISK EXCEPTION THE TERRY PATDOWN A police officer may observe certain unusual and suspicious activity which would indicate that something is wrong afoot. He needs not to wait for an explicit criminal conduct to be manifested before he may take action. Mere suspicious behaviour would not justify such an action. There must be a genuine basis, considering the officers experience and other surrounding conditions. A police may ask for the identity of the person apprehended and failure to give such may result in conviction of the so called stop and identify statutes. TERRY V. OHIO, 392 US 1 FACTS: Terry, Chilton and Katz were noticed by a certain policeman performing suspicious acts in front of a store. The police approached them and identified himself as such. He frisked (by merely patting down) the three and he was able to yield several revolvers. The trial court denied to suppress evidence, but it rejected the claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State SC dismissed the appeal on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was involved. HELD: Stop and frisk has two fold interests: general interest of effective crime prevention and detection; the more pressing interest of safety and self preservation. The court cannot blind itself to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where there may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behaviour he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon, and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of the crime, but to allow officers to pursue his investigation without fear of violence and frisk of weapons might be necessary and reasonable. (Cases of these kinds must be decided on the factual circumstances attendant thereto.)
ADAMS V. WILLIAMS, 407 US 143 FACTS: Police Officer Adams approached the automobile of respondent William after receiving a report that the latter was in a possession of a gun and narcotics. Respondent was convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of handgun, but the Court of Appeals reversed the same holding that the evidence that was used by the trial court was obtained by an unlawful search. HELD : THE Court recognized in Terrry that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect. The purpose of the limited search is not to discover evidence of crime but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
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without fear of violence and thus, frisk for weapons might be necessary or reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable law. Probable cause does not require technical type of evidence to support conviction. In this type of case, the court needs to evaluate generally circumstances at the time of the arrest to decide if the officer had probable cause for his action. Under the circumstances surrounding Williams, the officers actions in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden (at the respondents waist) constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety.
MALACAT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 283 SCRA 159 FACTS: In response to a bomb threat cascaded a few days ago, several policemen posted themselves in Plaza Miranda at around 6:30 pm. Consequently, a group allegedly was acting strangely. When one of the policemen approached one of the members of these groups, they all dispersed in different directions. When apprehended, a fragmentation grenade was recovered from Malalat, and revolvers to his companions. The group was convicted guilty under PD 1866. The trial court ruled that warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest is akin to stop and frisk whose object is to maintain status quo momentarily. HELD: Warrantless arrest incidental to a lawful arrest and stop and frisk do not have application in the instant case. For the first one, it is necessary that a lawful arrest precedes the search. In the case at bar, the incident happened the other way around. For the stop and frisk issue, while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, nevertheless, it holds that mere suspicion will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist in light of the officers experience and surrounding conditions to warrant the belief that the person has weapons concealed about him. There is also no stop and frisk in the instant case for the following reasons: 1. The claim that petitioners were responsible for the attempted Plaza Miranda bombing was not proved nor supported by any police power. The claim is not supported by any police report nor corroborated by any police officer who allegedly chased the group. 2. Nothing in petitioners behaviour or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast. Furthermore, this can be stricken out since the incident happened at dusk. 3. There was no probable cause to believe that the petitioner was armed with deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu. Based on the record of the case, the grenade was discovered insite the front waistline and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and the petitioner, any telltale bulge is not visible. What is unequivocal in this case is the blatant disregard to petitioners guaranteed right against unreasonable searches and seizures. EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES Recent innovation in law
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PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA, 233 SCRA 716 FACTS: A surveillance team was established in Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA due to an intelligence report that the said office was being used as a communication command post of RAM-SFP. It was the second day of the surveillance team when a group of persons mobbed themselves in front of the office. Five men dismembered themselves with the group and approached the car of the surveillance team and fired them consequently. This prompted the creation of a raiding team which was able to yield certain documents, firearms, ammunitions and explosives in the area. These confiscated items were said to be those of a certain Col. Martillano. De Gracia was arrested together with two janitors for they were the only ones in the office that day. It was later found out that the owner of the Eurocar was a certain Mr. Gutierrez. De Gracia was then charged with illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion and attempted homicide. He was found guilty with the former and was acquitted with the latter. HELD: Under the foregoing circumstances, it is the courts considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, military operatives taking into account the facts obtaining in the case had reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and is being committed. Furthermore, the raiding team had dearth of time in securing the search warrant. Under such urgency and exigency, a search warrant can be dispensed with. CONSENTED SEARCHES When a person waives his right to have a warrant, no warrant needs to be procured However it must not be lost of sight of that mere silence would not automatically mean consent. Such a passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances is considered no consent at all within the purview of constitutional guarantee (People v. Compacion, 361 SCRA 540) Requisites of a valid waiver: A. Right must exist B. The person involved had the knowledge, actual or constructive of the existence of such right C. Person had an actual intention to relinquish the right Proof of the existence of consent is based on clear and convincing evidence Whether or not consent to search was made voluntarily is determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: a. Age of the defendant b. Whether he was in a public or secluded location c. Whether he objected to the search or passively looked on
d. Education and intelligence of the defendant e. Presence of coercive policies f. Defendants belief that no incriminating evidence will be found
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g. Nature of the police questioning h. Environment in which the questioning took place i. Possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting
Consent given by landlords or hotel clerks may not be valid if they are not possessed of authority or not possessed with other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. US V. DRAYTON, 536 US 194
FACTS: Several police rode the bus where Drayton and Brown were riding. These police officers were inspecting persons or properties of passengers in search of weapons or drugs without discounting the right of the passengers to disagree with the search. Since the two respondents were wearing suits unsuitable for a warm weather, police officer asked if he could search their persons. Brown and Drayton were arrested on the ground that they had tapes of cocaine with them. They challenged the manner on how the evidence was obtained stating that they did not consent with the pat down method conducted by the officer. Trial court denied giving due course; appellate court reversed the same on the ground that respondents didnt feel free to disregard the officer. HELD: Police officers may approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to searches, provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse. While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one of the factors to be taken into account, the government needs not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. The court concludes that the facts of this particular case show that the police did not seize respondents when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. The officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers question. (Factual circumstances relative to the decision of the US SC are in the full text of the book) Dissenting Opinion, Justice Souter Anyone who travels submits to searches as a condition of boarding, ie aircraft. Intrusions are necessary to hedge against risks. The courts decision stating that bus passengers consent to searches to enhance their own safety is quite unrealistic AIRPORT SEARCHES Special concerns for safety and security PEOPLE V. JOHNSON, 348 SCRA 526 FACTS: In her flight to the USA, respondent Johnson was asked to undergo inspections which found out that she was hiding shabu below her abdominal girdle. She was convicted guilty of violating RA 6425. On appeal, she questioned the manner on which the evidence was obtained, the same was product of unreasonable searches and seizures.
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HELD: The methamphetamine HCl seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. The search was made pursuant to Section 9 of RA 6235. Such searches are reasonable and do not run counter with the constitution given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved and the reduced privacy exceptions associated with the airline travel. MISCELLANEOUS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES The proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, as already seen, has varied application, adapting to circumstances as they call for it. It continues to do so in other situations like extending it to non tangible things and other forms of searches involving alcohol and drug testing, transportation and communication and electronically enhanced intrusions. ALIH V. CASTRO, 151 SCRA 279 FACTS: In search of loose firearms and ammunition, several military operations in Zamboanga City were established. The same operations were dreaded and were tantamount to the force perpetuated by Japanese forces. Initially, people would resist military operations by bursting gun fire in order to drive them away; nevertheless, these armed forces would resort to bloodshed in furtherance of their designs. People then would be constrained to surrender which gave the military personnel to arrest 16 men who were finger printed, paraffin tested and photographed amid their oppositions. Several firearms, explosives and ammunitions were also confiscated. Petitioners went to the SC to enjoin the military to return the confiscated items. Military countered that they were just following lawful orders and their acts were aimed at regulating peace and order in view of the death of the mayor of the city. HELD : Respondents violated the precept that civilian authority is at all time supreme over the military. They bypassed the operation of civil courts which could determine probable cause in issuing warrant. The respondents cannot plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. The military had the opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. There was no reason why they should disregard the orderly process required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioners premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
GUAZON V. DE VILLA, 181 SCRA 623 FACTS: Petitioners wish to seek to prohibit the military personnel from furthering any saturation drive to clear up the area with subversives on the grounds of abuses enumerated thereto; some of these involve warrantless searches and seizures and warrantless arrest. HELD: It is undeniable that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would bring down the duly constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of the security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations set forth by the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and the left, the
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enlargement of whose spheres of influence it tries to suppress. When a violation of human rights is involved, it is the duty of the Court to stop the transgression where the power of the state may encroach upon the rights of the individuals. If the military and police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminals, such drives must be consistent with the constitution. It is not the police action per se which is impermissible; rather it is the procedure used or in the words of the court, the hardened sensibilities. TWIST: The Court believes that it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. However, the remedy is not to stop police actions, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Police force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. Where not one of the victims complains and not one of the violator is properly charged or identified, the problem is not with the SC but with the executive departments (CHR, DOJ, DND) or the trial courts. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Cruz Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or arrest may be made without warrant. They come under the concept of fishing expeditions stigmatized by law. Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured. OLIVER V. US, 466 US 170 FACTS: Kentucky State Police entered the land of the petitioner despite a no trespassing sign and despite that the fields are secluded and locked. The said police found marijuana fields on the petitioners land. In another case, homologous sets of facts were recognized by the court.
ISSUE: WON the open field doctrine apply
HELD: Open field doctrine allows peace officers to enter into a land even without the authority of a search warrant. The term effects under the Fourth Amendment do not include open fields. The US SC concludes that open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment. An individual may not legitimately demand activities conducted out of doors except immediately surrounding the home. In contrast, open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from the government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities such as cultivation of crops that occur in open fields. Curtilage and open fields must be distinguished. The former forms part of the home and therefore covered by privacy while the second is not.
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25 FACTS: On account of information given by an unnamed informer, Valdez was charged to have cultivated marijiuana beside his nipa house in Nueva Vizcaya. The police went to the said area adhering to the order that those plants will be uprooted and whoever has cultivated such plants would be arrested. Valdez was prosecuted for violating RA 6425. He denied the allegations by stating that he was merely
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brought to the area where his photograph was taken and that fear for the authority made him admit the offense. HELD: In the instant case, no search warrant was issued by a judge after personal examination of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisoned tree.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER SEARCHES Apply as well to the pry of administrative agencies that may intrude into the privacy of persons In the Philippines, the following are exempted from warrant: inspection of buildings, enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. Searches and seizures by government employers and supervisors to the private properties of their employees run against the constitutional grant (OConnor v. Ortega, 480 US 709( Requiring an employer to secure warrant before entering an employees room would seriously be burdensome and unreasonable. Work related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency CAMARA V. MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 387 US 523 FACTS: CAMARA was prosecuted for violating the State Housing Code after three efforts by the county to allow a warrantless inspection of the ground floor quarters which he leased and whose residential use allegedly violated the apartment building occupancy permit. Camara challenged the constitutionality of the act on the ground that municipal officials are being allowed to enter the dwelling of private individuals. HELD: Except in certain cases, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable. Protections provided by warrant procedure are needed; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of criminal penalty. The pivotal issue is not whether these inspections are needed for undeniably, their ends are justified, but in so doing, is a valid warrant needed in furtherance of the inspection? Searches made without warrant lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual and that the reasons put forth in the courts long line of cases are insufficient to justify the substantial weakening of the protection. In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable, the need for inspection mut be weighed in terms of goals of code enforcement. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against invasion which the search entail. But a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections (1) such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance; (2) public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated; (3) inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime; they involve a relatively invasion of the urban
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citizens privacy. Having said so, probably cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exit if reasonable legislative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. In the instant case, appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a search warrant and may not constitutionally convicted for refusing consent to the inspection. ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND RELATED TESTS Requiring a person to submit urine or blood or to undergo breathalizer testing are considered species of search covered by the constitution CANINE SNIFF TEST Although privacy interest is at stake, the same is deemed a not to approach constitutional dimensions It is not within the meaning of search by the Fourth Amendment
GROUNDS FOR WARRANTLESS ARRESTS Inflagrante Delicto Hot Pursuit Escaped Prisoner
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO A crime is committed or is about to be committed in the presence of the person making the arrest Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify the arrest. There must be a manifestation that the accused , thru overt acts, has committed, is committing or is attempting to commit an offense (People v. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142) Elements: a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has committed, is committing or is attempting to commit a crime b. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of a public officer PEOPLE V. BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1 FACTS: Cesar Masamlok was allegedly coerced to join the NPA by respondent Burgos. Several members of the Constabulary and INP were formed to subdue Burgos. In his house, several subversive items and revolver were recovered. He was found guilty by the trial court. On appeal, he questioned the validity of warrantless arrest and searches.
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HELD: Under Section 6 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the arresting person must have knowledge that a crime is apparently committed and that the offense must be committed in his presence / within his view. The right of a person to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizure is a basic and fundamental right. The statute or rule which allows exception to the requirements of warrants is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the contemplated situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or manifestly unnecessary. We cannot liberally construe the rule or extend its application beyond the ambit of the law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated. UMIL V. RAMOS, 187 SCRA 311 FACTS: The case is a consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus; the persons involved were arrested without warrant. Respondents assert that the privilege would lie because the petitioners have been legally arrested and incarcerated by virtue of information filed against them in court. The cases were violation of PD 1866, subversion, murder, inciting to sedition, among others. HELD: 1. As to the two petitioners who were apprehended and joining the NPA due to subversion, the same crimes continuing offenses, therefore their arrest is justified. 3. As to the petitioners who were charged with inciting to rebellion and murder, their cases fall under Hot Pursuit of Section 5(b) Rule 113 of the Rules of Corut Dissenting Opinions: Justice Cruz subversion is a continuing offense under Padilla v. Enrile Justice Feliciano inciting to sedition is a continuing offense Justice Sarmiento warrantless arrest is not possible in subversion unless there are overt acts manifesting furtherance of the same Motion For Reconsideration, 202 SCRA 252 The court does not imply that mere suspicion of being affiliated with NPA or CPP already constitutes sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. One of the petitioners was arrested because of subversion, which is a continuing offense. His subversive designs will not be mitigated merely because he was admitted in a certain hospital. It cannot be said as well that his arrest was due to suspicion but on a probable cause. PEOPLE V. AMINUNDIN, 163 SCRA 402 FACTS: Aminundin was arrested after information were given to certain police officers that he would transport marijuana from Jolo to Iloilo. When the police inspected his bag, marijuana leaves were found.
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He however denied the allegations claiming that what he merely brought were clothing, his merchandise as he was selling watches, and some personal belongings. Trial Court found him guilty of violating the Anti Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, he questioned the validity of search and arrest. HELD: In the case at bar, no warrant of arrest or search warrant was issued by judge after personal determination of probable cause. The respondent was not even in in flagrante delicto nor was a crime committed or being committed to justify such existence. Expediency cannot even be invoked in order to dispense with the need for a warrant. As presented, the officers had two days to go to court and ask for a warrant, the respondent was identified, the manner of transport was known and the vessel which he would disembark was also identified. STATE OF REBELLION In a case, a mob tried to get in their way to Malacanang which compelled the President to declare a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the group responsible for the same. Aggrieved, the group went to the SC for remedies; nonetheless, the case was mooted as the State of Rebellion was soon withdrawn by the president. The court pronounced that in quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrest of persons suspected if the circumstances under Rule 113 Sec 5 warrant. The warrantless arrest feared is not based on the declaration of the State of Rebellion (Lacson v. Perez, 357 SCRA 756) SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 421 SCRA 656 FACTS: The advent of Oakwood Mutiny, which asked the resignation of the President, the PNP Chief and the DND Secretary, compelled the President to place the Philippines under State of Rebellion. After long hours of negotiations, mutineers decided to return to barracks. However, the President only lifted the declaration of the State of Rebellion several days, thereafter. HELD : Plenary are the powers of the President to call the Armed Forces to suppress violence and state of lawlessness. But the manner perpetuated by the President in calling out of the Armed Forces and the calling out of the State of Rebellion is an utter superfluity. Such declaration is devoid of any legal significance. Regarding the apprehension that military or police may resort to warrantless arrest, the court declares rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. In quelling or suppressing the Rebellion, warrantless arrest may only be done if the conditions so warrant. HOT PURSUIT When a crime has just been committed, the law enforcers ordinarily would have to try to get the culprit as soon as possible before he eludes them. When a policeman had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that the suspect and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest aid suspect
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without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could have obtained a warrant, the culprit could have fled the law. A policeman cannot arrest a suspect based on a bio data sheet with suspects name on it which was found at the crime scene. By no means could this indicate that said person have committed the offense charged. (People v. Sequinio, 264 SCRA 79) GO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 26 SCRA 138 FACTS: Petitioner Go and Eldon Maguan had an encounter in a certain one-way street when the former entered the said street and their two cars almost collided with each other. Go went off his automobile and fired at Maguan. A security guard was able to witness what happened and was able to take down of the
plate number which fingered at him. Six days passed and petitioner surrendered himself with San Juan Police and he was subsequently charged initially with frustrated murder, then with murder upon the death of the victim. Go questioned the validity of his arrest. HELD: Umil v. Ramos cannot be applied in this case. In the said decision, the crimes committed were subversion which is a continuing crime. The detention of the petitioner does not fall within the terms of hot pursuit. Arresting officer obviously had no personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the petitioner was the gunman. The information was derived from the alleged eyewitnesses. TO cure the procedural defect, the police should have immediately scheduled GO for preliminary investigation in order to ascertain the existence of probable cause.
POSADAS V. OMBUDSMAN, 341 SCRA 388 FACTS: Dennis Ventura a member of Sigma Rho Fraternity of UP was killed in a rumble with another fraternity. Posadas, then Chancellor of UP sought the assistance of NBI. Upon positive identification of two witnesses, the NBI team initiated to arrest two suspects who belong to Scintilla Juris Fraternity. Posadas and some members of UP objected the arrest because the NBI were not armed with warrant. They instead promised to bring the two suspects to NBI the following day. Ombudsman recommended that PD 1829 be charged to Posadas for obstructing the arrest to be conducted. HELD: Hot pursuit cannot be applied in this case. NBI agents had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they were had been the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant. Petitioners cannot be prosecuted as well for PD 1829. Posadas and officials of UP had the right to prevent the arrest of their students because the arrest was illegal. To correct the procedural
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defects, NBI should have just secured a warrant of arrest in order to legalize the arrest of the two suspects. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU, 227 SCRA 627 FACTS: Mayor Sanchez was being fingered as the culprit of rape with homicide. After DOJ Special Prosecutors Panel conducted the preliminary investigation, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an invitation to Sanchez at Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna where he was identified by two witnesses in an extra judicial confession. He was then placed on arrest status and brought back to DOJ. Inquest proceedings were conducted and a warrant of arrest was issued to him by Judge Lanzanas. Sanchez was detained at CIS, Camp Crame. The respondent prosecutors filed seven information in Laguna and Judge Domingo also issued a warrant of arrest against him. The case was transferred to Pasig RTC under the sala of the respondent judge. Sanchez filed a motion to quash information substantially contending that his warrantless arrest was illegal. HELD: Arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person subject to the same. The application of actual force or incarceration needs not to be given credence. Petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim under the guise of an invitation by a high ranking military official. Obviously, a command or an order of arrest cloaked such request invitation that Petitioner went there without opposition, similar to the
pronouncement of the court in Babst v. National Intelligence Board. This form of arrest is not covered by Rule 113 Sec 5 of the Rules of Court. The arresting officers were not present during the rape and slay of the victims of Sanchez. Furthermore, the said crimes were committed 46 days had passed so it cannot be said that the crime had just been committed. Although the said arrest was illegal, the two subsequent arrests effected by virtue of the orders of Judges Lanzanas and Domingo were, although belated, but legal. Therefore, the RTC Pasig still has jurisdiction over the person of Sanchez.
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES A judge may still produce a warrant of arrest even if he did not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. He may rely on the findings from and the records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by prosecutors. (Oktubre v. Velasco, 434 SCRA 636) This is in accordance with the constitution because what he is merely required to do is personally determine the existence of probable cause. It is required, though, that a judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause (Okabe v. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685) A warrant of arrest cannot be expeditiously issued if what the judge had were only resolutions of the Panel of Investigators from the OMB, recommending the filing of information and the
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memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutors denying the existence of prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of a criminal case (Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan 360 SCRA 367) IF the judge and fiscal have contrary views regarding the existence of probable cause, the petition for warrant should not be dismissed at out rightly. The prosecutor must be asked to adduce more evidence (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465) IF the fiscal refuses, the case may then be dismissed. The court is not allowed to order for a second preliminary investigation if the prosecutor has already certified that there is a prima fascie case against the accused. (ibid) The certification of a fiscal as to the existence of probable cause does not obligate the judge to issue warrant of arrest (ibid) Even a judge conducting a preliminary investigation in finds probable cause, he may not issue a warrant depending on his appreciation of the circumstances (Samulde v. Salvani, 165 SCRA 734) The arrest can be ordered only in the event that the prosecutor files the case and the RTC Judge finds probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant (Pangan v. Ganay, 445 SCRA 574) LIM SR V. FELIX, 194 SCRA 292 FACTS: Mayor Vicente Lim Sr et al was charged with murder and frustrated murder before RTC Masbate. The prosecutor issued a certification to the effect that there exist probable cause and a prima fascie case against said accused and the court ordered their arrest. Lim asked for a change in venue and it was re raffled to RTC Makati. Lim asked the said court that the records from RTC Masbate be transmitted and another hearing be conducted for the determination of probable cause. RTC Makati denied the petition and merely relied on the above mentioned certification. HELD: A certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. He must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause on the basis of issuing the warrant; or if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the same. If a judge solely relies on the certification of the Prosecutor, he or she has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The determination is made by the prosecution which is contrary to the language of the constitution. At the very least, the judge should have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted in the light of the evidences presented in view of the political undertones. WEBB V. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 652 FACTS: NBI charged Webb, et al of Rape with Homicide against Vizcondes. DOJ formed a panel that conducted the investigation, and presented documentary evidences and affidavits pertaining to the way the crime was perpetuated by the petitioners. On his defense, Webb presented evidences showing that
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he was in US when the crime took place. DOJ filed a resolution finding probable casue to hold respondents for trial. The case was raffled to the ala of Judge Escano, but it was Judge De Leon who issued the warrant. Judge Escano inhibited from the case because he was once a member of NBI. Judge Tolentino continued presiding the case and issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Petitioners questioned the issuance of warrant by two judges who did not conduct a preliminary examination and the judges did not issue order of arrest prior to warrant of arrest. HELD : The Constitution, the Rules of Court ad the Case Laws repudiate that judges should have first conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing search warrants and warrants of arrest. They also reject petitioners contention that an order of arrest must first be issued before warrants of arrest. Judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. TALINGDAN V. EDUARTE, 366 SCRA 559 FACTS: Atty. Talingdan charged Judge Eduarte with improvidently issuing a warrant of arrest without first conducting preliminary investigation being first conducted by the Public Prosecutor. Several members of Cauyan police went to Talingdans house to issue the warrant for committing the crime of libel. In his defense, Judge Eduarte denied that the same was done with malice although he admitted that he issued the warrant. According to him, when the records of the case was sent to his office he asked the Criminal Docket Clerk to verify the records first and when an information has already been filed, prepare the corresponding warrant of arrest. Thus when he saw that the warrant of arrest was already prepared, he signed the same. HELD: Personal determination by the judge is necessary before issuing warrants. Judges are not obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses themselves. What is emphasized is exclusive and personal responsibility to satisfy him as to the existence of probable cause. What he is not allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutors bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Whats worse is that not even a certification was issued to that effect. Further, the responsibility delegated by the respondent was clearly unauthorized and unwarranted. He cannot abandon his judicial obligation by merely instructing a clerk to do the necessary determination of probable cause. ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS The constitution is explicit that only a judge can issue warrants. Officers other than judges may issue warrants under certain and limited circumstances alone. An Immigration Commissioner may do so for the limited purpose of carrying out a final judgment of deportation, but not for the purpose of conducting an investigation. Secretary of Labor
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cannot anymore issue search and arrest warrants with the coming of 1987 Constitution. (Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145) QUA CHEE GAN V. DEPORTATION BOARD, 9 SCRA 27 FACTS: Petitioners bought and remitted $130K to Hongkong without securing the necessary permit from the Central Bank. Respondent Deportation Board issued warrant of arrest against petitioner. Petitioner challenged the validity of deportation charges and questioned the jurisdiction of the Board. RTC ruled that the respondent had jurisdiction since it got its power from the Delegated Power of the President to determine the qualifications of aliens who stay in the country by determining their goodness or vileness. Hence, before the SC, comes the petitioner challenging the power of the President to deport and that of delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate. HELD: Under the existing laws, investigation for the conduct and deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected by order of the President, after due investigation pursuant to Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and by the Commissioner of Immigration upon the recommendation by the Board of Commissioners under Sec 37 of CA 613. The charges against petitioner constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or black-marketing of US Dollars in violation of Central Bank Regulations. Regarding the issue WON the President or Administrative Bodies may issue warrants of arrest, the advent of the current safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures were not lifted from the Jones Law or the US Constitution. Under the former two acts, any public officer may determine probable cause. However under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose merely s to determine the probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. Arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation, the President has the power to order the arrest, until the deportation order has been final, no arrest has to be effected. The Court however refused to decide whether an arrest may be effected if an arrest of a foreigner is allowed for purposes of investigation only before a definitive order of deportation may be issued. Same is not raised in the case at bar. HARVEY V. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, 162 SCRA 840 FACTS: On Feb 27, 1988, petitioners, who were foreign nationals, were apprehended by virtue of mission orders issued by respondent because of abusing children, they being pedophile. On Mar 4, 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted pursuant to Sec 69 of the Administrative Code. On Mar 7, 1988, warrants of arrest were issued by respondent. HELD: The ruling in Vivo v. Montesa, that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration for the purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued conflicts
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with the constitution, IS NOT INVOCABLE HEREIN. The warrant was issued in violation of Sec 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Sec 69 of the Administrative Code. The arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. The requirement of probable cause to be determined personally by a Judge does not extend to deportation proceedings. The same does not also deviate the Qua Chee Gan doctrine because here, probable cause already exists before the warrants were issued. NOTE: DISCLAIMER (opinion lang walang basagan ng trip ) In the Qua Chee Gan, the warrant of arrest was issued BEFORE the preliminary investigation, meaning NO PROBABLE CAUSE WAS YET DETERMINED. In the Harvey case, the warrant was issued AFTER the preliminary investigation and PROBABLE CAUSE WAS ALREADY DETERMINED. In the former, NO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS HAVE YET STARTED. In the latter, THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST COMMENCES THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS. (If probable cause has already been determined, the level of culpability has been established. Absent the same merits innocence) EXCLUSIONARY RULE THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE Bars the admission of tainted evidence and whatever other fruits they may bear or lead to without prejudice to still imposing just deserts upon errant officers. A fruit of an illegal or unconstitutional act could not and should not be given any form of legitimacy by its admission in evidence. It is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish probable cause. Silver Platter Doctrine allowing federal justice the use of evidence in violation of the constitution Purposes (Republic v, Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10) a. Deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizure b. Imperative of judicial integrity c. No man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence
GR: Evidence covered by exclusionary rule is not admitted as evidence. XPN: if the person whose favour the rule exits, waives it, as by failing to object to its introduction. Nevertheless, waiver should not be causally presumed, if the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of citizenry. (ibid)
SILVERSTONE LUMBER CO, INC V. US, 251 US 64 FACTS: Frederick Silverstone and his father were arrested. The DOJ and the US Marshall, without any authority of any guise, went to the office of the petitioner in order to gather books and effects
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which will be used as evidence against him. Silverstone sought that the items be returned. The District Attorney pledged that a new indictment may be filed on account of the photographs taken from the original evidence. The petition was granted by the court, the photographs which will be used as evidence to the new indictment were impounded and it issued subpoena that the original of the returned items be legally presented in court. Silverstone refused because it was violative of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures and he was charged with contempt. HELD : The government, while in for repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not have had. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, does not mean the facts that the thus obtained becomes sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any others. But the knowledge gained by the governments own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE GUARANTEE The erring officer may be subjected to criminal and civil liabilities for violating the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. MHP GARMENTS, INC V. COURT OF APPEALS, 236 SCRA 227 FACTS: Petitioner was commissioned by BSP to sell, distribute and manufacture uniforms and insignias relevant to BSP. In its agreement with BSP, the petitioner was empowered to initiate prosecutorial actions against those who should sell, distribute and manufacture BSP merchandise without authority to do so. In information from a source, the petitioner together with several police officers went to the private respondents store without the authority of warrant. They seized all the illegal items. They also charged private respondents with unfair competition, the same was dismissed. The fiscal ordered the return of the seized items. RTC decided in favour of the respondents. CA affirmed. HELD: A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officers and private individuals directly and indirectly responsible for violating the constitutional rights against searches and seizures. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies award. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere rhetoric of burst. GROH V. RAMIREZ, 540 US 551 FACTS: Petitioner applied for a search in the respondents ranch after receiving information that when the said informant visited the respondents ranch, several explosives were seen. A judge
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ordered for the search although he did not indicate the items to be searched and the location of these items. Ninth Circuit Court invalidated the search, and declared petitioner not qualified for immunity because he was the leader of the searching authority. HELD: The warrant was plainly invalid. Although it was based on probable cause and on sworn affidavit and it didnt describ particularly the place searched. But lacking of particularity annihilated the search itself. The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized does not save the warrant from facial invalidity. Particularity reckons at the WARRANT and not the papers to support APPLICATION. This does not mean that the subject constitutional guarantee forbids cross referencing other documents. In the case at bar, the warrant did not incorporate documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application accompany the warrant. On the issue as to whether qualified immunity applies to him depends on whether the right that was transgressed was clearly established that is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted. Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid. EXTRA TERRITORIAL REACH OF THE GUARANTEE US V. VERDUGO URQUIDEZ, 494 US 259 FACTS: Respondent, a Mexican national was believed to be the leader of a smuggling group that brings illegal drugs in the United States. The government of US obtained a search warrant and thru the help of the Mexican government, respondent was arrested and incarcerated in San Diego, CA. The DEA conducted a search at the respondents resident and several items implicating him with the crime being predicated to him was seized. ISSUE: Does the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches apply to aliens residing outside the country? HELD: The term the people as used in the US Constitution refers to a class of persons who are part of the national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community. The Fourth Amendment restricts itself to searches and seizures conducted by US in its domestic matters. It was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of US territory. Aliens receive constitutional protections only when they have come within the territory and developed substantial connections with the country. Thus, the respondent has no previous significant voluntary connection with US so the constitutional guarantees are not available to him. The US frequently employs armed forces outside its territory for the protection of American Citizens and the national security. The application of constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure to the
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respondent could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving the national interest. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSE KYLLO V. US, 533 US 27 FACTS: Several authorities used thermal scanner in order to detect whether marijuana was grown in Kyllos house thru the use of triplex. The result of the thermal scan showed significant results. Federal Judge issued a search warrant and it was found out that several plants were being grown in Kylloss home. HELD: At the very core, the Fourth Amendment stands the right of man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion. Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that the society recognizes as reasonable. The said amendment has never been tied with measurement of quality or quantity of information obtained. No matter how insignificant an information obtained by any medium possible using unlawful and unreasonable means runs afoul with the virtue of the Fourth Amendment. THE BIG BROTHER SPECTRE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Every member of society while paying proper deference to general welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be left alone As long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed OPLE V. TORRES, 293 SCRA 141 FACTS: Act No. 308 (The National ID System) was promulgated in order to provide Filipino Citizens and aliens alike with facilities to conveniently transact businesses with basic services on social security providers and other government instrumentalities by establishing a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking the same; and in order to reduce fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the National Computerized ID Reference System on the ground that it violates the Bill of Rights. HELD: AO 308 violates the right to privacy. Its broadness, vagueness and over breadth cannot withstand any constitutional attack. The heart of the law generates the scrutiny which provides for the Population Reference Number commonly known as biometrics. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the pin is the real owner thereof. It may be accomplished through finger scanning, biocrypt, retinal scan, artificial nose or thermogram. At the very least, the law failed to provide the way Biometrics will be secured. Considering the banquet of
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options, the fear that it threatens to the privacy rights of the people is not groundless. Furthermore, the law does not provide whether the stored information will be for identification purposes or for biological information. Although it has been argued that the information will be limited only to name, address and information, the law does not provide how the data to be gathered will be handled. It does not provide who may access the data, for what purpose and other circumstances similar to the same. The right to privacy is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that advance public service and the coon good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such instructions
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Art. III Sec. 3 (1) (2) : The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
A form of protection prescribed by the US Bill of Rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because this form of right protected by the Philippine Constitution is not provided forth by any of the US Constitution.
Part of the right to be left alone is necessarily the corresponding freedom to communicate in confidence with some other persons without the contents of that communication being disclosed to others, especially the government.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SEARCHES The Constitution requires that there be a court order or justifiable state interest, public safety or order at that, before interference with privacy of communications and correspondence could be allowed. Furthermore, government functionary could not just use his own ideas of public safety and order as the Constitution mandates that they be prescribed by law. KATZ V. UNITED STATES, 389 US 347
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FACTS: Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with wagering of information by telephone across state lines. FBI agents attached an electronic listening and recording device outside of telephone booth from which the calls were made, and they introduced the recording as evidence. CA affirmed the conviction finding that there was no fourth amendment violation since there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by the petitioner. ISSUE: WON a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by listening to the devices attached thereto would violate the right to privacy of the user thereof. HELD : US Supreme Court renounced the way the issue was presented because the Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of government intrusion and have nothing to do with privacy per se. Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places. Nevertheless, the conviction must be reversed. Absent the penetration (opined by the CA) was at one time thought to foreclose Fourth Amendment inquiry, for that was thought to limit only to searches and seizures of tangible property. But the premises that the property interests control the right of the Government to search and seizure have been directed. Indeed, The US SC opined that the Fourth Amendment governs not only seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to recording of oral statements overheard without any physical trespass. The government intrusion in electronically listening and recording petitioners words violated the privacy upon which he is justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of fourth amendment. On the issue whether the government has encroached upon the privacy prescribed by the Fourth Amendment, the answer is on the positive. The law on question requires adherence to judicial processes and that searches conducted outside judicial processes without the approval of the judge are per se unreasonable, except upon certain circumstances. It cannot be said that wiretapping is within the ambit of search incident to lawful arrest, hot pursuit and other justifying grounds. Concurring opinion, Justice Harlan The question that must be answered is what protection does the Fourth Amendment give to people? The answer is protection to places. The law requires two fold requirements. First, a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, and second, the expectation is recognized by the people. Conversation made in public is not covered by the privacy prescription, but a booth that is temporarily private place whose momentary occupants expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. Dissenting opinion, Justice Black The first clause of the Fourth A\mendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. These words connote the idea of tangible things being searched or seized. The second clause provides that no warrants shall issue particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, is not tangible and can neither be searched nor seized. Furthermore, how can an applicant for search warrant describe the particular conversation which will happen in the future? There can be no doubt that the Framers
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of the Constitution were aware of the eavesdropping practice because it has anciently been recognized as nuisance, and if they had desired to outlaw the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping or wiretapping, they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. SALCEDO ORTANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 235 SCRA 111 FACTS: Rafael Ortanzez filed with RTC a petition seeking that her marriage with petitioner Teresita Salcedo Ortanez be declared void for lack of marriage license and psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Rafael presented, in evidence, certain cassette tapes (involving the conversation of Teresita and unidentified persons) which his friends from the military wiretapped from their telephone line. Teresita opposed to the admissibility of the tapes, nevertheless, RTC admitted them. CA affirmed with RTC and held that it was devolved upon the lower court the appreciation of admitting evidence in the name of truth, interest and even handed administration of justice. HELD: RA 4200 expressly makes recordings which emanated from wiretapping inadmissible as evidence. Moreover, Section 2 of said act imposes a penalty of six months to six years imprisonment in violation thereof.
RAMIREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 248 SCRA 590 FACTS : Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case before the RTC indicting Ester Garcia of vexing and insulting her intelligence and attributing her employment with the help of the latter. She introduced a transcript culled from tape recordings taken during their confrontations. Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violating RA 4200. The case was quashed. CA reversed. Ramirez went to the SC insisting that the provisions of RA 4200 apply against third persons not directly involved with the communication. She further averred that the act protects communication and not conversation. HELD: RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in private communications. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the qualifier any. Consequently, even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as violator of the said law. On the second argument, the word communication in its ordinary signification connotes a process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols. This definition is broad enough the emotionally charged exchange between the petitioner and the respondent. Furthermore,
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conversation and communication were used interchangeably by Sen. Tanada in his Explanatory Note to the bill. What RA 4200 prohibits is the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. A tape recording of an altercation or verbal exchange between a police and a radio reporter is admissible even if said recording was done without the knowledge of the participants. (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA153) The use of telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing does not violate RA 4200 (Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112) ZULUETA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 253 SCRA 699 FACTS: Cecilia Zuluea, the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin, went to the latters clinic, and in the presence of his mother, a driver, and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened his cabinet and took some documents which consist of correspondence between Dr. Martin and her alleged paramours. The documents were used as evidence for petitioners suit for legal separation and to disqualify her husband from the practice of medicine. RTC declared Dr. Martin as owners of the documents. CA affirmed. HELD: Documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The Constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is enforced. The only exception provided for by the Constitution is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them from breaking drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is available when so warranted. The above pronouncement seems to be erroneous because the Bill of Rights is a guarantee against whimsical governmental exercise and not against private individuals. (SEE SERRANO V. NLRC, 323 SCRA 445 [2000]) WARRANT REQUIREMENT What might only be possible to constitute warrant is a reasonable description of the person whose communication is sought to be intercepted, identification of the crime that might be committed by means of such communication, as well as a delimitation of the period of the allowable search and seizure. (2003 Bernas 211 at 212)
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY

Art. III Sec. 4: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people to assemble themselves and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Consistent with the maxim Cogitationis poena nemo moretur (No man deserves punishment for his thoughts) Freedom of expression is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom (Blo Umpar Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712) Freedom of speech has been defined as the instrument and guarantee and the bright and consummate flower of all liberty. If the people are the repository of authority, they must be able to freely express themselves with the least interference or threat of sanction. (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447)
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Related to Art. II Sec. 24: The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation building. It may even gain more importance when the Freedom of Expression is precisely used to scrutinize governmental policies and acts, even if the same would mean disagreements and dissents. Our political system is essentially democratic and republican. Freedom includes the right of every member to freely discuss and dissent from the views, policies and practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonweal. Such is vital to the societys growth and development (Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448) The philosophy behind the guarantee is that the best interest of society would be better served by allowing free play and competition on the marketplace of ideas (Abrahams v. United States, 250 US 616) SCOPE OF THE GUARANTEE PRIOR RESTRAINT, SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT AND DAMAGES Basically directed against prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment. Flows from the philosophy that authorities do not necessarily know the best for the people. Emanated from the English Printing Act of 1662 which prescribed what could be printed, who could print and who could sell. It punished publications which were heretical, seditious, schismatic or offensive. The framers of the US Constitution to which the Bill of Rights was based, intended that speech must be allowed under any guise and that violation of the laws, either civil or criminal, that an expression may only be sanctioned. The freedom has expanded its coverage throughout the years and it has gradually come to encompass expressions which are of private and commercial concerns. (Time v. Hill, 385 US 374) The guarantee also ensures that claims for damages arising from the utilization of the freedom be not unreasonable as may chill its exercise. There must be a knowing and malicious intent to cause injury or a reckless disregard whether the statement is true or false, applying actual malice test, at least insofar as public officials or public figures or matters of public concern are involved. The right of free speech is not absolute. Exceptions include lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous and the insulting or fighting words, those by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. Requires STRICT SCRUTINY of any regulation which affects or impairs its free exercise.
THE CHILLING EFFECT PRINCIPLE THE DANGER OF SELF CENSORSHIP
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If the freedom to speak is not adequately shielded, people who might be minded to say something would rather be mute than be subjected to prosecution for something they utter. (Self censorship) Chilling effect needs not to spring only from threats from the government. They may also be affected by means of the use of libel laws that may indirectly enforce silence through the threat of financial ruin brought about by claims for damages or prosecution. (Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1) FACIAL CHALLENGES AND THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. The overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute that DOES NOT affect him, but may affect others not before the Court but whose activities are constitutionally protected. (Cruz v. DENR Secretary, 347 SCRA 128) However, there comes a point at which the chilling effect of an overbroad law, significant it may be, cannot justify prohibiting all enforcements of that law, particularly a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful conduct. But, there are costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks the application of a law to unprotected speech or conduct. To ensure then that costs do not swallow the social benefits of declaring a law overbroad, a laws application to protected speech must then be substantial, not only in absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the laws legitimate applications. (Virginia v. Hicks, 539 US 113) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS NEAR V, MINNESOTA, 283 US 697 FACTS: A Minnesota statute was enacted declaring that those who engage in the business of publishing malicious, scandalous and defamatory periodicals are guilty of nuisance. Under said law, intent is material, and good faith is a valid defense. Restraints may be imposed by the court, and in case a publishing firm defies the order, the said firm may be cited for contempt or even imprisonment. Near was indicted for violating the said act for publishing The Saturday Press which contained articles in its nine issues charging in substance that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis and that several law enforcing officers of the said area were not energetically performing their duties. A temporary injunction was issued against him. Petitioner Near challenged the constitutionality of the law. Nevertheless, he was found guilty and his publication was perpetually enjoined from further operating. HELD: It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the purview of the liberty safeguarded by the 14 Amendment. In maintaining this guaranty, the authority of the State to enact laws to promote health, safety, morals and general welfare is admitted. In passing the
th
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Constitutional question, the reason behind the statute must be scrutinized. First, the statute is aimed at the distribution of scandalous matter as detrimental to public morals and general welfare, tending to disturb the peace of the community. It is apparent that under the statute, the publication is to be regarded as defamatory if it injures reputation and it is scandalous if it circulates charges of reprehensible conduct. Second, the statute is directed not simply at the circulation of scandalous and defamatory statements with regard to private citizens, but at the continued publication by periodicals of charges against public officers. Third, the object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary sense, but suppression of the offending periodical. Fourth, the statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper, but to put publisher under an effective censorship. If we cut through the details, the operation and effect of the statute in substance is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter and unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring competent evidence with good motives and for justifiable ends, his paper is suppressed and further publication is punishable as contempt. This is the essence of censorship that has been prevalent even in early English era that previous restraints practiced by the government are sought to be corrected by the Bill of Rights. This does not however mean absolute utterance of thoughts. The constitutional guarantee of free speech does not protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have the effect of force. Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate, find their remedies against arbitrary publications under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, but certainly and should not be in proceedings to restraint the publication of periodicals. NEW YORK TIMES CO V. UNITED STATES, 403 US 713 FACTS: The New York Times and Washington Post were prohibited by the United States to publish a classified study entitled, History of the US Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy. HELD: Any prior restraint of expression bears a heavy presumption against constitutional validity. In the instant case, the United States failed to overcome the said presumption. Concurring opinion, Justice Black Looking at the history of the inception of the US Constitution in 1789, many people strongly opposed because the document did not contain Bill of Rights. In response to such a clamor, James Madison offered a series of amendments to satisfy the citizens that these liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of the government to abridge. One of the guarantees given was the Freedom of the Press which could bare the secrets of the government by informing the people of the same. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in the government. Responding on the argument that the President has inherent power to halt the publication of news by resorting to the court would wipe out and destroy the fundamental liberty.
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Concurring Opinion, Justice Douglas The dominant purpose of the first amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of materials that are embarrassing to the powers to be. Concurring Opinion, Justice Brennan The First Amendment stands an absolute bar to those imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances under any guise. The entire thrust of the governments claim has been that publication of the material sought to be enjoined could be prejudicial to national interest. But the first amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. There are cases that have indicated that there is a narrow class in which the ban on prior restraint may be overridden, but these cases apply only in times of war. Concurring Opinion, Justice Stewart The Executive is endowed with an enormous power in the areas of national defense and international relations. In the absence of the governmental checks and balances, the only effective restraint upon executive policy may lie in an informed and critical public opinion which can protect the values of democratic government. The hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the disclosure of relative facts, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained. Although it is contrite to say that the Executive is correct when it would not disclose documents prejudicial or that may greatly affect national interest, the document sought to be published by the petitioner does not in any manner cause irreparable damage to the nation. Concurring Opinion, Justice White Although the documents sought to be restrained by the United States bear significance as far as national interest is concerned, the United States has not satisfied the burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these. Concurring Opinion, Justice Marshall The Presidents power to conduct foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief give him authority to impose censorship on the press to protect his ability to deal effectively with foreign nations and to conduct the military affairs of the country. In some situations, there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of the Court as an aid to prevent publication of materials damaging to national security. HOWEVER, it would utterly be inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers if US SC would use its power to contempt the Congress for not passing the law that the executive department seeks. The Constitution did not provide for government by injunction in which the Courts and the Executive Branch can make law in blatant disregard to the powers of Congress. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Burger There are no factual chronology to begin with, therefore, deciding on the merits of the case is impossible if not a parody of judicial function.
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Dissenting Opinion, Justice Harlan The time which has been available to lower courts and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of consideration they deserve. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Blackmun Several courts have been pressed into hurried decision of profound constitutional issues on inadequately developed and largely assumed facts without careful deliberation, merely in the name of Freedom of the Press. Each provision of the Constitution is important and the doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment should not be given credence. What is needed is a weighing upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press and the narrow right of the government to prevent the same. BABST V. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, 132 SCRA 316 FACTS: Petitioners were journalists of various local publications. They have allegedly been summoned by the National Intelligence Board to shed light on certain matters. These summons include an annotation that their failure to appear on specified date and place would be tantamount to waiver on their parts and would warrant the seeking of appropriate remedy in accordance with the law. Consequently, two of the petitioners were charged with libel by Brig. Gen. Tadiar based on articles they published in a weekly released magazine. Petitioners would want the respondents to be enjoined from issuing subpoenas and fro filing libel suits on matters that have been subject of inquiry by the NIB, the same being violative of their press freedom. HELD: The assailed proceedings hav\e already ceased rendering the same moot and academic. Be that as it may, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some interrogations is not ipso facto objectionable. The so called invitation cannot be said to be voluntary but an authoritative command considering the factual circumstances that devolve upon it, i.e. the proclamation of martial law, the lifting of the writ of habeas corpus. Regarding the second issue, the petition must also fail. The issue of validity of freedom of expression is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, to wit, before the court where the cases are pending. The right to seek redress when libelled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libelled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Dissenting opinion, Justice Abad Santos In the instant case, the persons who compose Special Committee of the NIB have abridged the freedom to speak and the freedom to publish by intimidation and have veiled threats addressed to some members of the press who by their writings have been critical of the government. Their actions are more odious and had chilling effects because they were cloaked with the mantle of pseudo legality. FORMS AND VARIATIONS OF THE FREEDOM AND RELATIVITY OF STATE REGULATION
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Distinctions have to be made between pure speech and expressive conduct (more restrictive on expressive than spoken words); the print versus broadcast media (more restrictive on radio and television than print media); or television and movies (more restrictive on television than movies because people have to pay movie houses, while television sets may be available in every citizens homes). There are differences in the treatment of a daily newspaper and a weekly magazine (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116) Possession of obscene materials may not be criminalized, it would be an entirely different matter if the material involves child pornography (Stanley v. Georgia, 349 US 557) Government employers may impose certain restraints on the speech of their employees, restraints that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public (San Diego v. Roe, GR 01-1669, December 6, 2004) Some forms of speech are given more weight and importance, and thus a greater extent of protection compared with others (Ferber v. New York, 458 US 747) Thus, talk about governmental issues cannot be equated with that of an individual concern. Related to Article XVI Sec 10 of the Constitution EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION V. DANS, 137 SCRA 628 FACTS: Petitioner asked the court to compel the respondents to reopen DYRE Radio Station which was closed because the station was alleged to be utilized in inciting people to sedition. Petitioner claimed violation of its Speech Freedom and that of the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, the case was turned moot and academic because EBC already sold its interest in the said radio station and NTC acknowledged the willingness to grant to the new owner the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station. HELD: Pronouncements by the Court are still relevant for the guidance of lower courts and other administrative bodies: 1. The cardinal requirements laid down by Ang Tibay Doctrine must be followed before a broadcast station may be closed. 2. Due Process must be conformed before a government may deprive life, liberty or property 3. All forms of media are entitled to broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression. The test of limitations of the said freedom will be clear and present danger rule words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils. 4. The clear and present danger test does not embrace interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums that certain criteria must be established. Necessarily television and radio broadcasting are restricted compared with print as far as the speech freedom is
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concerned. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in all citizens. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children which the State protects. 5. The clear and present danger test must take particular circumstances of broadcast media. The government has to be protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to overthrow it. Media may not be used to organize a rebellion or to start uprising. 6. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. 7. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by both the Due Process and Freedom of Expression Claues. STANDARDS FOR REGULATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS (a) dangerous tendency rule; (b) clear and present danger test; (c) balancing of interest test. Of the three, the clear and present danger test is the most liberal and latitudinarian. DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some immediate or definite acts of force, violence or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the Congress seeks to prevent (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152) CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST - the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify the suppression of free speech and assembly. It must be shown that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that the advocacy was contemplated. The difference between the two is that the clear and present danger test is justified by the danger or evil of a substantive character that the state has a right to present. Unlike the dangerous tendency, the danger must not only be clear, but also present. Present means inevitable. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835) The dangerous tendency doctrine permitted the application of restrictions once a rational connection between the speech restrained and the danger apprehended was shown. The clear and present danger rule required the government to defer application of restrictions until the apprehended danger was more visible, until its realizations was imminent and nigh at hand. (ibid) [In short KUNG MANGYAYARI NA, clear and present danger. KUNG MAY POSIBILIDAD NA MANGYAYARI PERO DI PA MANGYAYARI, dangerous tendency. ]
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BALANCING OF INTEREST requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation. Factors to be considered are as follows (Gonzales v. COMELEC, supra): a. Social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by legislation b. The specific thrust of restriction (i.e. direct or indirect; affects few or many) c. Value and importance of public interest sought to be secured by the legislation with reference to the evil which Congress seeks to prevent d. WON specific restriction decreed by Congress is appropriate and necessary for the protection of the public interest e. WON the necessary safeguarding of public interest may be achieved by some other measures less restrictive of freedom Thus, If a person incited another to throw garbage on the street, the latter who acceded should be held responsible and not the former, because the latter considered the tangible manifestations of the formers thoughts. The purpose to keep streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person on public street from handling literatures to those willing to receive them. The public convenience in respect of cleanliness of streets does not justify an exertion of police power which invades the freedom of communication, information and opinion as secured by the Constitution. (Schneider v. State, 308 US 147) OBRIEN TEST a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: a. It is within the constitutional power of the government b. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest c. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
d. Incident restriction on expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of interest. TIME, PLACE AND MANNER RULE restrictions of this kind are valid when: a. Justified without reference to the content of regulated speech b. Narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest c. Leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information
Corollary to this is the difference between an injunction and a regulation and their standards of review (Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc, 512 US 753):
An injunction by its nature applies only to a particular group and regulates the speech and activities of a particular group. It does so because of the groups past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties. The parties seeking the injunction assert a violation of their rights; the court hearing the action is charged with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a statute addressed to the general public. Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of particular societal interests. Injunctions are remedies imposed for the violation.
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Injunction also carries great risks of censorship and discriminatory application than ordinances. The difference requires a more stringent application of First Amendment principles. When evaluating a content neutral injunction, the standard, time, place and manner analysis is not sufficient.
SCHNECK V. UNITED STATES, 249 US 47 FACTS: Defendants were found guilty on three offenses: 1. Conspiracy to violate the espionage act that defendants wilfully conspired to have printed and circulated a document alleged to cause insubordination; 2. A conspiracy to commit an offense against US that they transmitted through mails matters declared non subjects of mailing, and; 3. Unlawful use of mails for transmission of the same matters. They set up First Amendments as matter of defense. HELD: In many instances, the defendants saying that all was said in the circular would have been their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances when the same was done. The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. In one case, the US SC said that if the act of circulating papers, its tendency and the intent to which it is done are the same, theres no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the crime. This case might be disposed based from the same contention if the precedent covers all media concluendi. CONTENT BASED AND NEUTRAL REGULATIONS Regulations which are content based or those which either approve or disapprove based on the contents of the expression, such as favouring or disfavouring a topic, are subjected to strict scrutiny. The government is required to justify them by the presence of a compelling state interest and a showing of absence of other means by which the objective could be attained. They have to be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447) RAV V. CITY OF ST. PAUL, 505 US 377 FACTS: Petitioners assembled a crudely made cross by taping broken chair legs they burned inside the fenced yard of a black family. Although a number of laws were enacted, the petitioners were charged on Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance which prohibits a symbol one knows that arouses alarm , anger or resentment on basis of race, color, creed, religion or danger. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that it was overbreadth and impermissibly content based.
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HELD: The ordinance is unconstitutional. The general prohibition against content based regulations is that the government may effectively drive out certain ideas generally protected by the Constitution. However, the prohibition is not absolute and is subject to regulations. When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within class. For example, the State may prohibit patent obscenity; but it may not proscribe obscenity which ONLY includes offensive political messages. Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a content defined subclass of proscribable speech is that subclass happens to be associated with particular secondary effects of the speech so that the regulation is justified without reference to the contents of the speech. For instance, the State can allow all obscene live performances, but not to minors. Although the phrase arouses anger, alarm or resentment has been limited to reach only symbols or displays tantamount to fighting words, the remaining terms make clear that ordinance applies only to those that insult on account of race, color, creed, religion or danger. Displays containing abusive ideas, no matter how vicious can be permitted provided that they are not directed against the favoured sector by the ordinance. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers on who express views on disfavoured subjects. The phrase any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate person or group of persons would create unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas, therefore unconstitutional. (Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343)\
LIBEL AND THE DELIBERATE FALSEHOOD The knowingly false statement and false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth does not enjoy constitutional protection (Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US 64 Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. This would not be enough reason to take them out of constitutional guarantee. (Gertz v. Robert Wlech, Inc, 418 US 323) NEW YORK TIMES CO V. SULLIVAN
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FACTS: Sullivan filed a suit and alleged that he had been libelled by the petitioner newspaper in an advertisement involving a police action directed against students who staged civil rights demonstration. Although he was not named in the said advertisement, he claimed that the same referred to him because he was in charge of supervising the police department. NY Times published the advertisement from an order of an agency which submitted the advertisement with a letter from Phillip Randolph, a person known to be responsible, certifying that the urge for the advertisement came from the names that appeared in the said certification. However, each of the persons listed in the letter claimed that they did not give their consent for the usage of their names. Times claimed that it was unaware of the entire incident merely until the suit brought by Sullivan. The manager Times Acceptability Department testified that he had approved the advertisement because he knew nothing to cause him to believe that anything in it was false and because it bore the endorsement of a number of persons who are well known and whose reputations he had no reason to question. Jury trying the case sided Sullivan and held Times liable. Alabama Court affirmed. HELD: Sullivans claim for damages must fail and Alabamas decision must be reversed. Alabama Court contends that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are inapplicable here because the allegedly libellous statements were published as part of a paid commercial advertisement. The publication was not commercial in the sense that it communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of highest public interest and concerns. Under the Alabama law, a publication is libellous if the words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to bring him to public contempt. A showing of actual malice is a pre requisite to recovery of punitive damages, and the defendant may in any event, forestall a punitive award by a retraction meeting the statutory requirements. Hence, Alabama law requires that when general daages are concerned, malice is presumed. To the US SC, the power to create presumptions is not a mean to escape constitutional restrictions, the showing of malice required is not presumed but a matter that needs to be proved. On matters of evidence, the proof presented lacks the convincing clarity which the standard demands and hence, it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for the respondent. There was no evidence that petitioner was aware of any erroneous statements or were in any way reckless in that regard. Facts do not support the finding of malice. Lastly, there was no reference to respondent, either by name or official position. The words in the publication could not be reasonably imputed to him. Concurring opinion, Justice Black Times had an absolute and unconditional constitutional right to publish the advertisement of their criticisms of Montgomery agencies and officials. The Federal
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Constitution has dealt with the danger to the press by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticisms of the way public officials do their public duty. Concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg The first and fourteenth amendments to the constitution afford to citizens and the press an unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct. The right should not depend upon a probing of the jury of the motivation of the citizen or the press. Such criticism cannot be deterred by the courts at the instance of public officials in the name of libel. ROSENBLOOM V. METROMEDIA, 403 US 29 FACTS: Petitioner was a distributor of nudist magazines. The police of Philadelphia in an effort to suppress obscene literatures conducted surveillance among 20 newsstands and when satisfied that these stands were selling pornographic materials, they arrested the newsboys thereat. Subsequently, the petitioner was likewise arrested when he delivered the materials at the onset of the raid. The police, under the arm of a warrant, was able to yield several nudist materials from petitioners residence. Consequently, Rosenbloom surrendered which triggered the police to report the same to the respondent who was running a media station. Metromedia religiously made reported about petitioners arrest and conduct and in those reports; it described the petitioners business as smut distributor and girlie book peddler. Petitioner was acquitted and he charged Metromedia with libel on account that unqualified characterization of his books as obscene is per se libellous and the petitioners description of his business was deemed false by his acquittal. ISSUE: WON New York Times doctrine of knowing or reckless falsity standard apply in civil libel action brought by a private individual (instead of a public figure) uttered in a news broadcast by a radio station about the individuals involvement in an event of general interest. HELD: YES. Freedom of expression if it would fulfil its historic function, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. Constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters bearing broadly on issues of responsible government. If a matter is a subject of general interest, it cannot become less merely because a private individual is involved. The community, in the present case has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number of highly important values are potentially in conflict. Petitioner further argued that private individuals be merely allowed to prove that media failed to exercise reasonable care in publishing defamatory falsehoods because 1. Private individual do not have access to media to counter the defamatory statements and that they do not open themselves to defamation because they do not open themselves to public arena, and; 2. Focus must be given to the values served by the law of defamation in preventing and redressing attacks. Petitioners arguments DO NOT PERSUADE. The New York doctrine was applied to libel of a public official to give effect to Amendments
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functions to encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual. If the State fears that the private rights will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in ensuring their ability to respond, rather than stifling public discussion on matters of public concerns. Distinction between private and public men could produce paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discuss aspects of public figures. The vital needs of freedom of the press persuades us that allowing private citizen to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher failed to use reasonable care would not provide adequate breathing space for these freedoms. Reasonable care would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to name, picture or portrait. Fear of guessing the wrong inevitable causes self censorship. Furthermore, civil cases are decided based on preponderance of evidence and not reasonable care.
BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS, 301 SCRA 1 FACTS: Congress decided to launch the First National Conference on Land Transportation in order to address transportation crisis. Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director responsible for soliciting goods. Borjal, in his column, alleged that there were anomalous activities conducted by the organizer of a conference although he did not name who the same was. Wenceslao reacted and refuted the column and filed libel suit against Borjal. RTC dismissed the criminal aspect of the case but awarded him damages rationalizing that Wenceslao was sufficiently identifiable although not named. CA affirmed although it reduced the price of damages. HELD: Petition granted. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of libellous publication. In the instant case, it was Wenceslao who admitted that he was referred to by the said publication. The public wasnt aware of said fact until he exposed himself to be so. On the question as to whether the articles are considered privileged communication, the answer is yes. A privileged communication may either be absolute (not actionable even if the author acted in bad faith) or qualified (bad faith commences causes of action). Private communications belong to the second form of privileged communication. Indisputably, petitioners writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of the RPC governing privileged communication, however, the same does not mean that the writings are not privileged. Art. 354 of the RPC is not a complete repository of privileged communications and fair
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commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. To bolster the Doctrine of Fair Comment, while in general, every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent, unless proven otherwise, when discreditable imputation is directed against public person, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment, based on false supposition. If the comment Is an express opinion based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken as long as it might reasonably be inferred from facts. Publications, which are essentially privileged because public policies, are protected by the freedoms of speech and the press. The instant case requires Wenceslao to prove malice or a reckeless disregard (defendant seriously entertains doubt as to the veracity of a story) on the part of Borjal. He failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that the petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation or Borjal casted doubts on the veracity of his claim. There were several evidence presented by Borjal to substantiate his claim of alleged irregularity, thus, moved by civic duty, he proceeded to expose what he perceived to be a public deception. Every person truly has a right to enjoy good reputation, but that should not encroach with the press freedom.
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK V. AMEC-BCCM, 448 CRA 413 FACTS: Carmelo Lima and Hermogenes Alege, radio reporters who work for the petitioner broadcasting company assailed AMEC-BCCM by imputing to the said school that it was a dumping ground for morally and physically unfit teachers, that its graduates would be liabilities instead of becoming assets, that its PT School does not have the permit to operate, that it was getting tremendous aids from foreign institutions, that it engaged Dean Lola to minimize the expenses on its employees and that the school burdened its students with unreasonable fees and regulations. The expose was based on the complaints of several of its students, and parents. AMEC-BCCM and the dean of its Medical school filed for libel. RTC granted. CA affirmed with modification. Hence this petition. HELD: The broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause its dishonour, discredit and contempt. Rima and Alegre failed to show their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the gripes of students who went to their station to complain. Hearing the students gripes a month before their expose, they had sufficient time to verify their sources. Alegre simply relied on the words of their students which plainly showed their reckless disregard (serious doubt) of whether their report is true or not. On the petitioners argument that the broadcasts were results of free reporting, relying on the neutral reportage doctrine. Under the privilege, a publisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements against public figures is shielded from liability
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regardless of subjective awareness of truth or falsity. They cannot invoke this privilege because of their unfounded comments. Furthermore, the privilege of neutral reportage applies only when the defamed person is a public figure involved in an existing controversy. The petitioners cannot likewise invoke Borjal invoking the Doctrine of Fair Comment because although AMEC is endowed with matters of public interest, the same being an institution of learning, the broadcasts are not based on established facts. Had the comments been expression of opinion based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it is reasonably be inferred from facts. FLOR V. PEOPLE, 454 SCRA 440 FACTS: Petitioners were working with Bicol Forum, a weekly released newsprint in Bicol. It released an article implicating Gov. Villafuerte with irregularities as the governors trip to Japan and Israel was funded, not by the officials own money but by public funds. Gov. Villafuerte charged the petitioners with libel. He claimed that no trip to Japan was made, and his trip to Israel was in accordance with the order of Pres. Aquino, he being the Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization. Ramos countered that his report was based on his source, and his own investigation yielded some cash advances implicating Gov. Villafuerte of the challenged irregularity. Flor admitted that the headline belonged to him but he saw nothing malicious nor false about the sae and that its headline as written in accordance with the policy of their papers when dealing with matters of public concern. HELD: The prosecution failed to meet the criterion of reckless disregard. The said doctrine means that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. Publishing with such doubts show reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. As the records reveal, the issue of cash advances was a major political topic in the said municipality at that time. Thus, Ramos had in their possession information relating to cash advances and the private respondents travel abroad. The information was provided by one who worked in the treasurers office and had access to pertinent financial records of the government. VASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 314 SCRA 460 FACTS: Vasquez, et al went to the office of NHA General Manager Lito Atienza to complain their barangay chairman Jaime Olmedo. Vasquez, was interviewed by several people from media based on the said meeting. The following day, a news was released saying that Olmedo and Atienza had connivance in getting for themselves 14 lots in a certain area in Tondo, and that Olmedo was charged with attempted murder, illegal betting and cock fighting. Olmedo charged Vasquez with libel. RTC found Vasquez guilty. CA affirmed.
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HELD: The elements of libel are: allegation of discreditable act or condition concerning another; publication of the charge; identity of the person defamed; existence of malice. There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. On the other hand, the element of identifiability must show that at least, a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. Certainly, the first three elements were sufficed. The question is whether the defamation was made with malice. The answer is no. Petitioner was able to prove truth as to the charges against him. Petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda issued by the then NHA General Manager who recommended the filing of administrative charges against NHA officials responsible for the irregular consolidation of lots in Tondo. Petitioner was also able to show that Olmedos involvements in certain crimes were based on an affidavit and a resolution from the Office of the Special Prosecutor. PRIVACY, EXPRESSION AND DAMAGES Certain publications which intrude into the privacy of individuals or otherwise touch on matters they would rather keep themselves or desire not to be disseminated may give rise for damages which serve as vindication of rights, self esteem or worth. BANAS, JR V. COURT OF APPEALS, 325 SCRA 259 FACTS: Petitioner sold to Ayala a parcel of land for P2.3M. They agreed that P400k would be paid initially and P1.8M would be paid in for equal annual instalments. AYALA issued a promissory note in view of the instalment, but a Deed of Assignment was executed to discount P1.8M instalment. Ayala issued nine checks amounting to P205k. In his 1976 ITR, petitioner reported the P400k initial payment as income from disposing his assets and in succeeding years, P230k as the realized gain on disposition of capital asset for each year. BIR representatives examined the book of Banas. They discovered that from 1976 to 1980, petitioner had no receivable concluding that the sale was paid cash and that the entire profit should have been taxable in 1976 instead of spreading it for four years. BIR representatives declared a tax deficiency on the part of Banas. Respondent Larin assumed the role of the former BIR representatives and he reduced the price of tax deficiency to 50% in Banas favour. Despite demands, Banas insisted that the sale was made on instalments which compelled BIR to file for a criminal case. Three reporters covered the said tax controversy and made news mentioning of petitioners false ITR concerning the sale of the land to AYALA. Meanwhile, Banas was able to get two tax amnesties under PD 1740 and 1840 and he filed for damages against the three reporters and Larin and further charged Larin with extortion of money. HELD: Moral damages may be recovered under Art. 21 of the Civil Code provided that the case passes the Malice Test set forth by Times. Malice in this case is the humiliation suffered by Banas, and although the same is understandable considering that he was accused as tax evader by three media men in view of BIR actions against him, it does not justify what amounted to a baseless prosecution against respondent Larin. Petitioner did not present any evidence in view of extortion.
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The court was constrained to agree that there is a sufficient basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages in favour of Larin for he suffered anxiety and humiliation due to baseless charges against him by petitioner Banas. Considering that the award is in favour of a government official in connection with his functions, caution must be given for the same might subject citizens to fear pf lawsuits in vindication of rights of government officials. The law allows the award of attorneys fees when exemplary damages are awarded. Although the OSG represents government officials in litigations, fact was shown that Larin was obliged to hire lawyer for his case. LOPEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 34 SCRA 116 FACTS: The attention of the media, particularly the newspaper published by the petitioner, was turned to Babuyan Island when a certain sanitary inspector Fidel Cruz by name made a distress call regarding incidents of killing since Christmas which happened to be false. However, the incident drew the attention of the media to the onerous living conditions of the people of Babuyan Islands. Consequently, the news turned out to be in demand, making the same the hoax of the year thus, on two publications; the photograph which was attached to the said news story of Mayor Fidel Cruz was used instead of that of Sanitary Inspector and Respondent Fidel Cruz. The same act was ratified by both Manila Chronicle and This Week Magazine by placing in a conspicuous place in their periodicals that the photos of the two Fidel Cruz were switched. Respondent Fidel Cruz claimed for damages, and his petition was granted by the lower courts. HELD: The petition must fail and petitioners are liable for damages for the purpose of redressing personal wrong with money damages. Applying the Newell Treatise on Slander and Libel, publication of a persons photograph in connection with an article libellous of a third person is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person. The petitioners cannot rely as well on Quisumbing v. Lopez. Although it cannot be discounted that a newspaper should not be held to account a point of suppression for honest mistakes in the choice of words, especially when pressed with deadlines to meet, the case and doctrines are not on point. In the instant case, there was no pressure of a deadline. There is added requirement of reasonable care to be imposed. Nevertheless, since no pecuniary loss arouse from the publication, the awards for damages has to be reduced. BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION V. NOEL, 167 SCRA 255 FACTS: An article was published in Philippine Panorama talking about Lanao politics and claimed that it was the members of the royal families of Lanao who dominate the place, and it was only during the American era that Mindalano, a non member of the royal family was able to lead the place. Respondents who claimed to be relatives of Mindalano filed complained for damages, alleging that Mindalano was a member of the Royal Family and they assailed the statement that Mindalano lived with an American Family, the idea being repugnant to the connotation in Maranao society.
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HELD: Libel was not committed. Suit for damages must fail. It is axiomatic that in actions for damages for libel that the work challenged must be viewed in its entirety. In the present case, the essay is not focused on the Mindalanos. His identification is merely illuystrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme. On the claim that Mindalano was a member of the royal family and that the article refuted the same, the title of royalty or nobility are generally not acknowledged and the Constitution even forbids the granting of the same. Secondly, being a commoner is not defamatory because it is not an imputation of a vice or defect, or tending to dishonour, discredit or contempt, or blacken the memory of the one who is death. On the second claim, it is axiomatic and acceptable that a person mingles with foreign individuals and nothing is defamatory with it. The court recognized that petitioners were offended, but the law against defamation protects interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation in the community, and it is the community standards that the court must refer in evaluating a publication for libel. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY LTD V. CAPULONG, 160 SCRA 861 FACTS: Petitioner McElroy and his company envisioned the re-enactment of EDSA revolution in a movie, with the addition of four fictional characters and some photographs taken from the actual revolution. MTRCB and Gen. Fidel Ramos agreed with the production, but Sen. Enrile did not authorize the usage of his name and he did not consent that he or his family be implicated directly or indirectly with the film. Petitioner granted the dissent, but Sen. Enrile sought to enjoin petitioner from pushing through with the project, the same being violative of his right to privacy. HELD: Freedom of speech includes the freedom to film and motion pictures. As for the right of privacy, the same is not absolute. A limited intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and information sought to be elicited from him is a matter of public concern. Right to privacy only pertains to the right from unwarranted publicity and the wrongful publication of private affairs which are outside the realm of public concern. Limiting freedom of expression on account of private concerns should not be sustained. Applying the clear and present danger test, it would be noted that when the petitioner was enjoined from filming, no film was yet produced and the filming hasnt started yet. Secondly, there was no private life to speak because the film does not intend to individual life of Sen. Enrile. What was envisioned was the advent of the EDSA revolution p to the point when the people had to mob themselves in EDSA. Assuming further that it would encroach with his affairs, the extent of intrusion upon the life of Sen. Enrile would be of limited character and would only center on his participation. Finally, the line of equilibrium must be drawn in such an instance that the production of the challenged movie must be fair, truthful and historical. BARTNICKI V. VOPPER, 532 US 514 FACTS: The cellphone conversation of petitioners regarding the problems they encounter with the collective bargaining agreement between a union of Pennsylvania high school and the local school
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board was recorded. After the parties accepted the non binding arbitration proposal favourable to teachers, respondent Vopper played the intercepted recording in his radio program. It was soon found out that the recording came from Jack Yocum, the leader of the taxpayers who had been opposing to the demands of the teachers. Yocum testified that he merely got the recordings when someone left it at his mailbox, and when he recognized that the voice belongs to the petitioners so he delivered the tape to Vopper. HELD : The instant case fosters the clash between the interest of free dissemination of information and the right to individual privacy and free speech. Thus, primordial protection still belongs to the respondents. Several statutes of Pennsylvania were enacted criminalizing the distribution of unlawfully intercepted wiretapped recordings and under these statutes, petitioners are entitled to recover damages. The question is does the application of these statutes violate the first amendments? The answer is yes. First, respondents played no part in the interception, and found only about the interception after they occurred; their access to information was intercepted by someone else. Third, the subject matter of the conversation was a public concern. Privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in matters of public importance. A strangers illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. ARTS, LETTERS AND OBSCENITY Freedom of expression also protects literature and arts. The difficulty lies in asserting this is up to what extent does it protect arts and letters and up to what point does the law consider an expression, or display for that matter, obscenity in order not to make it covered by the protection.
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA, 413 US 15 FACTS: Appellant was convicted for conducting mass mailing campaign in order to sell adult materials. He was convicted under California Penal Code and bolstered by the Memoirs Test, to wit: dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to be prurient interest in sex; material is patently offensive; material is utterly redeeming without social value. HELD: The Memoirs Test must be abandoned. Basic guidelines should be as follows: (a) whether the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that work when taken as a whole, appeals to be prurient; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in patently offensive sexual conduct defined by applicable statute or law; and (c) whether the work when taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or social value. The concept obscenity must be based on the
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application of contemporary community standards. This case must be remanded for further proceedings applying principles not inconsistent with First Amendments. STANLEY V. GEORGIA, 349 US 557 FACTS: By virtue of a warrant, the police of Georgia searched petitioners room and they were able to seize a pornographic film. Stanley was found guilty of Georgia Statute penalizing possession of obscene matters. He assailed the constitutionality of the Georgia Statute on the ground that penalizing mere possession of obscene materials was violative of the First Amendments as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendments. HELD : Georgia sought the application of the doctrine of Roth. Although the US Supreme Court made a pronouncement in Roth that obscenity is not protected by Freedom of Speech or the Press, the said doctrine cannot be applied in the instant case because Roth dealt with the distribution of those obscene materials while this case involves mere possession. Stanley asserts that he has the right to read or observe whatever that he pleases. Georgia counters by arguing that there are certain types of materials that individuals may not read or even posses. The US SC ruled, mere categorization of films as obscene is insufficient justification for drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by first and fourteenth amendments. The constitution rebels at the thought of giving the government control to mens minds. It is true that the State has the power to control the distribution of obscene matters in furtherance of morality, but whatever power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to morality cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of ones private thoughts. NEW YORK V. FERBER, 458 US 747 FACTS: A New York statute prohibits persons from knowingly distributing materials containing sexual performance by a child below 16. Respondent sold to an undercover police a material depicting boys masturbating. He was convicted of the said statute. CA reversed opining that the statute violated the First Amendment. HELD Obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech. The state has a right and interest in prohibiting dissemination of obscene materials when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling parties or exposure of juveniles. The State has interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a minor. The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity is intrinsically related to sexual abuse of children. On the contention that the Miller application should be applied providing for mere prohibition (without criminalization so to speak) of pornography, the US SC ruled that all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene does not reflect the states particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote child exploitation, therefore, the state can go further than providing
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mere definition. Moreover, the constitutional speech freedom should not be used as an integral part in violating a valid criminal statute. This does not however mean that the ruling against child pornography is without limits and will not be subjected to standards. Compared with the Miller doctrine, a trier of fact needs not find that material appears to be prurient of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct be done in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue needs not be as whole. Furthermore, criminal responsibility may be imposed only if there is an element of scienter. On the Court of Appeals contentions of underinclusiveness, the penal law of New York sufficiently describes a category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection. On the contention of overbreadth because it would prohibit the distribution of materials with literary, scientific or educational value, it was not shown how often it may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct proscribed by the statute to produce medical or artistic works. This case must be remanded for further proceedings. ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION, 535 US 152 FACTS: The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 penalized any visual depiction, including any photograph x x x or computer generated picture that appears to be of minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and sexually explicit image that is advertised x x x or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression. Free Speech Coalition filed a suit contending that the phrases appears to be and conveys the impression o are vague and overbroad and provides a chilling effect of its work as protected by First Amendment. HELD: The challenged status prohibits the distribution of images or films covered by virtual child pornography or those that do not use actual children in pornographic matters, but either adults or computer generated images for that matter. Prohibiting the same goes beyond Ferber Doctrine, this distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit speech because of States interest in protecting the children exploited by the production process. These images do not involve harm to any children in the production process. The Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill the Freedom of Speech. CPPA is unconstitutional on its face as it prohibits a substantial amount of protected expression. The sexual abuse of a child is a serious crime. Congress may pass valid laws to protect children. The prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech. In the instant case, CPPA does not abide by the Miller requirements. IT prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, as long as rascal or lewd available. On the contention of Congress that the law discourages pedophiles from entertaining their bestial thoughts on children, the government cannot constitutionally premise legislation on desirability of controlling a persons private
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thoughts. Without a significantly stronger and more direct connection, the government may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may simply encourage an illegal conduct. PITA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 178 SCRA 362 FACTS: Mayor Ramon Bagatsing ordered the seizures of periodicals sold and distributed by several newsstand which are obscene, pornographic and indecent. One of these periodicals was Pinoy Playboy by petitioner Pita. He filed an injunction against the respondent mayor on the ground that her magazine was decent, artistic and educational; therefore, her speech freedom is protected by the constitution. HELD : Since the items being the object of this dispute has been destroyed, the case is already moot and academic. Nevertheless, the following must be observed as resume: 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order 2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials are obscene and pose clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant state interference 3. The judge must determine WON the same are obscene. Several tests might be used, in this jurisdiction, Katigbak, infra might be inferred, thus: whether to the average person applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The Miller case by the US Supreme Court might be resorted as well. 4. If in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the warrant prayed for 5. The proper suit devolves upon Art. 201 of the RPC 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. (In short, check US Decisions) FILMS, REVIEW, CLASSIFICATIONS AND CENSORSHIP TIMES FILM CORP V. CHICAGO, 365 US 43 FACTS: The Municipal Code of Chicago requires submission of all motion pictures for examination prior to their public exhibition and forbids their exhibition unless they meet certain standards. Petitioner did not present its film before the commissioner of police, as a requirement by the code, thus as a consequence, Chicago did not allow permit to be issued. It sought legal remedies claiming that the Code on its face bequeaths prior restraint which is prohibited by the Constitution. HELD: The Chicago Ordinance is not void on its face. Motion Pictures are included in the protection given by the constitution as far as free speech is concerned. This does not follow that the constitution requires
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absolute freedom to exhibit motion pictures of every kind. Chicago has its duty to protect its people against the dangers of obscenity in the public exhibition of motion pictures. The capacity for evil is relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control. It is not for the Court to limit the State in its selection of the remedy it deems most effective in the regulation of motion pictures. MTRCB V. ABS-CBN, 448 SCRA 575 FACTS: ABS-CBNs tv program, The Inside Story featured a story involving some students who act as prostitutes in order to pay their tuition fees. PWU was one of the schools named in view of the said story and its facade was even used in furtherance of the story. The chancellor and PTA members of PWU wrote a letter to MTRCB claiming that the story has repudiated the integrity of the school. MTRCB, after due investigation, rendered a decision making ABS-CBN liable because it failed to submit The Inside Story for review and it exhibited the same without its permission violating PD 1986. ABS-CBN assailed the constitutionality of the said law claiming that the law was tantamount to prior restraints and that the Inside Story was a public affairs program, a news documentary and socio political editorial airing within the protection of freedom of expression and press freedom. RTC granted the ABS-CBN motion to declare the law unconstitutional. HELD : Although the freedom of speech and the press are protected by the constitution, there has been no declaration that these two freedoms have preferred status. If the Court did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review of the MTRCB within the purview of PD 1896, with more reason as there is no justification to exempt Inside story. The only exception provided for by the said law is materials imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and Newsreels. Inside Story cannot likewise be said to be newsreels because these are films portraying re-enactments of events that had already happened. MTRCB further defined newsreels as straight reporting as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Since petitioner was merely penalized and MTRCB did not ban the viewing of Inside Story, the Court has no reason to delve with the Constitutional question. FREEDMAN V. MARYLAND, 380 US 51 FACTS: Appellant assailed the constitutionality of Maryland Motion Picture Censorship which required the submission of films before the State Board Censors as a form of review. He claimed that Sec 2 of the law would be tantamount to prior restraint. HELD: The following are procedural safeguards designed to obviate the danger of censorship. The burden of proving that the film is unprotected must rest on the censor; While the state may advance submission of all films in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to censors determination whether a film constitutes protected expression. It is readily apparent that Maryland procedural scheme does not satisfy these criteria. First, once the censor disapproves the film,
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the exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings; Second, once the Board acted against a film, exhibition is prohibited pending judicial reviews; Third, it is abundantly clear that Maryland provides no assurance of prompt judicial determination. The Maryland scheme fails to provide adequate standards against undue inhibitions of protected expression and this renders the law an invalid restraint. GONZALES V. KALAW KATIGBAK, 137 SCRA 717 FACTS: Petitoner Gonzales produced a film classified by respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions as For Adults Only and initially, the film was recommended with changes an deletions. On MR, although the classification was not changed, the board recommended no more deletions. Gonzales assailed the classification on the ground that it was without legal basis and the exercise is an impermissible restraint of his artistic expression. On the part of respondent, the standard of the law for classifying films afford a practical and determinative yardstick for the exercise of judgment. HELD: The power of the Respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage, and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. Censorship to media expressions is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest. The perception of obscenity by the respondent board appears to be restrictive. Obscenity based from US SC can be inferred by ascertaining whether to the average person applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as whole appeals to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex in art, literary or scientific works is not itself sufficient reason to deny the material constitutional problem of speech and press. EO 876 provides that for a great respect for contemporary Filipino cultural values This has to be reconciled with the mandate of the constitution that arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the state. Artists must be given enough leeway for them to do their crafts. [IN SHORT SINCE PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT CANNOT GIVE SUBSTANTIAL AND PRECISE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF MOTION PICTURES, LOOK AT US DECISIONS AGAIN] MODERN AMENITIES AND STATE REGULATIONS RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 521 US 844 FACTS: The Communications Decency Act of 1996 criminalizes the following acts perpetrated on the internet: knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient below 18; and sending or displaying to such person messages that in context depict or describe patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs. Proper defences will be given to those who take good faith, and effective actions to those who restrict access by my minors to prohibited communications and those who restrict such by requiring certain designated forms of proof
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such as verified credit card details|. District Court declared the law overbreadth and vague and therefore violative of First Amendments. HELD: Notwithstanding the legitimacy of congressional goal, the statutes abridge freedom of speech. Sexually explicit materials on the internet may be accessed either deliberately or unintentionally. Although there are systems in which control of certain website access by minors, these are not available to all. Regarding the age verification thru credit card details and password verifications, these means are not readily and effectively available to number substantial internet users, including adults. The overbreadth and vagueness of the law are seen on the following. The CDA fails to provide for a definition of indecent as used in the challenge statute, and importantly, omits any requirement that the patently offensive material covered by lack of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. It even included an additional year of those nearest majorities that under the NY statute, minor is below 17 while CDA prohibits the transmission of offensive materials to those below 18. The Court is likewise persuaded that CDA suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have as a constitutional right. There is no existing technology which would ascertain the age of internet users, thus the enactment of the law poses threats and fears among internet users to express whatever thoughts they have because they are uncertain if their materials will be considered indecent per se and will be read by someone below 18. Its open ended prohibitions also embrace posting of indecent messages merely at the presence of a minor. The term indecent is made dependent upon the community cover large amounts of non pornographic materials with serious educational and literary value. Incidentally, a mother who sent her 17 year old child information about say, birth control, will be incarcerated even though the mother or the child does not deem it indecent if the community finds the same as indecent. US Congress enacted the Childrens Internet Protection Act which states a public library may not receive federal assistance to provide internet filtering software to block images that constitute obscenity or child pornography. The US SC upheld the validity of the act holding that it is a valid exercise of spending power (US v. American Library Association, 539 US 194) UNITED STATES V. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC, 529 US 803 FACTS: Playboy challenged the constitutionality of Telecommunications Act of 1996 which requires cable television operators who provide channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming either to fully scramble or otherwise fully block those channels or to limit their transmission hours between 10 pm to 6 am. Playboy contends that the statute is unnecessarily restrictive content based legislation. District Court sided Playboy. HELD : Adults have the constitutional right to view the shows of Playboy, and Playboy has rights under first amendments to transit them. To prohibit this speech is a significant restriction of communication. The speech in question is defined by its content, and the law that tends to restrict is content based. It only
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applies to programming channels that are indecent. To withstand constitutionality, it must pass strict scrutiny, and it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest. If a less restrictive approach is available to attain the governments purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. In the instant case, the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket of curtailing speech freedom. Cable systems have the capacity to block unwanted channels on a household by household basis, and this is more practicable and less restrictive compared with total banning. Hence, when a plausible and less restrictive alternative is offered to a content based restriction, it is the governments obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals. The government has not met this burden. It merely relied on unsubstantiated statistics; and isolated cases on the inadequacies of household byhousehold blocking. THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE AND THE HECKLERS VETO Exception and unprotected by the Freedom of Speech FIGHTING WORDS by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. HECKLERS VETO the opposition of a rowdy crowd might drown out the voice of one seeking to exercise the right to speak. Comes in the form of regulations tending to prevent the expression of idea in view of the reaction that might be engendered among those opposed to it. FIGHTING WORDS should not give rise to HECKLERS VETO because the latter is a form of speech curtailment. The same would discourage the public from uttering criticisms about the government. In the US, a regulation stating that indecent speech should not be given when a child 17 years and below is present in a chatroom has been considered a Hecklers Veto. GOVERNANCE, ELECTIONS AND SPEECH As a requisite to an informed and meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage, there must be utmost freedom to discuss matters about issues, policies, programs and personalities. The public has the right to be informed of the mental, moral, and physical fitness of a candidate for public office. (Baguio Midland Courier v. Court of Appeals, 444 SCRA 28) A person seeking for public office must be allowed sufficient space to air and disseminate his thoughts about how he proposes to lead. This right must be consistent in keeping peaceful, clean, honest and credible elections and making equitable access to media for publicity or in preventing visual blights (City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789) GONZALES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 27 SCRA 835
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FACTS: Gonzales assailed the constitutionality of RA 4880 which prohibits too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. The law further provides that expression of opinions concerning the election shall not be considered part of the election campaign and that nothing in the law is to be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on political problem. Petitioner claimed that the enactment of the law would prejudice his right to free speech, assembly and association for purposes not contrary to law. HELD : The law provides that it shall be unlawful for any political party to nominate candidates for elective public office earlier than 150 days immediately preceding the election. Political parties may have less freedom as to the time during which they nominate candidates, but the curtailment is not of character to render the right meaningless. Neither is there an infringement of freedom to assemble. They can do so but not for such purpose. The law further provides that it shall be unlawful for a voter or a candidate to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during 120 or 90 days period provided by law. The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to acts designed to have a candidate promote his candidacy for public office. If the same is provided for by the challenged law, it cannot escape constitutional attack. A stricter standard of statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute inhibiting effect on speech. Although it cannot be discounted that the law intends to reduce the evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption, as well as violence that has been coupled with election campaigns and activities, still, fact remains that prohibition of speeches, announcements, or commentaries or holding of interviews against the election or any undertaking of any campaign propaganda is repugnant to a constitutional command. The challenged statute could have been narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. But since the court lacks one vote, the law cannot be declared unconstitutional. SANIDAD V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 181 SCRA 529 FACTS: Petitioners, who are journalists of a certain newspaper in Baguio, assailed COMELEC Resolution 2167 prohibiting all journalists from writing or announcing in their newspapers or radio programs during the plebiscite campaign period or on and before the election day itself their assent or dissent to the ratification of RA 6766 or the Organic Act of CAR. Petitioners claimed that the same was a prior restraint. On the part of the COMELEC, the resolution was an action to regulate media during the plebiscite periods and does not entirely bar petitioners from expressing their views as journalists may still do so outside the timeframe embodied in the resolution. HELD: It is clear from the Constitution that the power granted to it was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
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transportation or other public utilities, media communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space for public information campaigns among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be avoided is the possibility that a franchise holder may favour or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. The Constitutional grant does not mean that COMELEC has been granted the right to supervise media of their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. OSMENA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 288 SCRA 447 FACTS: Petitioners seek to revisit the National Press Club doctrine which upholds the constitutionality of Sec 11b of RA 6646 which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to COMELEC. HELD: Initially, the case is not ripe for judicial adjudication rendering the instant petition academic. The petitioners allege that the enforcement of the law would prejudice candidates who could not wage or launch media campaigns; nevertheless, none of them claim injury over the application of the law. But the Court is not constrained to make a ruling, to wit: There is no infringement of the speech freedom when the law allowed that print space be sold merely to COMELEC. The same was a regulatory measure to give equal opportunities those who can afford media campaign and those who cannot. On the petitioners argument that NPC doctrine is flawed because it rests on a misconception that Art IX-C Sec 4 of the constitution mandates equality of all candidates, should mean equality of opportunities. The same must lie. Access to public office will be denied to the poor if they cannot have access to media in order to reach the electorate. The petitioners further argued that the application of the law did not level the playing field between the rich and the poor. The Court opined that reversing the NPC doctrine and giving unlimited mass media advertisements will not necessarily address the inequality because the rich may still resort to other means of campaign. The measure is designed to give advantage to the dearth of poor candidates. Applying the OBriens Test, RA 6646 is a valid regulation of police power calculated to ensure equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns. The main purpose of the challenged status is regulatory. Any restriction on the speech is merely incidental and cannot outweigh the principles behind the law. In view of the dissent of Justice Panganiban who claimed that there is no clear and present danger that media aids do not partake of the real substantive evil the state has the right to repel, it is enough that a deferential standard review will suffice to test the validity because Sec 11b is not concerned with the content of the speech, the same being merely regulatory. Concurring Opinion, Justice Puno In view of the Dissent of Justice Romero who relied on the Buckley Doctrine which US Supreme Court ruled that limits on campaign expenditures violate the
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freedom of speech. A reading of the American legal literature would however reveal that Buckley has been widely criticized. It has allowed the polluting effect of money in election campaigns. It is difficult to think why the law has to be condemned when in fact it equalizes the political opportunities of the people. RA 6646 does not curtail speech as it no more than prevents the use of wealth by the rich to frustrate the poor candidates access to media. BLO UMPAR ADIONG V. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 FACTS: COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2345 which allows written materials of a specified size to be posted only in authorized areas and prohibits the posting of the same in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, including vehicles. Petitioner assailed the said resolution on the ground that it violated Sec 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 11a of RA 6646. He complains that the resolution prejudices him being a neophyte. He further claimed that he had not received from any COMELEC Registrar list of common poster areas. HELD: The resolution is unconstitutional. First, it infringes the citizens right to free speech. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. Between the right of the COMELEC to regulate clean, honest and orderly election versus the speech freedom, the former must be dispensed in favour of the latter because there can be no such election if in the first place, speech has been curtailed. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like vehicles poses no clear and present danger that the Congress may prohibit. Second, the statute is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even citizens private property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence, the same runs counter with Art. III Sec 1 of the Constitution. The Due Process clause protects the property, not merely in acquiring it, but in using the same. The posting of stickers does not require consent from the owners of the vehicles. In fact, even the owners themselves can make stickers for their candidates, and if we are to deprive the owners of these vehicles that right, we are in turn depriving them of due process and free speech. Third, the Constitution protects the right of candidates, rich and poor, equal opportunity to inform the electorate regarding their candidacies. ABS-CBN V. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 FACTS: ABS-CBN prepared a project to conduct radio-TV coverage of the 1988 elections and to make exit survey of the votes. Afraid that the said survey might be in conflict with COMELEC official count and the unofficial count of NAMFREL, COMELEC issued a resolution enjoining the petitioners from conducting the survey. ABS CBN challenged the resolution on the ground that the resolution violated its freedom of expression. On the part of COMELEC, it claimed that the survey would demean the secrecy
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of ballot, that the resolution was pursuant to the Constitutional mandate that COMELEC is tasked to ensure free, orderly and honest elections, and that the survey would cause confusion and would give premature conditioning on the part of the public as to who the real winners are. HELD: Holding of exit polls constitutes an essential part of freedom of speech. COMELEC cannot ban them in the guise of promoting orderly elections. Exit polls can be used as effective measures to attain the purpose of COMELEC. The arguments of COMELEC are merely speculative. First, the element of randomness is employed by exit polls in order to get precise sentiments of the public; second, the exit polls cannot replace the official count made by the COMELEC; third, the exercises of exit polls are independent of orderly elections. Although the Omnibus Election Code prohibited the presence of disruptors inside the voting precincts, COMELEC did not prove that the presence of media inside the precincts would disrupt the proceedings. On the COMELECs apprehension of violation of ballot secrecy, the reason behind the principle is to avoid vote buying through voters identification. Voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their ballots to other persons, making copies thereof, or putting marks which make the ballots identifiable. In the instant case, the voters may choose WON to disclose their identities in the survey. SOCIAL WEATHER STATION, INC V. COMELEC, 357 SCRA 496 FACTS: Petitioner assailed Sec 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Elections Act) which provides that no survey shall be released 15 and 7 days before elections. Petitioner argued that the law was a prior restraint, the survey it wishes to conduct within the span prohibited does not pose clear and present danger, and that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion on newspaper or broadcast media concerning political issues up to the day of the election. COMELEC averred that the law prevents manipulation in the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys. HELD: Sec 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an abridgement of freedom of speech, expression an of the press. The challenged law lays prior restraint on the freedoms of speech, press and expression by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within 15 and 7 days period. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of INVALIDITY. Applying the OBrient test which has been the most influential test for distinguishing content based from content neutral regulations, the law fails to meet criterion because there is no causal connection with the government interest sought to be protected and the expression curtailed. By prohibiting the publication of election surveys because of the possibility that such might undermine the integrity of the election, then the speech of those columnists, politicians, armchair theorists and opinion makers should be given the same prohibition as well. Second, the government interest does not outweigh the expression. It has been held that the law aims to prevent last minute pressures, creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak and the prevention of dagdag bawas.
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These aims cannot however sacrifice speech freedom when they can be penalized instead rather than preventing free speech. COURTS, CRITICISMS AND CONTEMPTS Courts may demand certain degree of respect in discharging its duties as protectors of rights. This respect may be demanded when there is perceived disrespect or undue and undeserved criticisms of the courts, or when there are means calculated to influence or pressure them, i.e. conducting rallies or other publicity efforts, which may be harnessed these magistrates to decide in a way repugnant to their own way. In such instances, the courts may exercise its powers of contempt. Although the officials of the SC may be commented or criticized, the criticism that takes the form of malicious insinuation, brazen ridicule or capricious innuendo has no place in formal resolution of an agency that seeks to hold in contempt the members of SC for issuing decisions and orders that have allegedly interfered with the COMELEC proceedings (RE: EM 03-010 Order of the First Dvision of COMELEC dated Aug 15, 2003) UNITED STATES V. BUSTOS, 37 PHIL 731 FACTS: Several residents of Pampanga signed a petition asking from the Executive Secretary the removal of Justice of Peace Ramon Punsalan, charging the same of exacting money from several people in exchange of a favourable litigation results. Executive Secretary endorsed the matter to the Judge of First Instance who initially recommended the removal of Punsalan, but latter on acquitted him because the charges were mainly made by some petitioners not because of transgression of law, but due to personal reasons. Punsalan instituted libel case against respondents. Defendants claim that their petition to the removal of Punsalan was protected by the speech freedom and that their letter entailing the petition is a privileged communication which cannot be the basis for libel. HELD: The guarantee of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of public concern. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republicanism and the complement right to free speech. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility of the charges made. The Doctrine of Privileged Communications rests upon public policy which looks to the free administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity of the evildisposed and malignant slanderer. IT may be absolute or qualified. Qualified privileged communication can be overturned with the presence of malice. Good faith may be a good defense for the absence of malice. Even when the statement is false; if there is a probable cause for the belief in their truthfulness; privileged communications can still absolve the individual claiming it. The burden of proof as far as malice is concerned lies on the prosecution. In this case, the Justice of Peace was not able to adduce evidence to prove the same.
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NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC V. SANCHEZ, 154 SCRA 542 FACTS: The parties, members of two labor unions, whose cases were pending before the Supreme Court intensified the staging of their rallies by building provisional houses in front of the Supreme Court which obstructed the entrance of justices, officials and employees of the Court. This was done although the leaders of the labor unions were already entertained by the court. The SC asked the leaders of the unions and their respective counsels to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt. HELD : Grievances must be ventilated through the proper channels, through appropriate petitions, motions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts entitled to proceed to the disposition of its business, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the proper administration of justice. The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such natural right has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. Parties have the constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public
clamor.
IN RE: PETITION TO ANNUL EN BANC RESOLUTION AM 98-7-02-SC. 296 SCRA 11 FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte applied for a Mayors Permit to hold a rally in front of the Justice of Peace of Las Pinas to protest the delay in the disposition of his clients case bending before the said court. The same was denied because AM 98-07-02-SC prohibits the staging of rallies within 200 m radius of any courts of justice. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court to challenge the said resolution because it abridges free speech. HELD: The Freedom invoked has never been understood as absolute right to speak whenever, wherever and however. Judicial independence and the fair and orderly administration of justice constitute paramount governmental interests that can justify the regulation of the publics right of free speech and peaceful assembly within the vicinity of courthouses. Petitioners claim that the court has exercised judicial legislation repugnant to the provisions of BP 880 (The Public Assembly Act) by converting public places, particularly the 200 m radius, into a non rally zone. It is a settled jurisprudence however, that the government may restrict speech plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. On the petitioners argument that the resolution violates equal protection because while they have complete access to legislative and executive offices, the same cannot be said with courts, the decision making process of courts is distinctly different from that of political departments of the government. On the argument that since the court is imbued with the power of
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contempt, the resolution is no longer necessary, the court also has the power to make rules to assure orderly court proceedings and to maintain the integrity of the judicial decision making process. The choice of which powers to exercise belongs to the Court which cannot be tampered by any extraneous power. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC V. ASUNCION, 228 SCRA 11 FACTS: SWS published a survey result which states that the satisfaction rating of the judiciary is lower than that of the PNP. Judge Maximiano Asuncion ordered the said station to show cause why it should not be cited for contempt for publishing the survey without asking permission from any courts of law. SWS complied and Judge Asuncion dismissed the contempt charges against it. SWS went to the SC to complain the act of Judge Asuncion as the same is tantamount to grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Judge Asuncion bolstered that he did the action because the survey tends to demean the image of the judiciary. HELD: The petition must fail. The powers of the courts to cite and punish for contempt as inherent in the judicial office is beyond debate. Contempt can be committed in two ways. 1. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence courts in administering justice in a pending suit. 2. A publication which tends to bring them in any way to disrepute. The contention that contempt for acts or utterances not related to a pending action must be rejected. Judge Asuncion cannot be faulted when he has felt duty bound to inquire into the basis of the derogatory news that has the tendency to bring disrespect to the court. IN RE: EMIL P. JURADO, 243 SCRA 299 FACTS: Emil Jurado wrote several columns for several months implicating judges and justices to alleged irregularities and corrupt practices. He wrote that there were several Makati judges and seven SC justices who were blatantly practicing said acts, the promotion to the SC was based on powerful political sponsor from JBC, that there was an irregularity when an executive of Equitable Bank sponsored a lunch in his office where several judges and justices were invited, that the decision reached by Justice Hugo in PLDT v. ETPI was erroneously written in favour of PLDT as validated by David Yerkes who was alleged to be a linguistic expert. These accusations gave rise to public clamours asking the impeachment of SC justices and the resignation of lower court judges. The Chief Justice created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate upon this matter. The committee invited Jurado but he failed to appear. During the pendency of the investigation, Jurado again wrote another article implicating PLDT as the sponsor of the vacation of several justices of SC in Hong Kong. PLDT wrote the instant petition denying the allegation, and it was bolstered by a letter of Equitable Bank executive who explained his side with the alleged irregular lunch. On his defense, Jurado said that he was not able to attend the meetings set by the Ad Hoc Committee because the invitation was handed to him on the day of the meeting and it was impossible for him to cancel his further
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engagements. He sought for the cancellation of the proceedings on the ground that what were written by him on his articles reflet his beliefs and they were based on reliable sources whose identities he cannot divulge. He also bolstered that the court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press; the present administrative charges cannot constitute direct contempt as there is no pending case or proceeding against him or even indirect contempt as no formal charge has been laid before the court, and; his comments would be more relevant if taken together with other journalists who gathered before the Ad Hoc Committee. HELD: Jurado is guilty of Contempt of Court. The Constitution guarantees speech and press freedoms and in the exercise thereof, the journalist must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. In respecting the individual rights guaranteed among judges and justices, the norm does not require that truth must be ascertained at the fullest extent, but it prohibits reckless disregard of truth by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the veracity of the reports. Regarding Jurados column implicating PLDT as the sponsor of the HK vacation of SC justices, Jurado did not make an effort to talk to anyone from PLDT or to SC to ascertain the claim of his reliable sources. Regarding the lunch held by Equitable Bank, the in house counsel explained that it was his birthday and he was the one who sponsored the same and the people who were invited were his peers from law school (sosyal!). Records show that Jurado did not repudiate any of these facts, and it does not show any effort on his part to ascertain the contents of his report. On Jurados report that seven justices voted as one in favour of a case, it can be inferred that no such case or even voting can be inferred from January to December 1992 volumes of SCRA. On Jurados accusation that JBC would consider a candidate for judiciary if there would be a sponsor (JBC members who have sons or nephews candidate for the judiciary) there has been no single instance that any son or nephew of a member of the council being nominated to the CA. Judge Joselito De la Rosa who was nominated for CA, was the son in law, not the nephew of Justice Relova (dib a parehas lang yun? One degree of affinity versus Three degrees of consanguinity). Common to all these utterances of Jurado is his failure to undertake cursory verification, the abdication of the journalists duty to report and interpret the news with fairness and the breach of laws injunction that a person act with justice x x x. On the argument of Jurado about contempt, the power to punish for contempt is necessary for the courts own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice, and it is not dependent upon the complaint of any parties or litigants. On Jurados claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he was being singled out as there were also other journalists who clattered the corruption issues faced by the judiciary, the court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation, or interfere with the proper administration of justice. Jurado has not been
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singled out. What has happened is that there have been brought before the courts formal complaints about his reports branding the same as lies. On collateral issues presented by the dissenting opinions, particularly the right of the newsmen to refuse summons and subpoenas inviting them to appear in administrative investigations and their right not to reveal the sources of their information under RA 53 being violative of the press freedom, the same are not the issue in the instant case. There are no summonses or subpoenas issued to Jurado by the Ad Hoc Committee. Jurado was merely invited to give light to the issue and when he refused to appear, no sanction was imposed to him. Granting that subpoenas were indeed issued, the same does not violate RA 53, ipso facto. It would be his duty to appear and answer the questions that would be propounded to him, and invoke only RA 53 when necessary. RA 53 further does not confer him immunity from liability for false or defamatory publications for the said law is unequivocal when it declared that the refusal to disclose confidential sources of information is without prejudice to civil and criminal liabilities. Courts must be respected. There is no principle of law that authorizes with impunity a discontented citizen to unleash, by publication, his wrath upon courts and judges. If he believes that a judge is corrupt and that justices have perverted the law, legal remedies are available to him. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Puno The case at bench is not a libel case or a damage suit where we can properly decide the kind of falsehood and the proper stage of proceedings when the court could compel the newsman to reveal his source of information. The case should be decided by determining whether the column, given their falsity and slant, posed a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. The Court should always adopt an approach that is less destructive of freedom of speech. The Hong Kong, and the birthday lunch reports showed no degree on how the false report degraded the administration of justice. Besides, they were not false but merely slanted. As a columnist, Jurado does not report news but interprets events from his own distinct prisms or perceptions. The US Supreme Court upheld the law that requires newsmen to appear and testify before state grand juries regarding criminal activities that might have come into their knowledge in the excercise of their profession as media practitioners; the same does not abridge press freedom. (Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US 665) SPEECH, PROFESSIONS AND CALLINGS Free speech is not exercised in the same extent by everyone. There are certain considerations which militate against an unfettered exercise in freedom of speech and of the press.
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A lawyers right to criticize the court may be circumscribed by their need to show respect towards the court and to maintain the integrity of such institutions (Jurado, supra). In obedience to lawful orders, soldiers right to express views on certain matter may also be circumscribed, the same tantamount to the discipline relevant to their profession (Kapunan v. De Villa, 168 SCRA 264). Government employer may impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraint which would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. (San Diego v. Roe, GR 01-1669, December 6, 2004)
ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 166 SCRA 316 FACTS: Supreme Court issued two resolutions against Respondent Gonzales enjoining him from filing Graft charges against Zaldivar before the Sandiganbayan. Gonzales released a statement before Philippine Daily Globe stating that the SC has been restraining him in his drive to prosecute corrupt officials. Zaldivar filed a contempt case against Gonzales. Consequently, SC made a resolution nullifying the Graft charges against Zaldivar. He sought for MR, and made imputations collateral with the issue, to wit: he was approached by a leading member of the court and was asked to slow down on Zaldivars case; he was asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements of the SC; he was called by a leading member of SC to dismiss the cases against him. He likewise attached handwritten notes which he claimed were sent by some members of the SC interceding cases pending before his office. He also stated the same before the press which has resulted to the cases being sensationalized. He was asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. HELD : The authority of the SC to discipline lawyers springs from the Constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law and the regulation of the practice of law itself. Only slightly less important is the public interest in the capacity of the court to effectively control professional misconduct on the part of the lawyers who are indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Lawyers rights to free expression may be limited than that of the laymen. Gonzales, apart from being a lawyer, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and the Court. Although he is not denied of his freedom of expression, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect courts. It is a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. The lawyers duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. On Gonzales argument that libel is the proper remedy and not contempt, the attack was made not against the single member of the courts, but on the entire institution itself.
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Motion for Reconsideration, 170 SCRA 1 There is no sufficient basis for modifying the ruling made. On the argument that the visible tendency rule should be used instead of clear and present danger test, the former has not been recognized in this jurisdiction. Either the court uses clear and present danger test or the balancing of interest test, the statements made by Gonzales are of such a nature and were made in such manner as to transcend the limits of the free speech. The substantive evil that the Court wishes to curtail is the degradation of the judicial system and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from the members of the bar and the officers of the court.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH Was declared recently by the US Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 US 748 Advertising though entirely commercial may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. Commercial speeches serve to inform the public of the availability, nature and prices of products and services, and performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in free enterprise The Court afforded a commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non commercial expression (Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447) Four Part Test to determine whether a commercial speech is constitutionally permissible: a. Must concern lawful activity and not misleading b. Asserted governmental interest is substantial c. If both are positive, the regulation directly advances governmental interest asserted
d. It is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Corollary to this is advertisement, protected by Art. XVI Sec 11 (2) of the RP Constitution (Only Filipino Citizens or Corporations or associations at least 70% of the capital is owned by such citizens shall be allowed in the advertising industry. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.) BATES V. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, 433 US 350
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FACTS: The appellant lawyers placed in a newspaper an advertisement of their services and fees. The president of the State Bar complained that the petitioners violated the State Supreme Courts disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertising in newspaper. The petitioners were found guilty. HELD: The Arizona Disciplinary Rule violates First Amendment. On the argument that advertisement has adverse effect on legal profession as it open floodgates to commercialization, the argument is open to question. The failure of lawyers to advertise creates public disillusionment. Studies reveal that many people do not retain counsel because they are afraid on their prices or because they do not know where to locate one. Advertisement addresses this. It is further argued that advertisement will be misleading because such services are individualized that prevents informed comparison on the basis of an advertisement; because the consumer is unable to determine the services he needs in advance and; because advertisement fails to show irrelevant factors of skills. The said arguments merely undermine the public. If the navet of the public will cause adcertising by attorneys to be misleading, it is the bars role to assure that the populace is informed as to enable it to place advertisement in its proper perspective. Another argument propounded is that advertising has an undesirable effect of stirring up litigation. It is argued to set up assertion of rights in court thereby undesirably unsettling societal repose. Advertising is not an unmitigated source of harm. It may offer great benefits. The notion that a person who suffers wrong must silent himself than to seek legal remedy is not acceptable. Further argument states that advertisement will merely increase the fees collected by lawyers to the detriment of the public. Studies show that prices of services will be lower if they are advertised rather than if they are not. The government argued that advertisement will give package of services to the prejudice of the public that lawyers might merely give services out of a certain package even though the client does not need it. Restraints on advertising are ineffective way of deterring shoddy works. AN attorney who is inclined to cut shady works will do so regardless of the regulations of advertising. In upholding the validity of the advertising by the lawyers in the case, it does not go that they may not be regulated. Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading s subject to restraint. Leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in commercial arena. It follows as well that there may be reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner of advertising. As a collateral matter, since advertising is linked to commercial well being, it seems UNLIKELY that the speech can be assailed by overbroad regulation. SYMBOLIC SPEECH, EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE When it comes to conduct as expression, the protection may not be as extensive as when the speech is conveyed through words. Conventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a complex society preclude an absolutist interpretation of freedom of expression where it does not involve pure speech but speech plus physical actions like picketing.
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Relevant to the use of public place or property for the freedom of expression is the PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE public areas like streets and parks are traditionally considered as proper venues for the free articulation of ideas and views and that the exercise of such freedom should not be unnecessarily restricted or impaired. Sec. 15 BP 880 Every city and municipality in the country x x x shall designate at least one freedom park or mall x x x where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of permit. In cities and municipalities of MM, the respective mayors shall establish freedom parks x x x. UNITED STATES V. OBRIEN, 391 US 367 FACTS: OBrien and his companions burned their Selective Services Registration Certificate on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse in front of a sizable crowd. OBrien was arrested and tried for violating 5 USC App. 462 b, which penalizes any person who forges, alters, or knowingly destroys or mutilates such certificates. On his defense, OBrien performed the same because he wanted to advocate his non-war belief. He was convicted. On appeal, he claimed that the law abridged his free speech and it served no legitimate purpose. CA upheld the same unconstitutional, but upheld the conviction of OBrien. HELD: The challenged law does not abridge freedom of speech. The law does not relate to speech. It does not only punish destructions made for the purpose of expressing views, but for destruction in general. On OBriens argument that the purpose of the law was to curtail his speech freedom, including symbolic speech, apparently limitless variety of conduct cannot be labelled as speech. However, even assuming that the same is speech, speech and non speech elements are combined in the course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. A regulation is sufficiently justified, if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, if it is unrelated to suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction of expression is no greater than the furtherance of that interest. The Constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies is broad and sweeping. Legislation to insure the registration to augment manpower requirements of said state interest, and the continuing availability of these certificates of registration serves a legitimate and substantial purpose. The court perceives no alternative means that would assure the continuing availability of the certificate issues. Furthermore, the challenged law and governmental interests merely seek the efficient functioning of Selective Service System, which does not necessarily involve communication. Government may create national symbol, promote the, and encourage their respectful treatment. But the Flag Protection Act of 1999 goes beyond this by criminally prosecuting expressive conduct because of its communicative impact. (US v. Eichman, 496 US 310) CLARK V. COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON VIOLENCE, 468 US 288
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FACTS: National Park Service allowed respondents to stage a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall and to build two symbolic tents in the area. However, it did not allow respondents to sleep in the tents because of the regulation of Washington DC that sleeping in symbolic tents may be allowed merely on designated campgrounds and campgrounds were yet established that time. District Court sided the
respondent on the ground that the regulation violated Speech Freedom. Hence, this petition.
HELD : There is no violation of Speech Freedom in this case. Expressions, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. This kind of restriction is valid if : they are justified without reference to the content of regulated speech, they are narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest, they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. The regulation satisfies the test. Prohibiting of sleeping may be an expressive conduct, but it does not make the ban any less a limitation on the manner of demonstrating. Further, the law does not totally ban sleeping. It merely designates where the conduct may be done. It is also apparent that the interest involved here is to make the park attractive and intact condition, readily available to the people who wish to see and enjoy the by their presence. The government may regulate activity in public place, even in so called PUBLIC FORUM. With respect to PUBLIC FORUM, the ability of the government to impose restrictions are more circumscribed. Regulation of speech activity on governmental property and those dedicated by the government for speech activity is under STRICT SCRUTINY. Regulation of speech activity where the government has not dedicated its property for first amendment is examined only for REASONABLENESS. Government authorities may ban picketing targeted at a particular residence only (Frisby v. Schultz, 487 US 474)
ANONYMOUS SPEECH The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the first amendment. Despite readers curiosity and the publics interest in identifying the creator of a particular work, an author has generally the freedom not to disclose her true identity. This anonymity is best exemplified by the secrecy of ballot. (McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US, 334) If the state has a compelling interest why the identity of a person must be revealed, the same must be upheld passing STRICT SCRUTINY test. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND RIGHT OF PETITION
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The Freedom of Speech, Expression and the Right of the People to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances are inseparable (Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553) If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasion (500 residents of a town who crowded into the council chamber to ask for the resignation of some officials), the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceful assembly and tumultuous uprtising (US v. Aprubado, 7 Phil 422) REYES V. BAGATSING, 125 SCRA 553 FACTS: Justice JBL Reyes sought permit from Mayor Reyes that he be allowed to conduct a peaceful march fro Luneta to US Embassy. After two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of all Foreign Military Bases would be given to any representative of the US Embassy. The petition was denied by the respondent on account of intelligent reports that a subversive element would infiltrate any assembly where a large crowd is expected and that the petitioner would be allowed if the demonstration would be conducted in Rizal Coliseum to ensure their safety. The petition was initially requested in favour of Reyes, but a dissent from Justice Aquino was presented stating that Ordinance 7295 of the City of Manila prohibits the holding of rally in front of US Embassy. HELD : This petition must be granted. Freedom of Assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public opinion. In exercise thereof, one may not advocate disorder in the name of protest; much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on a tumult attending a rally. However, the rally needs not to be utmost calm for occasions of feelings attendant the sae are always to a high pitch of excitement. Freedom of Assembly may be exercised in the streets and parks. But that does not mean absolute utility of those areas. Parks and streets must be regulated in subordination to the general comfort and convenience and in consonance with peace and good order. As a caveat, the regulation must not be repugnant to the exercise of freedom. In connection with the regulation, mayors may exercise their licensing powers. They may not curtail the conduct of peaceful assembly unless there is a clear and present danger, but they may regulate demonstrations with consideration to time, place or manner of the parade or procession (with a view to conserving public convenience). Ordinance 7295 which prohibits the staging of demonstrations should not be used as a defense unless, again to reiterate, there is a clear and present danger which is not present in this case. Reliance of Mayor Bagatsng in Navarro and PMP cases cannot be sustained, because although the SC upheld the Municipal Mayor in denying the permit in those cases, the dangers in those cases were imminent. Difference between EDSA I and II (Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452)
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EDSA I Exercise of the power of revolution Extra constitutional (not subject to judicial review) Presents a political question Presents a legal question EDSA II Exercise of freedom of speech and assembly Intra Constitutional (subject to judicial review)
Reasons for the guarantee of Speech Freedom and Freedom of Assembly: (ibid) A. Essential means of securing individual fulfilment B. Essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth C. Provides for participation in decision making by all members of society D. Method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community in maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.
It should be clear even to those with intellectual deficiency that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievance, all shall listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM Art. XIV Sec. 5 (2) : Academic Freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Involves the right of institution to determine what to teach, how to teach, who may teach the, and who to admit therein. (Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7) Includes who can and cannot study in it, on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduate, including the revocation or withdrawal of the honor it may have conferred where it is subsequently shown that the same was obtained through fraud. Academic freedom does not terminate during graduation (UP Board of Regents v. CA, 313 SCRA 404) Classrooms are marketplaces of ideas. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire and study, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding. (Sweezy v. Hampshire, 354 US 234) Academic Freedom involves the right of individuals in universities to investigate, pursue, discuss and follow argument wherever it may lead them, free from internal and external pressures. Admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right (Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277) Education Act of 1982: A student has a right to freely choose their study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation There also needs to be a balance between the right of the students to assemble and express themselves, and if ever, they do exercise their right, which may be an irritant to school, the same
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would not constitute a good reason for refusing their admission (ADMU v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644) Academic deficiencies and breach of disciplinary regulation may justify their being barred from re enrolling (Villar v. TIP, 135 SCRA 706) GARCIA V. LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, 68 SCRA 277 FACTS: Petitioner Garcia was refused by the respondent to enrol for another semester for her MA in Theology degree because her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the tendency of slowing the progress of the class. Garcia said that the reason given for her expulsion was not valid. Respondent however averred that it had the right to choose who may continue studying not only on account of intellect, but on accounts of a students traits, character orientation in relation with other students, facilities, professors and the optimum classroom size. IT claimed further that the petitioner was merely admitted to take some course for credit because the School of Theology was a school for priesthood and the petitioner was female. HELD: The petition must fail. Respondent has no clear duty to admit the petitioner. The matter of admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion of the school that certain standards must be met. The Constitution guarantees Academic Freedom. To soe sociologists, it is more often identified with the right of teachers to pursue specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of such endeavour without fear that retribution would be visited on hi in the event that his conclusions are found objectionable. But the Constitution refers to Institutions of Higher Learning. These institutions hen decide for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It should be free from outside coercion or interference save possibility when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraints. Citing Sir Eric Ashby, the following are the components of the academic freedom: admission and examination of students; the curricula of courses to study; the appointment and tenure of academic staff; the allocation of income among different categories and expenditures. The removal of petitioner does not demean her intellectual capacity, but merely based on the fact that it redounds to the benefit of other students and herself. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Makasiar Students and teachers must always remain free to inquire, to study and evaluate, to gain new understanding, otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. The concern of understanding is man and society. For the good of society, if understanding be an essential need of society, inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left unfettered as possible. MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC V. COURT OF APPEALS, 348 SCRA 265 FACTS: Petitioner imposed the penalty of suspension to expulsion to some staffers of the Colleges school paper and magazine because they wrote several articles which according to the Miriam
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Community, obscene and sexual explicit. The articles (1) about a group of young male who went to watch a certain bold show; (2) cover title of Libog at iba pang tula; (3) Foreword entitled Foreplay, etc. The school conducted ex parte investigation because students failed to appear and that they insisted that the jurisdiction should belong to DECS and that the students have rights granted by RA 7079 (The Campus Journalism Act). HELD : Noteworthy are the provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial board and members of a school publication. Sec. 7 of RA 7079 provides: A member of the publication staff x x x shall not be expelled on the basis of the performance of his or her duties in the student publication. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that in view of the Academic Freedom guarantee of the constitution, the establishment of an educational institution for higher learning requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational institution conducive to learning. Incidentally, the school not only has the right but also the duty to develop students not only intellectually, and socially but also morally. As may be gleaned from the two provisions, the power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. In several cases, the court has upheld the rights of the students to free speech. But, said right is not absolute as the right of free speech must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school. Malabanan doctrine provides that the free speech can be curtailed if the publication materially disrupts classroom or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights. In light of the same, Sec.7 of RA 7079, vis-a-vis the constitution and the decision of the supreme court shall be read as: The school cannot suspend or expel the student solely on the basis of the articles he has written, except, when such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. FINAL WORD: Little learning is a dangerous thing (Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism)
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art III Sec. 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. In a society that values freedom to think for oneself, it follows as a corollary that the government must not interfere in an individuals manner of communing with his idea of a Supreme Being or of the supernatural and of forces beyond any empirical explanation. The evils brought about by the previous merger of government and religion has made the more libertarian spirits to prefer the separation between what is secular and what is religious. (Everson v. Board of Education, 301 US 1) Relative to Art. II Sec 6 :The separation of the church and the state shall be inviolable. Separation does not however mean absolute antagonism See Art. VI Sec. 28 (3), Sec 29 (2), Art. XIV Sec. 3(3) The assurance of religious freedom under the Constitution consists of Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. AGLIPAY V. RUIZ, 64 PHIL 201
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FACTS: Director of Posts announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps (bearing the Catholic Chalice at the center with grapes and wheat) commemorating the celebration of the 33
rd
International Eucharistic Congress. Some of these stamps were already sold, thus, petitioner Aglipay, the Head of Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the selling of the remaining part of the stamps. HELD: Whats at stake here is the possible violation of religious freedom. History has taught us that the union of the government and the state is prejudicial to both. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition for religion. What is guaranteed is religious liberty, not religious toleration. Contrary to the averment of the petitioner, the Director of Posts does not authorize appropriation of public money for the support of a particular sect. In the present case, the issuance of postage stamp was not inspired to support the Roman Catholic Church, nor was the money derived from the sale would go to the said religion. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamp was to advertise the Philippines and attract tourists. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance which the Philippines host to give publicity to the country. It is significant to note that the designs of the stamps were even changed to the map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila and an inscription: XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress but Manila, the capital of the Philippines. The government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results religious n character if the purpose it had in mind could legitimately be undertaken by legislation. DEFINING AND DIVINING RELIGION Derived from the middle English word religioun, Old French religion, Latin religio referring to the bond between man and the Gods. Religion has reference to ones views to his relations to his Creator and to obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character and of obedience to his will (Davis v. Beason, 133 US 333) Criteria for the existence of religion (Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 133): a. Belief in God b. Religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belied c. Demonstrable sincerity in belief (but the court must not inquire into the truth about the belief)
d. Association ties Profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his creator (Aglipay v. Ruiz, supra) Reference to ones view of his relations to his creator and the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character and obedience to His will (American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil 387)
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THE ESTABLISHMENT CODE Prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favouring any religion against others. Refers to STRICT NEUTRALITY (See Golden Notes for definition) although the country refers to BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time, strive to uphold religious liberty to greatest extent possible within the constitutional limits. (Estrada v. Escritor, infra) Balance between religion and atheism Has been implicated with prayers in school, assistance to sectarian schools ranging from books, public transportation, equipment and teachers, to school buildings. Non establishment thus calls for government neutrality in religious matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid breeding of interfaith dissension. In deciding the ownership of a religious image between the parish priest and the barangay council, the court states that not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separations of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of property. The image belongs to the barangay. (Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510) SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON TOWNSHIP V. SCHEMP, 374 US 203 FACTS: This petition was brought to assail the Constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law requiring the public schools to begin each day with readings from the bible or reciting the Lords Prayer. The only exception given not to read the bible was when there was a written letter from parents asking for such exception. HELD: The law is unconstitutional. First Amendment requires that the state has to be neutral in its relations with groups of believers and non believers. It does not require the State to be their adversary. Schools are organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching and that the school can inculcate all the needed temporal knowledge and maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. To abide by the limits of the Establishment Clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Applying the establishment clause principles, reciting either the Lords Prayer or verses from the bible as part of the curricula in school buildings under the supervision of school personnel are religious practices to which the First Amendment frowns. Concurring Opinion, Justice Brennan The Freedom of Religion forbids those involvements of religious with secular institutions which serve the essentially religious activities with secular institutions; employs the organs of the government for religious purposes, or; use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice. On the other hand, there may be myriad forms of involvements of government which religion do not import
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dangers, and therefore not deemed to be violative of the Establishment Clause. Government cannot sponsor religious exercises in public schools without jeopardizing that neutrality. MARSH V. CHAMBERS, 463 US 783 FACTS: Nebraska Legislature begins each of its sessions with a prayer offered by a chaplain who is chosen by the Executive Board of the Legislative Council and paid out of public funds. Chambers assailed the act as violative of the Establishment Clause. CA affirmed. HELD: The opening of sessions of legislative and other bodies with a prayer is deeply embedded in history. Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative Chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of the constitution, for the practice of opening sessions with prayers continued ever since the early sessions of the First Amendments when they introduced the changes in the Constitution. Furthermore, invoking God at the beginning of each session is not establishing religion or a preliminary step for that purpose. It is simply an acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people. The payment of the chaplain from funds is also founded in its historical practice BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ALLEN, 392 US 236 FACTS: New Yorks Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to students including those from private and parochial schools. School Board assailed the constitutionality of the act, including orders from Allen who removed some members of the Board for defying with the law and it sought the US SC to prevent the use of state funds for the for the purpose of purchasing the textbooks to be lent for parochial schools. HELD: In order to identify if the law is valid, the Everson Test must be applied, to wit: What is the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances not inhibits religion. The express purpose of the law is to make educational opportunities available to the young. The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charged. Lending does not grant ownership, therefore, the ownership of the book is still that of the State. No funds are furnished to the parochial school as the benefit redounds to parents and children. Furthermore, the law does not authorize the lending of religious books or other religious literary articles. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Black Establishing a religion is not merely seen by over acts like paying salaries of religious school teachers, erecting buildings used for the same, etc. Taxes levied and raised cannot be used to support religious school and buy their books, or any other maintenance expenses.
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Dissenting Opinion, Justice Douglas The law provides that a book which a pupil is required to use for a semester may be lent to him. But the act of requiring revolves upon the parochial schools principal who happens to be, in Catholic Schools, a priest or a nun. The risk of violating the Establishment Clause is compounded by giving the sectarian schools the chance in selecting the textbooks they might require because most of these books contain seeds of creed and dogma (see examples on p. 129). WALTZ V. TAX COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FACTS: Waltz assailed the Constitutionality of the granting by the respondent of tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worships because said exemption indirectly requires him to give contributions to these religions, therefore, violative of his First Amendment right. HELD: The Religious Clause under the First Amendment connotes the establishment of a religion sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the religion in religious activity. The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group, or even churches as such; rather it has granted the exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by non profit, quasi public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical and patriotic groups. The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community and finds this classification useful, desirable and in the context of public interest. The court cannot read the granting of tax exemptions as establishing religion. It is simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit corporations. The grant of tax exemption is also not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches, but simply abstains from demanding that church support state. LEMON V. KURTZMAN, 403 US 602 FACTS: Pennsylvania Non Public Elementary and Secondary Education Act adopted a statutory program which provides financial support to some sectarian schools by giving reimbursement for the cost of teachers salaries, textbooks and instructional materials relevant for secular subjects alone. Rhode Islands Salary Supplement Act provides for 15% salary supplement to be paid to teachers in non public schools provided that those teachers will only teach courses offered in public schools, use only materials used in public schools and that they will not teach religion. The programs were designed to alleviate the rising cost of education. These two programs are now the subject of constitutional attack. HELD: In addition to the test that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose and that the primary effects neither advances nor inhibits the religion, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. The legislative intent clearly states that they are intended to enhance the
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equality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws. However, it must be recognized that church related elementary and secondary schools have a significant religious mission, and that a substantial portion of their activities are religiously oriented. The two states have to create statutory restrictions to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational programs and that the States financial aid supports only those secular. Gleaning from the entirety of the case, the statutes involve entanglement between government and religion. In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the instructions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the state provides and the resulting relationship between the government and religious authority. In the instant case, there is an impermissible degree of entanglement. 1. (Rhode Island Program) the law intends to benefit a certain school close to the parish churches, with religious articles inside and outside the building, with religion subject devoted 3 minutes each day, with religiously oriented extra-curricular activities, and 2/3 of the teachers are nuns. The substantial religious character of the school gives rise to the entangling church-state relationship the constitution avoids. The Court cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of religious from purely secular aspects of pre college education. Some of the lay teachers (who are even Catholics) claim that they do not teach religion, but what has been recounted suggests the potential hazards that the state avoids. These teachers would have difficulty in employing total separation between secular and religious educational materials. 2. (Pennsylvania Program) the conditions are almost similar to the Rhode Island Program. The schools are controlled by religious organizations that have the purpose of propagating and promoting particular religious faith and conduct their operations to fulfil that purpose. Another apparent defect is that the money to be reimbursed is not given to teachers, but passed directly to the school. Concurring Opinion, Justice Douglas The reason for the existence of the subject schools is the propagation of religious faith. Although the state should not aid them, nonetheless, the state cannot be held in abeyance in adopting a surveillance system over these schools, even to its minimum extent. Up to that point can the state only intervene.
TILTON V. RICHARDSON, 403 US 672 FACTS: Tilton assailed the acts of Richardson, who, pursuant to the Higher Facilities Act of 1963 (which provides for grants and loans for college and university facilities excluding any facility to be used for sectarian instruction, or religious worship or any program relevant to divinity), funded the construction of several projects in four institutions. Tilton claimed that the schools were sectarian as evidenced by the
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presence of religious authorities, the curricula content and other indicators of religious content. The schools however averred that their religious affiliations did not interfere with their secular educational functions. HELD: The petition must fail. The Congress intended to include colleges and universities regardless of affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious body. The challenged law was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient institutions. The law provides that the state has the right to disgorge the benefits if its conditions will be violated. Thus, record shows that the subject institutions did not violate the purpose of the law as no religious symbols were placed in them, and the buildings were not used for religious purposes. The petitioner argued that religion permeates the secular education provided by the questioned schools because religious and secular educational and religious educations are inseparable. Such argument must fail. Two of the buildings established were libraries and it was not proved that classes were conducted there; another one was a language laboratory. The school was able to prove that it was used solely to assist the students with their pronunciation. A science building was used in Fairfield University; again no evidence was shown that religion seeps into this facility. There is no evidence on record as well to show that the schools are under composite profiles (institutions that impose religious restrictions on admissions, require admission at religious activities, compel obedience to doctrines and dogmas of faith, and require instructions in theology). A provision of the law however must not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The government may recover the amount it granted if within 20 years, the beneficiary school will violate its conditions. Meaning, that the school can use the facilities without fear of reimbursement after the 20 year requirement. To that extent, the law violates the Religious Clauses. But it does not render the whole law invalid. On the issue of entanglement, although the schools were affiliated with religious functions, their predominant mission is to provide secular education to students. Evidently, not all of their students are catholics; they were not required to attend religious services; although theology is taught, the subject was taught on the context of human experiences and not really RC faith; they did not attempt to indoctrinate their students, and; academic freedom was fully exercised. The entanglement is also lessened by the non ideological character the government provides (religious neutral). Finally, entanglement is mitigated in the sense that there are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no audits or analysis of expenditures as distinguished from the Pennsylvania case.
AGOSTINI V. FELTON, 521 US 203 FACTS: The US Supreme Court held in Aguilar that the New York Law providing that public school teachers be sent to parochial schools to provide remedial education to the disadvantaged was
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unconstitutional and violative of the Religion Clause. The Board of Education of New York reverted to its usual practice of providing instruction at public school sites, at rented sites, in mobile instructional units, and the Board also offered computer aided instructions which did not necessitate public employees to be physically present on the premises of a religious school. After 10 years, petitioners, the board and some parents, sought the enjoinment of the former decision of the Supreme Court claiming succour under Rule 60b of the Rules of Civil Procedure stating that a party might seek enjoinment of a final judgment when it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. HELD: Aguilar Doctrine must be abandoned. Entanglement is present in Aguilar because of the level of monitoring required merely to assure that no religion has been discussed; the administrative cooperation required to implement the law; the dangers of political divisiveness and; employees who teach on the premise of religious schools must be monitored closely to insure that they do not inculcate religion. Using the Balls Test, the law has impermissible effect because any public officer or employee who works on the premises of religious school is presumed to inculcate religion in her; their presence creates a symbolic union of the church and the state, and; any public aid calculated towards the benefit of the educational function of schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination even if the aid reaches the schools as a consequence of private decision making. Starting from Aguilar, there has been significant changes particularly with the understanding of the criteria used to assess whether an aid to religion has impermissible effect. Government inculcation of religious beliefs has the impermissible effect of advancing religion. The first change regarding the test on impermissible effect is that the notion that the presence of public employees presence on parochial grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of the state sponsored indoctrination. The rule that financial aids, that directly aid the educational function of religious school, are invalid, are no longer holding. (These cases sprang from a two cases where a government employee served as interpreter for translating religious education to someone who is mute; and the disbursement of government funds to someone who is blind although utilization of government efforts was present, the benefit redounded not on the school but on secular objects). Applying these changes, there is no more reason to presume that simply because a teacher enters a parochial school already means that she will embark on religious indoctrination. Furthermore, the services are available to all children, disadvantaged at that, no matter what their religion is. Based from the decision reached in Aguilar, applying Allen, the last two considerations are also no longer relevant. To sum, the law on question does not run a foul the Religion Clause. It does not result in governmental indoctrination. A federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause. The holding cannot likewise be viewed to endorse religion.
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[Interpretation: (disclaimer: take it or leave it ) Ang coverage ng coverage ng establishment clause na IPINAGBABAWAL ng Constitution ay tatlo: establishment or endorsement, financial aid and involvement of government in religious activities. Para malaman kung ang isang batas ay saklaw ng tatlong yon, apply ang Allen's test: 1.there is a SECULAR legislative purpose; 2. the purpose does NOT advance or prohibit religious practice. Pero dahil hindi na sufficient yung test dahil may mga enactments ang Congress na nagsusupport sa Religion, apply ENTANGLEMENT TEST na nasa Lemon Doctrine: the character and purposes of the instructions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the state provides and the resulting relationship between the government and religious authority. May dalawang klase ng entanglement: Excessive at impermissible. Yung Lemon Doctrine, excessive. Ang impermissible entanglement, yung government nag eendorse ng certain religion. Based sa Doctrine ng US Supreme Court kay Agostini na may kinalaman sa entanglement, hindi porket ang government employee ay nasa parochial school ay may imprermissible entanglement na, at hindi porket nag dispense ng pera ang government for a project which is religious on its face, ay for religious purpose na yun. CHECK LEGISLATIVE INTENT/ PURPOSE, AND TO WHOM THE BENEFIT OF THE INTENT INURES AT WAG ASSUMING!] THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE The State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outward manifestations of ones beliefs and faith. The individual is assure that is religion would not be confined to thought only but also may find expression through action. This involves certain practices ranging from sacrifices, ceremonies, rituals, discipline, family life, proselytizing, etc. But, the liberty to act on the belief is not absolute, and that valid state regulations designed to promote general welfare and interests of society may be enacted. These enactments however will be subjected to STRICT SCRUTINY and CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST. Government action, including its proscription of immorality, like criminalizing concubinage, must have a secular purpose (Concerned Employee v. Mayor, 443 SCRA 448) WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION V. BARNETE, 319 US 624 FACTS: US Supreme Court upheld a state regulation requiring pupils, under pain of expulsion and prosecution of their parents, to participate in daily ceremony to salute the flag. Appellees, who are members of the Jehovas Witnesses assail the Constitutionality of the said act on the ground that its enactment runs counter to their religious freedom because under their dogma, they are not allowed to give salutation on any graven image and flag is included in their meaning of graven image.
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HELD: To sustain compulsory flag salute, the Bill of Rights which guards the right to speak whats left on ones mind compels him to utter what is not on his mind. If there is any fixed star in the constitutional constellation, it is that no official can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters or opinion, or force citizens to profess words or act their faith therein. The action of local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations and invades the spirit of the First Amendments. Concurring Opinion, Justice Black Love of country must spring from the willing hears and free minds, inspired by fair administration of wise laws enacted by peoples representatives within the bounds of constitutional prohibitions. The laws must be consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints consistent with a society of free men. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Frankfurter Religious freedom gives equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Otherwise, each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws deemed for public good. The lawmaking authority is not circumscribed by variety of religious beliefs, otherwise, the constitutional guarantee would be a denial of the exercise of legislation. People may exercise freely their faith but the exercise cannot restrict the community action through political organs in matters of community concern, so long as the action is not asserted in a discriminatory way, either openly or by means of stealth. GERONA V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 106 PHIL 2 *has been overturned by Ebralinag, infra FACTS: Petitioners seek to invalidate DECS Order No. 8, implementing Sec. 2 of RA 1265, requiring the conduct of flag ceremonies, the singing of the national anthem and the recital of the patriotic pledge, the same being repugnant to their dogma as members of the Jehovas Witnesses that they should not bow down to any image or attend to an exercise of other religious ceremonies. Trial Court denied their request. HELD: Practice of religion is subject to reasonable and non discriminatory laws of the state. If the exercise of religious belief clashes with established institutions of society and with the law, the former must give way to the latter. The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic. The determination of whether a certain ritual is a religious ceremony must remain with courts, otherwise, there would be confusions as several interpretations might arise. Considering the separation of the church and the state, the flag and saluting the same are devoid of religious significance. The recital of the Oath of Allegiance and the singing of the National Anthem are also not religious for the same are only professions of love for the Philippines. In enforcing the flag salutation practice, defiance of the law merely extinguishes their right to public education, and does not subject them to prosecution.
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EBRALINAG V. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, 219 SCRA 256 FACTS: Petitioners, members of Jehovas witnesses, are high school and grade school students who are expelled because they refused to sing the national anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and DECS Order No. 8. According to them, those are religious acts given to idols to which the bible prohibits. The petitioners claim that the conduct of local authorities invades the sphere of intellect and the spirit of Constitutional protection. HELD: Petition granted. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed is alien to the guarantee of free speech and the free exercise of religious profession. Since petitioners do not disrupt the flag raising ceremonies in respect to others who pay respect to the flag, the anthem and the pledge, they do not deserve the merits of dismissal. The sole justification for a prior restraint on the exercise of religious freedom and free speech is the presence of a clear and present danger to safety, morals, health and other legitimate public interests which the government has the right to protect. Absent such threat, the expulsion of petitioners is not justified. Forcing a religious group through the iron hand of the law to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. Let it be stressed however that this decision should not mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline students if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities of both religious and patriotic acts of others. Concurring Opinion, Justice Cruz In requiring the petitioners to participate in flag raising ceremonies, the state has declared ex cathedra that they are not violating the bible. This is an unwarranted intrusion into their religious belief. Right or wrong the meaning they derive from it, cannot be revered except by their own acknowledged superiors, but certainly not by the State. Religion is a forbidden territory that the state can invade. Resolution for Motion for Reconsideration, 251 SCRA 569 The petition for MR filed by the State must fail. The governments interest in moulding the young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is not totally free from a balancing process when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free Exercise Clause and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and sincere religious beliefs. On the States contention that the flag ceremony requirement would be equal to all citizens regardless of religious sect which does not discriminates others escapes the fact that a regulation neutral on its face, may, in its application, offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Compelling members of religious group to believe on the pain of denying children the right to education is a futile and unconscionable detour towards instilling virtues of loyalty and patriotism which are best instilled and communicated by
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painstaking and non coercive methods. Provided that these religious beliefs do not pose a clear and present danger to society, expression of diverse beliefs, no matter how bizarre they seem, should be upheld. Concurring Opinion, Justice Mendoza The refusal to salute the flag threatens no dire consequences to the life or health of the State. There is no compelling reason for resorting to compulsion or coercion to achieve the purpose to which the flag is instituted. CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT, 310 US 296 FACTS: The Cantwells were convicted with violating Sec. 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut which prohibited solicitation of money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause unless approved by the Public Welfare Council. It was found out that the Cantwells were engaged in going from house to house (where 90% of the population is catholic) where they would play records and would ask their listeners to buy their books. If the listeners refused, they would solicit contributions instead. Jesse Cantwell was convicted because he stopped two men in the street, asked, and received permission to play a record which happened to attack the Roman Catholic Church to which the two men belonged. Cantwell assails the Constitutionality of the Statute as violative of the Free Exercise Clause. HELD: The petition must be granted. First, there is a denial of due process here. The Cantwells urge that the requirement of the license from the Public Welfare Council would be a prior restraint. On the part of the state, the regulation was enacted to avoid frauds from soliciting from the citizens under the cloak of religion. It will be noted that the issuance of certificate by the Council involves an appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment and the formation of opinion. The Council is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment. The State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring the stranger, before permitting him to solicit, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the manner of solicitation in the interest of safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation for religious purposes upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by the authority as to what is a religious cause, is to hold the Constitutional guarantee futile. Second, the conviction of Jesse Cantwell must be set aside. The State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions (public safety, order, morals and health). In the instant case, no assault, or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy or personal abuse has been apparent on the conduct of Jesse. His actions only show an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money
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in the interest of what Cantwell conceived to be true religion. The conduct of Jesse posed no clear and present danger as to render him liable for conviction.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 259 SCRA 529 FACTS: Petitioner was airing a television program Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo which shows comparative studies of its dogmas with those of other religious sects. MTRCB considered some of its TV series Rated X on the ground that they attacked other religion which is prohibited by law. The Office of the President reversed the decision. RTC did likewise, with further condition that INC should refrain from attacking other religion. CA reversed holding that MTRCB had the power to review the subject TV series and found the TV series indecent, contrary to law and good customs. HELD: PD 1896 clearly provides that MTRCB has the right and duty to review all television programs. INC urges that the television programs should not include shows like Ang Iglesia ni Cristo because the same would violate Art. III Sec 5 of the Constitution. The argument is bereft of merit. Although each person has freedom to believe, his freedom to act on such belief will not stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting general welfare. Police power can be exercised to curtail practices inimical to the society. Religious freedom can be regulated when it brings clear and present danger to the interest which the state has the right to protect. Petitioner further argues that the MTRCB and CA gravely abused their discretions when they refused the airing of the petitioners controversial television series because it catered attacks against contrary religious beliefs. The ruling of CA must be reversed. First, prior restraints on speech should not be upheld, and this includes religious speech. Second, the words used are not attacks but mere criticisms of the dogmas of other religions. The ruling of CA that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs unduly suppresses the petitioners speech freedom and interferes with the freedom of religion (to persuade others that their view is correct). IT is not the task of the State to protect other religions by attack from others. Third, the ground attack against other religion is not a ground to invalidate a program under PD 1896. Fourth, in x-rating the tv program, the board did not apply the clear and present danger rule. Such test is applied by US Supreme Court in four types of speeches : speech that advocate dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, speech out of contempt of court and release of information that endangers a fair trial. Religious speeches fall under the speech that advocates dangerous ideas. UNITED STATES V. BALLARD, 322 US 78 FACTS: Respondents were indicted and convicted of using and conspiring to use the mail, for the purposes of solicitation and propagating their alleged fraudulent dogma that they were chosen by St. German or Guy W. Ballard as divine messengers with high spiritual attainments so that the words of St. German, whom they claimed to be the ascended master, would be communicated to them thru the
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fellowship of I Am movement, and that the sick be healed. Objections were raised to the admission of certain evidence regarding the respondents religious belief and the court confined the issues to the question of good faith. CA reversed and remanded the case for new trial holding that the action of the District Court in restricting the issue to the presence of good faith is null and that District Court should have ascertained the veracity of the dogma of the I Am Movement. HELD: The First Amendment precludes the requirement of ascertaining the truism of ones religious beliefs. Heresy trials are foreign to the constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. The religious views espoused by the respondents may seem incredible, if not preposterous, but they are entitled to such. Regarding the guilt of the respondents, the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA, 101 PHIL 386 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in selling and distributing bibles and gospel portions. The City of Manila required them to pay license fees and obtain permit. Although it paid the necessary fees demanded by the city, it protested on the ground that it was not making profit for the sales it made. It further questioned the constitutionality of the license fee and permit requirements on the ground that the two cause religious censorship and restrain enjoyment of religious profession and worship. HELD: The Ordinance requiring business permit might be upheld because it does not deprive petitioner of its constitutional right to exercise and enjoy religious profession by imposing charges or taxing the same. But the requirement of license fees cannot be sustained. The Constitutional guaranty of the free exercise of religious profession carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint on such can only be possible if there is a clear and present danger. When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against the religious freedom, the latter occupies a preferred status. IN RE SUMMERS, 325 US 561 FACTS: Summers challenged the right of the Supreme Court to deny his admission to practice law in Illinois on the sole ground that he is a conscientious objector to war. He obtained his view regarding violence from a religious point of view. HELD: The justices are justified in their refusal to admit petitioner to the practice of law. A conscientious belief in non violence to the extent that the believer will not use force to prevent wrong, no matter how aggravated, cannot swear in good faith to support the state constitution. Under the Constitution, men could not be excluded from the practice of law or any other calling merely because of affiliation with a religious practice. It cannot be said however, that such notion can stop the SC from regulating the admission of those who seek to the practice of law. The militia regulation is intended as a reinforcement of good citizenship, imbued with the ideals of helping in the defense of state or the repulsion of violence.
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Dissenting Opinion, Justice Black Under our constitution, men are punished for what they do or fail to do and not for what they think and believe. The State cannot lawfully bar Summers in the practice of law because he entertains a religious belief which might prompt hi at some time to violate a law in the future which has not yet been and may never be enacted.
WISCONSIN V. YODER, 406 US 205 FACTS: Yoder was charged and convicted with violating the Wisconsin Law requiring compulsory school attendance of children until the age of 16. The law was repugnant to the Old Amish religious belief of the respondent, that sending his children to school would endanger themselves to the censure of the church and the salvation of his children. District Court affirmed Convictions. State Supreme Court reversed and opined that the decision would violate the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, this petition. HELD: The law is repugnant to the Free Exercise Clause. Amish objection to formal education beyond eight is firmly grounded on the belief that the salvation requires life in a church community, separate and apart from mundane influences. Formal education is contrary to Amish belief not only because it subjects them to intellectual pursuits and competition which are worldly for them, but also, it takes them away from their community during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life. There is no doubt that the State may impose regulations for the control and basic education of the youth. But this paramount responsibility must yield to the right of the parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. Values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children have a high place in our society. (Sa Pinas, check Art. II Sec. 14) If the State is empowered as parens patriae to save a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring high school education, (in order to mold the as productive individuals) the State will in large measure influence, if not determine the religious future of the child. Wisconsin argued that the actions referring to the free exercise of belief are subject to regulation and not within the ambit of the First Amendment. The argument cannot be totally discounted; however, the same should not run counter with establishing or disfavouring certain religious sect. On the argument that it has interest in compulsory system of education ( in order to prepare the citizens to participate effectively in the political system, and to boost self reliance and self sufficiency among the citizens) that Amish way of life must give way, the compulsory education would do little to serve those interests. Although the state views the Amish as fosterer of mediocrity, the Amish group has been a highly successful social unit, even if apart from the conventional mainstream. Its citizens are self sufficient, productive and law abiding citizens. On the further argument of Wisconsin that these children will be detrimental in case they separate themselves with the Amish group and without proper education, no such evidence is adduced. In fact, no statistical figures have been introduced to delimit the attrition to the Amish group, vis-a-vis the
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inimical results of lack of formal education. Furthermore, the Amish Group does not totally abhor formal education, as it deems elementary education until eight relevant for basic skills such as reading the bible and dealing with non Amish people are needed by them.
VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION, 59 SCRA 54 FACTS: Victoriano resigned from the respondent labor union with the advent of RA 3350 which provides that membership to any labor union shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their members to such organizations. The labor union petitioned the management to dismiss Victoriano in view of the same. Victoriano, in turn, sought legal remedy by enjoining the company from dismissal. The union challenges the validity of RA 3350 on the ground that it abridges the right to lawful associations, impairs obligations and contracts, discriminates in favor of religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions in violation of the establishment clause and free exercise clause, and the equal protection clause of the constitution. HELD: The law is constitutional. The right to association entails liberty or freedom, the absence of legal restrain whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and power where an employee may as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. If the employee decides to join, and should he choose to cancel his membership, he is free to do so. RA 3350 leaves the prerogative to the employee to join or not to join. It even fosters a protection among employees that they cannot be dismissed solely on the basis of non membership to closed shop agreement of collective bargaining units if their religious beliefs prohibit them from doing so. On this note (applying the compelling state interest test), it cannot be said that RA 3350 violates the Religion Clause. Applying the Aglipay Doctrine, the law was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion by averting that certain persons be refused work by reason of union security managements. It does not also advance nor diminish the welfare of a religion because the primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreement redounds to the benefit of employees, who on account of not joining the labor union, are on the verge of dismissal. Any benefit that may inure in minute ways to religious sects are merely incidental since the prime benefit belongs to the employee. On the argument that the law violates the sanctity of obligations and contracts, the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. (In short, walang pilitan). GERMAN V. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514
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FACTS: Petitioners converged at JP Laurel St in Malacanang for the ostensible purpose of hearing a mass in St. Jude Chapel. They nevertheless shouted for anti government messages which compelled Gen. Barangan to order Major Lariosa to block the said petitioners. Major Lariosa posed a warning that the said attempt of the petitioners in the future would be prevented. Aggrieved, petitioners went to the SC via mandamus, to compel the respondents to allow them to go to St. Jude Chapel. HELD: Petition must fail. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable religious freedom, the exercise thereof must be done in good faith. The very acts of the petitioners denied the observance of good faith. The petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of the society and with the law, the former must yield and give way to the latter. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Chief Justice Fernando Although the court did not pronounce, religious freedom is accorded high respect and it must be curtailed only when there is a clear and present danger. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Abad Santos It is highly presumptuous for both the respondents and this Court to attribute unstated and unadmitted motives to the petitioners who claimed that they merely wanted to hear the mass. It is unthinkable that they would conduct anti government demonstration in the hallowed premises of St. Jude Chapel and thereby defile it. If they raised their fists in the St. Jude Chapel and shouted for anti government slogan that recourse to make them retreat had to be taken. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Melencio Herrera The acts of the petitioners did not pose clear and present danger. Proper security measures can always be taken. Separate Opinion, Justice Relova The act was done on a Tuesday, not Thursday when people offer devotion to St. Jude. If petitioners were really to stage a demonstration, they should have performed the same on a Thursday, when a crowd could hear them. The petitioners should have been allowed to hear the mass, and only when they performed their thing that officials should prevent them. Concurring Opinion, Justice Gutierrez This belabours a nonexistent issue since there was a mere miscommunication on the part of the respondent and the petitioner. ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR, 408 SCRA 1 FACTS: Alejandro Estrada charged Escritor (a widow) of immorality because (although not denied by her) she was living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr (who had been separated in fact with her husband) by virtue of a Declaration to the effect that she accepts Quiliapo as mate in marital relationship. Although she intends to ratify the Declaration by legal means, Escritor averred (this was corroborated by a witness) that the declaration is binding within the bounds and tenets of Jehovas Witnesses,
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therefore, she should not be held accountable for gross and immoral conduct. Investigating Judge Maceda recommended the dismissal of immorality against Escritor. The Office of Court Administrator considered the dismissal but suspended Escritor for six months and gave a warning that similar actions in the future would be dealt with more severity. HELD: The case presents a conflict between state interest and religious liberty. The Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. Respondent does not negate this catena of cases. She invokes that she is not guilty of such because of her religious beliefs. When the law speaks of morality, the same speaks of public and secular morality and not religious morality. Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies, the resulting policies would require conformity to what might be regarded as religious propaganda. The non believers would be compelled to conform to a standard buttressed by a religious belief. And if government bases its standards to a certain sect, (say in this case Jehovas Witnesses), the resulting effect would be to disfavour other religion. This is prohibited by the Constitution. Applying the Benevolent Neutrality test (in order to ascertain whether respondents averred religious beliefs outweigh compelling state interests) the first inquiry is whether the respondents right to religious freedom has been burdened; The answer is in the affirmative because whats at stake is her means of living and family for that matter; next, is to ascertain respondents sincerity in her religious belief. In this regard, yes she is sincere because she availed of the declaration not after she entered the judiciary, but even 10 years before. The declaration was not issued to escape a penalty but to bind her with her partner before God and men. Although it appears that the respondent has affirmatively satisfied her religious facets, since this is new specie in the legal arena, the OSG must be given the chance to discharge and adduce evidence in order to show a compelling state interest. (In short madaya). Separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Bellosillo the spouses have the right to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood (Art. XV Sec. 3). The rule is broad enough to include de facto family relations since it would be absurd to deny the free exercise of religious convictions by virtue of existence or non existence of marriage. Such family is not immoral per se. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE The First Amendment forbids both abridgment of the free exercise of religion and the enactment of laws respecting an establishment of religion. (Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 US 203)
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It is recognized that a tension between the two are apparent in their application. Resolving the tension would involve the courts in carefully balancing the interests and values implicated in each case (Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA at 155) RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, INTRAMURAL DISPUTES AND SECULAR JURISDICTION When generally, it should be no business of the government trying to meddle in the problems among the members of the same sectarian group, the same we hold true only on matters of purely religious dogma and discipline. It cannot withhold its judicial or administrative machineries when dispute is about the concern of society. The problem is determining when the secular authorities may properly assert jurisdiction to settle said squabble. The basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the latters absolute adherence to a common belief. Once the basis ceases, membership ceases as well. (Long v. Basa, 366 SCRA 113). In a case where dismembered men formed a religion and named it after their previous religion, the court upheld the decision of the SEC and that it is not violative of the religious freedom because SEC has the right to protect a person or entity that has acquired a prior right to use a particular name (HSK v. IDKCJHSB, 372 SCRA 171) AUSTRIA V. NLRC, 312 SCRA 410 FACTS: Petitioner was a pastor for respondent SDA. He has held several positions and has been promoted for several times. Petitioner was asked by Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of SDA to remit the collections his wife has held when Petitioner was still in Bacolod, but refused to do so because according to him Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate authorized his wife to make the collections. Petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat to persuade him to convene the Executive Committee in order to settle the dispute between him and Pastor Rodrigo. The said dispute was about the collection made by the petitioner for a debt due to his friend Danny Diamada, but Pastor Rodrigo failed to pay so he harboured ill feelings towards Pastor Austria. The request was denied by Pastor Buhat so a heated argument ensued. Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to give light to certain matters, these include the misappropriation and the argument that happened between him and Pastor Buhat. He was dismissed, and filed for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter sided petitioner and NLRC sided SDA. On MR, NLRC sided petitioner. SDA appealed and it invoked that Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case because of the separation of church and state. NLRC reversed again and sustained SDA. HELD: Separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The doctrine merely states that while the state is barred from purely ecclesiastical affairs, the church is barred from meddling in secular matters. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church or adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
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regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those unworthy of membership. While the case relates to the church and its religious ministers, it does not give the case religious significance, but the employment relationship between the church and its minister. The causes of dismissal of the petitioner were covered by Art. 282 of the PLC, that negates the nature as religious; but as secular. Furthermore, Book VI, Sec 1 Rule 1 makes the IRR applicable to religious organizations. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC V. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 405 SCRA 497 FACTS: EO 46 was enacted giving the Office of Muslim Affairs the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official Halal Certifications and sent letters to food manufacturers to secure Halal Certifications solely on it. Petitioner, aggrieved because issuing Halal Certifications was its previous business so to speak, assailed the Constitutionality of EO 46 contending that it violates separation of church and state since halal certification scheme is a function only for religious organizations or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. HELD: Petition granted. OMA was created to deal with societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim Community as a national cultural community, and not as a religious group. OMA must not intrude into purely political matters lest it violates the Religion Clause. Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because standards used are drawn from Quran. On the argument by the Solicitor General that EO 46 is a police power to protect health of the Filipino Muslims, the prevention of an immediate and grave danger only justifies the infringement of religious freedom. The protection of Filipino Muslims right to health are already provided in existing laws and ministered by government agencies (NMIC, BFD, DTI) charged with ensuring that food products are fit for human consumption. CONCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS Based more on statutory provisions than constitutional freedom The problem lies in determining whether the objection is within the ambit of the law. Guidelines in determining the entitlement to conscientious objector status: a. He is conscientiously opposed to war in any form b. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief c. He must show that his objection is sincere.
Concern is on individual, not on his own interpretation of the dogma (Clay v. United States, 403 US 698)
RELIGIOUS TEST AND EXERCISE OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
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No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights. Has reference to the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have professed to have a belief in some particular aspect of religion(Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 US 488 MCDANIEL V. PATY, 435 US 618 FACTS: The First Constitution of Tennessee prohibited priests and clergies from becoming legislatures. The state legislature applied this provision to candidates for the 1977 limited constitutional convention. Paty, a candidate for the convention, sued that a judgment be entered against McDaniel, who latter was elected in the convention. Tennessee SC declared that the state interests in preventing the establishment of religion and in avoiding dividedness and the tendency to channel political activity by clergy participations along religious lines were deemed sufficient. ISSUE: WON a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of Gospel or Priests from serving as delegates in limited constitutional convention deprive the right to the free exercise of religion. HELD: Yes. The act is tantamount to punishing a religious profession with a privation of civil right. Tennessee disqualification provision against clergymen was viewed as depriving the clergy of a civil right solely because of their status as such. In Torasco v. Watkins, the court invalidated the constitutional requirement of Maryland that all holders of public office declare their belief in the existence of God. The court in that case did not evaluate the interests assertedly justifying it, but held that it violated religious freedom (sic because of belief). RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS Religious leaders and their flocks are still entitled to participate in political affairs There is a need, however, to keep those sectarian principals from intruding into purely secular concerns thereby limiting them to their spiritual province
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LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Art. III Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be prescribed by law. In the US Constitution, this is under Due Process as this right is not considered part of the rights and liberties to which citizens are ordinarily entitled to and may only be limited with order from the court. Entails the right to live and stay where he wants within legal bounds. The Court in Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil 851 granted writ of habeas corpus in order to free an illiterate person from the house of her employer who allegedly prevented her from leaving due to her failure to reimburse the expenses incurred in bringing her from the province. A person should likewise be free to go to where he pleases, except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. Impairing the right to travel does not require court order, but executive officers may only do so if their act is in accordance with the law. The right to travel connotes the right to leave the Philippines or go to places within the country, but the right to return is different under International Law. (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668) Another limitation is in criminal cases, in which event their movement of choice or abode may be restricted by the courts as part of the condition of their being out on bail (Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 760) RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, 30 PHIL 660 FACTS: Petitioners, file for Petition of Habeas Corpus in favour of Manguianes who were claimed to be deprived of their liberty by the provincial board. Allegedly, on the pain of imprisonment, they are compelled to take their habitation in Lake Naujan pursuant to Board Resolution 25 and Sec. 2145 of the 1917 Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise challenge the Constitutionality of the said law on the ground of equal protection and due process, among others. HELD: The concept that no person shall be deprived of xxx liberty and property without due process of law is universal in application, and protects people regardless of race color or nationality. Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to do without being forced to do so, unless on compelling interests (for the common good) in accordance with law. The most overruling in deprivation of liberty is the police
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power which aims to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of the society. The purpose of the regulation of the board, as posited by the Solicitor General is for the advancement of non Christian people; to educate the Manguianes; Protection of Manguaines the protection of public forests burned by the tribe when they engage in Caingin, and; the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the tribe. This petition must therefore fail. The idea is to unify the people so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must approximately be equal in intelligence If the Philippines is to be a rich country, Mindoro must be populated with development. The public policy if the government is shaped with a view to benefit the people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfil this governmental policy, must be confined for the meantime. EDWARDS V. CALIFORNIA, 314 US 160 FACTS: Edwards was penalized under California law prohibiting the bringing into the State an indigent person, not resident thereof, knowing such person to be indigent. Edwards brought his brother in law from Texas to California. HELD: The law is unconstitutional and not covered by Police Power. The Court is mindful of the predicament it seeks to address : the huge influx of migrants into California that has resulted in problems related to health, morals and finance. The court is also mindful that the state provides precautionary measures against moral pestilence, vagabonds, possible convicts, but none of these and in the long line of cases decided by the court states that paupers are to be excluded in the interest of society. Not because a person is a destitute already means that he is a moral pestilence. Poverty and immorality are not synonymous. Concurring Opinion, Justice Douglas Although not guaranteed by the US Constitution, the right to move freely from state to state is an incident of national citizenship protected by the 14
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Amendment. Disallowing the transits of destitute from one state to other stigmatizes them to an extent that they are considered inferior.
Concurring Opinion, Justice Jackson The law on question denatures human rights. It is a privilege of US Citizenship that the right to enter any state, either temporary or sojourn, or for the establishment of permanent residence and for gaining citizenship thereof, should not be abridged. Indigence, or other similar status of a person, cannot be used by the state to test, qualify or limit his rights as citizens of the US.
ZEMEL V. RUSK, 381 US 1
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the Constitutionality of Passport Act of 1962 which did not give him the authority to travel to Cuba after US severed its diplomatic relations with the said country. Petitioner said that it violated his right to travel (in addition to his curiosity and want to be an informed citizen).
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HELD: The law is constitutional. The right to travel is protected by the Due Process Clause, and it may be curtailed when necessity arises (in the instant case, national security). It is the judgment of the State Department that the major goal of the Cuban government is to export its Communist revolution to the rest of Latin America. Travel to Cuba furthers subversive movements and endangers citizens of the United States.
MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, 177 SCRA 668 FACTS: After the deposition of President Marcos in February 1986, he was exiled in Hawaii and was banned entry in the Philippines by President Aquino. Marcos sought remedy via mandamus that he be allowed to return to the country. HELD : The right to liberty and abode, the right to travel (which posits the right to travel within the Philippines or leave the country) and the right to return to the country are distinct rights under International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right to return is not among the rights granted by the Bill of Rights. The question is does the President have the power to ban the entry of Former President Marcos? Yes. Such power is enormous. Executive Power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In fact, the President has residual power which she may use in relation to the instant case.In making decisions or drawing a plan for government, the prime consideration should be to serve and protect the people; to maintain peace and order; to protect life, liberty and property; and the promotion of general welfare. In answering the question as to whether the Marcoses be allowed to return, the consideration should be individual rights against general welfare of the people. The Marcoses liberty of abode and right to travel are unavailing because the residual powers of President Aquino can be availed for general welfare especially if it would advance violence and destabilization and exacerbate communist insurgency, Bangsamoro secessionist, murder with impunity to police / military and rightist conspiracies to grab the power, among others. Nevertheless, the conclusion reached by the court should not be binding as precedent. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Gutierrez The liberty of abode within the limits provided by law cannot be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Consequently, the right to travel includes the right to return and can only be impaired in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. There is no law setting the limits on a citizens right to move. The grounds provided by the president are national welfare and interest and the continuing need to preserve gains achieved in terms of stability. These grounds do not fall squarely on national security or public order, more on public health. There is no clear and present danger as to the return of the Marcoses. True that rebellion exists, but they are perpetuated not by the Marcoses but by the NPA. The argument that the enumerated violence would conspire
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with Marcos, who was dying, was speculative, after surgery. Lastly, phere is no law prescribing exile in a foreign land as the penalty for hurting the nation. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Cruz The proofs adduced were not sufficient to show prejudice to the security of the state. The expressed fears were based on mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without single piece of evidence to back up their apprehensions. In announcing the plenary powers of the President, the Court has ran counter with the limits envisioned by the framers of the constitution. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Padilla The apprehensions entertained by the respondents do not escalate to proportions of national security or public safety contemplated by the constitution. The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Sarmiento Marcos has the constitutional right to abode and movement that cannot be abridged by personal hatred or his speculated capacity to stir trouble. Resolution for Motion for Reconsideration, 178 SCRA 760 President Marcos died but the President still barred the entry of his remains until such time that the government has otherwise decided. HELD: The death of President Marcos, although a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Courts decision was rendered. The threats to the government have not yet ceased to exist. The President has residual power to decide what she deems best for national welfare as her oath states the promotion of the interest of the people. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Cruz If Marcos has died, the threat to national security alleged has died with him. Let the cadaver be brought home, be buried and let the riots be done forever. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Padilla If a live Marcos did not pose a serious threat to national security, the situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. The right of EVERY Filipino to be buried in his country, as part of a continuing right that is finally laid to rest with the majority decision.
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RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Art. III Sec. 7: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers, pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. People must be given sufficient data and information upon which to base any intelligent and meaningful decisions. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of general interest (Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733) Democracy cannot bloom where sovereignty is rooted on the top soil of an ignorant mass (In Re Emil P. Jurado, 243 SCRA 299) The first thing that people would have to know is the laws and regulations that govern them.
PUBLICATION AND EFFECTIVITY Ignorance of the law excuses no one from non compliance therewith (Art. 3, NCC) But it would hardly be fair for the law to presume knowledge if the government does not disseminate the laws and rules that govern the norms and conduct it expects from citizens. Publication should be a pre requisite. It would be preferable that the same be done through means which is more readily accessible, the newspaper of general circulation, apart from the traditional O.G. TANADA V. TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 FACTS: Petitioners seek the publication, through mandamus, of several presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of information and administrative
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orders. The respondents, through Solicitor General, questioned the locus standi of the petitioners claiming that they are not directly prejudiced by non publications of the regulations. HELD: When the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and need not to show any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for its effectivity. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish a citizen for the transgression of a law for which he had no notice, even a constructive one. Sec. 1 of CA 638 makes it an imperative duty for public officials if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. Furthermore, publication is also an essential ingredient of Due Process. However, other Presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons need not to be published on the assumption that they have been circulated to all concerned. Presidential issuances which have not been published shall have no force and effect. Resolution on Motion For Reconsideration, 146 SCRA 446 Publication is indispensable in every case. The omission of the publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. The conclusive presumption that every people know the law presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that the constitution recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, and this applies to legislative enactment of the government. The term law refers to the law of the land and not only those of general application; for all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public needs no publication. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. Publication must be in full since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Administrative Circulars with the intent of enforcing laws must be published, as well. DBM Circular which disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials pursuant to RA 6758 shall be published (De Dios v. COA, 294 SCRA 152. DBM Circular which diminished the monthly additional allowances given to changes by local government units shall also be published (Dadole v. COA, 393 SCRA 262) BENGZON V. DRILON, 208 SCRA 133
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FACTS: Justices of CA and SC receive their monthly pensions thru RA 910. It was amended by RA 1797 which gives automatic adjustments should the pension be increased or decreased. Same retirement benefits are also given to the members of the Constitutional Commission by RA 1568. President Marcos signed PD 578 which extends the same retirement benefits to the members of AFP. Then he issued PD 644 which repeals PD 1797 and relevant portions of RA 1797 providing for automatic adjustment. Subsequently, PD 1638 was enacted restoring the automatic adjustments, but this time to the members of AFP alone. Congress, realizing the discriminatory nature of PD 1638, enacted a bill similar to the nature of RA 1797. It was vetoed by the President on the ground that it would erode the benefits of Salary Standardization Law. Prior to the instant case, Retired Justices Barcelona et al sought the nullification of PD 644 opining that PD 644 was not published and was supplementarily published merely after how many years (1983 and it was enacted 1975). The Court favourably granted the petition of Barcelona and Congress included in the GA the payment for the adjustments of the pensions of justices. But President again vetoed it on the ground that GA would erode Salary Standardization and the President VETOED THE DECISION OF THE CASE IN THE PETITION BY BARCELONA that challenged PD 644s validity. Thus, this petition by Bengzon. HELD: PD 644 never became a law, therefore, PD 1797 was not repealed, because PD 644 was not published. All laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the OG, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature in accordance with Art. 2 of the NCC. On the veto of the decision of the SC, the executive cannot do the same because it undermines the doctrine of separation of powers. Publication is a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of established authority (Gorospe, The Rule of Published Law: Some Reflections on Tanada v. Tuvera, 73) UMALI V. ESTANISLAO, 209 SCRA 446 FACTS: RA 7167, providing for tax exemptions, was signed into law Dec 19, 1991, was published Jan 14, 1992 and the law provides that its takes effect upon approval. BIR promulgated Regulations 1-92 providing that tax exemptions would take effect Jan 1, 1992. Petitioners seek the court to rule that it the exemptions be given in 1991. HELD: RA 7167 took effect Jan 30, 1992 or fifteen days following its publication in Malaya, a newspaper of General Circulation. It cannot take effect on its approval. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature, may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period be shortened or extended. But tax exemptions retroact on Jan 1, 1991; because it was intended to cover 1991 when the
lawmakers intended that the law take effect upon its approval.
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The phrase shall take effect immediately shall only mean that it becomes effective immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette (La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association v. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148) PEOPLE V. VERIDIANO II, 132 SCRA 523 FACTS: Benito Bio drew a check (which eventually bounced upon maturity in September) on second week of May 1979. BP 22 was published on April 9, 1979 in the OG. The issue of the OG was released on June 14, 1979. Prosecution argued that the reckoning point of criminal liability should be the date of maturity of the check which was Sept. 26, 1979 and not the date of drawing the check. Trial court sided Bio. HELD: The date of publication of BP 22 would be June 14, 1979. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and or penalties. IF a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated. If the Batasan Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of the issue of the Gazette as the date when the law should take effect, it should have so stated. On the petitioners argument that the reckoning point of criminal liability should be on Sept 26, 1979 (after the effectivity date of BP 22), the law penalizes the act of drawing and not the fact of bouncing. DE ROY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 157 SCRA 757 FACTS: On Aug 17, 1987 CA promulgated a ruling adverse to De Roy. It was received by De Roy Aug 25, 1987. On Sept 9, the last day of the 15 day period for filing MR, De Roy sought for an extension. It was denied by a Resolution on Sept. 30, 1987. On Sept. 24, petitioner filed MR (which was the subject of the Sept 30 resolution) but it was denied by CA. Hence, this petition for certiorari. HELD: The Court in Habaluyas v. Japzon (promulgated May 30, 1986) provided that after one month from the release of the decision, the fifteen day period for filing MR cannot be extended. Petitioner contented that the Habaluyas case should not be applied because it was not published in the OG. Contrary to the argument, there is no law that requires the publication of SC Decisions in the OG before they can be binding. Petitioner further questioned that granting that there are no laws that provide for the required publication, is it not a practical measure that they be published so that lawyers will be abreast with the development of jurisprudence? The court answered that decisions normally bind only and are effective only upon the parties of the case, the self same parties who are likely to be the only ones to know the decision rendered by the court, at least until copies of the same are already made available to the public some months later. STATE PROSECUTORS V. MURO, 236 SCRA 505
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FACTS: Judge Manuel Muro dismissed 11 cases against Mrs. Imelda Marcos, involving violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions provided by CB Circular No. 960 ; on the ground that President Marcos announced in newspapers that the he is lifting all foreign exchange restrictions. Petitioner argued that when the announcement was made, the circular from the Central Bank was not yet issued, however, Judge Muro argued that there was no need to await for the issuance because the announcement made by the President was absolute, without qualification and was immediately effective. HELD: The requisites of judicial notice are: the matter must be common and general knowledge; it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or certain; t must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. Judicial notice cannot be taken of statute BEFORE IT BECOMES EFFECTIVE. (Assuming arguendo that he had the reason to believe that the announcement of the President took effect immediately, another constitutional question came to light as he violated the Prosecutions right to due process and its right to prove its case by presenting evidence.) NATURE OF THE GUARANTEE AND MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN: It can be invoked by citizens before the court (Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733) -The information and transactions have no defined scope and extend. However, the following are restrictions: national security matters and intelligence information; trade secrets and banking transactions; criminal matters; other confidential information (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152)
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, 384 SCRA 152 FACTS: President Aquino, pursuant to the mandate of PD 1084 issued a patent transferring to respondent PEA parcels of land called the Freedom Islands. The ROD of Paranaque issued certificates of title for the same. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI Coastal Bay and Development Estates Authority WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF PUBLIC BIDDING to develop the said islands. This was subsequently approved by President Ramos. Petitioner via mandamus sought to compel the disclosure of the ongoing negotiations. During the pendency of the case, PEA and Amari signed another contract and was approved by President Estrada. Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the new agreement. HELD: The right to information seeks to promote transparency in policy making and in the operations of the government, as well as to provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. It is also significant to make the public officials accountable to people. Respondent PEA argued that the right to information is limited to definite propositions of the government and does not include intra or inter agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated. Respondent AMARI further argued that there must
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first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring governmental officials to reveal deliberations will degrade the quality of decision making in government agencies. The arguments are not meritorious. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of the property (size, location, technical description, and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, minimum price and similar information). These are required by PUBLIC BIDDING. Information on ongoing evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken is not immediately accessible under the RIGHT TO INFORMATION. While the evaluation is still ongoing, there are no official acts, transactions, or decisions yet. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition. From that moment the publics right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non proprietary information leading to such definition. With regards to AMARIs argument, the framers of the Constitution contemplate inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the people in the dark until the contract has become disadvantageous. The petitioners may access evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meeting, terms or reference, and other documents attached to such minutes. It must be stressed that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, information on the investigation of crimes and other confidential nature.
CONFIDENTIAL MATTERS The secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the right to information. The moment negotiations are started, pressure groups begin to muscle in. (PMPF v. Manglapus, GT 84642, September 13, 1988) Access to non confidential matters is still subject to regulations. The purposes are to avoid damage or loss of public records, undue interference with the duties and, the exercise of the constitutional right be assured. (Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530) RA 6713: In the performance of duties, all public officials are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within 15 business days from receipt thereof and to ensure accessibility of all public documents for inspection within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality PRIVACY INTERESTS
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The people have the right to keep matters to themselves, and having certain data and information about them which had been gathered and stored by the Government does not authorize others, pursuant to right to information, to have access to the sae Privacy interests may be invoked by family members in order to prevent the release of death seen photographs (National Archives v. Favish, 541 US 157) A person requesting the information needs no preconceived ideas of the uses of the data. (ibid)
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Art. III Sec. 8: The right of the people, including those employed in public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Right to join others for reasons as varied as mans needs and aspirations may so require. Related to Art. XIII Sec. 15 and 16 Subject to limitation that the unions, associations or societies are organized for purposes not contrary to law.
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Has an indigenous origin- the Malolos Constitution (Gonzale v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835)
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Involves intimate and personal relationships, i.e. friendship and marriage [FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION] and impersonal groupings, i.e. societies where objectives may be social economic or political [FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION] Includes the liberty not to joint at all. (Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Gaston, 374 SCRA 396) While the right not to join a group is recognized, there are groups that may compel a person to contribute for its sustenance (In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 84 SCRA 554) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE V. ALABAMA EX REL PATTERSON, 375 US 449 FACTS: Petitioner organized an office in Alabama without securing the necessary permit requirement as it considered itself exempt from the qualification statute. The Attorney General alleged that the activities employed by the petitioner were causing irreparable injury so it must be expelled from the state and be restrained from conducting further activities. Petitioner argued that doing so would violate its right to assembly guaranteed by the Constitution. Before the date of the hearing, the State required petitioner for the production of Association records, bank documents, deeds leases and records containing the names and addresses of all members and agents of the association in Alabama. Petitioner was able to provide for everything but refused to produce the membership list. It was cited for contempt and fined $1000. HELD: Alabama does not have the right to compel the production of the membership list. Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs is inseparable to the aspect of liberty assured by the Due Process, and any state action that intends to curtail the right is subject to strict scrutiny and should only be entertained if it shows compelling state interest; The nviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to the preservation of freedom of association. In the past as petitioner posits revelation of membership results in economic reprisals, physical coercion and public hostility to their members. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that disclosure is likely to affect adversely the ability of the petitioner to pursue collective effort to foster beliefs which they advocate; it may induce members to withdraw and dissuade others from joining. Does compulsory disclosure show a compelling state interest? NO. The purpose of disclosure was merely to determine whether petitioner was conducting intrastate business in violation of Alabama Foreign Corporation registration statute, and membership list was expected to help resolve this question. COMMUNIST PARTY V. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD, 367 US 1
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FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the Subversive Activities as violative of its freedom of expression, association, right against bill of attainder, right against self incrimination among others. The said act aims to suppress the proliferation of a Communist Dictatorship by requiring Communist Action and Communist Front Organizations to register the names of their officers although the names of their members need not be disclosed. However, if the Attorney General has reason to believe that any organization not registered is an organization of a kind required to register or that any individual who has not registered is required to register, he shall petition the respondent for an order that the organization or individual register. Furthermore, once registered, subsequent consequences follow, i.e. prohibition, restrictions, disabilities, and disqualifications in regard to their communications and correspondence, employment, naturalization and foreign travel. HELD: Registration of the petitioner is in order. Compulsory disclosure of names may initially or on its face abridge the right of associations. The rule is, where the required making public of an organizations membership lists bears no rational relation to the interest which is asserted by the State to justify disclosure, and where because of community temper publication might prejudice members whose names were revealed, disclosure cannot be compelled. To put it differently, registration may be compelled if there is a state interest and if it does not cause public hostility to the members. In the instant case, the preservation of independence and giving of security against foreign aggression and encroachment is sought by the assailed law. There has been evidence gathered by the US Congress that shows that a group intends to establish a Communist Totalitarian Dictatorship thru communist groups either via peaceful or violent means. The other constitutional issues are not yet ripe for adjudication. [DISCLAIMER : Sariling appreciation ng cases the Philippine Constitution provides that the only exception that the State may intrude into the establishment of associations is when the associations are established for purposes not contrary to law. The difference between the two conflicting cases decided by the US Supreme Court lies in the purpose of the two organizations. The NAACP is intended for the welfare of Black Americans. The Communist Party is implicated with subversion.] PEOPLE V. FERRER, 48 SCRA 382 FACTS: Petitioners, charged with violating the Anti Subversion Act (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other Subversive Associations), assailed the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder, it is vague and it denies them equal protection of the laws. HELD : The law is constitutional. The challenged law is aimed at conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions.
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Resolution on Motions For Reconsideration, 56 SCRA 793 FACTS: Petitioner Tayag argues that membership must be coupled with direct participation in illegal activities before he can be held criminally liable for Subversion. HELD: The law distinguishes and gives separate penalties for those who merely joined and those who took arms against the government. Acceding to the argument of the petitioner would nullify the spirit of the law. The law is narrowly drawn as it punishes merely membership to be proved by overt acts knowing that the group is illegal. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE V. BUTTON, 371 US 415 FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Chapter 33 of Virginia Acts of Assembly because when the law is applied to it, or any of its members, attorneys and litigants to whom it might give assistance violates their Right to Association for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for the infringement of their constitutional rights. Said law forbids the solicitation of legal businesses by a runner or capper. Runner or capper includes agents which retain a lawyer in connection with actions, and are not party or do not have pecuniary right or liability. HELD: The acts of the association are upheld. The State argues that solicitation is not among the rights protected by freedom of assembly or expression. The Constitution also protects vigorous advocacy of lawful ends. Litigation, as in the case at bar, is a form of political expression, an avenue for petition of redress of grievances. In order to find constitutional protection, there is no need to subsume the activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. On the question as WON the provisions of the challenged law curtails the constitutional freedom of the petitioners? The answer is yes. The provision is vaguely worded. The meaning of agents and solicitations are unclear. Solicitation can mean simple referral or recommendation of a lawyer. The decree forbids expressly the solicitation on behalf of any attorneys in addition to attorneys retained or compensated by NAACP. The meaning of agent means anyone who represents another in his dealings with a third person. In sum, the state forbids the existence of the association that represents the Blacks in advocating their rights. On the argument that the state has a compelling interest to regulate the legal profession, the same cannot be done at the expense of Constitutional Freedom. [pag inapply sa Pinas, unlawful association or clear and present danger] There has been no showing of a serious danger of professionally reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against solicitation frequently seek to prevent. The problem actually is the dearth of lawyers who wish to litigate for blacks (sic which is addressed by the association). There has been no evidence adduced that a lawyer who wishes to litigate for a Negro has been deprived of his right because of solicitation which the law aims to prohibit. INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS
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Includes marriage and family because it is innate nature of man to find a mate with whom he may desire his life to be inextricably intertwined The Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by state (Roberts v. US, 468 US 609) GRISSWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, 361 US 479 FACTS: Connecticut makes it a crime for any person to use any drug to prevent conception. Grisswold was convicted as an accessory for giving information about and prescribing certain contraceptives. Grisswold challenged the constitutionality of the law as violative of the constitutional rights of married people with whom he had professional relationship. HELD: The right of association is not provided in the Bill of Rights, but its existence can be inferred from the right to expression. The relation of husband and wife are forms of associations and guaranteed by the freedom of expression because association necessarily includes the right to express attitudes or philosophies by membership or by affiliation within the bounds of the law. The challenged law is vaguely worded and violative of the right to privacy. It prohibits rather than regulates contraceptives. The ambiguity that can be shown is that the police will be searching for contraceptives inside a marital bedroom. (in short ang daming right na involve!!! for purposes of digesting the case in toto , at para sa dissenting opinions kaya nalagay yung ibang part. Ang ratio decidendi ay yung naka bold interface ) Dissenting Opinion, Justice Black The court opinion did not talk about the policy that the state wishes to attain. Instead it relies on right to privacy and it interchange with other constitutional rights, which is very flexible in scope and which can be stricken if the policy is capricious, arbitrary or whimsical. Such an action of the Court gives the law subjective application, meaning dependent upon the judgment of the court members. The Court cannot simply strike a statute based on its subjective appreciation of the law. Dissenting Opinion, Justice Stewart The use of contraceptives should be left to the personal and private choices of each person based on his moral, ethical and religious beliefs. Professional counsel about methods of birth should be available to all so that each individuals choice can be meaningfully made. But that is not the case at bar. The use of the right of privacy by the court is generic and cannot be expeditiously used to strike a constitutional infirmity upon a statute.
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ASSOCIATIONS, CONFORMITY AND DISSENSION The right to associate can be a powerful mean by which the aim of individual could be realized. While employees may organize a labor force, they could not however exercise the same with coercive action. The constitutional right limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike (Gesite v. Court of Appeals, 444 SCRA 51) The presence of rules to any group is necessary. The political parties enjoy governmental and court interference as far as their internal affairs are concerned. The matter will be left to proper tribunals of the party or to the electors at poll (Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266) COMELEC may not grant a party official greater authority than what the party has granted (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC, 423 SCRA 665) Corollary is the right to dissociate if they could no longer reconcile their beliefs with the group. There is also the right not to join at all. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, 175 SCRA 686 FACTS : SSSEA members staged a strike and refused to return to work, barricaded the entrance gates of SSS which prohibited non striking employees from working and members to transact, after SSS failed to act positively to implement the SSS old CBA on check off union dues and other monetary benefits. RTC rendered the strike illegal. CA affirmed holding that government employees are not allowed to strike. HELD: Although the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to self organization, it is silent as to whether such recognition includes the right to strike. Reading however on the deliberations of the Con-Com, it would be deduced that the Commissioners limited the right to formation of unions or associations ONLY without including the right to strike. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 implied by EO 180. Are SSS employees covered by the prohibition against strike? YES, because under the constitution, the civil service embraces all x x x instrumentalities of Government, including GOCCs with original charter, to which SSS belongs under RA 1161. Should the government employees deem the terms of their employment prejudicial or unjust, they may, through their unions, either petition the Congress for betterment of the same, or negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there are unresolved grievances, the same may be channelled to the Public Sector Labor Management Council
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IN RE: ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554 FACTS: IBP recommended the removal of respondent due to his stubborn refusal to pay his membership due despite demands. Respondent assailed the efficacy and constitutionality of the act of the IBP as inimical to his liberty and property because the maintenance of his status as a lawyer is conditioned upon good standing, to be a member of IBP and pay corresponding dues, despite antagonism to join the same. He also assailed the power of SC to strike him to the Roll of Attorneys because his case is an administrative matter that should be heard by an administrative body. HELD: IBP is a state organized association to which every lawyer must belong. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. The promulgation of PD 181 to which IBP was constituted is an effective exercise of police power calculated at the interest of regulating the legal profession, improving the administration justice, and enabling the bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. When respondent entered into the legal profession, his practice was subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to regulations as might be established for the common good, even at the expense of his liberty. On the issue of infringement to the right to associate, integration does not make a lawyer a member of the group of which he is not a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar Exams. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The payment is designed to raise funds to carry out the objectives of the integration. On the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court, matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision are recognized judicial functions by the fundamental law. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION Who a person associates with may be a reflection of what values and philosophy he holds. The right to group together people with similar ideas or views of life and its varied aspects may mean also the right to choose whom to associate or reject from the group. Given the right to associate does not mean that such persons may have the absolute right to exclude others who might not be to their liking. Such confronts the Courts in resolving policy against discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, gender and sexual preferences, etc The decision, however, must still be calculated to balance discrimination with a compelling state interest. (Roberts v. United States, 468 US 609) HURLEY V. IRISH AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON, 515 US 557
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FACTS: The South Boston War Veterans Council, an unincorporated association, has been granted the authority to organize the St. Patricks Day Evacuation Day Parade. In 1993, it denied the inclusion of respondents in the parade, so respondent group went to the court and alleged that the action of the council violated the public accommodations law which prohibits any discrimination on account of sexual preference relative to admission of any person in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement. District court sided with the respondents and opined that since the council for the past 47 years has been giving amusement to both the parade participants and spectators, the parade is within the statutory limits of public accommodation. It rejected as well the councils claim that the parade was private in the sense that it has no definitive procedures for accepting parade participants, and more likely would just allow whoever has showed up. It further opined that given the councils lack of selectivity in choosing the participants and failure to circumscribe the marchers message, the court finds it impossible to discern any expressive purpose. It concluded that the parade is not an exercise of protected right of expressive association but an open recreational event that is subject to public accommodations law. ISSUE: May Massachusetts require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to convey. HELD: NO, lest violation of the First Amendment. Parades are forms of expressions, are public dramas of social relations, and in them performers define who can be a social actor. Since every participant in the parade organized by petitioners affects the message conveyed by the Council, the State Courts opinion in its decision or compelling the council to accommodate the respondents essentially requires the petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade. The speaker (in this case petitioner) has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message. Whatever reason the Council has for not including the respondents in the parade, it has the benefit to express what it wants and to identify themes crucial in the celebration, which the government cannot intrude. Public Accommodations Law merely prohibits the discrimination in admitting a person to any place of amusement on account of race, creed, sexual orientation, nationality or disability. If the law is applied in the present case, the effect is to alter the protected constitutional expressive speech by the petitioner. [DISCLAIMER sariling appreciation ng case There are two associations involved in the case : the expressive conduct of the council, and the expressive conduct of the respondents. Both are entitled to their own expressions. But to compel the council to accommodate respondents, in effect, would violate the expressive conduct that is due the petitioners, considering that Boston has granted them the authority to organize the event.]
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE, 530 US 147
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FACTS: Dale entered Boy Scouts at 8, was promoted as assistant scoutmaster at 21. He went to college and there recognized himself as gay. Boy Scouts revoked his membership because homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values of Boy Scouts. Dale Complained. The NJ Supreme
Court sided Dale and concluded that excluding him violates public accommodations law, it violates the freedom to associate, that although the Boy Scouts proffer on certain values homosexuality is not tantamount to immorality, and Dales continued membership does not violate the Scouts Expressive Association right because in no way will Dales conduct be prejudicial to other members of the Scout.
HELD: Judgment by the State Supreme Court must be reversed. The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the groups freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. The only exception to allow government intrusion would be compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedom. Is the petitioner an association? YES. From the mission statement of the Boy Scouts, it is clear that the groups purpose is to instil values to the youth. Thus, an association that seeks to transmit a system of values engages in expressive activity. Does Dales forced inclusion significantly affect the ability of Boy Scouts to advocate viewpoints? The Boy Scouts of America in numerous occasions asserts that homosexuality is not morally straight from its point of view and it does not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behaviour. Since Dale admitted his sexual orientation and in fact he has become a leader of a gay group in college, his continued membership sends a message that Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behaviour considering that one of its leaders sic who serve to be a model among scouts is homosexual.
In Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 US 69 the court has rejected the refusal of a law firm from elevating the position of one of its lady lawyers because the firm did not take account the merits of the lawyer, but the refusal is premised on gender.
[DISCLAIMER: Sariling Intindi: Invidious discrimination may be allowed, if it advances the purpose of the organization. To put it differently, if forced inclusion of a member to a particular association will deter the functioning of the group, the forced inclusion may not be resorted. For example, women may not be allowed entry in the seminary or men in convents; only natural borne Filipino Citizen may be allowed to run as Senator because it is odd to the idea of internal sovereignty that a naturalized citizen sic who is technically or by blood a foreigner, to lead the nation the same runs in counter with the maxim par in parem non habet imperium; nor may a senior citizen be allowed to run for a party list sect denominated by the youth or the youth to the party list group denominated by senior citizens. But invidious discrimination may not be resorted if the discrimination is not for a germane purpose; thus religious or gender
195
requirement to the members of the SC are not recognized because whether a justice of the court is theist or an atheist; a man or a woman, his capacity in discharging the role is not dependent to the religious or gender affiliation.]

Fundamental Powers and Bill of Rights

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Fundamental Powers and Bill of Rights

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THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

EMINENT DOMAIN Property Rights Government; Private Sector

TAXATION Property Rights Government

Utilized for public use

(See the next bullet)

BASCO V. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52

Taking of property for public use

With Just Compensation

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS YARDSTICK AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE 1896 INTERREGNUM

Period of interregnum February 25, 1986 to March 25, 1986

POLITICAL, CIVIL ECONOMIC AND OTHER RIGHTS

THE BILL OF RIGHTS, VIGILANCE AND GOVERNMENT AS TEACHER

reasonable doubt Executory when final

JOSON V. TORRES, 29 SCRA 279

STANDARDS OF PROOF AND THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES

SUBSEQUENT NOTICE AND HEARING

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC V. DECS SECRETARY

WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG, 521 US 702

VOID FOR VAGUENESS, OVERBREADTH AND FACIAL CHALLENGES

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 394

NERA V. AUDITOR GENERAL, 164 SCRA 1

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

VALMONTE V. DE VILLA, 178 SCRA 211

ISSUE: WON the open field doctrine apply

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY

THE CHILLING EFFECT PRINCIPLE THE DANGER OF SELF CENSORSHIP

RELIGIOUS TEST AND EXERCISE OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE, 530 US 147

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