Was the double flash event a clandestine nuclear test?

CHARLIE KENZIE Department of Earth Sciences, University of Durham 2013

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1. Introduction 1.1 Double flash During the first few milliseconds of a nuclear explosion, extremely high temperatures and radiation cause gas to rapidly expand outward from the hypocenter, ionising the surrounding air and creating a spherical shockwave. The expanding shockwave is opaque and therefore shields the bright fireball from view. The process results in an initial intense flash followed by a dip in intensity, associated with the shockwave fireball interaction, and then a prolonged flash that steadily increases in intensity. 1.2 The Vela Incident On September 22, 1979, a double-flash event was detected by a pair of solid-state bhangmeter sensors onboard the American Vela satellite 6911. The measured event was equivalent to that of a 2-3 kT atmospheric nuclear explosion. The bhangmeter light patterns are shown in Fig.1a. Intelligence suggests that if the signal was caused by a nuclear test, it was most likely carried out by the governments of Israel, South Africa, or both collectively. The observations of the Vela Satellite remain ambiguous and there continues to be doubt over whether they originated from a nuclear explosion. 2. Evidence at the time of incident 2.1 Double flash observation The double flash observation provides the most convincing evidence that a surface nuclear burst (SNB) took place. There is no known single natural phenomenon that can imitate a double flash signature (Sublette, 2001). Additionally, 41 double flashes previously recorded by Vela satellites were all confirmed to be nuclear explosions through other means (Fig.1), (Sublette, 2001). However, in a report by a government appointed scientific comitee, headed by Jack Ruina, some elements of the observation proved problematic. Firstly, the nominal lifespan of the Vela satellites had long been surpassed by the time the flash was detected in September 1979. It was already known that this had caused a malfunction in the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) detector on the Vela 6911 (Weiss 2011). Additionally, both

bhangmeters should have recorded exactly the same source signal, only differing in either amplitude or phase. However, the Ruina panel argued that the intensities measured by the two bhangometers on September 22nd were different (Fig.1a). It was concluded, that the signal was probably not caused by a nuclear explosion, although it could not be ruled out (Ruina et al 1980). One possibility was that the double-flash observation was caused by sunlight reflecting off debris from a micro-meteroid that had struck the Vela satellite. Such anomalous events, were termed zoo-events (Ruina et al 1980), of which there had been a number recorded before the vela incident (Fig.2). Additionally, theoretical studies show that the Vela signal could be replicated by a series of meteroid collisions, if they possesed the right trajectory (Oetzel & Johnson 1980). However, further analysis showed that the chance of just one of the collisional models occuring was of the order of 1 in 100 billion (Oetzel & Johnson 1980). From just eyballing the observations taken by the Vela satellites, it is clear that the zoo-events (Fig.2) have markedly different signal characteristics to that of the September 22nd event and previous double flash observations (Fig.1). nd Additionally, the September 22 double flash event (Fig.1a) has a very similar signal to that of a double flash event recorded from an earlier confirmed nuclear explosion (Fig.1b). 2.2 Nuclear Fallout United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft were soon dispatched to recover any nuclear debris in the calculated area of testing. No radioactive debris was found. However, low levels of iodine-131, a short half life isotope produced by nuclear fission, were found in sheep in southeastern Australia, which appear to fit with wind patterns at the time (Barnaby 1989). A third bhangometer, usually in operation to locate the geographic origin of an event, was not operating on the Vela 6911, thus the location of any likely nuclear explosion could only be estimated within a 3,000 mile area (Richelson, 2006). It is possible that USAF flight sorites missed the nuclear debris due to the large error in pinpointing the actual test site.

CHARLIE KENZIE 2.3 Hydro-acoustic Data The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) collected and analysed hydro-acoustic and ocean wave data. According to one account the data showed that Navy sensors had recorded a strong acoustic signal reflected off the Antartic shelf, allowing a calculated estimate of the events location, which was matched with the vela satellite location for the hypothetical test. 3. Further evidecne 3.1 TIROS-N plasma A plasma analyser, on the TIROS-N satellite, observed an anomalously high precipitation of magnetospheric electrons into the auroral ionsosphere around the time of the Vela Incident. It was proposed that the anomaly was linked to the effects of an atmospheric nuclear explosion, however analysis indicates that the electron intensifaction occurred 3 minutes before the Vela light flash, and was caused by a naturally occurring auroral arc (Hones et al 1979). All-sky camera pictures taken from Syowa Base, Antartica, show a patch of auroral light that suddenly appeared a few seconds after the Vela event (Fig.3). Anomalous auroral patches are associated with whistler ducts, kilometer wide magnetic flux tubes at the ionosphere, which are produced by electromagnetic pulses (Hones et al 1979). A similar auroral patch was observed after an EMP was released from a US nuclear test, Operation Lea (Hones et al 1979). The auroral patch observed at Syowa base could be interpreted, though not uniquely, as a consequence of the electromagnetic pulse caused by the Vela nuclear test (Hones et al 1979). 4. Conclusions and implications of future monitoring systems Efforts during and after the Vela Incident to collect an unambiguous dataset have been unsuccesful. Firstly, the auroral data could, with indeterminate probability, be either caused by natural phenomenon or the consequence of an SNB (Hones et al 1979). The vela-satellite data appears to provide evidence of a nuclear test, but the observations can not be verified against any other data. This is with the exception of the NRL hydro-acoustic data, which was apparently ignored by the White House. Certainly, one has to consider the political implications of an Israeli nuclear test on the Carter adminstration, and thus question the reliability of the findings of the Ruina report. However, this cross-over between science and politics is a dangerous course, and can raise more ambiguity. Perhaps, an inherent problem of a government !"##$%&'( panel, such as the Ruina panel, is that a political agenda is immediately associated with it, regardless of the reliability of the panels conclusions. Indeed, the Ruina panel were specifically briefed to ignore all political questions concerning the event, however it does seem strange that the Carter adminstration choose to ignore the hydro-acoustic data, to allow the release of the Ruina report before the NRL report had been completed, and that at the time of writing, the 300 page NRL report was still classified. Perhaps the US government benefited from a conundrum apparent in society and science, that once a status quo has been reached with reguard to an observation (in this case the Ruina report) it is difficult, regardless of evicence shown to the contrary, to challenge the initial hypothesis. Nevertheless, even considering the NRL findings, it is still clear that more variables are needed to substantiate whether a nuclear test took place. An important consideration for future monitoring systems is that nondedicated scientific systems are likely to lack sensitivity or to be turned off at an event time. Even dedicated systems are not free of substantial background noise (Hones et al 1979). For example, vlf receivers can detect EMP signals from even small nuclear explosioins, but the signal is entirely similar in character to those produced by natural lightening strikes. Equally, Ionosondes have the ability to sense large SNBs but are insensitive to smaller explosions (Hones et al 1979). The use of seismometers is similarly restricted, since only the largest magnitude atmospheric explosions will generate a seismic signal. The best method would be to employ a number of specifically designed and maintained bhangmeter light sensors on a number of satellites, which would improve reliability and allow cross verification of observations on a global scale. )

CHARLIE KENZIE

Fig.1(a) Bhangmeter light patterns detected by the Vela satellite on 9/22/79 (Ruina 1980). The Ruina Panel explained the signal as a zoo event, caused by natural phenomena, not associated with a nuclear explosion. (b) Light pattern detected by a pair of bhangmeters from a Vela satellite for a known nuclear test (Ruina 1980). Notice the overall similarity of the signal to (a).

Fig.2 So called zoo-event from previous vela satellite observations (Ruina et al 1980). Notice the difference in signal characteristics in Fig.1. REFERENCES

Fig.3 Pictures of the sky taken with the all-sky camera at Syowa Base. The frame exposed fourth from left, top row, shows the time 00:52:50 to 00:52:57 UT, and displays a roughly trapezoidal patch of light that did not occur in the frame before. It appears unchanged in the next frame and then is gone. Possibly evidence of a whistler event caused by a nuclear explosion generated EMP.

BARNABY, F. (1989). The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East. I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. HERSH, S. (1991). The Samson Option. United States Government. Random House. HONES, E. W., Baker, D. N., & Feldman, W. C. (1981). Evaluation of Some Geophysical Events on 22 September 1979. United States Government, US Departments of Energy and Defense. Los Almos: United States Department of Energy. OETZEL, G., & Johnson, S. (1980). Vela Meteroid Evaluation. SRI International. SRI International. RICHELSON, J. T. (2006). Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea. Washington DC: W. W. Norton. RUINA, J., Alvarez, L., Donn, W., Garwin, R., Giacconi, R., Muller, R., et al. (1980). Ad Hoc Panel on the September 22 Event. United States Government, National Security Council. Washington, DC: Clifford Stone Document Archive. SUBLETTE, C. (2001, September 1). Report on the 1979 Vela Incident. Retrieved November 23, 2013, from Nuclear Weapon Archive: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/Vela.html WEISS, L. (2011). The 1979 South Atlantic Flash: The Case for an Israeli Nuclear Test. Stanford University. Washington, DC: Stanford University.