City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919 FACTS:

Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary. Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value. ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation? HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.

Republic v. PLDT Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement. Held: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.

People v. Fajardo Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view ofthe plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit toconstruct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi GR L-20620, 15 August 1974 En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 7 concur, 4 took no part

FACTS: 1 July 1947 - Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) occupied the land situated in Floridablanca, Pampanga of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi since by virtue of a contract of lease.

30 June 1956 - Before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused, intending to subdivide the lots for sale to the general public; filed civil case for ejectment of AFP.

26 June 1959 In view of the difficulty for the army to vacate the premises due to permanent installations and other facilities, AFP filed expropriation proceedings and was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959.

In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the abovementioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare (P.20/sqm), or a total market value of P259,669.10 when AFP first had the taking of the said property by virtue of the special lease agreement. Respondents allege that their lands are residential with a fair market value of not less than P15/sqm.

The trial court rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just compensation

ISSUE: 1. WON the taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action 2. WON the P10/sqm is fair and just compensation.

HELD: 1. The "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee. Elements B & E were not present when Republic entered the properties in 1947.

Elements/Requisites of taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: A. Expropriator must enter a private property. B. Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. C. Entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. D. Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. E. Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

2. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959.

The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid should not be paid based on 1947 fair market value amount.

Basic guidelines in determining the value of the land to be expropriated: Same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties.

Estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future.

In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market.

We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10/sqm is quite high. The price of P5/sqm would be a fair valuation and would constitute a just compensation. We considered the resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, that in the year 1959 the lands could be sold for from P2.50- P4/sqm, and the Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE PHIL, defendants-appellees. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. FACTS: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca (Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership and possession of her lot. The defendants denied the plaintiffs allegations stating: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages ,attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff'sclaim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had longprescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. ISSUE : W/N the appellant may properly sue the government RULING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is

neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated.

PPI vs COMELEC PPI vs COMELEC, GR L-119694 (En Banc) 22 May 1995 FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain? HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to taking of private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory donation, measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of just compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for Comelec space is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.

SUMULONG V. GUERRERO Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to lowsalaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation.

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due process.

Issues: (1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power of eminent domain. (2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated. (3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. (4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge.

Held: (1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls within the confines of public use. (2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. (3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation. (4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.

Manosca vs. CA Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: The expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born, valid and constitutional? Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

EPZA V. CA Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998) Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, and the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.