Moore Crucible Cultural Politics 1999

the crucible of cultural politics: reworking "development" in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands
DONALD S. MOORE
University of California at Berkeley
In early July 1991, Zimbabwean state officials, escorted by armed police, rolled into Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme in Toyota Landcruisers. The District Administrator addressed an anxious crowd of 200, speaking in the deep ChiManyika dialect of his grandparents, who had been evicted decades before from the bordering National Park. He demanded that those assembled move from their current homesteads into the scheme's densely packed residential grids located up to a kilometer away from household fields. The cordoned-off residential sites were a cornerstone of state resettlement policy, designed to promote "development" and environmental "conservation." The administrator used the English term villagesio describe the linear grids, as if to suggest that the unpeopled landscapemarked by rusted metal stakes on barren terrainconstituted a vibrant community in waiting. Most Kaerezians called these empty spaces simply the lines, the same term used for colonial land use plans that had forced Africans into linear settlement grids separated from fields and pastures. The administrator warned those who refused to enter the lines that they risked eviction from their current Kaerezi homes located on state land outside the demarcated residential areas. To dispel any misconceptions, he pointedly announced that the chief had no authority to allocate land in Kaerezi since it was state property administered by government officials. I lived with one of the affected families inside the resettlement scheme but outside the planned residential gridsan anthropologist among squatters. A group of Kaerezians had asked me to help them articulate alternatives to the state land use plan, and the District Administrator was initially receptive to the idea. But over the course of numerous meetings in his office, he defended the ecological benefits of resettlement policy with crisp scientific rhetoric honed at Syracuse University where he had majored in molecular biology. As he spoke to the gathering, I feared he might employ what he once described as government's "necessary coercive mechanisms" to enforce state policy. Recent evictions of squatters from a nearby state forest, the burnt rubble of huts freshly inscribed on the landscape, and the presence of armed police made tangible the sting of state power. The resulting camp of displaced squatters huddled under Red Cross tents was a prominent landmark along the rural bus route servicing Kaerezi. Alluding to the torched
In this article, I examine the cultural politics of development in a Zimbabwean resettlement scheme, situating state interventions in the deep histories of colonial efforts to discipline rural livelihoods. Popular memories of resistance to colonial conservation, shaped by transnational circuits and constitutive of Zimbabwean nationalism, animate the cultural idioms of entitlement and state power in the 1990s. The contingent micro-politics of agrarian struggle counter a recent tendency toward discursive determinism in anthropological perspectives on development. [development, cultural politics, practice, nationalism, spatiality, governmentality, southern Africa]
American E\hnologist 26(31:654-689. Copyright 2000, American Anthropological Association.
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huts and the forcible evictions, one elder cynically observed, "This government is made of matches." The local chief stood to address the crowd, tactically invoking the political capital of his predecessor, the late nationalist hero Rekayi Tangwena, who was buried with state honors in 1984. In the 1970s, BBC film footage captured Rekayi's defiance of Rhodesian evictions from that same property, then the white-owned Gaeresi Ranch. Images of burning huts, police brutality, and children in tattered clothes living without permanent shelter in the rugged mountains bordering Mozambique fueled an international sanctions campaign that travelled over transnational mediascapes. Hundreds of Tangwena's followers hid in the thick mountain forests surrounding Kaerezi, returning to their former homes on the ranch under the cover of nightfall to rebuild destroyed huts, temporarily staving off evictions. Under increased militarization of operations on the ranch, they fled en masse to Mozambique, where they sought refuge in FRELIMO-controlled liberated zones.' In 1991, almost twenty years after the most prominent evictions, the new chief placed territorial struggles in the landscape of national liberation. He attacked the lines. "Rekayi told me that his people 'won' this area. I came here to inherit his chiefdom. President Mugabe told Rekayi nobody would disturb his people. That's why I don't want the lines installed in my territory. We want development (budiriro), not the lines."2 The chief singled out specific development desires: tarred roads, buses, and agricultural demonstrators. Kaerezians cheered boisterously, serving up what a government report later lamented as "ululation and applause" which revealed that the "traditional leadership was still running the show regarding opposition" to resettlement policy.3 A prominent headman stood and commanded silence: "President Mugabe said there should be development in Tangwena's territory because we were oppressed by the whites." He used the English term developmentthat global keyword of modernity. It was the only English word he used. Then the headman quickly carved out the discursive distinction again, sharply and in Shona, reiterating the difference between the lines of oppression and the path of development, this time glossed as budiriro (development).4 Global development discourse, refracted through the crucible of Kaerezi's cultural politics, had encountered anything but docile bodies. A national party official, sensing the rising resentment, promised to call a meeting in the capital. More than a decade after the scheme's inception, resettlement policy in Kaerezi remained anything but settled.
micro-politics and cultural contestation

The crossfire of Kaerezi's resettlement politics in the 1990s signals the direction for a critical anthropology of development.5 Far too often, contemporary analyses eclipse the micro-politics through which global development discourses are refracted, reworked, and sometimes subverted in particular localities. It is too often assumed that development rigidly determines rural politics; such assumptions divert from the investigation of how particular interventions articulate with deeper histories of government attempts to regulate and discipline landscapes and livelihoods. The specificity of these struggles belies any single, totalizing development discourse. Such a unitary formulation conceals spatial, historical, and cultural differences. Recent perspectives have tended to downplay how contemporary global processes layer over previous historical connections, particularly those forged through capitalism and colonialism. A poststructural theoretical fascination with discontinuity and rupture has elided the recognition of salient historical continuities in the disciplining of agriculture, the spatial ordering of rural settlements, and the operations of colonial and postcolonial governmentality.6 In this article, I offer an alternative view. My focus is on popular opposition to postcolonial Villagization policy, that is, government officials' attempts to impose linear settlement grids upon the landscape in a state-administered Zimbabwean resettlement scheme.7 Debates over
the crucible of cultural politics
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Villagization in the 1990s hinged crucially on social memories of colonial land use plans, notably those that built on Centralization, introduced in 1929 by an American agriculturalist through the growing global circuits fusing conservation and development (explained further below). In Kaerezi, heated disputes over Villagization in the early 1990s deployed competing constructions of these keywords. Their valences, far from fixed and given, were produced through fierce struggles over the meanings and practices of state administration, traditional authority, and popular understandings of the political entitlements due active participants in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. While attending to particular historical conjuctures that are highly localized in Kaerezi, I do not advocate a return to an uncritical conceptualization of "the local" as a site hermetically sealed off from relational, translocal linkages. Rather, it is through the crucible of cultural politics where transnational influences have been reworked through grounded livelihood struggles. Broadly, cultural politics underscore the recognition that the "cultural has become a crucial ground for political struggle" (Gilroy 1993:57; see also West 1990). Critical for this shift is an emphasis on relations of power, social inequalities, and culture itselfthe latter conceived as a site of contestation (Jordan and Weedon 1995:11; Rosaldo 1994:525). In Kaerezi, the politics of identity, community, and territory have shaped the terrain of development debates through the early 1990s.8 Cultural idioms emphasize the sedimented histories of land struggles in the Eastern Highlands, infusing claims to political entitlements in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Gendered claims to land rights, understandings of chiefly inheritance and rule, and arguments linking cultural identity to place informed debates over development, influencing the impact of state policy within a particular locality. The micro-politics of land struggles in Kaerezi suggest the need to problematize the metaphor of development discourse as an "anti-politics machine," Ferguson's (1990) influential formulation that, despite its theoretical sophistication, has mechanistic and monolithic overtones. For Ferguson, development discourse "depoliticizes everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the while, performing almost unnoticed, its own preeminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power" (1990:xv). Yet his own analysis throws a wrench in the smooth functioning of this anti-politics machine. Ferguson's careful ethnographic investigation of a particular project in Lesotho reveals the "embeddedness in local political struggles" of development interventions (1990:87).9 Following this ethnographic insight, I argue, development needs to be conceptualized not as a machine that secures fixed and determined outcomes but rather as a site of contestation, its boundaries carved out through the situated practices that constitute livelihood struggles in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands. At stake in debates over the legitimacy of postcolonial interventions in Kaerezi was precisely how contested understandings of "culture", "politics", and "development" would be resolved in relation to popular perceptions of the national liberation war's unfulfilled promises. I intend my metaphor of the crucible of cultural politics, then, to emphasize the articulation of struggles that are simultaneously material and symbolic. Before returning to agrarian politics in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands, I must first interrogate prominent conceptualizations of development discourse. This requires, in turn, a consideration of the historical genealogies of development and their relationship to colonial projects in southern Africa. I examine Centralization, the colonial precursorto Villagization, in detail before tracing out the specific historical inflections of conservation and development practices in Kaerezi. This history allows for a greater appreciation of the salience of social memories within postrolonial resettlement debates and for the cultural idioms deployed by Kaerezians in their engagements with state interventions. It also underscores the cultural formation of nationalism, a process frequently neglected in analyses of development discourse. I conclude by reflecting on the advantages for an anthropology of development of a move toward cultural politics and discursive practice.
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deployments of development discourses

Critical analyses of development discourse sought to break definitively from earlier economisms that dominated development studies, notably Marxian political economy and neo-classical orthodoxy (Crush 1995; Escobar 1984-85, 1995; Ferguson 1990; Marchand and Parpart 1995; Sachs 1992).10 Influenced by poststructuralism, recent anthropological approaches have taken as an implicit point of departure Foucault's assertion that "power is not primarily the maintenance and reproduction of economic relations, but is above all a relation of force. The questions to be posed would then be these: if power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? In what does it consist? What is its mechanism?"U 980:89)'' The key to dissecting the operations of power, from this perspective, is to "understand development as a discourse""the system that allows the systematic creation of objects, concepts, and strategies; it determines what can be thought and said" (Escobar 1995:40, my emphasis).12 Yet to avoid the danger of substituting discursive determinism for a previous economism, poststructural approaches need to confront both the heterogeneity of cultural practices that constitutes development as well as the historical agency of social actors who shape and contest development's effects. Moreover, as Williams argues, an appreciation for practice and agency suggests a "notion of determination as setting limits, exerting pressures" rather than foreclosing fixed outcomes 0980:32). Crucially, poststructural approaches have signalled the importance of powerful global discourses and the vast institutional development apparatus that arose in the post-World War II period.13 Such analyses have directed needed attention to the unintended discursive and material effects of the institutionalization of development. The images produced by planning agencies within powerful institutions such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development have shaped both the range of policy options and the consequent patterns of intervention in some Third World landscapes and livelihoods (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Mitchell 1991).14 The advocates of these perspectives have emphasized the simultaneity of symbolic and material processes at work in powerful formations that produce meaningful and practical effects, overcoming a previous tendency to oppose underlying structural realities with ideational images.15 "In its Foucauldian derivation," Abu-Lughod asserts, discourse "is meant to refuse the distinction between ideas and practices or text and world that the culture concept too readily encourages" (1991.147)16 This move also offered the chance to break from classical anthropology's notion of a unified and homogeneous culture (Ginsberg andTsing 1990:3). Despite their real promise of conceptual advance, however, an array of approaches to development discourse shares two problematic tendencies. First, they rely on textual representations. This focus has reinforced the image of a single, monolithic discourse, papering over the multiple reworkings of and resistance to development in particular Third World sites. Notably absent are the charged and often highly localized cultural politics that inflect translocal discourses of development, a sort of contraflow to globalizing influences. Second, the emphasis on the discursive formation of global development institutions that arose after World War II ignores the older historical patterns of these more recent interventions. At issue is not simply the question of historical periodization but also the dynamics of articulation and continuities in the patterns of political economy and governmentality that span the postcolonial divide. As Slater argues, "The shock of the new should not de-sensitize us to the persistence of the 'old,' nor to their novel imbrication" (1994:238). One of the most prominent poststructural accounts of development discourse, Escobar's Encountering Development (1995), ironically risks reproducing one of its prime targets of critique: namely, the textual tyranny of World Bank planners and development technocrats. Planners and bureaucrats are accused of weighing the powerful documentary effects in technical reports much more heavily than the grounded livelihood struggles of historical
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agents.17 Yet Escobar's own heavy reliance on textual readings of policy documents elides attention to how discursive practices inscribe development in grounded contexts: how disciplinary effects confront not docile bodies but the situated cultural practices and sedimented histories of people and place; how they are reproduced, resisted, or reworked through rural livelihood struggles; and how development interventions unfold through radical inequalities in a global political economy.18 As Lowe astutely asserts, "discursive formations are never singular. Discourses operate in conflict; they overlap and collude; they do not produce fixed or unified objects" (1991:8). Discursive analysts thus need to avoid the trap of reproducing the fixed spatiality of an economistic world-system's perspective of cores and peripheries where the West is privileged as the originary site of modernity's meanings.19 As discursive practices travel, in this model from the West to the Rest, their journey parallels the historical dynamic of capitalism arriving from "outside," like a ship bringing Europe or the Americas to the people without history (Hall 1992; Wolf 1982; see also Asad 1987; Ortner 1984). The economic engine of exchange that powered Wallersteinian world-system theory is here replaced by the driving force of discursive formations that obscure not simply a heterogeneity of cultural practices, but also the historical dynamics of their global articulations.20 Far too often, discursive determinism is asserted, eclipsing the cultural politics through which particular development interventions are debated, contested, and played out. This tendency is particularly pronounced in analyses that invoke Harry S. Truman's 1949 inaugural speech as an originary moment of development. President Truman announced "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" (quoted in Esteva 1992:6).21 The fetishization of Truman's speech and its originary power is perhaps most pronounced in Sach's (in press) claim that "the opening of the development era happened at a certain date and hour" when Truman referred to the world's poorer countries as "underdevelopment areas."22 From this perspective, "there was no 'development,' 'underdevelopment,' or 'Third World' before 1945" (Escobar 1991:679).23 A counter position, however, asserts that "the doctrine of development was already old before Truman's invocation" (Cowen and Shenton 1995:29).24 In 1895 at his inaugural lecture at Freiberg, Max Weber famously proclaimed: "Processes of economic development are in the final analysis also power struggles, and the ultimate and decisive interests at whose service economic policy must place itself are the interests of national power, where these interest are in question" (quoted in Ludden 1992:249). In the same year, the British Colonial Secretary announced: "[It is] not enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world's surface unless you are willing to develop them. We are the landlords of a great estate; it is the duty of the landlord to develop his estate" (quoted in Cowen and Shenton 1991:145).25 A similar understanding of duty animated the reasoning of southern Rhodesia's influential 1944 Godlonton Commission. Making policy recommendations for Native Production and Trade, the Godlonton Commission concluded that "in their present relative stages of development the European races may in general be classed as forward peoples and the African races may in general be classed as backward peoples. . . . Forward peoples while preserving their settled economy have a duty by all reasonable and proper means to assist backward peoples to progress and for that purpose to enforce discipline without oppression."26 One could hardly find a clearer invocation of social evolutionary ideology and the burden of a racialized civilizing mission. Critical histories of development should simultaneously trace shifts in the meanings of the term as well as the different projects to which it has been directed. Across historically specific contexts, Cowen and Shenton (1996) offer an archaeology of the "doctrines of development" emphasizing the convergence oi Christian theology with organic metaphors derived from biology, the salience of social Darwinism, and Enlightenment concerns with rational order and
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teleologies of progress that unfolded in the wake of Comtean positivism in the late 19th century.27 As Nandy argues: "The ideology of development has come to faithfully mirror the key ideas of the colonial world-view and Baconian philosophy of science," providing a justification for "the white man's burden" (1994:204). This discursive formation, in turn, legitimized later understandings of colonial and Third World trusteeship. Among the most influential of these formulations was Lugard's Dual Mandate, in which "powerful states" accept the "grave responsibility o f . . . 'bringing forth' to a higher plane . . . the backward races" (1926:66).28 A number of studies have identified the historical geneaologies of development discourses within the capillaries of imperial rule and the circuits of colonial bureaucracies. Ludden traces "an institutional complexa development regimecreated by colonial capitalism and by bourgeois nationalism as a vital force in the cultural and material life of India," stressing continuity across the postcolonial divide (1992.249).29 Focusing on British and French colonial policies in Africa, Cooper (1998) contends that understandings of economic development that became key to organizing postcolonial international relations in the 1950s through the 1980s emerged in the context of colonial bureaucracies.30 From this perspective, the historical legacies of colonialism and imperialism have deeply shaped the contours of more recent development interventions and regimes of rule, as well as the radical inequalities in the global political economy. To avoid the danger of historical amnesia, then, it becomes crucial to ask how discourses of development after World War II have built upon prior colonial interventions in rural livelihoods.31 An appreciation for historical agency and contestation moves away from discursive determinism and toward a politics of contingency. Here, Foucauldian conceptualizations of development discourse might benefit from a more Gramscian understanding of hegemony and cultural struggle (see Parajuli 1996; Woost 1993). Gramsci asserts that "ideologies. . .'organise' human masses, and create the terrain on which men [and women] move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc." (1971:377).32 Neo-Gramscian formulations have thus conceived of "hegemony not as a finished and monolithic ideological formation but as a problematic, contested, political process of domination and struggle" (Roseberry 1996:77 emphasis in original).33 As Hall argues, politics, for Gramsci, "is where forces and relations, in the economy, in society, in culture, have to be actively worked on to produce particular forms of power, forms of domination. . . . This conception of politics is fundamentally contingent, fundamentally open-ended" (1991:124). Practice, process, and struggle here animate politics. Rather than conceiving of a single discursive formation as a fully formed system that arrives from the outside, unfolding across rural landscapes, Hall's neo-Gramscian vision suggests that historically contingent cultural politics produce development. Ethnographic attention to the micropolitics of development thus provides a necessary complement to a view that traces salient historical continuities between colonial governmentality and postcolonial policy and practice. This vision counters the twin dangers of ethnographic anemia and historical amnesia. My perspective builds on fine-grained ethnographic work on the rituals of state development (Brow 1996; Tennekoon 1988; Woost 1993), on the symbolic idioms through which development is debated (Crehan and von Oppen 1988; Croll 1994; Kane 1994; Pigg 1992, 1996), and on the myriad cultural practices through which state interventions seek to inscribe development (Gupta 1995, 1998b; Li 1996; Ts'mg 1993).34 In southern African contexts, Ferguson's (1990) pioneering work has its complement in the ethnographies of Crehan (1997) and Peters (1994) where a crucial stake remains the way to conceptualize the relationship among the conceptual keywords of "development," "culture," and "politics." To ground these concerns, I return now to struggles in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands over government efforts to implement resettlement policy, conceived as a national development strategy. The historical legacies of a colonial political economy and state strategies for spatial control have endured despite national independence in 1980. After sketching out the key
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contours of colonial land policy, I turn to the contentious meanings and practices of African settlement and livelihoods in Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme. While I trace histories of global linkages, the localized patterns of land struggles in Kaerezi preclude a single monolithic development discourse. Instead, they point to the necessity of attending to the cultural politics through which rural people have contested and reworked state interventions.
land alienation and racialization in Zimbabwe

I begin with a brief historical sketch of the region to help explain continuities and transformations in Zimbabwe. White settlers migrated to southern Rhodesia from what is now South Africa in the 1890s, overcoming armed African resistance.35 They created reserves for the defeated Matabele in 1894, setting aside more than 8.4 million hectares for other African groups by 1901, when 32 million hectares were targeted for European purchase in a country of 700,000 (Moyana 1984). By 1906, one-sixth of the country, including the most productive agricultural land, was allocated to white settlers (Moyana 1984; Roth and Bruce 1994). The 1930 Land Apportionment Act laid down the basic structure of racial apartheid through land designation, amended during the colonial period less in principle than in specific details (see Machingaidze 1991:558, Yudelman 1964:71). The "conquest lands" were alienated without any recognition of pre-existing African landrights (Palmer 1977:227). As N. H. Wilson of the Native Affairs Department explained in 1944: "We are in this country because we represent a higher civilization, because we are better men. It is our only excuse for having taken the land" (cited inSudbeck 1989:63). The racialization of land categories in colonial Rhodesia forcibly mapped white farming practices onto the country's highveld, the most productive agro-ecological zone with the highest rains and most fertile soils. Protective legislation and preferred access to markets further pushed Africans onto marginal lands (Moyana 1984; Moyo 1995). From the turn of the century, African reserves were articulated into a regional political economy, but on very subordinate terms. Hut taxes in the reserves and private rents on alienated land forced men to migrate in search of wages, journeying to distant mines and industrial centers as far away as Cape Town. The reserves represented the racialization of cordoned-off spaces and a policy of apartheid, Rhodesian-style, legally enshrined in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. These rural sites were also nodal points for male labor migrants, relational places situated in a regional landscape where the spatial control of Africans was a paramount government concern. By 1937, in Kaerezi's district, over half of all adult males were estimated to be working outside the district.36 Women's agricultural burdens, already shaped by a profoundly gendered division of labor within rural households, intensified during the long absences of their husbands and kinsmen (Schmidt 1992). If the civilizing mission represented a powerful invocation of a right of conquest, Zimbabwean nationalism seized on land expropriation as central to the liberation struggle. After Ian Smith's government declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, African nationalists launched a guerrilla war in 1966. Their rallying cause was recovering the "lost lands" alienated by white settlers.37 The 1979 Lancaster House agreement, the British-brokered independence constitution worked out among black nationalists and Rhodesia's Smith regime, ended the war. During deliberations at Lancaster House, Robert Mugabe, elected head of state at Independence in 1980, proclaimed: "Land is the main reason we went to war; to regain what was taken 89 years ago" (quoted in Astrow 1983:40).38
global and regional routes

Centralization, the cornerstone of colonial land use planning, was launched in 1929 by E. D. Alvord, an agriculturalist and missionary born and educated in the United States.
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Centralization involved the physical and functional separation of three mutually exclusive land categories: residential, arable, and grazing. Centralized linear settlement grids, usually paralleling dirt roads, divided common grazing land from farmers' individual plots. Trained agriculturalists allocated single, permanent fields for cultivation to married men, effectively eclipsing women's informal landrights by subsuming them under the assumed shared interest of an undifferentiated household. Alvord devised this technical spatial fix to curtail shifting cultivation and what he saw as the poor farming techniques that led to environmental degradation. Implemented in the same year as the Native Development Act, Centralization represented a powerful intervention fusing development and conservation concerns, marking a shift from earlier strategies or* territorial control to the disciplining of African settlement and agricultural practices in the diminished room for maneuver in the Reserves.39 As Centralization's chief architect, Alvord was part of a growing global network of technocratic consultants involved in colonial administration.40 As Grove points out, by the late 19th century, "'development' consultants [were] employed on a world-wide basis," serving as key agents in the dissemination of American and European conservation ideology in Africa, South East Asia, and Central America (1990:24; see also Grove 1995).4' In southern Africa's settler colonies, colonial administrators had long advocated concentrated linear settlements for the purposes of surveillance, control, and the collection of taxes and labor.42 The Rhodesian engineers of Native Reserves did not have to look far for a model of spatial containment of African agriculture and residence, nor for policies to promote the steady supply of cheap labor for white settler agriculture, mining, and industry.43 Government officials first used Native Locations as a conscious administrative policy in Natal in the 1830s and 1840s (Robinson 1996). They lauded the orderly planned spatial grids for disciplining African residence, market orientation, economic productivity, and cultural conduct within a European order. A 1847 Location Commission report, written by government officials and missionaries, extolled the economic virtues of these controlled socio-spatial arrangements, emphasizing their role in encouraging the greater incorporation of rural residents into transnational markets. The language of the report corresponds to export-oriented economic development models of the late 20th century: "The native locations will become centres of industry and improvement, the whole of the native population in the district and gradually those beyond it, will become consumers of imported articles and producers of articles for export" (quoted in Slater 1980:157). For South African officials, rural settlement schemes were designed to promote simultaneously conservation and development through orchestrated state interventions. The 1932 Native Economic Commission clearly perceived the connection: "In the economic development of the reserves must inevitably be sought the main solution for the Native economic problem. . . . Our problem is . . . not only as it is in agriculture to teach the Native how to use their land more economically, but it is also a race against time to prevent the destruction of large grazing areas, the erosion and denudation of the soil and the drying up of springs" (quoted in Yawitch 1988:102). When a modified version of Alvord's Centralization scheme was introduced to South Africa in the 1930s with the intent to counter environmental degradation and improve agricultural production, its very name, "Betterment," implied an official vision of progress, modernity, and development.44
coercing conservation
Alvord's innovation critically informed these schemes, formalizing the segregation of consolidated linear residential grids from spatially separate arable and grazing areas. By 1944, nearly a third of southern Rhodesia's Native Reserves had been centralized.45 In the same year, government officials celebrated Alvord's corrective to "the wasteful and injurious" practices oi African agriculture and the "prevailing haphazard distribution of agricultural and grazing
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lands."46 Alvord himself blamed environmental degradation in Native Reserves on African agricultural practices. He never considered the destructive effects of colonial land policy on society, politics, and ecology; in this, he echoed and anticipated colonial conservation concerns in Rhodesia (Chandiwana and Moyo-Mhlanga 1996) and throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa (Okoth-Ogendo 1993). "Because of their poor farming methods," Alvord lamented, "the lives of the great mass of our Rhodesian Natives are filled with poverty. They have worn-out lands, poverty-stricken cattle, poorly constructed huts and under-nourished, naked children. . .. Their methods are wasteful, slovenly and unnecessarily ineffective, and, if continued, will be ruinous to the future interest of Rhodesia" (1929:11). As a remedy to "slovenly" African agriculture, Alvord (1958) stressed an order for plowing, crop rotation, and soil management oriented toward intensive permanent cultivation on fixed parcels of land. Believing that "every native farming practice" was "governed primarily by custom without thought for cause and effect" (1929:9), Alvord's obsession was to fuse productive rationality with Christian belief, a deliberate project that sought the "colonization of consciousness" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1989). Entitling his unpublished autobiography "The Gospel of the Plow, or A Guided Destiny?," Alvord preached the miracle of the market. He effectively intercropped Christian faith, agricultural science, and a teleology of progressdefined primarily through economic industriousness and market orientation. Fields, however, were to be monocropped in line with ten "rules of permanent cultivation" phrased in language resonant with the Biblical Moses' receiving the Ten Commandments (see Sudbeck 1989:60).47 After a visit to the U.S. Southwest's dustbowl in 1936, Alvord introduced contour ridging to southern Rhodesia which became compulsory agricultural practice.48 He brought "Hickory King" hybrid maize from the United States, a higher yielding maize than that introduced by the Portuguese two centuries before. Helping to establish maize as a staple food and cash crop, Alvord promoted the intensive cultivation of commodity crops such as cotton, groundnuts, and sesame for European markets (Page and Page n.d.:6). Centralization's so-called conservation interventions ranged from the most quotidian of agricultural practicesthe depth of contour ridges, the spacing of furrowsto the further incorporation of Africans into national and global markets that progressively decreased rural cultivators' control over production and consumption. The wave of similarly "coercive conservation" (Peluso 1993) programs across sub-Saharan Africa has been likened to "the 'second colonial occupation' . . . with its 'do good' justification for meddling in African Agriculture" (Anderson 1984:322). South Africa's Betterment schemes engendered bitter resentment and fierce resistance in rural communities.49 In South Africa, Betterment and its successors translated into the forced removals of more than three million South Africans between 1960 and 1983 (Platzky and Walker 1985:9; Wilson and Ramphele 1989). As Vaughan underscores, colonial conservation policies often galvanized nationalist opposition to state interventions in rural livelihoods (1989:185). Provisions in the Natural Resources Act of the 1940s and the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951 added compulsory labor provisions for conservation works along with legislative bite to Centralization.50 A dual spatial fix sought to tie rural cultivators to permanent allocated parcels in reserves while simultaneously nurturing an urban proletariat with no land rights, wholly dependent on wage labor and permanently resident in colonial cities. Resistance to these provisions, as well as to destocking campaigns and to compulsory conservation measures, forced the Act's suspension in 1962 (see, in particular, Bessant 1992; Brown 1959; Moyana 1984; Wilson 1995). As Machingaidze (1991) has shown, opposition to the Act engendered complex alliances linking rural and urban resistance to colonial rule. Africans and Rhodesian administrators alike saw resistance to colonial conservation and development policies as fomenting the rising nationalist movement.
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tenancy and evictions from Gaeresi Ranch

Opposition to colonial conservation and development in the Eastern Highlands followed this broad national pattern, yet it was also distinctive. In 1899, two years after white settlers forcibly put down the first Chimurenga, or mass rebellion, against colonial rule, Chief Tangwena, who lived in Portuguese territory, sent British officials tax revenues on behalf of his followers living in what is now Kaerezi.51 The followers of Chief Tangwena encountered an influential rainmaker, Nyahuruwa, and members of related lineages who had long inhabited the Kaerezi River Valley. When the British South Africa Company sold the property to a Johannesburg-based syndicate in 1905, Africans living on the land paid rent to the new company.52 The following year, colonial officials voiced concern that "most of (the] Tangwena" had moved over into Portuguese territory to flee hut-rents.53 From the first decade of colonial rule, Africans whose livelihoods linked them to Kaerezi's landscape contended with the spatial control of government officials concerned with tax revenues, labor supplies, and risks to state security (see Worby 1994).54 Early administrators in the district complained of the rugged mountainous terrain, dispersed settlements, and African resistance to censuses and tax collection.55 As Appadurai has observed of census taking in colonial India, "numbers gradually became more importantly part of the illusion of bureaucratic control and a key to a colonial imaginaire in which countable abstractions, both of people and of resources, at every imaginable level and for every conceivable purpose, created the sense of a controllable indigenous reality" (1993:317). On the periphery of the Rhodesian state, administrators feared that their lack of knowledge of African settlements and practices threatened colonial rule. After a trip through the region surrounding Kaerezi in 1906, an administrator voiced concern that "the absence of well-defined paths in the past, and the entangled state of the approaches to this part of the district. . . has given the natives a sense of their security from interference from without." 56 In 1930, transnational flows of capital from British shareholders bankrolled William and Charles Hamner's purchase of the land containing Kaerezi.57 The brothers subdivided the property, with Charles becoming the managing director of the Pulpwood Company of Rhodesia in the western portion. In 1944, William took over Gaeresi Ranch in the eastern portion of Inyanga Block, the area that is now Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme. But it was not until the arrival of an on-site farm manager east of the Kaerezi River in 1949 that the increased white presence on the landscape critically changed local labor relations.58 The extension of wattle and pine plantations in the 1950s intensified labor demands on tenants, many of whom did not recognize their employer as the land's owner. A man born on Kaerezi in 1933 recalled, "Hanmer used to say, 'I bought this land,' so people followed what he said to avoid being chased away. When he arrived, there were people living here. I don't understand how the area could be sold when the land already had its owners here." Land rights on Kaerezi became contentious when a Tangwena chief, popularly perceived as a colonial puppet, died in 1965. Rekayi Tangwena was elected the new leader by a constituency of labor tenants living on Gaeresi Ranch. The Rhodesian regime refused to recognize Rekayi's chieftainship, however, targeting him as a squatter to be evicted. A government land inspection flight over the property in 1962 and subsequent ground visits the following two years revealed that, in the words of a 1969 report, "erosion, the forerunner of famine, was plainly evident." The landowner, William Hanmer, was held "legally responsible" for the "negligence in the land husbandry methods adopted by the tenants."59 Conservation concerns here joined with labor struggles on the ranch to accelerate the pace of evictions. From the early 1960s, the ranch owner had been evicting former labor tenants who refused to sign agreements to become full-time workers. As one Kaerezian in his sixties described the proposal to me, "You will sign, certifying that forever you will work here, and you will not be
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allowed to work anywhere else." Government efforts to aid the landowner's evictions were intensified after the 1969 Land Tenure Act more strictly enforced racial apartheid through land policy, making it illegal for Africans to live in a "European" designated area without a signed labor agreement. Significantly, defiance of the white landowner and government evictions cut against the dual spatial fix proposed by the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 with its intention to tie permanent rural cultivators to fixed parcels of allocated land, separate from an urban workforce permanently resident in colonial cities. Kaerezian labor tenants wanted both local landrights and the opportunity for better wages in distant mines and urban industries. As operations on the ranch became increasingly militarized in the early 1970s, Rhodesian security forces burned huts, seized cattle, and destroyed crops, building a dirt road for the forced removals. In the 1990s, a Kaerezian in his late fifties recalled the headlight beams of vehicles piercing the pre-dawn sky 20 years before. "It was like a city of lights floating toward us," he told me. Another man, who spent six years as a Rhodesian political prisoner during the war, recalled with exact details: "It was four a.m. when the Landrovers came. We counted them, 34 new Landrovers, five trucks, and one bulldozer. They were coming to burn huts." Twenty years after colonial evictions, many Kaerezians recalled the position of the sun or moon during particular raids, the color of cattle seized, and the features of the landscape that sheltered their escapes. One woman hid with her children behind a waterfall, leaving security forces to ponder the mystery of a well-stoked yet unattended cook hut fire. Women were on the front lines of protest. During one raid, Rhodesian police forcibly seized Rekayi, loading him into a Landrover while women clutched his legs. "They beat us with clubs," one woman in her fifties told me, "but we didn't let go of Rekayi. They had to pull us from him." While in the 1990s Kaerezians disagreed on who formulated the strategy, most spoke of a consciously gendered choice: women's active participation in protests was believed to lessen the risk of gunfire and severe beatings in physical confrontations with armed police. Men's physical defiance, in the absence of women, Kaerezians argued, ran a greater risk of escalating police violence. After Rekayi was captured by police during one raid, a sizeable Tangwena contingent marched more than 30 miles to the District Commissioner's Office. Gendered protest practices played off a colonial politics of embarrassment. Official records registered women's tactics in their complaints with respect to the "unseemingly behavior of the women of the tribe who stripped off most of their clothes, urinated in the road in the tourist village of Inyanga and made lewd gestures and remarks to the Police."60 Women's prominence during defiance of evictions in the early 1970s was well remembered two decades later, as in the words of one Kaerezian woman in her sixties: "When fighting we were ahead and the chief was behind." After forced removals, Kaerezians hid in the surrounding mountain forests, returning by nightfall to rebuild huts. They sprinkled red pepper on the trails to confuse tracking dogs. Rekayi claimed 1,000 followers in 1970, living, as he put it, "like baboons" in the mountains (Rhodesia Herald 1970). In 1972, a helicopter raid proved devastating (Rhodesia Herald 1972). Soldiers and police seized over 100 Tangwena schoolchildren who had been entrusted to the care of teachers at a nearby multi-racial cooperative, taking them to a distant social welfare camp (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia 1975). In 1991, a young mother of five recalled her capture and terror, convinced of imminent slaughter: "They said we were feeding terrorists. We were put in trucks . . . and taken from our parents. We thought we were going to be made into beef." Amidst Zimbabwe's rising guerrilla war, Kaerezians fled to Mozambique. During this exodus, they escorted Robert Mugabe, with Rhodesian Police in hot pursuit, through Kaerezi across the border in 1974. Rekayi Tangwena's connections with Samora Machel's FRELIMO forces enabled Mugabe to reach Zimbabwean Nationalist Army camps in Mozambique safely from where he helped command the armed liberation struggle. When Mugabe's party swept Independence elections in 1980, Kaerezians had accumulated potent postcolonial political
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capital: Rekayi became a state senator in Parliament and his followers returned to Kaerezi, which had been purchased by the state as part of its national resettlement program.
postcolonial resettlement politics

The British-brokered end to the war in 1979 thwarted African claims for the nationalization of land.61 Resettlement policy emerged as a transnational compromise, British aid providing half the capital to purchase land from "willing sellers" (invariably white) thus protecting the sanctity of private property.62 In 1980, the government proposed resettling 18,000 families nationally on 1.1 million hectares of land over a three year period; it revised its target to 162,000 families in 1982 (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982:66).63 As of June 1991, however, only 52,050 families had been allocated resettlement land (DERUDE 1992:3).64 As of 1996, around 55,000 families in a country of 11 million had been resettled on less than a tenth of Zimbabwe's national territory.65 The vast majority of resettlement schemes consist of smallholders farming individual family allocations.66 In contrast, the large-scale commercial farming sector, still almost exclusively white, occupies a third of the country, producing two-thirds of agricultural outputs (Christiansen 1993:1550). The former reserves now compose about two-fifths of Zimbabwe's territory. The resettlement sector, despite its small size and productivity, has freighted a great deal of symbolic capital, emerging out of a liberation struggle that promised to reclaim land expropriated by white settlers.67 Zimbabwe's first postcolonial Transitional National Development Plan refers to resettlement as occupying "a central place in the social, political and economic life of the country" (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982.66).68 In the second postcolonial plan, issued in 1986, resettlement is "one of the major programmes to attain the rural development objective" (1986:28). The following year, government stated its commitment to the World Conservation Strategy, pledging that "government will plan settlements such that they are economically viable and ecologically sustainable" while ensuring "that authorised settlers pursue sustainable and viable land use practices" (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 1987:24; see also Lopes 1996). According to Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, conservation was "not only a national duty, but an international one as well" (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 1987:ii). Also in 1987, the Brundtland Report put sustainable development and environmental concerns firmly on the global policy agenda (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). Bernard Chidzero, a member of the Brundtland Commission, was also then Zimbabwe's Minister of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development; his signature, along with that of Robert Mugabe, prominently adorns the country's first two national development plans. National and global concerns articulated with regional and localized histories in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands. In 1990, Kaerezi was home to approximately 1,000 families, around 5,500 people spread across 18,500 hectares.69 Returning from Mozambique after the war in 1980, most families settled themselves, establishing homesteads on land to which they claimed ancestral rightsa process overseen by Rekayi Tangwena and his six headman. Under Rekayi's postcolonial rule, Kaerezians asserted claims to territory over and against those of state administrators. The first government resettlement officer, who visited periodically in the early 1980s, was intimidated into leavingas one civil servant told me, "He Gime running back to the district center, wetting his pants." When Hanmer, the white owner of Gaeresi Ranch, had dispatched an African agriculturalist to peg contour ridges among labor tenants in the late 1960s, a practice first introduced by Alvord in the 1930s, he was, in the words of a 1969 Ministry of Internal Affairs report, "terrorized by the tenants and literally ran away in fear."70 In the 1990s, I encountered the unconfirmed and disputed rumor that Hanmer's hired agricultural demonstrator was later killed by the guerrillas during the war.71 The rumor, regardless of its veracity,
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offered a symbolically potent reminder of fierce Tangwena opposition to forcible interventions in rural livelihoods. After Rekayi Tangwena died in 1984 and was declared a national hero, a permanent resettlement officer moved into the scheme's newly constructed staff quarters in 1986. He supervised the siting of residential plots concentrated in densely packed linear grids modeled, as state planners in Harare told me, on dusted-off blueprints of the Land Husbandry Act and Alvord's Centralization scheme.72 The demarcation exercise went smoothly in areas of the scheme located on the former white ranch outside the Tangwena chiefdom. Settlers living outside Tangwena territory on this portion of the scheme arrived after Independence, having no previous ancestral ties to the land. As soon as the demarcation team crossed the river marking the chiefdom's boundary, however, pegs were uprooted and the hired laborers intimidated. Here, a Tangwena cultural identity, sharply territorialized, countered state attempts to implement a land use plan in the name of environmental conservation and development. Soon after the tense confrontation, the resettlement officer reported death threats from a prominent headman, lamenting that "one is bound not to feel safe when working in such a tense atmosphere where mostly traditional leadership is antagonistic to development activities."73
Maline vs. Madiro

While the state official termed the unpeopled residential grids villages, most Kaerezians called them the lines, the same term used for Alvord's Centralization policy, the linear grids of the Native Land Husbandry Act, the Native Locations in South Africa, and in the townships of Southern Rhodesia, whose spatial arrangements labor migrants had directly experienced. The Shona gloss for these linear grids simply added the pluralizing prefix ma to line, producing maline; the English resonance, if inadvertent, aptly captured popular sentiments. As the Resettlement Officer, the civil servant charged with on-site administration in Kaerezi put it, "Basically, people hate resettlement implementers." The crowded linear grids were located up to a kilometer from arable holdings. Kaerezians compared them to jails and cages. While people were penned up at night, Kaerezians argued, wild animals would freely raid their unattended crops. Many people recalled the so-called Protected Villages that Rhodesian forces built during the war; these crowded compounds, fenced and patrolled by armed guards, were part of an effort to cut guerrillas off from food supplies.74 A man born on Gaeresi Ranch in the 1930s explained his argument against the lines to me: I do not agree with the planned villages. It's giving us problems just like people living in "the keeps" [the militarized Protected Villages]. No freedom (rusununguko). No one will agree to it unless they are forced. Traditional leaders do not agree with it. I do not want to live as if I am in a Location. It does not show that we are free. We will be like prisoners. Others explicitly invoked resistance to colonial conservation policies as evidence of the lack of political legitimacy of the postcolonial state. As one man put it: "If the government told us we were going to live in lines we would not have supported them. They said we would live freely. Now the war's over and they want to put us in lines. The lines are terrible, just like being put in jail. Now we think, maybe the Rhodesian government was better." Another Kaerezian phrased his concerns with government policies two decades after his eviction from Gaeresi Ranch in the early 1970s. People in rural areas do not agree with the government because we do not see ourselves as liberated (kusununguka). We blacks have never liked to live as if we were in Locations. We don't get along well there.... You do not have rights (kodzero) in the lines. I would never want the lines. They are bad. On another occasion, one of his neighbors, a man born on Gaeresi Ranch in the early 1960s, complained that "to be settled as if we were in a Location, that cannot be. No matter how you look at it, I don't see how that will bring development." Rather than challenging government
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arguments lauding the economic advantages of Villagization, Kaerezians tended to concentrate on the historical resonances between postcolonial resettlement patterns and their colonial precursors. Metaphors of spatial containment, of limited mobility, and of incarceration wove themselves from the fabric of a frequently invoked opposition between maline and madiro (freedom). For them, the linear settlement grids were by definition antithetical to freedom from unwanted interventions. Moreover, opposition to the Villagization's spatial ordering fused moral and political objections to state policy, most often phrased in relation to memories of coercive colonial conservation policies and the ways in which resettlement plans threatened desired cultural practices. Kaerezians voiced fears that they would neither be able to propitiate their ancestral spirits properly, nor participate in rainmaking ceremonies; they said that incidents of witchcraft and adultery would greatly increase in the proposed cramped settlements. Resettlement policy was poorly suited to historically sedimented livelihood strategies. Kaerezians had located their homesteads near perennial streams and springs. Many diverted water through hand-dug irrigation channels to gardens that produced even in the dry seasonno small consideration during 1991, the eve of southern Africa's worst drought in a century. Moving into the lines meant leaving these secure waterpoints and household gardens. It would also mean living apart from matambwe (primary subsistence fields), usually planted with maize and beans, emanating out from homesteads' central cluster of huts. Villagization effectively eclipsed any chance of crop protection against wild animals, a frequent nightly occurrence particularly in the portions of the scheme bordering Nyanga National Park. The resettlement plan relied on Centralization's principles of permanent cultivation on a fixed field allocated to a single household headnow defined as married men, widows, and divorced womenthus subsuming women's landrights within patriarchal understandings of property. Moreover, it would confine agricultural activities within a single, static space. In contrast, most Kaerezians stressed the risk-averse practice of farming fragmented holdings spread across environmental micro-niches, topography, and social spaces. Fragmentation allowed farmers to take strategic advantage of highly site-specific variations in rainfall, moisture retention, soil quality, slope, and exposure to sun and wind. Complex crop rotations were distributed over varigated holdings: a mixture of maize and nitrogen-fixing beans in one field; vegetables in well fenced gardens; root crops planted in water-soaked bogs and on mountain terraces planted by women; and for those with capital for lime and fertilizer, irrigated potato production for market in yet another plot. Resettlement policy refused to acknowledge the efficacy of the diversity, dynamism, and heterogeneity of localized agricultural practices, recommending instead the market production of potatoes and beans. This would make settlers wholly reliant on buying maize meal; under Structural Adjustment policies, this staple commodity tripled in price between 1990 and 1992 while wages held constant (see Sachikonye 1995). ESAP, (Economic Structural Adjustment Policy), seeped into daily dialogue from radios and newspapers. ESAP was personified as an avenging, malignant spirit and a wild animalprovoking malevolent images: "Beware ESAPit will eat you" (Chenjerai ESAPIchamudya). Those with secondary school educations joked that the acronym stood for "Economic Suicide for African Peoples."75 This formulation deftly blended biting sarcasm, finesse of the English language, and a telling critique of Structural Adjustment's devastating socio-economic impact.
administrative optics and a "special case"

In contrast to Kaerezian concerns, the government's resettlement plan lauded the development advantages of provisioning concentrated settlements with infrastructureprimarily access roads for marketing and boreholes for water, which the goverment claimed would be drilled after settlers entered the so-called villages. Rather than recognizing resistance to resettlement
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as being based upon astute assessments of limited state capacities to deliver promised infrastructure, officials consistently invoked images of haphazard African settlement, an innate stubbornness manifested in opposition to the rationality of modernization and development. In March 1991, a Ministry of Local Government official voiced his frustration with the slow pace of resettlement implementation in Kaerezi, unwittingly echoing concerns voiced by colonial administrators almost a century before: Those people, the Tangwena, are stubborn. They refuse to cooperate. There are many government officials who don't want to do projects there because they know local people don't cooperate. They don't want development. Sometimes people need to be forced to develop. Take resettlementall the advantages of moving into systematic villages with infrastructure. You can't have development with all those scattered homesteads. Government officials sometimes glossed the Kaerezian's refusal to cooperate with government development efforts as a fusion of cultural essentialismthe stubbornness of the Tangwenaand the political capital they commanded as followers of Rekayi Tangwena, the celebrated anti-colonial chief whose name is affixed to a prominent avenue in Harare. In government officials' view, politics was an obstacle to the implementation of development. A senior Department of Rural Development planner, speaking in June 1992, offered an assessment in his high-rise Harare office: The political will is not there to move Kaerezi people into linear villages. The problem in some cases is that technical people haven't taken into account how the people were living on the land. The Kaerezi people, I think you know, are very stubborn people. They are mistaking our government for enemies and that may be why government hasn't recognized their traditional settlement patterns as acceptable. Kaerezi people have always claimed ownership of those properties. If government had in the first instance given the people other land, we wouldn't now have these problems. We allowed people to occupy the land they believed to be their own; that is the source of the problem. We see it as a resettlement scheme; they see it as traditional settlement in a Communal Area under their Chief.76 Civil servants charged with administering resettlement policy on the ground in Kaerezi sometimes voiced frustration with the absence of political will to implement Villagization in Central Government circles. Kaerezi's Resettlement Officer, who lived in staff quarters on the scheme, complained that political imperatives countered on-site administration: "In Kaerezi Scheme it seems the Department [of Rural Development], in particular Head Office and some political heavyweights. . . continue to sit on the fence regarding the villagisation programme."77 After a tense meeting in Kaerezi held to discuss opposition to Villagization in 1991, the District Administrator criticized the slow pace oi resettlement: "You need both the carrot and the stick. With the Tangwena, it has only been the carrot and the carrot. When you don't have the stick, nothing happens." This man's frustration was shared by a representative from the Provincial Department of Rural Development, the state agency overseeing resettlement, who reported on a 1990 Kaerezi meeting where "the District Administrator addressed the issue of village demarcation and its advantages for development." At the time, the government official had hoped Villagization could be legitimated by the security threats of cross-border incursions into the area by RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance). The official chronicled government efforts to defend "the advantages of planned settlement" put forward by representatives from the Army, the Ministry of Local Government, the Department of Rural Development, and other visiting dignitaries. Tersely, he observed that "all met with adamant opposition." Citing the numerous meetings held in Kaerezi to discuss Villagization, the official concluded that "it would appear a waste of manpower and financial resources to pursue the issue further without coercion. . . . The people are just unwilling to accept the idea of villages let alone the implementation." 78 If these reactions suggest a range of government responses to Kaerezian opposition to resettlement policy, they also signal a shared understanding of the wider political context shaping development efforts in the homeland of a nationalist hero. A Department of Rural
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Development planner who had worked in Kaerezi during the early 1980s, speaking during a 1992 interview in Harare, recalled orders issued a decade earlier: I was worried about resettlement policy as applied elsewhere. I was told by the Director [of the Department of Rural Development] that the Tangwena were the only people who 100 percent didn't cooperate with the Smith Government. Everybody else did to some extent... but Rekayi didn't and therefore I need not worry about policy applying here. This was a very special case. Rekayi had, of course, direct access to the then Prime Minister [and later president, Robert Mugabe]. I was also told that the people themselves had direct access, and if I did anything wrong I could be quite certain that they would board a bus and go directly to the Prime Minister's Office. Kaerezi's status as a special case was a frequently repeated government explanation for the anomalies of policy and their lack of smooth implementation in the scheme. In January, 1991, the Nyanga District Administrator explained, "Tangwena people epitomized symbolic resistance to the colonial government. At Independence, it was almost impossible for government not to support the chief. Tangwena was a special case. Our problem has always been defining just how special." Kaerezi's historical exceptionalism also presented obstacles deemed to be "cultural" by those administering development policies. Government officials, well aware of Kaerezian's political capital generated by their ties to Zimbabwean nationalism, phrased concerns about the wrath of ancestral spirits they risked in pursuit of their administrative duties. A Department of Rural Development planner recalled attending a 1986 meeeting where Kaerezians had voiced vehement opposition to government plans to construct a Rural Service Center. Among the reasons explicitly cited was the resentment of increased government surveillance. Chief Rekayi Tangwena had just spoken out "against the projects that were being planned" when the Minister of Lands, Moven Mahachi, was interrupted by a spirit medium (svikiro), who then became possessed. The planner relates: She went into a trance and for about twenty minutes made these INCREDIBLE noises which were quite sort of spine-chilling. The whole meeting came to a dead stop. Nobody spoke. Nobody moved.... She sided with Chief Tangwena against resettlement policy and all its rules. She spoke . . . she was supporting him against all that resettlement had brought and against the projects also.... During the time when she made these noises and was in a trance and spoke, I just observed everybody, all the actors that I had been working with and I could predict very accurately as to whom among the government workers would still work with me. If government administrators admitted that politics often trumped the smooth implementation of development in Kaerezi, it was not discursively disarticulated from culture. Rather, struggles over resettlement implementation in Kaerezi suggest that culture, politics, and development were each critical sites of strugglecontested terms whose deployments were marshalled in pursuit of competing agendas. At stake in debates over the legitimacy of postcolonial interventions in Kaerezi was precisely how these three terms were stiched together and linked to perceptions of the unfulfilled promises of the national liberation struggle.
"suffering for the land": the cultural politics of entitlement

In the early 1990s, many Kaerezians marshaled memories of their contributions to the liberation struggle in defense of local autonomy and freedom from unwanted government interventions, including interventions glossed as development. A widow whose husband, a war hero, had been a personal friend of Mugabe, recalled the president's escape to Mozambique through Kaerezi territory in 1974 with Rhodesian Security Forces in close pursuit: "When they were going, I gave Mugabe a bag made from tree bark so that he would come and liberate (kutora) Zimbabwe. . . . The government said the Tangwena people have fought so they should live as they used to live, madiro [freely, without unwanted interference]. Rekayi came and told
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us that the government said we should live madiro. . . . Rekayi and Mugabe moved together so they were good friends in the new government." One of her neighbors, a man born in Kaerezi in the late 1920s echoed, "The government knows it is through the Tangwena people that Mugabe and Tekere [another prominent nationalist] escaped death. . . .They were escorted to Mozambique since the Tangwena people were friendly with FRELIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique]." In 1992, he complained that Mugabe "is now forgetting the people who brought him to that position. We guided him through dangerous areas." Another Tangwena elder similarly lamented government's failure to fully appreciate his contributions to the liberation struggle: "I accompanied Mugabe to safety, and I sustained his survival (ndichimuponesa). But they [the government] don't even see us now. I am not being handled well." Bitterly, he reflected, "We were told that the second war is now for development (budiriro).79 The country, we seized it by fighting, but we cannot even educate our children." This sentiment echoed a widely voiced complaint about the escalating cost of school fees. Yet another Kaerezian argued that, after the war, "Rekayi was given this land because of his bravery (ushingi). . . . He was a brave man because he did not fear whites." Government officials, too, sometimes contributed to the understanding of Kaerezi as a political reward given by the state, the property's postcolonial owner, to those who deserved the land by virtue of their contribution to the nationalist liberation struggle. A former Department of Rural Development planner who worked in Kaerezi in the 1980s explained, in 1992, that "giving them the land, that was Tangwena's due reward." In this reasoning, deployed at times by state officials and Kaerezians, the symbolic capital earned through historical contributions to the national liberation struggle converted into a postcolonial political entitlement to land rights. For Kaerezians, such claims carved out a localized selective sovereignty, objecting to unwanted government interventions in rural livelihoods, arguing for autonomy over the spatial practices of land allocation, settlement patterns, and the siting of fields, residences, and grazing areas. Significantly, however, these same claims cited the postcolonial government's failure to deliver on the development promises of the national liberation struggle: universal access to free education, better infrastructure, improved access to markets, and increased standards of living. While Kaerezians voiced fierce opposition to state interventions that negated, in their view, land rights acquired through historical struggle, they simultaneously criticized the failure of the postcolonial government to deliver the benefits of development, modernity, and progress. Many Kaerezians phrased these claims through the cultural idiom of "suffering for territory" (kushingirira nyika), fusing political and moral rights acquired through historical struggle.80 While Kaerezians cited their contributions to the nationalist war to legitimate postcolonial land rights, many differentiated what they called "the Tangwena War" (Hondo ye Tangwena) against colonial evictions from the national liberation struggle (Chimurenga). Resettlement politics thus hinged, crucially, on how the contructions of identity, forged through territorialized resource struggles, articulated with the claims of Zimbabwean nationalism. Nyikaglossed as "territory," "country," "chieftainship," and "land"represented a simultaneously symbolic and material terrain on which the cultural politics of identity, territory, and community were played out. When Rekayi died in 1984, battles over where his body would be buried were animated by these same tensions. Rekayi was buried at Heroes Acre national monument in Harare in a televised ceremony, his legacy thus claimed by the nation-state. In the 1990s, a small Tangwena faction asserted Rekayi should have been buried in Kaerezi at the sacred chiefly graveyard. Some still resented the nationalist appropriation of the grounded struggles Rekayi embodied, holding the postcolonial state accountable for this cultural and political affront. The District Administrator was well aware of the tensions between the territorial claims of a Tangwena cultural identity and those of nationalism, telling me, "In Kaerezi, they have to define certain interestsare they local or national?" He argued that "national interests" justified the
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use of "necessary coercive mechanisms" marshaled in the name of "conservation" and "development." In the early 1990s, the District Administrator elaborated, this logic had dictated the displacement of those inhabiting the site of the Osborne Dam, a major development project outside of Mutare, the provincial capital. The material manifestation of destroyed homes, displaced farmers, and state imperatives were well known to Kaerezians and administrators alike. The imagined community of the nation (Anderson 1983), in the District Administrator's reasoning, trumped the articulated interests of the local. Moreover, the administrator's own transnational routes influenced his elaboration of the economic and ecological advantages of resettlement policy. In our conversations, he frequently drew on his biology training at Syracuse University to explain the principles of soil erosion, siltation rates, and river ecology. In his understanding, the global discourse of sustainable development needed to fuse sound scientific principles with attention to social equity, defined by state policy as the national interest.
selling out and the politics of location

In July 1991, these concerns informed the District Administrator's letter threatening eviction to all families who refused to occupy their assigned residential plot within the scheme's linear settlement grids. Shortly after receiving the letter, residents called for a meeting with the chief, voicing their concerns. At the public gathering, he proclaimed unequivocally, "I told you long ago I don't want the lines in my territory (nyika). . . . Mugabe said 'We bought that area for you, Tangwena. Do whatever you want with your people.' So anyone who I see moving into the lines, I will chase that person from this area because I was given that right by the government." For good measure, he added, "I am more powerful than the Resettlement Officer so I will go to Nyanga and talk to the District Administrator." A prominent headman and ally of the chief harangued the gathering for capitulating to government demands to enter the linear grids under penalty of eviction. The elder alluded to British financial backing for the resettlement program, claiming that Zimbabwean officials had received hefty financial rewards for "moving people into the lines." In a scolding tone, he raised his voice: "You are troubling us. What kind of people are you? You don't know development [he lingered on the English word]. Your job is to be given dried fish (matemba) and then you will move into the lines. In this territory (nyika), we don't want the lines . . . . Don't move into the lines." The image of dried fish, a store-bought commodity that often arrived with visiting relatives or the return of migrant workers on holidays, clearly signaled the products of an outside constructed against the local. The implication of being duped by this bribe resonated with the idiom of "selling out" (kutengesa), an expression commonly used for traitors to the liberation struggle who collaborated with the Rhodesian regime. The headman's demand not to sell out in the postcolonial period invoked a cultural logic that refused the commoditization of Kaerezian territory into landed property to be owned and controlled by outsiders. The reasoning applied both to the colonial owners of Gaeresi Ranch and, after Independence, civil servants charged with administering state property, designated as Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme. The headman's allegation that the assembled Kaerezians did not "understand development" implies that they were surrendering self-determination, capitulating instead to an externally conceived agenda for socio-spatial order. Yet these struggles also revealed profound tensions among Kaerezians over opposition to Villagization in the charged context of resettlement administration. The new chief's edict forbidding Kaerezians to enter the lines invoked a problematic cultural logic. He claimed sovereignty over the landscape by virtue of having been given an area purchased by the government. His right to evict those who defied the dictates of his rule, he argued, had also been given to him by the state. Both claims, by relying on the state for political legitimacy, ran counter to assertions of Kaerezi as a chieftainship, the inalienable inheritance (nhaka) of a
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Tangwena legacy. The new chief's reasoning accepted the commoditization of land fiercely opposed by Rekayi Tangwena and his followers during evictions from Gaeresi Ranch. Many still recalled in the 1990s that Rekayi's refusal to capitulate to Rhodesian rule meant that he never received a salary until after Independence. His successor, Magwendere, received a salary from the time of his initial government appointment as an Acting Chief in 1986. Many Kaerezians suspected the new chief's motives for seeking the office, disputing his legitimacy. They noted that the new chief's government salary made him a civil servant and hence an agent of the postcolonial state. His legitimacy was further compromised by his devout membership in the Apostolic Faith and his resultant refusal to brew beer and perform the rites of ancestral propitiation his constituents viewed as necessary to chiefly rule. Moreover, as many Kaerezians pointed out in the early 1990s, the new chief had not participated in their historical struggle for landrights on Gaeresi Ranch. During this formative period of Tangwena identity, he had lived in Honde Valley, a major tea-growing region more than a full day's hike from Kaerezi's southern border. This distance from Kaerezi's struggles was an issue for some people. In 1991, a man who had been seized by Rhodesian officials during a raid on Gaeresi Ranch in 1972 still harbored vivid memories of being separated from his family for more than a year during their flight to Mozambique. Recalling the evictions from the colonial ranch, he bitterly resented the newchief's assertions of political authority within Kaerezi: "While we were suffering for territory, the new chief was comfortable seated elsewhere, eating yams." These historical politics of location also shaped reactions to the District Administrator's letter threatening evictions from Kaerezi Extension. The new chief lived far from the affected area, near the border of Mozambique. Some extension residents argued that the new chief's grandstanding was an attempt to buttress his own political legitimacy among followers with little risk of repercussion to himself. At the meeting called to discuss the governmment's threats, one of the letter's recipients, a man in his seventies who had been evicted from Gaeresi Ranch, rose to respond to the chief's edict and the headman's harangue: "We don't want the lines, but we must arrange how to respond to this letter. The Chief has said he will resolve this issue before June 30 [the date stipulated in the letter by which recipients were demanded to reside within the planned settlements]. However, if June 30 arrives and the government evicts us, we will come to your home, our chief [gesturing toward the chief]. If you don't then give us a place to settle, we can chop each other to pieces with axes." Another man who had been prominent in defiance of colonial evictions from Gaeresi Ranch stood and challenged the chief: "If you come late with an answer to our case, you'll see huts erected in those lines." These same tensions animated debates over a proposed Protected Area extending from the adjacent Nyanga National Park into a portion of the resettlement scheme. Settlers were to receive income from a trout fishing concession on the headwaters of the Kaerezi River flowing through the scheme. Over the course of two years, residents had attended meetings, listened to workshops on ecotourism and sustainable development sponsored by Zimbabwe Trust, a Harare-based NGO (Non-Governmental Organization), and heard National Parks officials speak of the possibility of securing European Union (then European Economic Community) funding for the project. Conflicts arose over whether the proposed project would usher in expanded state surveillance over agricultural practices in the valley surrounding the river and bring with it, as a conditionally, Villagization. At a major meeting to discuss the issue, a man in his sixties who had been evicted from Gaeresi Ranch and whose solidarity with Rekayi Tangwena was well known, pointedly declared: If the Tangwena people see someone talking with an outsider, they think that person is trying to sell out the territory (kutengcw nyika). No, it's only development (budiriro). Grinding mills are far from here and it's a burden for our women, so it's good to have a community project where we can have a grinding mill; everyone will benefit.81
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Here, the elder sharply distinguishes development from surrendering control of the landscape and its inhabitants to outsiders and a logic of commoditization. The prohibitive cost of store-bought maize meal, increased by the inflationary spiral of Structural Adjustment policies, underscored the dangers of over-reliance on markets to the detriment of subsistence maize production. Moreover, the elder's argument appealed across gender lines. Women carried dried maize long distances over rugged and mountainous terrain to reach one of the few local diesel powered grinding mills, or ground the grain by hand through a labor intensive process. A nearby mill would greatly reduce women's labor, or at least allowed for debate, within domestic politics, over how the newly "free" labor would be allocated. Most women saw this as an opportunity to increase their autonomy over labor allocation, an opinion shared by some husbands. Other partriarchs saw this as a chance to capture their wives' labor for other purposes. The prospect of a local mill thus brought together a consensus out of competing interests. Crucially, this result emerged from locally inflected contestations over the meanings and practices of development and politics.82
conclusions
At times, the apparatus linking the actions of state administrators, planners, and bureaucrats in Zimbabwe effectively depoliticized technocratic development interventions. But the historical struggles of Kaerezians for land rights, the legacies of evictions in the Eastern Highlands, and challenges to the legitimacy of the postcolonial state also reworked development through a highly localized and contentious cultural politics of territory, identity, and entitlements that have all shaped the contours of development. This is not to romanticize resistance to state power, nor to understate the postcolonial government's capacity to marshall force in pursuit of its agenda. Zimbabwean squatters have witnessed burnt huts, destroyed crops, and forced evictions at the hands of postcolonial officials, all in the name of national development. Yet populist sentiments have also harnessed the promises of material infrastructure and social improvements, in effect demanding development from the postcolonial government. They simultaneously opposed Villagization, the spatial reordering of livelihoods under the auspices of state development policy.83 Instead of sweeping assertions about the determinative effects of a univocal discursive formation, the Kaerezi case suggests that development can appear as both a "discourse of control" and a "discourse of entitlement" animated by populist rhetoric (Cooper and Packard 1998:4).84 To claim development as a right, as some Kaerezians assert, and to argue for the selective benefits of specific development projectstarred roads, schools, clinics, or diesel-powered grinding millsdoes not emanate from the false consciousness of Third World subjects duped by Western hegemony.85 As Gupta (1998a) argues, development, a "powerful tool of domination in the postcolonial era . . . has also been appropriated and reshaped by subaltern groups," particularly in the contexts of Third World agrarian populism. Yet these diverse social movements, just as the positions staked out by various Kaerezians, contain their own "series of exclusions and repressions" (Gupta 1998a:320). The complex and shifting cultural politics of development in Kaerezi, I argue, only become understandable through fine-grained ethnographic and historical attention to conflicts over tradition, legitimate authority, and political rights. An emphasis on discursive practice and cultural politics helps overcome "the problems of persisting with a theoretical framework which simplifies politics and political agency into 'development' and 'resistance'" (Baviskar 1995:28).86 Instead of conceiving of development as overdetermining the shape of politics, I have tried to demonstrate how their discursive boundaries are reworked and contested through grounded livelihood struggles. This entailed a shift from an emphasis on a single, monolithic discourse toward the discursive practices and micro-techniques through which specific interventions have been imposed, opposed, and
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fought over in Kaerezi. My metaphor of a crucible, rather than a machine, conceives of development politics as a complex articulation whose outcomes are not guaranteed or foreclosed but are rather historically contingent. As Hall (1986a) notes, articulation carries within it the twin concepts of joining and enunciation.87 An articulation both brings together disparate elements and, in the process of assemblage, gives that constellation a particular form and potential force. The shape of this provisional unity, the effectiveness of the linkages established among its elements, and the impact it will have on cultural, social, and political processes is historically contingent, not rigidly determined by an underlying structure or discursive formation. Thus conceived, articulation offers a means for understanding the emergent assemblages of development in historically and geographically specific contexts. In such a vision, the cultural politics of development unfolds across what Gramsci termed "the terrain of the conjunctural" (1971:178). The complex, historically contingent contours of agrarian politics in Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme during the 1990s underscore "the necessary 'openness' of historical development to practice and struggle" (Hall 1986b:43). An emphasis on practice in Zimbabwe's development politics, moreover, highlights the simultaneity of symbolic and material struggles over land, legitimacy, and the legacies of the liberation war. As Haraway aptly asserts, "There is no gap between materiality and semiosis; the meaning making processes and the materiality of the world are dynamic, historical, contingent, specific" (1995:509). Rather than opposing discursive practice and political economy, my approach seeks to integrate them, joining a historical perspective on national and regional development policies with an ethnographic perspective on agrarian micro-politics in a particular locale. For state administrators and a differentiated constellation of Kaerezians, development has long been a contested terrain, marshaled for competing agendas. Since independence in 1980, a postcolonial politics of memory deployed the idiom of "suffering for territory" within a chieftainship, opposing civil servants' attempts to implement government Villagization policy. This historical consciousness emerged from Kaerezians' defiance of colonial evictions, flight to Mozambique, and eventual return to a landscape understood as a political entitlement earned through communal struggle. Alliances and consensus, when present, emerged through what Mallon terms "communal hegemony," processes "understood as the contestation, legitimation, and redefinition of power relations and cultural meanings" that are the "product of complex articulations of interests, discourses, and perspectives" (1995:65). As smallholders demanded recognition of landrights from the postcolonial state, they staked claims to the relative sovereignty of their nyika (territory), weaving a historical chieftainship into the cultural fabric of postcolonial nationalism. In the 1990s, Kaerezian's traversed a fractal landscape: a chieftainship overlay a rainmaking territory and, in turn, both occupy the ground of a former colonial ranch now constructed as a postcolonial administrative entity, Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme. Moreover, competing cultural practices carved out alternative understandings of place, authority, and land rights that underscore "the coexistence of multiple historicities within any particular locality" (Feierman 1990:29). Women's agricultural practices literally inscribed their claims beyond the reach of state and patriarchal control, echoing the assertion of the right (kodzero) to settle freely (kugara madiro) in scattered homesteads opposed to the spatial order of resettlement policy. Gendered understandings of the potential effects of Villagization, the disputed authority of a new chief who sought to assert his sovereignty by issuing an edict to defy government eviction threats, and variant migrant labor experiences all contribute to the fracturing of historicity. Despite these differences, however, Kaerezians articulated a largely shared cultural idiom of "suffering for the land," asserting defiance of colonial evicitions as formative of identity and claims to territorial entitlement. While these micro-politics and their historical sedimentations in Kaerezi are highly localized, they are not incarcerated in place, hermetically sealed from external influences.88 Rather, they
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suggest the "accumulated history of a place, with that history itself imagined as the product of layer upon layer oi different sets of linkages, both local and to the wider world" (Massey 1994:156). The simultaneity of symbolic and material struggle over the discursive practices of development constitute the very boundaries of locality, deployed in contending visions of legitimate criteria for defining insiders and outsiders. Those who participated in "suffering for the land," understood as a highly territorialized practice, included labor tenants who were also long-distance labor migrants, traveling between Kaerezi and cities as distant as Cape Town. Struggles that were specifically localized were never simply local, always connected to the cultural formation and political legacies of anti-colonial resistance, Zimbabwean nationalism, and the contested legitimacy of the postcolonial state. Methodologically, this suggests the need for multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1998), connecting Kaerezian contexts with administrative practices in Nyanga District Center, elsewhere in the province, and within central government offices in Harare. Rather than simply adding a deeper historical perspective, temporalizing development discourse prior to 1945, however, my goal has been to demonstrate the articulation of postcolonial development interventions with the spatial imperatives of colonial administration. In Zimbabwe, the spatiality of administrative strategies of disciplining African populations remains key to understanding the "sedimented effects and legacies of colonial power" in the postcolonial period (Dirks 1992:7). Struggles over African spatial practicesover the geographical and agro-ecological location of Native Reserves; over the ordering of grid-like linear settlements; over the micro-practices of agriculture and the siting of fields and pastures; over mobility, migration, and tenancyreveal the complex politics that contested colonial rule (see Cooper and Stoler 1997). This contentious history cautions against assuming a homogenizing saturation or uniform effect of colonial governmentality. As Thomas asserts, "government is not a unitary work but heterogeneous and partial, and moreover... the meanings engendered by hegemonic codes and narratives do not exist in hermetic domains but are placed at risk, revalued and distorted, through being enacted and experienced" (1994:4). In postcolonial Zimbawbe, Kaerezians have reworked government development agendas through their daily practices, asserting alternative cultural visions to challenge state Villagization efforts. If development is purged of a discursive determinism, its myriad cultural practices viewed ethnographically and situated contextually, the formation of a development era cannot be definitively asserted as emerging from an originary moment in the post-World War II Truman Doctrine. In contrast, colonial governmentality, the historical patterns of a regional political economy, and the dynamic formations of identity, territory, and sovereignty all shape development's contours.89 The challenge of a critical anthropology remains understanding how development and politics are woven together in particular localities, differentially deployed, and given form and substance through cultural practices. Rather than seeing development as determined by a monolithic and stable discursive formation that forecloses inevitable outcomes, Kaerezi's shifting terrain of struggle points to a politics of contingency and contestation. Far from arriving fully formed, an artifact dispatched by the distant West, the disputed formations of development, in all their malleable guises, are forged through the crucible of cultural politics, reworked through livelihood struggles.
notes
Acknowledgments. Field research in Zimbabwe from 1990-92 was supported by a Fulbright Fellowship, the Social Science Research Council, the U.S. Department of Education, and the Institute of Intercultural Studies. The Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, generously hosted my research affiliation. Kaerezians, as well as Nyanga District government officials, kindly tolerated an anthropologist among squatters, for which I remain grateful. A Ciriacy-Wantrup Post-doctoral fellowship provided crucial funding for writing, and for fieldwork in 1996. Many thanks for the critical comments on earlier versions of
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this article offered by Arun Agrawal, Bruce Braun, James Ferguson, Michael Goldman, Ramachandra Guha, Akhil Gupta, Gillian Hart, Tania Murray Li, James Murombedzi, Charles Piot, Matthew Sparke, Orin Starn, and Michael Watts. I am also grateful to the previous editor of American Ethnologist, Michael Herzfeld, and to the anonymous reviewers who offered thoughtful critiques that sharpened the argument. 1. FRELIMO, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, waged a guerrilla war against Portuguese colonial rule, attaining independence in 1974. 2. These and all subsequent translations from ChiManyika, a dialect of Shona, are my own. English terms embedded within Shona syntax are designated by italics. The archival sources referred to in this article are as follows: NDAFNyanga District Administrator's Files, Nyanga; ZNAZimbabwe National Archives, Harare; and ZNROZimbabwe National Records Office, Harare. 3. NDAF, Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme. 25 July, 1991, Kaerezi Resettlement Officer to Regional Rural Development Officer, Department of Rural Development, Mutare. "Notices Issued to Residents to Physically Occupy the Demarcated Residential Stands (Kaerezi Extension)." 4. The verb kubudirira is usually glossed as cultural and social "improvement," "progress," "advancement," or, most frequently, in its noun form of budiriro, as "development." Kubuda, from which the term derives, covers the semantic territory of "emergence," "coming out," "rising," and "growth." 5. Rather than using the cumbersome convention of placing deve/opmenf within scare quotes, my argument seeks to destabilize a single, monolithic meaning for the term. Occasionally, however, the scare quotes are used to highlight the term's constructedness. 6. See Foucault for an elaboration of the term governmentality. "the ensemble formed by the instutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics" that inform complex forms of power regulating a subject population (1979:20). Pels (1997) and Scott (1995) offer helpful formulations of colonial governmentality. 7. My choice to explore the cultural politics of development precludes any extensive engagement with the vast anthropological literature on involuntary resettlement. See in particular Colson's 1971 classic study of forced resettlement resulting from the Kariba Dam, Scudder and Colson's 1982 influential framework for the analysis of social displacement, and the collections edited by Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982 and Cernea and Guggenheim 1993. 8. Here, I agree with Escobar's assertion that anthropologists and other analysts have tended to "overlook the ways in which development operates as an arena of cultural contestation and identity construction" (1995:15). 9. Ferguson's The Anti-Politics Machine offers a theoretical model for explaining the regularity of discursive and material effects of a particular development apparatus in Lesotho during a specific historical moment (1990:xiv-xv, 29). Few readers, however, note the ethnographic and historical specificity that informs his project, which, I argue, cuts against the grain of his often-quoted theoretical bookends. 10. Slater argues "not that the economic sphere has to be expunged from our investigation, but that economism, as a vision and a mode of investigation, must be abandoned" (1987:279; emphasis in original). A decade ago, Apter suggested that "a common developmental discourse must begin by 'deprivileging' political economy" (1987:15). Escobar, in contrast, describes his perspective as "post-structuralist-oriented political economy" (1995:18). For Escobar, "the economy is not only, or even principally, a material entity. It is above all a cultural production, a way of producing human subjects and social orders of a certain kind" (1995:59). See Leys 1996 and Moore 1995 for helpful historical overviews of how political economy perspectives have conceived development. 11. Significantly, Foucault sought to "analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation" (1978:90). For extended analyses of Foucauldian perspectives in development contexts, see DuBois 1991 and Manzo 1991. 12. In this formulation, the determinism of a previous economism is displaced by what treads closely to a rigid discursive determinism where "the rules of the game . . . must be followed" (Escobar 1995:41). Escobar here builds on what Foucault termed "discipline": a "specific technology of power" that "produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (1977:194). 13. For reviews of the institutionalization of development anthropology, see Escobar 1991, Ferguson 1998, Hoben 1982, and Little and Painter 1995. 14. The Third World, a historically specific formation rather than a transhistorical geographical category, emerged in relation to discourses of development and the Cold War. For a helpful account of the term's genealogy, see Escobar 1995 and Pletsch 1981. 15. Two of the most prominent anthropological studies (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990) recognize that discursive practices are necessarily material in their effects. Ferguson follows Foucault in speaking about development as a "a conceptual 'apparatus'in order to suggest that what we are concerned with is not an abstract set of philosophical or scientific propositions, but an elaborate contraption that does something" (1990:xv; emphasis in original). His concern is thus with "what effects they end up producing" (xvi). For Escobar, "discourse is not the expression of thought; it is a practice, with conditions, rules, and historical transformations" (1995:216). While Ferguson and Escobar share a Foucauldian framework, a critical difference in their influential books remains one of method. Escobar advocates the need for "in-depth ethnographies of development situations" (1995:52), yet that is not his own project. Ferguson (1990), in contrast, combines discursive analysis with ethnography and regional history, bounding his object in space and time.
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16. The distinction between rhetoric and reality undergirds much of the literature on "development narratives" (e.g., Roe 1991; see also Chambers 1974:84). While several studies have engaged narrative approaches while attending to grounded livelihood struggles and cultural practices (notably, Fairhead and Leach 1995 and Hoben 1995), the literature's primary focus on textual readings of policy documents elides attention to cultural politics and discursive practices. 17. Escobar explicates Dorothy Smith's notion of "documentary reality" in reference to the "materiality of the planners' practice . . . intimately tied to the crafting of documents" (1995:146). As a result, "planners take their practice to be a true description of reality, uninfluenced by their own relation to that reality" (1995:121). Overall, critical perspectives on development are lacking in ethnographies that focus on the actual practices of planners. 18. Bassett (1993), Ferguson (1990), and Mitchell (1991) represent important counters to this tendency. Escobar demonstrates a sensitivity to these tensions as well: "at the local level . . . the concepts of development and modernity are resisted, hybridized with local forms, transformed, or what have you; they have, in short, a cultural productivity that needs to be better understood" (1995:51). Similarly, he alludes to the "extreme heterogeneity of peasant reality" (1995:145) and suggests that "the micropolitics surrounding the production, circulation, and utilization of development knowledge is poorly understood" (1995:148). Yet it is precisely the complex cultural politics through which development interventions articulate with localized livelihood practices that are left unexplored in Encountering Deve/opmenr (Escobar 1995). 19. As Stuart Hall argues, "The West' is a historical, not a geographical, construct" (1992:277; emphasis in original). Cooper and Packard criticize "postmodernist" perspectives on development for a tendency to "locate the power-knowledge regime in a vaguely defined 'West'" (1998:3; cf. Berger 1995). 20. Sachs argues that "from the start, development's hidden agenda was nothing else than the Westernization of the world. The result has been a tremendous loss of diversity" (1992:3-4). Latouche (1996:xii) deploys the image of a "Western steamroller" and the "drive for planetary uniformity" while Manzo evokes the threat of the legacy of the Black Consciousness Movement "being drowned by the global tidal wave of normalization/modernization crashing across the political wasteland of South Africa" (1995:231). 21. As Cowen and Shenton (1995:29) note, five of the twenty essays in Sachs's (1992) Development Dictionary invoke Truman's 1949 speech. Pew analysts of development, however, explore the historical continuities in U.S. Foreign Policy represented by the Truman Doctrine (see DePorte 1979; Leffler 1992). 22. Escobar similarly opens the influential Encountering Development with Truman's speech, which "initiated a new era in the understanding and management of world affairs" (1995:3). Elsewhere, Escobar has emphasized the "historical baggage" of planning techniques, "central to development" which have been "inextricably linked to the rise of Western modernity since the end of the 18th century" (1992b:132). Escobar's focus on the linkages between U.S. foreign policy and Latin American concerns orients his periodization. For interesting perspectives exploring the deeper historical formations shaping development discourse in Latin America, see Berger 1995, Love 1996, and Slater 1989. Love decenters North America as the privileged originary cite of development by comparing Brazil and Romania, arguing that "East Central Europe constituted a 'proto'-Third World in which the problems of economic and social backwardness were first confronted and formally theorized, against a range of development options, which included Soviet socialism" (1996:214). See also Stahl's 1993 related argument about modernization and developmentalism in 19th-century Romania and Halperin's 1997 exploration of dependency and development within Europe. 23. Escobar traces out a more nuanced yet related logic, arguing that "even if the roots of development are to be found in colonialism, 19th-century ideas of progress, and more generally, Western European modernity, something drastic happened in the early post-World War II period when an entirely new discourse, 'development,' emerged" (1991:679). See Escobar 1984-85,1988,1995 for further elaborations of the historical emergence of this discursive formation. I emphasize this larger corpus in great part to counter the allegation that "Escobar's approach to development is as ahistorical and depoliticized as the discourse of development organizations and their agents" (Little and Painter 1995:602). 24. Cowen and Shenton also note that, in 1937, the governor of Nigeria, addressing the Royal Empire Society in London, declared that "The exploitation theory... is dead and the development theory has taken its place" (1996:7). Havmden and Meredith (1993) offer a historically contextualized exploration of colonialism and development, focusing on patterns emerging in the late 19th century. See the collection of essays in Dewey and Hopkins 1978 for a related formulation. 25. Campbell-Bannerman, Britain's Liberal Prime Minister, responded in 1905 to Chamberlain's call for development: "We desire to develop our underdeveloped estates in this country; to colonise our own country: to give the farmer greater freedom and greater security" (quoted in Cowen and Shenton 1996:7). 26. Zimbabwe National Archives (ZNA) File: ZBj 3/1/1. 1944. W. M. Munro, writing on behalf of the Godlonton Commission, Report on Native Production and Trade Commission. Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. 27. Rist (1997) and Watts (1993) similarly stress the deep historical continuities among theological and scientific concepts informing formulations of development. 28. Sir Frederick Lugard, the British governor general of Nigeria from 1907 to 1919 and a member of the Permanent Mandate Commission, articulated his influential Dual Mandate position in the 1920s, drawing on colonial contexts in India and Africa (see Lugard 1922). In Lugard's view, colonial powers were "trustees for civilization" exercising a "dual mandate": as trustees on the one hand for the development of the resources of these lands, on behalf of the congested populations whose lives and industries depend on a share of the bounties with which nature has so
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abundantly endowed the tropics. On the other hand they exercise a "sacred trust" on behalf of the peoples who inhabit the tropics and who are so pathetically dependent on their guidance. [Lugard 1926:58] 29. In India, Gadgil and Gupta suggest that "the standard assumptions of modernization theory animated the influential policy statements of Visveswaraya as early as 1920 (1993:185). Chandra (1991) echoes this view, demonstrating the continuities of Indian economic development forged in the late 19th century with their manifestations in the 1930s and 1940s. Henry Maine assessed India's "progress" in 1887: "Taking the standards of advance which are employed to test the progress of Western countries, there is no country in Europe which, according to those criteria, and regard being had to the point of departure, has advanced during the same period more rapidly and farther than British I n d i a . . . . [There has occurred] a process of continuous moral and material improvement" (quoted in Chandra 1991:83). 30. Young notes the influential position of Albert Saurraut, French colonial minister from 1920-24, who advocated the notion of "'mise en valeur' as a duty of the international community" (1986:30). Cooper explores French and British colonial policy in Africa, stressing the "imperial context of development" (1998:65). Berger stresses the "liberal developmentalism" of the 1930s and its "continuity with the British Empire's white man's burden, the French mission civilisatrice, and the racist paternalism of the pre-1945 U.S. imperial state in the Americas and beyond" (1995:718; emphasis in original), lleto (1988) explores similar continuities in the Philippines, concentrating on the consolidation of particular forms of colonial power in the late 19th century. 31. A striking irony pervades prominent Foucauldian perspectives on development discourse that emphasize the Truman doctrine as an originary moment of a new era and novel discursive formation. While Foucault's elaboration of "effective history" stressed discontinuities and disruptions, it explicitly "rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for 'origins'" (1984:77). Foucault also warned against "one of the most harmful habits in contemporary thought...: the analysis of the present as being precisely, in history, a present of rupture, or of high point, or of completion or of a returning dawn, etc." (1988:35). 32. Gramsci was reworking Marx's famous 1859 Preface to A Critique of Political Economy. It is not the consciousness of men [and women] that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness... a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophicin short, ideological forms in which men [and women] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. [Marx 1986:187] 33. In the formulation of Raymond Williams, a "lived hegemony is always a process.... It is . . . continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all it own" (1977:112). Hall echoes these Marxian and Gramscian visions, arguing that "hegemony is constructed, through a complex series or processes of struggle" (1988:53; emphasis in original). 34. See the ethnographically-informed analyses of specific development interventions by Baviskar 1995, Fairhead and Leach 1996 and the contributors to the collections edited by Bennett and Bowen 1988, Grillo and Stirrat 1997, and Hobart 1993. 35. The so-called Pioneer Column of white settlers paved the way to Fort Salisbury for Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company, reaching Fort Salisbury (now Harare) in late 1890. In 1898, an Order-inCouncil made Southern Rhodesia a British Protectorate, reducing the powers of the British South Africa Company. The colony's legislative powers were further consolidated in the 1923 constitution. In 1953, Southern Rhodesia joined a Federation with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). After the Federation disbanded, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. 36. ZNA File: S 1563.1937, NC Annual Reports. Inyanga District NC Annual Report. By 1951, the Native Commissioner reported that more than half of the tax paying males were "to all intent permanently away from home, in employment in the larger centers" (ZNA File: S2827/2/2/1, v. 3. 1951 Annual Report). 37. While the liberation war did not reach its peak until the late 1970s, the nationalist party and many Zimbabweans recognize armed clashes with Rhodesian Security Forces in 1966 at the Battle of Sinoia (now Chinoyi) as the start of the war (see Kriger 1992:88). For perspectives on the war, see Kriger 1992, Ranger 1995, and the essays collected in Bhebe and Ranger 1995. 38. Cliffe (1988:57) sums up the past 50 years of agrarian political history in Zimbabwe as a peasant call to "give us our land back" while Kinsey (1982:92) argues that major political parties "viewed land as the critical issue in an independent Zimbabwe" (see also Herbst 1990). A 1978 policy statement by ZANU (Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union), the precursor to the current ruling party, declared "land hunger was one of the main objectives for the freedom struggle, and certainly is the inspiration of peasants who have rallied behind the movement" (ZANU 1978:57). For accounts of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle that underscore the importance of regaining the "lost lands" in the symbolic imaginary of Zimbabwean nationalism, see Lan 1985, Moyana 1984, Moyo 1995, and Ranger 1985. 39. The Native Development Act of 1929, according to Harold Jowitt, Direct of Native Development, defined the department's agenda as "the education of natives and any other work primarily designed to further the agricultural, industrial, physical or social advancement of Natives" (Report of the Director of Native Development for 1929. Salisbury: Government Printers, 1930. Quoted in Summers [n.d.:3]). Drinkwater quotes a 1961 Chief Native Commissioner Report that looks back on the 1920s as "the rising
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tide of development" (1989:293). For an elaboration of the bureaucratization surrounding development interventions in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe, see Drinkwater 1992 and Worby 1992. 40. Born in Utah in 1889, Alvord completed a Master's Degree in Agriculture at the State College of Washington. After joining the American Board of Foreign Missions in 1919, he was appointed to the Native Affairs Department of Southern Rhodesia in 1926/ eventually becoming Director of Native Agriculture from 1944-50 (see Sudbeck 1989). 41. South Africa's influence within the region was predicated on its being a hub in the global circuit through which "officials . . . drew on their experience of, and information about, other parts of the worldIndia, Australia and especially the USA under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1900-1908)" (Beinart 1984:56-57). Grove (1989) has emphasized the exchange of personnel and ideas between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in early conservation efforts. 42. Scott makes similar points in his recent study of the spectacular failures of massive development and settlement projects. He includes several southern African cases in his attempt to construct a more general model of "legibility as a central problem of statecraft" (1998:2) and emphasizes a "modernist visual aesthetic that animated planned villages" across diverse contexts (1998:254). 43. Earl Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1849, recommended: "Permanent locations should be established within the Colony, and in selecting the sites of these locations, sufficient intervals shall be left between each of them for the spread of white settlements, each European immigrant would thus have it in his power to draw supplies of labour from the location in his more immediate proximity" (quoted in Brookes 1974:159). 44. Beinart suggests that Centralization, Betterment, and related conservation schemes "must be seen as part of a broader shift towards a commitment to development" growing out of patterns established as early as 1900 (1984:79). Ferguson notes the historical resonances between Betterment, first instituted in South Africa in the 1930s, and development interventions in Lesotho during the 1980s (1990:261). 45. ZNA File: ZBJ1/1/4.1944. Alvord's testimony to the 1944 Native Production and Trade Commission, p. 3054. Drinkwater identifies the period from 1938 to 1944 as the "peak period of implementation" during which the area under centralization rose from 2.4 million acres to 7.4 million acres (1989:298). 46. ZNA File: ZBJ 3/1/1.1944. W.M. Munro, Report of Native Production and Trade Commission. 47. See Sudbeck 1989:60. African farmers, as many observers have noted, had long been practicing intercropping prior to white arrival in Zimbabwe as part of a complex strategy for contending with an array of agro-ecological conditions (Brown 1959; Yudelman 1964). Colonial disregard for African ecological knowledge failed to appreciate the risk-averse practice of fragmented holdings spread across environmental micro-niches, topography, and social space (Floyd 1959; Matowanyika 1991). Richards terms intercropping "one of the great glories of African science" (1983:27). 48. ZNA File: ZBJ 1/1/4,1944 Trade (Godlonton), 1944 Production and Trade Commission. See Alvord's testimony, especially pp. 3049-3054. As Anderson (1984) has demonstrated, the pervasiveness of colonial fears about another "Dustbowl" in sub-Saharan Africa and the World Depression were critical in shaping colonial concerns about productivity in African agriculture. 49. For accounts of the politics of Betterment, see Beinart 1984, de Wet 1995 and Ferguson 1990:261-262. Betterment policies shifted from early emphasis on imposing stocking rates, agricultural regulations, and the spatial and functional separation of discrete arable, grazing, and residential zones to the massive forced removals of entire communities through resettlement policies. 50. The Chief Native Commissioner, in 1961, marked the influential 1944 Godlonton Commission as "the decisive point of departure towards compulsory powers" (quoted in Drinkwater 1989:299). Bulman (1970) pegs the NLHA as a crucial component of "The Era of Compulsion" in colonial conservation. Machingaidze (1991) chronicles the NLHA's failure in what he terms "agrarian change from above." In the face of mounting political opposition, as late as 1960, the Assistant Director of Agriculture emphatically claimed that "the Act is a conservation measure" (Robinson 1960:29). 51. ZNA File N9/4/5, NC Monthly Reports, 1899. T. B. Hulley, Umtali NC, Umtali Monthly Report: November 1899. 52. In 1905, the Anglo-French Matabeleland Company purchased the Inyanga Block consisting of 73,600 morgan (approximately 63,000 hectares) from the British South Africa Company (Deed of Grant 6151). 53. ZNA File: NUC 2/3/1. Inyanga District Report for the Month of July 1906. 54. A 1926 military intelligence report listed 385 of the "Watawungena" as the smallest "tribe" in the district with 80 men capable of bearing arms (ZNA File S 604/1926. January 8, 1926. Inyanga District Amendments to Military Intelligence Supplied Under Police). 55. "It is a well known fact that the women and children of a kraal conceal themselves on the approach of any European and they remain in concealment until he leaves.... They are . . . wary about telling us how many children they have got. Under the circumstances it is very difficult to arrive at accurate figures" (ZNA File: NUC 2/1/1. May 19, 1904, Inyanga NC to Acting CNC). 56. ZNA File: L2/2/6/8. Anglo Portuguese Boundary, July 1, 1905-1907, June 8. August 20, 1906 Memo from Sawerthal, Barue Boundary Commission to the Surveyor General, Salisbury, Ruera-Pungwe Camp. 57. Brothers William and Charles Hanmer surveyed the property in 1928, and Charles boarded the next ship sailing from Cape Town to Great Britain in order to raise funds for acquiring the property. In 1930, they purchased 94,027 acres of the 162,000 acre property from the Anglo-French Matabeleland Company (Petherman 1987).
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58. I use the term white rather than European, the latter an official colonial racial designation in boutnern Rhodesia (and, later, in Rhodesia). White is a more encompassing category in the region, and would include Afrikaners, first-generation European immigrants, Rhodesian citizens of European descent, and expatriate Americans. 59. ZNRO File: Lan 16/16/3. Gaeresi Ranch Squatters: Press. Box 116598; Location 8.14.3R. Internal Affairs. March 27,1969, Ministry of Internal Affairs. "The Tangwena Issue at Gairezi." 60. ZNRO File: Lan 16/16. Gaeresi Ranch Squatters: Correspondence. Box 116598. Location 8.14.3R. Internal Affairs. October 26, 1970. Ministry of Internal Affairs memo, "The Tangwena Issue at Gaeresi." 61. A 1978 policy document outlining "integrated rural development" pointedly stated: "Utopian socialist schemes to blanket the country with communal settlements would rapidly lead to disaster by destroying an agricultural industry which provides a massive proportion of national wealth, national employment and foreign exchange. It would be replaced by a system noted for its failure elsewhere" (Ministry of Finance 1978). 62. In 1992, the Land Acquisition Act was passed, removing the "willing seller, willing buyer" enshrined in the 1979 Lancaster House agreement. As late as May 1998, however, the Ministry of Lands, responsible for farms designated for compulsory acquisition in 1997, had not made these properties available for resettlement. In May 1998, Ministry sources reportedly suggested that "the resettlement plans had not yet been drawn out as the government had no idea of how much land was available" (see "Zim's Farm Plan in Disarray," Electronic Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg, South Africa, May 18,1998. http://www.mg.co.za/ mg.news/98may2/18may-zim.html). 63. An AGRITEX document mentions a figure of 186,000 families to have been settled by 1985 (1984:15). A 1986 policy document refers to an expected figure of 15,000 families to be resettled annually between 1986 and 1990 (see Republic of Zimbabwe 1986:28). 64. In 1992, government plans still conceived of an enventual resettlement sector of 8.3 million hectares, roughly 21 percent of Zimbabwe's total area, to accommodate 162,000 families (DERUDE 1992:4). 65. During an August 1996 discussion, Sam Moyo suggested that the total number of resettled families had remained at approximately 55,000 for a number of years. Land acquisition, too, has slowed to extremely marginal figures through the 1990s. Most resettlement land was acquired in the early half of the 1980s, 83 percent in the first four years (Christiansen 1993:1552). The majority of this land consisted of farms abandoned by whites during the war and those who feared the adverse impact on white farming of a black nationalist government. 66. Nationally, most resettlement schemes fit neatly into discrete categories. In 1991, Model A schemes, where settler farmers are allocated individual family holdings, composed 79 percent of resettled land; Model A "accelerated" schemes, slightly more than 4 percent; and Model B "cooperative" schemes, approximately 6 percent; Model C, a more recently designated "hybrid model," comprised less than 0.5 percent of resettlement land. Model D, basically one massive pilot scheme in Matabeleland where grazing areas rotate, consisted of 10 percent of resettlement land (see DERUDE 1991). 67. For ethnographically informed analyses of resettlement politics elsewhere in Zimbabwe, see Derman 1997 and Jacobs 1992. 68. At the time, government rhetoric emphasized the "urgent need to correct the inherent social and economic imbalances" within the country through a plan that would represent "its first endeavor at socialist transformation" (Republic of Zimbawe 1982:i). 69. The initial properties purchased in 1980, principally Gaeresi Ranch, comprised approximately 14,500 hectares. See Gairezi Intensive Resettlement Preliminary Report, Manicaland Province, Inyanga Intensive Conservation Area, Planning Branch, Department of Conservation and Extension, October 1981. Slightly more than 4,000 hectares were added with the purchase of properties annexed to the scheme in 1986. See Gairezi Extension Resettlement Scheme, Model A Project Report, April 1988, Harare: Agritex Planning Branch. 70. ZNRO File: Land 16/16/3. Garesi Ranch Squatters: Press. Internal Affairs. Box 116598; Location 8.14.3R. March 27, 1969, Ministry of Internal Affairs, "The Tangwena Issue at Gairezi." 71. Rumors were difficult to substantiate and, for obvious reasons, political sensitivity precluded more detailed investigations. During a 1992 interview in Harare, the white former farm manager for Hanmer during the 1950s recalled that the hired agricultural demonstrator had "tried to stop people from cultivating on slopes and close to streambanks.... He was trained by the conservation people and knew how to peg land and knew the reasons why land should be pegged. He worked under Bill Hanmer [the ranch owner]. We employed him to do contours.... He was shot by the Terrs ("terrorists" in the Rhodesian rhetoric that sought to delegitimize the claims of "freedom fighters" or "guerrillas"], but that was after I left." 72. As late as 1991, the Nyanga District Administrator asserted that resettlement policy in Kaerezi was "Land Husbandryit's only Land Use Planning by a different name, but it's the same thing, and it's still necessary." Similar statements were made by senior officials overseeing resettlement policy in central government. 73. Nyanga District Administrator's Files. Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme: September 23, 1988. Resettlement Officer to Officer in Charge, Central Intelligence Organization, Nyanga. "Events Leading to My Being Threatened by a Delegation Lead by Chief Tangwena." 74. According to de Wet, approximately 250,000 Africans were enclosed in the militarized "Protected Villages" (1995:28).
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75. In this sense, popular critiques in Zimbabwe echo Ferguson's exploration of "the moral politics of structural adjustment" in what he terms "IMF-ruled Africa" (1995:144). 76. The senior DERUDE planner well understood that state attempts to impose Villagization in the chieftainship of a national hero would threaten government legitimacy. He elaborated: "No one in the Department of Rural Devlopment believes those [Kaerezi] people are going to move into those villages." As I waited for an invocation of the "necessary coercive mechanisms" at government's disposal, the planner surprised me by candidly suggesting that "maybe we need to swallow our pride and replan. Now there is a movement toward an incremental approach to planning small microprojects such as the ones the European Economic Community has been involved with." 77. Nyanga District Administrator's Files: Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme. Kaerezi Resettlement Officer to Regional Rural Resettlement Officer, Department of Rural Development, Mutare. October 25, 1991, "Management Problems in Kaerezi Scheme." 78. Nyanga District Administrator's Files: Lan 30/2 Resettlement Schemes, 10-10-84 to 18-1-91. May 14,1990, T. S. Mahlamvana, Regional Rural Development Officer to Director, DERU DE. "Report on Meeting Held at Magadziire School, Gairezi Resettlement Scheme on Village Demarcation, May 11,1990." A similar sentiment was voiced by a district-level report years before: "The masses suspect that the introduction of planned villages is only a clever introduction to a resettlement scheme." Nyanga District Administrator's Files, LAN: 16/87. February 23, 1987. 79. In the 1986 introduction to the government's National Development Plan, Mugabe declared, "The War for Economic Liberation" (Republic of Zimbabwe 1986). The catchphrase was frequently invoked at political rallies and state-sponsored meetings. 80. Nyika spreads across the semantic fields of nation, land, and territory where no sovereign is specified. The rhetoric of the nationalist liberation struggle invoked fighting for nyika, here the "lost lands" alienated by white settlers. 81. The elder used both the English development and Shona budiriro in his speech. 82. Ferguson (1990:110, 247) offers an illuminating ethnographic perspective on localized understandings on the slippage between development and politics in Lesotho. 83. Li (1999) and Tsing (1999) provide resonant ethnographic perspectives on popular longings for development in Indonesia. They show how resistance to specific development interventions may simultaneously mingle with popular claims upon the state to deliver resources, services, and the promises of modernity. 84. My analysis has focused upon highly localized claims to development as a political entitement within the context of Zimbabwean nationalism. Yet transnational coalitions among members of Third World nation-states have demanded development as a political entitlement since at least the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1955 Bandung conference, the latter marking the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement. Development aspirations that emerged from Bandung, however, often followed a "national bourgeois plan" (Amin 1990:46) and were certainly not immune from technocratic tendencies (Diouf 1998). 85. Escobar treads close to such a formulation of dominant ideology when he asserts that as more activists "adopt the grammar of sustainable development" institutions will "continue to reproduce the world as seen by those who rule it" (1995:203). Ironically, Escobar's Foucauldian framework here echoes the formulations of false consciousness offered by structural Marxism. 86. For recent explorations of the complexities of development and resistance in southern Africa, see Bond and Mayekiso 1996, Pieterse and Simone 1994, and Ramphele 1991. 87. Hall's (1986a) formulation builds on Foster-Carter's (1978) germinal analysis of Marxist theories of articulation. Yet Hall departs sharply from the structuralism of the Marxist modes of production debates, stressing a neo-Gramsican politics of contingency. Key to this move is "Understanding 'determinancy' in terms of the setting of limits, the establishment of parameters, the defining of the space of operations, the concrete conditions of existence, the 'giveness' of social practices, rather than in terms of the absolute predictability of particular outcomes . . . determinancy without guaranteed closures" (1986b:43). 88. See Moore 1998 for a related attempt to problematize spatial metaphors in agrarian and subaltern studies, and Watts 1999 for a critique of geographical imaginaries in recent anti-development perspectives. 89. The mutual imbrication of development and politics thus implies that a "post-development" era (Escobar 1992a, 1995:212-226; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997) cannot escape these historical legacies. A future imaginary that emphasizes a vision of discursive rupture able to transcend the historical sedimentations of political economy, cultural practice, and livelihood struggles is possible only by simultaneously invoking a post-political position.
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accepted April 28, 1998 final version submitted June 26, 1998 Donald S. Moore Department of Anthropology 232 Kroeber Hall University of California Berkeley, CA 94720-3710 dsmoore@globetrotter.berkeley.edu
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the crucible of cultural politics: reworking "development" in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands

University of California at Berkeley

micro-politics and cultural contestation

the crucible of cultural politics

deployments of development discourses

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

land alienation and racialization in Zimbabwe

global and regional routes

the crucible of cultural politics

tenancy and evictions from Gaeresi Ranch

the crucible of cultural politics

postcolonial resettlement politics

the crucible of cultural politics

Maline vs. Madiro

administrative optics and a "special case"

the crucible of cultural politics

"suffering for the land": the cultural politics of entitlement

the crucible of cultural politics

selling out and the politics of location

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

the crucible of cultural politics

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