This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts

for publication in the IEEE ICC 2010 proceedings

User Cooperation for Energy-efcient Cellular Communications

Matthew Nokleby and Behnaam Aazhang Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Rice University, Houston, TX, 77005, USA Email: {nokleby, aaz}@rice.edu

AbstractUser cooperation improves performance in wireless systems, but it requires other users to expend energy acting as relays. When energy is scarce, users have incentive to refuse to cooperate in order to conserve resources. Therefore, we investigate cooperative communications from an energy-efciency perspective. We present a cellular framework in which two mobile users, who desire to communicate with a common base station, may cooperate via decode-and-forward relaying. We maximize users bits-per-energy efciency by dening the achievable bitsper-energy region and nding the power allocations that achieve its Pareto boundary. To nd an efcient approach that gives selsh users incentive to cooperate, we apply game theory, nding the power allocations that achieve the Nash bargaining solution. Numerical results indicate that the Nash bargain provides a fair and efcient compromise and that both users obtain noticeably improved bits-per-energy efciency via cooperation.

I. I NTRODUCTION User cooperation, introduced in [1], has been shown to increase users data rates. Despite the well-documented advantages, however, user cooperation has yet to see widespread use in practical wireless systems. Perhaps the most obvious hurdle to practical implementation is the cost of increased energy expenditure: since cooperating users relay each others information to improve data rates, one users rate increases only when another user expends relay energy on its behalf. Especially in cellular systems, where mobile users face severe energy limitations, there is incentive for users to refuse to relay, which renders user cooperation (ostensibly) unappealing. Consequently, an important question is whether or not user cooperation is advantageous from the perspective of energy efciency. In this paper, we address this question by examining the bits-per-energy efciency of user cooperation in a cellular environment. We present a cellular-inspired framework in which users transmissions are time-division multiplexed. We introduce cooperation by giving idle users the option of relaying for the active user. Under a Rayleigh block-fading model, we dene the achievable bits-per-energy region for the system. We also provide an efcient characterization of the boundary of the bits-per-energy region, showing that the relay power allocations that achieve the boundary points are solutions to a convex program. Since users have a natural incentive to refuse to cooperate, we want an approach that encourages cooperation even among
B. Aazhang is also the Finnish Academy Distinguished Professor (FiDiPro) at the Center for Wireless Communication, University of Oulu, Finland. This work is partially supported by NSF grant no. CNS-0832025 and by Nokia through a research contract with Rice University.

selsh users. Such reasoning leads us to a game-theoretic analysis. We cast the users as players in an innite-stage game whose strategies are their relay power allocations and whose utility functions are their bits-per-energy efciencies. While we could employ any of a variety of game-theoretic solutions, we focus on the Nash bargaining solution [2], which suits our purposes for several reasons. First, it is well known to give a fair, efcient solution on the boundary of the achievable region. Second, we can easily show that the Nash bargaining solution is a Nash equilibrium [3] of the innite-stage game, meaning that even purely selsh users can be persuaded to cooperate. Finally, the Nash bargain gives improved bitsper-energy performance for both users whenever such an improvement is possible; otherwise, it simply collapses to the non-cooperative solution in which users refuse to relay. Our numerical results show that user cooperation indeed can simultaneously improve both users bits-per-energy efciency for a wide variety of channel conditions. Finally, our results conrm that the Nash bargaining solution results in a fair distribution of resources: although both users benet, weaker users benet more from cooperation than do stronger users. II. S YSTEM MODEL A. Transmission model We consider a simple cellular uplink scenario in which two mobile users communicate with a common base-station (BS). To eliminate inter-user interference, users transmissions are time-division multiplexed:1 user 1 transmits its data to the BS during odd time blocks, while user 2 transmits its data during even time blocks. The idle user can choose to act as a relay for the active user in order to help increase the active users rate. In other words, during odd time blocks (when user 1 transmits its data) user 2 can act as a relay node, and vice versa during even time blocks. The two users and the BS thus form a threeterminal relay channel in which the roles of source and relay are exchanged at each time block, as depicted in Figure 1. We assume a complex baseband, Rayleigh-distributed, block-fading channel model. During each time block t {1, 2, . . . } the channel coefcients hij between node i and j remain constant, and coefcients at different time blocks are statistically independent. The channel distributions 2 are specied by the expected gains E [|hij | ], which remain constant for all t. We assume that the mobile users are capable
1 Alternatively, we could orthogonalize transmissions via frequency or code division with only minor changes to our results.

978-1-4244-6404-3/10/$26.00 2010 IEEE

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2010 proceedings

U1 h12 (t) U2

h13 ( t)
BS

U1 h21 (t) U2

h13 ( t)
BS

t) h 23( (odd t)

t) h 23( (even t)

the min function correspond to the two possible bottlenecks of the decode-and-forward relay channel: the point-to-point channel between either the source and relay or the source and destination (whichever is greater), and the broadcast channel formed by the source, relay, and destination. Note that the achievable rate is always lower-bounded by the capacity of the source-destination channel. III. B ITS - PER - ENERGY EFFICIENCY Bits-per-energy efciency has been studied previously, most notably in [6], where an elegant information-theoretic characterization for the single-user, multiple-access, and interference channels is given. In [7], the energy efciency of the relay channel is studied. However, maximizing energy efciency almost invariably drives users to the low SNR regime, where rates are arbitrarily small. Strict maximization of energy efciency, then, is not typically useful in practice when users have target rates to meet or delay constraints to satisfy. To sidestep this obstacle, we impose limitations on the bitsper-energy maximization. First, we dene the bits-per-energy efciency. Since each time block has the same duration, the amount of data having reached the base station is proportional to the sum of rates over all previous time blocks. Similarly, the total energy expenditure is proportional to the sum of the power allocations in previous time blocks. So, the total bitsper-energy efciency for each user is proportional to e1 = e2 = Eh [r1 ] Eh [ps1 (h) + pr1 (h)] t odd ps1 (t) + t even pr 1 (t) r ( t ) Eh [r2 ] 2 t even = , Eh [ps2 (h) + pr2 (h)] t even ps1 (t) + t odd pr 1 (t) =
t odd r1 (t)

Fig. 1. Transmission schedule. During odd time blocks, user 1 acts as source and user 2 acts as relay, and vice versa for even time blocks.

of full-duplex transmission and that channel state information is available globally. During odd (respectively, even) time blocks, the source user transmits symbols X1 (X2 ) to the relay and base station, and the relay user transmits symbols X2 (X1 ) to the base station to facilitate the source users transmission. The received signals at the relay and destination are then Y1 = h21 (t)X2 + N1 (even t) Y2 = h12 (t)X1 + N2 (odd t) Y3 = h13 (t)X1 + h23 (t)X2 + N3 , where each Ni is additive white Gaussian noise having unit variance. To model the mobile users power constraints, we limit the average source and relay powers during each block: ps1 (t) = E [|X1 | ] 1, pr2 (t) = E [|X2 | ] 1 pr1 (t) = E [|X1 | ] 1, ps2 (t) = E [|X2 | ] 1
2 2 2 2

(odd t) (even t),

where psi (t) is the power allocated by user i while acting as the source node, and pri (t) is the power allocated by user i while acting as the relay. In other words psi (t) represents power user i spends on its own transmissions; pri (t) represents power spent relaying for user j . B. Achievable rates Assuming that each time block is sufciently long, we can use codebooks that achieve the information-theoretic rates for the relay channel. However, the capacity of the relay channel is unknown. So, we use decode-and-forward achievable rate presented in [4]. Although we could choose a different relay scheme (amplify-and-forward, compress-andforward, etc.), decode-and-forward is a simple, well-studied approach that leads to a tractable expression of the achievable rate. It also achieves capacity when the inter-user channels are much stronger than the channels between users and the BS. Since we may reasonably assume that geographically close users will be paired up for cooperation, decode-and-forward is a logical choice. The achievable rate is ri (t) = min{max{I (Xi ; Yj |Xj ), I (Xi ; Y3 )}, I (Xi , Xj ; Y3 )} (bits/s/Hz), for i = j , where Xi and Xj are jointly Gaussian, and where the mutual information terms depend on the channel gains and the source and relay powers at time t.2 The terms inside
2 We could achieve higher average rates by coding across time blocks, as in [5], but only at the cost of increased delay.

where the sums converge to expectations because the channels are ergodic, allowing us to write the power allocations as functions of the channel coefcients, denoted by the vector h. The units of e1 and e2 are normalized bits per joule: if each users transmitter power were 1 Watt and each channel were 1 Hz wide, the units of e1 and e2 would be bits per joule; we simply refer to the units as bits per energy. Now, to sidestep the obstacle of users rates becoming small, we constrain each user to employ full power for its own transmission. That is, we always have psi (t) = 1, meaning that each users rate is at least as high as the capacity of its link with the BS. In addition to bounding users rates away from zero, this restriction approximates a cellular environment, where users simply use the available power to achieve the highest possible quality of service (neglecting, perhaps, the need for power control). Thus, in our framework user cooperation is an appendage to the existing cellular system, which can be used to improve both data rates and bits-per-energy efciency. Now, we can write the energy efciencies as ei (pr1 , pr2 ) = Eh [ri (prj (h))] 1 + Eh [pri (h)] (1)

With the energy efciencies dened, we dene the achievable bits-per-energy region for our system: E = {(e1 (pr1 , pr2 ), e2 (pr1 , pr2 )) : 0 pr1 (h), pr2 (h) 1}.

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2010 proceedings

The bits-per-energy region is entirely characterized by the 2 channel statistics E [|hij | ]. E is necessarily compact, but it need not be convex, since time-sharing between power allocations does not result in convex combinations of bits-perenergy efciencies. Each point in E is achieved by using a different relay power allocation pair (pr1 (h), pr2 (h)). While the set of feasible power allocations is innite-dimensional, we can characterize the power allocations associated with the outer boundary of E . Denition 1: A point (e1 , e2 ) E is a (Pareto) boundary point if, for any other point (f1 , f2 ) E , f1 > e1 implies f2 < e2 , and f2 > e2 implies f1 < e1 . In other words, there is no point that gives increased energy efciency to one user without decreasing the efciency of the other user. Theorem 1: Let p r 1 and pr 2 be relay power allocations with average power Eh [pr1 ] = 1 and Eh [p r 2 ] = 2 , respectively. Then, the point (e1 (p r 1 , p2 ), e2 (pr 1 , pr 2 )) E is a Pareto boundary point only if, for i = j , p ri = arg max
0pri (h)1

similar to ours [10], Nash bargaining is used to facilitate user cooperation in a throughput-per-energy setting, although the work considers a simple bandwidth sharing rather than information-theoretic cooperation. A game is formally dened by three objects: a set of players, a set of strategies that those players can enact, and a set of utility functions denoting the payoff each player derives from the strategies enacted. We cast our scenario as a game in which each mobile user is a player whose strategies are the relay power allocations pri and whose utility functions are the bitsper-energy efciencies ei (pr1 , pr2 ). A. Non-cooperative games The solution to a game depends on the particular gametheoretic framework employed. The simplest possible framework is a single-stage non-cooperative game, where selsh players select strategies that maximize individual utility without regard for the utility of other players. Players simply select their strategies, collect their payoff, and never interact again. The classic solution concept for a non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibrium (NE) [3], which is a strategy selection such that no player can improve its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy. A NE is therefore stable with respect to selsh players, as they have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium point. However, while the NE is optimal from the perspective of each player individually, it is notoriously inefcient. Players who are willing to cooperate frequently can achieve higher utilities than the NE. For example, under a single-stage game, user cooperation is never a NE, regardless of the benets of relaying. Each user can improve its payoff by lowering its relay power, so the unique NE is pri (h) = 0, resulting in payoffs eNE i = ei (0, 0) = Eh [log2 (1 + |hi3 | )]. B. Nash bargaining solution To improve upon the single-stage NE, we turn to the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) from cooperative game theory [2]. Formally, a two-player bargaining game is dened by a set of feasible utilities U and a disagreement point U . The set U contains utility vectors u = (u1 , u2 ), denoting the payoff to both players, for all possible strategies the players may implement. The disagreement point represents the status quo prior to bargaining or utility guaranteed to each player should bargaining fail. In bargaining games, players cooperatively choose a compromise point. That is, rather than individually focusing on payoff maximization, players jointly choose a mutually agreeable utility vector and agree to enact the strategies associated therewith. The Nash bargain is an axiomatic solution, meaning that the solution point is dened by a set of (ostensibly) reasonable axioms rather than a concrete bargaining process. Rather than give a full description of the axioms, we briey note that the NBS is characterized as the point on the Pareto boundary that satises afne invariance, symmetry between players, and independence to irrelevant
2

Eh [rj (pri )]

(2)

subject to Eh [pri ] = i . Proof: We argue by contradiction. Let (e1 (p , p ) , e ( p , p )) E be a Pareto boundary point, and 2 r1 r2 r1 2 choose i = j . Supposing that p ri is not a solution to (2), there must exist some pri such that Eh [rj (pri )] > Eh [rj (p ri )] and ] = . Thus, e ( p , p ) > e ( p Eh [pri ] = Eh [p i j ri rj j ri , prj ), ri = ei (pri , prj ) by denition. So, but ei (pri , prj ) , p ) , e ( p , p )) cannot be a boundary point, (e1 (p 2 r1 r2 r1 r2 which is a contradiction. The content of Theorem 1 is that, in order to achieve a boundary point, power must be allocated efciently. That is, if a user commits a certain average power for relaying, then that power should be allocated to increase the other users rate as much as possible. Theorem 1 is useful because the maximization of the expected rate is a convex problem. Therefore, to achieve boundary points, we can transform the highdimensional problem of nding relay power allocations into a series of (relatively) simple convex programs. Conceptually, instead of searching over the entire set of permissible power allocations, we need only to search over the (1 , 2 ) pairs to nd the desired boundary point. Even with this characterization of the Pareto boundary, however, it remains to be seen to what extent user cooperation can improve users bits-per-energy efciency. Each users rate increases only logarithmically with the other users relay power, so it is still possible that refusing to relay is ideal in terms of bits-per-energy. To answer this question denitively, we turn to a game-theoretic approach. IV. G AME - THEORETIC FORMULATION User cooperation has recently received game-theoretic attention in the literature. In [8], the effectiveness of transmitter and receiver cooperation is studied from the perspective of coalitional game theory, and user cooperation is examined under a repeated-game framework in [9]. However, neither of these works considers energy efciency. In a work more

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2010 proceedings

alternatives. Nash showed that the unique3 point satisfying the specied axioms is uNBS = arg max[u1 1 ]+ [u2 2 ]+ ,
uU

(3)

where []+ = max(, 0). In other words, the NBS is the point that maximizes the product in (3), called the Nash product. For our problem, the set of feasible utilities is E , and we NE take the disagreement point to be = (eNE 1 , e2 ), the singlestage NE utilities. So, nding the NBS results in the following optimization problem:
0pr1 ,pr2 1

max

+ NE + [e1 (pr1 , pr2 ) eNE 1 ] [e2 (pr 1 , pr 2 ) e2 ] . (4)

The Nash bargain offers several advantages. First, the NBS point is on the Pareto boundary, guaranteeing an efcient solution. Second, the NBS is well known for providing a fair compromise between players, as we will empirically verify in Section V. Finally, since we maximize the product of players utilities in (4), we are guaranteed that, when possible, the NBS gives improved energy efciency to both users. Otherwise, the NBS simply results in the non-cooperative solution in which both users refuse to relay. By nding the Nash bargaining solution, we can say denitively whether it is possible to improve both users energy efciency via user cooperation. The optimization problem in (4) is non-convex, making it difcult to nd the NBS power allocations directly. Fortunately, since the NBS point is on the Pareto boundary, we can appeal to Theorem 1. Then, we need only to search over (1 , 2 ) pairs in order to nd the NBS power allocations, suggesting a straightforward optimization scheme. By deriving a simple upper bound on the Nash product, we can efciently search over the set of (1 , 2 ) pairs using branch-and-bound techniques [12]. For each (1 , 2 ) pair, we nd the bits-perenergy efciencies according to (2) and evaluate the Nash product. We continue the process until the Nash product is maximized. Note that we can modify this approach to nd any point on the Pareto boundary: we can nd the max-min point, maximize the sum efciency, or nd other bargaining solutions with this approach. C. Innite-stage games As a nal note, we point out that by casting our scenario as an innite-stage game we can make the NBS power allocations a Nash equilibrium, meaning that even purely selsh players can be enticed to cooperate. Rather than simply making a single decision and never interacting again, players in an innite-stage game repeatedly interact, making decisions again and again that affect their long-term payoff. Players in innitestage games therefore must consider the future consequences of their decisions, which introduces notions of reputation and reciprocity: players may reward or punish players for good and bad behaviors. In our case, one user may agree to relay for a user provided the other user agrees to do the same in
3 Strictly speaking, the NBS is dened only when the set of utilities is convex. The NBS can be generalized to non-convex sets [11], but for brevitys sake we omit the technicalities.

the future. With the additional incentives, cooperative behavior can often be sustained as a NE of an innite-stage game. In an innite-stage game, players strategies are expressed as functions of the strategies played in previous stages. So, for each stage, players specify what strategies they will play for every possible history of plays up to that stage. In other words, players specify their strategies for all possible contingencies. For our scenario, the players are the two users, and each stage is a time block t. At each time block, only the relay user has a decision to make, which is how much relay power pri (t) to use; this decision is a function of all previous decisions made by both players. The utilities are the bits-per-energy utilities (1). A Nash equilibrium of an innite-stage game is a set of strategies (including all possible contingencies) such that no single player can improve its payoff by deviating. Theorem 2: There exists a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium in the innite-stage game such that the users select the NBS power allocations dened in (4). Proof: We omit the proof for brevity; it closely mirrors the proof of the so-called folk theorem for repeated games [13]. 3 2.5 e2 (bits/energy) 2 eNE eNBS

1.5 1

0.5 0 E 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 e1 (bits/energy) 3

Fig. 2. Bits-per-energy region when E [|h12 |2 ] = E [|h21 |2 ] = 20dB and E [|h13 |2 ] = E [|h23 |2 ] = 5dB. The single-stage Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining points are shown.

V. N UMERICAL RESULTS To see to what extent user cooperation can benet users and to demonstrate the performance of the NBSwe show the results of numerical experiments. First, we plot the achievable bits-per-energy region for a given set of channel condi2 2 2 tions. Let E [|h12 | ] = E [|h21 | ] = 20dB and E [|h13 | ] = 2 E [|h23 | ] = 5dB, so that the inter-user channels are stronger on average than the channels with the BS. We numerically sweep over the (1 , 2 ) pairs, allowing us to nd the Pareto boundary and compute E . In Figure 2, we plot E as well as the NE and NBS points. In this case, since the NE point is not on the Pareto boundary, both users see signicant improvement in energy efciency through cooperation. Since we cannot show the NBS for all possible channel statistics, we focus on a family of meaningful cases. For

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2010 proceedings

Figure 3, we set the expected inter-user gains to E [|h12 | ] = 2 2 E [|h21 | ] = 20dB, set user 2s expected gain at E [|h23 | ] = 2 10dB, and let E [|h13 | ] vary between -5dB and 20dB. This range allows us to see the NBS performance when users channel conditions are asymmetric, thus giving us insight as to the fairness of the results. Figure 3 shows each users bitsper-energy efciencies, both without cooperation and under the NBS. In Figure 4 we show the results in terms of percent gain to each user. First, we note that regardless of the channel statistics, the NBS is non-trivial, and both users obtain improved energy efciency through cooperation. The gains are signicantin excess of 100% for user 1 when its link with the BS is weak, and approximately 15% for each user when their links are identical. We also see a notion of 2 fairness in the bargaining: when E [|h13 | ] is small, user 1 is at a relative disadvantage but experiences the greater increase 2 in efciency; conversely, when E [|h13 | ] is large, user 1 is at a relative advantage and experiences the lesser increase. 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 0 5
2

120
NE (eNBS eNE 100 i i )/ei

100 80 60 40 20 0 5 0 5
2

User 1 User 2

10

15

20

E [|h13 | ] (dB)
Fig. 4. Percent gain to each user, also as a function of E [|h13 |2 ].

Energy efciency (bits/energy)

NE (single-stage) NBS User 1 User 2

eNBS 1 eNE 1 eNBS 2 eNE 2

is a Nash equilibrium, giving incentive for selsh users to cooperate. Finally, numerical results show that our approach can signicantly improve improve users energy efciency. Several important issues remain open. For example, we considered full-duplex nodes, but most systems in practice use half-duplex nodes, which cannot transmit and receive simultaneously. We also assumed global channel state information, which is often difcult to obtain in practice. Extending our work to incorporate half-duplex nodes and limited CSI would contribute toward making user cooperation a practical, benecial option in wireless systems. R EFERENCES

10

15

20

E [|h13 | ] (dB)
Fig. 3. Bits-per-energy efciency under the single-stage NE (where users do not cooperate) and the NBS as a function of E [|h13 |2 ].

Of course, we have not explored the entire space of channel statistics, but we can commonsense make extrapolations from the data. Obviously, the effectiveness of cooperation increases 2 with the relative strength of the inter-user links; as E [|h12 | ] 2 and E [|h21 | ] increase and decrease, so also do the benets of cooperation. But, while there exist circumstances in which user cooperation can provide only limited improvement, we have seen non-trivial improvement in a variety of reasonable channel conditions, suggesting that user cooperation is a widely applicable means for improving energy efciency. VI. C ONCLUSION We have proposed a framework for decode-and-forward user cooperation in a cellular uplink, which we have analyzed from the perspective of energy efciency. We dened the achievable bits-per-energy region and showed that the boundary points are achievable through convex programming. We applied gametheoretic tools, providing an efcient means for constructing the relay power allocations that achieve the Nash bargaining solution. Under an innite-stage game, the Nash bargain

[1] A. Sendonaris, E. Erkip, and B. Aazhang, User cooperation diversity, part I: System description, IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 51, no. 11, pp. 19271938, Nov. 2003. [2] J. F. Nash, The bargaining problem, Econometrica, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 155162, April 1950. [3] , Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 286295, September 1951. [4] T. Cover and A. E. Gamal, Capacity theorems for the relay channel, IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 572584, Sept. 1979. [5] A. Host-Madsen and J. Zhang, Capacity bounds and power allocation for wireless relay channels, Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 20202040, June 2005. [6] S. Verd u, On channel capacity per unit cost, IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 10191030, Sept. 1990. [7] A. E. Gamal, M. Mohseni, and S. Zahedi, Bounds on capacity and minimum energy-per-bit for AWGN relay channels, IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 15451561, Apr. 2006. [8] S. Mathur, L. Sankar, and N. B. Mandayam, Coalitions in cooperative wireless networks, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 11041115, Sept. 2008. [9] Y. Chen and S. Kishnore, A game-theoretic analysis of decodeand-forward user cooperation, IEEE Trans. Wireless Communications, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 19411951, May 2008. [10] Z. Zhang, J. Shi, H.-H. Chen, M. Guizani, and P. Qiu, A cooperation strategy based on Nash bargaining solution in cooperative relay networks, IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 2570 2577, 2008. [11] M. Kaneko, An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function, Theory and Decision, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 135 148, June 1980. [12] R. Horst and N. V. Thoai, DC programming: Overview, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 143, Oct. 1999. [13] J. W. Friedman, A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 112, 1971.