Chapter I: Introduction Constitutional Law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as represented by the

e three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The ROLE of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are e ercised within the framewor! of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. Fundamental Powers of the State ". $. Police Power # the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property Eminent Domain # also called the power of e propriation% eminent domain is described as &the highest and most e act idea of property remaining in the go'ernment( that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method &in nature of compulsory sale to the State( Taxation # the power of the state to enforce proportional contributions from persons and property% le'ied by the State by 'irtue of its so'ereignty% for the support of go'ernment and for all public needs.(

safe and useful e ercise for the benefit of the body politic( -=ustice >alcolm0 Purpose of the Constitution *The purpose of the Constitution is to prescribe the permanent framewor! of a system of go'ernment% to assign to se'eral departments their respecti'e powers and duties% and to establish certain first fi ed principles on which go'ernment is founded( Basic indi'idual rights are not created or conferred by the Constitution but it merely recogni1es and protects these rights and does not bring them into e istence The Constitution is not &the origin of pri'ate rights? it is not the fountain of law nor the incipient state of go'ernment? it is not the cause but the consequence of personal and political freedom.( Supremac+ of the Constitution The CO,ST/T:T/O, is the basic and paramount law which all other laws must conform and to which all persons% including the highest officials of the land% must defer. Classification ,ritten and (nwritten ,ritten is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents. (nwritten consists of rules which ha'e not been integrated into a single% concrete form but are scattered in 'arious sources% such as statutes of a fundamental character% 7udicial decisions% commentaries of publicists% customs and traditions% and certain common law principles. Con%entional and Cumulati%e Con%entional an enacted constitution% formally &struc! off( at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort ta!en by a constituent body or ruler. Cumulati%e the result of political e'olution% &not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method( !igid and Flexi#le !igid one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process. Flexi#le 8 is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation. -./0 Constitution written% con'entional% rigid 1,!C2 Essential 3ualities of the ,ritten Constitution /t should be !"4D

).

Safeguards in the ill of !ights ". $. ). 2. 4. 5. *ue +rocess # &,o person shall be depri'ed of life% liberty or property without due process of law( -.rt. ///% Sec. "0 Equal +rotection # it requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated ali!e% both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. +rohibition against unreasonable searches and sei1ures 3reedom of e pression /mpairment clause 6uarantees against in7ustice to the accused

Common "#$ecti%e: Co8e istence9 Their ultimate goal is the same9 a well8ordered society based on the in'iolability of rights which% although they may not be curtailed arbitrarily% may ne'ertheless be regulated for the common good. The recognition of .:T;OR/T< is a condition sine qua non for the proper en7oyment of liberty% with the common weal as the criterion. Chapter &: The 'ature of the Constitution . C"'STIT(TI"') is &that body of rules and ma im in accordance with the powers of so'ereignty are habitually e ercised( -Cooley0 &The written instrument enacted by the direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the go'ernment are established% limited and defined% and by which those powers are distributed among the se'eral departments for their

 Because it pro'ides for the organi1ation of the entire go'ernment and co'ers all persons and things within the territory of the State /t is supposed to embody the past% reflect the present and to anticipate the future /t must be comprehensi'e enough to pro'ide for e'ery contingency /t should be !IEF /t must confine itself to the basic principles to be implemented with legislati'e details more ad7ustable to change and easier to amend. *ifficulty of its amendment would be a proli -e tended in length0 and 'oluminous codification inaccessible to the understanding or e'en only the interest of the people and unable to adapt readily to changing conditions /t must be CLE4! and DEFI'ITE /t must not shed ambiguity in its pro'isions result in confusion and di'isi'eness among the people% and perhaps e'en physical conflict. o 5P'9 Cases where the rules are deliberately worded in a 'ague manner to ma!e them more malleable to 7udicial interpretation in the light of new conditions and circumstance. Essential Parts of the ,ritten Constitution Constitution of Liberty - . series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental ci'il and political rights of the citi1ens and imposing limitation on the powers of go'ernment as a means of securing the en7oyment of those rights. 3ound in9 .rt. /// # Bill or Rights .rt. // # *eclaration of State +olicy .rt. /@ # Citi1enship .rt. @ # Suffrage .rt. A// # ,ational Economy and +atrimony Constitution of Government consists of a series of pro'isions outlining the organi1ation of the go'ernment% enumerating its powers% laying down certain rules relati'e to its administration% and defining the electorate 3ound in9 .rt. @/ -Legislati'e0 .rt. @// -E ecuti'e0 .rt. @/// -=udiciary0 .rt. A/ -Constitutional Commissions0 Constitution of Sovereignty consists of the pro'isions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about

3ound in9 .rt. A@// # .mendments and Re'isions Permanence of the Constitution Permanence is the capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by passing fancies% temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities. /t is not li!ely to be easily tampered with to suit political e pediency% personal ambitions or ill8ad'ised agitation for change. Disad%antage9 where the written constitution is unable to ad7ust to the need for change 7ustified by new conditions and circumstances Interpretation of the Constitution /t should be interpreted in such a way as to gi'e effect to the intendment of the framers. /t is disco'erable through9 o *ocument itself o :se of e trinsic aids o Records of the constitutional commission itself 3: Should the constitution be petrified or progressi'eB o 4: +rogressi'e. The constitution must change with the changing times lest it impede the progress of the people with antiquated rules grown ineffecti'e in a modern age. /n case of doubt% the constitution should be interpreted as self8e ecuting rather than non8self8 e ecuting o >andatory rather than directory o +rospecti'e rather than retroacti'e Self6executing pro%ision is a rule that by itself is directly or indirectly applicable without need of statutory implementation Collector of Customs v. Villaluz the SC held that 7udges deri'e directly from .rt. ///% Sec. $ of the Constitution the authority to conduct preliminary in'estigations to determine probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant or warrant of arrest% which power may not be withdrawn or restricted by the legislature. E ecuti'e power of the +resident # .rt. @//% Sec. "C is self8e ecuting 'on6self6executing is one that remains dormant unless it is acti'ated by legislati'e implementation Ex7: 4rt7 II) Sec7 87 &.ll citi1ens may be required% under conditions pro'ided by law% to render personal military% or ci'il ser'ice. Ex7: 4rt7 I9) Sec7 :7 &+hilippine citi1enship may be lost or reacquired in the manner pro'ided by law.

 5P' to 5P': /mplementation may% howe'er% be imposed as a duty upon the legislature by mandatory language of the constitution. Ex7: 4rt7 5) Sec7 -.7 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall% within eighteen months from the time of organi1ation of both ;ouses% pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in >uslim >indanao and the Cordilleras. The pro'isions of the constitution must be >.,*.TOR<? otherwise% the fundamental law would ha'e no force and prestige than a set of directions which the go'ernment and the people would be free to disregard. /f it is +RO;/B/TOR<% it is to be understood as intended to be a positi'e and unequi'ocal negation The pro'isions shall be applied in a +ROS+ECT/@E manner 4mendment or !e%ision People v. Pomar . case decided in "D$2 wherein the SC declared unconstitutional a law granting maternity lea'e pri'ileges to female employees on the ground that it impaired the obligation of contracts Social legislation has been sustained under the e panded concept of the police power as a 'alid limitation of the freedom of contract. Iron !ules pro'isions of the Constitution which are not malleable to 7udicial interpretation. They cannot be altered e cept by formal amendment. Ex: age qualification of officers or their term of office

$.

Constitutional Con'ention # $F) 'otes of the Congress or by a ma7ority 'ote of all its members% submit to the electorate the question of calling such con'ention.

Occena v. COMELEC Ghate'er the nature of the change contemplated% the choice of the method of proposal is discretionary upon the legislature Imbong v. COMELEC the Congress% acting as a constituent body% may with the concurrence of $F) of all its members call a constitutional con'ention in general terms only. Thereafter% the same Congress% acting this time as a legislati'e body% may pass the necessary implementing law pro'iding for the details of the constitutional con'ention% such as the number% qualifications and% compensation of its members. ). +eopleHs initiati'e -amendments only0

!4 =0:> 1Initiati%e and !eferendum 4ct2 ??for L"C4L I'ITI4TI9E "'L@ and not '4TI"'4L I'ITI4TI9E Position of the Constitutional Con%ention Theor+ of Con%entional So%ereignt+ -Loomis v. Jackson) the constitutional con'ention is supreme o'er the other departments of the go'ernment because the powers it e ercises are in the nature of so'ereign powers. oo!"s #$$eal the constitutional con'ention is inferior to the other department of the go'ernment since it is merely a creation of the legislature. %rantz v. #utry as long as it e ists and confines itself within the sphere of its 7urisdiction% the constitutional con'ention must be considered independent of and co8equal with the other departments of the go'ernment. 1&2 !atification 4rt7 59II) Sec7 8 .ny amendment to% or re'ision of% this Constitution under Sec. " hereof shall be 'alid when ratified by a ma7ority of the 'otes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than si ty days nor later than ninety days after the appro'al of such amendment or re'ision. .ny amendment under Sec. $ hereof shall be 'alid when ratified by a ma7ority of the 'otes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not be earlier than si ty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the CO>ELEC of the sufficiency of the petition. !atification in'ol'es the people themsel'es in the so'ereign act of drafting or altering the fundamental law. /n case of statutes% it is enough that it is enacted by their chosen representati'es pursuant to their mandates. Gonzales v. COMELEC The SC ruled that there is nothing to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special% not a general election. The circumstance that the pre'ious amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the

4mendment # isolated or piecemeal change in the Constitution !e%ision # re'amp or rewriting of the whole instrument Steps in amendment or re%ision 1-2 Proposal Proposal motion of initiali1ing suggestions or proposals on the amendment or re'ision 4d%antage of proposal for amendments made #+ ; of all the <em#ers of Congress: This method shall a'oid the unnecessary e penditure of public funds and time that the calling of a constitutional con'ention will entail. 4d%antage of proposal for re%ision made #+ constitutional con%ention: >ore time% opportunity and presumably also the needed e pertise to discharge it. /t can be made by ". Congress # E 'otes of the Congress shall be needed

people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. /t does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Occena v. COMELEC the SC sustained the simultaneous holding in "DIJ of the local elections and the plebiscite on the proposal to restore the retirement age of 7udges to se'enty years. Audicial !e%iew of 4mendments The question of the 'alidity of the adoption of amendments to the Constitution is regarded now as sub7ect to 7udicial re'iew 1Austicia#le Buestions2 Sani!a! v. COMELEC The Solicitor 6eneral would consider the question at bar a pure political one% lying outside the domain of 7udicial re'iew. The amending process% both as to proposal and ratification% raises a 7udicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the +residency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments% a function normally e ercised by the legislature% is seriously doubted. -./0 Constitution -.:> Constitution 1Commonwealth Constitution2 continued by its pro'isions to be operati'e after the proclamation of the Republic of the +hilippines -.0: Constitution -./= Constitution 1Freedom Constitution2 3ebruary $4% "DI5 By 'irtue of Proclamation 'o7 . by +res. .quino% a Constitutional Commission was made composed of 4J members appointed by her and charged it to frame a new charter not later than September $% "DI5. =ustice Cecilia >uno18+alma of the SC is "st to ta!e the position The Constitutional Commission was not able to meet the deadline because the members came from different sectors and represented di'erse persuasions. The final draft was appro'ed only on October $% "DI5 The plebiscite was scheduled and held on 3ebruary $% "DI5 C5.$DK to ratify% $$.C2K against

actually too! part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and 'oted thereon. -See case of Firestone Ceramics v. CA0 :nder the "D)4 Constitution -treaty or law O,L<0 -$F) 'otes0 :nder the "DC) Constitution -treaty% e ecuti'e agreement or law O,L<0 -"J 'otes0 "DIC Constitution -treaty% international or e ecuti'e agreement% law% presidential decree% proclamation% order% instructions% ordinance and other regulations0 -Concurrence of a ma7ority of the >embers who actually too! part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and 'oted thereon -4 members00 !eBuisites of Audicial !e%iew ". $. ). 2. There must be an actual case or contro'ersy The question of constitutionality must be raised by the property -locus standi0 The constitutional question must be raised in the earliest opportunity The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself -lis mota0

1-2 4ctual Case or Contro%ers+ .n actual case or contro%ers+ in'ol'es a conflict of legal rights% an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of 7udicial ad7udication. /t must not be >OOT or .C.*E>/C or based on EATR.8LE6.L or other similar considerations not cogni1able by a court of 7ustice. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of e isting law and 7urisprudence. . Austicia#le Contro%ers+ must: o Be definite and concrete% touching% the legal relations of parties ha'ing ad'erse legal interests. o >ust be a real and substantial contro'ersy admitting specific relief through a decree that is conclusi'e in character% as distinguished from an opinion ad'ising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. o /t is not essential to the e ercise of the 7udicial power that an in7unction be sought? allegations that irreparable in7ury is threatened are not required. Request for ad'isory opinion cannot come in category of an actual case or contro'ersy since the issue raised does not in'ol'e any conflict in law that has assumed the proportions of a full8blown dispute Counselling by courts is contrary to the doctrine of SE+.R.T/O, O3 +OGERS since their ad'ice will not ha'e the force of law but a mere suggestion or recommendation that may be accepted or re7ected at will by the department requesting it.

Chapter :: The Constitution and the Courts 9oting 4rt7 9III) Sec7 8 .ll cases in'ol'ing the constitutionality of a treaty% international or e ecuti'e agreement% or law% which shall be heard by the SC en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those in'ol'ing the constitutionality% application% or operation of presidential decrees% proclamations% orders% instructions% ordinance% and other regulations% shall be decided with the occurrence of a ma7ority of the >embers who

5P': !ule =8) Sec7 -7 /f the purpose of the ad'isory opinion is to solicit from the court *ECL.R.TOR< =:*6>E,T in'ol'ing the interpretation of the rights and duties of a person under the pro'isions of a deed% will% contract or other written instrument% or a statute or ordinance% the case is deemed an actual contro'ersy o'er which% the courts may 'alidly assume 7urisdiction. &#C' v. Secretary of E!ucation the possibility that such permit might be denied them in the future% according to the SC% is a premature case because there at the time% there was not showing of any conflict of legal rights that would 7ustify such assumption of 7urisdiction by the 7udiciary &(ILCO)S# v. Villareal The case was declared moot and academic by the Supreme Court because a new constitution -"DC)0 was established which resulted to the abolishment of the Congress of the +hilippines &erez v. &rovincial *oar! 8 The SC held that the petitionerHs claim to an appointi'e office was rendered moot and academic when he filed a certificate of candidacy for an electi'e office Morelas v7 +e la ,osa an election protest will ha'e to be dismissed upon the e piration of the protested officialHs term. o

1&2 Proper Part+ 1Locus Standi2 Proper Part+ is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an in7ury as a result of the act complained of. -ileston v. 'lmann - . physician challenged the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the use of contracepti'es because it would be dangerous for the health of his patients. The SC held that the patients and not the physician himself were the proper parties. Cuyeg.eng v. Cruz /n a quo warranto proceeding wherein the petitioner challenges the title of the respondent who he claimed to be appointed to the Board of >edical E aminers in 'iolation of the pro'ision of the >edical .ct of "D4D. The SC dismissed the case because Cuyeg!eng had not made a claim to the position held by Cru1 E/ &arte Levitt Le'itt was not a proper party since he was not claiming the position held by =ustice Blac!. &eo$le v. Vera the court held that the 6o'ernment of the +hilippines was a proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the +robation .ct because% more than any other% it was the 6o'ernment itself that should be concerned o'er the 'alidity of its own laws. Custo!io v. Senate &resi!ent a challenge by an ordinary ta payer to the 'alidity of a law granting bac!pay to members of Congress during the period corresponding to the =apanese Occupation was dismissed as ha'ing been commenced by one who was not a proper party.

#raneta v. +inglasan The rule on ta payers has been changed% allowing an ordinary ta payer or a group of ta payers% to raise the question of the 'alidity of an appropriation law. -olentino v. COMELEC a senator had the proper party personality to see! the prohibition of a plebiscite for the ratification of a proposed amendment. &(ILCO)S# v. Gimenez an organi1ation of ta payers and citi1ens was held to be a proper party to question the constitutionality of a law pro'iding for certain special retirement benefits for members of the legislature. O$osa v. %actoran the lower court dismissed the case on the ground inter alia that the plaintiffs were not proper parties but the SC through =ustice ;ilario *a'ide re'ersed the decision because the petitioners minors has the standing to file a class suit based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Sani!a! v. COMELEC +residential decrees% the enforcement of which% will cause direct in7ury to a person% can be a source of locus standi. Macalintal v. COMELEC a lawyer who questioned the O'erseas .bsentee @oting .ct was accepted as a proper party. The court has held that they may assail the 'alidity of a law appropriating public funds because e penditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of e ecuting an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Loza!a v. COMELEC a petition to compel the respondent to call special elections to fill "$ 'acancies in the interim Batasang +ambansa was dismissed on the ground inter alia that the petitioners were not proper parties as they had only what the SC called &generali1ed interest( shared with the rest of the people. Guazon v. +e Villa The SC held that &well8 meaning citi1ens with only second8hand !nowledge of the e'ents( were not considered proper parties to challenge the saturation dri'es or &1onas( being conducted by the military. 0ilosbayan v. Morato .t first% the SC held that the petitioners who were concerned citi1ens and ta payers is the proper party to question the contract pro'iding for the holding of the lotto or a national lottery but it was re'ersed by the SC when it changed its membership. Osmena v. COMELEC the petitioner% who is also a presidential candidate% did not show that he had been in7ured as a result of the ban on political commercials on radio and tele'ision. -elecommunications an! *roa!cast #ttorneys of t1e &1ili$$ines v. COMELEC The petitioners is not the proper party in questioning the law requiring tele'ision and radio stations to allocate free time to the respondent agency.

 4rt7 9II) Sec7 -/ allows any citi1en to challenge the suspension of the pri'ilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law. 1:2 Earliest "pportunit+ C!: Constitutional questions must be raised at the earliest opportunity% such that if it is not raised in the pleadings% it cannot be considered at the trial% and% if not considered in trial% it cannot be considered on appeal. 5P': -"0 /n criminal cases% the constitutional question can be raised at any time in the discretion of the court -$0 /n ci'il cases the constitutional question can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case -)0 /n e'ery case% e cept where there is estoppel% the constitutional question can be raised at any stage if it in'ol'es the 7urisdiction of the court 182 'ecessit+ of Deciding Constitutional 3uestion 1Lis <ota2 The courts fa'or the presumption of constitutionality of a law and adheres to the ma im that &to doubt is to sustain( Doctrine of Purposeful Desitation7 The 7oint act of the legislati'e and e ecuti'e authorities% a law is supposed to ha'e been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted Laurel v. Garcia The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law( Lalican v. Vergara -same ruling as abo'e0 2an!ueta v. +e la Costa # The petitioner% an incumbent 7udge% had accepted an ad interim appointment to a new court created under a law that had reorgani1ed the 7udiciary by abolishing some 7udgeships and creating others. Ghen his appointment was bypassed% he returned to his former court in >anila but found that the respondent had already been appointed thereto. Landueta thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against *e la Costa% arguing that he had not abandoned his old court in >anila by his acceptance of the new court in +alawan. ;is reason was that the law creating the latter court was unconstitutional because it 'iolated 7udicial security of tenure. The SC held that Landueta was estopped from impugning the constitutionality of the 7udiciary reorgani1ation law. Estoppel # under this rule a person cannot question the 'alidity of a law under which he had pre'iously accepted the benefits. Ocam$o v. Sec. of 3ustice and +e la Llana v. #lba Gobenciong v. C# it is basic that the matter of constitutionality shall% as a rule% be considered if it is

the lis mota of the case and raised and argued at the earliest opportunity. Effect of Declaration of (nconstitutionalit+ "rthodox %iew 1)orton v. S1elby2 an unconstitutional act is not a law? it confers no rights? it imposes no duties? it affords no protection? it creates no office? it is% in legal contemplation% inoperati'e% as if it had not been passed. /t is stric!en from the statute boo!s and considered ne'er to ha'e e isted at all -total nullity0. .rt. C% ,CC # &when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution% former shall be 'oid and the latter shall go'ern( <odern 9iew 1operati%e fact doctrine2 The court% in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. /t simply refuses to recogni1e it and determines the rights of the parties 7ust as if such statute had no e istence. The court may gi'e the reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law% but the decision affects the parties only and there is no 7udgment against the statute. The opinion or reason of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases% but it does not stri!e the statute from the statute boo!s? it does not repeal% supersede% re'o!e or annul the statute Cases (operative fact) Manila Motors Co. v. %lores The plaintiff filed a complaint for the reco'ery of instalments which fell due in "D2". The defendant pleaded prescription% ") years ha'ing elapsed since the due date. The plaintiff argued that the prescripti'e period had been suspended by the >oratorium Law% but the defendants a'erred that the law had been declared unconstitutional and therefore no rights could be built upon it. The SC re7ected this contention and% applying considerations of equity% rela ed the operation of the general rule. -an v. *arrios -similar ruling0 ,e$ublic v. (eri!a # -similar ruling0 ,e$ublic v. C%I -similar ruling0 1-2 Partial (nconstitutionalit+ The courts could hesitate to declare a law unconstitutional and% and as long as they can% will sal'age the 'alid portions thereof in order to gi'e effect to the legislati'e will as deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. !eBuisites for Declaration of Partial (nconstitutionalit+ -"0 The legislature is willing to retain the 'alid portions e'en if the rest of the statute is declared illegal -$0 The 'alid portions can stand independently as a separate statute

 Separa#ilit+ clause # & if for any reason any section or pro'ision of this .ct is declared in'alid or unconstitutional% the remainder of the .ct shall not be affected by such declaration( But e'en without such separa#ilit+ clause it has been held that if the 'alid portion is so far independent of the 'alid portion% it may be fair to presume that the legislature would ha'e enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could constitutionally do so. /n re Cunanan # declared partly unconstitutional. The amendment in the Rules of Court was prospecti'e but the reduction of passing a'erage in the bar e amination made it unconstitutional. Macalintal Case The SC% while sustaining the O'erseas .bsentee @oting .ct% declared as unconstitutional that part of the law gi'ing Congress the power to super'ise its implementation by the CO>ELEC as inimical to the independence of the electoral body. Sando%al: 4mendment and !e%ision Lambino v. COMELEC .rt. A@// of the Constitution spea!s of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three8fourths 'ote of all its >embers. The second mode is through a constitutional con'ention. The third mode is through a peopleHs initiati'e. Section " of .rticle A@//% referring to the first and second modes% applies to &M.Nny amendment to% or re'ision of% this Constitution.( /n contrast% Section $ of .rticle A@//% referring to the third mode% applies only to &.mendments to this Constitution.( There can be no mista!e about it. The framers of the Constitution intended% and wrote% a clear distinction between &amendment( and &re'ision( of the Constitution. The framers intended% and wrote% that only Congress or a constitutional con'ention may propose re'isions to the Constitution. The framers intended% and wrote% that a peopleHs initiati'e may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Ghere the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose re'isions to the Constitution% the people cannot propose re'isions e'en as they are empowered to propose amendments. Imbong v. COMELEC The Congress% when acting as a Constituent .ssembly% pursuant to .rt. A@ of the Constitution -now .rt. A@//0% has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a con'ention for the purpose% by a three8fourths 'ote of each ;ouse in 7oint session assembled but 'oting separately. The grant to Congress as a Constituent .ssembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional con'ention includes% by 'irtue of the doctrine of necessary implication% all other powers essential to the effecti'e e ercise of the principal power granted% such as the power to fi the qualifications% number% apportionment% and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the e penses for the

election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Con'ention itself% as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful con'ention. Ghile the authority to call a constitutional con'ention is 'ested by the present Constitution solely and e clusi'ely in Congress acting as a Constituent .ssembly% the power to enact the implementing details% which are now contained in Resolutions ,os. $ and 2 as well as in R... ,o. 5")$% does not e clusi'ely pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent .ssembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the e ercise of its comprehensi'e legislati'e power% which power encompasses all matters not e pressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or remo'ed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislati'e action. .nd as long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific pro'ision of the Constitution% they are 'alid. Consequently% when Congress% acting as a Constituent .ssembly% omits to pro'ide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional con'ention% Congress% acting as a legislati'e body% can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps% which authority is e pressly recogni1ed in Sec. I of Res. ,o. $ as amended by Res. ,o. 2. The fact that a bill pro'iding for such implementing details may be 'etoed by the +resident is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislati'e body nor present any difficulty? for it is not irremediable as Congress can o'erride the +residential 'eto or Congress can recon'ene as a Constituent .ssembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details. Gonzales v. COMELEC Doctrines: 1-2 +roposal of amendments is not a political but a 7usticiable question sub7ect to 7udicial re'iew. This doctrine is reaffirmed in Sanidad '. CO>ELEC. 1&2 The choice as to whether to propose amendments or to call a constitutional con'ention for that purpose or to do both was a question of wisdom and not of authority and hence was a political question not sub7ect to re'iew by the courts. 1:2 The constituent power% or the power to amend or re'ise the Constitution% is different from the law8 ma!ing power of Congress. -ana!a v. Cuenco The courts can inquire into whether or not the prescribed procedure for amendment has been obser'ed. Lambino v. COMELEC Courts ha'e long recogni1ed the distinction between an amendment and a re'ision of a constitution. ,evision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution% li!e altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of chec!s8and balances. There is also re'ision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution% as when the change affects substantial pro'isions of the constitution. On the other hand% amen!ment broadly refers to a change that adds% reduces% or deletes !it"o#t altering the basic principle in'ol'ed. Re'ision generally affects se'eral pro'isions of the constitution% while

amendment generally affects only the specific pro'ision being amended. /n California where the initiati'e clause allows amendments but not re'isions to the constitution 7ust li!e in our Constitution% courts ha'e de'eloped a two8part test9 the $#antitative test and the $#alitative test. The Buantitati%e test as!s whether the proposed change is &so e tensi'e in its pro'isions as to change directly the Osubstantial entiretyH of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous e isting pro'isions.( The court e amines only the number of pro'isions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The Bualitati%e test inquires into the qualitati'e effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will &accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic go'ernmental plan as to amount to a re'ision.( Ghether there is an alteration in the structure of go'ernment is a proper sub7ect of inquiry. Thus% &a change in the nature of MtheN basic go'ernmental plan( includes &change in its fundamental framewor! or the fundamental powers of its Branches.( . change in the nature of the basic go'ernmental plan also includes changes that &7eopardi1e the traditional form of go'ernment and the system of chec! and balances.( :nder both the quantitati'e and qualitati'e tests% the Lambino 6roupHs initiati'e is a re'ision and not merely an amendment. %#antitativel&% the Lambino 6roupHs proposed changes o'erhaul two articles # .rticle @/ on the Legislature and .rticle @// on the E ecuti'e # affecting a total of "J4 pro'isions in the entire Constitution. %#alitativel&% the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of go'ernment% from presidential to parliamentary% and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. . change in the structure of go'ernment is a re'ision of the Constitution% as when the three great co8equal branches of go'ernment in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. . shift from the present Bicameral8 +residential system to a :nicameral8+arliamentary system is a re'ision of the Constitution. >erging the legislati'e and e ecuti'e branches is a radical change in the structure of go'ernment. The abolition alone of the Office of the +resident as the locus of E ecuti'e +ower alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a re'ision of the Constitution. Li!ewise% the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of chec!s8and8balances within the legislature and constitutes a re'ision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any 7urisdiction) a shift from a Bicameral8+residential to a :nicameral8+arliamentary system% in'ol'ing the abolition of the Office of the +resident and the abolition of one chamber of Congress% is beyond doubt a re'ision% not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino 6roupHs proposed changes% it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framewor! of go'ernment as set forth in the Constitution. 3ather =oaquin Bernas% S.=.% a leading member of the Constitutional Commission% writes9

&.n amendment en'isages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable pro'isions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to impro'e specific parts or to add new pro'isions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may ha'e become obsolete or that are 7udged to be dangerous. /n re%ision% howe'er% the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re8e amination of the entire document% or of pro'isions of the document which ha'e o'er8all implications for the entire document% to determine how and to what e tent they should be altered. Thus) for instance a switch from the presidential s+stem to a parliamentar+ s+stem would #e a re%ision #ecause of its o%er6all impact on the entire constitutional structure7 So would a switch from a #icameral s+stem to a unicameral s+stem #e #ecause of its effect on other important pro%isions of the Constitution. -Emphasis supplied0( Ghere the proposed change applies only to a specific pro'ision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article% the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a re'ision. 3or e ample% a change reducing the 'oting age from "I years to "4 years is an amendment and not a re'ision. Similarly% a change reducing 3ilipino ownership of mass media companies from "JJ percent to 5J percent is an amendment and not a re'ision. .lso% a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the +residency is an amendment and not a re'ision. The changes in these e amples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific pro'ision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of go'ernment or the system of chec!s8 and8balances among or within the three branches. These three e amples are located at the far green end of the spectrum% opposite the far red end where the re'ision sought by the present petition is located. ;owe'er% there can be no fi ed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a re'ision. . change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a re'ision and not an amendment. 3or e ample% the substitution of the word &republican( with &monarchic( or &theocratic( in Section "% .rticle // of the Constitution radically o'erhauls the entire structure of go'ernment and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus% each specific change will ha'e to be e amined case8by8case% depending on how it affects other pro'isions% as well as how it affects the structure of go'ernment% the carefully crafted system of chec!s8and8 balances% and the underlying ideological basis of the e isting Constitution. Since a re'ision of a constitution affects basic principles% or se'eral pro'isions of a constitution% a deliberati'e body with recorded proceedings is best suited to underta!e a re'ision. . re'ision requires harmoni1ing not only se'eral pro'isions% but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus% constitutions normally authori1e deliberati'e bodies li!e constituent assemblies or constitutional con'entions to underta!e re'isions. On the other hand% constitutions allow

peopleHs initiati'es% which do not ha'e fi ed and identifiable deliberati'e bodies or recorded proceedings% to underta!e only amendments and not re'isions. Doctrine of Proper Su#mission: The entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Submission for ratification of piecemeal amendments disallowed. Lambino v. COMELEC The essence of amendments &directly proposed by the people through initiati'e upon a petition( is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. %irst% the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. ,o agent or representati'e can sign on their behalf. Secon!% as an initiati'e upon a petition% the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full te t of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who e press their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus% an amendment is &directly proposed by the people through initiati'e upon a petition( only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full te t of the proposed amendments7 The full te t of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition% or attached to it. 'f so attac"ed% the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that e'ery one of the se'eral millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full te t of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise% it is physically impossible% gi'en the time constraint% to pro'e that e'ery one of the millions of signatories had seen the full te t of the proposed amendments before signing. Sando%al: Audicial !e%iew Audicial Power 4rt7 9III) Sec7 -7 The 7udicial power shall be 'ested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

legislature. /t simply carries out the solemn and sacred obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them. This is in truth all that is in'ol'ed in what is termed P7udicial supremacyP which properly is the power of 7udicial re'iew under the Constitution. -acao v. C#. The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to ma!e them conformable to law and 7ustice includes the right to re'erse itself% especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mista!e in 7udgment% and that to adhere to its decision will cause in7ustice to a party litigant.

+rilon v. Lim Do lower courts ha%e $urisdiction to consider the constitutionalit+ of a lawE The lower court had 7urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section "IC% this authority being embraced in the general definition of the 7udicial power to determine what are the 'alid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically% B+ "$D 'ests in the regional trial courtHs 7urisdiction o'er all ci'il cases in which the sub7ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. *+,*-)% e'en as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with 'iolating and of the proceedings ta!en against him% particularly as they contra'ene the Bill of Rights. >oreo'er% .rticle @///% Section 4-$0% of the Constitution 'ests in the Supreme Court appellate 7urisdiction o'er final 7udgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or 'alidity of any treaty% international or e ecuti'e agreement% law% presidential decree% proclamation% order% instruction% ordinance% or regulation is in question. Political 3uestion Doctrine I*& v. 2amora - .s a general proposition% a contro'ersy is 7usticiable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court re'iew. /t pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recogni1ed by law. ,e'ertheless% the Court does not automatically assume 7urisdiction o'er actual constitutional cases brought before it e'en in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are &political questions.( The reason is that political $#estions are concerned !it" iss#es dependent #pon t"e !isdom, not t"e le.alit&, of a partic#lar act or meas#re bein. assailed. >oreo'er% the political question being a function of the separation of powers% the courts will not normally interfere with the wor!ings of another co8equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. .s (anada v. An.ara puts it% P"LITIC4L 3(ESTI"'S refer &to t"ose $#estions !"ic", #nder t"e Constit#tion, are to be decided b& t"e people in t"eir soverei.n capacit&, or in re.ard to !"ic" f#ll discretionar& a#t"orit& "as been dele.ated to t"e le.islative or e)ec#tive branc" of

=udicial power includes the duty of the courts of 7ustice to settle actual contro'ersies in'ol'ing rights which are legally demandable and enforceable% and to determine whether or not there has been a gra'e abuse of discretion amounting to lac! or e cess of 7urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the 6o'ernment. .s early as #ngara v. Electoral -ribunal% the SC held that when it performs his chec!ing function of the co8equal branches% it is merely performing a duty imposed upon it by the Constitution? that it acts as the mechanism that implements the Psupremacy of the Constitution.P ("e e)tent to !"ic" it e)ercises t"is f#nction, "o!ever, "as been limited b& t"e political $#estion doctrine. Ghen the court allocated constitutional boundaries% it neither asserts supremacy% nor annuls the acts of the

.overnment.( Thus% if an issue is clearly identified by the te t of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of go'ernment or to the people themsel'es then it is held to be a political question. /n the classic formulation of =ustice Brennan in /aker v. Carr, &MpNrominent on the surface of any case held to in'ol'e a political question is found a te tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department? or a lac! of 7udicially disco'erable and manageable standards for resol'ing it? or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a !ind clearly for non7udicial discretion? or the impossibility of a courtQs underta!ing independent resolution without e pressing lac! of the respect due coordinate branches of go'ernment? or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made? or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 'arious departments on the one question.( The "DIC Constitution e pands the concept of 7udicial re'iew by pro'iding that 0,(-"e 1#dicial po!er s"all be vested in one S#preme Co#rt and in s#c" lo!er co#rts as ma& be establis"ed b& la!. J#dicial po!er incl#des t"e d#t& of t"e co#rts of 1#stice to settle act#al controversies involvin. ri."ts !"ic" are le.all& demandable and enforceable, and to determine !"et"er or not t"ere "as been a .rave ab#se of discretion amo#ntin. to lack or e)cess of 1#risdiction on t"e part of an& branc" or instr#mentalit& of t"e 2overnment.3 (Article 4''', Sec. * of t"e *+56 Constit#tion) :nder this definition% the Court cannot agree that the issue in'ol'ed is a political question beyond the 7urisdiction of this Court to re'iew. 7"en t"e .rant of po!er is $#alified, conditional or s#b1ect to limitations% the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions ha'e been met or the limitations respected% is 7usticiable # the problem being one of legality or 'alidity% not its wisdom. >oreo'er% the 7urisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been gi'en to this Court. 7"en political $#estions are involved% the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a gra'e abuse of discretion amounting to lac! or e cess of 7urisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. By gra%e a#use of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical e ercise of 7udgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an e'asion of positi'e duty or a 'irtual refusal to perform a duty en7oined by law% or to act at all in contemplation of law% as where the power is e ercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. :nder this definition% a co#rt is !it"o#t po!er to directl& decide matters over !"ic" f#ll discretionar& a#t"orit& "as been dele.ated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its 7udgment for that of Congress or of the +resident% it may loo! into the question of whether such e ercise has been made in gra'e abuse of discretion. . showing that plenary power is granted either department of go'ernment may not be an obstacle to 7udicial inquiry% for the impro'ident e ercise or abuse thereof may gi'e rise to 7usticiable contro'ersy. Estra!a v. +esierto - /n fine% the legal distinction between E*S. +eople +ower / and E*S. +eople +ower // is clearR E*S. / presented a political question? E*S. // in'ol'es legal questions.

,eedless to state% the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain pro'isions in the "DIC Constitution% notably Section " of .rticle //% and Section I of .rticle @//% and the allocation of go'ernmental powers under Section "" of .rticle @//. EDS4 /n'ol'es the e ercise of the people power of re'olution which o'erthrows the whole go'ernment EDS4 & .n e ercise of people power of freedom of speech S freedom of assembly to petition the go'ernment for redress and grie'ances which only affected the office of the president. /s intra8constitutional and the resignation of the sitting president that it caused and the succession of the @+ as president are sub7ect to 7udicial re'iew =usticiable question

/s e tra8constitutional and the legitimacy of the new go'ernment that resulted from it cannot be sub7ect of 7udicial re'iew

+olitical question !eBuisites of Audicial !e%iew

1-2 4ctual Case or Contro%ers+ I*& v. 2amora - .n *4CT(4L C4SE "! C"'T!"9E!S@F means an e isting case or contro'ersy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of 7udicial determination% and that which is not con7ectural or anticipatory% or that which see!s to resol'e hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. . petition raising a constitutional question does not present an &actual contro'ersy%( unless it alleges a legal right or power. >oreo'er% it must show that a conflict of rights e ists% for inherent in the term &contro'ersy( is the presence of opposing 'iews or contentions. Otherwise% the Court will be forced to resol'e issues which remain unfocused because they lac! such concreteness pro'ided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of ad'ersary arguments e ploring e'ery aspect of a multi8faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. The contro'ersy must also be 7usticiable? that is% it must be susceptible of 7udicial determination. +avi! v. Maca$agal-#rroyo - .n actual case or contro%ers+ in'ol'es a conflict of legal right% an opposite legal claims susceptible of 7udicial resolution. /t is &definite and concrete% touching the legal relations of parties ha'ing ad'erse legal interest?( a real and substantial contro'ersy admitting of specific relief. Cutaran v. +E), - . A(STICI4 LE C"'T!"9E!S@ has been defined as% &a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties ha'ing ad'erse legal interests( which may be resol'ed by a court of law through the application of a law. Co#rts "ave no 1#dicial po!er to revie! cases involvin. political $#estions and as a r#le, !ill desist from takin. co.ni8ance of spec#lative or "&pot"etical cases,

advisor& opinions and in cases t"at "as become moot. Sub7ect to certain well8defined e ceptions courts will not touch an issue in'ol'ing the 'alidity of a law unless there has been a go'ernmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct ad'erse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its 'alidity. Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of +E), - /n the case at bar% there e ist a li'e contro'ersy in'ol'ing a clash of legal rights. . law has been enacted% and the /mplementing Rules and Regulations appro'ed. >oney has been appropriated and the go'ernment agencies concerned ha'e been directed to implement the statute. /t cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the ad'erse consequences of the law in order to consider the contro'ersy actual and ripe for 7udicial resolution. /t is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law% on its face% constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership o'er lands of the public domain and other natural resources. >oreo'er% when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute% this Court possesses sufficient authority to resol'e and pre'ent imminent in7ury and 'iolation of the constitutional process. 4d%isor+ "pinion C!: . request for ad'isory opinion cannot come in the category of an actual case or contro'ersy since the issue raised does not in'ol'e any conflict in law that has assumed the proportions of a full8blown dispute. The court in this case is being as!ed only to counsel and not to decide. 5P': Ghen the purpose is to solicit from the court a declaratory 7udgment in'ol'ing the interpretation of the rights and duties of a person under the pro'isions of a deed% will% contract% or other written instrument% or a statute or ordinance% the case is deemed an actual contro'ersy o'er which the courts may 'alidly assume 7urisdiction. <oot and 4cademic Cases Gonzales v. )arvasa - .n action is considered *mootF when it no longer presents a 7usticiable contro'ersy because the issues in'ol'ed ha'e become academic or dead. +avi! v. Maca$agal-#rroyo - . moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a 7usticiable contro'ersy by 'irtue of super'ening e'ents% so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or 'alue. 6enerally% courts decline 7urisdiction o'er such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The &moot and academic( principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resol'ing a case. Courts will decide cases% otherwise moot and academic% if9 first, there is a gra'e 'iolation of the Constitution? secon!% the e ceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is in'ol'ed? t1ir!, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench% the bar% and the public? and fourt1, the case is capable of repetition yet e'ading re'iew. .ll the foregoing e ceptions are present here and 7ustify this CourtHs assumption of 7urisdiction o'er the instant petitions.

+etitioners alleged that the issuance of ++ "J"C and 6.O. ,o. 4 'iolates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publicHs interest% in'ol'ing as they do the peopleHs basic rights to freedom of e pression% of assembly and of the press. >oreo'er% the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts% doctrines or rules. /t has the s+m#olic function of educating the bench and the bar% and in the present petitions% the military and the police% on the e tent of the protection gi'en by constitutional guarantees. .nd lastly% respondentsH contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly% the petitions are sub7ect to 7udicial re'iew. #*S-C*) *roa!casting Cor$oration v. COMELEC - Ghile the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the >ay ""% "DDI election% its implications on the peopleHs fundamental freedom of e pression transcends the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic go'ernment. By its 'ery nature% e it polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a tas! that could well crop up again in future elections. /n any e'ent% in Salon.a v. Cr#8 Pano% the Court had occasion to reiterate that it Palso has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles% precepts% doctrines% or rules. /t has the s+m#olic function of educating bench and bar on the e tent of protection gi'en by constitutional guarantees.P Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being in'o!ed here% we ha'e resol'ed to settle% for the guidance of posterity% whether they li!ewise protect the holding of e it polls and the dissemination of data deri'ed therefrom. Proper Part+ I*& v. 2amora - GLegal standingG or locus stan!i has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in7ury as a result of the go'ernmental act that is being challenged. The term PinterestP means a material interest% an interest in issue affected by the decree% as distinguished from mere interest in the question in'ol'ed% or a mere incidental interest. The .ist of t"e $#estion of standin. is whether a party alleges Psuch personal sta!e in the outcome of the contro'ersy as to assure that concrete ad'erseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.P +avi! v. Maca$agal-#rroyo - Locus stan!i is defined as &a right of appearance in a court of 7ustice on a gi'en question.( /n pri'ate suits% standing is go'erned by the &real8parties8in interest( rule as contained in Section $% Rule ) of the "DDC Rules of Ci'il +rocedure% as amended. /t pro'ides that &e'ery action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.( .ccordingly% the *real6part+6in interestF is the party who stands to be benefited or in7ured by the 7udgment in the suit or the party entitled to the a'ails of the suit.( Succinctly put% the plaintiffHs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

("e diffic#lt& of determinin. loc#s standi arises in $ublic suits. ;ere% the plaintiff who asserts a &public right( in assailing an allegedly illegal official action% does so as a representati'e of the general public. ;e may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. ;e could be suing as a &stranger%( or in the category of a &citi1en(% or &ta payer.( /n either case% he has to adequately show that he is entitled to see! 7udicial protection. /n other words% he has to ma!e out a sufficient interest in the 'indication of the public order and the securing of relief as a &citi1en( or &ta payer.( Case law in most 7urisdictions now allows both citi1en and ta payer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in /ea#c"amp v. Silk% where it was held that the plaintiff in a ta payerHs suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citi1enHs suit. /n the former% the plaintiff is affected by the e penditure of public funds% while in the latter% he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. .s held by the ,ew <or! Supreme Court in People e) rel Case v. Collins9 &/n matter of mere public right% howe'er% the people are the real parties. /t is at least the right% if not the duty% of e'ery citi1en to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished% and that a public grie'ance be remedied.( Gith respect to ta payerHs suits% (err v. Jordan held that &the right of a citi1en and a ta payer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his in7ury cannot be denied.( ;owe'er% to pre'ent 7ust about any person from see!ing 7udicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with% and thus hinders the acti'ities of go'ernmental agencies engaged in public ser'ice% the :nited State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent &direct in$ur+ testF in 9) Parte Levitt% later reaffirmed in (ileston v. :llman. The same Court ruled that for a pri'ate indi'idual to in'o!e the 7udicial power to determine the 'alidity of an e ecuti'e or legislati'e action% he must show that he has sustained a direct in7ury as a result of that action% and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the &direct in$ur+ testF in our 7urisdiction. /n People v. 4era% it held that the person who impugns the 'alidity of a statute must ha'e &a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained% or will sustain direct in7ury as a result.( O$osa v. %actoran - This case% howe'er% has a special and no'el element. +etitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Ge find no difficulty in ruling that they can% for themsel'es% for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations% file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsi#ilit+ insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. ,eedless to say% e'ery generation has a responsibility to the ne t to preser'e that rhythm and harmony for the full en7oyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. +ut a little differently% the minorsQ assertion of their right to a sound en'ironment constitutes% at the same time% the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Li#eral 4ttitude of the SC on Locus Standi I*& v. 2amora - /t must be emphasi1ed that this Court has the discretion to ta!e cogni1ance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is in'ol'ed. /n not a few cases% the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus% when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public% the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. +avi! v. Maca$agal-#rroyo - ;owe'er% being a mere procedural technicality% the requirement of loc#s standi may be wai'ed by the Court in the e ercise of its discretion. This was done in the "D2D Emergency +owers Cases% Araneta v. ;in.lasan% where the &transcendental importanceF of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. /n A$#ino v. C<=9L9C% this Court resol'ed to pass upon the issues raised due to the &far reaching implicationsF of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. /ndeed% there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been obser'ed% allowing ordinary citi1ens% and members of Congress% and ci'ic organi1ations to prosecute actions in'ol'ing the constitutionality or 'alidity of laws% regulations and rulings. Thus% the Court has adopted a rule that even !"ere t"e petitioners "ave failed to s"o! direct in1#r&, t"e& "ave been allo!ed to s#e under the principle of &transcendental importance.( +ertinent are the following cases9 -"0 C1avez v. &ublic Estates #ut1ority, where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with loc#s standi? -$0 *agong #lyansang Ma.abayan v. 2amora, wherein the Court held that &gi'en the transcendental importance of the issues in'ol'ed% the Court may rela the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lac! of direct in7ury to the parties see!ing 7udicial re'iew( of the @isiting 3orces .greement? -)0 Lim v. E/ecutive Secretary) while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as ta payers absent a showing that &Bali!atan J$8J"( in'ol'es the e ercise of CongressH ta ing or spending powers% it reiterated its ruling in /a.on. Al&ansan. =akaba&an v. >amora, that in cases of transcendental importance% the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be rela ed. By way of summary% the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpa+ers) %oters) concerned citiHens) and legislators ma+ #e accorded standing to sue) pro%ided that the following reBuirements are met: (11 The cases in'ol'e constitutional issues?

(11 3or taxpa+ers% there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the ta measure is unconstitutional? (11 3or %oters% there must be a showing of ob'ious interest in the 'alidity of the election law in question? (11 3or concerned citiHens% there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early? and (11 3or legislators% there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogati'es as legislators. Significantly% recent decisions show a certain toughening in the CourtHs attitude toward legal standing. /n ?ilosba&an, 'nc. v. =orato% the Court ruled that the status of ?ilosba&an as a peopleHs organi1ation does not gi'e it the requisite personality to question the 'alidity of the on8line lottery contract% more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. >oreo'er% it cannot sue as a ta payer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. ,or can it sue as a concerned citi1en as it does not allege any specific in7ury it has suffered. /n (elecomm#nications and /roadcast Attorne&s of t"e P"ilippines, 'nc. v. C<=9L9C% the Court reiterated the &direct in7ury test( with respect to concerned citi1ens cases in'ol'ing constitutional issues. /t held that &there must be a showing that the citi1en personally suffered some actual or threatened in7ury arising from the alleged illegal official act.( /n Lacson v. Pere8% the Court ruled that one of the petitioners% Laban n. ;emokratikon. Pilipino -L*+0% is not a real party8 in8interest as it had not demonstrated any in7ury to itself or to its leaders% members or supporters. /n Sanlakas v. 9)ec#tive Secretar&% the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress ha'e standing to sue% as they claim that the +residentHs declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress% thus impairing their legislati'e powers. .s to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido =an..a.a!a, and Social J#stice Societ&% the Court declared them to be de'oid of standing% equating them with the L*+ in Lacson. ,ow% the application of the abo'e principles to the present petitions. The loc#s standi of petitioners in C7!7 'o7 -0-:.=% particularly *a'id and Llamas% is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in C7!7 'o7 -0-8I.% Cacho8 Oli'ares and (rib#ne +ublishing Co. /nc. They alleged &direct in7ury( resulting from &illegal arrest( and &unlawful search( committed by police operati'es pursuant to ++ "J"C. Rightly so% the Solicitor 6eneral does not question their legal standing. /n C7!7 'o7 -0-8/>% the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislati'e powers. They also raised

the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whene'er the alarming powers incident to >artial Law are used. >oreo'er% it is in the interest of 7ustice that those affected by ++ "J"C can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged 'iolations of their basic rights. /n C7!7 'o7 -0-8II% -.L6/0% this Court applied the liberality rule in P"ilconsa v. 9nri$#e8% ?apatiran @. =.a @a.lilin.kod sa Pama"alaan n. Pilipinas, 'nc. v. (an% Association of Small Lando!ners in t"e P"ilippines, 'nc. v. Secretar& of A.rarian Aeform% /asco v. P"ilippine Am#sement and 2amin. Corporation, and (anada v. (#vera% that when the issue concerns a public right% it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citi1en and has an interest in the e ecution of the laws. /n C7!7 'o7 -0-8/:% T>:Hs assertion that ++ "J"C and 6.O. ,o. 4 'iolated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to gi'e it legal standing. Organi1ations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members. Ge ta!e 7udicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the +resident banning all rallies and cancelling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of ++ "J"C and 6.O. ,o. 4. /n C7!7 'o7 -0-8/.% petitioners% Cadi8 et al., who are national officers of the /ntegrated Bar of the +hilippines -/B+0 ha'e no legal standing% ha'ing failed to allege any direct or potential in7ury which the /B+ as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of ++ ,o. "J"C and 6.O. ,o. 4. /n 'nte.rated /ar of t"e P"ilippines v. >amora, the Court held that the mere in'ocation by the /B+ of its duty to preser'e the rule of law and nothing more% while undoubtedly true% is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citi1enry. ;owe'er% in 'iew of the transcendental importance of the issue% this Court declares that petitioner ha'e loc#s standi. /n C7!7 'o7 -0-8&8% Loren Legarda has no personality as a ta payer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogati'es as a lawma!er ha'e been impaired by ++ "J"C and 6.O. ,o. 4. ;er claim that she is a media personality will not li!ewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances pre'ented her from pursuing her occupation. ;er submission that she has pending electoral protest before the +residential Electoral Tribunal is li!ewise of no rele'ance. She has not sufficiently shown that ++ "J"C will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue in'ol'ed% this Court may rela the standing rules. /t must always be borne in mind that the question of loc#s standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper e ercise of 7udicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the &liberality doctrine( on legal standing. /t cannot be doubted that the 'alidity of ++ ,o. "J"C and 6.O. ,o. 4 is a 7udicial question which is of paramount importance to the 3ilipino

people. To paraphrase =ustice Laurel% the whole of +hilippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this 'ery critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the &transcendental importance doctrine(% a rela ation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the ++ "J"C cases. This Court holds that all the petitioners herein ha'e loc#s standi. Taxpa+erJs Suit #nti-Graft League of t1e &1ili$$ines v. San 3uan To constitute a ta payerQs suit% two reBuisites must be met% namely% that pu#lic funds are dis#ursed #+ a political su#di%ision or instrumentalit+ and in doing so% a law is %iolated or some irregularit+ is committed% and that the petitioner is directl+ affected #+ the alleged ultra %ires act. :ndeniably% as a ta payer% petitioner would somehow be ad'ersely affected by an illegal use of public money. Ghen% howe'er% no such unlawful spending has been shown% as in the case at bar% petitioner% e'en as a ta payer% cannot question the transaction 'alidly e ecuted by and between the +ro'ince and Ortigas for the simple reason that it is not pri'y to said contract. Gonzales v. )arvasa - . ta payer is deemed to ha'e the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds ha'e been disbursed in alleged contra'ention of the law or the Constitution. Thus% a ta payerHs action is properly brought only when there is an e ercise by Congress of its ta ing or spending power Earliest "pportunit+: C!: /f not raised in the pleadings% it cannot be considered at the trial% and if not considered at the trial% it cannot be considered on appeal. 5P': ". in criminal cases # can be raised at any time in the discretion of the court. $. 'n civil cases # can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself. ). 'n ever& case, e)cept !"ere t"ere is estoppel # can be raised at any stage if it in'ol'es the 7urisdiction of the court. 'ecessit+ of Deciding Constitutional 3uestion Laurel v. Garcia - The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. 4era, BC P"il. CB ,*+D6-). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law.

Lalican v. Vergara - Thus% e'en if all the requisites for 7udicial re'iew of a constitutional matter are present in a case% this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds% such as the application of the statute or general law.