BERNARDITA B.

ASUNCION
FACTS:

R. MACARIOLA

vs. HONORABLE

ELIAS

[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.]

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968, Macariola charged respondent Judge with "acts unbecoming a judge." The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of the complaint charged. HELD: The Court held that although the provision incorporated in the Code of Commerce is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Therefore, respondent was acquitted but reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent. [G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947.] FACTS: Petitioner was acting on a petition for habeas corpus based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. ISSUE: W/N the petition is tenable. HELD: The Court held that there was only suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy

passes temporarily to the occupant. Consequently, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation. Moreover, the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people. Petition denied. THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR. [G.R. No. 101949. December 1, 1994.] FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants. However, the burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines. ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is immune from suit. HELD: The Lateran Treaty, entered into by Italy and the Holy See, established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations." As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. Moreover, the lot in question was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The transfer of the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell it for profit or gain. Petition granted. The complaint against petitioner was likewise dismissed. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO [G.R. No. 76607. February 26, 1990.] FACTS:

The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base. In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center. It had been ascertained after investigation that he had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners. In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. The defendants argued that they were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are immune from suit. HELD: A state may not be sued without its consent. This is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. In G.R. No. 76607, petition is dismissed because there was implied waiver by the state when it entered into a contract with the barbershops which are commercial enterprises. In G.R. No. 79470, the state impliedly divested its immunity when it entered into the employment contract with complainant in the discharge of its proprietary functions. However, the complaint was still dismissed because the acts of complainant were not proper. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition was granted because the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. However, in GR No 80258, the court held that they still need to determine in what capacity the petitioners were acting to decide if they are immune. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR [G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973.] FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge declaring a decision

final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines upon the alleged ground of excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. Thus, it assailed that notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void. ISSUE: W/N the writ of execution is valid. HELD: The Court held that what was done by the Judge is not in conformity with the Constitution mandating that the state and its government is immune from suit, unless waived. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action `only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. Petition is thereby granted. DALE SANDERS vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II [G.R. No. L-46930. June 10, 1988.] FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer are employed as gameroom attendants. Their employment had been converted from permanent fulltime to permanent part-time. They protested the conversion and it was recommended for their reinstatement plus backwages. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners were performing their official duties. HELD: It is abundantly clear that the acts of the petitioners were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is the same with Moreau. Thus, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government and as such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

BUREAU OF PRINTING, et al. vs. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al. [G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961.] FACTS: The complaint by respondents alleged petitioners engaging in unfair labor practice. Petitioners denied the charges and alleged that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued, that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing governmental functions. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are immune from suit. HELD: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657) operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President. It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. Complaints dismissed. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN [G.R. No. L-33112. June 15, 1978.] FACTS: A writ of execution, followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of funds for the full amount mentioned in the writ, was issued by respondent Judge against petitioner. Petitioner with whose La Union Branch the funds to be garnished are deposited, objected and raised the doctrine of non-suability of the state, alleging that such funds are public in character. Failing to have the order set aside, petitioner instituted this present action. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is immune from suit. HELD: Petitioner is a public corporation whose funds could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment. When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules law governing private corporations. Petition dismissed. ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, et al. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, et al.

G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919 FACTS: Lukban, then Mayor of the City of Manila, with Hoffman, Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women prostitutes without the latters consent and knowledge and deported them to Davao and signed them in as laborers. Petitioner then filed for habeas corpus. ISSUE: W/N the acts of the respondent were valid. HELD: Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. It is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. The writ for habeas corpus granted. LAO H. ICHONG vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ [G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957.] FACTS: Congress passed RA 1180 (Retail Trade Nationalization Act) which provides for prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. Petitioner charged that the said law is unconstitutional for it violates the international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines and it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law. In response, it was contended that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed. ISSUE: W/N the Act is constitutional. HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Petition denied.

Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Petitioners assert that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern and contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency. Respondents deny that petitioners have the legal standing to sue. ISSUE/s: 1. W/N petitioners have legal standing. 2. W/N contentions of the petitioner are tenable. HELD: As the present petition is anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. However, petitioners' demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents' claim of executive privilege being valid. The petition is DISMISSED. JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, et al. vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN JR., et al. [G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.] FACTS: The petitioners, duly represented by their parents, imposed for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) and to cease and desist from approving new ones. They are suing not only as taxpayers but also in behalf of the succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility concerning the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. ISSUE: W/N defendants claims are tenable. HELD: The Court ruled that while the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category

MAXIMO CALALANG vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL. [G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.] FACTS: The petition is for the writ of prohibition to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works, pursuant to authority conferred to it by Commonwealth Act No. 548, pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Street to traffic animal-drawn vehicles for a year. It contends that such exercise of power is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: W/N the CA 548 is unconstitutional. HELD: The Court held that the contention is untenable. The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power because the authority conferred upon them is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act. The delegated power, if at all, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated, which is essentially an administrative function and therefore, it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. Petition denied. AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), et al. vs. THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al. [G.R. No. 170516. July 16, 2008.] FACTS: Petitioners seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership

of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, petition is granted. ATTORNNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, et al. vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) [G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991.] FACTS: PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. The petitioners are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to some state policies enunciated in the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the allegations of the petitioner are appreciable. HELD: Police power is "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked", its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Thus, petition is dismissed.

DANTE O. CASIBANG vs. HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO [G.R. No. L-38025. August 20, 1979.] FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former on the grounds of violations of the 1971 Election Code. During the proceedings, the 1973 Constitution took effect which created a parliamentary form of government. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction and the issue became moot and academic. The trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. ISSUE: W/N the protest involved is a political question. HELD: The Court ruled that the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest case. The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. Thus, if the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same. Petition granted. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ET AL., [G.R. No. L-6266. February 2, 1953.] FACTS: The petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first for urgent and essential public works, and the second for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. The EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 671 which authorizes the President to promulgate rules and regulations during a state of war or any other national emergency. ISSUE: W/N the EOs are valid. HELD: The Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress met in regular session and on June 9, 1945 (when the Congress convened in special session). Express repeal is not necessary; otherwise it would be unconstitutional since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. CA No. 671 lasted only during

the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines. That emergency terminated upon the ending of said war. Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void. THE UNITED STATES vs. ANG TANG HO [G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922.] FACTS: The Governor-General, pursuant to the authority vested by Act No. 2868, issued E.O. 53, published on August 20, 1919, fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Respondent was convicted for violating said law by selling rice at a price greater than that fixed on August 6, 1919, to which he appealed. ISSUE: W/N respondent is liable. HELD: The Court is of the opinion and holds that Act No. 2868 in so far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. One the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. After the passage of Act No. 2868, and without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price and he would not commit a crime. There was no legislative act which made it a crime to sell rice at any price. Defendant discharged. [G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.] RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of EO 626-A, with which he was charged, insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: W/N EO 626-A is valid.

HELD: The Court ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Wherefore, EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL [G.R. No. L-23825. December 24, 1965.] FACTS: President issued a series of EOs, pursuant to Sec. 28 of the Revised Administrative Code, creating 33 municipalities. The petition was to prohibit the respondent from passing in audit the budget for the implementation of said EOs for being null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: W/N there was valid delegation of legislative power. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In the absence of the said tests, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 28of the RAC does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of legislative authority. Therefore, the EOs are declared null and void ab initio and the petition for prohibition granted.