WARNING! DOUBLE CHECK IF THE CASES (CONTENTS) ARE CORRECT.

:)
1. UMALI VS. ESTANISLAO 209 SCRA 446 Facts: Congress enacted RA 7167 entitled An act adjusting the basic personal and additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level, amending for the purpose Sec.29 of the NIRC. The said act was signed and approved by the President on Dec.19, 1991 and published on Jan.14, 1992 in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. Sec.3 of the said act states: This act shall take effect upon its approval, while Sec.5 states: These regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992. Issue: WON RA 7167 took effect upon its approval by the president on Dec.19, 1991 or on Jan.30 1992, 15 days after its publication? Held: RA 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992 after 15 days of its publication. (Tanada vs Tuvera) The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended. 2. PP VS. DONATO 198 SCRA 130 Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed which was dismissed on 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 3. PP VS. LICERA 65 SCRA 270 Facts: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable. HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule. 4. CO VS. CA 227 SCRA 444 FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 also known as the Bouncing Check Law was filed against the petitioner after issuing a check on September 1, 1982 which

was dishonored on January 3, 1984. Related regulations of BP22 were released as Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, which was meant to free the drawer of the bouncing check, any criminal liability when the issuance of the check is part of an agreement to guarantee or secure payment of an obligation, and as Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984, which was meant to overrule the former and contained express mandate for prospective application of the regulation. ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 12 is applicable to the case at bar. HELD: It was opined that the interpretation of the Court constitutes a part of the law as stated in Art 8 of the New Civil Code, thus, the Circulars earning the power of law resulted from the cognizance of them by the Court as manifested by the Court decisions prior to the ruling of the case at bar. The Court further held that, although the Circulars have the power of law, Circular 12 can not be applied to the case at bar as that would be tantamount to giving retroactive effect which is in direct violation of the Circular itself and the Art 4 of the New Civil Code mandating prospective application of the law. The Court resolved that the assailed decisions of the inferior courts are reversed and set aside. Criminal prosecution is dismissed with costs de oficio. 5. NATIONAL MARKETING CORP. VS. TECSON 29 SCRA 70 Facts: December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year, they insisted that a year means a calendar year and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellant's theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil code. Issue: Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. Held: The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree. 6. QUIZON VS. BALTAZAR 76 SCRA 560 This is a petion for certiorari and prohibition to declare null and void the orders of the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, issued in criminal cases Federico Quizon and Profitisa Quizon, dated July 11 and August 17, 1964, respectively, denying petitioners' motion to quash the criminal complaints against them based on the ground of prescription of the offense of serious oral defamation of which they were charged, and to prohibit said court from proceeding further with the said criminal cases, except to dismiss the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtu FACTS:

On May 11, 1964, private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, with the assistance of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, filed with respondent court two separate criminal complaints both for serious oral defamation, the one against petitioner Federico Quizon and the other petitioner Profitisa Quizon, committed on the same day, November 11, 1963. Upon being called for arraignment, petitioner presented a written motion to quash contending principally that the offense charged had already prescribed as of May 9, 1964. Stating the provision of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of oral defamation prescribes in six months. Thus, From Nov. 12 to 30, 1963 there were December, 1963 had January, 1964 had February, 1964 had March, 1964 had April, 1964 had From May 1 to 9, 1964 was a matter of From Nov. 12, 1963 to May 9, 1964 were. 19 days

31 days 31 days 29 days 31 days 30 days 9 days

180 days

The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss by making a computation of time. Thus, from Nov. 12, 1963 to May 11, 1964 are 180 days pursuant to the provision (of the said Article 13) contained in paragraph 3 which reads "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included". From Nov. 12 to 30, 1964, there are December January February March 19 days 30 days 30 days 30 days 30 days

April From May 1 to 11, 1964, there are From Nov. 12, 1963 to May 11, 1964 are

30 days 11 days 180 days

Overruling their motion, respondent court reasoned out thus: Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, in providing for the prescriptive period for oral defamation, speaks of month, not of day, as the basic unit in reckoning the duration of the prescription, when it says that "offenses of oral defamation ... shall prescribe in six months." Article 13 of the new Civil Code says that "when the laws speak of ..., months, ..., it shall be understood that ... month ... of thirty days each ... It says further that "If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. Conformably to these legal provisions and applying the same to the case at bar, the computation given by the public prosecutor appears to be correct. The month of November was designated in the complaint so it will be given the number of days it has in the calendar which is 30 days. Hence this present petition. ISSUE: Whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. HELD: In accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code the "month" mentioned in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the period of prescription commences to run from the day "on which the crime is discovered by the offended party," it is logical to presume, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code meant or intended to mean that in the computation of the period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and the last one included, in accord with existing laws. The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months. Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, ... Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of the Month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be

understood as containing 30 days; With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). Hence, where the crime was committed on November 11, 1963, and the action was filed exactly 180 days later, said action was filed on time. 7. BELLIS VS. BELLIS GR. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967 FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conicts rule (rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply). ISSUE: Are they entitled to their legitimes? HELD: Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law which we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. (See Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code). (2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that Texas has a conicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law because the deceased was BOTH a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conicts of law rule in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500). (3) The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect states that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG, rstly because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special provisions, while Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because Congress deleted the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.16 in the new. It must have been its purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specic provision in itself, which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent . It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in

our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. (4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedents intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court rules in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored. 8. GLOBE MCKAY VS. CA 176 SCRA 778 Facts: On November 10, 1972, private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed. Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. In the case at bar, SC invoked Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code provided as follows:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. While Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, Article 21 provides for the remedy on the action for damages. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code and by such, it gives Tobias the right to recover damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. 9. PNB VS. CA 83 SCRA 236 Principles: Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. FACTS: Philamgen executed a bond, with defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio in favour of PNB San Fernando Branch in the amount of P2,000 to guarantee the payment of Tapnios account on said bank. In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever amount the bonding company would pay to the Philippine National Bank, both defendants executed the indemnity agreement. Under the terms and conditions of this indemnity agreement, whatever amount the plaintiff would pay would earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the whole amount due in case of court litigation. It is not disputed that defendant was indebted to PNB San Fernando in the amount of P2,000 plus accumulated interests. Despite the banks series of demands, Tapnio failed to pay her debts. Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio admitted all the foregoing facts. She claims, however, when demand was made upon her by plaintiff for her to pay her debt to the Bank, that she told the Plaintiff that she did not consider herself to be indebted to the Bank at all because she had an agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the latter her unused export sugar quota for the 1956-1957 agricultural year, consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80 per picul, or for a total of P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her obligation guaranteed by plaintiff's bond.

This lease agreement, according to her, was with the knowledge of the bank. But the Bank has placed obstacles to the consummation of the lease, and the delay caused by said obstacles forced 'Nazon to rescind the lease contract. Thus, Rita Gueco Tapnio filed her third-party complaint against the Bank to recover from the latter any and all sums of money which may be adjudged against her and in favor of the plaitiff plus moral damages, attorney's fees and costs. At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation for the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop. This arrangement was necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on the crop, may effectively enforce collection against her. Her sugar cannot be exported without sugar quota allotment Sometimes, however, a planter harvest less sugar than her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use. This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon regarding the former's excess quota for 1956-1957. Tuazon informed the bank that he be notified as to when the bank needs the money so he can execute a promissory note. The manager of the San Fernando branch forwarded his recommendation to VP JV Buenaventura and the Board of the PNB for approval of the loan of Tapnio. The board recommended to increase the quota to P3.00 per piculs not P2.00 to which Tuazon asked for reconsideration but the left the request unacted considering that the prevailing price was P3.00 per picul. Tuazon later wrote to the bank that he is rescinding the contract and thus leaving Tacnio losing P2,800 which she could have received from Tuazon to pay for her indebtedness to the bank. Philamgen filed a collection case against Tapnio for the bond it paid to the PNB. Tapnio in turn filed a third-party complaint against PNB on the ground that Tapnios failure to pay was due to the fault or negligence of the Bank. PNB argued that it was not negligent because under its charter and provisions of Corporation Code, it is authoprized to approve or disapprove loans and in fixing the rate of the rent of P3.00 per piculs, it was guided by statistics based on the prevailing rate. TC ruled that the rescission of the contract of Tuazon was due to the banks unjustified refusal to approve said contract. CA affirmed the decision of the TC. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Was the bank negligent? HELD: YES It has been clearly shown that when the Branch Manager of petitioner required the parties to raise the consideration of the lease from P2.50 to P2.80 per picul, or a total of P2,800-00, they readily agreed. Hence, in his letter to the Branch Manager of the Bank on August 10, 1956, Tuazon informed him that the minimum lease rental of P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him and that he even offered to use the loan secured by him from petitioner to pay in full the sum of P2,800.00 which was the total consideration of the lease. This arrangement was not only satisfactory to the Branch Manager but it was also approves by Vice-President J. V. Buenaventura of the PNB. Under that arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio could have realized the amount of P2,800.00, which was more than enough to pay the balance of her indebtedness to the Bank which was secured by the bond of Philamgen. There is no question that Tapnio's failure to utilize her sugar quota for the crop year 1956-1957 was due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of petitioner. The issue, therefore, is whether or not petitioner is liable for the damage caused.

"The fact that there were isolated transactions wherein the consideration for the lease was P3.00 a picul", according to the trial court, "does not necessarily mean that there are always ready takers of said price. " The unreasonableness of the position adopted by the petitioner's Board of Directors is shown by the fact that the difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board amounted only to a total sum of P200.00. Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured by chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of leasehold rights and interests on her properties, and surety bonds and that she had apparently "the means to pay her obligation to the Bank, as shown by the fact that she has been granted several sugar crop loans of the total value of almost P80,000.00 for the agricultural years from 1952 to 1956", there was no reasonable basis for the Board of Directors of petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a measly sum of P200.00. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body." Decision of CA is affirmed. 10. LAGUNZAD VS. GONZALES 92 SCRA 476 Principle: Art 26 of the NCC, every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons FACTS: Manuel Lagunzad had produced a film based on the life of Moises Padilla Story. The film was based on the book written by Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr. entitled, The Long Dark Night in Negros the rights of which was bought by Lagunzad in the amount of P2,000.00.

The book narrates the death of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty canididate under Nacionalista Party [a minority party] against Gov Rafael Lacson of Liberal Party, he and his men were tried and convicted in the People v Lacson, et al case. In the book, Moises Padilla was portrayed a martyr. Although the movie portrayed the public life of Mosises Padilla, there were scenes which touch the private life of Moises and the mother Gonzalesa scene whom Gonzales had relationship with Auring. Prior to the scheduled Premiere Showing of the film, the half-sister of Moises called the petitioner expressing her objections to some scenes and called the movie as exploitation of Mo ises life. In writing, Gonzales demanded that the film be changed and some scenes be deleted. Since Lagunzad had spent so much for the completion of the film, he agreed to enter into a licensing agreement with Gonzales. In the agreement, it was stipulated that Laginzad will pay Gonzales P20,000.00 which will be paid in three instalments but P5,000 will be advanced and 2 & % of the gross income as royalty. For failure of Lagunzad to pay the agreed amount, Gonzales brought a collection case against him. Lagunzad averred that the contract be declared null and void on the ground that he signed the agreement under duress since he was only forced to concede to the agreement when Gonzales threatened him that she will call a press conference and tell the media that the movie was inaccurate. Gonzales argued that the film pryed the privacy of her family and as such Lagunzad is liable for damages. The trial court ordered Lagunzad to pay. CA affirmed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: WON the film violates Art 26 of the NCC HELD: YES. The film was disrespectful to the dignity and privacy of the defendant. Neither do we agree with petitioner's submission that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, 14 "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased." Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. We also find it difficult to sustain petitioner's posture that his consent to the Licensing Agreement was procured thru duress, intimidation and undue influence exerted on him by private respondent and her daughters at a time when he had exhausted his financial resources, the premiere showing of the picture was imminent, and "time was of the essence. As held in Martinez vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, it is necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present when one gives his consent

reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires, or even against his better judgment. In legal effect, there is no difference between a contract wherein one of the contracting parties exchanges one condition for another because he looks for greater profit or gain by reason of such change, and an agreement wherein one of the contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either case, he makes a choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing Agreement has the force of law between the contracting parties and since its provisions are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner Should comply with it in good faith. Wherefore, petition is denied. Decision of TC and CA are affirmed. 11. AYER PRODUCTION VS. CAPULONG 160 SCRA 861 Facts: Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), envisioned for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact ment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour miniseries television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. Private respondent Enrile replied to a letter asking for permission to air the movie that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. Private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. The trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series film would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression.

Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. Respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. Hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution constitutes an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."

Ruling: No, the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy" due to the following reasons:

1. The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

2. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family.

3. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:" A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession

or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscriminately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. 12. MENDOZA VS. ALCALA 2 SCRA 1032 FACTS: "Extinction of penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Prior to September 12, 1965, in Criminal Case No. 3219, plaintiff, Gaudencio T. Mendoza, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija

charging the defendant, Maximo M. Alcala, with the crime of estafa predicated upon a receipt. The court eventually acquitted Alcala of the offense charged with the findings that prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had in fact represented to Gaudencio T. Mendoza that he had 100 cavans of palay stored in his sister's bodega, which he offered to sell for P1,100.00. The Court cannot believe that Gaudencio T. Mendoza would pay to the defendant the sum of P1,100.00 on the mere representation of the defendant that the palay was in the bodega of his sister, and on his request to pay him first as he was going to Manila. In the first place, there is no showing why the defendant was in urgent need of P1,100.00. Defendant also testified that he had no palay and had no land from which to raise that palay, which matter should be known by Mendoza as they had known each other for a long time and were even friends. However, the Court does not expressly pass upon the defense that the receipt signed by him arose from a usurious loan, as there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that there had been no deceit or misrepresentation and that the receipt is not what it purports to be. Any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character and not criminal. On December 16, 1954, while said criminal case was still pending, the plaintiff filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the complaint by which this case was initiated. That complaint was based on the very same receipt upon which the criminal action was predicated, and in it plaintiff, after alleging violation of the terms of said receipt, asked for judgment against the defendant for the sum of P1,100.00, with legal interest from September 5, 1953 until full payment plus P550.00 for damages, P300.00 for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. Defendant in his answer contented that effect that the transaction referred to in the complaint was a usurious loan in the sum of P500.00, and that the same had already been paid in full, and filed for counterclaim for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant could still be prosecuted for the collection of the amount stated in the said receipt after he had been acquitted by the Court on a charge of estafa based on the said receipt. RULING: YES

The pertinent provisions of law are Article 29 of the new Civil Code and Rule 107, Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Rules of Court. Article 29 of the new Civil Code provides: Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. A judgment of acquittal does not constitute a bar to a subsequent civil action involving the same subject matter, even in regard to a civil action brought against the defendant by the State, nor is it evidence of his innocence in such

action, and is not admissible in evidence to prove that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged. The declaration in the decision in Criminal Case No. 3219 to the effect that "any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character, and not criminal," amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party, Philippine National Bank vs. Catipon, supra, and the offense charged in said criminal case being estafa, which is fraud, the present action falls under the exception to the general rule and it can be filed independently of the criminal action. (Article 33, new Civil Code; Dianeta vs. Makasiar, 55 O.G. 10273; People vs. Balagtas, 51 O.G. 5714.) 13. MENDOZA VS. ARRIETA 91 SCRA 113 FACTS:On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. Two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya. The action against the truck-driver Montoya was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner. The trial Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand, accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled. Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Thereafter, another case was filed against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Issue: Whether or not the driver of the jeep(salazar) shall be held liable on damages ensued to the vehicle of the petitioner after acquittal of the driver on the criminal charged upon him.

Held: Jeep Owner driver Salazar was acquitted in Criminal Case. Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, the accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-ownerdriver Salazar in the criminal case where, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished as well. And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil code.

14. REPUBLIC VS. BELLO 120 SCRA 203 Facts: Private respondent Romeo Arceno was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds in the amount of P6,619.34 which he supposedly failed to produce or to make proper accounting thereof after repeated demands. A decision was rendered acquitting the accused due to insufficiency of evidence to establish his beyond reasonable doubt. After the acquittal, the Provincial Fiscal filed Civil Case No. V-3339 for the recovery of the total sum of P13,790.71 which represented the accountability of Arceo due to his failure to issue official receipts and to immediately deposit said funds with the National Treasury, and instead spent the said funds or disbursed them without complying with the requirements applicable to disbursements of public funds, with intent to defraud the government. A motion to dismissed was filed by the private respondent on the ground that petitioner has no cause of action. This was granted by the public respondent. Hence, this appeal. Petitioner maintains that the decision in the criminal case does not contain any declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Issue: Whether or not the judgment rendered in the criminal case acquitting the accused is a bar to the recovery of the petitioner of civil liability against the private respondent. Ruling: No. The dispositive portion of the decision in the criminal case did not state that the facts upon which his responsibility as an accountable officer is based were non-existent. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. 15. PADILLA VS. CA 129 SCRA 558 NOTES: This case explains the provision of Article 29 - where the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases, where the court expressly declares that the civil liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.

FACTS: Petitioners, in this case, were accused of grave coercion by Antonio Vergara and his family for destroying their stall in the market. Petitioners which involved a mayor and policemen contend that removal of complainants market stall was pursuant to the enacted municipal ordinance which gives the town mayor the power to order the clearance of market stall as it was considered nuisance per se. Lower court found the petitioners guilty of grave coercion beyond reasonable doubt and imposed the payment of actual, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages. Petitioners appeal to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals modified the lower courts judgment acquitting the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion since the facts showed that what they committed was not grave coercion but some other crime such as malicious mischief or threat. However, Court of Appeals ordered them to pay the actual damages. Petitioners filed a special civil action contending that their acquittal as to criminal liability results to the extinguishment of civil liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court erred in requiring petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them of the criminal charge HELD: What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. 16. MAXIMO VS. GEROCHI 144 SCRA 326 FACTS: Panghilason was charged with estafa before the Circuit Criminal Court of Bacolod for issuing checks which were dishonored for lack of funds or that her account with said bank had been closed and that she refused to make the necessary deposit. Respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground of prosecution's failure to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if accused had any

obligation, it is simply civil in nature that could be properly ventilated within the context of civil law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the decision regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered." MR was denied, notwithstanding admission of the accused of her obligation to pay the specific amount to petitioner. Judge said, "this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in the offense proved, but the question is not indubitable because the accused was acquitted in all the four (4) informations she was charged of." Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not civil liability of the accused is deemed absolved upon his acquittal in criminal case. HELD: Lower court is wrong. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment. "Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action." - Padilla v. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) Rationale of the rule: To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. (Art. 29 of NCC states, "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted...") 17. SAPIERA VS. CA 314 SCRA 370 Facts: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by the petitioner. When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Can petitioner be required to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after trial court had acquitted her of criminal charges? Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be

bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL clearly provides Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x (f) Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant. 18. ESCUETA VS. FANDIALAN 61 SCRA 278 Facts: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by the petitioner. When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Can petitioner be required to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after trial court had acquitted her of criminal charges?

Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL clearly provides Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x (f) Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.

19. MADEJA VS. CARO 126 SCRA 293 FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendants motion to dismiss stating that Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ISSUE: Whether or not an independent civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case for physical injuries. RULING: YES, Article 33 of the Civil Code, expressly grants such right. The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil action." 20. MANIAGO VS. CA 253 SCRA 674 Facts: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action. Issue:

whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Held: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise from the offense charged. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. 21. RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORP. VS. PP 329 SCRA 600 FACTS: A criminal charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Double Homicide and damage to property was charged against Romeo Dunca de Tumol, in Isabela. The accused-driver of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp, carrying a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande, hit and bumped a Nissan Pick-up, along the National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr. The offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged. The offended parties actually filed a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver. 2. Whether or not the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. RULING: NO. NO. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability. In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. ISSUE NO. 1 :Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused. ISSUE NO. 2: With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in

the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. 22. MERCED VS. HON. DIEZ 109 PHIL 155 FACTS: Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering the marriage with her. Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced. She denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan. Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil Case. ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a prejudicial question insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned. RULING: YES. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy. 23. LANDICHO VS. RELOVA 22 SCRA 731 FACTS: Rolando Landicho was charged with the crime of Bigamy, for contracting second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia, being lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay. Fe Lourdes Pasia, instituted the criminal case against Landicho, who in turn, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her.

Landicho, moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit, in which Judge Relova denied motion for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. RULING: NO. The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 24. GELUZ VS. CA 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari. ISSUE: Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child? HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to

the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. 25. RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION VS. IAC 155 SCRA 712

FACTS: Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the RTC of Legaspi with homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence because he had willfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven the Izusu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio Construction. The vehicle hit the Colt Gallant driven and owned by Judge Arsenio Solidum and directly caused his untimely death. Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but his appeal did not pursue because he died. A notice of death was filed by his counsel and on the same notice, Atty. Beltran manifested Rufo Mauricios intention to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as employer who is subsidiarily liable. The lower court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him as appeallant for the civil aspect of the case. On motion of the heirs of the victim, the court ordered a writ of execution. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied because Cabiliza was found insolvent as manifested by the Certificate of Insolvency issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The victims widow filed a motion for the Issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution to be enforced against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co. This was granted by the lower court and which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, Rufo filed an appeal to SC. ISSUE: W/N, the dismissal of criminal case against the accused wipes out not only employees primarily civil liability but also the employers subsidiary liability; the

W/N, the petitioner can be condemned to pay the damages without the opportunity to examine the witness; RULING: No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction( which became final and executory ) extinguished his criminal liability to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case. The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver).

Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the purpose adverted to hereinabove. The decision of the appeallate court was however, SET aside and the case was remanded to the trial court for hearing. 26. PP VS. BAYOTAS 236 SCRA 239 Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with raped and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal, he died due to cardio respiratory disease SC dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but required the Sol Gen to comment with regard to the civil liability arising from the commission of the offense charged. Sol Gen ruled that the death of the accused did not extinguish his civil liability, the appeal should be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court Counsel for the accused opposed arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his civil liability Ruling: Yes. The death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on the act complained of, i.e rape. "The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." The claim for civil liability survives nothwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligations other than delict. Art. 1157 of the CC enumerates these other sources: a. Law b. Contracts c. Quasi-Contractsa d. . e. Quasi-delicts

In this case, the civil action may be pursued only by filing a separate civil action against the estate of the accused depending on the source. 27. MANSION BISCUIT CORP. VS. CA 250 SCRA 195 FACTS: Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as the president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation (the Company), ordered numerous cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation. As payment of the orders, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion, four (4) postdated checks as payment for the nutriwafer biscuits before its delivery. There were other four (4) postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each, issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as co-signor. Subsequently, Mansion Biscuit delivered the goods. However, the first four checks were deposited, the same were dishonored for insufficient funds prompting Ang Cho to inform Ty Teck of the dishonor and requested him for its replacement. Ty Teck failed to replace the dishonored checks, instead delivered 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion plus cash, which were applied to the amount of the first postdated check that bounced Ang Cho then sent Ty Teck a formal demand letter requesting him to make good the dishonored checks within 5 days. Thereafter, the second batch of checks was issued by Ty Teck and Siy Gui, but these were later on dishonored again. This prompted Ang Cho to send a final demand letter and upon failure to comply with it, he will then file an action against Ty Teck. For failure of Ty Teck to comply, an Information was filed against him for violation of BP Blg. 22; identical information was likewise filed against Siy Gui as treasurer of Edward Ty Brothers Corp. Both of them pleaded not guilty to the charges and thereafter filed a bond. Notwithstanding the bond filed, the RTC issued an order of attachment on some of Ty Tecks real properties, upon Ang Chos motion. After the prosecution rested its case, Ty Teck filed a motion to dismiss by w ay of demurrer to evidence, which later on Siy Gui adopted, on the ground that the checks were issued as a mere guaranty for the payment of the goods delivered and as replacement for the first batch of checks. This was opposed by the prosecution. The RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss claiming that the stare decisis in the cases already decided involving the same issue is where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not the drawer is not criminally liable for either Estafa or Violation of BP Blg. 22, and found that Siy Guis liability had not been established by the prosecution as it appeared that he had no personal transactions with Ang Cho although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of four checks The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration and for clarification withregard to their civil liabilities, which the RTC denied and held that they did not incur any civil liability due to their acquittal. Initially, Ang Cho filed a special civil action of certiorari with the CA to question the order of the RTC setting aside the order of attachment, which the CA annulled. But thereafter, he filed another appeal with the CA assailing the decision of the RTC absolving Ty Teck and Siy Gui from civil liability in criminal cases. Pending appeal, Ty Teck died so his counsel filed a motion to dismiss but the CA denied and ordered his substitution by his children. The CA rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and held that the civil liab ility sought to be enforced by Ang Cho was not the personal obligation of Ty Teck but a contractual obligation of the Company, hence, Ang Cho should file a separate civil action against it.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: W/N civil liability can be enforced against Ty Teck for non-payment of the goods notwithstanding the fact that the contract was between the Company, on behalf of Ty Teck, and Mansion. Ang Chos Argument: When Ty Teck issued the worthless checks inducing Mansion to deliver the goods, 2 civil liabilities arose, arising from crime (Art. 100, RPC)and from tort or quasi-delict. Ty Tecks Argument: They cannot be held liable for the Companys obligations and that Ang Cho should file a separate case against it. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI: TY TECK AND SIY GUI ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING FROM THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY THEY ARE REPRESENTING AS IT IS NOT THEIR PERSONAL LIABILITY. The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by Mansion Biscuit to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against Ty Teck because the said civil liability was not his personal liability to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation As held by the Court of Appeals: o Assuming that plaintiff-appellant has basis for his quasi-delict claim, the same must be addressed still against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation for the established facts show that the post-dated checks were issued by accused-appellee not in payment of his personal obligations but of the corporation's. Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accusedappellee was merely incidental to the contractual obligation, not an independent act which could serve as a source of obligation. The cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, to illustrate that the existence of a contract does not preclude an action on quasidelict where the act that breaks the contract constitutes a quasidelict, have no application because the acts complained of therein were performed to break an existing contract, whereas the alleged fraud herein was committed at the time of the creation of the contractual relationship and as an incident thereof. o In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the checks in question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may be awarded contractual

Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED in toto.

28. PP VS. SANTIAGO 51 PHIL 68 Facts: Felicita Masilang, aged 18, was the appellant's niece. After the appellant raped her, he then conducted the girl to the house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who later brought a protestant minister who conducted a ceremony to marry the appellant and Felicita. The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as

above stated, and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act. Issue: Whether or not the marriage ceremony was valid. Held: The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer. Affirmed. 29. NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129 FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law. It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void. HELD: The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

30. PP VS. DAVID 13 CA REP. 495 31. DE LORIA VS. FELIX 104 SCRA 1 Facts: Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945. After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies. On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint. Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage. Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis? Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity? Ruling: Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife." The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.

In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them. In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" which in this case actually occurred In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs. 32. MARTINEZ VS. TAN 12 PHIL 731 Facts: It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all present during the ceremony. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace Held: The judgment of the court below acquitting the affirmed. defendant of the complaint is

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties

mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage. 33. SANTOS VS. CA 240 SCRA 20 Article 36: Psychological Incapacity FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at lea st communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar. HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, whi ch is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term ps ychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC

also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. 34. GOMEZ VS. LIPANA 33 SCRA 615 FACTS: The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.

The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez." On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate.

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife. ISSUES: WON the validity of marriage can be attacked collaterally HELD: The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows: SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless; (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: xxx xxx xxx (b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; xxx xxx xxx SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. The action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced within the periods and by the parties as follows: xxx xxx xxx (b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during the life of the other, or by the former husband or wife. xxx xxx xxx The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action for that purpose, which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse. However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case, particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance." This is the general rule, to which the only exceptions are those mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same provision. There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so. 35. REPUBLIC VS. CA 268 SCRA 198 Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. 36. CHI MING TSOI VS. CA 266 SCRA 344

FACTS: Private respondent Gina Lao and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological homosexual and incapacity. that she Gina had alleged that him Chi Ming an was impotent, and a closet the observed using eyebrow sometimes

cleansing cream of his mother. The parties submitted themselves to physical examination and it was revealed that Gina was still a virgin. Chi Ming was also found to be capable of erection. Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made but according to him, he did not want the marriage annulled because he loves her very much. After the trial, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void ab initio. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, Chi Ming Tsoi elevated the matter before SC. ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ? HELD: Yes!

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. 37. CHOA VS. BELDIA GR. NO. 120582, MAY 17, 1999 Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. I (Taken from G.R. No. 120582. May 17, 1999) In 1991, petitioner Leni Choa initiated a case for concubinage against her husband, Alfonso Choa, in the MTCC, Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case NO. 49106. In March 1994, when the promulgation of the decision was about to take place, Alfonso filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a complaint for annulment of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Thus, Alfonso filed with the MTCC a motion in an order dated March 23, 1994. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, on June 22, 1994, he filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a petition for certiorari with injunction against the trial court. On July 13, 1994, the RTC issued a restraining order, and denied Leni Choa's motion for intervention. II (Taken from G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002)

The case went to trial with respondent husband presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner wife filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence). The RTC denied petitioners Demurrer to Evidence and held that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. The testimony of respondent husband basically complains about three aspects of petitioners (wifes) personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. Issue: I (For G.R. No. 120582. May 17, 1999)

Whether or not it is proper to suspend the promulgation of judgment in the concubinage case due to a prejudicial question, annulment of marriage. II (Taken from G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002) of the wife has been satisfactorily

Whether or not psychological incapacity proven. Ruling: I (For G.R. No. 120582. May 17, 1999)

Yes, it is proper to suspend the promulgation of judgment in the concubinage case due to a prejudicial question, annulment of marriage. A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exist in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue in the civil action resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The prejudicial question is the issue raised in the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this article, a marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations of marriage. True enough, the nullity of marriage between petitioner and private respondent brings about two things: One, there is no marriage at all; Two, there is no ground to convict Alfonso Choa of concubinage because one element of the crime is not attendant, that is, the man must be married at the time of its commission. II (For G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002) of the wife has not been satisfactorily

No, the psychological incapacity proven.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina case, the Supreme Court affirmed that mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true,

was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Hence demurrer to evidence was proper. Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on alleged psychological incapacity is denied.) 38. DOMINGO VS. CA 226 SCRA 572 Facts: Delia Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Roberto Domingo, on the ground that, unknown to her, he was previously married at the time of their marriage. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for declaration of nullity is unnecessary citing People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that declaration of nullity is necessary under Article 40 of the Family Code is only for the purpose of remarriage. The lower court denied the motion. CA affirmed the denial. Hence, this petition Issues: 1) Whether or not a petition for necessary. If in the affirmative, purposes of remarriage; and judicial declaration of a void marriage is whether the same should be filed only for

2) Whether or not herein petition is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively. HELD: 1) Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriagebe free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The Declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 40 may be resorted to even for a purpose other than remarriage. Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position of the word "solely." xxx. As it is placed, it is meant to qualify "final judgment." Had the provision been stated as follows: "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for purposes of remarriage" and the husband would have been correct. The said article as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. 2) Yes. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." Private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. The Family Code has

clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. 39. AQUINO VS. DELIZO 109 PHIL 21 FACTS: Fernando Aquino, petitioner, was married to Conchita Delizo, defendant. Petitioner filed a complaint on the ground of fraud alleging that defendant conceived a child which was not his own. This means that defendant concealed the fact that she was pregnant with another man and then got married to him. Only the plaintiff testified and presented documentary evidence such birth certificate and affidavit of the petitioners brother who admitted that he is the father of defendants child. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not concealing the pregnancy constitutes fraud ground of annulment of marriage HELD: Yes. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In this case, it was alleged that defendant (wife) was only four months pregnant and was naturally plump or fat, therefore, plaintiff (husband) would not be expected to know by merely looking at her that she was pregnant at the time of their marriage. 40. ANAYA VS. PALAROAN 36 SCRA 97 FACTS: and may be a

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953.

Palaroan filed an action

for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the

validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim.

While the amount of

counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret She prayed for the annulment of her

constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD: The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other

misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore

would not warrant an annulment of marriage. 41. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA 56 SCRA 1 Facts: On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration. Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence. In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof. Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M. but petitioner failed to comply. Issue: Whether or not the decree of legal separation can be promulgated petitioners evidence and without the appearance of his wife. based on

Held: Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state: "ART. 88.No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

"In case of non-appearance of paragraph 2, shall be observed."

the

defendant,

the

provisions

of

article

101,

"ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. "In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated." The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds. 42. JOCSON VS. ROBLES 22 SCRA 521 Facts: Gloria Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo Robles on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage. Allegedly, herein defendant contracted a previous marriage with a certain Josefina Fausto which also filed a criminal complaint against herein defendant on the same ground of bigamy. Herein plaintiff asked for moral and exemplary damages and alleged that during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical abuse. On the otherhand, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage and argued that he was compelled by force, threat and intimidation by the parents of the plaintiff. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that no genuine issue of facts are involved in the case. To support this argument, defendant presented affidavits executed by herein plaintiffs father and brother. On the date set by the court, both parties did not appear in court. The defendants motion was denied by the lower court on the ground that before judgment can be had on the nullity of the marriage, proof that a previous marriage was validly subsisting. In addition, the court found an indication that there was collusion between the parties so as to get a declaration of nullity of marriage. Hence this appeal by the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the affidavits are sufficient to render judgment and declaration of nullity of marriage? Held:

The higher court ruled that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code. 43. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139 FACTS: In 1972, petitioner, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent, a citizen got married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence the Philippines; and, they begot two children. In 1982, the couples got divorced Nevada, United States and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time Theodore Van Dorn. US in in to

In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner claiming that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to barred by previous wherein respondent property" as of June dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community 11, 1982.

The lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada is valid in the Philippine jurisdiction. Held: Yes, the divorce is valid. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada has released private respondent from the marriage based on the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. To maintain that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. Petitioner should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 44. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355 Facts: Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."

On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFICebu. Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act. Issues: 1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued. 2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband. Held: 1. YES At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation. For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils. Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. 2. YES The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited. But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum". 45. PP VS. SENSANO 58 PHIL 73 Facts:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. After the birth of their only child, the husband left his wife and was gone for three years without writing to her or sending her support. While the husband was away, the wife began to live with Marcelo Ramos. When husband returned, he filed a charge of adultery which resulted in a conviction and a sentencing. When the sentence was completed, wife begged the husband to take her back but he refused. Abandoned a second time, the wife fled back to Ramos. Husband, knowing that his wife reverted to her lover, did not do anything to assert his rights and left for the states. He returned to the Philippines seven years later and presented a second charge of adultery. Issue: WON the second charge of adultery can be a ground for legal separation. Held/Ratio: No. The husband was only assuming a mere pose of an offended spouse. He consented to the adulterous relations of his wife and Ramos and is thus, therefore barred from instituting any criminal proceeding. Even if he was still in a foreign country, he would have still been able to take action against the accused but since he didnt take this option, it showed a considerable lack of genuine interest as the offended party. 46. BUGAYOG VS. GINEZ 100 PHIL 620 Facts: Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married on 1949 to Ginez while on furlough leave. Before he reported back to duty, they made arrangements as to where the wife would stay. In July 1951, the husband received letters informing him of his wifes infidelities. In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her, they lived together as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night after, they continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of her infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. The court ordered the dismissal of the action based on wifes motion to dismiss. He appealed but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted questions of law, to the SC. Issue: WON the copulation which transpired after the husband knew about his wifes alleged infidelities can be considered an act of condonation. Held/Ratio: Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of one party of a matrimonial offense which the other party committed. According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after the commission for the offense and with knowledge of the offense will amount to evidence of condonation. Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation is inferred. 47. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES 109 PHIL 789 Facts: Matubis and Praxedes got married on 1943. The couple agreed to live separately on 1944. On April, 1948, the spouses entered into anagreement stating that both relinquishtheir rights over each other as husband and wife, that both are free to marry again, and that wife is no longer entitled to support. In Jan. 1955, the husband cohabited with another woman and had a child with her. On April 1956, wife alleged abandonment and concubinage subsequently filing a petition for legal separation. RTC held that the acts constituted concubinage but dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Plaintiff appealed. Issue: WON there was consent of the wife to her husbands concubinage.

Held/Ratio: Yes. As seen in the agreement, there was an express condonation and consent granted to the husband. Having consented, the wife cannot claim legal separation and is undeserving of the courts sympathy. The petition was also filed after the prescriptive period. She came to know the situation in Jan. 1955 but only instituted the complaint on April. 1956 more than a year later. 48. CONTRERAS VS. MACARAIG 33 SCRA 222 Facts: In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her husband Macaraig was living with another woman. She ailed to verify the rumor from her husband. In April 1963, she heard rumors that her husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. In May of the same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. However she finally found out about her husbands mistress and the birth of the latters child. In December 1963, wife finally met with her husband and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. He declined. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription had, according to the court, already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her husbands illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription. Issue: WON the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963. Held/Ratio: December 1963. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her husbands infidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as a basis for legal separation. 49. RAMOS-SOMOSA VS. VAMENTA 46 SCRA 11 FACTS: Petitioner Lucy Samosa- Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage on the part of respondent Clement Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injuction for the return of her paraphernal exclusive porperty. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion for P.I. were heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become even dim. Respondent Judge Vamonte, thereafter, granted respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition. Hence, the petition; ISSUE: Whether or not, Article 103 of the New Civil Code prohibiting the hearing for an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such suit. RULING:

No. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision; that the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." 2 There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, 3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." 4 At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. 50. ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION 99 PHIL 709 FACTS: 1) Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal sep ground: adultery 2) Defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as pay for attorneys fees 3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has abandoned the childrenconjugal properties were worth only P80,000 - contends defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her

children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and w/o means to educate them CFI: granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys fees; reconsideration denied DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The ocurts order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is REVERSED RATIO: 1) main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced: art 103 of CC6 months allowancecooling off period 2) provision of code is mandatorycourt understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibitedstatus quo to be preserved for this time 3) it may be noted that since 6 mos have elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowedreasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given tat the scope of the art cited may be explained 4) cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation 5) but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the circumstances 6) the law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused 7) allegations of adultery letter of authenticity as evidenceabandonment of conjugal abodeevidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised 8) the rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary 9) thus determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody. 51. REYES VS. INES-LUCIANO 88 SCRA 803 FACTS: January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes and Celia Ilustre-Reyes got married. They had children. March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by fist blows, bumping her head against the cement floor, pushing her down the 13-flight stairs, hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half unconscious. May 11, 1976: She left their office May 26, 1976: She returned to get her overnight bag. Manuel demanded that she get out but she ignored him. Hence, he doused her with grape juice, kicked her, attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver. June 3, 1976: Celia filed the following petitions against Manuel: (1) Action for support pendente lite; (2) Legal separation for the attempt to kill her.

Contentions of Manuel: Celia committed adultery with her physician. She is thus not entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was excessive.

ISSUE: Whether or not Celia is entitled to support pendent lite. HELD: Yes. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support BUT only if proven. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action. BUT it must be established by competent evidence and not merely alleged. During hearing of the application for support pendente lite and for legal separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. YET Celia asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not necessarily from Manuels private funds. As to the determination of amount, Celia was unemployed and without funds. All their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President, Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel. i. Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61 ii. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84 iii. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. iv. That these companies have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of Manuel. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite, it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case. It is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. mere affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. 52. LAPUZ SY VS. EUFEMIO 43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging: September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz No children Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits Eufemios answer: Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969) June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father, Macario July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case - Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has not survived Did not act on the motion for substitution Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the EufemioLapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights? HELD: (1) YES, - action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse (2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile - the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself (2) YES - solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree * Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death * rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. - enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage - even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. * the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings. 53. MACADANGDANG VS. CA 108 SCRA 314 FACTS:

Mejias is married to Anahaw Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967 Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang) April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal Court dismissed the complaint CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; 2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: 1. YES - The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw. - Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. - Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child the fact remains - Physical impossibility: (1) impotence of husband; inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and (3) serious illness of the husband. 2. NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy. Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. 54. ARROYO VS.VASQUEZ 42 PHIL 54 ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921 FACTS: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration

of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other. HELD: NO. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. 55. ATILANO VS. CHUA CHING BENG 103 PHIL 255 Facts: Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City. After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. Chua returned toManila with the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she did not. In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents. Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she lives in Manilawith him. He was also willing to establish a conjugal dwelling separate from his parents. Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the Pilars allowance after finding that the latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she had experienced some previous in-law troubles. Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remitallowance to her in Zamboanga. His petition was denied, thus this case. Issue:

Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua Held: The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality. Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband. Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the obligation of giving any support. 56. SERRANO VS. SOLOMON 105 PHIL 998 FACTS: On the same day but before their marriage ceremony, Melchor Solomon made a donation to Alejandria Feliciano to the effect that if the latter will die before him, one half of all his properties and those acquired by them will be given to those who have reared Alejandria. Alejandria Feliciano, whose father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and who until now resides there, had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care of and raised her from the age 12 until she reached womanhood. Less than nine months after marriage, or rather on March 2, 1949, Alejandria died without issue. Several months thereafter Estanislao Serrano commenced the present action to enforce and implement the terms of the alleged donation particularly that portion thereof to the effect that if Alejandria died before her husband Melchor and left no children, then one half of Melchor's properties and those acquired by him and his wife would be given to those persons who had raised and taken care of her namely, Estanislao Serrano. Trial Court dismissed Serranos claim. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid donation propter nuptias. HELD: None. The donation could not be regarded as a donation propter nuptias for the reason that though it was executed before the marriage, it

was not made in consideration of the marriage and, what is more important, that the donation was not made to one or both of the (marriage) contracting parties, but to a third person. Manresa, in following: his commentary on Article 1327 of the Civil Code says the

Donations excluded are those (1) made in favor of the spouses after the celebration of marriage; (2) executed in favor of the future spouses but not in consideration of the marriage; and (3) granted to persons other than the spouses even though they may be founded on the marriage (6 M. 232). 57. SUMBAD VS. CA 308 SCRA 575 Facts: When Agata Tait (AT) died in 1936, her husband George Tait Sr. (GT), lived in common-law relationship with Maria Tait to whom he donated land to in1974. George died in 1977 and Maria died in 1988. The following year, Emilie Sumbad (ES) and Beatrice Tait (BT)sought an action for quieting of title, nullification of the deed of sale, and recovery of possession of damages by virtue of being compulsory heirs of GTs first marriage to AT. They allege that Maria sold the lots included in the property to Okoren, et. al., despite warning the respondents that Maria was not the real owner of the property. Okoren et. al., private respondents in the case, bought the property anyway on the strength of a Tax Declaration and claim that since the issuance of said Tax Declaration was made thirty years after the death of AT, Maria, GTs second wife, did not need the consent of her GT or his heirs for the sale. They also claim that the action is barred bylaches.RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents. CA affirmed with modifications, setting aside the attorneys fees. From this, petitioners, Sumbad, et. al, appealed claiming that the deed of donation issued in 1974 to Maria was void for the following reasons which the SC debunked as follows: Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) it was a forgery crafted by one Raquel Tait, proof of such was eyewitness testimony of one Shirley Eillenger who claims that she saw Raquel and her male board mates forge the signatures of GT and MT in a span of thirty minutes. ->Aside from the impossibility of accomplishment, such allegations were not proven by handwriting experts which the petitioners failed to make use of. (2) it was not executed as a public instrument because the deputy clerk of court notarized it instead of the duly authorized notary public -> deputy clerk of court was authorized by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Administrative Code of 1917. (3) it contravened Art. 133 of the CC (now Art. 87 of the FC) which states that donations made during the marriage shall be void, which also includes common-law relationships as decided in the earlier case of Matabuena v. Cervantes). -> There is no sufficient evidence on record to prove that GT and MT were in fact married, or if they were, when the marriage took place. There is no evidence as to the time the deed of donation was executed in 1974 that GT and Maria were still continuing their common-law relationship. BTs testimony merely states that in 1941,Maria became their stepmother and does not conclusively prove that in1974, GT and Maria were married. Lacking evidence to prove the contrary, the family code provision cannot apply. 58. MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES 38 SCRA 284 Facts:

- 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. - They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. - Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners. Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs. 59. SOLIS VS. BARROSO 53 PHIL 912 Facts: On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter nuptias of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against Maxima(surviving donor) et al and demanded:(1)the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law,(2)transferring one-half of the donated property, and(3)to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits The lower court granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment on article 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. Issue: WON one-half of the donated lands should properly be awarded to her.

Held: No. Donation proper nuptias here was no tvalid because it was made in a private instrument. This donation must be governed by the rules on Donation. Real Property may be valid, it must be made in the public instrument. (Formal Validity) The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, insofar as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts, and those which are to take effect upon the donors death, which are governed by the rules established for testamentary succession. Marriage in DPN is rather a resolutory condition which presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. 60. MATEO VS. LAGUA 29 SCRA 864 FACTS: Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name. In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages. On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious. HELD: Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts order of dismissal sustained. Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased

at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents. Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. 61. PLATA VS. YATCO 12 SCRA 718 Facts: - 1954 Amailia Plata purchased land - 1958 sold the property to Celso Saldana but he resold it ot her seven months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa - Sept 1958 Amalia mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed the deal - Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted - However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not conjugal property ISSUE: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa HELD: NO - Sufficiently proved that property contested is her own exclusive paraphernal property since she owend it before marriage and even if Saldana did give it back to her when she was already married it did not transform it to conjugal property since there was no prood that they money paid to Saldana came from common or conjugal funds. - Thus since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was paraphernal as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone doesnt affect the paraphernal property of Amalia. Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband. RESULT: cant decide at the moment whether property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and Gregorio. Up to CFI of QC. 62. ROSETE VS. PROV. SHERIFF 95 PHIL 560 Facts: In a criminal case for murder under CFI Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P2, 000.00 To satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. The parcels of land were sold at public auction but there was an unsatisfied balance. Gliceria was able to redeem two

out of the four parcels of land during the public auction. However, to satisfy the remaining balance of the indemnity, the sheriff levied upon the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria. Prior to said levy, Gliceria Rosete filed a case for conjunction to restrain the sheriff from carrying out the sale praying at the same time for a writ of preliminary injunction. This writ was issued upon the filing of the requisite bond, but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants who put up counter-bond. The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as originally scheduled and the property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus. Gliceria sought for the declaration of the sale by the sheriff null and void. The lower court declared the sale null and void on the strength of the ruling laid down in the case of Lichauco vs. Olegario. The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff of the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her right of redemption is valid it appearing that they formed part of the four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold to satisfy the same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case. Issue: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in question with money obtained by her from her father, has the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution? Held: We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons: (a) Gliceria Rosete, the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision (a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her by-right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to her (Article 1396, old Civil Code). The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may be likened to that of a wife in a homestead in American jurisdiction. That interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent interest." By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a homestead as successor in interest of her husband. The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not warranted by law. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de Jesus for P970 is hereby declared null and void, and the deed of repurchase executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on March 8, 1950

is hereby revived and maintained. The rest of the decision without effect. No pronouncement as to costs. 63. CASTILLO VS. PASCO 11 SCRA 102 Facts:

is declared

In October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous husbands. On April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow married her fourth husband, Luis San Juan, on June 8, 1934. The property subject of litigation is a fishpond located in Bulacan. Marcelo and Macaria bought the fishpond during their marriage from spouses Gonzales, which was payable in 3 installments. The initial payment was P1, 000.00 but only P400.00 cash was given as payment because the vendor-spouses owed Macaria P600.00. The other 2 installments were paid out of loans guaranteed by parcels of land which are exclusive paraphernal properties of Macaria. Upon the filed a Bulacan. property death of Marcelo, his children and grandchildren from the first wife complaint for partition and accounting against Macaria in CFI CFI Bulacan declared the property to be the exclusive paraphernal of Macaria and CA affirmed.

The heirs of Marcelo contended that they should have a share to the fishpond because it was acquired during the marriage of Marcelo and Macaria, hence conjugal. CA found that the fishpond was purchased with the exclusive funds of Macaria, who was known to be a woman of means even before she married Marcelo. It was also established that Marcelo could not have afforded the property who was only earning a meager income as provincial treasurer. Issue: Whether or not the litigated fishpond is conjugal or paraphernal property Held: The litigated fishpond is both conjugal and paraphernal property. On the initial payment: The initial payment was established to come out from Macarias exclusively private funds. The finding of the CA is that Gonzales owed this particular indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence of proof that the husband authorized her to use community funds therefor, the appellate Court's finding cannot be disturbed by us. Whether the evidence adverted to should be credited is for the Court of Appeals to decide. On the other two installments: Although the other two installments were paid by loans which were guaranteed by mortgage on paraphernal property of Macaria, it was shown that the loans have been made to Marcelo and Macaria as joint borrowers. The loans thus became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned is logically conjugal property. While the securing mortgage is on the wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation that the lenders could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so desired. As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to

the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco. 64. ZULUETA VS. PAN AM 43 SCRA 397 Facts: On October 23, 1964, the spouse Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta hereinafter referred to as plaintiff and Mrs. Zulueta, respectively as well as their daughter, Carolinda Zulueta hereinafter referred to as Miss Zulueta were passengers aboard a PANAM plane, on Flight No. 841-23, from Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. As the plane landed on said Island, the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover of about 30 minutes. Shortly before reaching that place, the flight was, according to the plaintiffs, very rough. Testifying for PANAM its purser, Miss Schmitz, asserted, however, that it was very calm; but her notes, Exhibit 7 prepared upon the request of Captain Zentner, on account of the incident involved in this case state that there was unusually small amount of roughness, which His Honor, the Trial Judge, considered properly as an admission that there was roughness, only the degree thereof is in dispute. In any event, plaintiff testified that, having found the need to

relieve himself, he went to the mens comfort room at the terminal building, but found it full of soldiers, in view of which he walked down the beach some 100 yards away. Meanwhile, the flight was called and when the passengers had boarded the plane, plaintiffs absence was noticed. The take -off was, accordingly, delayed and a search for him was conducted by Mrs. Zulueta, Miss Zulueta and other persons. Minutes later, plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach towards the terminal. Heading towards the ramp of the plane, plaintiff remarked, You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged. In the claim for damages, Mrs. Zulueta filed a motion alleging that she had, for more than two (2) years, been actually living separately from her husband, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, and that she had decided to settle separately with PANAM through compromise agreement and had reached a full and complete settlement of all her differences with said defendant, and praying accordingly, that this case be dismissed insofar as she is concerned, Required to comment on said motion, PANAM expressed no objection thereto. Upon the other hand, plaintiff prayed that the motion be denied, upon the ground that the case at bar is one for damages for breach of a contract of carriage, owing to the off-loading of plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, the husband and administrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds of which the PANAM had been paid under said contract; that the action was filed

by the plaintiffs as a family and the lower court had awarded damages to them as such family; that, although PANAM had questioned the award of damages, it had not raised the question whether the lower court should have specified what portion of the award should go to each plaintiff; that although Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta had, for sometime, been living separately, this has been without judicial approval; that Mrs. Zulueta may not, therefore, bind the conjugal partnership or settle this case separately; and that the sum given by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta is believed to be P50,000, which is less than 3-1/2% of the award appealed from, thereby indicating the advisability of denying her motion to dismiss, for her own protection.

Issue: Whether or not Mrs. Zuluetas compromise agreement with PAN AM would bind the conjugal partnership and whether the payment she received is effective.

Ruling: No, the effective. Indeed, (t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law, and it has not been shown that this is one of the cases so provided. Article 113 of our Civil Code, pursuant to which (t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year relied upon by PANAM does not warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by the latter. Obviously the suit contemplated in subdivision (2) of said Article 113 is one in which the wife is the real party either plaintiff or defendant in interest, and, in which, without being so, the hush must be joined as a party, by reason only of his relation of affinity with her. Said provision cannot possibly apply to a case, like the one at bar, in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally grieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership. Moreover, he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of conjugal partnership, the damages recoverable for breach of such contract belongs to said partnership. Mrs. Zuluetas compromise agreement with PAN AM would not bind partnership but the payment of P50, 000 she received is

conjugal

The payment of P50,000 to her is effective, insofar as it from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as partnership is concerned.

is deductible due) from the Zulueta. What the conjugal

In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the law seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them. It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was for her personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life." In fact Manresa maintains that they are deemed conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had been made by the wife. And this is the rule obtaining in the Philippines. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there is competent proof to the contrary. 65. JOVELLANOS VS. CA 210 SCRA 126 Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners.

Leonor

Dizon

died

consequently.

Then

Daniel

married

private

respondent

Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises.

With

the

lease

amounts

having

been

paid,

Philamlife

executed

to

Daniel

Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated

to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.

Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated marriage property still was acquired and by her deceased forms husband of while the their was subsisting which part conjugal

partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.

Issue: WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES

Held: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.

Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.

Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.

NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding property reimbursements on to the petitioners who is helped vested pay for the the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on bought installments, where ownership during marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership. 66. ALVAREZ VS. ESPIRITU 14 SCRA 892 67. VITUG VS. MONTEMAYOR 93 PHIL 939 68. MARAMBA VS. LOZANO 20 SCRA 474 Facts: 1948: Plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the collection of a sum of money from spouses Nieves and Pascual Lozano. This was granted by the court. 1960: Not satisfied with the judgment, LOZANO appealed to the CA who dismissed appeal because it was not filed on time. Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a writ of execution was issued. Aug. 18, 1960: a levy on a parcel of land in the name of Nieves Lozano was made. A notice of a sale at a public auction was also made and scheduled for Sept. 16, 1960. However, Lozano had made a partial adjournment of the sale to October 26. payment by then and asked for an

During this time, her husband died. She then prayed for a restraining order on the sale of the lot for sale being her paraphernal property. She also prayed that her liability be then fixed at of the amount awarded in the judgment. The sale proceeded anyway. June 28, 1961: trial court grants the motion of Nieves Lozano. The sale on her property was allowed to proceed to satisdy her liability which is only half now from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04) Issues/Held/Ratio: 1. W/N the decision of the trial court last 1959 could still be questioned. NO. SC states that a decision that is final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. 2. W/N the judgement was joint or solidary. JOINT. General rule is that when a judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and severally (as in this case), none of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. 3. W/N the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction. It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the marriage. In this case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to the wife alone. The court has previously stated that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.

The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of partnership pays for it. 69. CALTEX VS. FELIAS 108 PHIL 873 Facts: Spouses Juliano and Eulalia Flias donated Lot No. 107 to their daughter, Felisa Felias (ivate respondent) on March 31, 1928. On March 26, 1941, trial court held that in a case against respondents husband, Simeon Sawamoto, he had to pay Texas Company (Phil.) Inc. a sum of 661.94 plus legal interest and attorneys fees. A writ of execution was issued to the provincial sheriff who levied upon Lot NO. 107 togther with the improvements and a small parcel of coconut land and sold these at a public auction to Texas Company now Caltex (Phil.) Inc. Provincial Sheriff executed a final deed of sale which was duly recorded on a TCT. Felias filed an action declaring herself the owner of the 2 parcels of land. The court decided that the sale of Lot No. 107 is null and void and the sale of the coconut land is not and rightfully belongs to Caltex. Both parties appealed and CA declared that Lot No. 107 belongs to Felisa and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the entry of the levy, the ertificate of sale and the deed of sale by the sheriff. Caltex is still the exclusive owner of the small parcel of coconut land. Issue: What is the status and ownership of Lot No. 107 of the cadastral survey of the City of Agusan at the time it was levied upon and later sold by the sheriff? Held: It exclusively belongs to Felisa Feias. It was discovered by the CA that it was donated by her parents to her; it is her paraphernal property (exclusively owned by her) It was sold by the sheriff who believed it to be conjugal property as stipulated in Art. 1404 of the OCC and Art. 158 of the new Civil Code. Art. 1404 (2): Buildings constructed during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouse shall also belong to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same. Art 158n (2): Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. However, the building was already there even before the lot was donated to Felisa. Therefore, Art. 1404 should not apply. Felisa exclusively owns both the land and the building upon it. This being her own means that it is not subject to the obligations of her husband. Furthermore, the building was destroyed at the time of the sale by the Sheriff which means that the said house included in the deeds executed were no longer in existence. 70. DOMINADO VS. DERAYUNAN 49 PHIL 452 Facts:

An administration proceeding was filed for the settlement of the estate of Francisco Deruyanan. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the widow by the 2nd marriage objected to the scheme of partition submitted by the administrator. After hearing the parties, the court approved the said partition which provides that half of the conjugal property shall belong to the widow and the other half shall belong to the deceased, which will constitute the inheritance to be divided accordingly. As what the law provides, 2/3 of the remaining half shall be given as the legitime of the children and the remaining 1/3 shall remain as the free portion where the widow shall be accorded 1/6 of the remaining portion as usufruct. The widow then raised the question as regards the manner of determining the portion of the inheritance which pertains to the widow in usufruct and the 2 children inheriting with her. Issue: WON the determination as regards to the legitime and inheritance is correct? Held: Under Article 834 of the Civil Code provides that "any widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not be entitled or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who have not received any betterment." What is necessary, then, to determine is the legitime of the children who have not received any betterment. First of all, it must be noted that the legitime which serves as a point of comparison is that of the children or descendants who have not received any betterment, which implies that the deceased has made use of the right to give a betterment. But, in the present case, there being no betterment, what is the legitime of the two children? Sanchez Roman, in solving the legal problems that might arise the interpretation of article 834 of the Civil Code, among other things, says: "According to article 834, the legitime that pertains to a legitimate child or descendant not receiving any betterment, or the legitime by which the amount of the widow's usufruct is regulated in order that said legitimes may be equal in amount, is the two-thirds of the inheritance as a maximum when there is no betterment; as a minimum, the one-third constituting the short legitime only when the whole of the second third constituting the betterment is given as such; and as a medium, said one-third constituting the short legitime to which is to be added what remains of the third constituting the betterment when only a part and not the whole thereof is given; and fixing within these limits, maximum, minimum and medium, the amount which must be allotted to the widow in each case as her share, which must be equal to that of the child or each of the children not receiving any betterment, according to their number." (6 Sanchez Roman, vol. 2, p. 878.) For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, modified in that the portion pertaining to the widow in usufruct consists of

one-third of the estate of the deceased Francisco Derayunan, without any special findings as to costs. 71. CALIMLIM-CANULLAS VS. FORTUN 129 SCRA 675 FACTS: Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19, 1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in question. After FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land. In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage. On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also inherited by me from my deceased parents." Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale. ISSUES: (1) whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property; and (2) whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction. HELD: (1) Yes, a correct interpretation of Art 158 yields that both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house lot to Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale. (2) No, the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family. As provided by Art 1409, contracts such as this shall be void and inexistent. Also, art 1352 states contracts with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from donating or selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. This applies even to couples who are not married but are living as husband and wife. 72. LUZON SURETY VS. DE GARCIA 30 SCRA 111 Facts: 1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co Inc, executed a surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Chavez in the sum of PhP9,000. 2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon Surety Co Inc against any and all damages, costs

and and other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid; and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees. 3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees and other costs. 4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia. 5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants Chavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the amount to be paid to PNB. 6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy the claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar plantation. 7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor of them. Issue: WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety agreement Held: No. Decision appealed from was affirmed. Costs against petitioner. Ratio Decidendi: Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course. (1408a) Petitioner contends that Garcias transaction as a guarantor through which he acquires the capacity of being trusted, adds to his reputation and enhances his standing in the community. He can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal partnership. While not entirely without basis, such argument cannot prosper for it would negate what is expressly provided for in Article 161. In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the wefare of the spouses. There is none in this case. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically

accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. So it is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law. 73. COBB-PEREZ VS. LANTIN 23 SCRA 637 Facts: A debt was contracted when one Damaso Perez bought leather materials from Hormoso for his shoe manufacturing business. On February 1959, Hormoso filed suit against Perez and one Gregorio Sumbong for the recovery of unpaid purchases in t he amount of P17,309.44. On April, 1960, the petition was granted by the presiding judge (Lantin, respondent) and thus ordered Perez and Sumbong to fulfill their pecuniary obligation. They appealed but they were dismissed. They brought the action to the SC but it was also dismissed. Hormoso moved for the execution of judgment and this was granted on August 15, 1961. The Sheriff levied the shares ofcommon stock of Perez from Republic Bank but Perez urged to stay the execution alleging that the levy was excessive and unjust because he only owed P17,309.44 but the shares levied were worth P357,000. Sheriff was thus stopped from auctioning the shares pending resolution of Perezs new motion. But after respondent Judge Lantin denied both the appeal and the stay of execution, the sheriff again served a notice for auctioning the shares. This was subsequently cancelled by the CA pending hearing of another petition filed by Perez on October 5. CA resolved that the levy was indeed excessive but regardless sustained that such should be paid. Sheriff again published a notice of action but time auctioning only 210 shares of stock. The wife of Perez, Mrs. Cobb-Perez, filed a complaint against Hormoso, Republic Bank and the Sheriff alleging that the levied shares were conjugal property and thus should not be liable for Perezs exclusive debt . CFI once more enjoined the sheriff from executing the auction but later, upon resolving the case, it lifted its earlier order. A month before the writ of execution was lifted, however, the wife filed another motion for recall/lifting of writ of execution granted on August 15, 1961 on the same grounds enunciated in italics in this paragraph. Lantin denied the motion. This paved the way for the sheriff to, once more, give notice of the action and execute the sale. What followed after this was a series of delaying tactics, which finally ended with Damaso Perez filing an urgent motion for reconsideration using now his wifes reasons (see italics in paragraph above) and at the same time offered instead of his shares of stocks, the dividends of such amounting to P19,000. Sheriff was then stopped for the fifth time but the motion was still denied. After the sheriff scheduled the auction for the sixth time, the present petition was now filed which alleged that grave abuse of discretion was committed in not recalling the writ of execution (ordering the levy of 210 shares of stock which were deemed conjugal and thus not answerable to personal obligations made by the husband). Issue/Held/Ratio: WON levied shares are conjugal and thus liable for debt of the husband, Perez. No. Perez is estopped from claiming that said shares were conjugal because in the case where he challenged it as being excessive and unjust, he had given

the impression that such stocks were exclusive. This is further confirmed by the fact that the said stocks were registered in his name alone. Wife is also barred by judgment made on husband because she stands in privity with him. She cannot feign ignorance to justify a lapse of seventeen months in questioning the legality of the levy made on the stocks. They claim that Art. 160 of the CC is applicable but no proof was presented that such stocks were acquired during the marriage. No evidence was adduced as to when the shares of stock were acquired. Conceding that they were acquired during the marriage and is conjugal, it must be shown that the partnership is not liable for the judgment debt. No evidence pointing to this was presented. Petition dismissed. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel. 74. AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CO. VS. CA 286 SCRA 272 Facts: Phil. Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3M loan from AIDC. VP Cheng, for further security of the credit line, included himself jointly/severally liabile to PBMs indebtedness by virtue of security agreements. PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case against PBM and Cheng for the money. Court rendered judgment in favor of AIDC and ordered PBM and Cheng to pay the P50.3M with interests. While decision was being appealed, AIDC moved for a writ of execution. Upon placement of P8M bond, the writ was issued. Sheriff notified and scheduled the sale of 3 conjugal properties of Cheng. This subsequently led Cheng to file a suit of injunction against the Sheriff, enjoining him from enforcing orders against the conjugal property since these were not answerable to the loan. The loan not benefiting the conjugal partnership, payment of such should not come from the conjugal property. The lower court issued the TRO. AIDC filed a petition for certiorari in CA which issued a TRO on the lower courts initial TRO, paving the way for the scheduled sale of Chengs property. The auction took place and AIDC, being the only bidder, was issued the certificate of sale. However, after deciding the issue, the same CA which issued the second TRO, resolved to uphold the lower courts decision. AIDC then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue was now moot and academic since the sale was already consummated. Respondents however averred that a third-party was now questioning the sale and thus a different legal situation was presented. Lower court denied AIDCs motion to dismiss and after trial declared the sale null and void. The CA affirmed the decision. After a motion of reconsideration was denied, AIDC filed a petition for review in the SC. Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON CA erred in ruling that the obligation incurred by Cheng did not redound to the benefit of the family. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract (he directly received the money and services to be used for his own business/profession), that contract falls under the term debts and obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proven. AIDC claims that the benefits Chengs family would reasonably anticipate were the following: (i) employment of Cheng would be prolonged, (ii) shares of stock of members of Chengs family would appreciate if PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan obtained, (ii) Chengs prestige in PBM would be enhanced and

his career would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan. However these are not benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the CC. It cannot be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. The above-enumerated alleged benefits are not only incidental but also speculative. (2) Is a surety agreement/accommodation contract entered into by the husband within the contemplation of Art. 161 of the CC. No. The money received/services rendered redounded to benefit of PBM and the husband merely acted as a guarantor. The contract by itself cannot be considered as falling within the context of Art. 161. 75. CARLOS VS. ABELARDO 380 SCRA 361 FACTS: On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check worth $25k, in the name of Pura Vallejo, against his personal account in Bankers Trust. It was allegedly a loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in order to help them in their married life. Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis. Despite this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorios Banks Trust Check (the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel denied the nature of the money as a loan. He claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share in income from Honorios business, H. L. Carlos Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks against the account of HLCC to prove that he had been receiving profit from HLCC. However, he is not included in HLCCs Articles of Incorporation or Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer, employee, or agent. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that a check of $25k had been issued to Vallejo against the personal account of Honorio and that the same was received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for payment of a house and lot that became their conjugal dwelling. ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay for the loan of 25, 000 even when acknowledgement was not signed by husband HELD: YES - Art 121 obligations spouses or obligations benefited. of FCC conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by both one of them but with the consent of the other (2) debts that are without consent f one of the spouse but their family and the and has

Evidence here shows that family did benefit since they used the loan to buy the house which became their conjugal home. 76. GARCIA VS. MANZANO 103 PHIL 798 FACTS: Plaintiff Gonzalo Gar cia, husband, filed an action for the judicial declaration of the separation of the conjugal partnership property against her wife, Consolacion Manzano. He alleged that they have been living separately from each other since 1948 and that upon their separation, her wife assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership property and fictitiously transferred or alienated a majority of said property in favor of third persons. He alleged further that her wife failed and refused to turn over and deliver to him his rightful share and participation in the conjugal partnership property and its fruits. ISSUE:

Whether or not the judicial declaration of separation of conjugal partnership property can be granted based on the allegations of the husband HELD: No. The Civil Codes (both old and new) require that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code). In the system established by the Code, the wife does not administer the conjugal partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court and under its supervision (Arts. 168, 196) "with such limitations as they (the courts) may deem advisable" (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196). Legally, therefore, the wife can not mismanage the conjugal partnership property or affairs, unless the husband or the courts tolerate it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case of judicial authorization to have the wife manage the partnership, since such a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal property against his wife (Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil., 205) and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit such abuses. 77. PARTOSA-JO VS. CA 216 SCRA 692 FACTS: - 1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two complaints against Jose Jo for a)judicial separation of conjugal property and b) complaint for support for her and their daughter Monina - 29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prima but failed to include judgment on judicial separation of property in the dispositive portion - Prima elevated this to CA, CA affirmed judgment on support but dismissed petition for separation of property for lack merit saying that it was not allowed as their separation was due to their agreement rather and not because of abandonment ISSUES: - W/N the decision of RTC can be questioned given that it is final and executory - W/N she is entitled to judicial separation of conjugal property on the ground of abandonment HELD/RATIO: - The RTC failed put judgment on separation of property in the dispositive portion, BUT it was made in the penultimate paragraph reading as follows: o all the properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant is subject to separation of property. - The RTC held that they were legally married and that the properties were acquired during coverture although they were in the name of a dummy (Chinese national kasi) - Prima submits that their agreement was not to be separated but for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy

and that he would visit and support her. But when she returned to their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he refused to accept her. - She is entitled to separation of property on ground of abandonment. - Abandonment implies departure of one spouse with intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause and without providing for means although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The physical separation of the parties, coupled by the refusal by Jose Jo to give support to Prima, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for legal separation of their conjugal property. Aside from this, he admittedly cohabitated with other women and have not established just cause for his refusal to comply with his duties as husband. - Court ordered for division between the two half/half. It should include properties such as those which were registered in the name of other persons in violation of the anti-dummy law. The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to her of his eternal love and care. 78. LACSON VS. SAN JOSE 24 SCRA 837 Facts: - Feb 14, 1953 when they got married - Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila - March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila *Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen *This was affirmed by the CFI - May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old. - CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too. ISSUE: WON support should be awarded to the wife HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time - NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." *Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise *However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968 *Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence. Art 356 of the NCC - Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development. - However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses

and the dissolution of the conjugal sanction. (Art 190/191 of NCC)

partnership

since

it

had

judicial

Corroborated by already 5-year separation. 79. YAPTINCHAY VS. TORRES 28 SCRA 489 FACTS : Petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965. Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at 1951 TaftAvenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay City. To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. Among the properties left is a Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the verified petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the deceased, petitioner even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for reconsideration or for clarification/amendment of the herein controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts and capital, among which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated October 25, 1965 also verified in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10 But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house. They maintain that the construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the construction thereof. 11 ISSUE: WON the Forbes Park house be a subject of the is that HELD: NO. PETITION DISMISSED. Petitioner cannot claim ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either

or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." . But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. 16 At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix (legal wife) in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to the control of the probate court. Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside. 80. MAXEY VS. CA 129 SCRA 187 Facts: Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as husband and wife in Davao, out of this common law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners). 1903 when they started living together 1911-1912 when Melbourne bought the lands 1919 when they married in church and when 1st wife died. 1953- husband remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land. 1961 when children discovered sale Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the documents of sale over particular lands that were sold to private respondent couple by their fathers 2nd wife. They allege that common properties belonged to their parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their knowledge and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953. Children discovered sale in 1961. Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land. Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land. Melbourne and Maxey started living together in 1903. That same year, children allege that they got married in the military fashion . acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got married in 1919. Regina sometime in 1919, soon after the church marriage. 1953: husband remarried. they they the They died

Issue: 1. W/N spouses Maxey were married as early as 1903 in a military fashion as alleged by the children Held: NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in rejecting this since the Act No. 3613 a.k.a. the Revised Marriage Law was approved much later (Dec. 4, 1929). It could not apply to a 1903 marriage.

2. W/N common law spouses, prior to marriage, share conjugal property over lands acquired in 1912. Held: RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in common law marriages, the property acquired by both through work, industry, wages, salaries are governed by the rules of co-ownership. CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the land was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey. Art. 144 should not have applied because the Regina did not contribute to the acquisition of the profit. She had no income of her own. Cannot consider this a joint effort. SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there being no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application. Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only the man who works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of property acquired during their cohabitation together. The woman runs the household: "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . (Dean Cortes) In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Gov-Gen Leonard Wood) Ruling: The petitioners should land while the private use of one-half of the to rule out rentals on return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the respondents should pay some form of rentals for their properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.

81. VALDES VS. RTC 260 SCRA 221 Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971 and thereafter were blessed with five children. On June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Their children Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." The Trial Court made a clarification citing Article 147 of the Family Code which explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and

will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. Valdez filed a Motion of reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that: 1. Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. 2. Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code should govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. 3. Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. 4. It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based Article 147 or on Articles 50, 51 and 52 as contended by Valdez. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. 82. NICDAO-CARINO VS. CARINO 351 SCRA 127 FACTS: Article 40 In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the

previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all. 83. MODEQUILLO VS. BREVA 185 SCRA 766 FACTS: Judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al., Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages. The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2 A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

HELD: YES. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not welltaken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. 84. TAYAG VS. CA 209 SCRA 665 Facts: Atty. Ricardo Ocampo and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan had an illicit love affair. As a result Chad Cuyugan was born. Atty. Ocampo died and left several properties. While he was still alive, the illegitimate child, Chad Cuyugan, was showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of Atty. Ocampo. Emilie Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother and guardian of the minor filed a Claim for Inheritance praying that Chad be given support and its share of the estate of the deceased be delivered. Herein petitioner, the administrator of the estate of the deceased, contends that the suit is barred by prescription. Issue: Whether or not the action to compel recognition has prescribed. Ruling: Article 175 of the Family Code provides that the action to establish filiation by an illegitimate child should be brought during the lifetime of the putative father. But if the right was acquired under the Civil Code (Art 285), the child can bring such action within four (4) years from the attainment of the age of majority if the father of the child died when the child was a minor. This is a vested right under another law which cannot be

affected or defeated by the retroactive effect of the Family Code. For if the provisions of the Family Code will retroact that would impair vested rights acquired by the minor child. 85. BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA 229 SCRA 468 Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna. Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on 4/25/82 while latter died intestate on 11/13/89. On 9/24/90 Vicentes sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua was never a related by blood and not legally adopted therefore not a legal heir. On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that shes sole heir and shes capable of managing estate. She presented the ff evids:

daughter

Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial evids: -gyne for treatment of Vicente categorically declared that Marissa is not a biological child TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of Victoria. Ruled that legitimate daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and 170) Marissa is

CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply FC 166 and 170. Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC misapplied FC 166 and 170 Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions. SC said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171 are misplaced since said provisions show situation where husband denies own child with wife and not a situation where a child is alleged not to be a natural child of a couple. SC only sustained CA findings on ruling that Marissa is not a biological child Vicente and Isabel based on the ff: brother Dr. Nilo Chipongian, saying that shes been married already for 10 years but at age 36 was not yet pregnant and so she was even brought to the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel never became pregnant. Had she been, it would have been noticed by people around her. she was born in the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have

been born in the hospital and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the ob-gyne of her putative mother. saying that they are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has no other ascending or descending heirs. Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give Marissa her share which she would not have need to do had Marissa been their legal heir. 86. RODRIGUEZ VS. CA 245 SCRA 150 FACTS: 1. On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought before court, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein 2. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. 3. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained. 4. The petitioner now comes to this court questioning the act of the lower court in sustaining the objection Contentions: Petitioner: Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private respondent because such revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided: "When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be indentified." Respondent: Navarro v. Bacalla: the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to established his paternity ISSUE: Was the Lower Court correct in sustaining the objection? HELD: Yes. REASON 1: Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965). While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to established his paternity, such testimony was admitted during the trial without objection and the defendant accepted the finding of the trial court that he was the father of the plaintiff. Rule: the testimony of the mother may be used to prove paternity IF the father does not object. In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the mother of private respondent to the witness stand to name petitioner as the father of said respondent. REASON2: No similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.

Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175). Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the following: "The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: '(1) The record of birth appearing in the Civil Register or a final judgment; or '(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.' "In the absence of the foregoing evidence the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: '(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or '(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)'" Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."

87. REPUBLIC VS. CA 227 SCRA 401 Facts: Woman (Castro) seeks judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage (civil) to Cardenas on the ground that no marriage license was issued to them prior to the solemnization of the marriage. Allegedly Cardenas personally attended to the procurement of the license, and in fact, the marriage contract itself has reference to a license number. But upon requesting the Civil Registrars Office for a copy, said office could not find the license in question. RTC Quezon City, however, ruled against Castro stating inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. She appealed to the CA which consequently declared the marriage null and void. Petitioner RP petitions the SC for review on certiorari. Issue: WON documentary and testimonial evidence presented are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar prior to the marriage. Held/Ratio: Yes. Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that if a diligent search is made and no record is found in the office in question, it can be considered admissible evidence that there exists no record or entry in that office. CAs decision is affirmed. Marriage of the parties is considered null and void. 88. LUNA VS. IAC 137 SCRA 7 Facts: Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to Liberty Hizon-Luna (grandparents - petitioners). Maria Lourdes Santos is married to Sixto Salumbides (biological parents private respondents), and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides (9 years old when decision was promulgated) , who is the subject of this child custody case. Two or four months after the birth of the Shirley on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means. Before September, 1980, petitioners decided to take Shirley to America. However, when they asked for the written consent from the private respondents to the child's application for a U.S. visa, they refused to give it. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents, upon the latter's request. When they returned, private respondents refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. Decision was rendered, declaring that petitioners are entitled to the child's custody and forthwith granted the writ prayed for.

Private respondents appealed to the IAC, which reversed and set aside the CFI decision, ordering petitioners to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. MR and petition for review were denied. Upon finality, a writ of execution was issued. A motion to set aside the same was filed, but was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not procedural rules [more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases], should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child, to stay with her grandparents instead of her biological parents and who had signified her intention to kill herself or run away from home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her biological parents. Held: We find merit in the petitioner. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents, made during the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court, and during the hearing of the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment rendered inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and material security. Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embitered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy her future. J. Makasiar's DISSENTING OPINION: The rights of biological parents to the custody of their minor children is both a natural and a legal right, the law could not disturb the

parent-child relationship except for the strongest reasons, and only upon a clear showing of a parent's gross misconduct or unfitness. As long as the biological parents are living and they have not lost their parental authority, patria potestas is limited to them. Other ascendants have no authority over the children. The majority decision thus runs counter to the parental-reference rule. A 9-year old girl is not yet capable of defining feelings like love, anger, or cruelty. The child at bar has been living a pampered life with her lolo and lola and has not thus known hardships or disappointments.

89. SANTOS VS. CA 242 SCRA 407 FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confi ne the meaning INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to significance to the marriage. This psychological condition time the marriage is celebrated. of PSYCHOLOGICAL disorders clearly give meaning and must exist at the

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED.

90. REPUBLIC VS. CA 209 SCRA 189 Facts: Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu. Cynthia alleged that she was born to spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. After a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode. Since then, Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of her mother. Her mother and Ernesto Yu got married. Since her childhood, she had not known much less remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite of which she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment. Her step-father had been consulted about the petition and had given his consent thereto. Trial court granted petition, CA affirmed. Solicitor General disagrees. Issue: Whether the change of Cynthias surname to that of her step-fathers surname was proper. Held: We have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is known in society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment. The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private respondents change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondents step-father has two (2) children with her

mother. In the event of her step-fathers death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. In his memorandum, the Solicitor General, opines that Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy. Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of nameand to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her stepfathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. 91. LLANETA VS. AGRAVA 57 SCRA 29 Facts: From the denial by the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its special proceeding H-00237, of her petition for change of name, Teresita Llaneta has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari. Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Teresita lived with Atanacia's mother-inlaw, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse. The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this Court, that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship.

Issue: Whether or not it is proper that her name be changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. Ruling: Yes, it is proper that her name be changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. The principle that change of name that would give the false impression of family relationship is not allowed remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. 92. SILVA VS. PERALTA 110 PHIL 56 FACTS: In 1944, defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister Florence in the latters arrest and investigation in Anibongan. There, defendant met plaintiff and appellant Saturnino Silva, a US citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then started courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of marriage having been made to believe that he was single. They started living together as common-law H & W in Dec 1944 and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no documents of marriage were prepared nor executed. Only evidence offered was testimonies of the defendant and her counsel. Appellant Silva however, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It was only after May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical treatments of his battle wounds, did he divorce

Aussie. To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another marriage with coplaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. ISSUES: (1) WON appellants deception and fraud justified award of damages to defendant (2) HELD: Judgment modified. Defendant appellee Esther Peralta is enjoined from representing herself, directly or indirectly, as wife of appellant Saturnino Silva; and appellant Silva is ordered to pay defendant PhP 30,000 by was of pecuniary and moral damages, plus PhP 5,000 as attys fees. RATIO: (1) Yes, if appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have agreed to be with appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Council was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she should be indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He should then stand solely liable for any & all damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther acted in good faith since Slva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his name. (2) Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. It is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a married woman is authorized to use husbands surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise. WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs. Silva

93. CALDERON VS. REPUBLIC 19 SCRA 721 Facts: Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations

with other people; that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother. The court then granted the petition and ordered the change of the name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon." Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for a change of name, based upon "proper and reasonable cause" redounding to the best interest of the child Held: The court says, "In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the petitioner are valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor who after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate child." A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The court further states that "While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from taking another surname with the latters consent and for justifiable reasons." The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. The Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the petitioner here is of tender age, who cannot as yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of her name, may be prejudiced in her rights under the law. This apprehension is dispelled by the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalintal, as follow: ... But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). (In Re Petition for Change of Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S. Barrera vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-20874, May 25, 1966) 94. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC 112 SCRA 568 FACTS: Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia. They begot two children named Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Zosima's husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Cong. Maglana in the sum of 50,000.00 pesos and one Galagar in the sum of 10,000.00 pesos, also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.

The classmates of Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against their father. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname. HELD: No, the two minors are not allowed to discontinue surname and their mother's surname instead. using their father's

Mother's desire to change her children's surname should not be the sole consideration for the change. Also, eliminating father's surname by the minor children merely because their father is an alleged swindler is not sufficient justification for change of surname. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate. Article 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The minors Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname. Rule 103, Section 5, Rules of Court states, the change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable cases for such change. 95. LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC 98 PHIL 574 Facts: - Dec 10, 1933 petitioner married Lourdes Lukban but left after a fight. Never came back in 20 years. ISSUE: Won Francisco can be declared presumptively dead HELD: No, since it isnt authorized by law and to be declared a widow is dependent upon the death of her husband le RESULT: petition is denied Gue v RP presumption of death cant be declared since you cant be dead. 96. ABOITIZ VS. PEPITO 18 SCRA 1028 FACTS: - Between the night of November 30, and the early morning of December 1, 1961, Demetrio Pepito, a crew member of m/v P. Aboitiz, disappeared therefrom while said vessel was on voyage. - Dec. 26, 1961 Aboitiz Shipping Corp received from Vivencia Pepito a letter dated Dec. 21, stating that it is being notified that one of its

employees was reported missing while m/v P. Aboitiz was navigating. letter states that it is believed that Demetrio is already dead.

The

- Jan. 12, 1962 Vivencia filed with the Regional Office of Dept of Labor (DoL) a notice and claim for compensation, asking for death benefits. - Feb. 15, 1962 Aboitiz receive a copy of the complaint/claim - Feb. 16, 1962 Aboitiz sent to the DoL its own version: Pepito disappeared while off duty, and when the vessel was near Bucas Grande Island while the ship was in navigation on a calm sea and good weather. We do not know if he purposely jumped and swam ashore - March 21, 1962 - without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued an award for death benefits to respondents, planted upon the ground that the right to compensation of the claimant has not been controverted by respondent within the period provided for by law. The report states that Demetrio was found missing on Dec. 1, 1961. The MR was denied and the Workmens Compensation Commission affirmed ISSUE: WON non-controversion of the fact that a person is missing is an admission of the persons death NO RATIO: - Aboitizs controversion (feb.16) was made beyond the periods set forth in the law and the rules and regulations of the Workmens Compensation Commission, namely, 14 days from the date of accident or 10 days from knowledge thereof. According to its own report, it had knowledge of the disappearance on Dec.1. - Logically, the next problem we face is the scope of the non-controversion which may be clamped upon Aboitiz. - the notice and claim for compensation simply says that while the vessel was navigating, the herein deceased was lost or reported missing. This claim was filed on January 12, 1962, or barely 42 days after the event took place. At that time, no presumption existed that Demetrio Pepito was dead. The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of possibilities. Because nothing is certain. Nobody knows what has happened to him. - Legal implications such as right to compensation, succession, the legal status of the wife are so important that courts should not so easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death cannot be taken as a fact. Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply means admission of facts, not conclusions of law. - As applied to the case before us, the mere failure to controvert the statement that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be dead or deceased because

he was lost or was reported missing, does not import an admission that the man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing. - therefore, Aboitizs non-controversion admits but the fact that Demetrio Pepito was lost or missing, but certainly is not an admission of the actual fact of death. - Requiring Aboitiz to pay for death benefits violates its right to due process. The Commission, to justify the award, refers to an investigation report made 42 days after the incident by one Morales, a constabulary agent to the effect that no one knew what happened to Demetrio Pepito because he disappeared at midnight on a rough sea (big waves). But this report does not prove death, it just confirms the fact of disappearance. Moreover, it was not presented in any hearing, hence, it is a mere hearsay. - At this point, more than 4 years has already elapsed, hence, the disappearance could come within the coverage of art. 391, of CC: ART. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of estate among the heirs: (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. Hence, the records of the case are returned to the Workmens Compensation Commission for it to hold a hearing and render judgment accordingly. 97. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. LUCERO 124 SCRA 425 Facts: Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed as captain of the ship EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines and under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila . On February 16 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hong Kong to Manila, Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company stating that due to the violent weather, their voyage is at peril. Subsequently, his last message was for his entire crew to abandon ship. The company then notified the coast guard and the latter conducted a search, but to no avail. The insurers then informed the company about the loss of the vessel. Eastern Shipping then paid the death benefits to the heirs of the crew, however the widow of Capt. Lucero refused to accept the benefits. Mrs. Lucero then filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary of her husband which the company stopped paying on March 1980. She then alleged that because the contract of her husband was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, the company should pay her for her husbands salary until the ill fated vessel returned to the port of Manila.

The company refused to pay. The National seamen board upheld the complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC Issue: WON Mrs. Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary Held: The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 regarding the presumption of death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died because under the law, four (4) years have not yet passed. Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;... The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls." Hence the decision of the NLRC is reversed; however, death benefits should be paid. 98. REYES VS. ALEJANDRO 141 SCRA 65 FACTS: Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left neither will nor any property in his name or any debts. The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the judicial declaration of absence spouse for any purpose other than the protection of the interest or property of the absentee. HELD: No, there is no need.

The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines, there is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee as the primordial purpose of the declaration is to provide for an administrator of the property of the absentee. 99. REPUBLIC VS. MACLI-ING 135 SCRA 367 100. REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA 141 SCRA 462 FACTS: Respondent Leonor Valencia, for Bernardo and Jessica Go, filed with petition for the cancellation and/or Bernardo and Jessica Go in the Civil as Special Proceedings. and in behalf of her 2 minor children, the Court of First Instance of Cebu a correction of entries of the birth of Registry of Cebu. The case was docketed

The Solicitor General opposed the petition alleging that petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Article 412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of clerical errors. Respondent Leonor Valencia admitted that her petition involves substantial changes which are change in the civil status and nationality or citizenship of the respondents. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single". However, she also alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry record may be allowed if proper suit is filed, evidence is submitted, notice were given and publication of the petition was done. Local Civil Registry of Cebu filed the motion to dismiss the petition since corrections are not merely clerical but substantial. Lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the correction of petitioners citizenship and civil status and the citizenship and civil status of her minor children HELD: No. This Court adheres to the principle that substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the

parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. What is an appropriate adversay proceeding? One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39). Article 412 of the New Civil Code speaks of a summary proceeding for correction of entries in the civil registry that refer to mere clerical errors such as mispelled names, occupation of parents, etc. However, if the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate. Moreover, if all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia. The Court is of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. 101. KUMALA SALIM WING VS. ABUBAKAR 102 SCRA 523 FACTS: Kumala Salim Wing, petitioner herein, a Muslim woman and Filipino citizen, married to Wing Siong, 47 years old, Chinese citizen. The couple have been married for almost ten (10) years now and that during this length of time, they have six (6) children; and all these children are living and

none had died. The third child, Bio Heong, whose sex is sought to be corrected in this petition, was born in Tulay, Jolo, Sulu. The couple had all their children registered with the Immigration Office as aliens but that in the case of Bio Heong, their third female child, a mistake as to her sex was committed in the issuance of the child's certificate of live birth after the child, Bio Heong was delivered from the womb of its mother, petitioner herein assisted by the attending nurse, Hadji Kimjiok Donesa, who due to a confusion created by other deliveries she attended the same day when Bio Heong was also delivered, instructed Andami Labbay, her clerk, to prepare the Certificate of Live Birth of the newly born child, Bio Heong, and dictated the entries to be filled up in said document. This erroneous document was then filed with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Jolo, Sulu, without the attending nurse nor the parents of the child having discovered its mistake before registration. The couple had not discovered the mistake because both had no formal schooling and does not read nor understand English. However, when the couple wanted to register their child, Bio Heong, with the Immigration Office in Jolo, Sulu, the error or mistake in the child's certificate of live birth was discovered by the Immigration Office. Despite the discovery, the couple had the child, Bio Heong, registered in the Immigration Office with the data used as appearing in said certificate of live birth without correction. However, the Immigration Officer advised the couple to see a lawyer to have the mistake corrected. ISSUE: Whether or not there must be an adversary proceeding, not one summary in nature, in order to justify the correction of such an entry in the Civil registry. HELD: YES. Considering the publication made, the appearance of the parties concerned either personally or through their competent representatives and the presentation of the evidence during the hearing, this petition is not summary in nature, but it is undoubtedly an appropriate proceeding, where the matter proved was threshed out in a regular trial on the merits. The persuasive quality of the decision is thus apparent. No effort was spared to ascertain the truth of the matter. What is clearly discernible is that an error was committed and all that the Court did in accordance with law was to have it corrected. It would be unwarranted under the circumstances, to reverse such a decision. It must be affirmed. 1. Its conformity to the settled rule first set forth in the leading case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic of the Philippines, 1954 decision, is quite clear. The matter therein involved was the citizenship not only of the petitioner but of his children. This Court, through Justice Bautista Angelo, in interpreting Article 412 of the Civil Code, held: "After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those which may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. It refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.

2. Nor would it be the first time that a procedure of this character did suffice for the correction of an error in the records of the Civil Registrar. In Malicden v. Republic 16 this Court held that testimonial evidence may override an erroneous entry. Thereafter, in Alisoso v. Lastimoso 17 this Court ruled that an unauthorized false entry may be cancelled by the Court through an action of this nature. Matias v. Republic, 18 the opinion being penned by then Acting Chief Justice J.B.L Reyes, is even more in point. Thus: "Granting that the supplying of a name that was left blank in the original recording of the birth does not constitute, as contended by the Solicitor General, a rectification of a mere clerical error, it is well to observe that the doctrine of the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321, and subsequent adjudications predicated thereon, forbade only the entering of material corrections or amendments in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action against the Civil Registrar. In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No costs. 102. LEONOR VS. CA 256 SCRA 69 FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favor of the private respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioners appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CAs decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void? HELD: Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondents contention is untenable. The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner contending that A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.