BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 1
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Police Power & Procedural Due Process

MMDA vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC. Neptune Street / Police Power The MMDA sent a Notice to the BelAir Village Association (BAVA) ordering for the opening of Neptune Street (privately-owned by BAVA) to public vehicular traffic and that the perimeter fence separating said street from Kalayaan Ave. was to be demolished. The order was claimed to be in the exercise of police power. The powers of the MMDA are administrative in nature, and the MMDA Law (RA No. 7924) grants the MMDA neither police power nor legislative power. It is only a development authority organized for the purpose of laying down policies and with coordinating w/ the various government organizations for the delivery of basic services w/in the metropolitan area. Police Power is lodged in the National Legislature and was delegated to the Local Government Units through the Local Government Code. Police power was not conferred by Congress to the MMDA. PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS CASE Hierarchy of Rights Human Rights are imprescriptible and hold primacy over property rights. These include the right to free speech, religion, free assembly, the press, and the right to petition. A law that restricts the exercise of property rights is valid as long as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. However, a law restricting the basic human rights must satisfy a very strict criterion namely that there must be a grave and immediate evil that the state has the right to prevent. It must also pass the balancing of interest test. BANCO ESPAOL vs. PALANCA due process / notice by mail Actual Notice need not be sent to the absentee-owner of a mortgaged property subject to foreclosure. It is not absolutely necessary under the law. Rationale: property is presumed to be in the possession of the owner or his agents, and it is his duty to be vigilant and aware when his property is called to requisition. If he fails to gain notice through the ordinary publications, then it is his misfortune and he must abide by the consequences. The requisites of Due Process in Judicial Proceedings: 1. 2. 3. 4. Court or tribunal clothed w/ judicial power to hear & determine the matter before it Jurisdiction acquired over the person or property subject of the proceedings Defendant must be afforded the opportunity to be heard Judgment must be rendered after lawful hearing

ESPELETA vs. AVELINO right to be heard / cross-examination of witness The respondent judge disregarded and struck from the records, in its entirety, the testimony of a witness for the defense (w/c is indispensable to his case) for failure to appear on the scheduled date despite motions for continuance by the defendant counsel. By denying defendant the right to present evidence indispensable to his defense, he was practically denied the opportunity to be heard. This is a violation of due process. His right to his day in court was eroded. ANG TIBAY vs. CIR Administrative Due Process Although the Court of Industrial Relations is not bound by strict rules of technicality in order to settle and prevent further agricultural and industrial disputes, still it cannot do away with the basic and fundamental principles of due process. The requisites of Administrative Due Process are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. The right to hearing & presentation of his own case The tribunal must consider the evidence presented Decision must be supported by evidence Evidence must be substantial, reasonable, and adequate not mere hearsay Decision must be based on the evidence in the record & disclosed to the parties The judge must decide on his own and not merely adopt those of his subordinates The parties must be informed of the issues involved and the reasons behind the decisions rendered

PHILCOMSAT vs. ALCUAZ notice & hearing / quasi-judicial functions Commissioner Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued motu propio an Order requiring the provisional reduction by 15% of the rates that may be charged by the petitioner for the delivery of its services, w/o the benefit of a hearing. It was based upon a report submitted by the Gen. Auditing Office. Notice & hearing are not essential for administrative action if it is exercised as an executive, administrative, or legislative function. But if the administrative agency exercises a quasi-judicial function, notice & hearing is necessary. The Order pertains exclusively to the petitioner and it involves questions of fact. It was thus issued in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. That the said Order is interlocutory is immaterial. PHILCOMSAT is likewise entitled to controvert the report upon w/c the Order was based. The Public Service Act likewise requires notice & hearing before the NTC may fix service rates. The power of the government to regulate property rights and franchises must be reasonable and must not be arbitrary and confiscatory and must be in accord with the best interest of the public. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS vs. NTC notice & hearing / provisional rates PLDT applied for the approval of rates for Digital Service Transmission Facilities w/ the NTC w/c granted the PLDT provisional approval. No notice was sent to the other telecom providers except to PT&T w/c notified the others (petitioners herein) of the provisional approval. The petitioners thus allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and violation of due process. Under the Public Service Act, the NTC can provisionally approve rates proposed by public services w/o need for hearing, but subject to hearing 30 days thereafter. It applies to both initial and revised rates. Provisional rates are, by their nature, temporary and subject to adjustment after final hearing. No notice is required therefor. It is also noteworthy that it is impossible for the NTC to send notices to all affected parties. The law does not require the impossible. Rates are likewise presumed reasonable and the courts will not interfere w/ administrative action in the absence of gave abuse of discretion. NON vs. JUDGE DAMES rallying students / school discipline Ariel Non and 12 other students of the Mabini College participated in unruly mass actions within school premises. They violated their rally permits w/c only allowed them to rally in the school basketball court. It resulted to the disruption of classes. They were thus denied re-enrollment for the next semester. The following are the requisites for due process in school disciplinary actions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. students must be informed in writing of the nature & cause of the accusations they shall have the right to answer the charges, w/ counsel should they so choose they shall be informed of the evidence against them they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf school authorities must decide based on evidence penalty imposed must be proportional

The penalty of denying Non and the other petitioners re-enrollment is clearly excessive and disproportionate to the offenses committed. LAO GI alias CHIA Jr. vs. CA due process / deportation Deportation proceedings must be conducted in accordance w/ the principles of due process. There must be a preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable cause. The alien must be informed of the specific ground for deportation. Hearing must be in accordance w/ the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the issuance of search warrants, warrants of arrest, bail, motion to quash, and the trial. Private prosecutors cannot intervene in deportation proceedings in order to avoid harassment and oppression, hence there are special prosecutors tasked to prosecute deportation. PEOPLE vs. NAZARIO vague law / fish ponds case Nazario was charged for violating certain municipal ordinances w/c he assails as vague. The said ordinances impose a P 3.00 tax per square hectare of fishpond, w/c starts 3 years from the approval by the Bureau of Fisheries, or starting from the year 1964 in case it was opened beyond the said year. He likewise claims that, being a lessee, he is neither owner nor manager w/in the scope of the definition of the law. In order for a law to be vague, its obscurity must be evident on its face such that it cannot be clarified by a saving clause or by construction. It is distinguished from laws couched on imprecise language or laws that are fairly ambiguous but nevertheless applicable. In the case at bar, the ordinances are not vague and merely poses a simple mathematical problem as to the dates of the payment w/c may nevertheless be computed. Being the one who benefits and profits from the fishponds, the petitioner likewise falls squarely w/in the coverage of the term operator or manager of the said fishpond for the purpose of the tax.

CORONA vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS occupation / property rights The Phil. Ports Authority (PPA), in the exercise of its control power, enacted an Admin. Order, ordering that all appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be for a term of only 1 year, subject to renewal or cancellation yearly after rigid evaluation of performance. The Office of the President, through Exec. Sec. Corona, affirmed the validity of the said resolution. However, it was nullified by the trial court. Procedurally, the Admin. Order is valid despite the lack of notice & hearing prior to its enactment, because it was enacted through the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. However, substantially, it is unreasonable and superfluous and amounts to deprivation of property w/o due process of law because it restricts the harbor pilots from enjoying their profession before their compulsory retirement. The right to ones occupation is a vested property right and can only be restricted or denied with due process of law. ARMY & NAVY CLUB vs. CA property rights / historical landmarks The City of Manila attempts to evict the Army & Navy Club for its failure to comply w/ contractual obligations. The latter asserts that it is a historical landmark for being so declared by the Natl Historical Commission and thus, its existence allegedly cannot be undermined by a simple ejectment suit. When properties are classified into historical treasures, it imposes limits on ownership hence it must be done in accordance w/ due process. As an exercise of the police power, such authority is lodged in the legislature and the governing laws are RA No. 4846 and PD No. 374 providing the manner by w/c said properties are to be classified. Hence, it must follow the prescribed procedure first before being so classified. ACEBEDO OPTICAL vs. CA business permit vs. professional license Acebedo Optical applied w/ the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit w/c was granted, anent opposition from local optometrists, but subject to various burdensome condition such that it is limited to a commercial store, that it cannot examine or prescribe reading glasses & cannot sell the same w/o prescription of independent optometrists, that it can only advertise Ray Ban and similar frames. Although police power is vested in the legislature and is granted to local government units (including the power to issue permits), a business permit cannot be equated w/ a license to practice a profession, the issuance of w/c is lodged in a board of commissioners tasked specifically to regulate the said profession in this case, the Board of Examiners in Optometry. The local government does not have authority to regulate the profession or practice of Optometry. Further, a corporation such as Acebedo has all the contractual rights of a person and may employ qualified optometrists it is not against public policy or the law. SEC. OF JUSTICE vs. LANTION extradition / notice & hearing Herein respondent demands that he be furnished a copy of the extradition petition and its supporting papers pending the evaluation stage w/ the Sec. of Justice, to w/c the latter refuses. He claims that such refusal violates the right to notice and hearing. The implementing law, PD No. 1069 provides that the notice shall be given at the same time as the warrant of arrest. The same rule is likewise provided in the treaty to w/c both the US and the Philippines agree and to w/c other countries have expressed the same interpretation. For the purpose of notice and hearing, a criminal procedure cannot be equated w/ an extradition proceeding and it follows that the evaluation process is not similar to preliminary investigation. Also applying the balancing of interests test, considering that the case is only in its evaluation process, the nature of the right being claimed is nebulous in character and the degree of injury is minimal. The balance is thus tilted in favor of the State. Such procedural protection has not yet become due given the extent to w/c the defendant is to suffer loss or injury. DD: Notice and hearing for extradition cases is not required during the Executive Phase of the proceedings, but it is required in the Judicial Phase thereof. Considering that the petition is still under the evaluation of the Secretary of Justice, then it is still in the Executive Phase hence no notice and hearing is yet required. SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD vs. TORCITA conduct unbecoming of officer / notice & hearing PO Torcita was charged w/ several counts of conduct unbecoming of an officer, grave threats, and abuse of authority. All charges were dismissed. However, he was instead convicted of Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty for w/c he was not specifically charged. Petitioners allege that the offense of Simple Irregularity (w/c includes being drunk during duty hours) is covered by the more serious offense of Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer. A person cannot be found guilty of an offense for w/c he was neither notified nor charged. It violates the rudimentary requirements of due process.

DD: A person cannot be penalized for an offense for w/c he was not charged or one w/c is not alleged in the information because to do so would violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. It is a violation of due process. LAZATTA vs. STATE OF NEW JERSEY gangster / vague law The State of NJ enacted a criminal statute penalizing w/ a fine and imprisonment any person not engaged in a lawful occupation who is a member of a gang of two or more persons and has been convicted at least 3 times. A statute, especially a penal statute, must explicitly prescribe the rule to govern conduct and warn against transgression. The law is vague and leaves even persons of common intelligence to speculate as to its meaning and differ in its application. A vague law violates due process. DD: The word gang is vague and was not properly defined in the statute. If a law is vague, there is no way by w/c common people may be certain as to how to conduct themselves so as not to violate the law. It would be unfair considering that it is presumed that the people know the law and ignorance of the law excuses no one. PEOPLE vs. DE LA PIEDRA vague law / illegal recruitment Carol de la Piedra was convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale. She challenges the constitutionality of the Labor Code provision penalizing the same for being vague. When recruitment or placement is undertaken by unauthorized persons it is deemed to be illegal recruitment and if the same is perpetrated against 3 or more persons, then it is deemed to be on a large scale. She likewise asserts overbreadth. The concept of overbreadth is peculiar to free expression cases and is inapplicable to the case at bar. An act will be declared void for vagueness only upon a showing that defect or vagueness is to such an extent that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. The said law is capable of reasonable construction, hence it cannot be declared void. ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN plunder law / vague law / series or combination Former Pres. Estrada is prosecuted under the Plunder Law (RA No. 7080) as amended by RA No. 7659. He challenges the constitutionality of the said law for being vague claiming that the words combination and series in the phrase combination or series of obvert and criminal acts are vague. A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. Words in a statute are understood in their plain and common meaning, unless the legislature otherwise intended. It can very easily be understood that what the law punishes is the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P 50 million through the series or combination of criminal acts. It is, in fact, clear and free from ambiguity. The concept of overbreadth, peculiar to free expression cases, is not applicable to the case at bar. GONZALES vs. NLRC & ATENEO DE DAVAO removal of teacher / due process Lorlene Gonzales, a teacher, was investigated pursuant to complaints from 2 parents alleging that she resorted to corporal punishment to discipline students. She called for the amendment of some school rules, particularly that w/c limited the participation of her counsel to advice only w/o direct participation. She was terminated upon notice; the NLRC sustained the termination. Opportunity must be afforded the accused to defend herself either personally or through counsel, to be informed of the nature and causes of the accusations against her, and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. The adamant refusal of the committee to accede to the demand to amend the rule and allow her counsel to participate has led to her failure to successfully confront and cross-examine the accusers ultimately vitiating the investigation.

Substantive Due Process

UNITED STATES vs. TORIBIO slaughter of carabao / restraint on property use The appellant was prosecuted for slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered a carabao, against the provisions of Act No. 1147 w/c is now assailed either as an invalid exercise of eminent domain or police power. The legislature may regulate and restrain the use of property as would be inconsistent or injurious to the rights of the public. Great discretion is vested upon the State to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are reasonably necessary to such interests. It does not amount to taking of private property for public use. YNOT vs. IAC carabeef / valid purpose, invalid means Ynot transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught and penalized under EO No. 66-A prohibiting the inter-provincial transport of carabaos and carabeef & authorizing the immediate confiscation of the said carabaos & distribution of the same to deserving farmers (charitable institutions in the case of carabeef) as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit. The purpose of the law was to protect carabaos as a national energy

resource given the prevailing energy crisis. Take note that the carabao is said to be the poor mans tractor. There is no connection between prohibiting inter-province transport of carabaos / carabeef & preventing their slaughter. They can be slaughtered nevertheless w/o having to transport them. It is an unreasonable exercise of the police power. It orders the immediate confiscation and forfeiture of the said property w/o due process and w/o affording the defendant the opportunity to be heard. The objective may be valid, but the means amount to deprivation of property w/o due process of law. The EO also encroaches upon the powers of the judiciary in violation of the principle of the separation of powers by allowing the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission to dispose of the confiscated properties as he may see fit. CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY billboards regulation Act No. 2339 allows the Collector of Internal Revenue, after due investigation, to decide that any sign or billboard exposed to the public view is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and empowers him to summarily order the its removal. If not complied with w/in 10 days, he may cause the removal himself. The plaintiffs contend that it constitutes deprivation of property w/o due process of law. The regulation of billboards falls squarely w/in the police power of the State. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell, or hearing, may be suppressed by the State especially those situated in thickly populated districts. The people are entitled to protest against the indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers especially if they are offensive to the senses under certain conditions. The State has the duty to promote a healthy social and economic condition and the comfort and convenience of the people fall squarely w/in its coverage. The prevailing public sentiment likewise militates against the erection of billboards w/c are offensive to the sight. DD: Aesthetics may now be regulated by the police power of the State, although usually justified by the public interest and safety. PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO view of the plaza / deprivation of property Juan Fajardo was convicted for having constructed a building, w/o permit from the Municipal Mayor, that obstructs the view of the Plaza from the Highway, contrary to an Ordinance enacted for that matter. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. The purpose of the law may be valid; however, the means employed is arbitrary. An ordinance w/c permanently restricts the use of property such that it can no longer be used for any reasonable purpose, is beyond regulation and constitutes taking of property. It clearly oversteps the boundaries of the exercise of police power and amounts to confiscation and deprivation of property w/o just compensation. The use and enjoyment of the property is an element of ownership. DD: If the State will restrict the use of private property such that it can no longer be used for any reasonable purpose or for the purpose for w/c it is intended then it amounts to taking of the property. In this case, the State must expropriate the property and pay the owner just compensation. ACEBEDO OPTICAL vs. CA business permit vs. professional license Acebedo Optical applied w/ the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit w/c was granted, anent opposition from local optometrists, but subject to various burdensome condition such that it is limited to a commercial store, that it cannot examine or prescribe reading glasses & cannot sell the same w/o prescription of independent optometrists, that it can only advertise Ray Ban and similar frames. Although police power is vested in the legislature and is granted to local government units (including the power to issue permits), a business permit cannot be equated w/ a license to practice a profession, the issuance of w/c is lodged in a board of commissioners tasked specifically to regulate the said profession in this case, the Board of Examiners in Optometry. The local government does not have authority to regulate the profession or practice of Optometry. Further, a corporation such as Acebedo has all the contractual rights of a person and may employ qualified optometrists it is not against public policy or the law. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS vs. CITY OF MANILA hotel regulation To address the increase of prostitution and other activities offensive to the public morals, the City of Manila enacted an Ordinance burdening the hotel / motel operators (petitioners) with certain regulations such as that lessees are to be required to fill up registration forms, imposing a prohibition against the lease of rooms to minors, or for more than twice w/in 24 hours, that the said establishments must be open for inspection by the Mayor of Chief of Police, and classifying said establishments into 2 classifications (1 st class & 2nd class) and imposing certain minimum requirements therefor. Petitioners assail the Ordinance for invading their right to privacy. Police power is the power of the State to enact regulations to promote the health, morals, peace and order, and welfare of the society. The

said ordinance is enacted precisely for that purpose: to prevent the deterioration of the public morals. The standard for the validity of its exercise is its responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It must not be arbitrary and oppressive. The additional taxes imposed are reasonable and may be imposed as an exercise of police power for so long as it is just and uniform. In the absence of a clear showing of infirmity, the presumption of constitutionality prevails. MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES legal gambling / LGU police power Because of the success of its Casino business, the PAGCOR planned to establish a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. They leased a portion of a building from Pryce Properties for that purpose. A wave of strong protest from the local officials, organizations, and other citizens followed w/c led the local Sanggunian to enact the assailed Ordinance prohibiting the establishment of casinos w/in its territory. While it is generally considered illegal, the Constitution does not prohibit gambling outright. It is up to Congress to decide, based on its own wisdom, whether or not to prohibit the same outright or some forms of it. Although the local governments are imbued w/ police power, they may only prohibit gambling that is illegal, but not forms of gambling allowed by law in this case by the PAGCOR Charter. The following are the requisites for a valid ordinance: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. It must not contravene any law or the Constitution It must not be unfair or oppressive It must not be partial or discriminatory It may not prohibit but may regulate trade It must be general and consistent w/ public policy It must not be unreasonable

LAWRENCE vs. TEXAS sodomy / form of liberty The Houston police, responding to a weapons disturbance report, entered Lawrences apartment and saw him and anot her man engaging in sexual acts. They were thus prosecuted under a Texas Law prohibiting sodomy. The fact that the majority perceive something to be immoral is not, by itself, sufficient to justify a law prohibiting the same. Furthermore, individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships are a form of liberty protected by the due process clause. The case involves two consenting adults, not minors or persons that may be injured or coerced, or prostitution, such that would warrant the States interference. DD: The State has no business meddling w/ the sexual preferences of consenting adults for as long as they pose no danger to the public health or interest. It is guaranteed by their right to liberty. BALACUIT vs. CFI half-priced seats for kids / no public interest served The City Board of Butuan enacted Ordinance No. 640 mandating that admission seats for children between 7-12 years old should be sold for half the price, apparently to lessen the economic burden of parents whose kids are lured by the so-called attractive nuisances. It provides for penalties for violators. Police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. A reasonable relation between end and means must exist. No public interest at all is served by the ordinance. Ascertaining the ages of children for the purpose of the discount is likewise difficult. It is not at all practicable, as the Council asserts, to require children to present birth certificates while purchasing theater tickets. AGUSTIN vs. EDU early warning devices / road safety Pres. Marcos, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Road Signs & Signals, enacted PD No. 229 requiring, as a pre-registration requisite, the installation of an Early Warning Device for vehicles, which may be procured from any source provided that it substantially complies with the specifications therein contained. The statute was enacted in the exercise of the police power to promote road and traffic safety clearly in the interest of the public. In the absence of a clear factual foundation of record to overthrow the validity of the said law, then the presumption of validity must prevail. BENNIS vs. MICHIGAN confiscated car / deterrent against illegal use The car jointly owned by the Bennis spouses was confiscated by the Michigan Court as a public nuisance because the husband, John, used it to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute along a Detroit City street. He was convicted of gross indecency. The wife, Tina, claims that, being the co-owner and innocent spouse without knowledge or consent to her husbands illegal activity, she has been deprived of her property w/o due process of law. It is a well settled rule in jurisprudence that the acts of the possessor bind the interests of the owner, whether he is innocent or not. It is a defense of the State against forbidden use and the evasion from liability by dispensing with the necessity of conducting judicial inquiry regarding possible collusion. The government is NOT required to compensate the owner of the property it has lawfully taken unless the taking was done in the exercise the power of Eminent Domain. In this case, the forfeiture was exercised through the police power of the State. The confiscation of the said property is in the

nature of a penalty, hence no compensation is due. The purpose of the law is to deter illegal activities leading to the deterioration of the neighborhood and to unsafe streets. CRUZAN vs. MISSOURI DIRECTOR OF DOH euthanasia / State interest to protect life Nancy Cruzan, due to an automobile accident, is in persistent vegetative state. The state trial court authorized the termination of death-delaying procedures at the instance of her close family but the State Supreme Court reversed. Generally, a competent person has the constitutionally-protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition. However, it does not follow that the same applies to an incompetent person. The State has a general interest in the protection and preservation of human life. It must guard against potential abuses by surrogates who may not act according to the interests of the patient. For this reason, the State of Missouri can apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to determine w hether or not the proposed termination of the death-delaying mechanisms is in accordance w/ the will of the patient. In this case, the evidence adduced in trial (based on the testimony of her friend that she once remotely expressed not wanting to live further in a vegetative state) does not suffice to meet the said standard. The Due Process Clause does not require the State to accept the substituted judgment of close family members in the absence of clear proof that they reflect the same views of the patient.

Equal Protection Clause

PEOPLE vs. CAYAT prohibited liquors for natives Cayat was a member of the non-Christian tribes of Benguet. He was charged and sentenced (under RA No. 1639) for possession of intoxicating liquors other than the so-called native wines. He challenges the constitutionality of the said act. The guarantee of equal protection is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. The free use of the said liquors by the natives has resulted in lawlessness and crimes hampering the efforts of the government to prepare them for integration w/ the mainstream community. When the public safety so requires, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance despite inconveniences that some members of a particular class may suffer. The following requisites must be complied with to satisfy equal protection: 1. 2. 3. 4. It must rest on substantial distinctions It must be germane to the purpose of the law It must not be limited to existing conditions only It must apply equally to all members of a class

DD: The distinction made in this case may no longer be valid under the present state of society. ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ retail trade law / aliens vs. citizens The assailed law aims to nationalize the retail trade industry by restricting engagement in retail trade to Filipinos and providing prohibitions against alien participation, as well as the transition of the retail trade towards Filipinization. Chinese retail businessmen challenge the law for being discriminatory. The constitutional guarantees are not limited to citizens but are extended towards aliens as well. Equal protection does not demand absolute equality but merely that persons similarly situated be treated similarly, both w/ regard to the conferment of privileges and imposition of liabilities. It is undeniable that in many communities, the alien retailers have replaced the natives, and have gradually exercised control and dominance, and it is the responsibility of the government to step in to prevent the economic subjugation of the nation. It is apparent that aliens have repeatedly engaged in pernicious and intolerable practices. For the purpose of engaging in retail, there is a sufficient distinction between citizens and aliens, who do not owe the same degree of allegiance and loyalty to the country. It is a reasonable classification that justifies unequal treatment and preference for the Filipino trader. DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 65 year old candidate / age distinction / accused vs. convict Patricio Dumlao, a candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya assails the validity of a provision of BP No. 52 that prohibits retired elected officials over 65 years old from seeking re-election for the same position from which he retired. The rationale for the said provision is the necessity for new blood and the policy of the State to promote its emergence in local governments. (Justice Teehankee dissents from the classification stating that it does not further the aim of the law, because the retiree can run for a position other than that from w/c he retired)

Another provision of the law prohibits persons charged with crimes from seeking public office. It contravenes the constitutional provision on presumption of innocence and in effect classifies those merely charged with those already convicted. DD: A person merely charged for a crime cannot be put in the same level as a person already convicted for the purpose of disqualifying him from office. It is an invalid classification. FARIAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ipso facto resignation / elective vs. appointive officials The Fair Elections Act repealed the provision of the Omnibus Election Code declaring those officials holding elective positions ipso facto resigned upon filing their candidacy for other positions. It, however, retains the rule against appointive officials. In short, an elective official retains his position even upon his filing of a certificate of candidacy for another position; while an appointive official is deemed ipso facto resigned upon filing the same. There is a substantial distinction between elective and appointive officials. Appointive officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities or from taking part in elections except to vote. DD: Cabinet members are not covered by the rule considering that they hold office by virtue of the mere confidence of the Chief Executive and are thus, essentially, partisan in his favor. This case abandons the ruling in the Dimaporo Case which was based on the Omnibus Election Code. GOESART vs. CLEARY wife or daughters of tavern owner only / unwise but valid The assailed Michigan law states that no female may be licensed to be a bartender unless she is the wife or daughter of the male owner. While Michigan may deny to all women the opportunity for bartending, they cannot play favorites with women w/o rhyme or reason. The legislature apparently believes that the wives or daughters of male bar owners are less susceptible to the hazards of the said job due to the oversight afforded by the owner of the bar. The law may be questionable insofar as its wisdom, but the court cannot gainsay the belief of the legislature. DD: It is not the province of the Judiciary to rule upon the wisdom of legislation only its legality may be ruled upon. This is in keeping with the principle of the separation of powers. ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL vs. ORMOC CITY tax imposed on the said company only / uniformity The Municipal Board of Ormoc imposed a tax on all sugar productions milled at the Ormoc Sugar Central Company (the only sugar central existing in Ormoc City during that time) at 1% per export sale. It taxes only the sugar produced in the said company and none other. The classification, in order to be reasonable, must be applicable to future conditions as well. While Ormoc Sugar Central is the only sugar central in the City of Ormoc during that time, the ordinance will not affect other sugar centrals established thereafter. Taxing ordinances should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar centrals. SISON Jr. vs. ANCHETA taxation / professionals & businessmen vs. compensation earners BP No. 135 imposed a higher tax rate for net income of professionals and businessmen as opposed to the gross income tax at a lower rate applied to compensation or fixed-wage earners. Taxpayers may be classified into different classes or categories and such classification must rest upon substantial distinctions. There is a significant distinction between compensation earners and professionals / businessmen. Wage earners have no overhead expenses and are not entitled to make deductions for taxing purposes. Businessmen and professionals, on the other hand, are not uniform as to their expenses necessary to produce their income. There is thus ample justification for the classification. HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE preventive suspension / PNP vs. ordinary accused Himagan, a member of the PNP, was charged for the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr. and the attempted murder of Barnabe Machitar. For this he was preventively suspended on the basis of the DILG Act for such period until the termination of his case. He contends that the 90-day maximum period for preventive suspension under the law should apply to him. There is ample distinction between members of the PNP and other ordinary people charged w/ offenses. Policemen carry weapons and a badge that can be used to harass or threaten witnesses. The legislative intent, based on the record of deliberations, is clear. The 90-day suspension period was not meant to apply to members of the PNP charged w/ crimes. Their suspension is valid for such period prior to the termination of their case. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. vs. PARDO franking privilege / judiciary vs. other departments RA No. 7354, through its repealing clause, withdraws the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retains it for the other branches of the government, such as the executive and the legislative, even in favor of former first ladies and the AFP Ladies Steering Committee. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged based on the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. It is the Judiciary that needs the franking privilege the most. If the problem is loss of revenue for the Phil. Postal Corp. then the remedy is to

withdraw the privilege from all branches of government. The distinction between the grantees of the privilege and the Judiciary is simply superficial. TIU vs. CA SBMA businesses tax incentives RA No. 7227 and EO No. 97-A grant several forms of tax incentives in favor of businesses and residents w/in the secured area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) but denies them to those businesses located outside the said zone. The policy of the law is to develop the SSEZ into a self-sustaining commercial and financial investment center. There is clearly a substantial difference between the big investors being lured in to establish their business w/in the SSEZ and the present small merchants doing trade outside the area. The establishments outside of the said zone do not have any impact on the purpose of the law to turn the former military base into an industrial and commercial hub; hence there is hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits under RA No. 7227. DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC re-assignment of election officers / singled out The Voters Registration Act declared that election officers who have served for more than 4 years w/in a said municipality or city are to be re-assigned to a different area. This has resulted to the re-assignment of De Guzman and the other herein petitioners. They aver that they have been singled out. The policy of the law in singling out the said election officers is to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place assignment. Hence it does not violate the equal protection clause. PT&T vs. NLRC company policy against marriage Herein respondent, a married woman, was dismissed from her work at PT&T due to concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds. The record, however, discloses that her termination was, in reality, primarily caused by the companys policy against married women. The policy against accepting women workers who contract marriage runs afoul to the right against discrimination of women protected by labor laws and the Constitution. The companys policy is highly discriminatory. It is the policy of the State to protect labor as well as the fundamental right to equality before the law of women and men. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE vs. QUISUMBING foreign hires vs. local hires Respondent International School employs both foreign and locally-hired teachers but grants the foreign-hires additional salary of 25% and other benefits such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, travel allowances, and the like. The local-hires cry discrimination. Discrimination, especially in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Employees should be given equal pay for equal value of work. Local hires perform basically the same functions and services as foreign hires and are thus entitled to the same compensation. Thus, the dislocation factor is not a valid basis for distinction in salary rates but may be adequately compensated by the other benefits granted by the school to w/c it is more directly related. DD: It appears in this case that the Bill of Rights was invoked against a private entity as opposed to the common and general rule that the Bill of Rights regulates the exercise of State power.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 2
Searches and Seizures
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and so search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Validity of Warrants
VALMONTE vs. GEN. DE VILLA (part 1) checkpoints / not per se illegal Due to the alarming lawlessness and violence prevalent in urban areas and the threat of the NPA, LOI No. 02-87 created the NCR District

Command (NCRDC) to establish an effective territorial defense and to provide an atmosphere of peace and order in Metro Manila. It mandated the creation of checkpoints placed in various strategic locations manned by military personnel. It conducted regular searches and check-ups of vehicles without a warrant or court order. There was once an instance when a person was fired at and killed for speeding off and refusing to submit to the search. Thus, the petitioner challenges the measure alleging that it serves as a vehicle for harassment or abuse. The Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. The petitioner cannot invoke it for other persons. Mere apprehension that the checkpoints will lead to harassment and violation of rights is insufficient to declare the checkpoints illegal per se. The inherent right of the State to protect its existence prevails over an individuals right against a warrantless search, provided that it is reasonably conducted. VALMONTE vs. GEN. DE VILLA (part 2) The 6th coup detat against the Aquino Government took place. Checkpoints were once again instituted. For as long as the search is limited to a visual search and no body search is conducted, then they do not violate the right against unreasonable search. Check points are not illegal per se and under exceptional circumstances, they may be installed by the government. Where abuse marks the operation of checkpoints, the citizen is not helpless and may avail of other legal remedies. Consolidated Dissents (Justices Cruz and Sarmiento): The checkpoints have basically taken the place of a search warrant in violation of the right against unreasonable searches. The failure of the government to suppress crimes is not an excuse to suspend the operation of the Bill of Rights. Constitutional shortcuts should not be allowed. Probable cause is determined by a judge, not by a soldier or policeman. The checkpoints allow the officers to fish for probable cause where originally there is none. PEOPLE vs. ESCANO firearms found in the trunk / vehicle search A gun was found in the trunk of Escano (with Usana and Lopez) during a routine vehicle search in a checkpoint pursuant to the COMELECs gun ban during the election period. They were charged w/ illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Jurisprudence recognizes the following valid warrantless searches: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Search incidental to a lawful arrest Search of moving vehicles Evidence in plain view Customs searches Consented warrantless searches Stop-and-frisk situations

There are indications that Escano consented to the search because he did not refuse and freely accompanied the police to the trunk of his car. Checkpoints need not be announced; and to limit the search to visual searches would defeat the aim of the COMELEC to effect the gun ban. DD: The court seemed to have presumed a waiver of rights from the actions of Escano. This is contrary to the generally accepted principle that waiver of constitutional rights is never presumed as well as the rule that inspection during checkpoints must be limited to visual searches only. ALVAREZ vs. CFI search for money-lenders papers / hearsay / fishing expedition Suspected for being a loan shark, a search warrant was issued against Alvarez based solely on the affidavit of Agent Almeda stating that he acquired information from a reliable source. A search warrant must be based upon an application under oath of the applicant or the witnesses he may produce; personal knowledge is necessary not mere hearsay. In the absence of personal knowledge of the complainant, affidavits of witnesses with personal knowledge must be procured before the warrant can issue. The warrant is thus void. On the other hand, a particular description of the things to be seized is necessary, unless, by the nature of the goods to be seized, they must be described generally. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles sought (books, receipts, lists, etc. in connection w/ money-lending activities), no better and more accurate description is possible. The petitioner protested to the seizures from the beginning, hence there is no waiver of rights. Statutes authorizing searches and seizures must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. PEOPLE vs. VELOSO parliamentary club / john doe Jose Veloso, a member of the House of Representatives and manager of the so-called Parliamentary Club (a gambling den), was arrested pursuant to a John Doe warrant issued based on an affidavit executed by secret-agent Geronimo. It alleged that John Doe was illegally in possession in the building (specifically described as 124 Calle Arzobispo, Manila),

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as well as of certain effects used in violation of the Anti-Gambling Law. Veloso violently resisted the arrest alleging that the John Doe warrant is void. A warrant must specifically describe the persons or things to be seized. But if the name of the person to be seized is unknown, a John Doe warrant may still be valid provided that a descriptio personae sufficient to enable the arresting authority to identify the person is made therein. In this case, the description enabled the police to identify, accurately, the person sought to be seized. Thus, the warrant is valid. There is likewise no justification for excessive violence in resisting arrest. Upon a lawful arrest, the officers may likewise take from the arrested person things or effects used to perpetrate the offense or the fruits thereof. PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL marijuana / personal examination of complainant Mamaril was found in possession of marijuana (and various effects relative thereto) pursuant to a search warrant. In trial he contended that there was no evidence that searching questions were asked the complainant during application for the warrant. There were no stenographic notes in support thereof. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. The judge must examine the complainant or witnesses personally, under oath, and it must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. Mere affidavits are insufficient. In the absence of such, the search warrant is void, and all evidence obtained therefrom is deemed inadmissible. Failure to object to the entry into his house is not tantamount to a waiver of such right. The courts indulge every presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. DD: Take note that under the Rules of Court, in order to justify the issuance of a search warrant, there must be personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, personal determination suffices. STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO general warrants / fishing expedition A total of 42 search warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of w/c they are officers for violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff & Customs Laws, the Internal Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal Code. It mandated the seizure of all papers and documents pertaining to the businesses regardless of the legality of the transactions. There was no specific offense charged and no reference to any particular provision. It is thus a general warrant. General warrants are outlawed by the Bill of Rights. It was impossible for the judges who issued the same to have found the existence of probable cause. Particular acts must be alleged. Likewise, no search warrant shall issue except for more than one specific offense. Things to be seized must likewise be particularly described. The search warrants are thus void and evidence obtained therefrom is thus inadmissible. To hold otherwise would render the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches illusory. What was committed was, in fact a fishing expedition. Only corporations, however, may contest the warrants appertaining to them because they have their respective personalities. DD: The right against unreasonable searches is personal and may be invoked only by the person whose rights have been violated. CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE unauthorized banking / general pattern of business Judge Morfe nullified a search warrant issued against the First Mutual Savings & Loan Organization w/c allegedly engaged in banking practices w/o authority from the Monetary Board such as extending loans. Morfe stated that the deponent must have stated the specific illegal acts and transactions , and their respective perpetrators and victims, so that only books and records pertaining thereto are to be seized from the said Organization. This contention is untenable. Failure of the witness (Manila Police detective) to mention the particular individuals does not disprove his knowledge of the specific acts of the Organization. The records clearly suggest that the illegal transactions constitute the general pattern of business of the Organization. That no victims were named is immaterial; the law obviously seeks to protect the public not only from actual but also potential injury that may be caused by the illegal banking practices of the corporation. COLUMBIA PICTURES vs. CA copyright infringement / master tapes The seizure of allegedly pirated video cassettes was assailed on the basis of lack of probable cause. Based on the 20th Century Fox case, in order to determine the existence of probable cause in video piracy cases, the original or master tape must be presented in court and compared with the (purchased) counterfeit in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The court will not give credence to mere testimony alleging the supposed similarity w/o the presentation of the originals and the counterfeit copies for the purpose of comparison. However, this rule is no longer applicable the master tapes are no longer absolutely necessary to determine the existence of probable cause. They are only needed if there is doubt as to the true nexus of the infringed material in comparison w/ the original. The 20th Century Fox Case, in this regard, has already been superseded.

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BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF subversive publication / typo error / general warrants Two offices of the We Forum publication were searched, pursuant to 2 separate warrants, for subversion according to PD No. 885. Printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles, and other effects were seized. The two search warrants, however, pointed to one and the same place (apparently a typo error). In this case, the executing officer (Col. Abadilla) was likewise the complainant and the executing officers prior knowledge of the premises to be searched is relevant. The intent of the judge who issued the warrant is clear that there are two separate places to be searched. Further, should there be ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, the executing officer may resort to the affidavit to clarify the same. That properties seized are owned by other persons is immaterial. For as long as they are subject of the offense, or intended to be used in connection therewith, is sufficient. Only personal property may be seized; and since they do not allege ownership over the land, then any equipment attached thereto shall be considered as movable property. The warrant, however, fails on the aspect of its being a general warrant. In warrants directed against publications, the alleged subversive materials must be specified. Mere generalizations will not suffice. CORRO vs. LISING Philippine Times / inciting to sedition / general warrants Warrants were issued ordering the search and seizure of copies of the Philippine Times, articles, copiers and typewriters, subversive documents, and other such effects. The libel case filed against the same was rendered moot by the Agrava Commission report regarding the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Motion for reconsideration w/ the lower court may be dispensed with where violations of the fundamental rights taint the proceedings. It is well settled that applications for warrants for subversive publications must specify w/ particularity the alleged offenses and the things to be seized. Allegations that the articles breed hatred towards the government are mere conclusions of law, not of fact, and cannot serve as basis for the issuance of the warrants. Likewise, the warrant authorized the seizure of materials and effects indiscriminately whether they are legal or illegal. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant abhorrent to the Constitution. DD: The padlocking of the publications office amounts to prior restraint in violation of the freedom of expression and of the press guaranteed by Section 4 of the Bill of Rights. PEOPLE vs. CA adjacent place / particularization of place to be searched Hussain was allegedly in possession of firearms and explosives in Abigail Store. A search warrant was thus issued for the said place, but the police instead entered Apartment No. 1, adjacent to the store resulting to the arrest of 4 Pakistanis and the seizure of chemicals and explosives, as well as various belongings and money not mentioned in the warrant. The discrepancy resulted from the inaccurate description of the officers of the said place and the judge merely entered in the record the information he was provided. The Burgos Ruling is inapplicable because this case involves not merely a typo error but rather the absence of the meeting of the minds between applicant and issuing judge as to the place to be searched. Particularization of the place to be searched is decided by the judge, not by the executing officers otherwise it opens the door to abuse. Particularization is, in fact, for the purpose of leaving the executing officer w/ no room for discretion. He must only act according to his warrant. PEOPLE vs. TEE undetermined amount of marijuana / no technical precision required The accused challenges the validity of a search warrant that specified an undetermined amount of marijuana for failing to satisfy the requirement of particularity. It is not required that technical precision of description be applied, especially when, by the nature of the things to be seized, the description must be general. Otherwise, no warrant can ever issue. SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO POEA / only judges issue warrants / deportation The authority of the POEA to issue warrants was contested in this case. Although Pres. Marcos, through PD No. 1920 granted the Labor Minister arrest and closure powers, and through PD No. 2018, gave the same arrest and seizure powers, under the 1987 Constitution, only judges can issue warrants. The said laws were thus impliedly repealed by the Constitution. Neither can prosecutors issue warrants. The only exception is the power of the Executive to arrest aliens for the purpose of deportation w/c is an exceptional power given the supremacy of the Executive in matters of foreign affairs. DD: The Executive through the Commission on Immigration and Deportation may issue warrants but only for the purpose of enforcing a deportation order that has become final and executory. BACHE & CO. vs. RUIZ tax assessments / personal examination by judge A search warrant was issued against Bache & Co. for violation of Sec. 46 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The BIR made tax assessments based on the documents obtained therefrom. No transcript of the testimony was attached to

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the questioned warrant. The complainant (De Leon) and the witness (Logronio) brought with them prepared depositions and a prepared warrant for signature of the issuing Judge Vivencio Ruiz. After a hearing he was conducting that day, he simply listened to a few stenographic notes read to him, gave a warning against the commission of perjury, and proceeded to administer the oath and signed the warrant. Examination of the complainant and the witnesses must be conducted personally by the judge and by none other. Personal examination is necessary for the judge in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The degree of participation offered by the respondent judge cannot, in any way, be considered as amounting to personal examination. DD: Once again, be careful of the distinction between a search warrant and a warrant of arrest. For the former, personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary. For a warrant of arrest, personal determination suffices. SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR libel / personal determination An information for libel was filed against petitioners Soliven & Beltran; warrants for their arrest were issued pursuant thereto by the judge w/o personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. The Constitution no longer requires personal examination by the judge of the complainant and the witnesses. What the Constitution underscores personal determination of the existence of probable cause w/c is simply the exclusive and personal duty of the judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. He must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause. He may require the submission of supporting affidavits should he find the report insufficient. The rationale behind the rule is that to require the judges to personally examine the complainants, judges would be unduly laden w/ preliminary investigation instead of concentrating on deciding cases. DD: This is the prevailing rule insofar as warrants of arrest are concerned personal determination suffices. PLACER vs. VILLANUEVA supporting affidavits / fiscal report not binding Refer to the originals for the facts of the case. The judge may rely upon the fiscals report to determine the existence of probable cause however he is not obligated to issue a warrant on the basis thereof. If, on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of supporting affidavits from witnesses. The issuance by a judge of a warrant is discretionary and not ministerial. LIM vs. JUDGE FELIX fiscal & judge / power to issue warrant vs. power to prosecute Refer to the originals for the facts of the case. The determination of probable cause lies at the discretion of the Judge solely. The Prosecutor may assist him in arriving at his conclusion, but he is never bound by the fiscals findings. Determination must likewise not be based solely on the prosecutors report but must be supported by affidavits, transcripts of stenographic notes (if any) and all other supporting documents. Otherwise, it is as if the fiscal made the determination and not the judge. The determination of the existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant is at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, determination of the existence of probable cause during preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether to file criminal charges is discretionary upon the fiscal. It is an Executive and not a Judicial function.

Warrantless Searches
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO PEA-AMARI / bank secrecy Ombudsman Desierto issued an Order to Union Bank Julia Vargas Branch Manager Marquez ordering the production of several bank documents relative to its investigation of the PEA-AMARI controversy. Marquez failed to submit the documents requested and is thus being charged w/ contempt. Generally, bank deposits are strictly confidential except for the following instances: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Upon authority of the Monetary Board if there is reasonable ground for fraud or serious irregularity Regular audit of an independent auditor Upon written consent of the depositor Impeachment Upon order of competent court When the deposited amounts are subject of litigation

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In order for an in camera inspection to be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, there is none and what the Ombudsman would wish to do is to conduct a fishing expedition in violation of the rights of the depositor. The bank personnel and depositor must likewise be notified and should be present during the inspection. PEOPLE vs. ARUTA valid warrantless searches Refer to the originals for the facts of the case. The following are valid warrantless searches: 1. 2. 3. Search incidental to a lawful arrest Search of moving vehicles Evidence in plain view i. there must be prior valid intrusion ii. evidence was inadvertently discovered iii. evidence must be immediately apparent iv. mere seizure of evidence w/o further search Customs searches Consented warrantless searches Stop-and-frisk situations

4. 5. 6.

DD: A 7th category may be added, which pertains to warrantless searches under exceptional or emergency situations such as during a coup detat as provided in People vs. De Gracia. NOLASCO vs. PAO warrantless search only in place of arrest Mila Aguilar Roque was arrested on board a public vehicle for alleged rebellion. The military officers, however, armed with a void general search warrant, and at the instance of the arrest, searched not only her person, but also her residence for the recovery of various subversive documents. They allege that the search was made incident to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search can only be made upon the person lawfully arrested, and in the place where the arrest was made, and not elsewhere. Roque was not even in her house during the time when the arrest and the search were made. Given the fact that the evidence was obtained clearly in violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, any evidence obtained therefrom is deemed inadmissible. The so-called exclusionary rule is the only practical means of preventing violations of the above principle. DD: A search incidental to lawful arrest may be made only in the person of the arrestee as well as the area w/in his immediate control. The purpose is to protect the arresting officer from possible hidden weapons or anything that the arrestee can use to harm him but not to fish for evidence. PAPA vs. MAGO customs searches Responding to a counter-intelligence report, the PNP, through Chief Ricardo Papa (duly deputized by the Commissioner of Customs) intercepted trucks containing allegedly contraband goods. They were not armed w/ a search warrant. The Tariff & Customs Code does not require warrants for customs officers to board and search vessels, beasts, or persons suspected of introducing contraband merchandise into the Philippines. However, the search of dwelling houses, even for the enforcement of Customs Laws, requires a warrant. Search of motor vehicles is likewise valid w/o a search warrant. Vehicles are, after all, not actively used in w/in the home, where the sanctity of privacy is more safeguarded, but instead is used in public places such as roads and may facilitate commission of crimes. The PNP, having been deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, is thus authorized to carry out such searches. PEOPLE vs. CFI Dodge car chase / exceptional circumstances Relying upon an intelligence report, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), w/o a search warrant, intercepted and chased a blue Dodge car allegedly containing contraband goods from Angeles to be brought to Manila. In the car were Sgt. Hope and Monina Medina. They found 4 boxes in the rear seat and 7 more in the compartment containing untaxed wristwatches. They claimed not to know the contents of the boxes. The RASAC proceeded to the drop-off spot but aborted the mission given the fact that the suspected receivers never came. The prosecution found the existence of a prima facie case against them, but the trial court declared the evidence inadmissible. It is a settled rule that Customs searches do not require a warrant, except for those conducted in the dwelling of persons. Furthermore, the case is an exceptional case. The RASAC could not have possibly secured a warrant based on their intelligence reports w/c are not fully certain. But given the occurrence of the fact, it is easily discernible that the information, in this case, was more than just hearsay. In extraordinary events involving warrantless arrests, their reasonableness becomes purely a judicial question. When the officials see the existence of probable cause, coupled w/ the fact that the case involves motor vehicles, searches need not be justified by a warrant. Separate Opinion of Justice Teehankee:

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In the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant must be procured. Given that they had the information one week in advance, there was ample time to procure a warrant and not simply rely on bare information given by an unidentified source. They could have delayed actual seizure until the warrant has been secured because they already had actual possession of the vehicle. In this case, the search was remote to the arrest and hence a search warrant must have been secured. The doctrine relied upon by the majority called superior property rights (co ntraband) has already been abandoned by the Supreme Court. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects is w/o distinction, whether the effects to be seized are contraband or otherwise. What was committed was a typical shortcut in enforcing the law. PEOPLE vs. LO HO WING undercover agent / taxi / warrantless search The Phil. Constabulary (PC) received info regarding importation of illegal drugs. The services of Reynaldo Tia were employed to be the undercover agent. Tia spied on the accuseds Lim and Peter Lo from China all the way until arriving at Manila, w/ the supposed drugs stashed in tea cans. Upon their arrival, the PC took strategic positions, followed and cut the taxis they were riding, arrested the accuseds, and took custody over the suspected illegal drugs. They did not have a warrant. That the authorities had reasonable grounds to suspect the importation of illegal drugs is sufficient probable cause given that the arrest and search involved a moving vehicle. Their knowledge and information clearly was insufficient for a valid search warrant to issue, w/c justifies their failure to procure one prior to the arrest. DD: In the above cases we will see how the arresting officers exploit the moving vehicle exception to the requirement of a valid warrant. The Supreme Court seems to tolerate the short-cut method. CABALLES vs. CA jeep covered w/ leaves / no probable cause / intrusion Two officers flagged a jeep suspiciously covered by kakawati leaves and found that it contained 700 kilos of conductor wires owned by the NAPOCOR. They were stolen wires. The officers arrested the driver and took custody of the said wires for evidence. They did not have a search warrant. Generally, mere routine checks of vehicles do not violate the right against unreasonable searches. But when the officer goes beyond the portion of the vehicle viewable from the outside, such already constitutes an intrusion into the domain protected by the Constitution and hence must be justified by the existence of probable cause. Mere suspicion because some vehicle appears be uncommon does not amount to probable cause. DD: Routine traffic checks must be limited to visual searches only. An extensive search cannot be conducted unless there is probable cause. This case may be reconciled w/ the Valmonte Ruling. OBRA vs. CA truck moving into mining area Facts of the case are very limited; refer to the originals for accurate statement of facts. A truck was flagged and searched extensively upon its entry into a mining zone. It was not leaving the area nor was it transporting minerals. In the absence of probable cause, moving vehicles cannot be subjected to an extensive search in the absence of probable cause. DD: Take note that the truck was moving into the mining zone, not leaving it. PEOPLE vs. MALMSTEDT Caucasian w/ marijuana / search pursuant to lawful arrest Responding to certain intelligence reports (regarding a Caucasian carrying drugs), the NARCOM set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose. Without any warrant, they stopped the bus that Malmstedt was riding and conducted a search therein. One of the soldiers noticed a bulge in Malmstedts waist. Their suspicion was aroused as well by his failure to present valid IDs. They found hashish in his pouch. There were some that were likewise stashed inside teddy bears in his luggage. He was thus arrested and prosecuted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Majority Opinion: There is no search warrant required for that made incidental to a lawful arrest. Given the bulge in his waist and his suspicious behavior, as well as the intelligence reports, there is probable cause to suggest that Malmstedt was committing a crime that would justify the warrantless search and seizure. Also, the officers were only making a routine search, not an extensive search. Consolidated Dissents of Justices Narvasa & Isagani Cruz: There was no probable cause in this case hence there is no valid arrest; and when there is no valid arrest, any search made incidental thereto is void. Malmstedt has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime in the soldiers presence when he was searched. There is no probable cause yet. The mere bulge in his waist does not suffice. Upon searching and finding the hashish, that is the only time that they arrested Malmstedt a typical fishing expedition. The arrest must first be made; then the incidental search follows. The process cannot be reversed; otherwise it amounts to a fishing expedition. According to Justice Cruz, in this case, it was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself.

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DD: This is another notorious case, so take note of the dissents. A search incidental to a lawful arrest must come after the arrest, not before the arrest. Otherwise, a fishing expedition is being committed. ROAN vs. GONZALES wrong guns / hearsay Respondent Judge issued a search warrant based on the mere affidavit of Capt. Quillosa and some witnesses w/o taking their depositions in writing. Quillosa did not have personal knowledge but relied upon the statements of the witnesses. They stated that they saw 8 men deliver arms to Roans house. Upon search, the officers did not find any of the articles mentioned in the warrant but instead found a Colt Magnum Revolver. A search warrant must not be issued based on mere hearsay. The judge must not merely rehash the statements but must examine them closely and ascertain the existence of probable cause. The search warrant is thus defective and void and the gun and bullets of the petitioner were confiscated illegally. That the said guns are illegally possessed is of no moment. Just because they are illegal items does not mean that they can just be summarily seized w/o due process. PEOPLE vs. TABAR marijuana buy-bust / kid and aunt / plain view Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation involving the sale of marijuana. The child who sold the marijuana to the undercover agent entered a shanty where his aunt was. Acting nervously and suspiciously, the aunt was caught w/ a white pair of pants w/c, upon order of the officers, she spread out revealing packs of marijuana. The crime was committed in the plain view of the officers. Even assuming that there was no warrant, there was a waiver of the right when the aunt submitted to the search and seizure. in this case, a valid warrantless search and arrest was justified. ANIAG vs. COMELEC Batasan Checkpoint / gun ban / intrusion Pursuant to the gun ban, the petitioner ordered his driver to return his 2 issued firearms to the HR. His driver, however, was flagged and searched in a checkpoint 20m away from the Batasan entrance and was detained and charged accordingly. In the absence of probable cause, the PNP could not extensively search the car w/o violating the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. The driver was not, in any way, acting suspiciously, and the guns were neatly wrapped and placed in their cases and kept in the trunk of the car. He did not have instant access to the guns. Nothing could have triggered their suspicion and instead, they intruded upon a persons privacy. Note: I think this case may somehow indicate a re-consideration of the Valmonte ruling. D.D. PEOPLE vs. TUDTUD marijuana in King Flakes boxes / arrest before search / waiver On the basis of reports made by a civilian asset Bobong Solier, the police suspected Tudtud for being responsible for the proliferation of marijuana. They received a report that Tudtud will arrive from Cotabato w/ a supply of marijuana, thus they posed undercover. They saw 2 persons (one matching the reported looks of Tudtud) helping each other unloading boxes. They approached and introduced themselves as police and asked if they may look into the boxes to w/c Tudtud did not contest. Among the contents was indeed marijuana leaves. For this, they were arrested and charged accordingly. It is now accepted that the arrest must come before the search, and not the other way around. Nevertheless, if there is probable cause, and the search is substantially contemporaneous to the arrest, it may precede the same. In this case, there was absolutely no hint that they were committing a crime. They were merely unloading some boxes. Mere reliable information no longer suffices to amount to probable cause. The mere fact that he did not oppose does not indicate waiver. The courts indulge every presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. The following are requisites for such waiver: 1. 2. 3. the right exists the person had actual or constructive knowledge of the right actual intention to relinquish the right

DD: This case may be an affirmation of the Cruz dissent from People vs. Malmstedt. VERONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. ACTON mandatory drug test / privacy / negligible The petitioner school district imposed a Student Athlete Drug Policy w/c authorizes random urinalysis testing for those engaged in athletic programs. Acton was denied admission to the football program for refusing to submit to the procedure. He assails the validity of the measure claiming that it amounts to an intrusion upon privacy. There are special needs attendant to the school setting that justify the measure such as the interest to prevent drug use among students and athletes. Students who participate in such athletic programs have a reasonably lesser degree of privacy, particularly w/ medical examinations and procedures. The intrusion in requiring a urine sample is negligible. DD: It likewise does not violate the right against self-incrimination w/c covers only testimonial compulsion, not the taking of specimens from the body of the person.

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PEOPLE vs. COMPACION marijuana plant used for migraine / no valid intrusion Compacion was put under surveillance for maintaining marijuana plants in his yard. The NARCOM tried to procure a warrant but was unable to (due to office hours) and nevertheless proceeded to Compacions house to make the search and arrest. The marijuana plants were allegedly for the use of his wife medicinally. He did not contest their entry given they were heavily armed and intimidating. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. Mere passive conformity and failure to object to their entry cannot be construed as a waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizures. The courts indulge every presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. The plain view rule cannot likewise apply because the NARCOM had no authority to enter the dwelling w/o a valid warrant. The following requisites must concur: 1. 2. 3. 4. valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest evidence was inadvertently discovered / they have the right to be where they are evidence must be immediately apparent seizure w/ no further search

PEOPLE vs. DE GRACIA coup detat / exigent situations In the event of a coup detat the Eurocar Building was put under surveillance for housing large quantities of ammunition. One time, the car of the surveillance team was fired upon by 5 persons from a crowd w/in the vicinity. The team raided the building one night w/o a warrant. The court at that time was closed due to the disorder. The raiding team was able to seize de Gracia along w/ 2 janitors and plenty of explosives and ammunition. The case is an exceptional one and there was more than sufficient probable cause to justify their intrusion. The arrests were impelled by the exigencies of the situation w/c concerned the very survival of society itself and the government. The arrests were in the nature of capturing enemies of the State, and if the officials are justified in killing them given the dangerous situation so much more are they justified in depriving them temporarily of their liberty. BOARDS OF EDUC. vs. EARLS urine test for extra-curricular activities / negligible intrusion The Tecumseh School District implemented mandatory urinalysis testing for students engaged in extracurricular activities. It was to test whether the students are engaged in drug use. Some students oppose claiming that it violates their right to privacy. The schools, as custodians of the children, are possessed w/ a high degree of tutelary responsibility. Students who engage in extra-curricular activities likewise have less to expect regarding privacy. The measure is reasonable and the intrusion brought about by the testing is pretty much negligible. It is exercised pursuant to a legitimate policy w/c is to curb the proliferation of drugs in campuses and among the youth.

Warrantless Arrests
IN RE: UMIL vs. RAMOS Rebellion / continuing crime Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA, shot and killed two policemen in furtherance of rebellion. He was confined in the St. Agnes Hospital when he was arrested w/o a warrant. Mere membership w/ the NPA is a continuing crime w/c is set apart from common crimes hence, warrantless arrests are justified on its basis. Dural was no less subversive just because he was confined in a hospital; and the nature of the offense impels repetition of the same acts of lawlessness until the objective of overthrowing the government is attained. DD: A rebel will not stop until the overthrow of the government is achieved. Thus, he is said to be always in flagrante delicto even when he is asleep. Hence a warrantless arrest can be effected against him anytime. PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ buy-bust / search incident to lawful arrest Respondent was apprehended through a buy-bust operation and was charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He challenges the constitutionality of such operation. It is true that buy-bust operations are prone to abuse; however they have proven to be the most effective means of addressing drug trafficking. It is more a question of implementation. Through it, the arresting officers catch the malefactor in flagrante delicto. A search warrant is not necessary because a search pursuant to a buy-bust operation is one made incidental to a lawful arrest. DD: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment w/c is not illegal per se. What the Constitution proscribes is Inducement, where the arresting officer induces an otherwise innocent person to commit a crime, and arrests him thereafter. PEOPLE vs. AMINUNDIN just disembarking from a ship / no warrant / no probable cause Based on a tip from an informant, the officers of the Philippine Constabulary waited for Aminundin to disembark from a the M/V Wilcon 9, accosted him, searched his belongings, and found what was later confirmed to be marijuana.

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They were not armed w/ any warrant. Aminundin was not in flagrante delicto when he was arrested and searched he was merely disembarking from a ship. Hence, there is no probable cause. Mere information does not constitute probable cause. The PC had 2 days to procure a warrant but they did not even exert any effort to comply w/ the law. Since the arrest was invalid, the search made incidental thereto was likewise invalid. HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO pedophiles / deportation is not a criminal procedure Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout are aliens arrested upon Order by the Commissioner of Immigration (Miriam) for having engaged in pedophilia. Various effects such as videotapes were seized therefrom. They were under close surveillance for 3 months. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against the said aliens. Since the deportation proceedings have already been instituted, then, their detention has become legal, even assuming that to begin with, it was not. Hence, habeas corpus can no longer apply. The probable cause was likewise affirmed by the 3 months of close surveillance. The Commissioner of Immigration & Deportation is authorized by the Revised Admin. Code to issue warrants. The warrant however must give the alien sufficient info about the charges and there must still be due regard for his basic rights. The rule that only judges issue warrants does not apply to deportation proceedings it is not a criminal but only a preventive measure. Since it is only administrative in nature, bail is not mandatory but is discretionary upon the CID. DD: The Commissioner of Immigration & Deportation may issue warrants only for the purpose of carrying out a deportation order that has become final and executory. PEOPLE vs. SUCRO sale of marijuana in chapel / personal knowledge Fulgencio, a police officer, monitored the activities of Sucro who was allegedly selling marijuana. Under surveillance, Sucro 3 times sold marijuana along a chapel to 3 different buyers. On the 3 rd time, the police zeroed in on him and the buyer who tried to escape, threw a tea bag to the ground w/c was found to contain marijuana. The illegal act was committed in the presence of the arresting officers. He was caught in flagrante delicto, and the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest; hence no warrant is necessary. The arresting officers were near enough to see the movements of the appellant and the buyer. PEOPLE vs. RODRIGUEZA big mistake in buy-bust Responding to intelligence reports regarding the ongoing trafficking of drugs, the police conducted a buy-bust operation. Taduran posed as the buyer and purchased from a certain Don 100g. of marijuana for P 200 (marked money). However, instead of arresting him on the spot, Taduran returned to Headquarters and reported the incident. Thereafter, a team was formed and, w/o a warrant, stormed through Rodriguezas house, confiscated various effects of marijuana, and arrested both Rodrigueza and his father. For there to be a valid warrantless arrest, the person arrested must have been caught in the act. Taduran should have arrested him on the spot and such would have been a valid warrantless arrest. The raid of the house w/o a search warrant is likewise illegal. Otherwise, a warrant was necessary. Further, even if Rodrigueza waived his rights under custodial investigation, the said waiver should have been in the presence of counsel. PEOPLE vs. BAGISTA similar to Malmstedt / probable cause / moving vehicle Responding to reliable information stating that there is a woman w/ curly hair around 52 who will be transporting drugs from the north, the NARCOM established a temporary checkpoint. They flagged a bus and boarded the same, noticed a woman of the same description, and inspected her bags revealing marijuana. Searches of moving vehicles are allowed w/o a warrant provided that there is probable cause. The NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop ad search the vehicles given the information report that they received. The accused likewise fit the description made by the informant. DD: It would seem from the foregoing and from some other similar cases that mere information may suffice to constitute probable cause provided that the search was made of a moving vehicle. The courts seem to tolerate such short-cut arrests or searches even w/o a valid warrant. PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE looking from side to side / no probable cause Based on a phone call regarding suspicious persons, the police stationed a surveillance team who noticed two men (Mengote & Morellos) looking from side to side and one of them holding his abdomen. The police approached, and introduced themselves but the men tried to run. They were caught and a search thereafter yielded a .38 cal gun. There was no probable cause because at the time when the accused was arrested he was merely looking from side to side while holding his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination was he committing a crime. Furthermore, the police did not have personal knowledge to justify the warrantless arrest and search because all they had was hearsay info from the phone call. DD: When the accuseds ran after seeing the police officers, was there not probable cause already?

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GO vs. CA murder due to traffic mishap / warrantless arrest 6 days after the fact While driving, Go nearly collided w/ Maguan who was driving in the opposite direction on a one-way street. Go shot Maguan and sped away but his plate number was identified by the security guard who, upon being shown a sketch of the perpetrator, confirmed that it matched the appearance of Go. The police launched a manhunt. Six days after the shooting, Go showed up at the Station and inquired as to what was going on; he was accompanied by 2 lawyers. Immediately he was arrested. There is no valid warrantless arrest if the crime had not just been committed. In this case, it was 6 days ago. None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the circumstances of the offense. Warrantless arrest must immediately follow the commission of the crime. Murder is not a continuing crime that would justify the warrantless arrest anytime. PEOPLE vs. MANLULU 1 a.m. killing, 7 p.m. arrest / personal knowledge, not gathering of info Manlulu was arrested w/o warrant for having killed another person at around 1:00 a.m. The warrantless arrest, however, was made around 7:00 p.m. some 19 hours later. For there to be a lawful warrantless arrest, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the offense w/c has in fact just been committed. Further, that Pat. Perez personally gathered the info does not suffice what the law states is personal knowledge, not personal gathering of the information. DD: Even if an arresting officer has personal knowledge of the facts constituting the crime, he can only effect a warrantless arrest if the crime has just been committed. If a sufficient amount of time lapses as to allow him to procure a warrant, then he must do so. PEOPLE vs. BOLASA peeping through the window Tipped by an anonymous caller PO3s Salonga and Carizon parked their car 300 m. from the alleged den, and then proceeded to peep through the window where they saw a man and woman packing marijuana. They entered the premises and seized the various effects therein. Solely on the basis of the tip they received, the arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of the crime. There was likewise no valid intrusion and the marijuana was not inadvertently discovered hence the plain view doctrine cannot apply. They had to intentionally peep through the window. They should have 1st conducted a surveillance and then proceeded to secure a proper warrant before making the intrusion. PEOPLE vs. ESCORDIAL arrested while watching basketball Escordial allegedly committed a crime but was arrested while watching a game in the local basketball court 1 week after the commission of the crime. Since the warrantless arrest was effected 1 week after the offense, the arresting officers could not possibly have personal knowledge of the facts constituting the offense. Further, the offense should have just been committed. The arresting officers thus have no reason for not securing a warrant first before proceeding w/ the arrest. However, the fact that Escordial pleaded not guilty and did not question the arrest amounts to a waiver of right. PEOPLE vs. JAYSON ihaw-ihaw case / pointed to by the bystanders Jayson was a bouncer of the IhawIhaw Nightclub who shot Nelson Jordan. The police officers arrived at the scene responding to a radioed order pertaining to the said crime. The bystanders pointed to Jayson who was seen running from the crime scene. He was apprehended and searched, and seized form him was the .38 cal pistol. The assailant was pointed to by the by-standers only moments after the shooting and such suffices to give the arresting officers personal knowledge of the facts constituting the comm ission of the offense. Jurisprudence has repeatedly upheld such rule. PEOPLE vs. SALVATIERRA waiver by submitting to jurisdiction Salvatierra was charged for the murder (by stabbing) of Charlie Fernandez. He never raised the legality of his arrest in his pleadings. He is thus estopped from questioning the legality of the arrest because he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and participated in the trial. PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ failure to quash / plea of not guilty amounts to waiver Hernandez was arrested w/o the benefit of a warrant but he does not file for a Motion to Quash prior to arraignment. Instead, he enters a plea of not guilty and participates voluntarily in trial. Failure to file a Motion to Quash prior to arraignment amounts to a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest. Also, filing a bail bond amounts to such waiver. DD: Under the present state of law, filing a Bail Bond no longer amounts to a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest (Okabe vs. Judge de Leon). PEOPLE vs. DORIA entrapment / objective & subjective test PO3 Manlangit posed as a buyer of marijuana; the informant initially contracted the accused Doria to deal w/ him. As a result, Doria was apprehended as he handed a brick of marijuana to Manlangit. Entrapment in US jurisprudence is equivalent to Instigation in our jurisprudence. In Philippine law, instigation is prohibited while entrapment is generally allowed. In entrapment, the criminal impulse originates from the mind of the accused;

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while in instigation, it is the arresting officer who encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime. Instigation is a good defense in criminal proceedings, entrapment is not. Both objective phase and subjective phase must be applied to test the validity of the entrapment. In the objective phase, it is necessary to determine if the arresting officers conducted themselves w/in permissible bounds. In the subjective test, the circumstances of the accused, such as previous criminal records, must be considered. Given the circumstances of the case, clearly Doria is guilty of selling marijuana. TERRY vs. OHIO stop and frisk Detective McFadden was observing 2 persons who were suspiciously walking back and forth and pausing to stare at the same store and conversing suspiciously amongst themselves. They converged w/ a 3rd person and it was at this time that McFadden approached them and introduced himself. They mumbled something; then McFadden spun them around, frisked them, and found concealed pistols w/in their outer clothing. When a reasonably prudent officer believes that there exists a threat to the public, he may make searches for weapons against persons whom he believes to be harmful and dangerous. The reasonableness is determined based on the circumstances of the case. In this case, the actions of the accuseds reasonably corroborate the officers theory that they were planning a daylight armed robbery. The search was limited to what was reasonably required by the circumstances; hence it is a valid search. MALACAT vs. CA fast eyes / no genuine belief In response to a bomb threat, Rodolfo Yu of the WPD and other officers stationed themselves near the Mercury Drugstore in Plaza Miranda where they observed 2 groups of Muslim-looking men who were acting suspiciously and with eyes moving very fast. As the officers approached the said groups, they ran but were apprehended and a search of their persons yielded a hand grenade and a .38 cal pistol. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade. They were charged w/ illegal possession of explosives. The trial court sustained the search. The alleged perpetrators were not in flagrante delicto when they were arrested and searched. The allegation that they had eyes moving very fast was very doubtful and could not have justified the existence of probable cause. Hence, since the arrest was invalid, any search made incidental thereto, is likewise illegal. While probable cause is not necessary to stop-and frisk, mere suspicion will likewise not validate it. A genuine reason must exist to warrant a belief that the person has weapons concealed. Nothing in the accuseds behavior then would warrant such suspici on. PEOPLE vs. CHUA Zest-O Box / no stop-and-frisk / no in flagrante delicto As Chua arrived w/in the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel carrying a Zest-O box, he was hurriedly accosted by the police, searched and arrested for possession of drugs. There was no probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest; hence any search incidental thereto is also void. He was not in flagrante delicto. There is likewise no valid stop-and-frisk. For it to apply, the police must 1st approach and introduce himself, ask initial questions, and restrain a person who manifests unusual conduct and search for possible weapons. The accused did not manifest any unusual conduct. In stop-and-frisk, the introduction must be before the search, not thereafter. Given the fact that the accused has been under surveillance for 2 years, there absolutely is no excuse for not obtaining a valid warrant of arrest.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 3
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when the public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Right to Privacy & the Exclusionary Rule

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PEOPLE vs. MARTI package of marijuana / intrusion by private person Marti & Shirley Reyes employed the services of Manila Packaging & Export Forwarders for the purpose of sending a package to a friend in Switzerland. Shirley refused to have the box inspected and claimed that it contained merely cigars and books. However, Job Reyes, a co-proprietor, opened the boxes during a routine inspection and suspected that the contents were illegal drugs. Thus, he forwarded the contents to the NBI w/c confirmed that they were marijuana. The NBI proceeded to the exporters and supervised the complete opening of the package. Marti assails the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him. The protection conferred by the Bill of Rights is intended as a restraint against the State, not against private persons. The contents of the box came to the possession of the State w/o transgressing the right to privacy because it was a private individual who opened the package. The NBI made no search and seizure it was Reyes who did it. Mere presence of the NBI during the search does not make it the kind of search prohibited. DD: When a private individual violates another persons right to privacy, th e evidence obtained therefrom is admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code. RAMIREZ vs. CA tape recorded slandering A verbal altercation ensued between Garcia and Ramirez, who was allegedly vexed and humiliated by the former. On the occasion of a confrontation, Ramirez taperecorded the altercation w/o the knowledge and consent of Garcia. Garcia thus sues for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200). Sec. 1 of the said law clearly makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by the parties to a private conversation, to secretly record such communication using a tape recorder. Either the parties themselves, or 3rd persons who invaded their privacy may be liable for therefor the law does not distinguish. However, the use of a telephone extension does not violate the RA No. 4200 because its use is not expressly enumerated therein; penal laws are strictly construed. PEOPLE vs. DAMASO personal right / may be waived only by the injured party The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso w/o a valid warrant when the latter was absent. Only Tancianco and Morados were there, the latter being a mere helper. When they opened the door, the authorities saw copier machines, an M-14 rifle, ammunition, and other items used for the purpose of committing subversion. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose rights are injured or one who is expressly authorized to make the waiver in his behalf. Morados, being a mere helper, does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation of her employer. The search thus being invalid for lack of warrant evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible. SPOUSES VEROY vs. LAYAGUE qualified consent and waiver The Veroy Spouses moved to Quezon City and left their Davao City house to a caretaker who only had keys only up to the kitchen thereof. They maintained possession of the keys to the bedrooms. Capt. Obrero raided the said house based on a report that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding therein. They only entered up to the yard since they did not have a warrant. They contacted Ma. Luisa Veroy, the wife, who allowed entry to their house subject to the condition that it be monitored by Major Macasaet a personal friend. The consent was only for the purpose of finding out if rebel soldiers were indeed hiding there. However, despite the qualified consent, the officers however entered various rooms, including the childrens room, and confiscated various subversive items such as a handgun, printed materials w/ subversive indicia, ammunition, and other such items. The permission was granted only for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of rebel soldiers. In order for them to be allowed to conduct a search therein, they should have obtained a warrant. Just because the items were allegedly subject to an offense mala prohibita (subversion) it does not mean that they can be summarily seized w/o a valid warrant. PEOPLE vs. EVARISTO gunshot sounds / personal knowledge / inadvertent discovery Officers Vallarta and Romeroso, among others, were on routine patrol when they heard bursts of gunfire. They proceeded to where the sound came from and saw Rosillo who ran to the house of Evaristo. Vallarta noticed the bulge on Evaristos waist and frisked him revealing a .38 cal revolver. Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for the entry into the latters house to w/c he consented. Upon entry they found various firearms, paraphernalia, and other effects. The plain view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the firearms & effects because their discovery was inadvertent. The purpose for the entry (w/c was consented to by Evaristo) was to search for Rosillo, hence the discovery of the firearms was accidental. The arrest and search upon the person of Evaristo was likewise justified. The gunfire, the bulge in his waist, and the peace officers professional instinct more than suffice to grant him personal knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been committed.

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For there to be a valid waiver of rights, the following requisites must attend: 1. 2. 3. The person must be possessed of such right He must know of the existence of the right He must have actual intention to waive his right

DD: Based on the foregoing requisites, was there really a valid waiver of rights in this case?

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 4
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Prior Restraint
NEAR vs. MINNESOTA Saturday Press / scandalous criticism / prior restraint The Session Law of Minnesota (1925) mandated the abatement, as public nuisances, of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory publications. Enjoined from publication as a result of this provision is The Saturday Press, owned by the petitioner Near, w/c published articles critical of certain local public personalities such as Mayor Leach, Chief of Police Brunskill, and County Attorney Olson, among others. The articles allege that the said officials are not energetically performing their duties in preventing gambling, racketeering, bootlegging, and other crimes allegedly controlled by a certain Jew. The statute does not aim to provide remedies for any wrong that may be committed through publication; rather it is aimed towards prevention. Its object is not punishment but rather suppression. The very nature of criticism implies that the imputations be to some extent scandalous. Although no penalty is provided, continued publication would make the publisher liable for contempt. Authority to resume publication thus becomes discretionary upon the court and would require presentation of evidence to substantiate whatever allegations are contained therein and this typically amounts to prior restraint. It is a form of censorship repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and of the press. NEW YORK TIMES vs. US Vietnam Files / national security The US Government sought to enjoin the NY Times & Washington Post from publishing the History of US Decision -Making on Vietnam Policy based on national security considerations. Any prior restraint upon the freedom of the press bears a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. The Government must clearly make out a case to overcome this presumption and in this case, it failed. The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior restraints upon the press predicated upon beliefs that untoward consequences may result therefrom. The press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, w/o censorship or restraint. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose government deception to the people. There is no informed populace w/o an informed press. There is, also, no act of Congress relied upon by the State to justify the restraint. Congress itself has opted not to enact such laws. Since the Executive possesses unshared power to regulate national defense and conduct foreign relations, it is likewise its responsibility to protect the confidentiality of its own records. Only in times of war may prior restraints possibly be justified. DD: According to the dissent, the Executive possesses the wisdom to determine up to what extent publication of such information will prejudice the national interest. This is in keeping w/ the principle of the separation of powers. FREEDMAN vs. MARYLAND Revenge at Daybreak / delay amounts to restraint / safeguards Freedman, a theatre owner, was convicted for having shown Revenge at Daybreak w/o having submitted the same to the Board of Censors for review. The Maryland Motion Picture Statute requires the time-consuming appeal to the courts once exhibition of a proposed film is denied by the Board. Further, no time limit is imposed upon the Board to decide whether to allow the showing of a film submitted to it for review. In the area of

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freedom of expression, one has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a particular regulation if it allegedly delegates excessively broad licensing ability upon an administrative office. Likewise, restraint always bears a heavy burden against its constitutionality. Adequate safeguards to obviate dangers of censorship must be put in place. Final decision regarding the suitability for publication must be in the hands of the judiciary, not an administrative branch. The procedure must also assure prompt decision and quell the deterrent effects of interim or erroneous denials of license. The Maryland Statute fails to meet the criteria. It requires recourse to the court and the exhibitor assumes the burden of proof to establish that it is protected expression. Pending approval, the film cannot be exhibited; otherwise it may give rise to contempt. There is no assurance of prompt judicial action, hence the statute is unconstitutional. All the circumstances put together paints a clear picture of prior restraint. AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. JUDGE CAPULONG EDSA 4-Day Revolution / public figure Ayer Productions produced the Four Day Revolution depicting the events that transpired during the EDSA people power revolution. It combined fictitious characters w/ real-life ones in order to portray the Filipino culture and the historic events that transpired. It was a docu-drama production for television viewing in coordination w/ HBO. FVR himself gave his consent to the showing of the film, but Juan Ponce Enrile objected and invoked his right to privacy. The freedom of expression is granted both to locally-owned and foreign-owed production companies. That the exhibition of said film is for profit is of no moment. There is no dispute that Enrile is a public figure given the role he has played in EDSA and the fact that he is a Senator. A limited intrusion upon the privacy of a public person is permissible if the info sought to be elicited from him is a matter of public concern. The rules of clear and present danger as well as the balancing of interest are applied. There was no clear and present danger since there was no knowledge yet of the actual contents of the film. With regard to the balancing of interest test, the intrusion is fairly reasonable in order to keep the film a truthful historical account. The producer, however, assumes the responsibility not to divulge intimate or purely private matters pertaining to Enrile or any of the characters therein, and there must be due regard for the truthfulness and accuracy of the events. EASTERN BROADCASTING vs. DANS summary closure Radio Station DYRE was summarily closed for national security reasons for allegedly having aired subversive programs. The said programs were geared more towards public affairs. It is a recognized rule that broadcasters have to be licensed. They do not possess the same scope of freedom as that of publications. The rules on administrative due process under the Ang Tibay Ruling must govern. In this case, there was no opportunity to be heard, and there was mere summary closure. Public officials do not posses the power to simply summarily close down broadcasting stations or arbitrarily deny its license. This amounts to curtailment and prior restraint. The clear and present danger rule must be applied. After all, the government has the right to be secure against broadcasts intended to incite persons to overthrow it. There was clearly no such danger in this case. Mere criticism of public officials does not amount to inciting to sedition or subversive acts. IN the case at bar, there is no grave and imminent danger of a substantive evil that the government has the right to protect against. In the absence of substantial compliance w/ the requirements of due process and in the absence of clear and present danger, the summary closure is deemed null and void. TOLENTINO vs. SEC. OF FINANCE VAT on publications The enactment of the VAT Law (RA No. 7166) in effect removed the tax exemptions previously conferred by the National Internal Revenue Code upon print media. The Finance Secretary enacted a Regulation exempting circulation income but not income acquired through advertising. There is no violation of press freedom in this case. The press is not immune from the general regulations by the State. They must pay equitable taxes just like all other businesses. Imposition of reasonable taxes does not amount to prior restraint. The press is not being singled out; instead the State merely takes back what it had once conferred tax exemption. Allegations that such taxes will drive some publications out of business are unfounded. The imposition of registration fees likewise violates no right; it is not a pre-condition to the exercise of any right but is merely an administrative fee. ALEXANDER vs. US porno guy / prior restraint vs. subsequent punishment Ferris Alexander was engaged in the adult entertainment industry for more than 30 years. He was convicted for obscenity as well as for violation of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Law (RICO Law). As a result, several

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of his assets amounting to millions of dollars, including his porn and adult stores and enterprises were foreclosed. He alleges that the foreclosure amounts to prior restraint against his future expression. The concepts of prior restraint and subsequent punishment are different. The foreclosure imposed upon him is a punishment for criminal conduct, not a prior restraint against his freedom of expression. The foreclosure does not impose a ban on any future expression he might make; it only deprived him of specific assets w/c were found to be related to his previous racketeering violations. He may return to his porno businesses anytime w/o being cited for contempt; it is just that he cannot finance those activities using assets derived from racketeering. DD: In this case. Alexander was being punished, not for the expression of his ideas, but rather for his having derived proceeds from racketeering. Free expression was never the issue in this case.

Subsequent Punishment
GONZALES vs. COMELEC campaign law / early nomination / political campaigning Responding to the undesired reality of prolonged political campaigns, RA No. 4880 was enacted containing 2 assailed provisions, Sec. 50-A prohibiting the early nomination of candidates by parties, and Sec. 50-B limiting the period of campaign and partisan political activity. It does not, however, prohibit the common expression of thoughts or the mention of names relating to the elections. Freedom of expression, and the right to freely associate are not absolute. They are both affected in this case. The right to associate is not impaired; the scope of activities is merely limited. The dangerous tendency doctrine permitted the application of restrictions once there is a rational connection between the speech and the danger apprehended, and the tendency of one to create the other is shown. This doctrine has already been abandoned. In the clear and present danger rule, the court must find that the evil sought to be avoided is both serious and imminent to a high degree. It must be present and inevitable. The balancing of interest test, on the other hand, mandates the court to determine w/c of the two conflicting demands particular speech or conduct against that of the public order demands greater protection based on the circumstances. In the case at bar, it was the balancing of interest test that was applied in determining the validity of Sections 50-A and 50-B of RA No. 4880. While the Court has expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the provisions insofar as they are vague and defective, the required 2/3 vote to declare it unconstitutional was not attained. PEOPLE vs. PEREZ lets cut off Woods head w/ bolos! / seditious Isaac Perez, the Municipal Secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, was charged for inciting to sedition for having uttered seditious words while engaged in a discussion, where he said that the Filipinos should all get bolos and cut of Gov. Gen. Woods head for recommending bad things for the Filipinos and for killing the independence. He was charged for violating certain provisions of the Penal Code. Free speech is permitted even if critical of the government, but when the intention and effect is seditious, they are not protected speech. In the case at bar, there was a seditious tendency in the words used, and it could easily cause disaffection among the people. It was made to stir up the people to rise against the lawful authorities. DD: This is a very old case decided during the American Occupation. The rule applied here is the dangerous tendency doctrine. This rule no longer holds g round under the present state of law. DENNIS vs. UNITED STATES conspiring communists / advocacy vs. discussion Dennis and the other petitioners were convicted for conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United States , w/c advocates the destruction and overthrow of the government. They transformed the Communist Political Association into the Communist Party and changed its policy from peaceful cooperation to that of violent overthrow. There is no doubt that it is w/in the power of Congress to enact measures to protect the security of the State from armed rebellion. However, given the fact that the crimes sought to be prevented contain elements of free speech, they deserve special and careful consideration. The clear and present danger rule must be applied in order to sustain a conviction based on evidence taking the form of speech and expression. In the case at bar, the prohibition is directed against advocacy, not discussion. The right of the people to free discussion is not impaired. The probability of success of the rebels is of no moment; what is important is that the requisite danger exists. We cannot bind the government to inaction until it is too late and in this case, there was clearly a group ready to make an attempt at any time.

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US vs. OBRIEN burning of certificate / incidental restriction OBrien and 3 other companions burned their Selective Service Certificates outside of a Boston Courthouse, in front of a crowd, in order to influence them to accept his anti-war beliefs. It must be noted that there is an existing law penalizing the intentional destruction of the said certificate; he assails the validity of such law for violating his right to symbolic speech. The right to free speech cannot be used as an excuse to justify limitless varieties of conduct for the purpose of expressing an idea. The governments interest in penalizing the destruction has no connection w/ free expression, and whatever incidental restriction that is made against free expression is justified provided that is no greater than that w/c is essential to its furtherance. DD: In this case, the impairment of free speech was merely an incidental effect of the enforcement of the law. The law was not targeted towards free speech. BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE vs. JUDGE MAJADUCON gross ignorance / no malignant intent Pursuant to Resolutions filed by Sen. Ople and Sen. Sotto, the Blue Ribbon Committee conducted inquiries regarding a possible coup detat as well as alleged mismanagement of military retirement and be nefit funds. It probed the purchase of a lot from Atty. Flaviano for P 10,500 per sq.m. The Registry of Deeds disclosed that the purchase price is only P 3,000 per sq.m. Flaviano refused to appear during the inquiries after having been summoned and filed for a TRO w/ Judge Majaducon, w/c the latter granted. The Committee, through Sen. Pimentel, countered w/ a petition for certiorari w/c alleged gross ignorance of the law on the part of Majaducon. It was published in the Philippine Star and as a result, Majaducon, motu propio, found Pimentel guilty of indirect contempt. The term gross ignorance of the law is a description of normal usage in law to describe acts of lower courts that are challenged before higher tribunals. There is no malignant intention behind its usage. It does not constitute improper conduct that tends to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. Further, the contempt power should be used correctively, and not in a retaliatory manner. Publications, likewise exercise discretion as to what material they would publish and Pimentel or the Committee cannot be faulted for the Philippine Star articles. DD: The TRO issued by Judge Majaducon against the appearance of Atty. Flaviano during the Senate inquiries was a clear violation of the separation of powers. That is why Sen. Pimentel alleged gross ignorance of the law on his part. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC ban on political ads The COMELEC promulgated a Resolution banning political ads other than those dedicated to the COMELEC time or COMELEC hour. The freedom of expression is a preferred right and may not be curtailed except on the basis of a substantial and clear government interest in this case, to prevent the evident degradation of the electoral process. The right to expression is not absolutely curtailed but is merely regulated in the interest of the public. The regulation is thus valid. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC plebiscite / restraint / no legal basis The COMELEC promulgated Res. No. 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite for the approval of the Cordillera Autonomous Region Organic Act. It prohibits the use of columns or commentaries from campaigning for or against plebiscite issues during the campaign period. It uses BP No. 881 as basis, w/c prohibits the sale or granting of and space or air time to candidates during the election period and requires leave of absence of candidates engaged in the broadcast or print media business. In a plebiscite there are no candidates, only issues are voted upon hence BP No. 881 cannot apply. While the restriction does not absolutely bar the freedom of expression, it is still a restriction upon his choice of where to express his views, and no sufficient justification has been advanced in support of the prohibition. DD: Free discussion of the issues pertaining to the plebiscite must, in fact, be encouraged rather than curtailed so as to allow the voters to cast enlightened and well-informed votes. ADIONG vs. COMELEC no posters, stickers allowed / restraint / property rights The COMELEC promulgated Res. No. 2347 w/c provides that decals and posters may only be posted on authorized posting areas such as campaign headquarters, candidates residences, common posted areas, etc. It also prohibits the exhibition of stickers and decals in mobile places such as vehicles. The regulation unduly infringes upon a citizens right to free speech. There is no adequate government interest endangered that would justify the curtailment; there is no clear and present danger. It likewise strikes at the freedom of the individual to express his preference and support and sweeps too broadly invading the area of protected freedoms. It is also too loosely worded such that even posting in ones re sidence (noncandidate) or car is illegal. It infringes upon the lawful use of private property. That the law intends to equalize the playing field in favor of the poorer candidates is immaterial as it is merely of a marginal significance.

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ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC exit polls / speculative The COMELEC promulgated a Resolution to enjoin the ABS-CBN from conducting and reporting the results of exit polls, claiming that it could prejudice the results of the election, promote bandwagon mentality, and impair the secrecy of the ballot. Even if the governments purpose is legitimate, it cannot be pursued by means w/c broadly stifle fundamental liberties. There must be a substantial government interest involved to justify restrictions upon free expression, not mere speculations. There is no showing of any chaos or confusion brought about by the conduct of exit polls. The secrecy of the ballot is not exposed because participation in the exit polls is voluntary and the actual ballots are not exposed. SWS vs. COMELEC surveys / direct & total suppression / disproportionate The Fair Election Act prohibits the publication of election surveys 15 days before the national elections, and 7 days before local elections, allegedly to prevent the manipulation of the electoral process by the publication of erroneous and unscrupulous surveys. The SWS and Kamahalan Publishing (Manila Standard) assail the validity of such provisions. While the prohibition may be for a limited time only, it is direct and absolute and constitutes the total suppression of a category of speech: publication of surveys. The suppression is clearly greater than that w/c is necessary to further the government interest. The Admin. Code provides ways by w/c the purpose may be more narrowly pursued such as by punishing unlawful acts instead of punishing or prohibiting free expression itself. It likewise constitutes prior restraint.

Commercial Speech
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELEC. CORP. vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION commercial ads The NY Public Service Commission banned the electric utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity the aim being to promote energy conservation. It is true that commercial expression is afforded a lesser degree of protection; however, it is still protected against unwarranted government regulation. The following are guidelines for the States regulation of commercial speech and expression: 1. 2. 3. 4. The advertisement must not be misleading There must be a substantial government interest The regulation must directly advance the government interest It must not be more extensive than necessary.

There is not even any allegation that the ads are misleading. Although there is a legitimate government interest in this case, the government went overboard by employing means that are too sweeping and curtail fundamental liberties. RUBIN vs. COORS BREWING strength wars / direct advancement of interest The Federal Alcohol Admin. Act prohibits the display of alcohol content in the beer labels and hence rejected the respondents application for the approval of its labels. The aim is to curb the so-called strength wars, where brewers compete on the basis of the strength of alcohol content. The government has a significant interest in preserving the health and safety of the citizens, however, the said labeling cannot directly and materially advance the governments aim because there are provisions in the same act that tend to undermine the means employed. For example, the law allows liquors to be identified as malt liquors to emphasize the strength of its alcohol content. There are more direct ways to achieve the aim of the government w/o intruding upon the right to free expression, such as directly regulating alcohol content, etc. CINCINNATI vs. DISCOVERY NETWORK news racks / reasonable fit standard The State of Cincinnati authorized Discovery to maintain free-standing news racks for the purpose of distributing free magazines for the advertisement of its services. It was later revoked on the basis of an old ordinance prohibiting news racks for aesthetic reasons. The city has failed to discharge its burden to establish a reasonable fit between its interest in safety and aesthetics and the means it chose to attain those ends w/c intruded upon free speech. Commercial and non-commercial publications are equally responsible for the clutter but the city failed to justify the differential treatment between the two types of news racks. There were equal protection issues involved in this case.

Relation with Judicial Process

IN RE: REQUEST FOR TV COVERAGE OF ERAP TRIAL rights of the accused prevail A request for possible TV coverage of the Estrada plunder trial in the Sandiganbayan was filed but was rejected by the same court. Live video coverage is prohibited in order to protect the right of the parties to due process, prevent the distraction of proceedings, avoid the miscarriage of justice, and to avoid prejudice and pressure

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during the trial. In case of seeming conflict, the rights of the accused under criminal trial prevail over the rights of others to free expression or information on matters of public concern. IN RE: PETITION TO ANNUL 98-7-02 SC demonstrations in vicinity of courts The said Resolutions prohibit demonstrations along premises w/in a 200m. radius of the Supreme Court or other courts because such activities interrupt and hamper the working conditions in the said courts. It is for the purpose of assuring the people impartial and orderly administration of justice. The court is, after all, empowered by the Constitution to promulgate rules for the purpose of protecting rights. US vs. GRACE prohibition of display of flags & banners / protected speech Title 40 of the USC prohibits the display of such devices w/in the vicinity of the US Supreme Court or any of its grounds including sidewalks constituting the outer bounds of the premises. Persons bearing picket signs or distributing leaflets were threatened w/ arrest on the basis of the said law. Picketing and leaflet distribution are covered by protected speech. An absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression will only be upheld if based on compelling governmental interests. Such prohibition likewise does not serve substantially the purpose to maintain law and order on Court grounds. DD: This is a United States case; in case of conflict, local jurisprudence must be favored.

Additional Cases
BAYAN, KARAPATAN vs. ERMITA permit to rally / CPR / regulation / maximum tolerance The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) was implemented by the Executive to strictly enforce the provisions of BP No. 880 particularly the no permit no rally policy. It resulted to the violent dispersal of various protest actions and assemblies hence the assault upon its constitutionality. BP No. 880 requires a permit to be issued by the Mayor who must be informed of the date, time, and place of the rally, and who may deny the issuance of the same if, to his judgment, there exists a clear and present danger. It also mandates the designation of freedom parks where protesters may organize peaceful actions w/o the need of a permit. BP No. 880 is not an absolute ban on public assemblies but is merely a content-neutral restriction that regulates the time, place, and manner of assemblies to the extent needed to avoid clear and present danger. Hence, it is a valid enactment and does not violate the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble. The content of the rally is immaterial, the permit may only be denied in case of a clear and present danger, and in the absence of such, it must be issued. The SC requires the designation of freedom parks from the various LGUs, otherwise all public parks w/in the said LGUs will be deemed freedom parks. BP No. 880 requires maximum tolerance, w/c is the highest degree of restraint that the peacekeeping authorities must observe during assemblies. Dispersal should be the last resort; all peaceful means of conciliation between the police and the protesters must first be pursued. The CPR is thus struck down for being inconsistent w/ the rule and constitutes a darkness that shrouds freedom of expression. IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. CA attacks against other sects / no clear and present danger Certain programs of the Iglesia were given an x-rating by the MTRCB for attacking the dogmas of other religions and were thus prevented from being aired. Thus this petition. The right to religion has been accorded a preferred status and involves both the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act upon ones beliefs. The free and outward exercise of religion may be regulated by the State when it will bring about a clear and present danger of some substantive evil and if it is inimical to society. The conduct of the MTRCB clearly amounts to prior restraint in this case. Simply criticizing other religions does not pose a clear and present danger, and the MTRCB cannot prohibit such criticisms, no matter how unclean they are, in the absence of such danger. The clear and present danger test was not properly applied in this case. DD: Mudslinging is common to the free market of religious dogmas. These expressions, no matter how odious they are, cannot be curtailed unless they begin to pose a clear and present danger. MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN Prosti-tuition / jurisdiction of MTRCB / all TV shows The Inside Story, produced and hosted by Loren Legarda, aired the segment Prosti -Tuition depicting female students moonlighting as prostitutes. The name of Philippine Womens University was mentioned and the faade of the PWU Building was used as background for the said show. It caused uproar w/in the said school, particularly its administration, leading to the filing of suit before the MTRCB. The show was not submitted for approval to the MTRCB; hence the ABS-CBN was penalized for showing it.

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The MTRCB is empowered by law to disapprove the show or the exhibition of various forms of media w/c are immoral, indecent, contrary to law or good customs, derogatory to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines, or w/c tend to encourage the commission of crimes or violence. ALL television programs, whether religious, documentary, or otherwise are subject to the MTRCBs review powers. The only exceptions are those programs aired by the Government and newsreels w/c is simply straight news reporting. The Inside Story cannot be considered a newsreel because it contains analyses, commentaries, and opinions. DD: Despite the doubtful constitutionality of the existence of the MTRCB or its exercise of prerogatives, particularly because it exercises prior restraint on a regular basis, the Supreme Court has yet to rule upon the matter of its legality arguing that the Philippines is not yet ready to adopt the more liberal policy enunciated in Freedman vs. Maryland.

Libel
POLICARPIO vs. MANILA TIMES sensationalized news / unfair Lumen Policarpio was the Exec. Secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. She terminated Herminia Reyes from the service; and the latter countered by filing a case for estafa thru falsification and malversation of public funds against her. The issue was published by the Manila Times, but it reported that the case was filed by the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) pursuant to an administrative investigation. It did not indicate that the alleged stencils Policarpio used for private purposes amounted to only P54.00 and that the reimbursements she made were for certain trips. In short, the Manila Times sensationalized the issue and made them appear to be far more serious than they actually are putting Policarpio in an unfavorable light. In order to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory info must be both TRUE and FAIR, and must be made in GOOD FAITH, w/o comments or remarks. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious if there is no good intention or justifying motive, except for the following: (1) private communication and (2) a fair and true report made in good faith, w/o comments and remarks (Art. 354 RPC). In the case at bar, the article was clearly unfair; and even if they acted in good faith under a misapprehension of facts, Manila Times is still guilty of negligence. Even assuming that a subsequent article was published to rectify the error, it does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the 1st article although it mitigates liability. LOPEZ vs. CA hoax of the year / wrong guy! / negligence Fidel Cruz was a sanitary officer assigned in Babuyan Islands who made a distress signal to the passing USAF plane, w/c dropped an emergencysustenance kit w/ a radio. He used the radio to contact Manila, concocting a story that a mad killer s on the loose, prompting the authorities to send a rescue squad. An article was published by the Manila Chronicle, but erroneously used the picture of Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman from Bulacan, who then sued for libel. The Chronicle published a subsequent article expressing their sincere regrets for the mistake, w/c was displayed conspicuously. Generally, a newspaper should not be held to account for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words to the point of suppression. However, in this case, they were not even under the pressure of a deadline, as the article was published in a weekly magazine. Hence they failed to observe reasonable care and are thus held liable therefor. Subsequent rectification does not erase the liability for the previous article. Dissent of Justice Dizon: There is no evidence of actual malice in this case, and it clearly falls w/in the ambit of excusable negligence. Hence, the Chronicle should not be held liable. DD: The Supreme Court seems to have departed from the Policarpio and Lopez Rulings and has been very lenient towards the media as illustrated by the succeeding cases. Even when the media is guilty of sensationalizing or even negligence, the Supreme Court absolved them in the absence of clear and actual malice unless they clearly intrude upon the personal lives of private individuals. NY TIMES vs. SULLIVAN criticism of officials / factual errors & defamatory language / no actual malice A public official brought an action for damages arising from the defamatory criticisms made in an article of the NY Times. The action was grounded upon an Alabama statute declaring that it is libelous per se if the published material brings the official in contempt or tends to injure his reputation . Factual error, or the effect of injuring official reputation, or even the utterance of half-truths and some misinformation, do not suffice to justify the repression of free speech. Officials may not recover damages from the publication unless they can establish ACTUAL MALICE. In this case, what was made was effective criticism w/c constitutes protected speech.

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DD: Actual malice means either (1) intentionally publishing the imputations knowing that they are false, or (2) reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the imputations published. BORJAL vs. CA blind item / qualified privileged communication Arturo Borjal, in his column w/ the Philippine Star called The Jaywalker, alleged anomalous activities of a conference organizer w/o naming any person specifically alleging that the person has engaged in dubious ways, or is thick faced, or engages in shady deals. Francisco Wenceslao, the organizer of the First National Conference on Land Transport (FNCLT), apparently thinking that the article is targeted towards him, filed a complaint before the National Press Club, as well as a criminal complaint for libel. The libel case was dismissed but he later filed a civil case for damages. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is necessary that the person targeted is named. It is not sufficient that Wenceslao identified himself. The articles did not name him, and there are, in fact, several organizers of the said event. Privileged communication may be absolute (like statements made by legislators in Congress) w/c are never actionable, or qualified w/c are not actionable if found to have been made in good faith or for justifiable motive. The above article belongs to the category of qualified privileged communication. Further, Wenceslao is a public official as organizer of the FNCLT being an entity imbued w/ public interest; he cannot dissociate himself from media scrutiny. While generally every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious, if the communication is privileged, the presumption does not arise. The plaintiff assumes the burden of proving malice as in this case. In the absence of clear malice, the action for damages thus cannot prosper. ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS INC. allegedly raped vs. in fact raped / leeway Emelita Despuig, in the police station and in the presence of a reporter Morales, executed an affidavit stating that she was abducted and raped on one instant, and the same crime has in fact just been attempted upon her that same night again by a certain Director Arafiles of the National Institute of Atmospheric Studies. Morales interviewed the complainant, and submitted the report to his editor; the article was published the same night saying Govt Exec Rapes Coed and the article stated that the girl WAS ABDUCTED and RAPED. It did not qualify that the said acts were merely alleged. Thus, Arafiles filed an action for damages claiming that the articles were overly sensationalized. The alleged libelous material should be viewed as a whole. Reference to other sections of the report indicates that the narration of the events was based only on an account made by Emelita. Newspapers must be given a certain degree of leeway and tolerance to enable them to perform their duty courageously and effectively. They should not be held accountable for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. VASQUEZ vs. CA barangay official denounced / elements of libel / public official / malice A citizen denounced a barangay official of the Tondo Foreshore Area for alleged misconducts in office. The barangay official thus sues for libel. The following are the elements of libel: 1. 2. 3. 4. allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another publication of the charge identity of the person defamed (at least a 3rd person or stranger may identify) malice (there must be ill will)

Considering that the person criticized is a pubic official, no liability may be imposed unless the statement was made with actual malice or w/ knowledge that it was false, or w/ reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements. GERTZ vs. ROBERT WELCH INC. alleged frame-up / public officer / public figure A Chicago cop named Nuccio was convicted of murder. The respondents magazine alleged that the petitioner who is neither a public official nor public figure was responsible for the frame-up, and implied that he has a criminal record and is a Communist fronter. The protection imbued by the NY Times Ruling does not apply to defamation or falsehoods committed against persons who are neither public officials nor public figures. Private persons are more protected. They have not voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk of defamation and are more vulnerable, w/ fewer avenues to rebut the allegations. In this case, mere appearance as an attorney at the coroners inquest does not make him a public official. He has lik ewise not attained any degree of notoriety or general fame and involvement in societal affairs to qualify him as a public figure. Hence, he is more protected by the law. Damages may be claimed, but only for actual injuries. TIME vs. FIRESTONE divorce issue / public official / public figure Respondent sought separate maintenance from her husband who countered w/ a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery and extreme cruelty. Time reported that the divorce was in fact granted based on the said grounds. Respondent was neither public official nor figure as she did not occupy any role of special prominence in the

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society; hence the NY Times Ruling (requiring actual malice as an element) does not apply. She is entitled to greater protection from unwarranted defamation. Further, no finding was ever made by the divorce court regarding adultery. Two criteria must be followed in determining civil liability in libel cases: 1. 2. Compensatory awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury Liability cannot be imposed w/o actual fault.

Since the court did not find actual fault on the part of the petitioner, no damages are due. HUSTLER MAGAZINE vs. JERRY FALWELL Jerry Falwell talks about his first time Hustler Magazine featured an ad parody portraying Falwell (a known commentator in politics and other public affairs) engaged in a drunken sexual and incestuous rendezvous w/ his mother in an outhouse. It was modeled after actual Campari ads featuring celebrities interviewed about their 1 st times drinking Campari. Falwell filed a libel claim alleging outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the absence of a false statement of facts made w/ apparent malice, public officials or public figures, such as Falwell, cannot recover damages for the tort or intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature. The caricature was not reasonably believable; hence, it cannot be interpreted as having stated actual facts.

Obscenity & Indecency

MILLER vs. CALIFORNIA hardcore sex / contemporary community standards Miller conducted a mailing campaign for the promotion of adult material. Some brochures were received unwillingly by a restaurant owner and his mother in Newport Beach, prompting them to file a complaint. The Court has decided to abandon the Memoirs Doctrine requiring the material to be utterly w/o any redeeming social value, it being a burden almost impossible to discharge. In order to be benefited by the protection conferred by the 1st Amendment, the prurient and patent display of sexual conduct must have some serious literary, political, or scientific value. Forms of expression may be considered obscene if the following characteristics attend: 1. 2. 3. the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, to appeal to the prurient interests It depicts patently offensive sexual conduct It lacks some serious literary, political, or scientific value.

No one may be punished for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless they depict patently hardcore sexual conduct. Such material can be regulated by the state but need not be utterly devoid of redeeming social value. What the 1st Amendment protects is the commerce of ideas, w/c must be distinguished from the commercial exploitation of obscene material w/c is not a protected form of expression. DD: The Memoirs Doctrine requires that a form of expression must be utterly devoid of literary, scientific, or political value. In this case, that a form of expression lacks serious literary, scientific, or political value is sufficient to classify it as a form of obscenity. Notice that in the former case, the burden is almost impossible to discharge. GONZALES vs. KALAW-KATIGBAK Kapit sa Patalim / classification / parens patriae The Board of Review classified the movie Kapit sa Patalim as being For Adults Only, for containing some sexually explicit scenes, such as naked women dancing, or lesbian action, among other things. The Board ordered the deletion of the said scenes and delayed the issuance of permit to exhibit. The power of the Board is limited to that of classification to determine what films are for general patronage, and what are suitable for adults only. Although the law requires a clear and present danger for the limitations upon freedom of expression, it generally frowns upon obscenity. To determine what is obscene, it is based upon the perception of an average person applying contemporary community standards to determine if the theme of the material caters to the prurient interest. Although the standard applied by the Board is unduly restrictive, the Court failed to muster the required number of votes to find grave abuse of discretion. Although the State must not meddle w/ the sexual preferences of consenting adults, it has an interest in guiding the development of the youth pursuant to the parens patriae doctrine.

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PITA vs. CA Pinoy Playboy / due process / unwarranted search / judicial determination Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign, the Manila WPD seized from the sidewalks, stores, and peddlers copies of allegedly obscene materials, including the so-called Pinoy Playboy. They were ordered destroyed. It is recognized that the right of the press in not absolute and the State may protect the people from pornography. However, the requirements of due process and the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be compromised. The following procedure must have been applied: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Application for a warrant from a judge Authorities must convince the court that the material to be seized is obscene and pose a clear and present danger The judge will determine if they are indeed obscene through exercise of sound discretion Issuance of the warrant Proper suit is brought to court under the provisions of the RPC Conviction subject to appeal. The court determines whether or not the materials are indeed obscene.

BARNES vs. GLEN THEATER pasties! / government interest in morality / incidental effect The Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theater are two establishments that seek to exhibit totally-nude-dancing, and thus assail an Indiana statute that requires dancers to wear pasties and a g-string. They claim that the statute violates the 1st Amendment. The court applied the O Brien Test and ruled that the objective of the law is to protect the societal order and morality against public nudity. It is not specifically targeted against free expression and the restriction is merely an incidental limit upon the said expressive activity. The interest in unrelated to free expression and requiring the wearing of pasties and g-strings does not deprive the performances of whatever expressive or erotic messages they convey. Dissent of Justice White: The OBrien Test is not applicable in this case. The Indiana Statute clearly is targeted, not towards public nudity in general w/ incidental effect upon expression, but against a particular form of expression itself w/c is the communicative aspect of an erotic dance. The nudity of the dancer is an integral part of the emotions and thoughts that the nude dance evokes. And where government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes, the regulation should definitely be unconstitutional. They do not punish nudity in stage plays, or ballets, or operas, but only the nudity committed w/in the said go-go bars. The States interest, allegedly, is to prevent offense to the public, but all of the customers of such go-go bars are consenting adults who are there precisely for the enjoyment of the said performances. DD: It appears that the regulation specifically targeted the go-go bars and was not concerned with public nudity at all; the US Supreme Court nevertheless sustained the regulation. FCC vs. PACIFICA FOUNDATION words you wouldnt say ever / offensive / nuisance Pacifica aired a 12 minute monologue by George Carlin where he uttered extremely vulgar language depicting sexual and excretory activities, broadcast during the daytime when children could have been listening. It was reviewed by the Commission and put on the record of Pacifica w/ a warning that further acts would result to the non-renewal of their license. Although the law does not confer upon the Commission the power to censor the material prior to broadcast, there is nothing to preclude them from reviewing the same and to impose sanctions. Obscenity is different from indecency the latter being simply nonconformance w/ accepted standards of society. Prurient appeal is an essential element of indecent language; it offends in the same manner as obscenity offends. It is not accorded absolute constitutional protection. Given the intrusive nature of broadcasting, w/c can reach into the privacy of the home and tap the young audience; the broadcaster may be deprived of his rights if he transmits such shocking and vulgar material. It is just as harmful to children as obscenity is. It is quite similar to a nuisance, possibly the right thing in the wrong place. Consolidated Dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall: The stance of the majority of the court would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents. The interest of the majority was upheld but to the detriment of the minority who equally have the right to listen. Further, the courts have maintained the trend that obscenity, w/c the minors must be protected against, must partake of an erotic nature and in this case, this is not evident. The parents have the time-honored right to raise their children as they see fit. Lastly, the speakers choice of words cannot be divorced from the ideas he wishes to express. A sanitized message would not deliver the same message as effectively as the author intended.

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RENTON vs. PLAYTIME THEATERS - zoning / legitimate interest / content-neutral The City of Renton planned to enact a zoning ordinance for the purpose of regulating adult-oriented establishments. The council issued a moratorium on licensing and a issued a regulation that no adult theater shall be situated w/in 1,000 feet from a school, residential dwelling, church, or park. Playtime Theaters acquired property and intended to open 2 adult movie houses and thus challenged the said enactments. The ordinance does not ban adult theaters altogether but merely regulates the time, manner, and place of their operations. Generally, laws enacted for the purpose of regulating speech or expression based on its content are void, however, there is a legitimate and substantial government interest to preserve the quality of urban life in this case. The proximity of such adult theaters to wholesome areas has produced various ill effects and the city must be given reasonable opportunities to formulate solutions to such problems. BETHEL SCHOOL vs. FRASER lewd speech / school setting / loco parentis Matthew Fraser, during a speech to support his candidate for the school elections, and before a crowd of some 600 14-years-olds, made use of lewd and sexual innuendo. As a result he was suspended for 2 days and disqualified from being the graduation speaker. Represented by his father, he sued the school for violating his freedom of speech. Through the exercise of the right to speech, one must also consider the sensibilities of others. The right conferred to adults to utter certain forms of offensive expressions does not necessarily extend to children. The right to speech does not prevent the school from determining the extent of allowable conduct w/in school premises; likewise, school authorities, acting in loco parentis, have the right to protect students from sexually explicit and indecent speeches. DD: It is also part of the academic freedom of the school to determine what disciplinary measures to impose and what policies to implement pursuant to its mission and vision. Unlike public forums that enjoy greater constitutional protection, expression in schools may be regulated according to the principles and policies of the institution. HAZELWOOD SCHOOL vs. KUHLMEIER school paper / school policy / less rights Principal Reynolds of Hazelwood School deleted 2 pages from the proposed issue of the school paper, Spectrum, one of w/c deals w/ teenage pregnancy, and the other dealing w/ the effects of divorce upon the students. He alleged that the identities of the students were not adequately protected and the parents and families must be afforded the right to be heard. The authors thus sue the school for violating their right to speech. A school need not tolerate speech or publication inconsistent w/ the school policy or mission. In this case, the paper Spectrum was but a part of the Journalism class curriculum and the school exercises discretion as to its content. It is not a public forum. A students right to expression is not co-extensive w/ an adults rights under the 1st Amendment. DD: Unlike speech in public forums that enjoys greater constitutional protection, expression of ideas in schools may be regulated according to the principles and policies of the institution. RENO vs. AMERICAN CLU internet regulation / vagueness / problematic application The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) sought to protect minors from the harmful effects of the internet by criminalizing the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any person below 18 years old. The description is void for vagueness. It differs from other laws in that it failed to define indecent or it does not allow parents consent to the use of restricted mater ial, and omits the standard of lack of socially redeeming value. Further, given the complexity of cyberspace, the factors recognized for broadcast and other mediums are not applicable. It is likewise not content-neutral. Internet forums are open to all comers making its applicability very difficult especially given the growing complexity and diversity of the internet. ASHCROFT vs. FREE SPEECH UNION child & virtual porno / overboard The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) penalized ANY visual depiction of what appears to be, or in any way depicts, minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct including virtual CG renderings. The law is gravely overboard and is thus unconstitutional. The regulation proscribes ANY form of depiction, even if it is not patently offensive. Many otherwise legitimate and artistic films would fall w/in its prohibition and would be penalized. The presence of a single explicit scene will criminalize a certain expression and as a rule, the work must be considered as a whole. Further, virtual porn is not intrinsically related to the abuse of children. Even assuming that watching virtual porn will whet the appetites of pedophiles and encourage them to commit such acts, that reason alone is insufficient to justify the prohibition and the penalty. The overbreadth doctrine disallows the government from banning a certain unprotected speech if, as a result, certain protected speech will likewise be proscribed.

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DD: Regulation of free expression in the internet is a problematic issue considering the rapid development of cyberspace. There is a very easy tendency for regulations to go overboard considering that access is available to both minors and adults. Jurisdiction is also a problem. US vs. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOC. surfing for porn in the library / conditions imposed Due to the fact that the free internet services in the public libraries have been used for searching for porn, the Congress enacted the Childrens Internet Protection Act, requiring libraries to install softwar e to filter or block obscene or pornographic websites. Otherwise, their internet service will not be maintained. The Congress may impose certain conditions when it appropriates funds for the public benefit. Internet access in libraries should be for educational or research purposes. There is likewise a substantial government interest at stake that of protecting young internet users from inappropriate material. DD: The library computers are public property made available to the people; thus the government may impose reasonable regulations for their utilization.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 5
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Non-Establishment Clause
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ Eucharistic Congress stamps / no religious purpose / incidental effect RA No. 4052 authorized the Director of Posts to issue postage stamps commemorating the Eucharistic Congress celebrated in Manila and organized by the Catholic Church. The government appropriated money for it and expected to generate around P 1.6 million from the sale of such stamps. Gregorio Aglipay of the Phil. Independent Church sought to prohibit the issuance and sale of such stamps for violating separation of church and State. The law contemplates no religious purpose; the stamps were not sold for the benefit of the Catholic Church but merely to advertise the Philippines as the seat of the Eucharistic Congress. Resulting propaganda possibly in favor of the church is merely incidental and should not frustrate the main purpose of the law to generate profit and boost tourism. GARCES vs. ESTENZO quarrel over San Vicente Ferrer idol / no favor to church / private funds In preparation for the town fiesta, the Barangay Council enacted resolutions (ratified through plebiscite) authorizing the purchase of a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer, patron saint of Valencia, Ormoc. The image was to be acquired through sale of tickets and cash donations and was to be placed in the custody of the hermana mayor. It was temporarily placed at the altar of the church but the parish priest Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay claiming that it was property of the church; hence the barangay filed a Replevin case. Osmea countered by assailing the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The resolutions were not enacted for the purpose of favoring the church or any religion, nor did it authorize the allocation of public funds for religious purposes. In fact, private funds were used to purchase the image. Since the Barangay is the owner of the said image, then it has the right to determine who shall exercise custody over it. SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP mandatory prayers / violation of neutrality and rights Various states required the reading of certain verses from the Bible as well as the recitation of The Lords Prayer to begin each school day; thus some students represented by their parents assail the constitutionality of the said policies. The government should be neutral about religion; it protects all but cannot promote or favor any. The State cannot forbid but it cannot likewise aid in the performance of religious functions. Ceremoniously reading from the Bible and reciting The Lords Prayer are clearly exercises of religion, and to require their performance would violate the rights of the students. Objective study of the Bible for academic purposes such as for its historic or literary qualities may be made part of the curriculum as a secular activity, but the aforesaid activities clearly partake of a religious exercise and cannot be made mandatory w/o violating constitutional rights.

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LEMON vs. KURTZMAN salary subsidy to parochial schools / excessive entanglement Rhode Island statutes provide a salary subsidy of 15% of the teach ers annual wage in favor of non-public elementary schools including parochial schools. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, provides financial support for salaries reimbursement, textbooks, and other instructional materials to such schools. There are 3 thin evils sought to be avoided by the Establishment Clause: sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement. There are likewise 3 requisites that must be satisfied so as not to run afoul to the Establishment Clause: 1. 2. 3. the statute must have a secular legislative purpose its principal effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion it must not foster excessive entanglement of government w/ religion

The parochial schools have a significant religious mission; they foster an atmosphere of religious instruction and vocation. They maintain substantial religious activity and are under church supervision and control; and the teachers therein have, in an understatement, the difficulty of being religiously neutral. In order not to run afoul to the Establishment Clause, the teachers subsidized must not inculcate religion, and ensuring compliance would cause the government to be excessively entangled w/ the church. They likewise provide financial aid directly to church-related schools clearly in violation of the Constitution, and to ascertain if the proceeds are dedicated to secular purposes would likewise entail further excessive entanglement. TILTON vs. RICHARDSON construction grants / 20 yr. limitation void / less entanglement The Higher Education Facilities Act authorized federal grants and loans to colleges and universities for the construction of various buildings and facilities such as libraries, laboratory, theatre, and science buildings subject to the condition that they must be used for secular purposes only for the period of 20 years after construction. Should this condition be violated, then the State is entitled to recover the amount proportionate to its grant based on its present value. As opposed to that of Lemon vs. Kutzman where teachers were subsidized, the facilities themselves are religiously neutral; hence there is less tendency for entanglement as inspection requires minimal contact. Further, evidence disclosed that the colleges and universities are more inclined to providing the students w/ secular education, unlike the primary and secondary parochial schools that require participation w/ religious activities; hence there is less risk of support for religious activities. However, the 20 year restriction opens the door for religious use after the grace period; hence it violates the Establishment Clause. After the 20 year grace period, the properties partially or fully subsidized by the government may already be used for religious purposes; this is a violation of the Establishment Clause. The grace period should thus be struck down. ZOBREST vs. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL interpreter / child is the beneficiary The respondent school district refused to provide an interpreter for a deaf student as allowed by the Individuals w/ Disabilities Education Act because he attends a Roman Catholic school. The school district claimed that it would promote his religious development and benefit the parochial school at the expense of the Establishment Clause. Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to citizens w/o reference to religion do not violate the Establishment Clause. The child is the primary beneficiary, not the school; and whatever benefit may accrue to the latter is merely incidental. AGOSTINI vs. FELTON public school teachers in parochial schools / neutral / no presumption NY Citys program sent public school teachers to parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children. It was declared unconstitutional in Aguilar vs. Felton and the petitioners pray that the court reexamine the ruling. Such government-funded programs are neutral and are made to favor the disadvantaged children regardless of their religion; presence of public school teachers in parochial schools does not violate the Establishment Clause provided that adequate safeguards are in place. The presumption that the presence of public employees in parochial institutions tends to benefit the latter has been abandoned, hence, pervasive monitoring is no longer required. Overall, the program does not result in indoctrination, it does not discriminate based on religion, and it does not create excessive entanglement; hence it is not abhorrent to the Establishment Clause. MITCHELL vs. HELMS materials and educational aids / neutral application / no indoctrination The Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA) channels federal funds to schools lending educational, media, and library materials including software and compute rs to implement secular, neutral, and non-ideological programs. Around 30% of the funds spent have benefited religiously affiliated schools, thus the program was challenged for violating the Establishment Clause. Just because some of the beneficiaries of the program are religiously-affiliated, it does not automatically make it a law respecting an establishment of religion. It passes the Agostini Test; it does not result in governmental

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indoctrination (religious indoctrination attributable to governmental action), it is made available neutrally and equally among beneficiaries regardless of religious affiliation, and it neither impairs nor promotes the same, and it allocates aid based on the private choices of the students as to w/c schools to attend. ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS tuition aid program / neutral application Ohios Pilot Project Scholarship Program provided tuition aid for certain students who chose to remain enrolled in public schools; both religious and secular schools were participants but a significant majority (82%) of the participating private schools was religiously-affiliated. The purpose of the law was to provide educational assistance to poor students. The law was neutral regarding all aspects towards religion and confers assistance to a broad class of persons regardless of their religious affiliation. Whatever incidental advancement of the religious missions of the parochial schools cannot be attributed to the government whose sole aim was to distribute benefits among the students. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. AMERICAN CLU Christmas & Chanukah greeting signs / affiliation The County Courthouse displayed a nativity scene crche donated by Holy Name Society w/c bore the words (in Latin) Glory to God, while the City-County Building displayed an 18-foot Chanukah menorah beside a Christmas tree and a sign bearing the mayors name. The American Civil Liberties Union sought to enjoin the county and the city from displaying the said symbols invoking the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from appearing to take positions regarding religious belief. The government must remain secular; it may recognize the holidays secular aspects but it cannot go as far as to suggest that the people praise the Christian God for the birth of Jesus Christ. Consolidated Dissents: The symbols merely recognize that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the winter season and have attained a secular status in the society; it merely recognizes cultural diversity. The Christmas Tree is widely viewed today as a secular symbol of the Christmas Holiday, and such symbols cannot be interpreted as an endorsement of Christianity or Judaism. There is no apparent risk of establishment and there also is no coercion. If opening prayers are allowed before convening Congress, there should be no obstacle to displaying the said symbols. CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW & ADVISORY BOARD vs. PINETTE The Klan! / protected speech / reasonable observer The Ku Klux Klan applied w/ the petitioner Board for a permit to display an unattended cross in Capitol Square, a forum for public questions and discussions the use of w/c was regulated by the latter according to Ohio State Law. They were denied based on the theory that, given the proximity of the square to the seat of government, the symbol could be interpreted to mean that the government was endorsing a said religion. The display sought by the Kluxers belongs to protected speech as a secular private expression. Given the fact that Capitol Square is a public forum, the expression sought should be allowed therein. Further, it is private expression, not one made by the government. The reasonable observer could not possibly interpret the symbol to be endorsed by the government given the public nature of the place. Also, other alternative means could have been sought w/c will not infringe upon the free exercise of religion and of expression, such as the posting of disclaimers. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL vs. EXEC. SECRETARY halal certification / religious act EO NO. 46 created the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme, w/c designated the respondent OMA to oversee its implementation granting it exclusive authority to issue halal certificates to guarantee that food products do not contain pork or any of its derivatives. All other halal certificates not issued by the OMA were deemed illegal. The Islamic Dawah Council is a non-government organization engaged in the issuance of such certifications (among other social functions). Manufacturers stopped seeking their certifications resulting to loss of income, hence the petition for prohibition. Classifying food products as halal is a religious function drawn from the Koran and other Islamic beliefs; hence the government, in granting the OMA exclusive authority to perform the said act, clearly encroached upon the free exercise of religion. Infringement of religious freedom can only be curtailed on the basis of a compelling State interest w/c in this case is not present. DD: The issuance of halal certificates is a religious practice and the government has no business meddling with the exercise.

Free Exercise of Religion

CANTWELL vs. CONNECTICUT annoying people w/ a phonograph / council approval / restraint Newton Cantwell and his 2 sons, allegedly Jehovahs Witness ministers, were walking from house-to-house soliciting and carrying books and pamphlets and a phonograph record w/c they played upon permission of

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their interviewees. Entitled Enemies, the content attacked other religions, especially Catholicism. Around 90% of the residents of the neighborhood were Catholics. They annoyed many people along the way. They were charged for inciting breach of the peace under a Connecticut statute prohibiting solicitation for alleged religious or charitable purposes w/o the approval of the Public Welfare Council. It was enacted for the purpose of protecting the citizens against solicitation for bogus religious, philanthropic, or charitable purposes. The statute sweeps though a vast array of conduct, renders an indefinite characterization therefor, and gives the Council too much discretion in its application; it is obnoxious to the free exercise of religion. It also amounts to prior restraint. The functions of the Council (in approving or denying authorization) were not merely ministerial but were discretionary. There was no apparent threat or menace to the public peace and order; there was only an attempt to persuade willing listeners to embrace, or at least, contribute to his religious cause. US vs. BALLARD I am St. Germain! / fraud / no proof needed / good faith is the only question Guy Ballard organized the I Am Movement and claimed to be some sort of divinity, or master or the medium through w/c St. Germain would transmit his message to mankind or something to that effect. He claimed to have cured various persons w/ ailments and performed such other supernatural deeds. He was convicted for conspiring to use the mails to commit fraud, by making 18 different misrepresentations, and the trial court ruled that such claims were false and were concocted mainly to defraud other persons. The ONLY question that must be resolved is whether or not Ballard honestly and in good faith believed such things. It is not for the Jury, as a trier of facts, to test the veracity of his claims, but merely to determine if he acted in good faith. No man may be put to the proof of his religious beliefs or doctrines. The law knows no heresy. Case is remanded for further proceeding. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA Bibles for sale / non-profit / prior restraint The Acting Treasurer of Manila informed the American Bible Association (ABA), w/c was selling bibles and pamphlets for 25 and 5 respectively, that it was engaging in the business of general merchandise w/o Municipal License and Mayors Permit and assessed certain taxes against them. The right to the free exercise of religion carries w/ it the right to disseminate its beliefs. Any restraint can only be justified by clear and present danger. In this case, the sale of bibles and pamphlets was clearly not for business, even if the prices were a bit higher, but rather for the purpose of dissemination, w/c cannot be subjected to prior restraint in this case, the procurement of a license or permit. Hence, the Ordinances requiring for permits as well as imposing taxes for such exercise cannot be applied in this case. DD: But if the sale of religiously-inspired merchandise is for profit, reasonable taxes may be imposed. EBRALINAG vs. SUPERINTENDENT salute to the flag / no clear & present danger / exceptions Students who were members of the Jehovahs Witness were expelled from school for refusing to take part in the flag ceremony, where they supposed to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. They claim that it contradicts their religious beliefs. They were expelled on the basis of RA No. 1265 and Order No. 8 of the DECS. The SC has decided to abandon the Gerona Ruling. The only justification for restraints or limitations upon the free exercise of religion is the presence of a clear and present danger. In this case, the students did not manifest any disrespect and merely stood silently and in attention. Forcing the children to salute the flag violates their right to religion and is hardly conducive to fostering love of country. Expelling them on the basis of such conduct will likewise violate their right to receive education. When the laws conflict w/ the scruples of conscience, certain exceptions may be granted, provided that no compelling state interest intervenes. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION vs. SMITH drug-use during a ritual / law is neutral Smith and Black were both fired by the Private Drug Rehabilitation Organization for ingesting a hallucinogenic drug called peyote, for sacramental purposes during a ceremony at the Native American Church. They were likewise denied unemployment compensation. They invoke the free exercise clause. The dangerous drugs law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is applied equally to all, regardless of whether they do the act for religious or non-religious purposes. Hence, the law does not offend the free exercise clause. To hold otherwise would create an extraordinary right to ignore general laws in the name of religion for as long as no compelling state interest intervenes. LONG & ALMERIA vs. BASA expulsion from church / conclusive upon courts A person was expelled from his Church, hence he seeks reprieve in the civil courts. The by-laws of the Church merely require that the Board of Directors be informed that a member has failed to observe any of the regulations and by-laws or has conducted himself in any manner dishonorable to the Church ; then they shall issue the corresponding Resolution for his expulsion. No prior notice was required. The internal rules of churches and other denominations may be peculiar, but decisions of church authorities pertaining to such

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internal matters are conclusive upon the civil courts. There is usually no room for dissent in a religious corporation. DD: Admission to or excommunication from churches is a matter left entirely upon their discretion and the State has no business meddling therewith. This doctrine was later affirmed in the Philippines in the case of Taruc vs. Bishop. AUSTRIA vs. NLRC pastor terminated from service / employer -employee relation / secular matter Dionisio Austria was a pastor for the Seventh Day Adventist Church. He was terminated after 28 years of service for misappropriation of funds, breach of trust, gross misconduct, and habitual neglect of duties, among other reasons. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate him prior to his termination. He sued the Adventist Church before the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. The Adventist Church invokes the separation of church and state. The principle of separation of church and state does not apply in this case. The case does not concern purely ecclesiastical or religious affairs, but rather that of employer and employee, w/c is governed by labor laws. It is a purely secular matter. It is not as if Austria was expelled or excommunicated; he was terminated from his employment. The act of terminating Austria was an exercise of management prerogatives, not religious prerogatives. The provisions of the Labor Code apply to all establishments, whether religious or not. CENTENO vs. VILLALON-PORNILOS poor old men / religious vs. charitable / incidental effect The Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay is an organization composed of elderly men who engaged in solicitation for the renovation of their barrio chapel. They did not have the necessary permit from the DSWD. They tried to solicit from Judge Adoracion Angeles who sued them for violating PD No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law). The said law, however, mentioned only solicitations for charitable or public welfare purposes and requires a permit therefor, w/o making any mention of religious purposes. The terms religious purpose and charitable purpose are separate and cannot be interchanged. The acts of the elderly men cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not contemplate solicitation for religious purposes. Nevertheless, the State has the right and duty to protect its people from fraudulent solicitations, and a general law w/c does not involve any religious test cannot be deemed invalid even if there are some incidental effects upon the free exercise of religion. The concurring opinion goes as far as to state that requiring a permit before solicitation for religious purposes would amount to prior restraint. WISCONSIN vs. YODER compulsory education / free exercise prevails / no compelling reason Members of the Old Amish Religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church were charged under a Wisconsin law on compulsory school attendance for refusing to send their children to school after graduating the 8 th grade. They claim that it violates their beliefs and endangers their salvation. The Amish religion and community believe in seclusion from the modern life and recourse to the simple country life as part of their religious beliefs; and they have sufficiently established their sincerity towards such beliefs. The States claim of parens patriae cannot prevail over the free exercise claim of the Amish Community in the absence of a compelling state interest. The Amish Sect has established that there is no apparent danger to the welfare of the children should they be deprived of the 2 years of additional education. DD: Take note that the duty of the State to raise and educate the youth is only subsidiary to the primary right and duty of their parents. PAMIL vs. TELERON priest-slash-mayor / religious test / religion vs. profession Fr. Margarito Gonzaga (priest) was elected to the position of municipal mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A suit for quo warranto was filed against him for violating the separation of church and the state. The court rendered a divided decision hence the vote is indecisive. The Revised Admin. Code expressly disallows ecclesiastics, soldiers, contractors engaged w/ the government, among others, from holding public office. The required majority to nullify the assailed provision, however, was not attained. DD: Under the 1973 Constitution, it requires a majority of all members of the Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional; under the 1987 Constitution, it only requires majority vote of all members who took part in the deliberations and voted thereon. Majority Opinion: The ban imposed by the Admin. Code is incompatible w/ the Constitution because it amounts to a religious test for the exercise of a political right. However, the prohibition against appointment to public office remains valid. Separate Opinion of Justice Makasiar: The separation of church and state shall be inviolable. The assailed provision does not impose a religious test; it merely defines a disqualification. One is not disqualified from office on the basis of his

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beliefs or religion, but rather based on his profession or vocation. The contractors, soldiers, and other persons disqualified therefrom all somehow profess a certain religion. There is even a provision in the Constitution that prohibits religious organizations from registering as political parties. This manifests the intent of the Constitution to bar religious organizations from holding office in the government. There is a dangerous tendency for such officials to use the government to further whatever interests their respective churches or religions may have. McDANIEL vs. PATY constitutional delegate / exercise of right conditioned upon religion Paty, a constitutional commission candidate, sought the disqualification of McDaniel, a Baptist minister and a rival candidate, for the same position, invoking the Tennessee Constitution w/c disqualifies ministers of whatever denomination from holding the said office. While it may be said that the Tennessee disqualification targets not religious belief but rather the status, and conduct of the clergy, it nevertheless violates the free exercise clause. It has the effect of conditioning the exercise of his right upon the surrender of his religious vocation. It thus, establishes a religious classification w/c inhibits religion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. GOLDMAN vs. WEINBERGER skullcap / uniformity in military Goldman was an Orthodox Jew and member of the US Air Force. He was prohibited from wearing his yarmulke (a skullcap of sorts), indoors in accordance w/ Air Force regulations. According to their beliefs, it serves to cover their heads before the Omnipresent God. Goldman spent most of his duty indoors. The Free Exercise Clause does not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing the yarmulke at the expense of its policy to evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of military uniformity. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brennan: The rules of the Air Force itself nevertheless allow expressions of individuality; excluding however those extreme, unusual, or fad forms of expression. The rules tolerate manifestations of religious diversity such as wearing of crosses, some forms of religious garments, among others. There is no reasonable and striking basis for prohibiting the wearing of yarmulkes. LEE vs. WEISMAN rabbi invited to graduation day / coercion / State cannot support religion Lee, a middle school principal, invited a Jewish rabbi to offer a prayer during the graduation ceremony of his public middle school; Weisman, a father of one of the students, sought to enjoin the practice, during the present case, and for future cases. The government may not coerce anyone to support any religion or participate in any of its ceremonies w/o violating the Establishment Clause. The actions of the principal are attributable to the State, w/c cannot place the dissenter in the dilemma of silent participation or protest. A graduation ceremony, w/c is a personal milestone, cannot be equated w/ routine sessions of Congress w/c have opening prayers. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia: Prayer has been a prominent and accepted part of ceremonies and proclamations. It has been a long established practice in public events, such as graduations. There is likewise no reasonable and discernible trace of coercion in the absence of any threat of penalty. Hence, the practice should be allowed. CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI vs. CITY OF HIALEAH animal sacrifices / not neutral and general The Church of the Lukumi practices the Santeria religion, w/c practices animal sacrifices. After leasing some property in the respondent city and signifying their intent to establish a chapel therein, the City suddenly enacted ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices, or the unnecessary and cruel slaughter of animals during rituals or for purposes other than for food. A law that burdens religious practice can only be justified if it is neutral and is of general applicability. In such a case, it need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest. In this case, the Ordinances, though seemingly neutral, were actually targeted towards repressing the Santeria practices hence, they violate the free exercise clause. There is likewise no compelling state interest enough to justify the restriction. LAMBS CHAPEL vs. CENTER MORICHES use of school premises for film / rule must be neutral NY Law authorizes school boards to regulate the use of school facilities after school hours and for purposes other than religious purposes. Lambs Chapel evangelical church made requests for the use of the said premises for the purpose of showing a film about family values and such topics. The school board denied them access based on the statute. Denying the church access to public school premises violates the Freedom of Speech Clause. It discriminates based on viewpoint. It permits the use of such school premises for other purposes but denies the same to religious groups. The film was to be shown after school hours and would have been open to the public, hence, there is nothing there to indicate that the State endorses or benefits any religion. Access to such forum can be based on subject matter, but the distinction must be religiously neutral.

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ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR concubinage / church approval / sincerity / compelling state interest Soledad Escritor was an interpreter for the Las Pias RTC, who was charged administratively for immoral conduct for co-habiting w/ Quilapio w/o the benefit of marriage over the last 20 years, their union bearing a child. At the time they started co-habiting, Escritor was still married, but at the time she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow. Escritor and Quilapio were members of the Jehovahs Witness. They secured a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness signifying their churchs approval of their union in accordance w/ their religious beliefs. Indeed, the case at bar has put a burden upon her free exercise of religion, and she likewise appears to be sincere in her religious beliefs. She procured the certificate 10 years after their union began, and not merely after being implicated or before entering the judiciary. Apparently nothing from her actuations would constitute grossly disgraceful and immoral acts so much as to warrant administrative sanction. The State undertakes the burden of satisfying the compelling state interest test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed upon Escritor. There are 3 tests that have to be determined in this case: 1. 2. 3. The sincerity and centrality of religious beliefs The right to free exercise may only be overcome by a compelling state interest The means adopted by the State should be least restrictive of free exercise

The case is thus REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator to determine the case based on the above considerations. The Solicitor General is likewise ordered to intervene.

Consolidated Dissents: Escritors conduct constitutes the felony of concubine clearly w/in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Religious beliefs, no matter how sincere, cannot exempt from liability under the RPC for criminal acts.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 6
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.

Liberty of Abode & Right to Travel

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS right to return to ones country / residual powers / paramount interest In his deathbed, the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos signified his intention to return from exile and die in his native country. At that time, the local situation was rather volatile, given the repeated coup attempts, the secessionist movement in Mindanao, communist insurgency, accumulated foreign debt, and the devastated economy. President Aquino thus refused to allow Marcos to re-enter the country. The case is in a class by itself; it should not create any precedent. The Marcoses invoke the constitutional guarantee of liberty of abode and freedom to travel, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights , w/c both provide for the right against being arbitrarily deprived of right to enter his own country. They also invoke the incorporation clause. The President, on the other hand, invokes her residual powers as well as her duty to maintain peace and order and the protection of the people. This is how the Supreme Court decided the issue. The right to return to ones own country guaranteed under International Law is separate and distinct from the constitutional right to liberty of abode and travel. The Bill of Rights makes no mention of the right to return to ones own country. Such guarantees are not inflexible and may be subject to limitation should the paramount national interest so require. The President possesses residual powers inherent in her duty to protect the general

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welfare. The extent of her powers is not limited to those expressly conferred by the Constitution. The prohibition imposed by the President is thus sustained. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Interpreting the Constitution for only one person smacks of unequal protection. The liberty of abode and of changing the same cannot be impaired except upon lawful order of the COURT. This provision speaks of the Judiciary, not the Executive. Furthermore, the right to travel cannot be impaired except in the interest of the national security, public safety, or public health, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. This speaks of the Legislature, not the Executive. There has bee no law passed for this particular purpose. Likewise, the deposed president is in life-support. There may be local disturbances present, but not to such an extent as to compel the Supreme Court to ignore a plea under the Bill of Rights. Also, the Legislature, although recognizing the Presidents residual powers, nevertheless proposed, through a Resolution, for the President to allow entry in the spirit of reconciliation and goodwill. DD: This is a very exceptional case. For the purpose of deciding future cases (or answering exam questions), I suggest that the rules laid down in the dissenting opinion must be followed unless the case is as extraordinary as the Marcos Case. Also, the right to travel may be impaired or regulated even by administrative agencies, for as long as the regulation is provided for or allowed by the law and is in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. Restrictions on the liberty of abode or of changing the same, however, require court order. See the case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban where the Manila Mayor deported the Ermita prostitutes to somewhere in Mindanao. It was deemed a violation of their liberty of abode.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 7
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by law.

The Right to Information

LEGASPI vs. CSC eligibility of sanitarians / / right to info / only Congress may deny such right Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission info regarding the civil service eligibilities of certain government sanitarians. The CSC refused to divulge the information, thus Legaspi filed a case for mandamus. The people have the right to information on matters of public concern, and access to official records shall be allowed to citizens as may be provided by law. It is a self-executing provision. The right to information is a public right and every citizen is entitled thereto. Civil service eligibility is a matter of public concern; there is nothing secret about it. Limitations upon the right to access information are discretionary upon the Legislature, not the agency in question. Administrative agencies may only regulate, but may not prohibit access, unless otherwise authorized by law. Granting access is not discretionary upon the agencies of the government but only upon the Legislature. VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE GSIS loans / public funds / no law authorizing confidentiality Valmonte, among other petitioners, was a member of the press who requested from the GSIS a list of Batasang Pambansa who have been able to avail of loans, through the intervention of Imelda Marcos. They also asked for access to the official records. The GSIS refused to prepare the list and denied them access thereto invoking right to privacy and privileged confidentiality. There is no such law granting the GSIS confidentiality w/ regard to its documents. Likewise, corporations such as the GSIS have no right to privacy. They cannot invoke the right to privacy of their borrowers because such right is personal in nature. Further, the funds of the GSIS assume a public character. It is a matter of public interest; information pertaining thereto cannot be denied unless provided by law.

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The petitioners are thus entitled to access official records pertaining thereto. However, the right to information does not confer upon the citizens the right to compel agencies to prepare lists, summaries, or other such documents. Only access to the records is permitted. Otherwise, they would unduly burden the agencies w/ the preparation of their requested lists or summaries. AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MORATO MTRCB voting / public nature, functions, and character Sarmiento is an employee of the MTRCB who requested from the latter permission to examine the voting slips made by the board members in rating the films submitted for review. Chairman Manoling Morato denied her request claiming that the manner of voting should be kept confidential as they are supposedly conscience votes. The rest of the board members agreed w/ Morato; hence this petition. It is the general policy of the state to adopt full public disclosure of all transactions involving matters of public interest. The very existence of the MTRCB is public in nature thus, there can be no valid claim to privacy. The decisions of the board are made in the exercise of public functions; hence they assume a public character. Access to records pertaining thereto must thus me allowed. As a matter of public right, access to information or official records cannot be made dependent upon the discretion of the agency involved, unless the law itself provides otherwise. GONZALES vs. NARVASA multiple positions / self-executing / matters of public concern Gonzales requested Exec. Secretary Zamora to answer his letter, asking who are the officials holding multiple positions in the government, and for copies of their appointments, receipts of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs, among other pieces of information. The right to information is self-executing and may be invoked by any citizen before the courts. For as long as the information pertains to matters of public concern, the public must be allowed access thereto. Zamora thus has the responsibility and the duty to answer the letter and to allow inspection of official records and documents. CHAVEZ vs. PEA negotiations / official recommendation / cannot compel agencies to make lists Petitioner Chavez seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose information regarding its negotiations with potential holders of the said estates even prior to final agreement. The PEA refuses to disclose the information claiming that the right to info does not include intra-agency communications and recommendations. Chavez thus filed a case to compel the PEA to divulge the same. While evaluations and reviews are on-going, there are still no official acts, transactions, or decisions. However, the moment the committee makes its official recommendation, there is now a definite proposition, and the right to information begins to attach. It does not require that the contracts be consummated first before the right to information to be invoked. The right covers 3 categories of information: 1. 2. 3. Official records Documents pertaining to official acts, transactions, and decisions Research data used in formulating policies

On the other hand, the following are not covered by the right to information: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Military and diplomatic secrets Information affecting national security Information on investigation of crimes before prosecution of the accused Presidential communications and correspondences during closed-door Cabinet meetings Internal deliberations of the courts Executive sessions of Congress Other limitations w/c Congress may impose by law

The right to information includes official info on on-going negotiations before final contract as long as there is already a definite offer or proposition. However, the right does not include that of compelling the government to prepare lists, reports, summaries, or other documents. DD: Take note that the constitutional right is conferred to citizens. DD: Under the recent case of Hilado vs. Judge, the right to access public records covers orders and decisions or verdicts of the courts, but not accesses to the pleadings upon w/c decisions are based.

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BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 8
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the pu blic and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Right to Form Associations, Unions, or Societies

UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORY UNION vs. LAGUESMA managerial employees not covered The petitioner (United Pepsi) is a union of supervisory employees filing for Certification Election on behalf of the route managers of Pepsi-Cola. Their petition was denied by the Secretary of Labor based on Art. 245 of the Labor Code w/c provides that managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, or form labor organizations; supervisory employees are not allowed to join rank-and-file organizations, but may form their own unions. Managerial employees are generally classified into 3 groups 1. 2. 3. Top Managers, who are policy-determining and are in charge of overall management Middle Managers, who direct the conduct of other managers and balance the demands of superiors and workers, and First-line Managers, who directly supervise the workers and are deemed the supervisory employees.

Route managers are, by all means, managerial employees; they hold a great deal of responsibility in determining the success of the company through planning, operation, and evaluation. They belong to the category of middle managers. The Constitution only intended to restore the right of supervisory employees to form unions. It does not confer the same right to middle managers. The ruling was based on the observation that Delega te Lerum made repeated reference to supervisory employees (as well as government employees and security guards) in proposing for the restoration of the right to unionize. The rationale supposedly was that managerial employees act in a confidential capacity and may thus lead to conflict of interest; the unions might also become company-dominated. The route managers being managerial employees, are not eligible to unionize; and the assailed Labor Code provision remains valid. Dissent of Justice Davide: Delegate Lerum expressly stated that he intended Articles 245 (assailed provision) and 246 of the Labor Code to be automatically abolished. There is no ambiguity or vagueness in his statements that would warrant implying anything else. The intent was clearly to grant to all persons, whether rank-and-file or managerial, the right to associate and form unions. Where the intent is clear, there is no room for interpretation. TUCP vs. NHC right to unionize granted to government employees The NHC is a government-owned and controlled corporation w/o an original charter. Questioned in this decision is the application by the NHC workers for a Certification Election for the purpose of forming a union. The Constitution explicitly recognizes the right of the people employed in both government and private sectors to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law. Further, under Art. 9-B Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The government is an employer is every sense, and the unions have in fact, functioned as effective watchdogs against graft and corruption. They have also served as effective forums where dialogue as well as professional and selfdevelopment are promoted. SSS EMPLOYEES vs. CA no right to strike for government employees Employees of the SSS staged a strike; the RTC enjoined the said employees and ordered them to return to work; thus this petition before the Supreme Court. The Constitution is silent as to whether government employees have the right to strike. Reference to the Deliberations as well as to applicable laws (RA No. 875) reveals that the right to form organizations does not include the right to strike. Art. 13 Sec. 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of workers to self-organization, negotiations, xxx including the right to strike in accordance w/ the law. For as long as there is no law allowing government employees to strike and regulating the same, any strike made by them is illegal.

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Relations between private employers and employees rest on a voluntary basis subject to certain requirements provided by law, but public employees are governed by Civil Service Laws. It is the government that, by law, fixes the terms and conditions of their employment not any collective bargaining agreement. EO No. 180 allows public employees to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment not fixed by law. If negotiations fail, their unions may bring the matter before the Public Sector Labor Management Council. They may likewise lobby in Congress for the terms they want; but they do not have the right to stage strikes, walk-outs, or other temporary work stoppages. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS vs. LAGUIO teachers on strike / SSS ruling / dissents A strike was staged by Manila public school teachers praying for decent wages and protesting against the general lack of concern of the government for their pressing grievances. The DECS summarily dismissed 20 teachers, 40 were suspended for 1 year, 33 for 9 months, 122 for six months. Many teachers were placed on preventive suspension beyond the 90-day statutory limit. The majority of the court applied the doctrine laid down in SSS Employees vs. Court of Appeals in enjoining the strike. It was met by a barrage of dissenting opinions. Dissent of Justice Gutierrez The suspensions meted against the teachers were cruel, arbitrary, and punitive, being beyond the allowable 90-day period. This amounts to denial of substantive due process. The SSS Ruling remains good law; however, what was involved here was the right of the teachers to peaceful assembly, to free speech, and to petition the government for redress of grievances not the right to strike. Dissent of Justice Cruz The teachers should be ordered reinstated in the meantime pending their administrative investigations. They should not be indefinitely suspended. The SSS Ruling should not be used as an excuse by the government to flatly ignore the legitimate complaints of its employees. Just because teachers are governed by Civil Service Law, it doesnt mean that t hey are deprived of their rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble. Further, the prohibition against strikes made by government employees must be re-examined. Dissent of Justice Feliciano The prohibition on strikes is not even statutory in nature; it is only administrative and regulatory in character. The Constitution itself is silent on the matter. It could not be made an absolute rule. The court failed to balance the rights and legitimate interests of the teachers on the one side, against the effective maintenance of government on the other. Dissent of Justice Padilla There is also a violation of procedural due process. The dismissals and suspensions were handed out in rapid succession characterized by arbitrariness and undue haste. Further, the court dismissed the case because it supposedly involved a question of fact, but proceeded, on the other hand to declare that it was illegal and his could only be done if the facts were duly considered. Dissent of Justice Sarmiento There was clearly grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DECS, and the court should not shirk based on the handy excuse that it cannot try facts. It must be resolved before the court whether there was indeed due process or arbitrariness in handing out their suspensions and dismissals. There is no harm in listening to our educators.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 9
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Eminent Domain
BARDILLON vs. BARANGAY MASILI RTC jurisdiction / legality & necessity The jurisdiction of the MTC questioned over the course of expropriation proceedings. Expropriation suits are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC, regardless of the value of the property. The subject of the action i s the governments

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exercise of eminent domain w/c is beyond pecuniary estimation. It does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. The question that must be resolved in such cases is the propriety of the expropriation whether it complies w/ the requisites for the valid taking of private property. The Local Government Code provides requisites for valid immediate entry as follows: 1. 2. Filing of a complaint, sufficient in form and substance, for the purpose of expropriation Deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value (FMV) of the property based on its current tax declaration

The RTC has authority to inquire about the legality as well as the genuine necessity for expropriation. The amount is then determined only after the RTC is satisfied w/ the validity and legality of the expropriation. ESTATE OF JBL REYES vs. CITY OF MANILA statutory requisites / order of priorities Heirs of JBL Reyes filed a case for unlawful detainer against Abiog & Maglonso; they obtained a writ of execution. However, during the pendency of the case, the City of Manila sought to expropriate the same properties. The CA issued protective orders, requiring the parties to maintain the status quo until the expropriation is resolved. The heirs question the legality and validity of the expropriation. The Local Government Code and the Charter of the City of Manila empower the same to expropriate private property for its urban land reform and housing program; however there are other laws to be complied with. RA No. 7279 (Urban Development & Housing Act) lays down the mandatory priority in the acquisition of lands: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Those owned by the government Alienable lands of the public domain Unregistered, idle, or abandoned lands Those w/in declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement, Slum Improvement, or Resettlement Program sites Bagong Lipinan Improvement Sites and Services (BLISS) w/c have not been acquired Privately owned lands (last in the priority)

Further, the same Act provides that expropriation is to be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition (community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation, joint venture, negotiated purchase) have already been exhausted. The City of Manila failed to comply w/ any of the aforesaid requirements. The exercise of eminent domain cannot override the guarantees of due process conferred upon the property owners. REPUBLIC vs. CASTELLVI requisites for taking / computation from date of filing Castellvi was the owner of real properties w/c she leased to the AFP the year 1949. On the year 1959, the government sought to expropriate the properties, but contended that actual taking commenced during 1949; hence, just compensation should be based on the value of the property in 1949, not 1959. The following are the requisites of a valid taking of property: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The expropriator must enter the property Entry must be for more than a momentary period Entry should be under warrant or color of authority The property must be devoted to a public use, informally appropriated, or injuriously affected Utilization of the property for public use must be to such an extent as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof

The 2nd and 5th elements are missing. The entry was by virtue of a contract of lease, renewable every year; it is for a momentary or limited period only. Possession was merely transitory. Further, Castellvi remained the owner of the land and was not deprived of any benefit therefrom she was paid rentals. The taking of the property commenced from the time the complaint for expropriation was filed (1959 and not 1949); just compensation must be determined based on the date of the filing of such complaint. CITY GOVERNMENT vs. ERICTA - cemetery lots for paupers / police power / confiscation The City of Quezon City passed Ordinance No. 6118; Sec. 9 thereof provides that the at least 6% of memorial parks or cemeteries should be set aside for the burial of paupers who have been residents of QC for more than 5 years. The City Council then issued a Resolution ordering the City Engineer to stop the selling of such memorial park lots for failure to donate the said 6% portion. Among those ordered was Himlayang Pilipino Inc. w/c assailed the constitutionality of the said Ordinance. The City argues that it is a valid exercise of police power. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. It does not include the power to take private property for public use. If property is to be taken under the authority of the

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police power, it must for the purpose of being destroyed for the protection of the public welfare. The case at bar is not one of regulation, but one of outright confiscation and w/o any just compensation. The Ordinance must be struck down for warranting deprivation of property w/o due process of law and w/o just compensation. DD: If property is seized in the exercise of police power, then it must be destroyed and no compensation is due. If property is taken for public use, then it is the power of eminent domain that is exercised and just compensation must be made. US vs. CAUSBY too near the runway / deprived of any use / indirect intrusion Causby owned 2.8 acres of land situated very near to an airport used by the government. The path of glide of the said airport passed directly over his property. Various forms of aircraft used the airport, from bombers, to transport aircraft, to fighters. They fly low enough to barely miss the top of the trees and blow the leaves off; the noise is startling and the glare from the planes is disturbing. Causby was forced to close his chicken business because many of his chickens were killed. He and his family have been deprived of sleep and the value of the property has greatly depreciated. If by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not use his land for any reasonable purpose, the loss would be complete and it is as if the government entered into the land and took possession of it altogether. It was as if the lands were used as runways themselves. Even assuming that the airspace is deemed a public highway, still the landowner must have exclusive control over the immediate atmosphere. The fact that the planes do not touch the surface is immaterial because there was intrusion nonetheless w/c was so immediate and deprives the owner of any beneficial use of his property. The flights of the planes were the direct and immediate cause for depreciation of his properties as well. PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO view of the plaza / deprivation of property Juan Fajardo was convicted for having constructed a building, w/o permit from the Municipal Mayor, that obstructs the view of the Plaza from the Highway, contrary to an Ordinance enacted for that matter. He assails the validity of the Ordinance. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. The purpose of the law may be valid; however, the means employed is arbitrary. An ordinance w/c permanently restricts the use of property such that it can no longer be used for any reasonable purpose, is beyond regulation and constitutes taking of property. It clearly oversteps the boundaries of the exercise of police power and amounts to confiscation and deprivation of property w/o just compensation. The use and enjoyment of the property is an element of ownership. DD: If the City Government wishes to deprive Fajardo of any beneficial use of his property to preserve the view of the plaza from the highway, then the city will have to expropriate the property. Take note that for a LGU to expropriate private property, an Ordinance for that matter is necessary; mere Resolution is insufficient. This is according to the Local Government Code. REPUBLIC vs. PLDT telephone service disputes / expropriation of services The PLDT entered into a contract w/ RCA Communications for the reception / transmission of telephone messages to and from the US. The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own telephone system and rented the trunk lines of the PLDT subject to the condition that their use was not to be dedicated to private use . Later the Bureau contracted w/ RCA for a joint overseas service; PLDT objected stating that the Bureau was using their own trunk lines to compete w/ them. PLDT threatened that should the Bureau refuse to desist therefrom, in violation of the agreement, PLDT would sever the telephone connections. The Bureau refused to comply; thus, the PLDT severed the connections. The Philippines was thus disconnected from the rest of the world except from the US. As the PLDT and the Bureau failed to arrive at a compromise, the Bureau sought to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract for the lease of the said trunk lines. Obviously, parties cannot be compelled to enter into contracts. The courts cannot make contracts for the parties where there is none. However, the government may exercise the power of eminent domain and require the PLDT to permit interconnection w/ the government telephone system subject to the payment of just compensation. It even imposes a mere burden w/o loss of title and possession; the more should it reasonably be allowed. The lower court should have just treated the case as one for expropriation. NPC vs. JOCSON procedure / amount of deposit no longer discretionary / assessed value This case enunciates the proper procedure for filing complaint and deposit of corresponding amount of compensation. Under the OLD RULE, for the purpose of expropriation, the court has authority to determine the provisional value w/c must be deposited to the Treasurer before possession may be effected. Under the NEW RULE, the courts no longer have such discretion. What is to be deposited was the amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes as reflected in the tax declaration. No hearing is required for

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the purpose but the owner of the property must be duly notified. After the filing of the complaint and compliance w/ the abovementioned deposit, the government can now take possession of the property. BENNIS vs. MICHIGAN confiscated car / police power / no compensation due The car jointly owned by the Bennis spouses was confiscated by the Michigan Court as a public nuisance because the husband, John, used it to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute along a Detroit City street. He was convicted for gross indecency. The wife, Tina, claims that, being the co-owner and innocent spouse, without knowledge or consent to her husbands illegal activity, she has been deprived of her property w/o due process of law. It is a well settled rule in jurisprudence that the acts of the possessor bind the interests of the owner, whether he is innocent or not. The government is NOT required to compensate the owner of the property it has lawfully taken unless the taking was done in the exercise the power of eminent domain. In this case, the forfeiture was exercised through the police power. The confiscation of the said property is in the nature of a penalty, hence no compensation is due. PENN CENTRAL vs. NEW YORK landmark designation / office over the terminal / mere regulation The Landmarks Preservation Law created the Landmark Preservation Commission w/c was empowered to designate buildings as landmarks, and particular areas as landmark sites. Before alterations to such landmarks may be made, the owner must acquire approval from the Commission. Penn Central was the owner of Grand Central Terminal, w/c was designated as a landmark, and the area around it as a landmark site. Penn Central sought to build a multi-story office building over the terminal but was refused permission by the Commission. Thus, Penn Central claims that such law deprives them of the use of their property w/o due process of law. There was no taking because the City did not take possession or control of the premises, but only regulated the exploitation of it. It simply prohibits Penn Central from occupying certain features of the space above it, but allowing the use of the other portions. The law does not interfere w/ the terminals present use nor does it prevent Penn Central from any reasonable use and benefit therefrom, as opposed to US vs. Causby, where the owner was almost completely deprived of any reasonable benefit from his property. There is no showing that a smaller and more harmonizing structure cannot be authorized. SUMULONG vs. GUERRERO socialized housing / public purpose The NHA sought to expropriate 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal; among those sought were properties of Sumulong & Balaoing. They assail the validity of the expropriation, alleging that it does not satisfy the public use requirement since it would benefit only a handful of people. The public use requirement is a flexible, comprehensive, and evolving concept. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement; the construction of low-cost housing (socialized housing) is recognized as a public purpose. The fact that not all of the public but only some beneficiaries may avail thereof does not deprive the expropriation of its public character. It is made pursuant to the States mandate to promote social justice in all phases of national development. The NHA is likewise vested w/ broad discretion to designate particular properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes. CAMARINES SUR vs. CA pilot farm & housing / public use / no need for DAR approval Camarines Sur sought to expropriate certain parcels of land contiguous to the capitol site to establish a pilot farm for nonfood and non-traditional crops and a housing project for government employees. It was assailed on the basis of public use; the Solicitor General further opined that Camarines Sur should first secure the approval of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform to convert the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural lands. Under the old concept of public use the condemned property must actually be open to use by the general public; however, under the new concept, public use simply means public advantage or benefit or that it is intended to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity. The pilot farm and housing project more than satisfy this requirement by enhancing livelihood of farmers and fishermen and for benefiting government employees. While the power of local governments to exercise eminent domain may be limited by the legislature, such limitation must be made expressly. There is nothing in the Local Government Code that requires approval from the DAR before properties may be expropriated by local government units. EPZA vs. DULAY just compensation / court discretion The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) sought to expropriate certain properties and presented tax assessments made by the city assessor during martial law (way back) as basis for computing just compensation. The EPZA further claims that the owners are estopped from questioning the said assessments because they had prior opportunities to do so. EPZA invokes PD Nos. 76, 464, 794, and 1533 claiming that the courts no longer have discretion to determine just compensation.

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Under the Rules of Court, the estimation of just compensation is discretionary upon the courts. The assailed PDs have later been enacted taking away this discretion, stating that the basis for determining just compensation shall be the market value declared by the owner, or determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. The said Decrees are unconstitutional. They encroach upon judicial prerogatives. Final determination of just compensation is incumbent upon the courts. The PDs deprive the courts of discretion to determine what is just and fair. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of its taking; it requires a full equivalent of the loss sustained. In order to arrive at such value, all the pertinent facts and circumstances, as well as improvements must be considered. The rule laid down by the PDs can serve as a guideline at most but cannot bind the courts. Due process also requires that the owners be given the chance to dispute the valuations made in the tax assessments w/c no longer reflect the true value of the lands. DD: Determination of amount of just compensation is a judicial function. CITY OF MANILA vs. ESTRADA determining just compensation / present and future use Facts of the case are not provided. Determining the amount of just compensation is usually a difficult task. The market value is attained by a consideration of all those facts w/c make it commercially valuable. The same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties in the regular course of business. The present use of the properties must be considered as well as the possible future uses to w/c it is suitable. MADDUMBA vs. GSIS Land Bank bonds / must be accepted at face value A Land Bank bondholder purchased a residential house from the GSIS using the said bond (acquired as just compensation). He seeks to compel the GSIS to accept the said bonds in their face value; GSIS seeks to negotiate and secure a discount therefrom. The Land Bank bonds are fully-guaranteed by the government and their values cannot be diminished directly or indirectly. They are not ordinary commercial papers subject to discounting. The mere acceptance of Land Bank bonds as just compensation already entails some sacrifice on the part of the landowner; to reduce their value would impose yet another burden. The purpose of the law (RA No. 3844) is precisely to cushion the impact of dispossession upon the landowner. That there is no explicit provision regarding the matter is immaterial; the intent of the law prevails. GOCCs such as the GSIS thus may be compelled under the law to accept such bonds at their face value. DD: Generally, just compensation must be made in cash; however, the Supreme Court made an exception in case the property is expropriated under the Agrarian Reform Program. In this case, the SC allowed compensation in the form of Land Bank bonds, among other modes. This entails sacrifice on the part of the landowners. To allow government to discount the value of the bonds would augment the sacrifice of the landowners; thus, they must be accepted at face value. NAPOCOR vs. CA computed based on date of filing of complaint / exception Facts of the case are not provided. At issue in this case is the point from w/c just compensation is to be computed. The general rule is that the taking coincides w/ the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Thus the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint serves as basis. The same applies if the complaint is made prior to entry into the property. The exception to the rule is when such would give undue incremental advantages to the landowner arising from the use by the government of the said property. In this case, just compensation is computed on the basis of the entry or the taking of the property, not from the filing of the complaint. DD: If the entry took place before the filing of the complaint, and as a result the value of the property increased, then the value of the property at the time of the taking shall be basis for computing just compensation, plus legal interest. In all other cases, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint shall be basis. Under the present state of law, the State must make a down payment of 15% of the fair market value based on the tax declaration before entering the property. Full payment is not required before entry to the property can be effected (Iloilo vs. Legaspi). MERALCO vs. PINEDA Board of Commissioners is mandatory Respondent judge, during the expropriation proceedings, arrived at the valuation of P 40.00 per sq.m. based on a Joint Venture Agreement submitted before him and w/o the reception of evidence before a Board of Commissioners. There are 2 stages in an expropriation proceeding: 1. 2. Determination of legality of the exercise of eminent domain, and Determination of just compensation.

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A trial before the Board of Commissioners is a mandatory requirement. It is indispensable and allows parties to present evidence regarding just compensation. The court should appoint 3 competent and disinterested persons to act as the Board upon the entry of the order of condemnation. The court may rely upon the report of the Board or may reject the same, but nevertheless cannot dispense w/ the said requirement w/o violating the right of the landowners to due process and just compensation. The Joint Venture Agreement relied upon is incompetent to determine just compensation. DE KNECHT vs. BAUTISTA EDSA extension / into residential district / arbitrary The government, through the DPWH sought to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard; the said extension was to pass through Cuneta Avenue. However, subsequently, the DPWH decided to change the course of the extension to make the same pass through Fernando Rein & Del Pan Streets, w/c are lined w/ old and substantial houses among the owners was Cristina de Knecht who sought to enjoin the government from proceeding w/ the expropriation. It is not disputed that the government may take private property for public use upon just compensation; however, this power cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. The landowners are covered by the mantle of protection of due process. It is odd why the DPWH decided to suddenly change the course of the extension when the previous course through Cuneta Avenue was subject to careful study and consideration. Likewise, the Human Settlements Commission, tasked by the President to investigate the matter, found that the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets was indeed arbitrary and ill-advised. REPUBLIC vs. DE KNECHT last man standing / supervening events / no longer arbitrary A few years after the ruling in De Knecht vs. Bautista, the legislature enacted BP No. 340 expropriating the same properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. However, certain factual changes have taken place. The government has already acquired, though negotiated sale 80% to 85% of the said lands from their respective landowners; only a few landowners including De Knecht vigorously opposed. The social impact w/c persuaded the court to consider the extension arbitrary under the previous ruling has already disappeared. De Knecht remains as the sole obstacle to the project. De Knecht even offered armed resistance through her private guards. If the said property was not to be taken, traffic will continue to clog EDSA and Taft intersections and the drainage and flood control programs would be paralyzed. The Legislature thus no longer acts w/ arbitrariness in deciding to expropriate De Knechts property. According to Justice Cruz, BP No. 340 is not a reversal of the ruling in De Knecht vs. Bautista because this case was tried under a different set of facts. MANOTOK vs. NHA expropriated by Presidential Decree / no proceedings whatsoever LOI No. 555 & 557 declared the Tambunting Estate and Estero de Sunog-Apog blighted communities. PD No. 1669 & 1670 declared the said properties expropriated, and authorized the NHA to immediately possess and control them. The President declared that the actions of the NHA pursuant thereto are beyond review by the courts. The said PDs decreed maximum compensation at P 17 million and P 8 million for the respective properties, payable in 5 annual installments. The 1st annual installments were deposited w/ the PNB; notice was given to the owners of the said properties. Manotok, one of the landowners, assailed the validity of the said PDs. The assailed PDs suffer several constitutional defects. The estates were summarily declared blighted areas and expropriated w/o any proceedings whatsoever. This violates due process for many reasons. The landowners are not afforded the opportunity to be heard, or question the payments or the propriety of the expropriation. The value of the property should also be determined in appropriate proceedings. There is no showing that the said premises are even blighted areas other than the declaration of the President. Expropriation must be exercised based on public necessity. There is no showing why the said properties were singled out for expropriation. At least, expropriations in Congress are attended by debates and deliberations; this was issued by the President w/o justification for the choice of properties sought. Also, private property may not be expropriated for private use, even despite full compensation. The government cannot just take private property and transfer ownership thereof to another private individual. The government has to justify the expropriation on the basis of public use and necessity.

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BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 10
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The Impairment Clause

HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL mortgage moratorium / remedies modified / reserved powers In order to address an economic crisis, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law was passed allowing parties to a contract to judicially avail of postponement of auction sales or extensions of periods of redemption; effective only during the existence of the emergency. It was assailed for allegedly impairing the obligation of contracts. The means of enforcing the debt is material to the obligation; but while the obligation may generally not be impaired, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the legislature may direct, provided substantive rights are not diminished. The prohibition against impairment of obligations of contracts is not absolute. Certain powers are reserved to the State to protect public safety, or in this case, the economic interests. The legislature cannot bargain away the public health or the public morals. They cannot be removed from the regulative powers of the State. The test is whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end, and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate. In this case, there was indeed an economic emergency to be addressed, threatening the massive loss of homes and lands. The law was enacted for the interest of the society and was effective for a limited period only, w/c by all means is not unreasonable. The integrity of the mortgage was not impaired; the conditions and terms attendant to mortgage are preserved except that the remedies are slightly modified. DD: Since impairment of the obligation of contracts is necessarily an exercise of the police power, the standards of substantive due process are applicable. The impairment must be for a valid and lawful purpose, and the means must be reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive. RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN debt moratorium / 8-year period is oppressive / no emergency RA No. 342 provides debtors in contracts entered into prior to World War 2, who have suffered from the ravages of the said war, a period of 8 years to settle their debts upon filing a claim before the Phil. War Damage Commission. The debts cannot be enforced until after the lapse of the said period. The purpose allegedly was to enable the pre-war debtors to rehabilitate themselves and to keep them from being victimized by their creditors. The 8-year period is unreasonable and oppressive. The application of the reserved powers of the State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation, but the restriction must not be unduly burdened w/ conditions or the extensions should not be so piled-up as to make the remedy a shadow. Some of the investments were pending as early as 1941, and the law would require the creditors to wait for some 12 years before they may claim what is due to them. The debtor is not even required to pay legal interest. Further, in the context of the prevailing circumstances, development has spurred after the war as evidenced by national economic developments. The contemplated emergency thus is no longer existent. The said law should thus be struck down. DEL ROSARIO vs. DE LOS SANTOS tenancy-leasehold agreements / social justice Victorino & Tomas de los Santos, as farmer-tenants of landlord Ernesto del Rosario, filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations to take advantage of Sec. 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, w/c empowers the tenant to change the tenancy contract from share tenancy to leasehold and vice versa, and from one crop sharing agreement to another. Del Rosario assailed the validity of the said law for violating the impairment clause. The obligation of contracts must yield to the proper exercise of the police power for a lawful and reasonable purpose provided that the means used are not arbitrary and oppressive. The validity of the measure is beyond question; it is for the improvement of the conditions of the oppressed farmertenants. It is mandated by the social justice provisions of the Constitution. Those who have less in life should have more in law. The means adopted was not arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive. ABELLA vs. NLRC hacienda employees / separation pay / protection of workers Abella leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona for a period of 10 years extended for another 10 years. She hired Dionele and Quitco, who have been employed for 33 and 14 years respectively, both promoted to the position of Cabo. As her lease expired, Abella closed her business and terminated the services of Dionele and Quitco, who then

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demanded overtime pay, reinstatement, and separation pay based on Art. 284 of the Labor Code. The NLRC sustained separation pay but since the cessation of the business was a valid cause for termination, the other remedies were denied. Abella alleges that when she leased the Hacienda, she and the lessor never contemplated any separation pay to workers at the end of the lease. The impairment clause is not absolute; it only prohibits impairment that is unreasonable. Appropriate legislation may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect, provided that there is a lawful purpose to justify it, and the means employed is legitimate. The purpose of the law, in this case, is obvious: to afford protection to the workers. The means employed is likewise not unreasonable or oppressive. Also, to come under the prohibition, the law must affect the rights of the parties among each other and not w/ reference to third parties. Even though Dionele and Quitco were absorbed by the new management, there is no showing that the new management absorbed the responsibilities of the former; thus they are deemed terminated from previous employment and employed as new workers under the new management. Thus they are entitled to separation pay. VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES vs. PHIL. VETERANS BANK power to regulate banking system The Phil. Veterans Bank, created under special law, was placed under receivership by virtue of Res. No. 334 of the Monetary Board, w/c eventually ordered its liquidation. It was opposed by the Phi. Veterans Bank Employees as well as the Veterans Federation of the Phils. alleging that the Bank was created under special law and a contract now exists between the government and its stockholders (veterans), and to disturb that relation would violate the Impairment Clause. Even assuming that the charter created a contract between the government and the stockholders, it does not follow that the relationship cannot be altered altogether. The Central Bank Act expressly empowered the Central Bank to regulate the banking system and to step in and salvage the remaining assets of the Bank to prevent their further dissipation. Contracts cannot, by express agreement, fetter the authority of Congress. It is the duty of the government to preserve the public faith in the banking system. The mere fact that the Bank was created under special law does not confer upon it extraordinary privileges above those granted to other banks w/ similar charters. DD: Non-impairment is now actually the exception rather than the general rule, because all contracts somehow affect the public interest and thus cannot be severed from the police power. Better stated, the rule now is that Congress may impair any obligation, provided that it is done for a lawful purpose and carried out through reasonable means. ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK zoning regulation / valid purpose and means Ortigas & Co. was selling lots, particularly those of Highway Subdivision Hills, along EDSA. It sold Lots 5 & 6 to Augusto Padilla, who transferred his rights to Emma Chavez. The sale was subject to the condition that the said lots were to be used exclusively for residential purposes. The conditions were annotated in the respective TCTs. The lots later were acquired by Feati Bank w/c started to build a Bank; Ortigas sought to enjoin the construction. Feati alleges that Resolution No. 27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declared the said area (including Lots 5 & 6) a commercial and industrial zone. Ortigas asserts that the Resolution impairs the obligation of contracts. The non-impairment clause is not absolute; it must be reconciled w/ the exercise of the police power of the State. The Local Autonomy Act empowered the LGUs to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and regulations. It does not even require an ordinance for a mere resolution suffices. The Resolution was enacted for a valid purpose, w/c was to promote the development of the area into a commercial district; and the means used to carry it out were neither arbitrary nor oppressive. In fact, the lots front EDSA, where industrial and commercial complexes have flourished already. JUAREZ vs. CA rental regulation / housing problem / public interest BP No. 877 was enacted regulating rental rates, especially in urban areas. It prevents the lessor from increasing the rentals arbitrarily, and at the same time prevents the lessee from insisting on paying inordinately low rentals. It covered all residential units w/ a monthly rental less than P 480 and applied retroactively. Juarez assails its constitutionality on the basis of the impairment clause. Housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country and the lease of residential units affects the public welfare; thus the police power prevails over the impairment clause in this case in the absence of arbitrariness. Most private contracts nowadays have for their subject matter things necessarily imbued w/ public interest and are thus subject to the police power of the State. CITY OF SAN PABLO vs. MERALCO franchise tax / local autonomy / taxing power San Pablo imposed a local franchise tax upon Meralco through Ordinance No. 56. Meralco asserts that it enjoys tax exemptions based on its franchise. The Local Government Code empowers the LGUs to impose franchise taxes notwithstanding any exemption granted by law. The franchise tax is thus imposable in spite of any exemption either under general or special law. The purpose of the LGC is to further the constitutional policy

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of local autonomy and to enable the LGUs to attain the fullest development as self-reliant communities. Thus it does not violate the impairment clause; franchises are subject to alterations through the reasonable exercise of the police power. Further, the power to tax, like police power, cannot be bargained away by the legislature.

Additional Case
CHAVEZ vs. COMELEC product endorsements / pre-mature campaigning Frank Chavez entered into endorsement contracts w/ the 96 North, Konka International Plastics, and G-Box companies for the advertisement of the latters products. As a r esult 3 billboards were erected along the Balintawak Interchange of North Expressway bearing his name and picture endorsing the products of the said companies. Based on Res. No. 6520, the COMELEC ordered Chavez to remove the said billboards. The said provision requires the removal of posters, streamers, and other forms of media bearing the name or picture of candidates for public office w/in 3 days after its effectivity. The objective of the Resolution is to prevent pre-mature campaigning and to level the playing field between candidates w/ substantial war chests and those who are less wealthy. Chavez assails the validity of the said Resolution based on the impairment clause (among other grounds). The impairment clause is not absolute and must be reconciled w/ the police power of the State. In this case, the Legislature, through the Omnibus Election Code, expressly empowered the COMELEC to prohibit pre-mature campaigning, either directly or indirectly. The moment Chavez filed his certificate of candidacy, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed a partisan political character; and brought Chavez under the coverage of the prohibition. It amounts to indirect campaigning. The Omnibus Election Code and the Implementing Rules of the COMELEC are enacted for a valid purpose, w/c is to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and to level the playing field among candidates for public office; this particular means to carry out the objective is neither arbitrary nor oppressive.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 11
Section 11. Free access to courts and to quasi -judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

Free Access to Courts, Quasi-Judicial Bodies, and Adequate Legal Assistance

MIJARES vs. JAVIER-RANADA P 472 million docket fee! The petitioners in this case represent the human rights victims during martial law. They were able to secure a favorable judgment in the US District Court of Hawaii, w/c rendered a final judgment awarding them some $ 1.9 billion from the Marcos Estate. They thus filed a petition before the Makati RTC praying for the execution of the said judgment. They paid P 410.00 in docket and filing fees; the Marcos heirs contested invoking SC Circular No. 7 pertaining to the proper computation of filing fees. On the basis thereof, the Makati RTC assessed and required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of P 472 million. Thus, they appeal to the Supreme Court. The ruling is patently unjust. To preclude the filing an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment due to exorbitant assessment of docket fees runs afoul to the general principles of justice as well as international law. The respondent judge should have relied on Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in assessing the docket fees, the action falling under the category all other actions not involving property. Thus, only the minimal blanket filing fee should be required. The free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. This is provision gives rise to a demandable right as part of the guarantees under the Bill of Rights.

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BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 12
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of t his section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Rights under Custodial Investigation

MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA The Miranda Rights In this case, the US Supreme Court examined and discussed the common practice of ominously securing extra-judicial and incriminating confessions from persons under custodial investigation. The accused was placed in a secluded room w/ no access to the outside, in an obviously police-dominated atmosphere. Interrogators are often directed to use trickery or threat to extract confessions. The persons are misinformed that their refusal to talk may suggest guilt. The person is deprived of any outside support; his will is undermined and he is led into affirming a preconceived story concocted by the police. Many people succumb to this tactic and render self-incriminating statements. The US Supreme Court laid down the following rules to be observed during custodial investigation: 1. 2. 3. 4. The person must be informed of his right to remain silent That any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him That he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed Any waiver should be made voluntarily and knowingly

Evidence obtained in violation thereof is inadmissible. The said rules intend to protect the person against self-incrimination and to keep the arresting officers from taking short-cuts to secure convictions. The rules intend to preserve the publics faith in the justice system. MAGTOTO vs. MANGUERA prospective effect Two persons under custodial investigation were not informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel; extra judicial admissions were obtained therefrom. The said investigation took place before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution where no such right had yet existed. The Constitutional provisions on the right to remain silent and to counsel, as well as the right to be informed of such, are to be applied prospectively. Since the confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, then the admissions are still admissible as evidence, even if they were presented thereafter. Had the admissions been obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they would have been inadmissible. PEOPLE vs. MAHINAY Updated set of rights The following rules must be complied with while the accused is under custodial investigation, he must be informed of: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The reason for his arrest and must be shown the warrant His right to remain silent His right to counsel, preferably of his own choice That if he has no lawyer, one will be provided for him That no custodial investigation can be conducted except in the presence of counsel

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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

That at any time he is allowed to confer w/ his lawyer, immediate family, priest, etc. That he may waive the said rights knowingly and intelligently That should he waive such right, it must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel That he may refuse, at any stage of the process, to answer interrogations That any previous waiver of such rights is not a bar to invoking them again That any evidence obtained in violation of such rules is inadmissible against him

PEOPLE vs. TAYLARAN the granny killer / voluntary surrender / no custodial investigation yet Taylaran surrendered to the police and admitted to Pat. Basilad that he killed a certain Ofremia Atup (an old woman) because of her alleged vow to kill him through witchcraft. The confession was made even before the police investigation could be initiated. He now questions the admissibility of the said confession for not having complied w/ the constitutionally mandated procedure. The statement was not made while under custodial investigation; hence the statement is admissible and Section 12 does not yet operate. The constitutional safeguards thus cannot yet be invoked. He voluntarily admitted the killing for the exact purpose of surrendering to the police. PEOPLE vs. JUDGE AYSON statement during administrative proceedings Felipe Ramos was a PAL ticket freight clerk. He was investigated for irregularities in the sale of plane tickets. He executed a handwritten statement during the investigation saying that he is willing to settle the irregularities charged against him. It was not executed in the presence of or w/ the assistance of a lawyer, nor was he informed of his right to remain silent. He was then charged for estafa. He assails the validity of the statements he made during the administrative investigation for violating his right against self-incrimination and his Miranda Rights. While the right against self-incrimination may be invoked during civil, administrative, or criminal proceedings, the Miranda Rights apply only to persons under custodial investigation for the commission of offenses. The person must be taken into custody or must otherwise be deprived of liberty in a significant way. The abovementioned statement was not made under custodial investigation; thus is not protected by the Miranda Doctrine. Ramos even voluntarily answered the said questions during the administrative investigation. There is a different set of rights for persons once the case is filed in court , such as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. Right to refuse to testify Right not to be prejudiced as a result of his refusal Right to testify in his own behalf subject to cross examination Once he testified, the right against self-incrimination for other offenses than those for w/c he is being prosecuted

DD: The rights under prosecution are discussed extensively under Section 14. PEOPLE vs. MARRA spontaneous statement / admissible Sgt. De Vera reported to crime scene to conduct an investigation and was informed that a man wearing a security guards uniform perpet rated the incident. He was directed to Marra who was eating in a nearby carinderia. Marra informed him that his gun was at his house. They proceeded to the house. De Vera asked Marra why he killed Tandoc, but the later initially denied. Eventually though, he admitted the same and claimed self-defense. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he informed of his Miranda Rights. The admissibility of the admission was thus questioned in this case. Marra was not under custodial investigation when he made the statement; thus they are admissible in evidence even if Marra has not been informed of his rights. He was never subjected to any form of restraint. Marra could have validly refused to answer the questions from the very start, instead he the statement spontaneously; De Vera was merely probing the possibilities. DD: Take note that Marra was not deprived of liberty and he made the confession spontaneously. PEOPLE vs. MAQUEDA Miranda Rights / any time prior to arraignment / admission vs. confession Maqueda was prosecuted for the commission of an offense; evidence adduced against him included (1) a Sinumpaang Salaysay as well as (2) extra-judicial admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate for the purpose of negotiating his privileges as a possible state witness. The Sinumpaang Salaysay was not made in the presence of counsel and was executed after Maqueda has been arrested and prior to arraignment. As opposed to the ruling in People vs. Judge Ayson, the Miranda Rights cover not only custodial investigations, but also apply to persons not in custody at any time prior to arraignment. Thus the Sinumpaang Salaysay, executed prior to arraignment, is inadmissible as evidence for not having been executed w/ assistance from counsel. The Sinumpaang Salaysay, however, was merely an extra-

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judicial admission, NOT an extra-judicial confession. An admission pertains only to pertinent facts, while a confession is a declaration by the accused of his own guilt. The admissions before the prosecutor, however, are admissible. They were made freely and voluntarily and not during the course of an investigation but merely for the purpose negotiating immunity as a state witness. They are not covered by the exclusionary rule under the Bill of Rights. PEOPLE vs. BALISTEROS Miranda Rights are personal Galvante executed a sworn statement under pressure categorically admitting guilt w/o the assistance of counsel and in the presence of the opposing counsel, the brothers of the deceased (whom he allegedly killed), and a stranger. The appellants (not Galvante, but other accuseds) assail the validity of Galvantes confession as having been made in violation of the Miranda Rights. The objection can only be raised by the confessant or the person whose rights have been violated, and not by other persons. The right is a personal right. DD: Simply put, an extra-judicial admission or confession made by the confessant in violation of the Miranda Rights is inadmissible as evidence against him (confessant), but is admissible against other persons. GAMBOA vs. JUDGE CRUZ police line-up / vagrancy / no interrogation Gamboa was arrested and detained w/o warrant for vagrancy. He was lined up w/ 5 detainees and the complainant pointed to him saying that ones a companion. He was then made to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being interrogated. The line-up was made w/o the presence of counsel; thus its validity is being assailed. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of investigation, when the officers start to interrogate and elicit information or confessions from the accused. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence no right to counsel yet attaches. Gamboa did not have to give any statement to the police nor was he interrogated. It was actually the complainant who was being interrogated by the police. However, the moment that there is even a slight move to elicit information, then the accused should then be assisted by counsel. PEOPLE vs. LOVERIA police line-up / hold-up men / no custodial investigation Upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained, Manzanero proceeded to the detention facility and identified to Pat. Bill Ayun the perpetrator Loveria during a police line-up. He made a sworn statement to that effect w/c was presented in court. Loveria was not entitled to counsel yet when he was in the process of being identified, because at that time he was not being interrogated. The Miranda Rights may only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation, w/c Loveria was not. PEOPLE vs. DIMAANO same thing A confrontation was arranged by the Caloocan City Police between the complainant and her witnesses and the alleged perpetrators for the purpose of identification. The person had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense; there was still no confrontation between the State and the individual. A police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest; hence no right to counsel yet accrues. PEOPLE vs. HATTON line-up / may be part of custodial investigation / but not in this case Hatton was subjected to a police line-up and invokes US vs. Wade in asserting that his Miranda Rights, particularly to counsel, were violated. In the case of US vs. Wade, a lawyer was present during the police line-up to be identified by the prosecution witness. In the Wade Case, even if he was subjected to a police line-up, such line-up was already part of the custodial investigation because Wade was also being interrogated; thus his right to counsel accrued. It was conducted already 15 days after his arrest. In this case, Hatton was only brought for the purpose of identification by a witness for the killing of Algarme; hence he was not yet under custodial investigation. PEOPLE vs. FRAGO line-up / exception inapplicable / no peculiar circumstances here Orlando Frago was identified by a certain Jicelyn during a police line-up composing of 10 men; most of them were mustachioed. He invokes People vs. Hassan asserting that he ought to have been assisted by counsel during the police line-up. In the Hassan Case, there was a peculiar factual milieu. Hassan was the only person brought for identification, w/c was held in the funeral parlor, amidst the grieving relatives of the victim. It is as tainted as an uncounselled confession. As a result, what purported to be a mere identification was actually a confrontation; hence Hassan had the right to counsel. No such facts are attendant in this case. In short, the Hassan Case was attended by exceptional and anomalous circumstances. In this case, there was nothing to show that during the police line-up, the police sought to extract any information from Frago; hence his right to counsel had yet to accrue.

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DD: From the foregoing we deduce the general rule that police lineups are not part of custodial investigation because the accused is not asked questions. He just has to be identified. But from the moment he is interrogated or asked questions pertaining to the crime, the right to counsel attaches. PEOPLE vs. GAMBOA paraffin test / not testimonial compulsion / no right to counsel Gamboa was subjected to a paraffin test to determine if he indeed had fired a gun. The results turned out positive. He asserts that he should have been assisted by counsel and that it amounts to self-incrimination. The rights against self-incrimination as well as the right to counsel extend only to testimonial compulsion, and not when the body of the accused is examined. PEOPLE vs. LINSANGAN marked money / not basis for liability / no self-incrimination Linsangan initialed the P 10.00 bills found tucked in his waist w/o the presence of counsel. He acquired the marked money for the sale of marijuana during a buy-bust operation. His possession of the marked bills did not constitute the crime; what constituted the crime was his act of selling marijuana. Thus his right against self-incrimination was not violated by his possession of the marked bills. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. PEOPLE vs. DE LAS MARIAS Receipt signed by accused / right to remain silent De Las Marias and Torres were made to sign a Receipt for Property Seized, acknowledging that they are the owners of the things seized in connection w/ the commission of a felony . It was a clear violation of the right to remain silent because it had the effect of an extrajudicial confession of the commission of the offense albeit not verbally expressed. They practically admitted possessing certain articles in connection w/ an offense. It should be the police who should have signed the receipts, not the accused. It was merely a clever ploy to incriminate the suspects. PEOPLE vs. ENRIQUE signed name in marijuana sticks/ tantamount to admission During investigation, Enrique was made to sign his name on rolled marijuana cigarettes w/o the assistance of counsel. The arresting officers did not even inform him of his Miranda Rights. In effect, the act was obviously tantamount to an admission in clear violation of the Constitution. PEOPLE vs. BANDIN Booking Sheet / mere record / not basis for conviction Bandin was arrested for possession of drugs. He signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at the Station. He also signed the Receipt of Property Seized w/o the assistance of counsel. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accuseds being booked as well as the date of his arrest. It cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be the basis for a judgment of conviction. The accuseds signature on the Receipt (seizure of drugs) was tantamount to an admission because mere possession of drugs is a crime in itself. It was an extra-judicial and uncounselled admission made in clear violation of the Bill of Rights. ESTACIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN waiver of rights / last minute arrival of lawyer / ratified While Estacio was under investigation, he was briefed by the investigator of his rights under custodial investigation. When asked if he wished to waive the said rights, he agreed and signed a waiver. He then proceeded to make certain extra-judicial statements. Then, his lawyer, at the last minute, arrived, read the waiver, and confirmed w/ Estacio whether indeed he sought to waive his rights. Estacio confirmed the waiver. While the accused was validly informed of his rights, the waiver was initially invalid for having been made w/o the presence of counsel. However, when his counsel arrived at the last minute and Estacio signed the waiver in his presence, the defect was cured. The statements were thus held admissible as evidence. DD: This ruling no longer holds under the present state of law. Counsel must be present at every stage of the investigation, not only during the closing stages as will be illustrated by the next cases. PEOPLE vs. DE JESUS reduced to writing w/ counsel / right accrues at start of investigation Tupaz and De Jesus were turned over to the investigating officer by the CID for investigation. They were interrogated w/o the presence of counsel for a certain robbery hold-up w/ homicide. The facts and statements were reduced in writing and signed in the presence of a CLAO lawyer, Atty. Saldivar. The right to counsel attaches from the START of the custodial investigation, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or confessions from the accused. Thus, there was a clear violation of the accuseds right to counsel in this case and the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible. The Constitutional requirement was not sufficiently satisfied. DD: This is the more accurate rule as opposed to the Estacio Case provided above.

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PEOPLE vs. BOLANOS confession on board police jeep / already custodial investigation While Bolanos and Magtibay were boarded in the police jeep, and on their way to the station, Bolanos confessed killing the victim. This was the only evidence relied upon to convict him. As Bolanos was already on board the police jeep, he was already under custodial investigation and should have been informed of his Miranda Rights already. Given that the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible, the accused must be acquitted. DD: From the moment the accused is in any way significantly deprived of liberty, he cannot be asked questions unless he is assisted by counsel and was well informed of his rights. Otherwise, any confession or admission made by him is inadmissible. PEOPLE vs. LUCERO left by lawyer during interrogation / denial of right to competent counsel While Lucero was under custodial investigation, he was provided w/ a lawyer from the CIS Legal Department (Atty. Peralta). Peralta explained all his rights under custodial investigation and stated that even had he made certain statements therein, he could still refuse to sign the same. Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood. When the investigation started, Atty. Peralta then left to attend the wake of his friend and gave word that should he be needed, he could be reached at his residence. The next day, Lucero, accompanied by CIS agents arrived at Peraltas residence carrying a signed statement by Lucero. Peralta explained the implications of such statements but Lucero nevertheless consented thereto. Later, Lucero claimed that he signed the statement under duress and in the absence of his lawyer. When the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it means effective and vigilant counsel. Peralta left the accused during the most crucial point of the investigation. The result was an uncounselled confession. The right to counsel attaches from the start of the investigation. In this case, Lucero was practically denied his right to competent legal counsel. PEOPLE vs. PAJORINOG choice of lawyer / acquiescence Pajorinog, who was arrested for triple murder, claims that the lawyer assigned to him, Atty. Fuentes, was not of his choice and was only forced upon him. The evidence however reveals that Atty. Fuentes was nevertheless w/ him throughout the investigation; he complained regarding the matter only during trial. While the initial choice of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused has the final choice and may reject the same and ask for a new lawyer. However, in this case, all throughout the proceedings, the accused never voiced any objection as to the choice of his counsel. He thus acquiesced to the choice of the investigators and raised the matter only during trial, which was too late. DD: From the foregoing, it is clear that while generally the choice of counsel devolves upon the accused, the investigators may provide him w/ counsel if he consents thereto. If he distrusts the counsel appointed, he has the right to refuse and may request counsel of his own choosing. However, if he acquiesces or does not object to the counsel appointed, and the latter performs his duties properly, the accused cannot, all of a sudden, aver that his right to choice of counsel was violated. Definitely, the matter cannot be raised only during trial. PEOPLE vs. PAMON lawyer appointed by investigator / conformity of confessor / valid confession Pamon asserts that Atty. Ligorio was not his choice of counsel and that he was merely forced to sign a paper w/c turned out to be a letter to Atty. Ligorio. Atty. Ligorio, however, was present during the time when Pamons confession was made and sworn to and has participated nonetheless during the investigation. If the counsel is appointed by the investigators, generally, admissions made before said counsel are inadmissible unless the appointment was made w/ the conformity of the confessor. The rule is otherwise if the accused acquiesced to the choice of counsel. Pamon never signified that he had a lawyer of choice, hence he was merely provided w/ one and he clearly acquiesced thereto. PEOPLE vs. BAELLO failure to ask for new counsel While Baello was under custodial investigation, he stated that he could not afford the services of a lawyer; hence he was provided w/ one in Atty. Generoso. No objection was voiced by Baello during the entire proceedings. Atty. Generoso informed him in detail of his rights and the implications of his confessions. He even advised against such but Baello insisted in confessing to robbery. Baello later on asserts that he was not fully and duly assisted by counsel engaged by him. Every lawyer is presumed to be knowledgeable about the law as well as training in procedure. Baellos failure to request for new counsel during the proceedings negates his claim for denial of the right to choose his lawyer. PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN Ilocano farmer / lawyer foisted upon accused / associate of the fiscal Agustin, a farmer who understood only Ilocano, was unlawfully arrested by military officers and was taken into custody for investigation. He asserted that he wished to be assisted by counsel; automatically Atty. Cajucom was foisted upon him and was to represent him. Atty. Cajucom was an associate of the prosecutor in charge of interrogating him. Cajucom informed him of his rights in English and Tagalog. He was interrogated in the

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presence of military officers. An extra-judicial confession was extracted from him under threat where he attested that he knew a certain Jun and Sonny and had participated in the crime. Atty. Cajucom could not have possibly been voluntarily and intelligently accepted by the accused. Atty. Cajucom was merely foisted upon him. I t is even doubtful if he understood Atty. Cajucoms briefings in English and Tagalog and there are likewise special circumstances w/c cast doubt upon the integrity of his representation being a close associate of the fiscal. The extra-judicial admissions (not confessions) are thus inadmissible as evidence and they being the sole basis for conviction, the accused must be acquitted. PEOPLE vs. BALISTEROS Miranda Rights are personal Galvante executed a sworn statement under pressure categorically admitting guilt w/o the assistance of counsel and in the presence of the opposing counsel, the brothers of the deceased (whom he allegedly killed), and a stranger. The appellants (not Galvante, but other accuseds) assail the validity of Galvantes confession as having been made in violation of the Miranda Rights. The objection can only be raised by the confessant or the person whose rights have been violated, and not by other persons. The right is a personal right. DD: Simply put, an extra-judicial admission or confession made by the confessant in violation of the Miranda Rights is inadmissible as evidence against him (confessant), but is admissible against other persons. PEOPLE vs. GUILLERMO cavalier treatment of constitutional requirements Guillermo was sentenced to death for the murder of a certain Keyser. Upon being arrested he was only made to read his rights posted in the wall, he was not provided counsel (allegedly because it was a Sunday and there were no lawyers in touch), and there was no showing of any waiver of the said rights other than the fact that he said that he regrets nothing. These facts are actually affirmed upon testimony by the arresting officer SPO1 Reyes. In short, the arresting officers made no serious effort to comply w/ the constitutional requirements. A confession, in order to be admissible must be: 1. 2. 3. 4. Voluntarily made Made w/ the assistance of counsel Expressly made It must be in writing

There was no showing that Guillermo waived his rights; but even if he so intended, the waiver is still invalid because it was not made in the presence of counsel. The right to be informed likewise entails an obligation on the part of the investigators to explain the said rights and ensure that the accused understood the same. However, even assuming that his extra-judicial admissions during custodial investigation are inadmissible, Guillermo spontaneously made confessions to private individuals. Such evidence is admissible. PEOPLE vs. MOJELLO right to counsel / final choice / acquiescence When the accused is granted the right to counsel preferably of his own choice it does not preclude other equally competent lawyers from handling his case. Otherwise, the accused could impede the progress of investigations. The initial choice is lodged w/ the investigators, but the final choice is the accuseds. If the accused fails to object to the appointment of his lawyer during the course of the investigation, or subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer, then the accused is deemed to have acquiesced thereto. PEOPLE vs. SAYABOC silent lawyer / violation of right to competent counsel Sayaboc was convicted for the murder of Joseph Galam. During the custodial investigation, he was represented by PAO lawyer Atty. Cornejo who remained silent during the entire proceedings. As a result, Sayaboc made extra-judicial admissions that led to his conviction. Extra-judicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary provided that the prosecution establishes that all constitutional safeguards are complied with. Sayaboc was not afforded his right to competent legal counsel. It is Atty. Cornejos task to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions at each stage of the proceeding. He should be aware when his client ought to remain silent and advise the same. Instead. Atty. Cornejo just remained silent all throughout. If the advice given is useless, then the voluntariness of the accuseds confe ssion is impaired. The court likewise found a violation of the right to be informed. The investigating officers merely mechanically recited the said rights to the accused w/o making sure if the latter understood the same. It should allow the suspect to contemplate the consequences of his actions. The same especially applies in the case at bar, where Sayaboc finished only Grade 4.

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PEOPLE vs. MARLENE OLERMO absent lawyers / right to choose counsel not absolute Marlene Olermo was first represented by Atty. Domingo, since Atty. Yuseco, her counsel of choice, was in Cagayan. During subsequent trials, she was represented de officio by Atty. Perez, because her preferred lawyers were likewise unavailable. This prejudiced her case; and she then asserts that she was deprived her right to competent legal counsel because her lawyers were not familiar w/ her case. When the accused is granted the right to counsel preferably of his own choice it does not preclude other equally competent lawyers from handling his case. Otherwise, the accused could impede the judicial process by choosing lawyers who are unavailable just as in the present case. PEOPLE vs. PINLAC right to information / must be explained and understood The right to be informed is complied w/ not merely by mechanically and ceremonially reciting to the accused the constitutional provisions, the investigator must also explain the effects of the same in simple and practical terms. The accused must be made to understand the implications of his actions. The rights of persons under custodial investigation are reiterated: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. The reason for his arrest and must be shown the warrant His right to remain silent His right to counsel, preferably of his own choice That if he has no lawyer, one will be provided for him That no custodial investigation can be conducted except in the presence of counsel That at any time he is allowed to confer w/ his lawyer, immediate family, priest, etc. His right to waive the said rights knowingly and intelligently That should he waive such right, it must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel That he may refuse, at any stage of the process, to answer interrogations That any previous waiver of such rights is not a bar to invoking them again That any evidence obtained in violation of such rules is inadmissible

PEOPLE vs. ROUS right to remain silent / waiver w/o counsel / may be ratified Even if the waiver of the right to remain silent was not made in the presence of counsel, the same may be ratified when the lawyer arrived at the closing stage of the investigation and verified w/ the accused whether or not he understood the implications and the accused nevertheless decided to proceed w/ the admission. DD: Under the present state of law, counsel must be present at every stage of the investigation.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 13
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Right to Bail
PEOPLE vs. NITCHA appeal / right vs. discretion Facts are not provided. Even if the accused has posted bail, once the decision of conviction is promulgated, the accused is subject to re-incarceration. Bail must not be granted during the pendency of appeal, because it implies that the trial court established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Rules to remember: 1. 2. Bail is a matter of right if the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. If the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, bail is a matter of discretion depending on whether evidence of guilt is strong.

DD: Under the present state of law, when the case is on appeal, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

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CARDINES vs. ROSETE illegal recruitment / life imprisonment / bailable under 1985 Rules Judge Rosete is being charged for misconduct and ignorance of the law for granting bail to Erlie & Emilio Claro, both charged for illegal recruitment in large scale constituting economic sabotage, punishable by life imprisonment under the Labor Code. The applicable law then was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the said rules, the only exceptions for denying the right to bail are offenses punishable by capital punishment, or reclusion perpetua in both cases evidence of guilt must be strong. There was no mention of life imprisonment. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous. Reclusion perpetua is covered by the Revised Penal Code, has a definite duration, and has accessory penalties; life imprisonment is covered by special laws, and has neither a definite duration nor accessory penalties. Thus the accuseds are entitled to bail. DD: Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amended the said rules; life imprisonment is no longer bailable provided evidence of guilt is strong, but the same cannot apply retroactively as it is not favorable to the accused. PADERANGA vs. CA must be under custody / constructive custody When Ely Roxas was implicated for multiple murder, his counsel was Miguel Paderanga, his former employer. Strangely, Roxas implicated Paderanga alleging that he was the mastermind behind the Bucag Massacre. An arrest warrant was issued for Paderanga but before the same can be served, he filed a Motion for Admission to Bail. He was, however, then confined in a hospital and manifested that he was submitting himself to the custody of the law; the prosecution offered no objection. He managed to appear before the court to post bail as well as attend the hearings. Bail cannot be posted unless custody is acquired, either through arrest or voluntary surrender. Its purpose is to relieve the accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction, and yet secure appearance during trial. While it is true that Paderanga posted bail before he was actually arrested, nevertheless, given the factual circumstances, he was constructively under custody. He voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of the law and the jurisdiction of the trial court. Given that the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, the grant of bail is discretionary upon the court depending on the strength of evidence. A trial, summary in nature, must thus be held so that the prosecution may present evidence, and the court must justify the grant or denial of bail based on the evidence. YAP vs. CA P 5.5 million bail / excessive Francisco Yap was convicted by the trial court for estafa; he appealed the decision and prayed for provisional liberty pending appeal. The court required him to post bail amounting to P 5.5 million corresponding to the amount he allegedly embezzled. He was also required to secure a certification from the mayor that he was a resident of that area, and that should he transfer, he should inform the court and the complainant. He prays that the amount be reduced to P 40,000 according to the Bail Bond Guide, but the appellate court denied his petition. The apparent rationale is to prevent him from leaving the country during the pendency of the case considering that he himself admitted having gone out several times. While the condition requiring him to present a mayors certification is reasonable, the amount of bail is clearly excessive. Imposing excessive bail renders illusory the right to bail altogether. The Supreme Court reduced the amount of the bail to P 200,000.00. NARCISO vs. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ parricide / hearing is mandatory / duties of the judge Narciso was charged w/ parricide, punishable by reclusion perpetua. He was granted bail by the trial court only 10 minutes after he filed his motion to post bail. The prosecution objects. In order to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong, a hearing is necessary whether summary or otherwise. This affords the prosecution the opportunity to submit the evidence before the court. Ten minutes could not have possibly been sufficient to receive or evaluate any evidence. The judge practically denied the complainant the opportunity to be heard, in violation of due process. The following are the duties of the trial judge in an application for bail when the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, capital punishment, or life imprisonment: 1. 2. 3. 4. To inform the prosecution or require him to submit a recommendation To conduct a hearing, even if the prosecution refuses or fails to present evidence Decide if evidence of guilt is strong based on the evidence presented Approve or deny provisional liberty based on the strength of the evidence

PEOPLE vs. CABRAL evident guilt / great presumption / reviewable by the SC Cabral was charged w/ rape qualified w/ the use of deadly weapon w/c is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The grant of bail is thus discretionary upon the court depending on whether evidence of guilt is strong. The test is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether the evidence shows evident guilt or great presumption of guilt depending on the facts, circumstances, and evidence presented. While the

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same is discretionary upon the trial courts, the SC will not hesitate to overturn the decision of there is grave abuse of discretion. Evident proof means clear and strong evidence w/c leads a well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed and the accused is the guilty agent and that he will be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances manifest a strong and convincing inference of guilt excluding any other probable conclusion. SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN arraignment is not a prerequisite to bail The Sandiganbayan erred in ordering the arraignment of Serapio before proceeding w/ the hearing for bail. As soon as a person is deprived of liberty, either through arrest or surrender, the right to bail accrues. He need not await arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In case the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, capital punishment, or life imprisonment, the petition for bail may be heard ahead of arraignment. US vs. JUDGE PURUGANAN Mark Jimenez / extradition is not criminal in nature / no bail While his case was pending in the US, Mark Jimenez fled to the Phils. Thus, the US seeks to extradite him. During the extradition proceedings, Jimenez applied for bail. Extradition proceedings are sui generis. They are not criminal proceedings w/c call into operation the rights of the accused under the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to bail does not accrue. The only question that has to be resolved in such proceedings is whether he is extraditable and the extraditing country complied w/ the treaty. It is only a measure of international judicial assistance, usually summary in nature, and requires merely a prima facie case. Final discretion lies w/ the President. It is not concerned w/ his guilt or innocence, w/c will be tried separately by the extraditing country. Further, Jimenez has demonstrated the capacity and will to flee, w/c is precisely what the Extradition Treaty guards against. The general rule is that in extradition proceedings, bail is NOT a matter of right. It may only be granted as an exception if: 1. 2. The defendant can demonstrate that he is not a flight risk, and Exceptional, humanitarian, or compelling circumstances.

Jimenez bears the burden of proving the existence of any of the 2 exceptions. Dissent of Justice Puno From the moment a person is arrested, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights operate, including his right to bail. This is more in accord w/ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. PEOPLE vs. JUDGE DONATO & RODOLFO SALAS if matter of right, no hearing needed / waiver Rodolfo Salas, along w/ Josefina Cruz & Jose Conception were arrested and charged for robbery. At that time, the applicable law prescribed a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. EO No. 187 was enacted w/c reduced the penalty to prision mayor, thus making the same a bailable offense. In this case, bail has become a matter of right. If bail is a matter of right, the prosecution loses the right to present evidence for the denial thereof. The court has also repeatedly held that the right to bail may be availed even during the pendency of the appeal. However, the court erred in fixing the bond to P 30,000 and then later changing it to P 50,000 w/o hearing the prosecution. There are guidelines that must be complied with. To this extent, a hearing should be held but only for the purpose of determining the amount of bail. However, the right to bail can be waived; and there is such a waiver in this case made by Rodolfo Salas. A compromise was entered into whereby the arrest warrants for Cruz & Conception were to be lifted but Salas was to remain in legal custody. Custody means nothing less than physical custody. Such a waiver is not contrary to law, good customs, public order, and public policy and is not prejudicial to any third person. The right to bail is a personal right. The waiver was intelligently and knowingly entered into and w/ the assistance of counsel. DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE mayor / murders / excessive bail / guidelines for computing Mayor Ricardo de la Camara of Magsaysay, Misamis was arrested for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. He applied for bail claiming that there was no evidence to link him to the crime. The prosecution failed to present evidence but Judge Enage fixed the bail at some P 1.2 million. De la Camara assailed the order of the judge; however, he later escaped from jail. His petition to nullify the said order has thus become moot. Nevertheless, the court found that the amount of bail fixed was clearly excessive. It has the effect of rendering nugatory or illusory the right to bail. At most, the bail should have been fixed at P 50,000.00, P25,000.00 for each charge. The following rules must be considered in fixing the amount of bail:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Ability of the accused to give bail Nature of the offense Penalty for the offense charged Character and reputation of the accused Health of the accused Character and strength of evidence Probability for the accused to appear on trial Forfeiture of other bonds Whether accused was a fugitive when arrested If the accused is under bond for appearance in other cases

Additional Case
RODRIGUEZ vs. JUDGE extradition / cancellation of bail, notice & hearing / not flight risk / special circumstances Eduardo and Imelda Rodriguez offered themselves for voluntary extradition; they posted a cash bond worth P 1 million each. They were granted bail by the trial court. The US government moved for reconsideration; the SC directed the trial court to decide the matter based on the outcome of the Mark Jimenez Case. Following the ruling therein, the trial court cancelled the bail without prior notice and hearing and issued the corresponding warrants of arrest. Eduardo, meanwhile was already in the US attending to his case, thus the case is moot as far as he is concerned. It is Imeldas case that stands to be affected by this decision. The cancellation of Imeldas bail, w/o prior notice and hearing, is a violation of her right to due process. She is not a flight risk and does not pose any danger to the community; hence her bail could not be cancelled w/o notice and hearing. While, it is true that notice and hearing is not required before issuance of a warrant of arrest for extradition cases because it would only tip the extraditee and cause him to flee, the same principle does not apply here. Special circumstances must be considered. Imelda is in her sixties and under medical treatment, she offered herself for voluntary extradition, she surrendered her passport and there is an existing holddeparture order against her. She falls clearly w/in the 2 exceptions where a bail may be granted to an extraditee: (1) she is not a flight risk, and (2) the attendance of special and humanitarian considerations such as her health and age. DD: A flight risk is a person who demonstrates the capacity and the will to escape.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 14
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

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Rights under Prosecution

OLAGUER vs. MILITARY COMMISSION military tribunals / judicial power / due process Olaguer and several others were arrested and charged for subversion and several other crimes before a Military Tribunal created under martial law. The military tribunal found them guilty only after a 25 minute recess and sentenced them to death. They filed a case for habeas corpus and sought to enjoin the military tribunal from trying their case. The due process clause of the Constitution contemplates trial by JUDICIAL process. The military tribunals are not part of the judicial system but rather fall under the Executive Branch. Court Martial proceedings are intended primarily for ensuring military discipline. Judicial power resides in the courts, not the Executive. Even during the existence of martial law, military tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses properly cognizable by the civil courts for as long as the same are functioning otherwise the rights of the accuseds to due process are violated. The lifting of Martial Law effectively divested the Military Tribunals of any supposed authority. Further, the grave national emergency that once justified their existence no longer exists. Thus, all cases pending under such tribunals should be transferred to the civil courts. TAN vs. BARRIOS acquitted by military tribunals / operative fact Pursuant to the rulings in Olaguer as well as Cruz vs. Enrile, declaring the military tribunals functus officio and the proceedings therein null and void, several persons convicted by the military tribunals during martial law prayed for a re-trial of their case. The courts thus directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations in the proper civil courts. However, pursuant thereto, Fiscal Barrios re-filed informations against Tan and other persons who have been ACQUITTED by the military tribunals. The lower courts then issued the warrants for their arrest. The ruling in Cruz vs. Enrile should not prejudice persons who are not parties thereto; otherwise it could be used as an instrument for oppression. The military tribunal hearings as to the following cases should stand: 1. 2. 3. Persons who had finished serving their sentences thereunder Persons who have been granted amnesty Persons who have been acquitted by the said tribunals

Thus, the rule laid down in Cruz vs. Enrile should be applied prospectively. Even assuming that proceedings under military tribunals are void, operative fact applies. This bars the re-filing of informations against the herein accuseds; to rule otherwise would violate their rights against double jeopardy and the enactment of ex post facto laws or rulings. US vs. LULING prima facie evidence of guilt / legislative power of the State Luling was a wharf watchman who was charged under Act. No. 335 for having solicited and received the sum of P 100 from Rufino Elord so that he may secure the delivery and importation of certain rolls of paper containing opium. He assails the validity of Sec. 316 of the said law for making the mere receiving of certain gifts from importers or exporters prima facie evidence of violation, alleging that it violates his right to presumption of innocence by transferring the burden of proof to the accused. Since the State has the right to declare what constitute criminal acts, it likewise has the right to define what proof constitutes prima facie evidence of guilt and to pass the burden to the defendant to prove that his acts were innocent. The constitutional provision on presumption of innocence is not violated by such statutes. PEOPLE vs. MINGOA malversation / overcome by contrary presumption / reasonable Mingoa, a public officer entrusted w/ funds, failed to account for the same alleging that the said monies were lost. He was charged for malversation. Under the Revised Penal Code, mere failure to account for public funds or property amounts to prima facie evidence that he has put the said funds or property to personal use. He assails Art. 217 of the RPC for violating the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence. There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption and what evidence suffices to raise such presumption. Further, the law establishes a mere presumption; it affords the accused the opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and founded upon experience of human conduct. DUMLAO vs. COMELEC election disqualification / charged vs. convicted / not synonymous BP No. 52 disqualifies a candidate CHARGED either before the civil or military tribunals for acts of disloyalty, subversion, insurrection, rebellion, and such other crimes. There is a distinction between a person who is charged and a person who is convicted. The same cannot be equated. A person merely charged cannot be put in the same footing as a person already convicted. The law violates the constitutional right to presumption of innocence. Further, evidence regarding such acts of disloyalty should be presented before the courts, not the administrative bodies such as the COMELEC. Legislative or administrative determination of guilt cannot substitute for judicial determination of guilt. (This is the same case under Section 1)

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MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC fugitive from justice / disqualification Defeated candidate Bienvenido Marquez sought the disqualification of Edgardo Rodriguez for the governorship of Quezon Province for being a fugitive from justice based on Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code. Rodriguez was charged for 10 counts of insurance fraud and grand theft in a Municipal Court of Los Angeles, but he fled from the US to evade prosecution. The term fugitive from justice embraces not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who flee to avoid prosecution. It is well supported in jurisprudence.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Davide The said prohibition does not infringe upon the right to presumption of innocence because one is not being disqualified for his guilt (or the lack of it), but rather for his act of fleeing from justice. As opposed to Dumlao vs. COMELEC, the person was disqualified due to a presumption of guilt even when he was merely charged; the same does not attend in this case. PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO duties of the judge Holgado was charged for slight illegal detention for kidnapping and detaining Artemia Fabreag for 8 hours w/o justifiable reason. During arraignment, he was asked Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? He did not have an attorney and pleaded guilty, saying that a certain Mr. Ocampo had instructed him to do so. During arraignment, if the accused is unaccompanied by counsel, the court has the following duties: 1. 2. 3. 4. Inform the defendant of his right to counsel Ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney If he chooses to avail but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to defend him If the defendant chooses to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so

None of these duties have been complied with. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. DD: If the victim is a woman, the offense should be serious illegal detention, not merely slight illegal detention. US vs. ASH history of right to counsel / stages of proceedings Under the old English Common Law Rule, the right to counsel was limited to trial; however, this notion has been gradually disregarded. There was a growing recognition of the fact that an unaided layman, even if educated or learned, may not be able to defend himself intelligently given the intricate procedural system. Thus counsel was necessary as a guide through the complex legal technicalities. The creation of the Office of the Prosecutor further necessitated the presence of counsel. The prosecutor was dedicated primarily for the purpose of prosecuting defendants and is incomparably more familiar w/ procedures, idiosyncrasies of juries, and the personnel of the court. There was thus the need to minimize the imbalance. The development of pre-trial proceedings further necessitated the assistance of counsel; otherwise trials could become mere formalities. These involve critical stages where the accused may make mistakes or his reasoning dimmed by emotional tension; thus he needs a spokesman or advisor in his lawyer. Counsel was further extended to police line-ups under the Wade Case to prevent the prosecution from taking advantage of the accused during such stages. The more so that during trial the accused must be aided by counsel so as to be able to plead his case intelligently w/o surrendering his right against self-incrimination. PEOPLE vs. LIWANAG effective counsel / reasonableness Liwanag was provided w/ counsel de oficio in Atty. Uy who assisted him during arraignment and trial, and who cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. Liwanag contends that Atty. Uy was not intelligent counsel for not being able to safeguard his right against unreasonable searches and seizures for not having contested his warrantless arrest, and that Atty. Uy failed to secure a reversal of his conviction. He contends that this in fact amounts to a violation of his right to counsel. The right to counsel under the Constitution simply means effective counsel. The Supreme Court found that the services of Atty. Uy were sufficiently effective. In the Philippine setting, counsel assisting the accused is presumed to be providing all the necessary legal defenses w/c are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance w/ the said norms. The Strickland Standards cannot be applied in our jurisdiction. The proper standard here is mainly reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. PEOPLE vs. LARRAAGA choice of counsel / counsel de oficio / prevent dilatory tactics During trial, Larraagas counsel de parte unceremoniously withdrew. He asked for a continuance of 3 weeks to 1 month wanting to procure counsel of his own choice. In order to prevent any dilatory maneuvers on the part

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of the defense counsel, the court appointed counsel de oficio and refused to suspend the trial. Thus, Larraaga contests that he was denied the right to counsel. The preference of counsel pertains more aptly to persons under custodial investigation, but nevertheless, such preferential discretion is not absolute so as to allow the accused to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of all others equally capable. Otherwise, it allows the accused to dictate the tempo of the prosecution and delay the resolution of the case. Further, the period of extension requested was unreasonably long. The right to counsel is, to some extent, subject to the supervision of the trial court, especially after the trial has already commenced. PEOPLE vs. REGALA assault / knowledge not alleged in information / cannot convict Regala and Flores were charged for murder w/ assault upon an agent of a person in authority for having stabbed and killed Sgt. Desilos. However, the information failed to allege the crucial element of knowledge that the accuseds had knowledge of the fact that the victim was indeed an agent of a person in authority. Thus, the accuseds cannot be convicted of the said crimes. The fact that the victim was engaged then in the exercise of his duties does not suffice. Knowledge must be alleged in the information. There are no other allegations in the information that would clearly point to the fact that the accuseds had knowledge. The fact that the accuseds did not object thereto likewise does not cure the defect. To rule otherwise would be to convict the accuseds of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information. This would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. DD: The facts must be alleged in the information so as to allow the defense to prepare evidence or arguments to contradict the same. The defense should not be surprised by the introduction of new averments during trial that they were not given the chance to prepare for. ENRILE vs. SALAZAR alleged: simple rebellion Sen. Enrile was arrested and charged w/ the complex crime of rebellion w/ murder and multiple murder committed during the failed coup attempt. He alleges that he is being charged for an offense that does not exist in the statute books. The Supreme Court held in the case of People vs. Hernandez that rebellion cannot be complexed w/ murder or homicide. However, the information does charge a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. DD: Simply put, the facts averred in the information suffice to form the elements of simple rebellion. The information should contain statements of fact, not conclusions of law w/c are for the courts to decide. PEOPLE vs. LEGASPI 2 separate informations / separate crimes complexed w/ each other Pamela was charged under 2 separate informations, one for double murder, the other for violation of RA No. 6539 (AntiCarnapping Act). She was convicted of the complex crime of robbery w/ double homicide, combining and complexing the two crimes alleged in separate informations. While the court can hold a joint trial of two or more cases and can render a consolidated decision, the court cannot combine 2 crimes charged in 2 separate informations to form a complex crime and convict the accused therefor. It violates the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ conclusions of law De La Cruz was charged for committing sexual abuse on his daughter, either by raping her or committing acts of las civiousness on her. The validity of the information was questioned. The information contained conclusions of law, not averments of facts. It does not cite w/c provisions of RA No. 7610 were violated by De la Cruz. It did not state the acts and/or omissions constituting the offense of the attending circumstances. DD: The information went ahead to conclude that he committed the felony of acts of lasciviousness w/o mentioning what particular acts he committed constituting the same as well as the applicable provisions of law violated. Conclusions of law are for the judge to make. PEOPLE vs. ESPERANZA qualifying circumstances must be alleged Nelson was charged for the rape of his 13 year old niece. Supposedly, minority (under 12 years of age) and relationship (w/in 3rd civil degree of consanguinity) are qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape. However, the information does not allege that he is related to her w/in the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity, and he was charged under paragraph 1 of Art. 335 of the RPC (intimidation), not under paragraph 2 or 3 (minority / deprivation of reason). While the victim turned out to be 11 years old as proved during trial, the crime cannot be qualified by minority (under 12 years of age) because the information alleged that she was then 13 years old. To appreciate these qualifying circumstances against Nelson w/o having properly alleged the same in the information would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. DD: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved during trial. PEOPLE vs. PURAZO time not an essential element of rape / need not be alleged accurately Purazo was charged and convicted of rape (incestuous). He alleged that the information failed to state w/ particularity the time when the rape was committed, thus violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

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accusations against him. It provided merely sometime in the Month of March 1997. Date is not an essential element in the crime of rape; thus it need not be accurately stated. It satisfies the 2 requirements that: (1) it is as near to the actual date of commission as permissible, and (2) the time ultimately proved should be alleged in the complaint. GARCIA vs. PEOPLE basis is nature of the crime, not the designation Garcia was charged for estafa under Art. 315, Section 2 (a), w/c penalizes false manifestations or fraudulent machinations, but was convicted based on Art. 315 Section 2 (d) for having issued post-dated checks that were not funded or insufficiently funded. The real nature of the crime is determined by the facts alleged in the information and not by the title or the designation of the offense contained therein. CONDE vs. RIVERA unreasonable delays / mandamus to dismiss the case Aurelia Conde had to respond to 5 separate informations and had to make court appearances for over a year already. Even so, there has still yet to be any resolution of the case. Thus she came before the SC to seek redress. When the prosecuting officer secures postponements of trials beyond reasonable time, the accused may file a case for mandamus to compel the dismissal of the case. It is also a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; it is practically an acquittal. She may likewise petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to obtain freedom is her liberty s retrained. Every person has the right to have a speedy trial. NEPOMUCENO vs. SEC. OF DEFENSE own fault / delay must be unreasonable Nepomuceno along w/ several others have yet to be arraigned for their respective offenses before the Military Tribunal. This is due to the fact that they filed a Motion to Quash, and then a Supplemental Motion questioning the constitutionality of the Military Commissions, and even asked for preliminary injunction to suspend the trials. Then they assert that their right to a speedy trial is violated and seek the dismissal of the case. Any delay in the disposition of Nepomucenos case is attributable to his own actions. Further any delay in filing the charges was brought about by the exigencies of martial law and by the circumstances of the case. What the constitution prohibits are unreasonable and capricious delays. The delays in this case are neither unreasonable nor capricious and were brought about by the accuseds own actions. Further, the right may be waived. MATEO vs. VILLALUZ notarized by judge / under intimidation / to be decided by him Mateo, among others, was tried before Judge Villaluz for robbery in a band w/ homicide. Later on, a certain Rolando Reyes executed an extra-judicial statement implicating Mateo; the statement was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Villaluz. However, Reyes later repudiated the said statement claiming that he made the statement under intimidation from a government agent. In short, it is possible that Judge Villaluz had something to do about it. Mateo thus prayed that Judge Villaluz disqualify himself from the case to w/c the latter refused. Due process requires that every litigant be entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Through the exercise of sound discretion, a judge may disqualify himself from a case. While discretion lies w/ the judge, the Supreme Court exercises corrective authority. In this case, clearly the refusal of the judge to inhibit himself amounts to grave abuse of discretion. He is being called upon to decide a matter w/ w/c he is involved; this casts serious doubts upon his impartiality. IN RE: OLIVER public trials Secret trials are a menace to liberty. They are instruments for the repression of religious and political heresies and allow the government to act arbitrarily. An effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power is the knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion. Besides the accused should at least be entitled to have his friends, relatives, or counsel present no matter what offense is charged. GARCIA vs. DOMINGO trial in the chambers of the judge / public trial / public not precluded The trials in this case, on 14 separate instances, were held in the air-conditioned chambers of the trial court judge, for the purpose of convenience. The defendants offered no objection. Later on, they assert that their right to a public trial has been violated. Generally, trials should be held in public in order to offset any danger of conducting them in an illegal or unjust manner. This only means that any person interested in observing the proceedings may do so, even if not a party to the case or a relative of any party thereto. In this case, there is nothing to show that other persons are prohibited from observing the proceedings; hence there is no violation of such right. It even suffices that the relatives, friends, or counsel of the accused are allowed to be present. FAJARDO vs. GARCIA written interrogatories / not embraced by compulsory process Fajardo, along with other accuseds, were charged for murder. Evidence of the prosecution disclosed that during the night of the murder, the accuseds were wounded. They presented medical certificates issued by Dr. Academia. However, when the judge asked where the doctor was, it turned out that he left for the United States. Counsel for the accuseds asked the judge to allow them to send interrogatories to Dr. Academia in the

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United States, invoking the expanded guarantee of compulsory process to produce evidence. The judge refused, and thus they appeal alleging grave abuse of discretion. The service of written interrogatories is worlds apart from the compulsory process guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such is not embraced therein. Evidence of their stay in the hospital, besides, could be easily obtained from the testimony of nurses or the records of the hospital w/o having to resort to sending the interrogatories all the way to the United States to Dr. Academia. CARREDO vs. PEOPLE waiver of right / duty to appear Carredo was charged for malicious mischief. After arraignment, he posted bail and waived his right to appear during trial. During trial, the prosecution witnesses were presented but hearing was postponed because they could not identify the accused; thus the trial judge summoned Carredo. After his failure to appear during trial, the judge ordered his arrest and the forfeiture of his cash bond. In the bail system under our constitution, the accused is granted provisional liberty subject to the condition that he appears during trial; his failure to do so would make the previous warrant of arrest sufficient for his re-confinement. The accused may waive his right to meet the witnesses face to face, but he cannot waive his duty to appear in court for the purpose of being identified by the prosecution witnesses. It is possible that the witnesses do not know him by name but only by appearance. Further, if he is to be allowed to be absent during all hearings, he may, in his defense, say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and thus entitled to acquittal.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 15
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS a writ directed to a person detaining another commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption (capture) and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.

Limitations on the Power to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ under the 1987 Constitution 1. 2. The President may suspend the privilege for a period not exceeding 60 days, Congress may revoke the suspension w/c the President cannot set aside (Congress may also extend the suspension upon the initiative of the President) The Supreme Court, at the instance of ANY CITIZEN may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension and must promulgate its decision w/in 30 days from its filing. The suspension is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The power of the SC is no longer restricted to determining if the President acted w/ arbitrariness; the SC is now empowered to: a. b. 5. review the sufficiency of the factual basis determine whether the public safety requires the suspension

3.

4.

The only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger is a CITIZEN; he need not even be a taxpayer Insurrection is no longer a ground for the suspension of the privilege of the writ Imminent danger of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion is no longer a ground for the suspension

6. 7.

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8.

The grounds for suspension are now limited to: a. b. ACTUAL INVASION ACTUAL REBELLION, when the public safety requires it

9.

In case the privilege is suspended, the suspension shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion, such as Crimes against National Security and the Law of Nations. Examples: treason, espionage, communication in wartime w/ hostile country, and giving information to hostile country.

10. Simply put, for a person to lose the privilege of the writ, he must first be judicially charged. 11. The person must be judicially charged w/in 3 days after being arrested or detained, otherwise he shall be released. The purpose is simple: to require all those detained to be immediately turned over to the judicial authorities. 12. Even if the person is arrested on the basis of a valid warrant, he must still be judicially charged w/in the said 3 day period, otherwise he must be released 13. The suspension of the privilege of the writ DOES NOT SUSPEND THE RIGHT TO BAIL

Additional Notes from the Isagani Cruz Book: 1. 2. The purpose of the writ is to test the validity of a persons detention A Petition for Habeas Corpus takes precedence in the calendar of courts and must be acted upon immediately Even moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of the writ , such as when a housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the person detaining her Habeas corpus may also be resorted to in case of unlawful denial of bail, or in case of denial of the right to speedy trial After the lapse of 60 days, unless otherwise extended by Congress at the instance of the President, the suspension is automatically lifted There is a catch. Since Congress may extend the period of the suspension at the initiative of the President, the extension may be indefinite depending on the will and discretion of the legislature. The Supreme Court then would be the only hope depending upon the courage of that body.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Additional Reminders: 1. In revoking the suspension of the privilege, the Congress votes jointly. A majority vote is required and it may be conducted during regular or special session. If Congress is not in session, it is mandated by the Constitution to convene w/in 24 hours after the suspension of the privilege of the writ The imposition of Martial Law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ During the suspension of the writ, any person arrested or detained must be charged w/in 3 days, otherwise he must be released.

2.

3. 4.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 16
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

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Speedy Disposition of Cases

LOPEZ vs. OMBUDSMAN Certain complaints have been pending before the Sandiganbayan for almost 4 years. This interval prior to the resolution finding the existence of probable cause came w/o any explanation; thus the accused therein prayed for its dismissal invoking his right to speedy disposition of his case. Eventually, after the prolonged delay, the appropriate informations were filed. The subsequent filing of the informations does not cure or correct the unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints. There has been, in this case, an unreasonable delay in the resolution of the case, thus the right accrues. The case is thus ordered Dismissed.

Notes on Speedy Disposition: 1. 2. The guarantee covers the period before, during, and after trial It is a flexible concept and various factors must be considered, such as the length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and the prejudice caused by the delay The right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured, or when an unreasonable time elapses without the partys case being tried. Not all delays are unreasonable. The remedy in case of unreasonable delay is dismissal obtained through Mandamus

3.

4.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 17
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Right against Self-Incrimination

US vs. NAVARRO guilt due to mere silence / presumption of innocence Subject to review in this case were 2 provisions of the Penal Code. Art. 481 punishes unlawful deprivation of liberty , while Art. 483 provides that a person who detained another, who fails to give info as to his whereabouts or does not prove that the same has been set free shall be punished by a higher penalty. Therefore, in order for the accused to lessen the penalty he stands to incur, he is forced to divulge the whereabouts of the detainee or declare that the same has been set free this is practically an admission that he in fact detained another. If he opts not to speak, he incurs a more severe criminal liability. Simply put, the evidence required to absolve him under Art. 483 has the effect of convicting him under Art. 481. This violates the right against self-incrimination. Under Art. 483, the fact of guilt follows the mere silence of the accused; this cannot be permitted. Refusal to testify should not create a presumption against the accused otherwise it amounts to a law adjudging w/o evidence. The accused has the right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. US vs. TAN TENG physical test for gonorrhea / only testimonial evidence Prosecuted for rape, Tan was physically examined after his arrest and a substance was taken from his body for the purpose of testing him for gonorrhea. He tested positive. He assails the admissibility of the evidence claiming that it was obtained in violation of his right against self incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is a prohibition against extracting from the defendants own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. It does not cover all forms of compulsion but only testimonial compulsion. The examination does not call upon the accused to be a witness, nor does it compel him to render testimony or answer questions; the evidence obtained from him is not testimonial in nature and is not covered by the right. By analogy, a physical examination for evidence is similar to introducing stolen property taken from the person of the thief. Also, Tan never objected to the extraction from his body of said substances.

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VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS examination of womans privates / dura lex sed lex Emetria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged for adultery. The trial court ordered Villaflor to be examined by physicians to determine if she was pregnant; the latter refused, thus she will be cited for contempt. She invokes her right against self-incrimination. While to compel a woman to submit to the examination of her private parts indeed amounts to great embarrassment and shame, nevertheless, the court must apply the constitutional provision in accord w/ the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by sentimental influences. The prohibition against self-incrimination is, and remains to be, limited to compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. Physical examinations are not covered by the right. However, due care must be exerted at least not to embarrass the accused any more than necessary in carrying out the test. US vs. ONG SIU HONG morphine in the mouth / not testimonial compulsion Ong was forced to discharge a certain amount of morphine from his mouth. The substance was appreciated as evidence against him. He thus assails the admissibility of such evidence, invoking his right against self-incrimination. The purpose of the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination, in order to extort unwilling confessions implicating the accused. The case of Ong was no different from the Tan Case where the accused was subjected to a test to obtain substances from his body as evidence to prove his guilt. The evidence is obviously admissible. BELTRAN vs. SAMSON handwriting specimen / testimonial act Beltran was ordered by the respondent judge to appear before the fiscal for the purpose of taking a sample of his handwriting to determine if he was the one who wrote certain falsified documents. There was yet no information filed against him; it was merely an investigation, not a prosecution. Nevertheless, he invokes his right against self-incrimination. The prohibition is not limited to declaration, but rather to be a witness against oneself or to give or furnish evidence. Any pressure towards relaxing the said prohibition must be appreciated w/ suspicion. Writing is something more than a mechanical act; it requires application of intelligence and attention. Compelling a person to produce a specimen of his handwriting is treated more seriously that compulsion to produce mere documents and chattels which themselves are covered by the privilege. Here the person is compelled to produce evidence that previously did not even exist evidence that causes him to be identified as a falsifier. He is being compelled to perform a positive and testimonial act. The respondent judge and fiscal are thus ordered to cease and desist therefrom. BERMUDEZ vs. CASTILLO expanded right The right against self incrimination has been expanded to cover other forms of proceedings or compulsion, such as: It now extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law It now extends to both accused as well as mere witnesses in a prosecution It protects equally in civil cases when incriminating questions are asked It covers litigious or non-litigious proceedings It covers proceedings ex parte or otherwise It covers all forms of interrogation before the courts It now extends to investigations conducted by legislative bodies It now prohibits rendering incriminatory handwriting specimens (Beltran vs. Samson)

CHAVEZ vs. CA accused cannot be compelled to take the witness stand Chavez, along w/ several others, was charged for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During trial, the fiscal called upon Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness (not a state witness), to w/c the trial judge acceded amid strong objection by the defense counsel and the refusal of Chavez. The judge said that the act of testifying, by itself, does not necessarily incriminate him, and it is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness including the accused. Thus the accused was compelled to take the witness stand. The accused occupies a greater degree of protection than an ordinary witness. He may altogether refuse to take the witness stand or answer any questions. After all, the purpose of the prosecution for calling a witness to the stand is to secure a conviction. This rule applies even to a co-accused in a joint trial. The damaging facts forged in the decision of the lower court were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez and are inadmissible. Forcing the accused to testify likewise violates his right to remain silent. Actual violence need not be employed to amount to compulsion; moral coercion, as in this case, is sufficient. Chavez did not waive his rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination. His objection in the beginning is a continuing one; waiver must be unequivocal and certain, and should be made willingly and intelligently. The courts indulge every presumption against waiver of constitutional rights.

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DD: A witness can also invoke his right against self-incrimination, but only when an incriminating question is already asked. As stated above, the accused, on the other hand, can refuse to take the witness stand altogether. CABAL vs. KAPUNAN forfeiture proceedings / criminal in nature / rights accrue Col. Jose Maristela of the Army filed a letter-complaint to the Sec. of National Defense, charging Chief of Staff Manuel Cabal for graft and corruption, unexplained wealth, and other reprehensible acts. Maristela did not seek the removal of Cabal but rather the forfeiture of Cabals unexplained wealth. The President ordered the formation of a Committee to investigate the matter. The Committee then ordered Cabal to take the witness stand, but the latter refused to be sworn and invoked his right against self-incrimination. Forfeiture is imposed by way of punishment. It is a penalty. While technically civil in nature, such proceedings are actually criminal in nature thus the rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination accrue. In criminal proceedings, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand altogether. Generally, forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature; but when the forfeitures are imposed as a vindication of the public justice as in this case the proceedings acquire a criminal nature. The properties may be forfeited only by proving a breach of the laws. The same rule applies to administrative cases where the person charged is sought to be dismissed. PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS medical malpractice proceedings Pascual was being tried administratively before the Board for alleged immorality and malpractice. The result could be the cancellation of his license to practice his medical profession. He was then ordered by the Board to take the witness stand; he refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination. The ruling in Cabal vs. Kapunan is applicable in this case. The Board, in an administrative proceeding that could result to the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession, cannot compel the respondent therein to take the witness stand w/o his consent. The cancellation of license to practice medicine, as a consequence, acquires the nature of a penalty; thus the right against self-incrimination and the right to refuse to take the witness stand accrue. The provision on self-incrimination should be liberally construed in favor of the person invoking the same. The guarantee also protects the right to remain silent. Silence should not be used to raise a presumption of guilt. DD: Remember that the right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law, w/c include investigations conducted by special boards or committees. If the proceedings are criminal in nature and may result to the imposition of penalties, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand altogether.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 18
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 19
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

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(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

Right against Excessive Fines Cruel & Degrading Punishment Death Penalty
PEOPLE vs. ESTOISTA possession of firearms / standard for cruel & excessive As punishment for illegal possession of firearms, the term of imprisonment for 5 to 10 years is neither cruel nor unusual, especially considering the prevalent circumstances such as rampant lawlessness, and the promiscuous carrying of weapons. Just because the punishment imposed is severe, it does not mean that the same is cruel and degrading. To fall under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. If in a given case the imposition of the full extent of the penalty would be too harsh considering the degree of malice of the perpetrator, the courts are allowed to recommend to the Chief Executive for clemency. Guides in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual (Furman vs. Georgia): 1. 2. 3. 4. It must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity It must not be applied arbitrarily It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society It must not be excessive

Note: Fines are excessive when, given the circumstances, they are disproportionate to the offense. Criteria according to Justices Marshall and Brennan: 1. 2. 3. 4. There are certain forms of punishment w/c involve too much pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them There are unusual punishments in the sense that they have never before been known A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no legislative purpose A punishment that is not excessive and possessed of a legislative purpose may nevertheless be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it

DD: Notice that under the 1987 Constitution, the prohibition against unusual punishment has been removed to allow the government some leeway in developing penology. PEOPLE vs. MUOZ computation in the absence of death penalty The 1987 Constitution had the effect of barring the imposition of the death penalty until the same is reactivated by the Congress. The manner of computing penalties was discussed in this case in case the range of the penalty adjudged includes the death penalty. The only thing to remember is that the death penalty cannot be imposed. The threegrade scheme of the original penalty (such as reclusion temporal to death) is maintained, except that the maximum penalty of death cannot be imposed. After all the death penalty was not abolished. It was merely ordered not to be imposed subject to the wisdom and subsequent enactment of Congress. There is no need to adjust the 2 remaining periods by dividing them into 3 shorter periods. Its just that the maximum penalty of death will not be imposed. PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY rape / heinous crimes / power of Congress The Constitution confers upon the Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty subject to certain requisites: 1. 2. 3. Congress must define what are heinous crimes Congress must penalize by death only those crime that qualify as heinous, and Congress must be motivated by compelling reasons.

Heinous crimes are those crimes w/c by their wickedness or viciousness, are completely repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality. The provisions on the aggravating circumstances under the RPC subsist and affect criminal liability. Rape, especially one perpetrated against

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ones own daughter, is an intrinsically evil act and is outrageous to dignity and decency and deserves to be punished by death. PEOPLE vs. PURAZO consolidated separate opinions RA No. 7659 and its single mandatory penalty of death for certain offenses should not preclude the courts, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, from considering the facts and circumstances and to determine whether the crime committed is heinous, and whether there are compelling reasons to impose the death penalty. The SC must vote twice in reviewing cases where the death penalty was imposed: 1. 2. First, to decide whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime charged, and Second, to decide whether to impose the death penalty.

If less than a majority of the court choose to impose the death penalty, then reclusion perpetua will be automatically imposed.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 20
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Imprisonment for Debt

LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ BP No. 22 / bouncing checks / liability ex delicto In this case, the constitutionality of BP No. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, was assailed for violating the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. It is allegedly a bad debt law rather than a bad check law. The debts covered by the constitutional prohibition are debts arising from contractual relations; they are liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages and imprisonment arising from actions ex delicto, or those arising from crimes. Such fines are imposed as punishment for a crime and do not arise out of contractual obligations What the law punishes w/ imprisonment is not the failure to pay the debt, but rather the act of making and issuing worthless checks. The purpose of the law is to protect the public interest from the deleterious effects of the proliferation of bad checks which then amounted to some P 200 million worth in circulation per day. Acceptance of checks is based on confidence; they are not legal tender. Thus, if that confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as substitutes for currency would be greatly diminished. A check flasher injures not only the payee but also the public interest. BP No. 22 was enacted by Congress as a valid exercise of the police power. It is a valid law and does not infringe upon the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS (GR No. 154037) rentals / civil debt / covered The petitioners were tenants of a land. They were ordered by the court to pay their rentals to Eleuteria Bolano the Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma Allers. They failed to pay the necessary rentals because they were then uncertain as to the rightful person to whom they should pay. Thus, Bolano sought to have them cited for contempt for their failure to comply w/ the orders of the judge to pay the appropriate rentals. The debt covered by the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt pertains to civil debt. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract express or implied. The payment of rent is covered by the prohibition. It is a contractual debt, not one arising from a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot be imprisoned for their failure to pay rent w/o violating their constitutional right against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. DD: Poll taxes are no longer allowed under the Constitution; it amounts to a property qualification for the exercise of the right to vote w/c is prohibited under Article 5.

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BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 21
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Right against Double Jeopardy

Requisites for the defense of Double Jeopardy: 1. 2. 3. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second The first jeopardy must have been terminated The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first

DD: To determine if the offenses charged are the same, it is important to observe if the offense alleged is merely an ingredient or element of the other, or is merely an attempt for frustration of the other. PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN when does jeopardy attach For a person under prosecution to be placed in jeopardy, he must be placed on trial under the following conditions: 1. 2. 3. 4. Court of competent jurisdiction Upon a valid complaint or information (sufficient in form and substance) After he has been arraigned After he has pleaded to the complaint or the information (issue is properly joined)

Purpose: the right against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment, but rather against the burden of being tried again for the same offense so that after being notified of the dismissal of his case, the accused can rest assured that he will not have to prepare for yet another litigation or prosecution. PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN plea of guilty but acquitted / no valid 1st jeopardy Aurelio Balisacan was charged for homicide for attacking and stabbing one Leoncio Bulaoat. Upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty. Upon motion of his counsel de oficio, he was allowed to present evidence to mitigate liability. Thereafter, he claimed that he merely acted in self-defense and alleged voluntary surrender. On the basis thereof, the trial judge rendered a decision acquitting him; the prosecution thus appealed. Balisacan invokes his right against double jeopardy. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt and leaves the court no alternative but to impose the appropriate penalty. Balisacan was allowed to testify only to present evidence to mitigate liability thus such testimony cannot be taken as a trial on the merits. What the trial judge should have done was to take the defendants plea anew because his testimony of self defense had the effect of vacating his pervious plea of guilty. There was thus no valid plea one of the requisites for jeopardy to attach at the time the court rendered its decision of acquittal. The acquittal is null and void. Jeopardy did not attach the first time in the absence of a valid plea; thus appeal by the prosecution cannot violate the accuseds right against double jeopardy. Further, the prosecution was deprived of its day in court an evident violation of the right of the People to due process. DD: What element is lacking? A valid plea. PEOPLE vs. ESPINOSA conditional arraignment / waiver must be clear and express Espinosa, among others, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for estafa and attempted corruption of public officers. Espinosa motioned to have his case re-investigated before the Ombudsman, and then later filed a motion for leave to travel abroad. The Sandiganbayan had the accused conditionally arraigned where the latter pleaded not guilty. The condition apparently was for the accused to waive his right against double jeopardy for him to be allowed to travel abroad pending re-investigation. The Ombudsman then moved to withdraw the charges ex parte. Later on, the Ombudsman filed w/ the same court informations for Malversation of Public Funds; Espinosa argued double jeopardy.

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Conditionally arraigning an accused is a practice not recognized in regular rules of procedure. Arraignment, being an indispensable element of due process, cannot be regarded lightly or be brushed aside. Espinosa made a simple and unconditional plea of not guilty. There was no express or manifest intention on his part to waive his right against double jeopardy; such waiver cannot be implied or assumed from the proceedings. It must be clear and categorical. The dismissal of the case was likewise secured by the Ombudsman w/o the consent of Espinosa; this bars a subsequent prosecution. BULAONG vs. PEOPLE rebellion & subversion / first jeopardy is still pending Agaton Bulaong, a.k.a. Ka Era, was charged for rebellion before the CFI of Laguna. Trial did not proceed until 1958 because he remained at large. The Anti-Subversion Act took effect the year 1957, and he was charged before the CFI of Manila for the crime of subversion. While his case for subversion was pending, he was convicted of the crime of rebellion; he thus invokes his right against double jeopardy alleging that the facts alleged in both charges were the same. The defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was terminated or otherwise dismissed w/o his consent. Ka Era was not convicted or acquitted of subversion, neither was the case terminated or dismissed w/o his consent. Thus, double jeopardy does not attach. DD: Simply put, when Bulaong was convicted for Rebellion, his jeopardy for Subversion has yet to be terminated. One of the requisites for invoking the right against double jeopardy is that the first jeopardy must have terminated. BUSTAMANTE vs. MACEREN service of sentence / finality / bar to re-opening of case Albaro Gregorio was charged for serious physical injuries caused through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day imprisonment. That same day, he paid the necessary fines and he began serving his sentence. Decision has become final and executory due to his service of the sentence. On that same day also, the trial judge rescinded the decision and re-assigned the case for a new trial allegedly based on new findings of fraud on the part of the accused. This time, he pleaded not guilty and raised the defense of double jeopardy. The decision becomes final upon: 1. 2. 3. The expiration of the period to perfect an appeal, or When the offense has been partially or totally satisfied, or When the defendant expressly waived his right to appeal.

In this case, Gregorio has already begun serving sentence; thus the decision has become final. A judgment of conviction can only be modified or set aside before it has acquired finality. The act of re-opening a case that has already become final violates the accuseds right against double jeopardy. The trial judge thus erred in not accepting the plea of double jeopardy; and considering that Gregorio has already served the full term, he is entitled to be released already. PEOPLE vs. OBSANIA rice fields / motion to dismiss / estoppel / no jeopardy Willy Obsania was charged for having raped a 14-year old girl, while armed w/ a dagger, and in the rice fields along the street. The information failed to expressly allege the existence of lewd designs w/c is inherent in all crimes against chastity. Obsania was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and moved for the dismissal of the case due to a defective information, averring that the subsequent info filed by the fiscal did not cure the defect in the first information. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. First of all, lewd designs need not be expressly alleged in the information it is a mere superfluity because lewd designs are manifest from the very act of rape. Thus, the initial complaint is valid. If the dismissal of the case was upon motion of the accused, this is not a bar to subsequent prosecution. He is barred by estoppel from raising the defense of double jeopardy. In such a case there is no trial on the merits. The accused cannot question the jurisdiction of the court in moving for the dismissal of the case and then later invoke double jeopardy w/c requires among others that the case be brought before a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, the accused motioned for the dismissal of the case; he cannot now raise the defense of double jeopardy, because the dismissal of the case was w/ his consent in fact, at his instance. If the dismissal was due to failure to prosecute or due to a violation of the right to a speedy trial, then it amounts to an acquittal and double jeopardy can be invoked. Such a circumstance does not attend in this case. RIVERA vs. PEOPLE verbal order / must be written / may still be set aside Rivera was arrested for allegedly attempting to transport marijuana to Manila. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. During trial, no witnesses were available; neither was the confiscated marijuana presented. Capt. Sarmiento, the

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Forensic Chemist, on repeated occasions, failed to appear during trial. On the 3 rd instance that Capt. Sarmiento failed to appear, the respondent judge verbally granted the motion to dismiss and ordered Riveras immediate release. Barely an hour later, Capt. Sarmiento arrived, and upon satisfactory explanation, the judge set aside the verbal dismissal and ordered the case re-scheduled. Rivera now invokes double jeopardy. For the order of dismissal to become final. it should be reduced in writing and signed by the judge. Generally, an order of dismissal due to failure of the prosecution to present witnesses has the effect of acquittal and becomes immediately executory; however, it must be reduced in writing to attain the status of finality. In this case, the judge still had the power to set aside the verbal order; double jeopardy has yet to attach. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & VELASCO insufficiency of evidence / same effect as acquittal Velasco was charged before the Sandiganbayan. After the prosecution had rested its case, he filed a Demurrer seeking to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence; it was initially denied but eventually granted upon his Motion for Reconsideration. He now invokes double jeopardy to bar subsequent prosecution. The prosecution contends that the dismissal was void for failing to state a summary of facts. The trial court (or Sandiganbayan) may dismiss a case based on insufficiency of evidence and such dismissal amounts to an acquittal. Thus even if the same has been granted at the instance of or w/ the consent of the accused, it serves as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Double jeopardy attaches. CONDRADA vs. PEOPLE temporary dismissal Condrada was charged w/ rape. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty. On two separate occasions, the complainant and the witnesses failed to appear during trial. On the third instance the court ordered the sub poenae to be coursed through the NBI, but still the complainant and the witnesses failed to appear; the prosecution yet again requested for postponement. The court denied the accuseds motion to dismiss based on the right to a speedy trial; but allowed the temporary dismissal of the case subject to revival w/in 30 days therefrom, otherwise, it shall be dismissed permanently. Upon revival of the case, Condrada invokes double jeopardy. A provisional dismissal is a dismissal w/o prejudice to reinstatement or revival before the order becomes final, or w/o prejudice to the subsequent filing of a new information. It is not a permanent dismissal w/c bars subsequent prosecution or revival based on double jeopardy. Dismissal bars subsequent prosecution when: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. There was conviction or acquittal (trial on the merits) Dismissal due to failure to prosecute Dismissal due to unreasonable delays in violation of the right to speedy trial Dismissal without the consent of the accused Dismissal due to insufficiency of evidence (People vs. Sandiganbayan & Velasco)

PEOPLE vs. PANFILO LACSON Kuratong Baleleng Panfilo Lacson, among others, was charged for multiple murder for the annihilation of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang particularly 11 members thereof. The case was provisionally dismissed by Trial Judge Agnir on the basis of Sec. 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The said rule was about provisional dismissal. It p rovides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except: 1. 2. With the express consent of the accused, and Due notice to the offended parties (or their heirs, since the victims here were all killed). If the offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years (as in this case), the provisional dismissal shall become permanent if the case is not revived w/in 2 years after the issuance of the order. Thus, the People move for reconsideration. The prosecution seeks to revive the case, even despite the lapse of the 2 year period, and pray that the Resolution of Judge Agnir dismissing the case be set aside, contending that the abovementioned requisites for provisional dismissal are not present; hence, according to them, Ping Lacson should not be entitled to the immunity granted after 2 years from the provisional dismissal, since the provisional dismissal was invalid in the first place. Lacson did not pray for the provisional dismissal; he never consented thereto and never sought it neither expressly nor impliedly. What he sought in his motion was merely judicial determination of probable cause and examination of the witnesses so that should the court find the absence of probable cause, the arrest warrants should then be cancelled. Thus, the 1st element is missing.

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Likewise, no notice of the motions for provisional dismissal were ever served to the heirs of the victims, at least 3 days before the said hearing as required by the rules of court; thus the 2nd element is likewise missing. The rationale behind such rule is to afford the victims or their heirs the chance to object to the motion on valid grounds. Since none of the elements required above attend, then the Rule on Provisional Dismissal does not apply. The dismissal does not fall w/in the aforesaid rule on Provisional Dismissals; therefore the case may be revived beyond the prescribed 2 year period subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the basis of Double Jeopardy or the Statute of Limitations. DD: I believe that even though the Rule on Provisional Dismissal does not apply, nevertheless, the accused should be entitled to the defense of double jeopardy. The case was dismissed clearly w/o his consent; and by no stretch of the imagination can his motion for judicial determination of probable cause be taken as consent to the dismissal w/c must be given unequivocally, positively, and clearly. If dismissal was made w/o the consent of the accused, it acquires the status of finality, and such dismissal bars subsequent prosecution for the same offense in accord w/ the right against double jeopardy. Dissent of Justice Puno: The underlying reason why Sec. 8 of Rule 117 was formulated, in the first place, was to prevent the prosecution from arbitrarily reviving or re-animating an case that has become dormant due primarily to the prosecutions own failure or inaction w/o justification. It confers new rights independent of but related to the rights to a speedy trial and against double jeopardy. The prosecutors should thus be constrained to work within the prescribed timeline and not unduly burden the accused w/ the hassles of prolonged and protracted prosecutions. PEOPLE vs. CA (GR No. 142051) review disguised as certiorari / acquittal is final Respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted by the Court of Appeals. The People, through a writ of certiorari, allege errors of judgment or misappreciation of evidence on the part of the CA, not errors of law or jurisdiction. This is an erroneous application of the extraordinary writ of certiorari because the Supreme Court cannot inquire into factual matters unless there is a blatant abuse of authority on the part of the lower court. Regardless of its nomenclature, the petition is actually one for an ordinary review of the factual findings of the lower court. It was practically an appeal disguised as a petition for certiorari and for the SC to entertain such would violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Unless there is a mistrial, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable pursuant to double jeopardy. This is regardless of whether it is decided by the trial court or the CA. DD: A decision of acquittal becomes final immediately and bars the re-opening of the case. The exception is when the prosecution was denied due process. PEOPLE vs. RELOVA ordinance & law / if based on same act, double jeopardy applies Manuel Opulencia was charged for violating Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1974 of Batangas City for having made unauthorized installations and wirings in his ice plant to lower his power bill fraudulently (typical jumper). He pleaded not guilty although he admitted to the presence of such unauthorized installations w/in his ice plant. However, given the fact that the case against him has prescribed the trial court was constrained to dismiss the case against him on the ground of prescription. Being a light felony, it prescribed 2 months after the discovery the asst. fiscal filed the case 9 months thereafter, way beyond the prescriptive period. Later on, the fiscal filed a case against Opulencia, this time for Theft of electric power, punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Opulencia answered w/ a Motion to Quash. Double jeopardy operates when an ACT is prosecuted under an ordinance, and then later the same act is prosecuted under a statute and vice versa. The 2nd sentence of the provision makes reference to ACTS, not offenses as provided in the 1st sentence. Conviction or acquittal under either constitutes a bar to prosecution for the same act. Thus, even if the offenses charged under the ordinance and the law are different, if the charges under the law and ordinance are based on the same act, double jeopardy applies. In this case, there is obviously only one act sought to be punished although different offenses are alleged. Thus, double jeopardy protects the accused. MELO vs. PEOPLE supervening event / offense acquires new character / amended complaint Conrado Melo was charged for frustrated homicide for stabbing and inflicting fatal wounds to one Benjamin Obillo. He pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the victim died; thus, the next day, an amended information was filed against him charging him this time w/ consummated homicide. Melo invokes double jeopardy. In this case, the second offense was not in existence during the time of the 1st prosecution because the accused could not possibly have been convicted of an offense that was still inexistent. The victim then was still alive; thus no case for consummated homicide could prosper. It was at most frustrated homicide.

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Even assuming that the second offense is identical to the first the first being a mere frustration of the second nevertheless, the right against double jeopardy is not violated by the filing of the amended complaint in this case. Supervening events took place that changed the character of the offense, thus the accused cannot be said to be placed under double jeopardy for being prosecuted for the new offense. The amended complaint should thus be allowed to stand. His service of the first penalty however should be credited in case of conviction of the second offense. DD: Take note also that the first jeopardy has not yet terminated; thus no double jeopardy can attach. PEOPLE vs. BULING fractures later discovered / no supervening events Buenaventura Buling was charged for less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds upon Isidro Balaba. The findings of the medical examination showed that the Balaba was to be incapacitated and would require medical attendance for some 10 to 15 days. Buling pleaded guilty and served sentence that same day. Prior to the filing of the subsequent amended complain, he has in fact fully served his sentence. Later on, Balabas wounds did not heal. A second medical exam was committed, this ti me an x-ray machine was used; fractures were found in the victims hand w/c would take him some 90 days to heal. An amended information was filed against Buling, this time for serious physical injuries. The prosecution invoked supervening events to justify the filing of the new complaint. There were no supervening events here that would justify the filing of an amended complaint. The fractures already existed during the time of the first examination; it is just that they were only discovered during the subsequent examination. Thus, an amended complaint cannot be validly filed against the accused w/o violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. In this case, the court warns that before filing appropriate informations in such cases, thorough medical examinations must be conducted to avoid such circumstances where the accused could not be held liable for the more severe but rightful liability as he is shielded by the guarantee against double jeopardy. DD: Take note that the first jeopardy has already terminated; the accused had, in fact, fully served his sentence.

Important reminders: Always take note of the elements of double jeopardy. If the first jeopardy has yet to attach due to the lack or defect of any of the elements (court of competent jurisdiction, valid information, arraignment, valid plea), then double jeopardy cannot yet be invoked. Even if the first jeopardy has attached, the same would have to terminate, otherwise to invoke double jeopardy would be premature (Bulaong vs. People). If the dismissal of the case is with the consent of the accused, the dismissal does not bar a subsequent prosecution, unless, the dismissal was based on the merits such as failure to prosecute or lack of evidence. If the dismissal of the case was due to a violation of the right to speedy trial, it amounts to an acquittal and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 22
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Ex Post Facto Law & Bill of Attainder

LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY two-tiered appeal / right to appeal preserved / SC reviews The accuseds in this case are being prosecuted as accessories for multiple murder w/ regard to the Kuratong Baleleng rubout. Under the old law, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC; however, RA No. 8249 was enacted expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Before only principals for offenses

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cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may be tried by it; under the new law, accomplices and accessories may also be tried by the Sandiganbayan, not only principals. RA No. 8249 was made to apply to cases pending in any court over w/c trial has not yet begun such as the case of the accuseds where evidence has yet to be presented. Their case was thus transferred to the Sandiganbayan; they now allege that the law is an ex post facto law because the new law deprives them of the two-tiered appeal before recourse to the SC. It is w/in the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to certain constitutional limitations. RA No. 8249 is not a penal law; it is merely a substantive law on jurisdiction. Even though the law deprives the accuseds of the two-tiered appeal, it nevertheless preserves the right of the accuseds to appeal before the Supreme Court. The SC still has the power to review the case to determine if the presumption of innocence is overcome. It thus is not an ex post facto law. DD: Cases decided by the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court; while cased decided by the RTC may be reviewed first by the Court of Appeals before being reviewed by the Supreme Court. It must be noted, however, that the CA may determine questions of fact; the SC generally may only rule upon questions of law. PEOPLE vs. FERRER Anti-Subversion Act The Anti-Subversion Act outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other subversive organizations, and punishes any person who knowingly and by obvert acts affiliates himself, becomes, or remains a member of the said Party or any similar subversive organization. It is alleged to be a bill of attainder. A Bill of Attainder is a law w/c inflicts punishment w/o trial. It substitutes a legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. The issues are resolved as follows: 1. The mere fact that it singles out the CPP and imposes a burden upon it is insufficient to deem it as a Bill of Attainder nevertheless, the said law does not apply solely to the CPP but to any other organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the government. Under the law, the guilt of the accuseds must still be judicially determined. The court must still prove that the accused joined knowingly and w/ intent to attain its specific objective to overthrow the government; hence it is not an ex post facto law. The judgment expressed in the legislation regarding the criminal nature of the CPP is so universally acknowledged as to be certain and judicially noticeable. The SC on many occasions has found the CPP to be an illegal organization, engaged in armed struggle for the purpose of overthrowing the government, etc. If a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is necessarily also an ex post facto law. The said law, however, punishes acts committed AFTER the enactment of the law. It applies prospectively, not retroactively. Members of the CPP have the opportunity to renounce their affiliation or discontinue their criminal acts; hence the penalties are not inescapable. The law is not an ex post facto law; neither is it a bill of attainder.

2.

3.

PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (GR No. 101724) longer prescriptive period / cannot retroact Paredes committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) for w/c he was prosecuted. He committed the said offense the year 1976. The prescriptive period then under existing law was 10 years. Subsequently, BP No. 195 was enacted (1982) w/c extends the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under RA No. 3019 from 10 years to 15 years. Paredes is now being prosecuted due to the extended prescriptive period, although under the old law, his liability therefrom must be extinguished. The provisions of BP No. 195 regarding the longer prescriptive period for prosecution of offenses cannot be applied retroactively against Paredes because it is not favorable to him as the accused. To do so would make it an ex post facto law, contrary to the Constitution. It would punish him for a crime w/c should have already been extinguished through prescription. CO vs. CA rubber checks / operative fact I have arranged the facts chronologically as follows: YEAR 1981: The Ministry of Justice issued a Circular declaring that the issuance of rubber checks was not covered by BP No. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Checks Law). Hence it was NOT PROHIBITED by law. YEAR 1983: Albino Co issued the rubber check subject of this prosecution. He relied upon the Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

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YEAR 1984: The said Circular was reversed by the Ministry of Justice declaring that the issuance of rubber checks was covered by BP No. 22 and hence IS PUNISHABLE under the said law. YEAR 1987: The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Que vs. People that the issuance of rubber checks was indeed prohibited by law and PUNISHABLE under BP No. 22. Co is now being prosecuted for the issuance of the said rubber check in violation of BP No. 22.

Not only laws must be applied prospectively. Administrative issuances interpreting the laws, as well as judicial decisions laying down new doctrines must also be applied prospectively. They cannot retroact especially if prejudicial to the accused. In this case, Co relied upon the interpretation of the Minister of Justice; the Que vs. People Ruling was promulgated already after his act of issuing the rubber check. Thus the same cannot retroact and apply to his case because it is not favorable to him as an accused.

ARTICLE 4

CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and [4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
VALLES vs. COMELEC jus sanguinis / waiver must be express Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a candidate for public office. Her eligibility was challenged on the basis of citizenship. She was born in Australia to a Filipino father (Telesforo) and an Australian mother. She was born the year before the 1935 Constitution took effect thus the Philippine Bill and Philippine Autonomy Act were the applicable laws. Under both Acts, all inhabitants of the Phils. who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and who resided therein, including their children, are deemed Filipino Citizens. Telesforo, her father, qualifies as a citizen under the said laws. The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis doctrine, where the citizenship is determined based on blood relationships. Rosalind, thus, being a child of a Filipino father, is deemed a Filipino citizen. The mere fact that she was born in Australia does not suffice to make her lose her citizenship. Assuming that Australia adheres to the jus soli doctrine, then she is at most a dual-citizen. Even assuming that Rosalind possesses an Australian Passport and Alien Certificate of Registration, this does not suffice to amount to a waiver of her citizenship, because waiver must be made expressly. Further, when the Local Government Code disqualifies dual-citizens from office, it speaks of dual allegiance. Even so, by her act of filing her certificate of candidacy, Rosalind in effect renounced her Australian citizenship, because she declared herself a Filipino citizen and swore to uphold the

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Constitution and maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Thus, she satisfies the citizenship requirements for eligibility for local public office. CO vs. HRET born of Filipino mother, still natural born / election through actions Jose Ong Jr. was proclaimed Representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar; Balinquit and Co, his losing competitors, challenge his natural-born citizenship before the HRET, w/c upheld the same, hence this petition for certiorari. Family history goes as follows: Ong Te (grandfather) arrived from China the year 1895, established residence in Samar, and was able to obtain a Certificate of Residence under the Spanish Colonial Administration. He qualified as a Filipino citizen under the Phil. Bill of 1902. Even so, his citizenship was questioned in this case in a collateral approach. An attack upon a persons citizenship can only be done through direct action for nullity not collaterally. Jose Ong Chuan (father) on the other hand was brought to the Phils. the year 1905 and married a natural born Filipina (mother). The CFI of Samar, after trial, declared him a Filipino Citizen. Jose Ong (respondent) was then born the year 1948 under the 1935 Constitution. Emil Ong (brother) was a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, which affirmed his citizenship and other qualifications as a member of the said body. Jose Ong was thus born of both a Filipino father and mother. There is thus no question that he was a Filipino citizen. However, even assuming that he was born merely to a Filipino mother and under the 1935 Constitution, and that he would have to elect or choose to be a natural born Filipino citizen, he likewise satisfies the requirement albeit not expressly. To expect Ong to elect his citizenship expressly would be a mere superfluity (after all he was already a Filipino citizen) . Election is both a formal and INFORMAL process. He exercised his right to vote, lived in the Philippines since birth and established a life here, held sensitive positions in the government (Central Bank), exercised a profession (CPA) reserved only to Filipinos, and embraced the Philippine customs and values. He was voted for overwhelmingly by his constituents. These acts in themselves suffice to constitute electing to be a citizen of the Philippines. Having elected citizenship and being of a Filipina mother, then he is deemed as a NATURAL BORN Filipino citizen and thus eligible for public office. The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion. DD: The Constitution requires that a person must be natural-born in order to be eligible as a Representative in Congress. Take note, however, that only the Constitution can distinguish between natural-born and naturalized citizens in conferring rights and privileges. Naturalized citizens are, after all, not second class citizens and possess the same rights as a natural-born citizen. YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO actions manifest renunciation / executive process Willie Yu was originally issued a Portuguese Passport the year 1971. He was naturalized as a Filipino citizen the year 1978, but by the year 1981, he once again applied for and was issued a Portuguese Passport. As a naturalized Filipino, he even declared his nationality as Portuguese in public and commercial documents, despite his oath to maintain true allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Yu pleads that he has never formally renounced his Filipino citizenship. All the foregoing acts, such as procurement of a foreign passport, or representing oneself as a citizen of another country, all suffice as an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. The decision in this case was summarily rendered by the Executive Branch (I believe by the Commission on Immigration & Deportation) in an executive proceeding, not a judicial proceeding. Consolidated Dissents: The pieces of documentary evidence, which consist primarily of photocopies of certain documents, are insufficient to indicate a categorical and unequivocal renunciation of citizenship. Further, Yu deserved to have his day in court; a judicial proceeding must be held to afford him his right to due process. A summary executive proceeding is not sufficient. The proper procedures laid down by law must be observed. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC loss of US citizenship / no automatic restoration to Phil. citizenship Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor elect of Sorsogon. His eligibility was challenged before the COMELEC on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized as an American the year 1983, and that he has not re-acquired his Filipino citizenship on the day of the elections. He claims that he acquired American citizenship only to protect himself from the Marcos Regime and that the same was merely forced upon him to avoid persecution that it was not impressed w/ voluntariness. This feeble excuse must be rejected outright. If he really wanted to disavow his US citizenship and re-acquire Philippine

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citizenship, he should have done so in accordance w/ the law either by act of Congress, naturalization, or repatriation. He claims to have been repatriated by participating in the elections in the Philippines and filing his Certificate of Candidacy, but assuming that he may have lost his American citizenship through such acts, this does not automatically restore him to his Filipino citizenship w/c he had earlier renounced. He must still comply w/ the requirements of the law. He is thus at most a stateless person. Considering that public officials owe allegiance to the State at all times, the court cannot tolerate the anomaly of having an incumbent governor who owes allegiance to another country. LABO vs. COMELEC Aussie naturalization / res judicata / no compliance w/ procedures Labo was proclaimed Mayor of Baguio City. According to an unrefuted statement from the Australian Embassy, it turns out however, that sometime prior to his election, he married an Australian woman and acquired Australian citizenship by naturalization. He was required to swear an oath or make an affirmation renouncing all other allegiance. He also swore true allegiance to the Queen of Australia. He even categorically stated that he was an Australian in a number of sworn statements. Subsequently, his marriage to his Aussie wife was declared void for being bigamous. He applied for Immigrant Cert. of Registration. The COMELEC affirmed his citizenship stating that the said acts were all mistakes, while the CID declared that he was not a citizen. He invokes res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata obviously does not apply to questions of citizenship. The fact that his marriage to the Aussie was declared void and had the effect of divesting him of his Aussie citizenship is a matter between him and the State of Australia. It does not automatically restore him to his status as a Filipino citizen. The fact is that he lost his Filipino citizenship by committing all of the following acts: 1. 2. 3. Naturalization in a foreign country Express renunciation, and Subscribing an oath of allegiance to a foreign country.

He must thus first re-acquire his lost citizenship through the processes required by law, such as by: 1. 2. 3. Act of Congress, Naturalization, or Repatriation

He has not complied w/ any of the modes for re-acquiring citizenship. The fact that he was elected by his constituents does not cure the defect. He was ineligible according to the Local Government Code and should thus be ordered to vacate his position as Mayor. DD: An example of naturalization by an Act of Congress is the case of Ronnie Nathanielsz, who was naturalized by virtue of a Presidential Decree, w/c has the force and effect of law. ANZAR vs. OSMEA Alien Registration / does not follow that there is renunciation Lito Osmea was a candidate for governor for the Province of Cebu. Aznar, sought to disqualify him as candidate alleging that he was an American citizen based on a Statement issued by the CID affirming the existence of the following documents: (1) Application for Alien Registration, (2) Alien Certificate of Registration, (3) Permit to Reenter the Philippines, and (4) Immigration Cert. of Clearance all under the name of Osmea, who was eventually proclaimed as winning candidate. From the get go, the case may be dismissed for not being filed w/in the 25-day period required by law from the filing of the Cert. of Candidacy; nevertheless, the Court decided to decide the case based on the merits. There is no substantial and convincing evidence to find that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen. There was no proof that Osmea lost his citizenship by (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to a foreign country. Osmea vehemently denied having taken an oath of allegiance to the US. Being the son of a Filipino father, Osmea was presumed to be a Filipino, and Aznar failed to discharge the burden. From the mere fact that Osmea possessed a Certificate of Alien Registration as an American, it does not follow that he is no longer a Filipino. It is a classic case of non sequitur. It is possible that he possesses both nationalities. It cannot be implied that he actually renounced his Filipino citizenship. The statement under the Constitution against dual allegiance has no retroactive effect and is to be dealt w/ by law; but no law has yet to be enacted. Consolidated Dissents:

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When a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. Simply put, how can a person claim to be both an alien and a citizen at the same time? Obtaining an Alien Certificate is a clear and unambiguous act of declaring that one is not a citizen. It was a voluntary act for the purpose of insulating oneself from the jurisdiction of the State over its nationals. Express renunciation on the one hand and naturalization on the other are separate modes of losing citizenship. One need not be naturalized to actually have to renounce his citizenship. All the documents that Osmea requested from the CID are predicated upon the fact that he is an alien under Philippine laws especially his Permit to Re-enter. Entry to the country is a right conferred to citizens; if he believed himself to be a citizen, seeking permission would not be necessary. Osmea also made several sworn statements declaring himself to be a US citizen. Treating Osmea different from Frivaldo and Labo smacks of unequal treatment. Citizenship is like a jealous wife. When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say that he still loves her despite his desertion. Isagani Cruz BENGZON vs. CRUZ US Marine service / repatriation / restores old status Teodoro Cruz was born the year 1960 of Filipino parents. He was a natural born Filipino citizen. However, in 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US. He thus lost his Filipino citizenship. He was then naturalized as a US citizen the year 1990. However, by 1994, Cruz had reacquired his Filipino citizenship by virtue of Repatriation under RA No. 2630. Then he ran for and was elected as Representative of 2 nd District of Pangasinan. Bengzon, his losing competitor, assailed his citizenship qualification claiming that he is no longer a natural born citizen because he had to perform an act to acquire or perfect his citizenship . A person who, at the time of birth was a citizen of a particular country, is a natural born citizen thereof. In repatriation, the person recovers his ORIGINAL citizenship. In this case, since Cruz was once a natural-born citizen, repatriation had the effect of restoring his natural -born status. It is not a grant of new citizenship. RA No. 2630 indicated repatriation; it did not require the long and tedious process of naturalization. All that it required was for Cruz to once again swear allegiance to the Philippines, renounce any other allegiance, and for the same to be recorded in the Civil Registry. There are thus only 2 classifications of citizens: (1) natural born citizens, and (2) naturalized citizens. Only naturalized citizens are deemed not natural born. Dissent of Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez: If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation, or legislation, the citizenship cannot be considered natural-born. The person would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming is allegiance to the Philippines. The patriotic intent of the Constitution is to impose a more stringent requirement for those aspiring to hold high offices in the government particularly Congress. The majority has adopted a liberal and cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizenship. DD: Take note that for Repatriation to be effective, it must be registered w/ the Civil Registrar as well as the Bureau of Immigration (Altajeros vs. COMELEC). It is likewise not a matter of right but merely a privilege granted by the State. Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Section 5.

DD: RA No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act allows former Filipinos who have been naturalized in foreign countries to re-acquire their Filipino citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance and the registration thereof. The irony is that the Constitution deemed dual allegiance inimical to the public interest and mandated Congress to deal with the matter. What the Congress did in response was to legalize dual allegiance!

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ARTICLE 5

SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

AKBAYAN vs. COMELEC two-day extension Akbayan, along with other civic organizations and claiming to represent the youth sector, requested the COMELEC for a two-day extension to register as voters especially for those who have failed to register before the deadline of Dec. 27, 2000. After deliberating the issue, the COMELEC denied their request, claiming that under Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189, no voters registrations shall be conducted w/in 120 days before the election , and that the conduct of the said registration was now operationally impossible to be accomplished before the 120 day bar arrives. Thus, Akbayan filed a case for certiorari and mandamus, claiming that the COMELEC undermined their right to vote and that Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189 was unconstitutional for disenfranchising voters. The right to vote is not absolute and must be exercised w/in the framework of the Constitution and applicable laws providing for procedural and substantive requirements. One of the indispensable procedural requirements is registration. The State, in the exercise of police power, may enact laws to safeguard the credibility of elections. The aforesaid provision serves to secure the elections against flyingvoters, non-qualified registrants and the like; to void the same would compromise the integrity of the voters list and the entire election. Although RA No. 8436 allows the COMELEC to fix other dates and periods for activities regarding suffrage, such as registration, registration must still be done before the 120 day period laws must be harmonized. The law likewise does not require that the impossible be done and aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. The petitioners had every opportunity to register, but they were remiss and slumbered on their rights. ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC asylum / no intent to abandon / hardly voluntary / no change of residence Phillip Romualdez, son of Former Leyte Gov. Kokoy Romualdez and nephew of Imelda Marcos, established his residence in Bgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte sometime in the early 1980s. He once served as Bgy. Captain and was campaign manager for Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. After the EDSA Revolution, and fearing for their safety, the Romualdezes fled to the US where they sought asylum. In the year 1991, he was ordered to depart from the US by the Immigration Dept. He arrived in the Philippines December, 1991 and went back to his residence in Tolosa. He then registered to vote for the May 1992 Elections; Donato Advincula filed a petition to exclude Romualdez from the voters list; Romualdez had been physically present in Tolosa for only around 5 months while the Constitution requires at least 6 months residence in the place where he proposes to vote. In election cases, domicile and residence are treated synonymously. It imports not only an intention to reside in the place, but also personal presence coupled w/ conduct indicative of that intention. Domicile connotes a fixed permanent residence to w/c when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. In order to change domicile, the following requisites must concur: 1. 2. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality Intention to remain there (indefinitely)

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3. 4.

Intention to abandon the old domicile The change of residence must be voluntary

In this case, their sudden departure from the country is hardly voluntary and cannot constitute abandonment of residence. They went into self-exile under fear for their safety, which is perfectly understandable. Thus, their residence, which is Tolosa, remains the same. It cannot be said that they intended to abandon it in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Romualdez is thus eligible to vote in Tolosa, Leyte. MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC Absentee Voting / exception to the residency requirement Atty. Romulo Macalintal, through certiorari and prohibition, and as a lawyer and taxpayer, sought to declare certain provisions of the Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (RA No. 9189) unconstitutional claiming that it circumvents the residency requirement of the Constitution for the exercise of the right to vote. Under the said law, Filipinos residing abroad who are not otherwise disqualified, even immigrants or permanent residents, may vote for the national elections provided that they execute an affidavit stating: 1. 2. 3. That they will return to the Philippines not later than 3 years from the approval of their voters registration under the said Act That they have not applied for citizenship in a foreign country Failure or refusal to return w/in the said period shall be penalized by perpetual disenfranchisement

The presumption of constitutionality prevailed. While Section 1 provided for a residency requirement (1 year in the Philippines and 6 months in the locality where one will vote), the doctrine of necessary implication was applied. The strategic location of Section 2, mandating Congress to provide for a system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad, makes Absentee Voting the exception to the general rule under Section 1. The residency requirement was thus not applicable to Absentee Voting. Assuming arguendo that the residency requirement applies, the concepts of residence and domicile are synonymous for purposes of Election Law. By their act of executing the affidavit, the Absentee Voter manifests that he intends to return to his original residence in the Philippines thus, he is presumed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines despite his physical absence. Failure to return w/in the 3-year period is a ground for perpetual disenfranchisement. The intent of the Constitution is to confer the right to vote to as many Filipinos abroad and grant Congress the power to define the parameters for the exercise of such right. DD: How can a person be a PERMANENT resident of one country and still be domiciled in another? Notes: Qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Philippine citizenship Age of 18 years or over (at the time of the election) Residence in the Philippines for at least 1 year (domicile) Residence in the place where they propose to vote for at least 6 months preceding the election (may be temporary residence) Freedom from disqualifications prescribed by law

Reminders: The right to vote beings on a citizens 18th Birthday A person may register even if not yet 18 years old, provided he is 18 years old at the time of the date of election Registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin does not suffice to cause the loss or abandonment of such residency

DD: If a person has resided in one locality for 6 months or more and is at the same time domiciled in another, come election time, he has the option to choose the place where he will vote whether his current residence or his domicile.

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Additional Case
NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMELEC dual-citizens / absentee voting RA No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention & Re-acquisition Act allowed citizens who have been naturalized in other countries to re-acquire their Filipino citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance, among other requirements. It restores them to their civil and political rights. Loida Nicolas-Lewis, a dual-citizen under the said law, among other persons, applied for registration to be an Absentee Voter. The COMELEC wrote them through the Philippine Embassy that the Absentee Voting Law was not intended for them and thus, they are not eligible to vote unless they comply w/ the residency requirement in Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the Constitution. For as long as they comply w/ the requirements under the Absentee Voting Act (such as the affidavit requirement), the dual-citizens may avail of their right to vote through the said law. They need not satisfy the residency requirement, Absentee Voting being the exception to the general rule requiring residency. The intent of the Constitution and the law is to enfranchise all Filipino citizens living abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin and manifest their intention to return to the same. RA No. 9225 merely expanded the scope of the Absentee Voting Law to include the dual-citizens.

ARTICLE 13

SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Pertinent Cases Only
Labor
SSS EMPLOYEES vs. CA no right to strike for government employees Employees of the SSS staged a strike; the RTC enjoined the said employees and ordered them to return to work; thus this petition before the Supreme Court. The Constitution is silent as to whether government employees have the right to strike. Reference to the Deliberations as well as to applicable laws (RA No. 875) reveals that the right to form organizations does not include the right to strike. Art. 13 Sec. 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of workers to self-organization, negotiations, xxx including the right to strike in accordance w/ the law. For as long as there is no law allowing government employees to strike and regulating the same, any strike made by them is illegal. Relations between private employers and employees rest on a voluntary basis subject to certain requirements provided by law, but public employees are governed by Civil Service Laws. It is the government that, by law, fixes the terms and conditions of their employment not any collective bargaining agreement. EO No. 180 allows public employees to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment not fixed by law. If negotiations fail, their unions may bring the matter before the Public Sector Labor Management Council. They may likewise lobby in Congress for the terms they want; but they do not have the right to stage strikes, walk-outs, or other temporary work stoppages. REPUBLIC vs. CA (180 SCRA 428) The National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) is a government agency; hence its employees are governed by Civil Service Rules & Regulations. Therefore, the disputes between the NPDC and its employees are cognizable by the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, NOT the Dept. of Labor and Employment. EAGLE SECURITY vs. NLRC contractor & employer liable for unpaid wages Phil. Tuberculosis Society Inc. (PTSI) contracted the services of Eagle Security Agency for the service and assignment of security guards. Eagle security failed to pay the 16 guards assigned thereto their wages and allowance increases according to Wage Orders 2, 3, 5, and 6, thus the latter filed a case before the labor arbiter who ruled in favor of the guards. It held both PTSI and Eagle solidarily liable to the security guards for the payment of the latters wages. The PTSI argues that liability for unpaid wages should be born exclusively by Eagle as per their contract. The Labor Code provides that in case of failure by the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages to their workers, the employer (as well as any person or association employing such services) shall be liable with the contractor as indirect employer thereof. The purpose of the law is to afford protection to the workers; the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State and does not violate the Impairment Clause.

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DE VERA vs. NLRC separation for cause but w/ separation pay / compassion De Vera violated Company Rules by hitting Ocampo in the head. He was thus dismissed. While it is true that the company was itself prejudiced by De Veras conduct and disturbed its peace, the penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to the offense committed. De Vera has been working w/ the company for 14 years and performed well and seemed to have patched up his differences w/ Ocampo. Nevertheless, since reinstatement would not be practical, the court sustained his dismissal but required the Company to render separation pay. In certain cases, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy in even if his dismissal was for cause. The social justice policy mandates a compassionate attitude towards the working class in its relations w/ management and urges a moderation of sanctions. However, if the cause of separation is serious, then the generosity of the law must be more discerning.

Agrarian Reform
ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM CARP case Agrarian Reform in the Philippines underwent a steady evolution through various enactments including: (1) PD No. 27, requiring the compulsory acquisition of private agricultural lands for distribution to farmer-tenants and specifying retention limits, (2) EO No. 228 declaring full ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD No. 27, (3) Proc. No. 131 & EO No. 229 instituting the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and (4) the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL (RA No. 6657). It was subjected to bitter attacks against its constitutionality in several cases. The issues raised are resolved as follows: The President did not usurp legislative powers in enacting EO No. 228 & 229 as well as Proc. No. 131. The said enactments were made during the time when the President enjoyed extraordinary legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution and before Congress was convened. They were later authorized by the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. PD No. 27 was likewise enacted by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his then legislative powers during Martial Law. The enactments will continue to be in force until repealed or declared unconstitutional. The enactments were not appropriation measures; hence they are not bound by the more stringent requirements of appropriation. Even if it creates a Fund and the appropriations therefor were uncertain (at least P 50 billion) the same is nevertheless valid. Appropriation was not the main objective of the law, which is agrarian reform. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. All the requisites have been satisfied. The argument that not only landowners but also owner so of other property must suffer the burden must be outright rejected. The CARL was enacted in the exercise not only of the police power but also of eminent domain thus just compensation is due. It requires the surrender of the physical possession of the land as well as title thereto. The contention that the government must first pursue public lands before expropriating private agricultural lands is a POLITICAL QUESTION. The SC refuses to interpose its authority unless the acts were clearly illegal w/c supposedly is not the case here. The public use requirement was also obviously satisfied. The fact that determination of just compensation is initially vested in the DAR does not amount to usurpation of judicial powers. It is only an initial determination w/c may be brought to the proper court in case of disagreement. The said laws require the landowners to accept compensation not in the form of cash money. Only the initial deposit was required to be in cash. While jurisprudence, both local and US, is consistent in stating that compensation must be in the form of cash, the Agrarian Reform Program is an exceptional circumstance, a revolutionary expropriation, w/c would require a more pragmatic approach. The Constitution supposedly left it to Congress to determine the manner of payment. Payment in LBP bonds, tax credits, shares of stock, etc. were, after all, not oppressive. While jurisprudence was likewise consistent in stating that ownership only vests upon the full payment of just compensation, the SC nevertheless sustained the said laws. While not totally in cash, ownership transfers upon the deposit of the compensation in cash or bonds w/ the accessible bank. Until then, title remains w/ the owner.

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DD: Basically, in this case, we see how the Supreme Court was willing to make considerable exceptions even to well-settled rules, all in the interest of social justice. MADDUMBA vs. GSIS Land Bank bonds / must be accepted at face value A Land Bank bondholder purchased a residential house from the GSIS using the said bond (acquired as just compensation). He seeks to compel the GSIS to accept the said bonds in their face value; GSIS seeks to negotiate and secure a discount therefrom. The Land Bank bonds are fully-guaranteed by the government and their values cannot be diminished directly or indirectly. They are not ordinary commercial papers subject to discounting. The mere acceptance of Land Bank bonds as just compensation already entails some sacrifice on the part of the landowner; to reduce their value would impose yet another burden. The purpose of the law (RA No. 3844) is precisely to cushion the impact of dispossession upon the landowner. That there is no explicit provision regarding the matter is immaterial; the intent of the law prevails. GOCCs such as the GSIS thus may be compelled under the law to accept such bonds at their face value. TANAKA vs. JAPAN for comparison only In Japan, the amount of just compensation is not equivalent to the fair market value of the land in the free market. Rather, the amount of compensation is fixed by law. It is not calculated based on the existing economic conditions and does not always correspond to the value so determined. In the interest of public welfare, the use of private property may be regulated ; the use of farm lands cannot be for any other purpose than agriculture and the rent is fixed by law. However, payment of just compensation must be in the form of CASH and based on the fixed standard. It is important to take note of the scarcity of agricultural land in Japan. LUTZ FARMS vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM livestock & poultry lands not included in CAR Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) the DAR promulgated its implementing rules and regulations regarding Production & Profit Sharing. The CARL included poultry and livestock in the term agriculture, equated commercial farms w/ the private agricultural lands, and the Implementing Rules and called upon such farms to execute a production sharing plan allocating 3% of gross sales and 10% of net profits to their workers as additional compensation. Lutz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry, assailed the validity of the said regulation as well as the pertinent provisions of the CARL. It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry w/in the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Program. There is simply no reason to include them in the coverage, w/c covers only arable and suitable agricultural lands. Further, the required production and profit sharing scheme was arbitrary and confiscatory. DAR vs. DECS not dedicated to education but rather to business / not exempt The late Esteban Jalandoni donated a portion of the Hacienda Fe to the DECS, w/c then leased the lands to Agro Agricultural Corp. initially for 10 years but was renewed for another 10 years. Alpar and other farm workers filed a Petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program w/ the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office w/c was later approved by the DAR. The DECS contends that the said land was not covered by the CARL. The general policy of the law is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. It includes all alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. The subject lands are clearly w/in the coverage of the law and there is no legislation or presidential act converting it to residential, commercial, or industrial classification. For the subject lot to be exempt, it must be absolutely necessary for national defense or for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes. The subject lands were not exclusively dedicated for educational or research purposes but rather for business purposes; thus it is not exempt. DD: The Agrarian Reform Law allows the owners to retain certain portions of land and the choice of which portions to retain is exclusively vested to them.

Commission on Human Rights

CARIO vs. CHR teachers on strike / CHR cannot adjudicate / it can only investigate Some 800 public school teachers staged mass actions calling for redress of their grievances but elicited no response from the DECS. They were instead ordered to return to work or face dismissal. For failure to heed the instruction, certain teachers were dismissed or preventively suspended by DECS Sec. Cario. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed a similar petition w/o prejudice to appeal before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The teachers then submitted affidavits to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) w/c scheduled a dialogue and then, in an Order, adjudicated and decided the case on the merits declaring that the DECS had committed human rights violations against the dismissed and suspended teachers. The CHR

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manifested that it was not bound by the SCs R esolution dismissing the case contending that the same was based on a different set of facts. The CHR does not have the power to resolve cases on the merits, which is a judicial function. It only has investigative powers. It cannot decide cases like the courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The proper remedy for the teachers is to appeal their case to the DECS on a motion for reconsideration. If denied, they have recourse to the Civil Service Commission, and eventually to the SC. The CHR has no place in the scheme of things. EPZA vs. CHR The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla! RA No. 1980 designated the Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ). A parcel belonging to Phase 4 thereof was bought by Filoil Refinery Corp. but later was resold to the EPZA. However, before the EPZA could take possession thereof, several individuals unscrupulously intruded thereupon and planted their crops. In order to convince the intruders to leave, they were paid P 10,000 and made to sign quitclaims. 10 years later they filed a Joint Complaint w/ the CHR claiming that their human rights were violated. They allege that Engr. Damondamon and his armed group accompanied by the PNP brought a crane and bulldozer and threatened them. When they showed an Order from the President to postpone the bulldozing, the same was crumpled and thrown to the ground by one of Damondamons men who remarked, The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla! The media men invited by the squatters were likewise beaten and their cameras were taken and destroyed. The CHR issued an ORDER commanding Gov. Remulla to desist from the demolition, but 2 weeks later, they bulldozed the area again. The CHR issued yet another Order for the same purpose. The provision in the Constitution allowing the CHR to provide preventive measures and legal aid services cannot be construed as including the power to issue Temporary Restraining Orders or Writs of Injunction. If that were the intent of the Constitution, it would have expressly provided for it. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. The CHR may petition the court for the writ of injunction but has no power to be the one to issue the same. Its powers are merely investigatory in nature, not judicial. SIMON Jr. vs. CHR no judicial power / no power to issue writs of injunction / contempt power The Local Government of Quezon City sent notices of Demolition to members of the North EDSA Vendors Association giving them 3 days to vacate the sidewalks to give way for the construction of the Peoples Park. The CHR, at the instance of the hawkers, issued an Order directing Mayor Simon and the City Government to desist from conducting the demolition while the complaint was pending resolution w/ the CHR. The City Government ignored the Order and proceeded w/ the demolition; thus the CHR issued another Order citing the responsible officials in contempt for violating the Order directing them to desist from the demolition charging each of them a fine of P 500.00. Once again, it has been well settled that the CHR was not intended by the Constitution to be another judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. It has no business issuing Writs of Injunction. Its powers are merely vinvestigatory in nature. Writs of Injunction may only be issued by the court in w/c an action is pending. It is an ancillary remedy available only in a pending principal action. Thus the Order to desist being null and void, the Order of Contempt has no leg to stand on. The contempt power of the CHR must be utilized in relation to its investigatory powers such as refusal of persons to heed summons, or unduly withholding information. It cannot be utilized for purposes not w/in the power of the CHR to pursue. Reference to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the creation of the CHR was meant to investigate SERIOUS human rights violations, such as protection of rights of political detainees, prevention of tortures, disappearances, and the like although Congress may, by law, provide for other cases cognizable by the CHR, taking into account its recommendation. DD: Take note also that the CHR does not enjoy the same degree of Fiscal Autonomy as the other Constitutional Commissions.

ARTICLE 14

EDUCATION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY ARTS, CULTURE, & SPORTS

Pertinent Cases Only
MEYER vs. NEBRASKA teaching German / prohibition is arbitrary / right of parents to educate A Nebraska statute prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students unless they have already passed the 8th grade; violation of such rule amounts to a misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and imprisonment. The intent of the law apparently was to curb the baneful effects of the settlement of foreigners who rear

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their children in their native tongue and inculcate ideas inconsistent w/ American ideals. Meyer, an instructor at the Zion Parochial School, was convicted under the said law for teaching the German language to a 10 year old child. While the intent of the law is valid, the means employed is arbitrary. It infringes upon the right to liberty w/c includes the right of parents and teachers to instruct the children as they deem proper. Further, mere knowledge of the German language cannot be said to be harmful. No emergency has arisen that would require such a drastic prohibition. PIERCE vs. SOCIETY OF SISTERS compulsory public schooling / violates liberty of parents The Compulsory Education Act required that every parent or guardian of a child between 8-16 years old to send their children to a public school for a certain period; violation thereof amounts to a misdemeanor. The purpose of the law is to compel general attendance in public schools by normal children who have yet to complete the 8th grade. The Society of Sisters, a corporation w/c engages in the business of primary and secondary schooling and w/c owns considerable educational facilities, assails the validity of the law for violating the parents right to rear their children. They also stand to lose considerable profits du e to the enforcement of the law. The law unreasonably interferes w/ the right of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their students. The idea of standardizing children by forcing them to accept public instruction militates against the fundamental principle of liberty. DD: The duty to educate and rear children is primarily vested in their parents; the State merely has the subsidiary duty to educate and rear the same. The parents have the right to choose between public schools and private schools for their children. WISCONSIN vs. YODER Amish Community Jonas Yoder and the other defendants, were members of the Amish Religion who, against a Wisconsin compulsory attendance law, refused to send their children to igh school either private or public school after finishing the 8th grade. According to them and their expert witness, their religious dogmas mandate a return to the old Christian life, de-emphasizing competitiveness and success, and requiring aloofness from the material world. They allege that high school education goes against their dogmas favoring manual work and devotion to a life in harmony w/ nature, and so on and so forth. In fairness, the Amish have demonstrated to be law abiding and productive members of the society. It is true that the State has a paramount interest and responsibility for the education of its citizens; however, it must be subjected to a balancing process whenever it conflicts w/ other fundamental rights. In order to outweigh a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion and the right of parenthood, the State must establish that there is a compelling interest of great magnitude. That burden has not been discharged in this case. There is no proof that the Amish alternative education causes any harm to the students; and any argument that it deprives the children of choice as well as the chance to be competent is largely speculative. Despite their strangeness, the Amish have proven that adherence to their beliefs has allowed the Amish to survive for the last 3 centuries as productive and self-reliant citizens. There is no compelling state interest involved here. GINSBERG vs. NEW YORK Girly Mags! Ginsberg was operating Sams Stationer y and Luncheonette w/c also sold some magazines. He was charged and convicted for having sold girlie magazines on 2 separate occasions to children less than 17 years old in violation of the NY Penal Law. He attacks the validity of the said law for impairing the right to liberty. At the onset, obscenity is not protected speech; what may be protected expression for adults may not be considered protected expression for dissemination to children. The State has a legitimate interest in the well-being of its youth; and while it is true that the custody and care of children reside first in their parents, the State nevertheless has the responsibility to protect the youth from things that may impair their moral or ethical development. There is nothing in the statute to prevent a parent from purchasing the magazine and allowing his child to read it. But since parents cannot always be expected to monitor the children, reasonable regulation of the sale of such material by the State is justified. DECS vs. SAN DIEGO NMAT Flunker San Diego, a graduate of Zoology from UE, four times took the NMAT for entry to med school. He flunked the exam as many times. He was barred by the DECS from taking the NMAT the fifth time on the basis of the Three Flunk Rule laid down in MECS Order No. 12 w/c allows students to take the NMAT only 3 times. Should they fail the 3 rd time, they will no longer be allowed to take the exam. In fact he has already been able to take the exam more times than allowable. He challenges the constitutionality of the Three Flunk Rule for violating his right to academic freedom and quality education, as well as equal protection. The Three Flunk Rule was laid down as a valid exercise of the police power of the State as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

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In order to achieve its goal of upgrading the selection of applicants to the medical schools, the State may reasonably prescribe such admission tests. It is the duty of the State to ensure that the medical profession, w/c affects the very lives of the people, is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives. It likewise does not violate equal protection because the medical profession requires more careful and vigilant regulation. While San Diegos persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love NON vs. JUDGE DAMES rallying students / student-school contract / re-enrollment Ariel Non and 12 other students of the Mabini College were denied re-enrolment for having participated in unruly mass actions w/o permits from the school authorities resulting to the disruption of classes in violation of school disciplinary rules. The SC previously held in Alcuaz vs. PSBA that when a college student enrolls for one semester, the contract between him and the school is only for that semester and terminates by the end of the said semester. The school cannot be compelled to re-admit the student because the courts cannot make contracts for the parties. Non seeks a re-examination of the said ruling. The following doctrines have been laid down or reiterated: The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the school gate. The protection in favor of free speech, as well as to due process, among other rights, is similarly guaranteed to students. While the authority of the school to discipline students is recognized, it cannot go as far as to violate constitutional safeguards. The exercise of free expression and assembly cannot be used as basis for denying re-enrollment. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. The following must be observed: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. students must be informed in writing of the nature & cause of the accusations they shall have the right to answer the charges, w/ counsel should they so choose they shall be informed of the evidence against them they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf school authorities must decide based on evidence penalty imposed must be proportional

The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract; it is imbued w/ public interest. The State has power to supervise and regulate educational institutions pursuant to its constitutional mandate. Assuming that the contract was only for 1 semester, it does not mean that the reenrollment of the student is a matter entirely discretionary upon the school. BP No. 232 likewise recognized the right of the student to continue his course up to graduation, except in cases of (1) academic deficiency, or (2) violation of disciplinary regulations. In this case, the penalty of refusing re-enrollment is disproportionate to the offenses committed. Considering that 5 of the students did not have failing marks, they should be entitled to re-enrollment. 2 students had only 1 or 2 failures w/c cannot be sufficient deficiency. Since the academic standards of the school were never pleaded, Non, and the 3 others who had several failures are to be re-admitted w/o prejudice to any appropriate action if it is shown that they have indeed failed to satisfy the schools academic requirements. BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. JUDGE ALFONSO grossly inadequate med school The Phil. Muslim-Christian College of Medicine, later re-named Rizal College of Medicine, was ordered by the DECS to be closed down based on several findings of the Commission on Medical Education. The Commission, through several tests and surveys, found that the school suffered from serious deficiencies and lack of facilities and full-time faculty, among others in short, inadequate in every imaginable aspect. The College was able to obtain an injunction from respondent judge enjoining the DECS from closing down the school. The courts have no business substituting its judgment against that of the DECS and the Medical Board regarding matters clearly w/in its competence, unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The records clearly indicate that there is nothing to support the idea that the DECS committed grave abuse of discretion; in fact it was the respondent judge that was guilty thereof. The evaluating teams came from different sectors of the medical field and have conducted several studies, all approved by the Office of the President. They also afforded the College ample opportunities to improve its facilities but the latter repeatedly failed. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER vs. CA school closes down / no obligation to remain open Teachers of the Capitol Medical Center College (CMCC) demanded from the latter vacation & sick leave privileges. Upon being denied, they postponed the final semestral exam and influenced the students to boycott the school and conduct mass demonstrations. The school, upon due notice to the DECS and DOLE was forced to

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close down after the 1st semester. Thereafter, the students and the teachers filed an action to compel the school to re-open and admit them for the 2nd semester alleging that it was a contractual obligation of the school to allow them enrollment for the next semester. While it is true that the school may not unduly expel a student or refuse the latter enrollment w/o a valid cause (academic deficiency or violation of rules), nevertheless there is no contract between the school and the students for the former to remain open for the entire duration of the students courses. Further, the contract between the school and the student creates reciprocal rights and obligations that is for the school to educate the student, and for the student to comply w/ the rules and standards of the school. It was improper for the trial court judge to have issued an injunction for the school to re-open. Injunctions mandate maintenance of the status quo the status quo in this case was that the school was closed down. GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE seminary / no obligation to admit / academic freedom Epicharis Garcia was admitted for certain summer classes for credits in the Loyola School of Theology, a seminary. When she applied for enrollment for the 1st semester, the Faculty decided to bar her admission, thus she filed a case for mandamus to compel the school to admit her. It must be noted that the Loyola School merely allowed certain lay persons to attend its classes but admission to the school rests upon the discretion of the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of Ateneo. It is only upon the admission by the Asst. Dean that the student is deemed admitted to the degree or program. There was clearly no obligation on the part of the School to admit Garcia. After all, it is a seminary and she is a woman. All institutions of higher learning enjoy academic freedom. It includes discretions as to 1. 2. 3. 4. Who may teach, What may be taught, How it is to be taught, and Who may be admitted to study.

Academic freedom for the institution is distinguished from the academic freedom of the scholar w/c is the freedom to discover, publish, and teach the truth as he sees fit in the field of ones competence. Academic freedom likewise includes discretion as to the tenure of the academic staff as well as the allocation of income among different categories of expenditure. LUPANGCO vs. CA no reviewing before the exams! / academic freedom The Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) issued Res. No. 105, w/c prohibits examinees from attending review classes or briefings or from receiving handouts, tips, or review materials from their schools or review centers w/in 3 days before the licensure examinations. The examinees thus sue to annul the said Resolution. The Resolution is arbitrary and unreasonable and infringes upon academic freedom. The PRC had no authority to dictate upon the examinees how to prepare themselves for the exams, or to restrain them from taking lawful steps to fulfill their ambitions. Nor can they interfere w/ the conduct of reviews by the schools unless the instructions are found to be impractical or riddled w/ corruption. The PRC should find the sources of the leakages and stop them right then and there; but they cannot interfere w/ the legitimate means of preparing for exams. UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS vs. CA cum laude through mandamus / academic freedom Jennifer Lee filed a case for mandamus to compel the University of San Carlos to confer upon her the Degree of BS Commerce major in Accounting, cum laude. She, in fact, earned a grade of 5 (failure) in 2 of her subjects, more than enough to disqualify her from honors; although she was able to have her grade changed through manifold maneuvers. Schools are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in granting honors for graduation. This is guaranteed by their academic freedom and their discretion may not be disturbed by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion. Even assuming that she had her failing grades removed, it is still discretionary upon the school whether they it should confer upon her academic honors. REYES vs. CA 3 agonizing years of uncertainty The UP College of Medicine (UPCM) prescribed a passing rate of 70% in the NMAT as the cut-off score for admission to the College of Medicine; it was approved by the University Council (UC). Later on, the UPCM changed the passing score to 90% w/o the approval of the UC. Upon appeal to the Board of Regents (BOR) by the respondent-students the BOR reverted to the 70% NMAT cut-off score, and the students who attained scores between 70% and 90% were thus ordered admitted. The Dean of the UPCM as well as the Faculty did not heed the directive for them to admit the students. The students filed a case for Injunction before the RTC, and while the same was pending, they were admitted and had, in fact, completed 3 years already.

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The students then wrote to the UPCM manifesting that they never intended to question the facultys right to academic freedom and left the case for the humanitarian consideration of the same; they also sought the dismissal of the case before the RTC. The BOR, invoking its plenary power regarding matter affecting university affairs, approved the admission of the respondent-students in the interest of equity and justice. The Dean and the Secretary of the UPCM, again, refused to follow the directive. Under the UP Charter, the power to determine the admission requirements belonged to the UC. When the UPCM fixed the cut-off grade to 90%, it did not have the approval of the UC. The 90% cut-off rate fixed by the faculty was thus inefficacious. The UC alone, not the Dean or the UPCM, has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. This is by virtue of an express provision of law. MIRIAM COLLEGE vs. CA Libog article / power to investigate inherent in academic freedom Members of the editorial board of Chi-Rho, the school publication of Miriam College, published the article Libog w/c was described by the Miriam College community as obscene, sexually explicit, vulgar, and the like. Complaints against the students responsible for the article have been filed; the students invoke Sec. 7 of the Campus Journalism Act, w/c states that a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of the article he/she has written. They likewise aver that the investigation should be conducted by the DECS. Imposing discipline is not only the right but also the duty of the school. It is inherent in academic freedom that the school be allowed to determine who among its students deserve sanction and to establish rules and regulations therefor. The power to investigate is adjunct to the power to suspend or expel. It is inherent in academic freedom. Thus Miriam College has the right to hear and decide the case. Also, it is axiomatic that the right to free expression is not absolute, whether exercise w/in school premises or elsewhere. Sec. 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should thus be harmonized w/ the Constitution to mean that students should not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of the articles they write, provided, they do not materially disrupt class work or provoke substantial disorder. UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. CA plagiarism A. William Margaret Celine was a candidate for Ph.D. from UP. Dean Paz requested from the Board of Regents (BOR) the exclusion of her name from the list of graduating students pending clarifications about her dissertation, but her letter did not reach the BOR on time; thus Celine was able to graduate. Upon thorough investigation by the External Review Panel composed of senior faculty, it was found out that her dissertation contained at least 90 instances of plagiarism. The College Assembly and University Council unanimously approved the withdrawal of her Ph.D. She then filed a case for mandamus before the RTC of Quezon City to compel UP to restore her Ph.D. A writ of mandamus cannot issue against UP w/o violating its right to academic freedom. The university has the right to determine upon whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. If it is shown that the conferment was obtained through fraud, the university has the right to withdraw or revoke the honor. Celine was likewise afforded her right to be heard because she was present during the investigations. TAN vs. CA severely strained relations / practical approach There was a bitter conflict between parents and school administration to such an extent that one of the parents spit in the face of the Vice Principal. The school refused to admit the children of the adversarial parents. Where relations between parents and children on the one hand and school administrators and teachers on the other have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, the private school may, in the interest of everyone, including the adversarial parents and their children, require that their students be enrolled elsewhere. To rule otherwise would unduly jeopardize the morally conducive and orderly educational environment, to the detriment of the students. It is comparable to certain labor disputes where relations have become so strained as to make reinstatement an unfeasible solution.

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