United States Code Annotated Constitution of the United States Annotated Article III.

The Judiciary (Refs & Annos) U.S.C.A. Const. Art. III 2, cl. 1

Section 2, Clause 1. Jurisdiction of Courts

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STANDING TO MAINTAIN ACTION Standing to maintain action generally Supreme Court has an obligation to assure itself of litigants' standing under Article III. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, U.S.2006, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 547 U.S. 332, 164 L.Ed.2d 589, rehearing denied 126 S.Ct. 2961, 548 U.S. 920, 165 L.Ed.2d 979, on remand 197 Fed.Appx. 454, 2006 WL 2793084. Federal Courts 460.1 Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial selfgovernment, core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, U.S.Minn.1992, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 504 U.S. 555, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Standing does not refer simply to party's capacity to appear in court; rathe r standing is gauged by specific common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that party presents. International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, U.S.La.1991, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 500 U.S. 72, 114 L.Ed.2d 134, on remand. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, U.S.Dist.Col.1976, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L.Ed.2d 450. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Inquiry as to standing involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise; in both dimensions, it is founded in concern about the proper, and properly limited, role of the courts in a democratic society.Warth v. Seldin, U.S.N.Y.1975, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on party seeking to get his complaint before federal court and not on issues he wishes to have adjudicated; when standing is placed in issue in case, question is whether person whose standing is challenged is proper party to request adjudication of particular issue, and not whether issue itself is justiciable. Flast v. Cohen, U.S.N.Y.1968, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 392 U.S. 83, 20 L.Ed.2d 947. Federal Civil Procedure 111

Doctrine of standing focuses upon party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, rather than justiciability of issue at stake in litigation. Fulani v. Bentsen, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 35 F.3d 49. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Standing requirement, which comes from Article III requirement that federal courts determine only those issues that arise in a case or controversy, is a threshold requirement to any suit. State of Mich. v. U.S., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1993, 994 F.2d 1197. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Once Article III standing exists, nothing prevents Congress from not only creating a private right of action, but also defining the scope of the litigation; stated differently, Congress may override the judicial scruples informing determinations of prudentialstanding. Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., E.D.Cal.2006, 413 F.Supp.2d 1130. Action 3; Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 The elements of standing are: (1) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, i.e., an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, i.e., the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the East Lake Sammamish Trail v. City of Sammamish, W.D.Wash.2005, 361 F.Supp.2d 1260, reconsideration denied. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 There are three elements which plaintiffs must show to be granted standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, either actual or threatened, (2) there must be a causal con nection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) the injury must be likely redressed by a favorable decision. Anderson v. Orleans Parish School Bd., E.D.La.2004, 340 F.Supp.2d 716.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Court need only find that one plaintiff has established Article III standing to allow case to proceed. Western Land Exchange Project v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, D.Nev.2004, 315 F.Supp.2d 1068. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 To establish standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) injury in fact, that is, invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) causal relationship between injury and challenged conduct, that is, injury that is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant, and not result of independent action of some third party not before court; and (3) likelihood, not mere speculation, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision.Arakaki v. Cayetano, D.Hawai'i 2002, 299 F.Supp.2d 1090, reconsideration denied 299 F.Supp.2d 1107, affirmed on other grounds423 F.3d 954, vacated 126 S.Ct. 2859, 547 U.S. 1189, 165 L.Ed.2d 892, on remand 477 F.3d 1048, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 2861, 547 U.S. 1200, 165 L.Ed.2d 909, reconsideration denied 299 F.Supp.2d 1114, reconsideration denied 299 F.Supp.2d 1129.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 No case or controversy exists if plaintiff lacks standing to make claims asserted. Arakaki v. Cayetano, D.Hawai'i 2002, 299 F.Supp.2d 1090, reconsideration denied 299 F.Supp.2d 1107, affirmed on other grounds 423 F.3d 954, vacated 126 S.Ct. 2859, 547 U.S. 1189, 165 L.Ed.2d 892, on remand 477 F.3d 1048, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 2861, 547 U.S. 1200, 165 L.Ed.2d 909, reconsideration denied 299 F.Supp.2d 1114, reconsideration denied 299 F.Supp.2d 1129. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2;Federal Courts 12.1 A plaintiff must meet three requirements to establish Article 3 standing: first, she must demonstrate injury in fact, that is, a harm that is concrete, actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; second, she must establish causation, that is, a fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant; and, third, she must demonstrate redressability, that is, a substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. Doe v. Rumsfeld, D.D.C.2003, 297 F.Supp.2d 119, stay granted 297 F.Supp.2d 200. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3

Notion of standing, which constitutes part of Article III case and controversy limitation on jurisdiction of federal courts, focuses on party seeking to get complaint before federal court and not on issues that party wishes to have adjudicated. Blocker v. Small Business Admin., D.D.C.1996, 916 F.Supp. 37. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 To bring action in federal court, plaintiffs must have standing and matter must be ripe for adjudication. Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp, D.N.D.1995, 904 F.Supp. 1061. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Standing doctrine is aspect of constitutional case or controversy requirement, and requires elimination of claims where plaintiff has failed to make out case or controversy between himself and defendant. Lawson v. Dugger, S.D.Fla.1994, 844 F.Supp. 1538, reversed 85 F.3d 502. Federal Courts 12.1 Standing to sue is essential and unchanging part of case-or-controversy requirement. Gilbert v. Shalala, D.Colo.1993, 828 F.Supp. 815, affirmed 45 F.3d 1391, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 49, 516 U.S. 806, 133 L.Ed.2d 14. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Federal judicial power is limited under Article III to adjudication of cases and controversies, which limitation includes requirement that plaintiff have standing to bring action, in turn requiring that plaintiff personally have suffered some actual or threatened injury.Mason v. Bradley, N.D.Ill.1992, 789 F.Supp. 273. Federal Courts 12.1 To achieve standing, plaintiff must satisfy both case and controversy requirements of Article III, and certain prudential requirements. Hitachi Metals, Ltd. v. Quigg, D.D.C.1991, 776 F.Supp. 3, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1920. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Question of standing is essentially whether litigant is entitled to have court decide merits of dispute or of particular issues; focus is upon qualifications and status of party seeking to bring complaint before federal court and not on issues he wishes to have resolved. National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, W.D.Tex.1991, 761 F.Supp. 1285. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Requirement that litigant have standing to bring lawsuit in federal court is derived from constitutional requirement that federal courts may adjudicate only actual cases or controversies; if plaintiff lacks necessary interest in lawsuit to have standing, there is no case or controversy, and court lacks jurisdiction. Clarke v. Ford Motor Co., E.D.Wis.2004, 220 F.R.D. 568, vacated 228 F.R.D. 631. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Standing inquiry regarding plaintiff's personal stake in outcome of controversy is based on constitutional and prudential concepts, seeks to eliminate claims for which there has been no actual or threatened injury from allegedly illegal conduct, and limits access to courts to those who would be best suited to assert particular claim. In re Bequette, Bkrtcy.S.D.Ill.1995, 184 B.R. 327. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Jurisdiction, standing to maintain action The core component of the requirement that a litigant have standing to invoke the authority of a federal court is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, U.S.2006, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 547 U.S. 332, 164 L.Ed.2d 589, rehearing denied 126 S.Ct. 2961, 548 U.S. 920, 165 L.Ed.2d 979, on remand 197 Fed.Appx. 454, 2006 WL 2793084. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Person seeking to invoke jurisdiction of federal court must establish requisite standing to sue before federal court can consider merits of legal claim; Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction only over cases and controversies and doctrine of standingserves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through judicial process. Whitmore v. Arkansas, U.S.Ark.1990, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 495 U.S. 149, 109 L.Ed.2d 135. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1

If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, then a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Delta Commercial Fisheries Ass'n v. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, C.A.5 (La.) 2004, 364 F.3d 269. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Standing requirement is, at its core, constitutionally mandated prerequisite for federal jurisdiction, and is essential and unchanging part of case or controversy requirement of Article III. Mausolf v. Babbitt, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1996, 85 F.3d 1295, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Standing is jurisdictional under Article 3, and thus is threshold issue in all cases, since putative plaintiffs lacking standing are not entitled to have their claims litigated in federal court. Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 81 F.3d 521.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Standing is a constitutional precondition to jurisdiction of a federal court and may not be conferred by judicial fiat upon a party who does not meet the requirements of Article III. U.S. v. AVX Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1992, 962 F.2d 108. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Owner of undeveloped property suffered actual injury by denial of his application for zoning permit to develop property for commercial use on basis of floating size cap, and, therefore, he had standing to make civil rights challenge to township zoning resolution and standards for particular development on basis that cap was unconstitutionally vague. Wedgewood Ltd. Partnership I. v. Township of Liberty, Ohio, S.D.Ohio 2006, 456 F.Supp.2d 904. Civil Rights 1333(3); Zoning And Planning 1588 While lack of statutory standing can be excused at sound discretion of trial judge, Article III standing is prerequisite for court to attain subject matter jurisdiction over matter. U.S. v. One Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand, Three Hundred Eighty-One Dollars in U.S. Currency ($138,381.00), Seized on October 24, 1996, at John F. Kennedy International Airport from Jose M. Agudelo-Garcia, E.D.N.Y.2003, 240 F.Supp.2d 220. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Case or controversy requirement for exercise of federal courts' jurisdiction gives rise to the concepts of standing and ripeness.Goleta National Bank v. O'Donnell, S.D.Ohio 2002, 239 F.Supp.2d 745. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 If plaintiff does not have standing, matter before court is not case or controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution of United States for subject matter jurisdiction to exist. Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, D.S.C.2002, 236 F.Supp.2d 564, affirmed 361 F.3d 786, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 373 F.3d 580, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 1036, 543 U.S. 1119, 160 L.Ed.2d 1067. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 In absence of plaintiff with standing, federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear case. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, C.D.Cal.1996, 922 F.Supp. 327, affirmed 195 F.3d 1039, amended on denial of rehearing, certiorari denied 120 S.Ct. 2717, 530 U.S. 1261, 147 L.Ed.2d 983. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Standing does not focus on merits but is preliminary jurisdictional requirement necessary to establish that litigant is entitled to judicial action. Berry v. City of Little Rock, E.D.Ark.1995, 904 F.Supp. 940, affirmed 94 F.3d 648. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases or controversy of which standing is core component. Vannatta v. Keisling, D.Or.1995, 899 F.Supp. 488, affirmed 151 F.3d 1215, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 870, 525 U.S. 1104, 142 L.Ed.2d 771.Federal Courts 12.1 Constitutional limitation of federal court jurisdiction to cases or controversy requires that party seeking to invoke jurisdiction havestanding. Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., D.Del.1992, 805 F.Supp. 252. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases or controversy, and standing doctrine is one aspect of that requirement.Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Blanchard, W.D.Mich.1991, 761

F.Supp. 1303, affirmed 979 F.2d 851, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1847, 507 U.S. 1031, 123 L.Ed.2d 471. Federal Courts 12.1 Determination of standing, standing to maintain action Any party, and even the court sua sponte, can raise the issue of standing for the first time at any stage of the litigation, including on appeal. Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Products, Inc., C.A.Fed. (Mo.) 2003, 320 F.3d 1354, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985, on remand2003 WL 24272366. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 623 A federal court has an obligation to assure itself that a litigant who seeks an injunction has Article III standing at the outset of the litigation. Association for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Integra Resort Management, Inc., M.D.Fla.2005, 385 F.Supp.2d 1272.Injunction 114(2) Courts are obliged to examine issues of standing sua sponte under the case-or-controversy requirement associated with Article III of the United States Constitution. US Fax Law Center, Inc. v. iHire, Inc., D.Colo.2005, 362 F.Supp.2d 1248, motion denied 373 F.Supp.2d 1208. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 While a plaintiff must have a personal interest at stake throughout the litigation of a case, such interest is to be assessed under the rubric of standing at the commencement of the case, and under the rubric of mootness thereafter. Van Arnam v. General Services Admin., D.Mass.2004, 332 F.Supp.2d 376. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Claimant does not need to prove underlying merits of claim to have standing in forfeiture action. U.S. v. $244,320.00 in U.S. Currency, S.D.Iowa 2003, 295 F.Supp.2d 1050. Forfeitures 5 Standing is issue of law that should be decided by court. U.S. v. $244,320.00 in U.S. Currency, S.D.Iowa 2003, 295 F.Supp.2d 1050. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 District court has duty to ascertain sua sponte the standing of a party under the Constitution's grant of power to the federal courts to resolve cases and controversies. Marcus Cable Associates, L.L.C. v. City of Bristol, Virginia, W.D.Va.2002, 237 F.Supp.2d 675.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 Standing question is threshold test that must be satisfied before considering whether plaintiff has adequately pled federal cause of action. U.S. ex rel. Yellowtail v. Little Horn State Bank, D.Mont.1992, 828 F.Supp. 780, affirmed 15 F.3d 1095. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Determination of standing is threshold test that must be satisfied in every federal case before court may entertain suit. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Campbell Farming Corp., D.Mont.1992, 828 F.Supp. 1468, affirmed 31 F.3d 768, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1362, 514 U.S. 1018, 131 L.Ed.2d 218. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 For purposes of determining whether party has standing, courts consider constitutional notion of justiciability and judicially imposed prudential limitation on exercise of federal jurisdiction. Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of West Orange, N.J., D.N.J.1992, 786 F.Supp. 408. Federal Courts 12.1 Elements, standing to maintain action Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: (1) plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. U.S. v. Hays, U.S.La.1995, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 515 U.S. 737, 132 L.Ed.2d 635, on remand 936 F.Supp. 360. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III, which is the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered injury in

fact, that the injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority, C.A.8 (S.D.) 2003, 342 F.3d 871, rehearing denied. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Article II standing requires showing of: (1) injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) causal connection between alleged injury and defendant's conduct; and (3) likelihood that favorable decision will redress injury. Doe ex rel. Doe v. School Dist. of City of Norfolk, C.A.8 (Neb.) 2003, 340 F.3d 605, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Three elements are required to establish Article 3 standing: first, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, namely, an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lincoln v. Case, C.A.5 (La.) 2003, 340 F.3d 283. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Standing is comprised of three elements: first, plaintiff must have suffered injury-in-fact, an invasion of legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; second, there must be causal connection between injury and conduct forming basis of lawsuit, that is, injury has to be traceable to defendant and not result of conduct of third person not party to action before court; third, it must be likely that injury will be redressed through favorable decision by court. U.S. ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp., C.A.7 (Wis.) 1995, 49 F.3d 1208, on remand 165 F.R.D. 83.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Constitutional limitations on standing are threatened or actual distinct and palpable injury to plaintiff, fairly traceable causal connection between injury and defendant's challenged conduct, and substantial likelihood that requested relief will redress or prevent injury. Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 24 F.3d 56. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To establish standing to sue, party must, at irreducible minimum, show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct, that injury fairly can be traced to challenged action, that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable decision, and that he falls within zone of interests that particular statute addresses. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, C.A.Fed. (Cal.) 1991, 932 F.2d 920, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1677. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To have Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiff must demonstrate that he is likely to suffer future injury, that he is likely to suffer such injury at hands of defendant, and that relief sought will likely prevent injury from occurring.Cone Corp. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1190, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2238, 500 U.S. 942, 114 L.Ed.2d 479. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 In determining standing of parties to sue, court should consider whether complaint falls within zone of interest protected by statute or constitutional provision at issue, whether complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately resolved by legislative branches, and whether plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than legal rights and interests of third parties. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1987, 812 F.2d 687, on remand 804 F.Supp. 1547. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 For purposes of Article III standing requirement that plaintiff show an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, particularized means that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way; inquiry focuses not on likelihood of success on the merits,

but on nature and source of the claim asserted. Torres v. Rite Aid Corp., N.D.Cal.2006, 412 F.Supp.2d 1025. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 To establish constitutional standing to bring a federal action, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he has have suffered an injury in fact, by an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, so that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of a third party not before the court; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, D.D.C.2003, 279 F.Supp.2d 13. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) injury in fact, i.e., the invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, i.e., that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, i.e., that the prospect of obtaining relief from a favorable ruling is not too speculative. D.L. v. Unified School Dist. No. 497, D.Kan.2002, 270 F.Supp.2d 1217, amended 2002 WL 31296445, modified on reconsideration 2002 WL 31253740, vacated 392 F.3d 1223, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2305, 544 U.S. 1050, 161 L.Ed.2d 1090, on remand 2008 WL 4148593. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Complaint in putative class action by Louisiana residents against nation's mobile home manufacturers failed to establish that residents had Article III standing, in that complaint contained no allegation, either general or specific, of physical injury or property loss suffered by any plaintiff due to alleged design defects in manufacturers' products, did not show requisite causal link between any injury and manufacturers' conduct, and could not show likelihood of redress, given absence of alleged injury. Matte v. Sunshine Mobile Homes, Inc., W.D.La.2003, 270 F.Supp.2d 805. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5 Plaintiffs have burden of establishing standing to bring their suit by demonstrating that they have: (1) suffered injury in fact; (2) which is fairly traceable to conduct complained of; and (3) is capable of judicial redress. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, D.D.C.2003, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, concurred with in part, dissented from in part 251 F.Supp.2d 176, entered 251 F.Supp.2d 948, probable jurisdiction noted 123 S.Ct. 2268, 539 U.S. 911, 156 L.Ed.2d 127, probable jurisdiction noted 123 S.Ct. 2268, 539 U.S. 912, 156 L.Ed.2d 127, probable jurisdiction noted 123 S.Ct. 2269, 539 U.S. 912, 156 L.Ed.2d 127, probable jurisdiction noted 123 S.Ct. 2270, 539 U.S. 912, 156 L.Ed.2d 127, probable jurisdiction noted 123 S.Ct. 2271, 539 U.S. 912, 156 L.Ed.2d 127, probable jurisdiction noted 123 S.Ct. 2272, 539 U.S. 912, 156 L.Ed.2d 127, affirmed in part, reversed in part 124 S.Ct. 619, 540 U.S. 93, 157 L.Ed.2d 491, stay granted 253 F.Supp.2d 18. Federal Courts 1042 To satisfy Article III's standing requirements, plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) injury is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant, and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Vermont Public Interest Research Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, D.Vt.2002, 247 F.Supp.2d 495. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; there must be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of; and it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will

be redressed by a favorable decision. United Prison Equipment Co., Inc. v. Board of County Com'rs of Caroline County, Md., D.Md.1995, 907 F.Supp. 908. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 From a constitutional standpoint, there are three minimum elements of standing plaintiff must satisfy: plaintiff must have suffered injury in fact, i.e. an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent not conjectural or hypothetical; there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, such that the injury is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant and not the result of independent action of some third party not before the court; finally, it must be likely, and not merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Pagan v. Dubois, D.Mass.1995, 894 F.Supp. 45. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 For plaintiff to have standing under Article III, three minimum constitutional requirements must exist: plaintiff must suffer actual or threatened injury; plaintiff's injury must be traceable to alleged unlawful conduct of defendant; and relief plaintiff seeks must be likely to remedy plaintiff's injury. Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., D.Utah 1995, 876 F.Supp. 1231, vacated 98 F.3d 590. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 In order to satisfy constitutional requirement that parties bringing case or controversy have standing, party invoking court's authority must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant, and that injury fairly can be traced to challenged action and is likely to be redressed by favorable decision. Doe v. Shalala, D.Md.1994, 862 F.Supp. 1421. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Three constitutional limitations of Article III standing, namely, distinct and palpable injury to plaintiff, fairly traceable casual connection between injury and challenged conduct, and substantial likelihood that relief requested will prevent or redress injury, may be summarized as requirements of injury, causation, and redressability. MAI Systems Corp. v. UIPS, N.D.Cal.1994, 856 F.Supp. 538. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Case or controversy requirement of Article III standing contains three elements: injury in fact, causal connection between injury and conduct complained of, and capability of favorable decision to redress injury. Ehn v. Housing Authority of City of Sarasota, M.D.Fla.1993, 830 F.Supp. 1438. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3; Federal Courts 12.1 To have standing, plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered or imminently will suffer actual injury, that injury is fairly traceable to conduct or actions of defendants, and that favorable federal court decision will effectively provide redress for the injury alleged; additionally, plaintiff may assert only his or her own rights, and cannot raise rights of third parties who are not before the court, and party cannot sue as citizen or as taxpayer who shares grievance in common with all other citizens or taxpayers.Pankey v. Webster, W.D.Mo.1993, 816 F.Supp. 553. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 In order to have standing, plaintiff must demonstrate some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of named defendant, and must show that injury can be fairly traced to challenged action and that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable decision. Herlihy v. Ply-Gem Industries, Inc., D.Md.1990, 752 F.Supp. 1282. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Prudential requirements, standing to maintain action Prudential standing considerations did not weigh against Article III standing for assignees of payphone operators in their Communications Act suits against long-distance carriers seeking to recover dial-around compensation for coinless payphone calls; assignees were asserting first-party interests, having acquired all rights, title and interest in operators' claims, operators' choice to proceed by assignment rather than class action did not by itself warrant finding of no standing, and district court could address any practical problems such as operators' non-compliance with discovery

requests. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., U.S.Dist.Col.2008, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 554 U.S. 269, 171 L.Ed.2d 424. Telecommunications 916(2) Prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, U.S.2004, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 542 U.S. 1, 159 L.Ed.2d 98, rehearing denied 125 S.Ct. 21, 542 U.S. 961, 159 L.Ed.2d 851. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Even when case falls within constitutional boundaries, plaintiff may still lack standing under prudential principles by which judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated, and to limit access to federal courts to those litigants best suited to certain particular claim, and, e.g., litigant normally must assert injury peculiar to himself or to distinct group of which he is part, rather than one shared in substantially equal measure by all or large class of citizens, and plaintiff must also assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, U.S.Ill.1979, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 441 U.S. 91, 60 L.Ed.2d 66. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 The source of plaintiff's claim to relief assumes critical importance with respect to the prudential rules of standing that, apart from minimum requirements of this article, serve to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes; essentially, the standingquestion in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. Warth v. Seldin, U.S.N.Y.1975, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Investment advisor's relationship with clients upon whose behalf advisor brought suit for violations of federal securities laws did not confer prudential exception to injury in fact requirement for Article III standing, absent demonstration that there was a hindrance to clients' ability to protect their own interests. W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 549 F.3d 100, on remand 2009 WL 73117, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 2011, 173 L.Ed.2d 1088. Securities Regulation 25.19; Securities Regulation 25.60; Securities Regulation 60.36 Shareholder in law firm that sponsored several prototype retirement plans lacked prudential standing to seek refund, on fraud/malfeasance grounds, of his pro rata share of sanction imposed by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and arising from failure to timely correct deficiencies in plans, even though firm had been dissolved and shareholder had contributed personal funds to pay sanction; sanction had been imposed against firm, closing agreement pursuant to which sanction was collected was between IRS and firm, and dissolution of firm did not preclude its ability to raise claim against IRS under governing state law. Jewell v. U.S., C.A.8 (Ark.) 2008, 548 F.3d 1168, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Internal Revenue 5246 Coalition of environmental groups had prudential standing to challenge, under NEPA and National Forest Management Act (NFMA), Forest Service's amendments to forest plans regarding procedures for collecting information on proposed, endangered, threatened and sensitive species (PETS); agency action was final, plaintiffs alleged that Service's failure to comply with NEPA with respect to revisions to certain forest plans had adversely affected the environment, which was the source of their injury, and, since injury alleged was environmental, it fell within zone of interests protected by NEPA, via the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006, 463 F.3d 1163, on remand 535 F.Supp.2d 1268, corrected.Environmental Law 652; Woods And Forests 8 Waste management companies had prudential standing to challenge municipal waste flow control ordinances enacted by regional waste management authority, which required disposal of all solid waste generated within geographic boundaries of authority at one of its facilities, as to their burden on interstate commerce, though companies did not ship any garbage collected in the region out of

state; companies were engaged in interstate commerce, and their interstate commerce was allegedly burdened by the ordinances. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Pine Belt Regional Solid Waste Management Authority, C.A.5 (Miss.) 2004, 389 F.3d 491, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 332, 546 U.S. 812, 163 L.Ed.2d 45. Commerce 52.10 Executive order, directing that in meeting federal space needs in urban areas first consideration be given to centralized community business areas, was enforceable through judicial action, and therefore city had prudential standing to challenge procedures used by Department of Interior (DOI) in reaching its final decision with respect to site selection for proposed new office building; executive order was based on Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, neither Act nor order precluded judicial review, and regulations were sufficiently specific to allow a court to determine whether DOI abused its discretion in its site selection process. City Of Albuquerque v. U.S. Dept. Of Interior, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2004, 379 F.3d 901. United States 56 Manufacturer of approved substitute for particular ozone-depleting chemical had prudential standing to challenge Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule authorizing use of other substitutes, which were themselves ozone-depleting, under certain circumstances; manufacturer was, for its own competitive reasons, suing to enforce statutorily demarcated entry restriction.Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. E.P.A., C.A.D.C.2004, 374 F.3d 1363, 362 U.S.App.D.C. 538, opinion withdrawn in part on reconsideration393 F.3d 1315, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 244. Environmental Law 656 Pharmaceutical manufacturer had prudential standing to petition for review of order of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), issued pursuant to Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act, requiring importers to suspend shipments of ephedrine to manufacturer, on ground that shipments might be diverted to clandestine manufacture of controlled substance, where Act's suspension provision necessarily regulated interests not only of importers but also their domestic customers such as manufacturer. PDK Laboratories Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., C.A.D.C.2004, 362 F.3d 786, 360 U.S.App.D.C. 344. Customs Duties 22 Prudential principles that bear on the question of standing are: (1) the Plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties; (2) even when the Plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III, the federal courts will not adjudicate abstract questions of wide public significance which amount to generalized grievances shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches; and (3) the Plaintiff's complaint must fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Miller v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., C.A.3 (Pa.) 2004, 362 F.3d 209. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 City resident's alleged injuries, that he felt alienated and offended by Ten Commandments monument displayed at city park, and that he curtailed his use of city park because of it, met judiciallyconstructed prudential standing requirements to file lawsuit challenging presence of monument as violative of the Establishment Clause; such injuries were within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the Establishment Clause, that is the prohibition on government establishment of religion, resident asserted his own interests, not those of third parties, and grievances were not pervasively shared, and could be addressed by federal courts. ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, Nebraska, C.A.8 (Neb.) 2004, 358 F.3d 1020, rehearing granted and vacated, on rehearing 419 F.3d 772. Constitutional Law 835 Private Parcel service satisfied prudential requirements for standing to bring suit seeking to prevent Postal Service from implementing International Customers Mail (ICM) service; (1) private service was asserting its own interests rather than those of any third party, (2) interest sought to be upheld was concrete rather than abstract, and (3) private service, as competitor of Postal Service, was within zone of interests sought to be protected by federal statutes governing operation of Postal Service,

even though it was claimed that mailers were to be protected rather than competitors. UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, C.A.3 (Del.) 1995, 66 F.3d 621, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1261, 516 U.S. 1171, 134 L.Ed.2d 210. Postal Service 1 Insured did not have prudential standing to bring action against automobile liability insurer for judgment for medical expenses which were not paid by insurer but which were paid by Medicare; insured was seeking to vindicate rights of a third party, the United States, and was not the best suited to assert the complex claims that Medicare benefits are secondary to no-fault benefits.Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1994, 22 F.3d 534. Insurance 3567 Issue of whether foreign entities had standing to contest Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) final asbestos rule was question of prudential standing, which was of less than constitutional dimensions; thus, touchstone of analysis was statutory language used by Congress in conferring standing upon general public. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A., C.A.5 1991, 947 F.2d 1201, opinion clarified, rehearing denied. Environmental Law 656 The irreducible minimum that Article III of the Constitution requires a party to show in order to maintain action in federal court requires that party personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, but there are also prudential requirements of standing, including requirement that asserted interests fall within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaranty in question. FAIC Securities, Inc. v. U.S., C.A.D.C.1985, 768 F.2d 352, 247 U.S.App.D.C. 235. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Prudential limitations on standing are not constitutional requirements, but are developed and imposed by the United States Supreme Court in its supervisory capacity over the federal judiciary. Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, C.A.D.C.1977, 566 F.2d 130, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 238, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1280, 434 U.S. 1086, 55 L.Ed.2d 791. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Group, claiming that rules of judicial ethics limiting public statements of judges was restriction on First Amendment right of members to receive speech, satisfied standing requirement that they demonstrate existence of prospective speakers, by citing to affidavit testimony of judge that he would have responded to questionnaire presented by group but for ethics rules, and others who cited rules when declining to answer some questionnaire items. Duwe v. Alexander, W.D.Wis.2007, 490 F.Supp.2d 968.Constitutional Law 855 Motorists, who were non-residents of Grand Island and, thus, paid higher toll prices than Grand Island residents when they traversed Grand Island Bridge, did not identify any in-state commercial interest that was favored, directly or indirectly, by the challenged toll policy at expense of out-ofstate competing interests, and because their alleged injuries had little relation to out-of-state economic interests and did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause, motorists lacked prudential standing to bring 1983 Commerce Clause claim against New York Thruway Authority. Selevan v. New York Thruway Authority, N.D.N.Y.2007, 470 F.Supp.2d 158, affirmed in part, vacated in part 584 F.3d 82. Civil Rights 1333(6) Foreign sovereigns and lumber producers had prudential standing to bring suit challenging United States Trade Representative's (USTR's) administration and enforcement of Section 129 determination of International Trade Commission (ITC) finding an affirmative threat of material injury arising from imports of Canadian softwood lumber; producers and foreign sovereigns, which claimed that defendants' administrative actions harmed their economies and tax revenues, were within the zone of interest intended to be protected by Section 129. Tembec, Inc. v. U.S., CIT 2006, 441 F.Supp.2d 1302, 30 C.I.T. 958, subsequent determination 461 F.Supp.2d 1355, 30 C.I.T. 1519, vacated 475 F.Supp.2d 1393, 31 C.I.T. 241, appeal dismissed 227 Fed.Appx. 911, 2007 WL 1799686. Customs Duties 84(4)

Breadth of disabled person's right to bring lawsuit under ADA for illegal barriers in retail establishment was not limited by prudentialstanding doctrine, which was judiciallycreated doctrine of self-restraint; reasonable construction of ADA required recognition that Congress intended to permit suits for injunction to reach any existing barriers, and as long as Article III standing existed, nothing prevented Congress from doing so. Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., E.D.Cal.2006, 413 F.Supp.2d 1130. Civil Rights 1331(6) The prudential standing considerations include general prohibitions on litigant's raising another person's legal rights, rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in representative branches, and requirement that plaintiff's complaint fall within zone of interests protected by law invoked; included among prudential considerations is principle of statutorystanding. Lifrak v. New York City Council, S.D.N.Y.2005, 389 F.Supp.2d 500. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Although Article III standing inquiry clearly subsumes constitutional requirements, it also imbues prudential considerations. Flynn v. Dick Corp., D.D.C.2005, 384 F.Supp.2d 189, reversed and remanded 481 F.3d 824, 375 U.S.App.D.C. 328, rehearing en banc denied, on remand 2008 WL 2410406. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 The prudential limitations on standing encompass the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Pettit v. State of New Mexico, D.N.M.2004, 375 F.Supp.2d 1140. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Father of high school student had constitutional and prudential standing, as next friend of student, to bring action challenging school dress code as violation of student's First Amendment rights, even though father and mother were divorced and student was living with mother; both parents had agreed to assert litigation jointly. Jacobs v. Clark County School Dist., D.Nev.2005, 373 F.Supp.2d 1162, affirmed 526 F.3d 419. Constitutional Law 862 Nonprofit corporation, which had distributed questionnaire to candidates for state judgeships eliciting their views on controversial issues, and two individuals, satisfied requirements for prudential standing to sue state officials, seeking determination that judicial canon precluding candidates for judicial office from expressing views on specific issues violated First Amendment; claimants were not asserting rights of judicial candidates to speak out on issues, but were rather asserting their own rights to receive information regarding candidate's positions, and claims fell within zone of interests protected by First Amendment. Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc v. Wolnitzek, E.D.Ky.2004, 345 F.Supp.2d 672, stay denied 388 F.3d 224. Constitutional Law 863 Children who were diagnosed with elevated blood lead levels while living in public housing had prudential standing to sue city housing authority for monetary damages based on alleged violations of Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (LPPPA) and Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (RLPHRA), which addressed hazards of lead-based paint contamination in public housing, particularly for young children, and, along with implementing regulations, required public housing agencies to inspect for and disclose such hazards, inasmuch as children fell within zone of interests that statutes sought to protect. L.B. III v. Housing Authority of Louisville, W.D.Ky.2004, 344 F.Supp.2d 1009, subsequent determination 345 F.Supp.2d 725. Municipal Corporations 857 Pursuant to citizen suit provision of Endangered Species Act (ESA), counties and business association had prudential standingto challenge legality of designation of critical habitat for wintering piping plover by Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, D.D.C.2004, 344 F.Supp.2d 108, motion granted 2005 WL 583133.Environmental Law 654

In order for there to be federal jurisdiction, plaintiff must satisfy prudential consideration that parties generally assert their own legal rights and interests and not rely on the rights and interests of third parties in creating standing to bring an action. USA Interactive v. Dow Lohnes & Albertson, P.L.L.C., M.D.Fla.2004, 328 F.Supp.2d 1294. Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Owners of strawberry crop that was to have been harvested by farm and forest labor contractor whose license was suspended failed to satisfy prudential requirements for standing in 1983 action against Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) officials; crop owners' equal protection argument rested on allegations that BOLI's conduct in suspending license treated contractor, not them, differently from others similarly situated and record did not even show that officials were aware of relationship between crop owners and contractor, and crop owners' due process claims also did not allege deprivation of their own constitutional rights or interests. Lumbreras v. Roberts, D.Or.2004, 319 F.Supp.2d 1191, affirmed 156 Fed.Appx. 952, 2005 WL 3304174. Civil Rights 1332(6); Civil Rights 1333(6) Rural distributor of satellite television programming lacked prudential standing to maintain its declaratory relief claims against national provider of satellite television programming, seeking to assert telecommunications cooperative's rights under agreement between provider and cooperative, where cooperative had settled its disputes with provider and was no longer a party to the litigation, and distributor was not a third-party beneficiary to contract. Pegasus Satellite Television, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., C.D.Cal.2004, 318 F.Supp.2d 968. Declaratory Judgment 301 In addition to the constitutional elements of standing, courts must consider three prudential concerns: (1) whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within the zone of interest protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue; (2) whether the complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately resolved by the legislative branches; and(3) whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of another. Russell v. Choicepoint Services, Inc., E.D.La.2004, 302 F.Supp.2d 654. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Prudential standing requirements include general prohibition on litigant's raising another person's legal rights, rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in representative branches, and requirement that plaintiff's complaint fall within zone of interests protected by law invoked. Bancard Services, Inc. v. E*Trade Access, Inc., D.Or.2003, 292 F.Supp.2d 1235. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Organization of drug manufacturers had prudential standing to challenge state Medicaid initiative, which required prior authorization before prescribing drug if its manufacturer failed to provide state with rebates greater than those required under national Medicaid agreement, on grounds that it violated provision of Social Security Act requiring Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize state rebate agreements with a manufacturer; manufacturers were, as a practical matter, regulated by the alleged improper approval of a state rebate agreement. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Thompson, D.D.C.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 39, affirmed 362 F.3d 817, 360 U.S.App.D.C. 375. Corporations And Business Organizations 3536(4) There are two types of standing, constitutional standing and prudential standing, and all plaintiffs must satisfy both the constitutional requirements and the prudential restrictions. Goleta National Bank v. O'Donnell, S.D.Ohio 2002, 239 F.Supp.2d 745.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Antiabortion activists who challenged constitutionality of criminal statute which prohibits persons from obstructing access to health care facility in particular way not only had legal standing, but they also had prudential standing, where activists were distinct minority of citizens who had grievances different in substance and intensity from those of substantial majority of their fellow citizens and where activists were asserting their own rights to free speech. Hoffman v. Hunt, W.D.N.C.1994, 845 F.Supp. 340. Constitutional Law 856

Prudential principles that must be considered in standing are party must assert his own legal rights or interests, abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances are not sufficient to provide standing, and complaint must be arguably within zone of interests to be protected by constitutional guarantee in question. Vote Choice, Inc. v. Di Stefano, D.R.I.1993, 814 F.Supp. 195, affirmed 4 F.3d 26. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Third-party protestor in reissue patent proceeding failed to meet prudential requirements of standing to bring suit challenging reissue of patent, as its interests as third-party protestor, as a competitor of reissue patentholder, and as potential target of infringement suit did not fall within zone of interests protected by relevant statute or implementing regulations. Hitachi Metals, Ltd. v. Quigg, D.D.C.1991, 776 F.Supp. 3, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1920. Patents 147 Prudential issues which court must consider in determining whether plaintiff has standing to sue are whether plaintiff's complaint falls within zone of interests protected by statute or constitutional provision at issue, whether complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances that are more appropriately resolved by legislative branches, and whether plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interest rather than legal rights and interest of third parties. Church of Scientology Flag Services Organization, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, M.D.Fla.1991, 756 F.Supp. 1498, affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds and reversed in part on other grounds 2 F.3d 1514, rehearing denied 12 F.3d 221, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 54, 513 U.S. 807, 130 L.Ed.2d 13. Constitutional Law 667; Constitutional Law 675; Constitutional Law 982; Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 No prudential concerns justified denial of standing to trash brokers who sought to challenge constitutionality of Indiana statutes regulating importation of out-of-state waste; trash broker's interests were protected by commerce clause and further, rights of third parties could be vindicated through granting of standing to trash brokers. Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, S.D.Ind.1990, 753 F.Supp. 739. ; Prudential concerns unique to standing doctrine did not bar adjudication of employer's constitutional challenge to Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act; vigor with which case was litigated demonstrated that it was not collusive, and employer did not seek to invoke rights of another. General Offshore Corp. v. Farrelly, D.Virgin Islands 1990, 743 F.Supp. 1177. Constitutional Law 708 Prudential requirements of standing are that plaintiff assert his own legal rights, that the grievance be specific to the plaintiff and not generalized, and that the complaint fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Pitt v. Pine Valley Golf Club, D.N.J.1988, 695 F.Supp. 778. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 The prudential standing considerations include general prohibitions on litigant's raising another person's legal rights, rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in representative branches, and requirement that plaintiff's complaint fall within zone of interests protected by law invoked; included among prudential considerations is principle of statutorystanding. Fisher v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., S.D.N.Y.2005, 230 F.R.D. 370, vacated and remanded 303 Fed.Appx. 979, 2008 WL 5381269, on remand 703 F.Supp.2d 374. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Adverse nature of interests, standing to maintain action Underlying every question of standing is the constitutional requirement that there be a real case or controversy sufficient to provide that degree of adversariness which is necessary for a court to decide the case properly; and it is of the essence of this question to ask whether plaintiff, as he comes into court, has in fact been injured by the conduct he challenges. Reich v. City of Freeport, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 666. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as successor in interest to insolvent thrift, lacked standing to assert claim inWinstar case, where government's counterclaim against shareholders represented by the FDIC exceeded the FDIC's claim against the government; claim did not satisfy case or controversy requirement, because ultimate disposition of case would involve merely the shifting of funds from one government fund to another and would not provide any additional amounts to pay non-governmental creditors, and the FDIC and the government were not adverse parties. Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. U.S., C.A.Fed.2003, 66 Fed.Appx. 849, 2003 WL 21267457, Unreported. Federal Courts 13 Injury requirements, standing to maintain action--Generally Case or controversy provision of Article III, establishing irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, requires: that plaintiff have suffered injury in fact arising from invasion of judicially cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; that there be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of so that injury is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant, and not result of independent action of some third party not before court; and that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, U.S.Or.1997, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 520 U.S. 154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281, on remand 112 F.3d 402. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires that plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical; that there be a causal connection between the injury and conduct complained of so that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party who is not before the court; and that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, U.S.Minn.1992, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 504 U.S. 555, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Term standing as bearing upon right to judicial relief subsumes blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations, but, at irreducible minimum, this article requires party who invokes court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant and that injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by favorable decision. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., U.S.Pa.1982, 102 S.Ct. 752, 454 U.S. 464, 70 L.Ed.2d 700. See, also, Matter of Appointment of Independent Counsel, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1985, 766 F.2d 70, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 569, 474 U.S. 1020, 88 L.Ed.2d 554; Belles v. Schweiker, C.A.Iowa 1983, 720 F.2d 509; Common Cause v. Department of Energy, C.A.D.C. 1983, 702 F.2d 245, 226 U.S.App.D.C. 266; Electricities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Southeastern Power Admin., W.D.N.C.1985, 621 F.Supp. 358; Ridge v. Verity, W.D.Pa.1989, 715 F.Supp. 1308. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Regional water district that was responsible for supplying public water to northern Texas alleged sufficient injury to have standingunder Article III to claim that water distribution compact between Texas and Oklahoma preempted certain Oklahoma water statutes, on allegations that compact allowed Texas appropriators to take water from portion of subbasin in Oklahoma on equal footing with Oklahoma appropriators, water district had filed application with Oklahoma water board to appropriate such water for use in Texas, Oklahoma water laws interfered with water district's efforts to import water from Oklahoma, and compact anticipated litigation involving parties other than signatory states. Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmann, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2011, 656 F.3d 1222. States 6; Water Law 1042

Importer's allegations of suffering injury-in-fact by paying higher tariff on gloves used by men than on gloves used by women, caused by government's purportedly discriminatory tariff rates under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), satisfied requirements for Article III standing of importer as third party, on grounds that purchasers, rather than importer, were objects of alleged sex discrimination in violation of Equal Protection Clause, since importer had close relationship with purchasers, importer suffered injury-in-fact, and purchasers had no remedy for challenging tariff classification. Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. U.S., C.A.Fed.2010, 594 F.3d 1346, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 92, 178 L.Ed.2d 28. Customs Duties 84(4) President of corporate coal mine operator lacked standing to assert First Amendment retaliation claim against Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) official, where he did not allege that he sustained a direct injury not derivative of operator's injury. Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2008, 538 F.3d 969. Corporations And Business Organizations 2223 Importer of toasted breads had standing to object to Trade Representative's failure to review and revise the retaliation list in response to European Union's refusal to import hormone-treated meat, although review and revision of the list would not necessarily have led to the removal of toasted bread products from the list; the failure to conduct review and revision of the list injured importer by depriving it of at least an opportunity to have its products removed. Gilda Industries, Inc. v. U.S., C.A.Fed.2006, 446 F.3d 1271, rehearing denied 453 F.3d 1362, on remand 30 C.I.T. 1609. Customs Duties 84(1) Anyone whose request for specific information has been denied has standing to bring an action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); the requester's circumstances, namely why he wants the information, what he plans to do with it, and what harm he suffered from the failure to disclose, are irrelevant to his standing. Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Secretary of State, C.A.D.C.2006, 444 F.3d 614, 370 U.S.App.D.C. 269, on remand 511 F.Supp.2d 97. Records 63 In cases in which a party has been accorded procedural right to protect his concrete interests, primary focus of standing inquiry is not imminence or redressability of injury to plaintiff, but whether plaintiff who has suffered personal and particularized injury has sued defendant who caused that injury. National Committee for New River, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n, C.A.D.C.2005, 433 F.3d 830, 369 U.S.App.D.C. 63. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Fire service labor organization lacked direct standing sufficient to satisfy Article III of Constitution, in lawsuit alleging that administration and scoring of firefighting exam violated equal protection rights, since organization did not proffer any concrete and particularized facts to establish cognizable injury to itself or its members. Antonelli v. New Jersey, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2005, 419 F.3d 267.Constitutional Law 929 Although claim of a subjective chill is insufficient to gain standing, a litigant who suffers an ongoing injury resulting from a statute's chilling effect on his desire to exercise his First Amendment rights does have standing to sue. Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, C.A.10 (Utah) 2005, 414 F.3d 1221. Constitutional Law 795 Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute. Shays v. Federal Election Com'n, C.A.D.C.2005, 414 F.3d 76, 367 U.S.App.D.C. 185. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Injuries that are shared and generalized--such as the right to have the government act in accordance with the law--are not sufficient to support standing. Seegars v. Gonzales, C.A.D.C.2005, 396 F.3d 1248, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 512, rehearing en banc denied 413 F.3d 1, 367 U.S.App.D.C. 1, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 1187, 546 U.S. 1157, 163 L.Ed.2d 1141. Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 Advocacy groups lacked standing to challenge the composition of a negotiated rulemaking committee assembled by the Department of Education (DOE) to propose regulations as required by No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA); procedures regarding the negotiated rulemaking process were

not designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of the groups. Center for Law and Educ. v. Department of Educ., C.A.D.C.2005, 396 F.3d 1152, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 416. Schools 45 Party suffers cognizable injury under Article III, for purpose of establishing standing, when agency lifts regulatory restrictions on its competitors or otherwise allows increased competition. Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. E.P.A., C.A.D.C.2004, 374 F.3d 1363, 362 U.S.App.D.C. 538, opinion withdrawn in part on reconsideration 393 F.3d 1315, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 244. Administrative Law And Procedure 668; Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Frustration of a party's generalized interest in proper application of the law is not by itself an injury in fact for purposes of standing.Delta Commercial Fisheries Ass'n v. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, C.A.5 (La.) 2004, 364 F.3d 269. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 If a plaintiff has not suffered a judicially cognizable injury, there is no standing and the court is without jurisdiction to consider the action. ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, Nebraska, C.A.8 (Neb.) 2004, 358 F.3d 1020, rehearing granted and vacated, on rehearing 419 F.3d 772. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 To establish standing, intervening party must first show that it has suffered an injury in fact, an invasion of a legally-protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, C.A.9 (Idaho) 2002, 313 F.3d 1094. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 At minimum, constitutional dimension of standing requires that plaintiff suffered injury in fact which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; that injury is fairly traceable to challenged action of defendant, and not result of independent action of some third party not before court; and that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Baca v. King, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1996, 92 F.3d 1031. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Standing inquiry focuses on appropriateness of party bringing questioned controversy to court; it requires that anyone who would invoke aid of courts in resolving complaint must allege, at minimum, actual or imminent injury personal to plaintiff that is fairly traceable to defendant's conduct and that is likely to be redressed by requested relief. Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. Browner, C.A.D.C.1996, 87 F.3d 1379, 318 U.S.App.D.C. 370, rehearing denied. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2;Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires that plaintiff suffer injury in fact, that injury be fairly traceable to challenged conduct of defendant, and not result of independent action of some third party, and that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Medina v. Clinton, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1996, 86 F.3d 155. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 In order to have constitutional standing, plaintiff must show that he is subject to actual or threatened injury, that injury is fairly traceable to challenged conduct of defendant and that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable ruling, and must show that prudential considerations do not weigh against consideration of the claims. Cuban American Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1995, 43 F.3d 1412, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 2578, 515 U.S. 1142, 132 L.Ed.2d 828, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 299, 516 U.S. 913, 133 L.Ed.2d 205. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To satisfy constitutional requirements for standing, plaintiff must show that he has suffered actual or threatened injury, that injury is fairly traceable to challenged conduct of defendant, and that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable ruling. Harris v. Evans, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1994, 20 F.3d 1118, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 641, 513 U.S. 1045, 130 L.Ed.2d 546. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 At bottom, Article III standing requires: concrete injury to legally protected interest; causal connection between asserted injury and challenged conduct, such that injury is fairly traceable to

challenged conduct and not result of independent action by third party not before court; and likelihood that injury will be redressed by favorable decision on merits. Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election Com'n, C.A.D.C.1994, 13 F.3d 412, 304 U.S.App.D.C. 289, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 84, 130 L.Ed.2d 36. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3; Federal Civil Procedure 103.4 To show case or controversy for purposes of standing, first, plaintiff must clearly demonstrate that he has suffered injury in fact, which means injury to himself that is distinct and palpable as opposed to merely abstract, and alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, second, claimant must allege facts which show that injury fairly can be traced to challenged action, and, third, injury must be likely to be redressed by favorable decision. Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1993, 993 F.2d 962. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3; Federal Courts 12.1 To establish standing, litigant must show injury in fact that is both fairly traceable to challenged action and likely to be redressed by favorable decision. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., C.A.D.C.1993, 983 F.2d 275, 299 U.S.App.D.C. 250. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 At minimum, to satisfy core standing requirements derived from Article III of the United States Constitution, plaintiff must allege: personal injury or threat of injury; that injury fairly can be traced to action challenged; and that injury is likely to be redressed by requested relief. Heldman on Behalf of T.H. v. Sobol, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 962 F.2d 148, on remand 846 F.Supp. 285. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To satisfy constitutional imperative for standing, plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by requested relief. U.S. v. AVX Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1992, 962 F.2d 108. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Two matters are required for standing: there must be an actual case or controversy, which can be shown by proving an injury in fact that can be redressed by a favorable decision; as a prudential matter, plaintiff must be a proper proponent, and the action a proper vehicle, to vindicate the rights asserted. Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Com'n, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1991, 926 F.2d 573, certiorari dismissed 112 S.Ct. 672, 502 U.S. 1022, 116 L.Ed.2d 763, certiorari dismissed 112 S.Ct. 673, 502 U.S. 1022, 116 L.Ed.2d 763.Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 In order to satisfy Article III restrictions on standing, party must show at least that he or she has suffered actual or threatened injury caused by defendant, and that favorable judicial decision is likely to redress injury. ACORN v. City of Tulsa, Okl., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1987, 835 F.2d 735. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 For purposes of constitutional case or controversy requirement of standing doctrine, ability of plaintiff class member to show that he personally had suffered some actual injury as result of the illegal conduct of defendant is not affected by nonresidence.Silva v. Bell, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 605 F.2d 978. Federal Civil Procedure 103.7 Although standing does not depend on the merits of the party's contention that certain conduct is illegal, standing does require an injury to the party arising out of a violation of a constitutional or statutory provision or other legal right. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Grella, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1977, 553 F.2d 258. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Water district and irrigation district that were not in federal reclamation project unit submitted sufficient evidence of specific facts which, taken as true, established actual harm resulting from federal government's failure to provide required drainage service to unit to establish standing to challenge government's proposed drainage plan for unit, even if there were factual disputes as to extent to which drainage waters from unit impacted districts' land, where districts claimed that

drainwater from unit flowed downslope into their service areas. Firebaugh Canal Water Dist. v. U.S., E.D.Cal.2011, 2011 WL 4590810. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requester could not assign to another party her rights and interests in pursuing judicial review of the denial of her request, and therefore, that party did not have standing to bring FOIA action against agency; permitting assignment of FOIA rights would undermine statutory distinction between categories of requesters in areas such as fees paid by certain requesters, assignment would multiply opportunities for mistake and mischief that would overburden FOIA administrators to verify the validity of an assignment, and there was no indication that the requester was unable to pursue her own litigation or that requester shared same interests and purposes as the other party. Feinman v. F.B.I., D.D.C.2010, 680 F.Supp.2d 169, motion to certify denied 2010 WL 962188. Assignments 26; Records 52 Importers of subject frozen warmwater shrimp from India, who alleged that they were adversely affected or aggrieved by the unauthorized and unlawful actions of Customs in requiring increased continuous entry bonds pursuant to a bond directive, hadstanding to bring action challenging the bond directive; complaint alleged injury in fact occurring to importers in their activities as importers, and importers' interests fell within the zone of interests of the relevant statute governing discretion of Customs in establishing the requirements for term bonds. Seafood Exporters Ass'n of India v. U.S., CIT 2007, 479 F.Supp.2d 1367, 31 C.I.T. 366, modified on reconsideration 2008 WL 168636. Customs Duties 84(4) The actual injury test is based on the constitutional requirement of standing, which is determined by the facts at the time the complaint is filed. Laplante v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, D.Mass.2003, 2003 WL 1877872. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Pesticide manufacturer had Article III standing, as required to intervene in action seeking invalidation of the registrations, pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), of three of its products; manufacturer would be injured is the registrations of its products were invalidated. Hardin v. Jackson, D.D.C.2009, 600 F.Supp.2d 13. Environmental Law 656 Alleged Federal Records Act (FRA) violations contributed to inability of special interest group to presently obtain requested records of visit to White House and Vice President's residence, which was ongoing injury sufficient to support Article III standing, even if those records were preserved under Presidential Records Act (PRA) and would be available at some future date. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., D.D.C.2009, 592 F.Supp.2d 111, appeal dismissed 2009 WL 4250490. Records 21; Records 22 Research groups' injury in fact from real risk that millions of deleted White House e-mails would be unavailable for their pending and future Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests was likely redressable by relief sought under Federal Records Act (FRA), by order requiring Archivist and Head of Office of Administration (OA) to request Attorney General to initiate legal action to restore deleted e-mails and establish records management system, as required for Article III standing, despite that Attorney General was not party to suit. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Executive Office of President, D.D.C.2008, 587 F.Supp.2d 48. Records 17(.5) United States' taking of property with cross to be used as a veterans memorial did not constitute the kind of concrete and particularized injury required to give California resident standing to challenge taking as a violation of the Establishment Clause, even if government planned to maintain a cross on the property; statute enacted to purportedly take property merely provided for the acquisition of the land, the compensation of land owners, and the maintenance of the property as a veterans memorial, and none of those actions were religious action. Trunk v. City of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2007, 547 F.Supp.2d 1144. Constitutional Law 835 Researchers who sued National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), seeking access to records of former president and challenging incumbent president's executive order implementing Presidential Records Act (PRA), had standing to pursue claim pertaining to national archivist's

reliance on order; researcher had Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for documents currently pending for review by representatives of former president, and thus had been harmed by delay created by executive order. American Historical Ass'n v. National Archives and Records Admin., D.D.C.2007, 516 F.Supp.2d 90. Records 34 In the District of Columbia Circuit, no standing exists if plaintiff's allegations are purely speculative, nor is there standing where court would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions in any endeavor to connect alleged injury with challenged conduct. Larsen v. U.S. Navy, D.D.C.2007, 486 F.Supp.2d 11, remanded 525 F.3d 1, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 69, rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 738, 172 L.Ed.2d 728. ; Canadian producers of goods subject to countervailing and antidumping duty orders sufficiently alleged they suffered injury-in-fact required for Article III standing in their action challenging Customs' implementation of the Byrd Amendment to the Tariff Act; plaintiffs alleged that they were in direct competition with domestic producers that received Byrd distributions and suffered harm to their economic and competitive interests as a result of such distributions. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. U.S., CIT 2006, 425 F.Supp.2d 1321, 30 C.I.T. 391, subsequent determination 441 F.Supp.2d 1259, 30 C.I.T. 892, affirmed 517 F.3d 1319, on remand558 F.Supp.2d 1366, on remand 577 F.Supp.2d 1313, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 344, 555 U.S. 819, 172 L.Ed.2d 32. Customs Duties 84(4) Adult-oriented business lacked standing to seek an injunction against enforcement of city's regulatory scheme relating to adult-oriented businesses; city had not enforced the vast majority of the challenged ordinances against plaintiff business or any other business, plaintiff could not show that a future or ongoing harm was likely to occur from an application of the zoning ordinance which city did enforce, other challenged zoning regulations were not applicable to the parcel of land owned by plaintiff's owner, and it was speculative whether invalidating any of the ordinances would allow plaintiff to reopen. Dolls, Inc. v. City of Coralville, Iowa, S.D.Iowa 2006, 425 F.Supp.2d 958. Zoning And Planning 1586 Refusal to provide information to which one is entitled under Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) constitutes cognizable injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Johnson, D.D.C.2006, 422 F.Supp.2d 105, reversed and remanded 488 F.3d 1002, 376 U.S.App.D.C. 306. Records 34 Injury requirement, for standing to sue city claiming that signage ordinance was unconstitutional, was satisfied in suit by homeowners who wished to participate in political process, but were kept from doing so by restrictions on number and size of election signs, and by resident real estate agent, who was hampered by ordinance restrictions of on-site advertising. Kennedy v. Avondale Estates, Ga., N.D.Ga.2005, 414 F.Supp.2d 1184. Constitutional Law 855; Constitutional Law 863 Constitutional minimum requirements for standing under Article III involve triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.Springs v. Stone, E.D.Va.2005, 362 F.Supp.2d 686. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Case or controversy jurisdiction, standing and ripeness requirements were satisfied by motorist's claim that company violated requirements of Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) by receiving from state data submitted in support of license application without motorist's consent; unconsented to disclosure was necessary injury, obviating any need for further showing of harm.Schmidt v. Multimedia Holdings Corp., M.D.Fla.2004, 361 F.Supp.2d 1346. Federal Courts 13; Records 34 County resident whose voter registration application was rejected because she failed to provide the last four digits of her Social Security number did not suffer injury necessary to give her standing to bring action against county supervisor of elections, where she timely amended her application and was registered to vote. Diaz v. Hood, S.D.Fla.2004, 342 F.Supp.2d 1111, vacated and remanded 2005 WL 2402748. Elections 112

Constitutional standing requires that plaintiff: (1) has suffered injury in fact, i.e. invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be causal connection between injury and conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, AFL-CIO v. New York City Transit Authority, S.D.N.Y.2004, 342 F.Supp.2d 160. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Article III standing requires (1) injury in fact, (2) causal connection between injury and conduct complained of, and (3) likelihood that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Score LLC v. City of Shoreline, W.D.Wash.2004, 319 F.Supp.2d 1224. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Where plaintiffs validly assert procedural injury, they need not meet normal standards for redressability and immediacy required for Article III standing. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Fry, D.Mont.2004, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2;Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Plaintiff has Article III standing to assert claim if: (1) it can show that it has suffered injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) injury is fairly traceable to conduct of defendant; and (3) it is likely, not just merely speculative, that injury will be redressed by favorable decision. Live Entertainment, Inc. v. Digex, Inc., S.D.Fla.2003, 300 F.Supp.2d 1273. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 While possession of defendant property in forfeiture proceeding is evidence of claimant's standing in proceeding, ultimate focus of any standing inquiry is injury. U.S. v. $746,198 in U.S. Currency, more or less, S.D.Iowa 2004, 299 F.Supp.2d 923. Forfeitures 5 Injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.Sierra Club, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., W.D.Ky.2003, 299 F.Supp.2d 693. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 For a plaintiff to have Article III standing to bring a claim in federal court, he or she bears burden of establishing that he or she has suffered (1) an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical-(2) which is fairly traceable to the challenged act, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Seegars v. Ashcroft, D.D.C.2004, 297 F.Supp.2d 201, affirmed in part, reversed in part 396 F.3d 1248, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 512, rehearing en banc denied 413 F.3d 1, 367 U.S.App.D.C. 1, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 1187, 546 U.S. 1157, 163 L.Ed.2d 1141. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To demonstrate injury in fact for standing, a plaintiff must show the invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, D.D.C.2003, 257 F.Supp.2d 53. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 In order to satisfy Article III of the United States Constitution and demonstrate an actual case or controversy conferring standingfor injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff in federal court must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Aiken v. Nixon, N.D.N.Y.2002, 236 F.Supp.2d 211, affirmed 80 Fed.Appx. 146, 2003 WL 22595837. Declaratory Judgment 299.1 In order to establish standing to bring suit, a party must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that is (1) actual or imminent; (2) caused by, or fairly traceable to, an act that the litigant challenges in the instant litigation; (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision by the

Court. Iyengar v. Barnhart, D.D.C.2002, 233 F.Supp.2d 5. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Standing requirement imposed by United States Constitution is satisfied by showing that plaintiffs have suffered some actual or threatened injury as result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant, injury can fairly be traced to challenged action, and injury is likely to be redressed by favorable decision. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Burhans, W.D.Mich.1995, 947 F.Supp. 319. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Constitutional requirements for standing are that plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, that is, an invasion of legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; that there must be a causal connection between injury and conduct complained of, that is, injury has to be fairly traceable to challenged action and not result of independent action of third party not before court; and that it must be likely, as opposed to speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Knowles v. U.S. Coast Guard, S.D.N.Y.1996, 924 F.Supp. 593. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 For standing purposes, plaintiff's injuries must be caused by actions of defendant, and not those of plaintiff or third parties.California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, C.D.Cal.1996, 922 F.Supp. 327, affirmed 195 F.3d 1039, amended on denial of rehearing, certiorari denied 120 S.Ct. 2717, 530 U.S. 1261, 147 L.Ed.2d 983. Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 In cases brought under Fourteenth Amendment, denial of equal treatment resulting from imposition of barrier is injury, forstanding purposes. Alexander v. Prince George's County, Md., D.Md.1995, 901 F.Supp. 986, affirmed in part, reversed in part 95 F.3d 312, 168 A.L.R. Fed. 705, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1425, 520 U.S. 1165, 137 L.Ed.2d 535. Constitutional Law 915 Party seeking to establish standing to present case or controversy in federal court must, in addition to showing injury, establish that injury concretely and demonstrably resulted from defendant's action, i.e., that there was causation-in-fact. Doe v. Shalala, D.Md.1994, 862 F.Supp. 1421. Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 Plaintiff may not invoke powers of federal courts unless he can meet three Article III standing requirements: (1) that he personally suffers some actual or threatened injury; (2) that injury fairly can be traced to defendant's putatively illegal conduct; and (3) that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable decision. U.S. ex rel. Yellowtail v. Little Horn State Bank, D.Mont.1992, 828 F.Supp. 780, affirmed 15 F.3d 1095. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To possess Article III standing, plaintiff must personally have suffered some actual or threatened injury that is caused by or can fairly be traced to defendant's challenged conduct, and that is likely to be redressed by favorable court decision. Comer v. Kemp, W.D.N.Y.1993, 824 F.Supp. 1113, affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds 37 F.3d 775. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To have standing plaintiff must suffer a personal injury, injury must be fairly traceable to defendant's conduct, and injury must likely be redressable by the requested relief. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope, Div. of American Envelope Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1065. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To have standing to seek injunctive relief under Article III, plaintiff must demonstrate that he is likely to suffer future injury, that he is likely to suffer that injury at the hands of the defendant, and that relief which he seeks will prevent injury from occurring.Schlosser v. Coleman, M.D.Fla.1993, 818 F.Supp. 1534. Injunction 114(2) Standing requires injury in fact, causal connection between injury and conduct complained of, and that injury must be capable of redress by favorable decision. Azevedo v. Housing Authority of City of Sarasota, M.D.Fla.1992, 805 F.Supp. 938, vacated in part on other grounds on rehearing 147

F.R.D. 255, affirmed 39 F.3d 324. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To establish standing for federal court action, plaintiff must prove personal injury in fact, injury fairly traceable to alleged unlawful conduct, and that requested relief will redress injury. Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., D.Del.1992, 805 F.Supp. 252. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To have standing, plaintiff must proffer specific facts that establish its actual or imminent injury; if those facts are not established, then neither is litigant's right to sue. Pulte Home Corp., Inc. v. Ply Gem Industries, Inc., M.D.Fla.1992, 804 F.Supp. 1471. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Standing doctrine is concerned with the issue of who was the proper party to bring a suit challenging a statute and, in determining standing, court should look to the nature of the plaintiff's injury, not the legal theories on which plaintiff relies.Voluntary Ass'n of Religious Leaders, Churches, and Organizations v. Waihee, D.Hawai'i 1992, 800 F.Supp. 882. Declaratory Judgment 300 To have standing, plaintiff must have suffered, or be about to suffer, demonstrable, particularized injury which is fairly traceable to defendants' alleged conduct, and must also show that requested relief will likely redress alleged injury. Mason v. Bradley, N.D.Ill.1992, 789 F.Supp. 273. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 To have standing, plaintiff must allege personal injury, actual or threatened, that is caused by defendant's allegedly unlawful behavior and is likely to be redressed by relief sought. New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista) v. Hernandez Colon, D.Puerto Rico 1991, 779 F.Supp. 646. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To establish standing, litigant must show actual or threatened injury, fairly traceable to action by defendants, which is redressable by court action. Santiago v. Miles, W.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 775. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 To satisfy minimum constitutional requirements for standing, plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered actual or prospective injury as result of putatively illegal conduct, that injury is fairly traceable to challenged action, and that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable court decision. Church of Scientology Flag Services Organization, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, M.D.Fla.1991, 756 F.Supp. 1498, affirmed in part, vacated in part and reversed in part on other grounds 2 F.3d 1514, rehearing denied 12 F.3d 221, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 54, 513 U.S. 807, 130 L.Ed.2d 13. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 To establish standing to challenge a particular act or policy, litigant must show that he personally has suffered from actual or threatened injury as a result of putatively illegal conduct of defendant, and that injury fairly can be traced to challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Olympic Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, D.D.C.1990, 732 F.Supp. 1183, appeal dismissed and remanded on other grounds 903 F.2d 837, 284 U.S.App.D.C. 219. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 Case or controversy limitation of Article III requires that a party invoking federal court jurisdiction have standing, a personal stake in the outcome; in order to satisfy that requirement, plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered injury in fact that has been caused by the challenged conduct and that can be redressed by the remedy sought. Dallas Gay Alliance, Inc. v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist., N.D.Tex.1989, 719 F.Supp. 1380. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2; Federal Courts 12.1 To establish constitutional standing, plaintiff must demonstrate an injury, causal connection between injury and complained-of acts, and redressability. Gabrielsen v. BancTexas Group, Inc., N.D.Tex.1987, 675 F.Supp. 367. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2;Federal Civil Procedure 103.3 In order for party to have standing to sue, party must personally suffer actual or threatened injury as result of defendant's putatively unconstitutional conduct, injury must fairly be traced to challenged

action, and injury must be one that can likely be redressed by court's favorable decision. Love Church v. City of Evanston, N.D.Ill.1987, 671 F.Supp. 508. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2 ---- Abstract nature of injury, injury requirements, standing to maintain action An individual who challenges federal action on the grounds of impermissible interference with state sovereignty is subject to the Article III requirements for standing, as well as prudential rules for standing, applicable to all litigants and claims; it is not enough that a litigant suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally, and if, in connection with the claim being asserted, a litigant who commences suit fails to show actual or imminent harm that is concrete and particular, fairly traceable to the conduct complained of, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, the Federal Judiciary cannot hear the claim. Bond v. U.S., U.S.2011, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269. States 4.16(1) Ohio taxpayers did not have Article III standing to challenge award of state franchise tax credit to automobile manufacturer to induce it to remain in city simply by virtue of taxpayer status; alleged injury of imposition of disproportionate tax burdens on Ohio taxpayers as a result of depleted state funds was not concrete and particularized since it was unclear that the tax breaks in fact depleted the treasury, and the injury was hypothetical in that it depended on how legislators responded to a reduction in revenue, if that was a consequence of the credit. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, U.S.2006, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 547 U.S. 332, 164 L.Ed.2d 589, rehearing denied 126 S.Ct. 2961, 548 U.S. 920, 165 L.Ed.2d 979, on remand 197 Fed.Appx. 454, 2006 WL 2793084. States 168.5 Requirements of standing under this article are not satisfied by the abstract injury in nonobservance of Constitution asserted by citizens. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., U.S.Pa.1982, 102 S.Ct. 752, 454 U.S. 464, 70 L.Ed.2d 700. Constitutional Law 681 County attorney lacked Article III standing to bring suit seeking judgment declaring unconstitutional special courts instituted by Arizona Superior Court for Spanish-speaking and Native American driving-under-the-influence (DUI) offenders, and enjoining operation of special probation programs for those offenders; county attorney's abstract outrage at his obligation to participate in purportedly unconstitutional programs was official, rather than personal. Thomas v. Mundell, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 2009, 572 F.3d 756.Declaratory Judgment 302.1 State legislator did not allege that he suffered requisite direct and concrete injury to him in asserting equal protection claim alleging that he, and other state legislators, were denied ability to discuss, debate, and perhaps amend bill increasing salaries of state legislators, executive officials, and state judges before having to vote on that legislation, in that claim challenged procedure which excluded most state legislators, but which did not nullify legislator's vote, and therefore legislator lacked Article III standing to assert equal protection claim. Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2009, 558 F.3d 249, certiorari denied130 S.Ct. 1015, 175 L.Ed.2d 618. Constitutional Law 869

Feelings of frustration experienced by signature collectors stemming from their disagreement with the Oregon Secretary of State's application of unwritten rules governing Oregon's initiative petition process were not sufficiently concrete to constitute the injury -infact required for Article III standing in their 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Gest v. Bradbury, C.A.9 (Or.) 2006, 443 F.3d 1177. Civil Rights 1333(6)