Case 4:06-cv-00833 Document 15 Filed 06/30/2006 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

PHILIP W GREEN, §
§
Plaintiff, §
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-06-833
§
SERVICE CORPORATION §
INTERNATIONAL, §
§
Defendant. §

ORDER COMPELING ARBITRATION

Before the court is a motion to compel arbitration brought by the Defendant, Service

Corporation International (SCI). Doc. 8. The Plaintiff, Philip W. Green (Green), has filed a

response. Doc. 10. The parties have also filed a number of subsequent documents elaborating

on and supplementing their arguments. Doc. 11, Doc. 12, Doc. 13 and Doc. 14. The motion of

SCI is GRANTED. Doc. 8.

On March 6, 2001, Green executed an agreement with SCI to arbitrate all disputes

relating to his employment. Doc. 8, Exh. A. Green does not deny that this agreement would

bind him to arbitrate his dispute, except that he claims SCI waived its right to compel arbitration

by defending itself in an administrative proceeding through the Department of Labor (USDOL).

In a letter dated June 17, 2005, Green's attorney offered to conduct informal discussions

of the claims. Doc. 10-3. SCI agreed in a letter dated June 27, 2005. Doc. 10-4. Following

those discussions, SCI sent a letter dated July 18, 2005 in which it stated that Green would have

to arbitrate any dispute. Doc. 10-5. Through a letter dated July 27, 2005, Green responded,

claiming that he did not agree that he was limited to seeking relief only through an arbitration

1/4
 Case 4:06-cv-00833 Document 15 Filed 06/30/2006 Page 2 of 4

proceeding, but agreed to “participate in arbitration, with the understanding that by doing so he

[would] not [be] voluntarily foregoing any other means of relief he might have under the law.”

Doc. 10-6. Through a letter dated August 26, 2005 and described as a “Complaint of

Discrimination,” Green sought to begin administrative proceedings through the USDOL. Doc.

10-8. Later, Green objected to an investigator's findings and requested a hearing. Doc. 10-10.

They also conducted discovery. Doc. 10-14 through Doc. 10-20.

The Supreme Court has held, “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the

scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand

is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like

defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,

24-25 (1983). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has held, “[w]aiver [of the right to compel

arbitration]will be found when the party seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial

process to the detriment or prejudice of the other party.” Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. v.

Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib.

Co., 781 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir.1986)). When determining whether a party has waived an

arbitration provision, “[t]here is a strong presumption against waiver of arbitration.” Id.

Although the Fifth Circuit has not determined whether admnistrative proceedings are the

equivalent of judicial proceedings for the purpose of determining whether a party waived its

right to compel arbitration, the First Circuit has addressed the issue and held, “it is to judicial,

rather than administrative, proceedings that we look to determine whether such waiver has

occurred.” Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1986)). The Brennan court did not

explain how judicial proceedings differed from administrative proceedings and Sevinor did not

2/4
 Case 4:06-cv-00833 Document 15 Filed 06/30/2006 Page 3 of 4

address the difference between judicial and administrative proceedings, but only whether the

party seeking to avoid arbitration had suffered prejudice.

However, all doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitrating a dispute. Accordingly, this

court accepts the result in Brennan and holds that SCI did not invoke the judicial process even

though it may have used an administrative process similar to the judicial process.

Furthermore, SCI attempted to persuade Green to arbitrate his dispute. Green chose to

disregard the letters from SCI unless it met his conditions. Thus, any prejudice that he suffered

by pursuing administrative proceedings was self-inflicted and, therefore, is not actually the

prejudice from which courts should protect parties.

Green also argues that it is not clear that the arbitration agreement applied to him. Doc.

10 at 8. Specifically, he claims that SCI did not identify itself as the party who could enforce the

arbitration agreement. However, Green's argument is merely that the arbitration agreement was

ambiguous. The court looks to the cover of the agreement to find the identity of the party bound

by it: Even though SCI is not identified by its legal name, any ambiguity must be resolved in

favor of creating a binding arbitration agreement. Thus, this court must infer that the arbitration

agreement referred to SCI and that Green accepted a binding arbitration agreement.

Finally, Green asks that this case be dismissed, rather than stayed. However, district

courts should stay, rather than dismiss cases governed by arbitration provisions. 9 U.S.C.A. § 3;

Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending Inc., 389 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2004). In fact, even if this court

were to close the case, Green would not be entitled to appeal the decision as a final judgment.

Id; and CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, --- F.3d ----, 2006 WL 1644828 (5th Cir. 2006).

Furthermore, and contrary to Green's concerns, leaving a case open, or closing it

administratively, does not permit either party to relitigate the issues upon the conclusion of the

3/4
 Case 4:06-cv-00833 Document 15 Filed 06/30/2006 Page 4 of 4

arbitration proceedings. Instead, once a district court has compelled the parties to arbitrate their

dispute, it has nothing left to do but enter a judgment confirming the arbitrator's award.

CitiFinancial , 2006 WL 1644828 (citing Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531

U.S. 79, 86 (2000), Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994);

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)). Thus, this court will stay Green's

proceedings and compel arbitration.

Because SCI did not use the judicial process and Green did not suffer any prejudice this

courts holds that Green is bound to arbitrate his dispute with SCI. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion of SCI is GRANTED. The parties shall resolve their dispute

through binding arbitration according to the agreement. Doc. 8. It is further

ORDERED that the case is hereby STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED

pending a motion by either party for further judicial intervention.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 30th day of June, 2006.

____________________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4/4