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The Significance for Cognitive Realism of the Thought of John Poinsot

by Douglas B. Rasmussen

To the question "Whether the formal rationale constitutive of a sign as such consists, primarily and essentially, in an ontological or in a transcendental relation," we have only two systematically conceived answers. One, published by a professor at Alcala, in Iberia, in the year 1632, according to which concepts (being natural signs formal in type) as they function in cognition are ontologically relative, and so sustain the convertibility of being with truth: this is Poinsot's Treatise on Signs. The other, published by a professor at Konigsberg, Germany, in 1781, according to which concepts even as functioning in actual cognition remain primarily transcendental in their relative being, and so compromise the transcendental character of truth (that is, the character of truth as mind-independently founded) and its convertibility with being. John Deely, "Editorial AfterWord," Tractatus de Signis, 508-09. It seems very hard to defend cognitive realism in this day and age. To some contemporary philosophers the very idea of making reference to realities that exist and are what they are apart from some conceptual/linguistic scheme is unintelligible. For them such realism is nothing more than a relic from the classical and mediaeval past. To others, it is the central metaphysical and epistemological truth upon which all wisdom is based. To many, realism is but a part of an endless debate in which philosophers engage without too much evidence of progress. I plan to continue the debate, but I do nonetheless hope to provide some evidence of progress. I argued recently, in response to Hilary Putnam's assertion that
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Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Realism, Intentionality, and the Nature of Logical

Copyright 1994, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVIII, No. 3

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reference to transtheoretical/translinguistic reality is impossible, that Putnam had failed to consider Poinsot's claim that a concept or intention2 is a formal sign which as such does not stand in need of some scheme, linguistic or otherwise, to relate it to reality. As a result, Putnam failed to see the import of concepts as formal signs for the realisi/anti-realist debate. In the penultimate paragraph of my critique of Putnam,3 I considered the following objection: "Concepts do not exist apart from mental acts; but if this is so, how can concepts have their relational character in virtue of themselves? Does not their power to refer or signify depend on our mental acts and thus how we choose to relate them to realities? If this is so, are we not back with Putnam in holding that all reference and signification depend on our conceptual choices?" My response was that, while it is true that concepts do not exist apart from our mental activities, this does not mean that the relational nature of concepts is determined by how we choose to relate them. On the contrary, the relational or intentional character of concepts flows from the fact that they are essentially relative: their being consists in relating, and this does not depend on us. Just as the mental acts which
Relations," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 65 (1992): 267-77. 'Concept' or 'intention' can, of course be used to describe the psychological acts of cognition as well as the logical instruments of cognition. I shall be using these terms primarily in the latter sense. I am using 'logical' here in an Aristotelian sense, that is, as an organon or tool for knowledge. Also, when I speak of logical relations," I am referring to concepts, propositions, and arguments, which are relations of reason because they never exist apart from psychological operations but are, nonetheless, distinct from and not reducible to them. Finally, I am following the practice of Francis H. Parker and Henry B. Veatch in their book, Logic as a Human Instrument (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers, 1959), 28-29, in considering logical relations or second intentions as formal signs. This, however, requires further explanation. To begin with, it should be noted that there is a significant, though confusing, ambiguity in the word 'intention.' It may be used to indicate the operation of intendi/ig or the object which is intended. Thus an intention involves an object intended in an intending. Suppose, for example, that the object intended is a horse and that the operation of intending is one of conceptualization. We may say, then, that a horse is the first intended of a first intending. The first intending, however, can become the object of a second intending. We may note that what is formed by this act of conceptualization is the concept of a horse. We can note the concept's features, such as predicability, and how these features may be related, such as genus to species. Thus, the concept of a horse becomes the second intended, and it has features that its object, the first intended, a horse, does not have. Moreover, we can note that there is an overall character that all logical relations have that first intended objects do not have. This is intentionality; for they are that in and through which first intendings intend their objects. Thus, logical relations or second intentions are formal signs or intentional in nature, because they are simply that in which first intendings carry out their acts of cognition. 3 "Realism, Intentionality," 274.
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produce concepts do not have to be thought of to exist and have the nature they have, so. also it is with concepts: they do not have to be objects of some awareness in order to exist or to have their relational nature. Though sufficient for casting doubt on Putnam's views, my claim that concepts as formal signs are essentially relative requires further explanation. I propose to provide additional explanation now. I will use some of the central insights that Poinsot develops in his Tractatus de Signis, which is the principal classical locus for discussions in this area.4 In this way I also plan to show the importance of Poinsot's thought for cognitive realism.5 Poinsot's views seem to be the best hope for the realist claim that knowledge of transtheoretical/translinguistic reality is possible.
1.

I shall understand "realism" to consist of two claims. The first is ontological in nature and the second is epistemological: 1. There are beings which exist, and are what they are,
4

These two major English translations of Poinsot's philosophical work are both based on the Ars Logica, which is Volume I of the three-volume Cursus Philosophicus of Poinsot in the edition of B. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930-1937), although Deely brings in much material from the other volumes in notes to the Tractatus text. Reiser's edition of Poinsot's philosophical work is standardly referred to by volume, page, column, and line numbers. Difficulties peculiar to translating Poinsot's Latin are discussed at length by Deely, Tractatus de Signis, 457ff. 6 This is not to say that Poinsot's thought is only important for the issue of cognitive realism. His insights have implications for both the philosophy of mind (for example, mental states cannot be reduced without remainder to physical states), and language (for example, thought is actualized in language and is not something private and internally present only to the knower). For a discussion of these claims, see Douglas B. Rasmussen "Deely, Wittgenstein, and Mental Events," The New Scholasticism 54 (Winter 1980): 60-67; "Wittgenstein and the Search for Meanings," in Semiotics 1982, eds. John Deely and Jonathan Evans (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 577-90; and "Rorty, Wittgenstein, and the Nature of Intentionality," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 57 (1983): 152-62. 8 I shall confine myself in this essay to discussing the importance of Poinsot's thought for cognitive realism. It would, however, be remiss of me not to note that Poinsot indicates that the term "relatio rationis" has a wider extension than

See the critical bilingual edition of John Poinsot, Tractatus de Signis, ed. John Deely in consultation with Ralph A. Powell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Henceforward I will often abbreviate this work to TDS. Also, see Yves Simon, John Glanville, and Donald Hollenhorst's translation, The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). The Simon translation includes much material from Poinsot's work outside the scope of the Deely edition of the Tractatus de Signis (for particulars, see the "Editorial AfterWord" to TDS, 406 note 15).

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independent and apart from, anyone's cognition of them. 2. These beings can be known more or less adequately, often with great difficulty, but still known as they really are.

There are, however, many other distinctions that must be made if this account of realism is to be properly understood: (a) A real being is a being whose existence and nature is independent of its being thought about or, in general, being cognized. Its existence and nature is not dependent upon the fact that it may be an object of awareness. Note carefully, therefore, that mental or psychological activities, since they do not have to be objectified or known in order to exist or be what they are, are not mind-dependent in the sense contrasted with real beings. On the contrary, they are a subset of real beings. (b) A being of reason is a being whose existence and nature is dependent on its being thought about. It is an object-of-thought, or more exactly, an object-of-awareness. It would be wrong, however, to identify a being of reason with the psychological activities sufficient for its existence. A being of reason is in principle distinct from a real being regardless of whether it be physical or psychologicalfor a being of reason only exists in relation to some knower. It is for that reason an objective being. A real being does not exist only in relation to some knower. It does not require a subject to which to be related. It could, then, contrary to what is common in English usage, be termed a "subjective" being,8 be it physical or psychological. (c) A physical being is a being whose existence is independent of mental or psychological activities. Sometimes a physical being is also just logical relations or second intentions. (Tractates de Signis, First Preamble, article 2, 58-64.) This term also refers to fictional, mathematical, and cultural beingsin principle, to all the various forms of human thought and expression. Further, it is the case that many things which are first intentions, for example, a thoroughbred horse like Secretariat, are not simply beings in rerum natura, but beings that are the result of much artifice, custom, and convention. This is, of course, not to deny that there are beings in rerum natura that exist and are what they are, nor is it to say that there is not an important difference between the concept "horse" and a horse. Yet it is to say that many of our first intentions do involve relations resulting from the activities of speculative or practical reason. Indeed, there is a history that is involved with some of them. There is, however, more to this issue than I can discuss here. So, it will have to suffice for me to observe that I do not think any of the foregoing observations are inconsistent with realism as I have defined it here. 7 For purposes of this discussion we will ignore the issue of how these distinctions would be modified if we assume the existence of a Deity. 8 The consequences of such a terminological shift are developed at length by John Deely, first in his Basics of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), but especially in his more recent The Human Use of Signs (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), which is a kind of extended essay on the point.

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called a "real" being in order to indicate the dependency of the psychological on the physical, but not vice-versa. In other words, mental or psychological activities do not exist apart from physical states, such as neurological conditions of the brain, but physical states can exist apart from mental or psychological activities. This is, of course, not to say the mental or psychological can be reduced without remainder to the physical. (d) A mental or psychological being is an activity of a particular mind or consciousness. It is important to note that while a mental or psychological being, for example, an act of perceiving or of conceiving, cannot exist apart from a particular knower, a being of reason, for example, the concept of hydrogen or the character Hamlet, is independent of any particular knower. It is, however, not independent of every particular knower, tout court.9

2.
As said, realism claims that we can know both the existence and nature of reality. The nature of the cognitive relation is such that what one knows is not some tertium quidbe it a copy or image or ideabut reality itself. When one knows something, one knows it, not something else. Thus if one knows something, there is an identification by the knower of the object. An identity between knower and known results. This identity is a formal identity in that the form of the object becomes present to the knower. The process by which an identity between knower and known is achievedspecifically the role of logical relations in this processwill be discussed shortly. It is crucial to realize at the start that it is the very nature or form of a real being that makes it potentially sensible and intelligible and not the knower. The knower does not'create the sensibility and intelligibility of a real being. It is the knower, however, who makes a real being actually sensible and intelligible. Though what can sound and what can hear are different things, the actual sounding of the sound and the actual hearing are one actuality, as Aristotle notes (DeAnima, 466al5),

10

See the summary discussion in John Deely, "The Ontological Status of Intentionality," The New Scholasticism 2 (Spring, 1972): 232-33, note 24. See Joseph Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (Houston, TX: The Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992), 33-62; and John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948), 407-12 and 441-68 for an excellent account of the formal identity between knower and known.

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AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY and as Aquinas claims (De Veritate, q. 8): "Knower and known are one principle of activity inasmuch as one reality results from them both, namely the mind in act. I say that one reality is the result, because therein mind is conjoined with its object." So, as said, there are no intermediate entities that are known, but only one actuality. The actualization of objects of sense and thought is the actualization of sense and thought faculties. Though the knower receives the form of the object and thus is metaphysically passive, the knower must be epistemologically active for cognition to occur. Thus, the cognitive relation is real because the formal identity between knower and known does not need to be an object of cognition in order to exist. Knower and known are really identified. Yet such a relation cannot exist without the requisite psychological or mental activities and the logical relations they create. Accordingly, the passive and active dimensions of human knowledge gives rise to the distinction between the real cognitive relation of identity and the logical relations which make it possible.12 These logical relations do not represent or signify something in virtue of being like or similar to that other thing, but simply in virtue of being of or about that other thing. As said, they are intentions or formal signs, but what is the nature of these intentions or formal signs? They are essentially relative, for they necessarily involve an ordination or respect to something else. Yet such relations as "north of," "father of," "equal to," and even "similar to" do not capture the character of intentions or formal signs. Their whole nature does not consist in being merely of or about something else. They have a character of their own. They cannot be used to explain the character of intentions or formal signs. So, what sort of relation could serve to explain the nature of intentions or formal signs?
3.
Henry B. Veatch in his classic work, Intentional Logic, follows Poinsot in arguing that logical relations are fundamentally intentional relations of identity: There is a type of structure or relation of which it may be said not just that it can serve as an intentional form, but rather that it is simply an intentional form. That relation, I believe,

"See Poinsot, TDS Book II, Questions 1-3. 12 Obviously, sense perception plays a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, but a discussion of this role will have to be left for another time. However, see David Kelley, Evidence of the Senses: A Realist Theory of Perception (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

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is none other than a relation of identity.13


He claims that concepts, propositions, and arguments have different functions, but they each constitute a relation of identity. They respectively allow the knower to identify what something is (essence), whether something is (existence), and why something is (cause).14 They are, as already noted, the relations through which the real cognitive relation comes about. The basic idea behind the claim, that an intentional form is a relation of identity is as follows: since to know anything, regardless of what it may be, requires that we know what it is, this means that we have to know it in terms of what it is. Accordingly, we must intellectually separate what something is from itself and reidentify it. This is precisely what a relation of intentional identity is. A relation of identity can only hold between a thing and itself, not something else, but in order to be identified with itself, it must in some sense or other be separated from itself. Thus, a relation of identity cannot be like a relation among physical things, because no such being is ever separate from itself, much less related back to itself. It is only through an act of abstraction that the intelligible features of things can be universalized and become predicable. It its only through an act of judgment that something is actually predicated and thus identified with itself, and it is only through an act of reasoning that something is demonstrated or explained and thus identified as the cause of something else. Thus, relations of identity must be relations of reason. There is, however, much involved in the claim that an intentional form is a relation of identity. To see more clearly just what an intentional relation of identity is we shall examine the particular case of concepts. The context for this examination will be the "problem of universals." The problem of universals as it will be discussed here is based on epistemological considerations. If our concepts are to provide knowledge of what something is, it must be accomplished by abstraction. It is impossible to recognize anything, for example, what a horse is, without distinguishing it from the things with which it is conjoined but which
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Henry B. Veatch, Intentional Logic: A Logic Based On Philosophical Realism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1952; reprinted 1970 by Archon Books), 23. Veatch states in the preface, "I have relied heavily on the very rich but sadly neglected Ars Logica of John of St. Thomas." See Poinsot, "On the Universal Considered in Itself," Part II, Question 3, of The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, but especially article 5, "Whether universality consists essentially in a relation," 123-30 (= Artis Logicae Secunda Pars, q. 3 "De Universal! Secundum Se," art. 5 "An consistat essentialiter universalitas in relatione," Reiser ed. I 333a28-342b48). 14 For a thorough discussion of this claim, see Francis H, Parker and Henry B. Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument (New York: Harper & Row, 1959) in addition to Veatch's Intentional Logic.

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are really different from it, for example, a horse's color, size, and shape. The senses alone cannot provide such recognition; a conceptual consideration is needed. Yet to consider just what a horse is, as such, apart from its color, size, and shape is to have a universal concept of horse, because it is to consider any horse, or horse in general, without regard to any of its individuating features. If the foregoing, however, is true, that is, if what a horse is is really distinct from its color, size, and shape and if through abstraction we consider horse just as such in itself, then it would seem that we do not know the nature or essence of any individual horse but rather some universal nature or essence of horse. So, it seems that if we are to have knowledge, we must have universal concepts; but if we have such concepts, we do not know particular things, but only universal natures. Essences would not really be particularized but would instead be universal. This is, of course, the challenge of Platonic extreme realism. On the other hand, if to avoid the threat of extreme realism we deny that we have universal concepts and confine our concepts to what the senses explicitly recognize for themselves, then we are very limited in our ability to differentiate and discriminate. We would have no real knowledge of what even a horse, for example, is. In such a context, the very claim that there is a nature or essence that makes a horse what it is would indeed be most dubious.15 This is, of course, the challenge of nominalism. To meet the challenge presented by Platonic realism and nominalism it should first be determined just what it is to say that the essence of something is really distinct from something else. Most generally put, it means that everything is what it is and not something else. For example, a substance is not its quality (a horse is not its color), even though a substance has a quality (a horse has a color). A substance is a substance, and a quality is a quality. Neither is the other nor anything else. This distinction is a real distinction. It holds in reality, apart from what anyone says or knows. To say that some essence is really distinct from another essence, however, does not necessarily mean that they exist apart from one anotheras do, say, two substances, the horses Secretariat and Seattle Slew. Our ability to separate an essence from other essences through abstraction, to consider it universally apart from its individuating conditions, does not mean that it really exists apart from other essences or in any manner other than as particularized. Essences need only be abstract and universal when considered by the mind. Be this as it may, it seems nonetheless that the problem of universals remains, because the intellectual activity of abstraction which makes essences universal would seem to distort reality. Essences as they exist
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See Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism," The New Scholasticism 58 (Summer 1984): 316-35, for a discussion of this issue.

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in reality are particular and conjoined with other essences. So, how can that which is a universal ever be identified with that which is particular? Concepts cannot tell us what things really are and thus are anything but relations of identity. The solution to this problem has two parts. The first part comes from Aquinas. An essence considered in itself, apart from its manner of existence and solely in terms of its intelligible content, is neither existent nor non-existent. Nor is it either particular or universal.17 It is, however, capable of existing in either manner. The very same essence, for example, "horse," that exists as individuated in many horses can also exist as one when conceived intellectually. Thus, we can through abstraction conceive the whole essence or nature of a particular thing,19 not some universal essence or part, because the manner of existence of an essence does not pertain to the essence itself. It is the neutrality of essences in themselves to their manner of existence that allows Aquinas to make the following observation (Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 2.75): "Although it is necessary for the truth of cognition that the cognition answer to the thing known, still it is not necessary that the mode of the thing known be the same as the mode of its cognition." Being a universal pertains to the mode of existence of an essence as an object of cognition. It does not pertain to the essence itself, and does not require that an essence in reality, apart from cognition, be
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Aquinas, Being and Essence, 2nd ed. rev., trans. Armand Maurer, C.S.B. (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 37-44. "This type of consideration is called an "absolute consideration," where one abstracts from every way of existing but prescinds from none (see following note). One thus never encounters an essence absolutely considered in reality or cognition, for the essence is freed from all modes of existence. Yet it is an essence so considered that makes conceptual knowledge possible. 18 Technically, this is abstraction without precisionthat is, abstraction which merely does not express, as opposed to excludes, differentiating traits of an essence or nature. What this type of abstraction considers is the whole individual viewed in a distinctive way as, for example, when we abstract the essence "horse." "Horse" is truly predicable of Secretariat. It is not merely of some "part." Abstraction with precision, however, cuts off differentiating traits as, for example, when one abstracts a form as a part, say, "horseness." This is not an abstraction of a whole. "Horseness" is not truly predicable of Secretariat. In non-precisive abstraction differentiating traits are implicit. For example, though the non-precisive abstraction of the essence "horse" does not specify the particular color, size, or shape of the essence "horse"it can be any within a certain rangeit does require that there be some determinate color, size, or shape the essence "horse" takes. It thus includes the differentiating traits in the sense that it allows them to be different in each instance when they are made explicit. 19 Particular things are the material objects which we know through their intelligible aspects (natures), which are the formal objects. The material objects are what we know and the formal objects are what we know about them. See Parker and Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument, 47, n. 1.

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anything other20 than always individualized. Conceptualization need not distort reality. The second part of the solution to the charge that conceptualization distorts reality comes from Poinsot.21 The universal is not something existing by itselfwhether it be a Platonic "form," some Porphyrian "part" existing in particular things (in rebus) or some "idea" which one mentally inspects before knowing anything else. It is not some tertium quid. Rather, it is a relation.22 The foundation for this relation is the essence or nature as such that has been abstracted, but the universal itself is the expression of this nature as a whole (or unit) which bears upon its many instances. The universal is a relation of one nature or essence to many particulars in which it is found.23 This relation is a relation of reason in that it is the result of an intellectual process of abstraction and comparison. It is a relation of identity because it is the same essence, the essence considered in itself, that is both one and many. As a universal, a nature or essence is capable of being predicated of many, but what is predicated is the essence as such, not the universal. The mode of existence which makes it possible, for example, to predicate "horse" of Secretariat does not pertain the essence "horse" itself. One should be careful not to confuse the mode of existence of the essence "horse" when intellectually conceived as onethe second intention with its mode of existence as it exists in manythe first intention. To
think things to be other than they are is to think falselyfor example, to think that Secretariat had no color, size, or shape. To think of Secretariat, however, without thinking of his color, size, or shape involves no falsehood. To abstract is not the same as to judge falsely ("abstractio non est mendacium,"is the old scholastic adage). 21 Tractates de Signis, Book I, question 1, "Whether a sign is in the order of relation," 116-34, and Book II, question 2, "Whether a Concept is a Formal Sign," 240-53. ^Poinsot makes clear in the Tractates de Signis that the concept understood as "a specifying form expressed by the understanding" is "most properly a formal sign" (24fyl3-15), and that the being proper to a sign is that of "a relation according to the way a relation has being" (119/10-15). 23 Aristotle (De Anima, 3.4429bl6-17) describes this relationship as being like the relationship that a bent line has to itself when pulled out straight. 24 Arelation of reason can be of two types: either with no foundation in real beings or with a foundation in real beings. It is, of course, being argued that we are here dealing with the latter type. (See Poinsot, Artis Logicae Secunda Pars, q. 17 "De Ente Rationis Logico," art. 3, "Quid Sit Distinctio et Unitas Rationis Ratiocinatae et Ratiocinantis," Reiser ed. I 294a3-300b48.) 26 A concept's signification involves both comprehension, which is not limited to what is only explicitly considered, and an extension that extends over an indefinite number of individuals. A concept's signification is, then, not something that is determined by an inspectio mentis procedure. On this very point, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Logical Possibility: An Aristotelian Essentialist Critique," The Thomist 47 (October 1983): 423-40.

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ignore this point is to commit a fallacy. This is illustrated by the following syllogism: (1) Secretariat is a horse. (2) Horse is a universal. (3) Therefore, Secretariat is a universal. Though it is doubtful that there ever has been anyone who has seriously and explicitly accepted a syllogism of this sort, it is the very same reasoning that lies behind the epistemological form of the problem of universals. Both extreme realists and nominalists fail to see that essences in themselves are neutral with respect to their manner of existence, and both fail to see that a universal's essential character is that of a relation. As a consequence of these dual failures, a universal is treated as if it were either the primary object of cognition or simply groupings of individuals whose basis is, at best, some vague resemblance or, at worst, something entirely arbitrary. In either case our concepts cannot know the essence or nature of individual things. If Aquinas and Poinsot are right, however, such a consequence seems avoidable.
4.

Has the charge that concepts cannot tell us what things really are been entirely met? As universals, concepts are a relation of identity between an abstracted essence and the possible particulars in which that essence exists. Yet how are we to understand a universal's status as a relation? If relations of identity are to be formal signs, they have to have the ability to refer or signify in virtue of themselves. They need to have the character of a relation. Yet do they have a respect or ordination to something because of themselves, or because of how they are understood? Do they really allow the knower to overcome the limits of his or her subjectivity, or is it ultimately the case that all referring,27 meaning, or signifying is determined by how we attempt to explain things? Or, to express the issue as Kant saw it, do our concepts conform to the objects or do the objects conform to our concepts? It would seem that if cognitive realism is to be possible, the relational structure that we recognize our logical instruments to have cannot qua relation be something that results from their being an object of cognition. Instead, their relational structure must be independent of cognition. It must be something real; something they have by their very nature. It is here, then, that we come to the central insight of Poinsot's Tractatus de Signis. Poinsot argues that the relation that is proper to a
26

The failure to see that a universal is a relation is also found in those so-called "moderate realists" who hold that there are universal natures existing in particular things, in rebus. 27 1 use 'referring' in a semantic sense and not solely to indicate existential denotation. For a discussion of the importance of not conflating these two senses of the term, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism," 320. n. 10.

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formal sign is that of a relation considered just as such, that is, according to the way relation has being.28 To better understand this claim, however, we need to avail ourselves of the following distinction. This distinction is between a relation secundum esse (RSE) and a relation secundum did (RSD). 'Esse' does not mean here existence but essence. The distinction pertains to that which is by its very nature a relation and that which is not. Something is a RSE when both its definition and explanation require a reference to something else. Something is a RSD when it can be defined without reference to another, but cannot be explained or accounted for except by reference to something else.29 This distinction focuses on the way that relations have being
28

Deely coins the term "ontological relation" in order to replace the cumbersome expression, "a relation according to the way it has being" (see the "Editorial AfterWord" to TDS, esp. 463-65). We should be careful not to impose any other meaning on this term that might lead us to assume that it refers only to relations that exist apart from cognitive activities, for the following reason, which goes to the heart of Poinsot's doctrine of signs (TDS 96/28-36): "in the case of relatives, indeed, not only is there some non-being conceived on the pattern of relation, but also the very relation conceived on the part of the respect toward, while it does not exist in the mind-independent order, is conceived or formed on the pattern of a mind-independent relation, and so that which is formed in being, and not only that after whose pattern it is formed, is a relation, and by reason of this there are in fact mind-dependent relations, but not mind-dependent substances." Deely, in "The Two Approaches to Language: Philosophical and Historical Reflections on the Point of Departure of John Poinsot's Semiotic," The Thomist 37 (October 1974): 869-70, explains the point as follows: "Like each of the other categories relation is a rationale of being, an 'ontological' rationale, that is, a rationale expressive of the possibilities of existence. But unlike the other categories, relation as an ontological rationale embraces in its positive content both the mind-dependent and mind-independent orders of being; and so relation may be most properly called 'ontological' when it is understood that the positive content in question is indifferent to realization according to its proper being in the opposed orders of what is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent. Not that mental relations belong to the category of relationwhich would be a contradiction in termsbut that mental relations are relative according to the way they have being, just as are categorial relations." 29 Relativity in this sense (as Deely pointed out in his controversial note 16 to TDS 86/22, as well as in the Editorial AfterWord, 472ff. section on "the fundamental architecture of the Treatise on Signs," and in his subsequent discussion, "The Semiotic of John Poinsot: Yesterday and Tomorrow, "Sent iotica 69.1/2 [April, 1988]: 31-127) pertains to every category, not relation alone, for if one is to understand what something is, be it substance or accident, there must be a reference to something elsenamely, its principles and causes. The requirement to refer to something else results from what is necessary to grasp the intelligible character of something. Since relativity in this sense is not restricted to any one category, it is also a "transcendental relation." Not only, then, is a transcendental relation not essentially relative, it is not a categorial relation. Moreover, it differs from categorial relation in that there is not a distinction between the relation and its subject or foundation, they are merged: for example, the relation of potency to act, substance to accident, and supposit

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apart from the cause or foundation of their existence. To say that there is such a thing as an RSE is to say that there is something whose entire character (ratio) is nothing more than a respect, an ordination, to something else and that this is so apart from whether it is cognized or apprehended. In other words, it is to say that a relation is a real being in the sense that its distinctive character as a respect or ordination to another is not formally caused by its being cognized. To say that something is an RSE, however, does not mean that it exists in any other manner than that of an accident.30 Nor does it suppose that a relation can exist without some foundation in a substance such as quality, quantity, or activity. Yet it is to say two very important things: (1) a relation as such is not reducible to merely those accidents that provide its foundation; and (2) a relation as such can base its to essence. Yet the fundamental question that concerns us is whether a logical relation is simply a transcendental relation or also an "ontological relation," a RSE. ^This seems to be contrary to what Mortimer J. Adler holds. Though he enthusiastically endorses Poinsot's treatise on signs in his book, Some Questions About Language (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), 172, Adler denies the existence of relations as such because he believes that commits him to rejecting the fundamental division of being into substance and accident. This is consistent with his earlier position in "Sense Cognition: Aristotle vs. Aquinas," The New Scholasticism 53 (Autumn 1968): 582: "That which is a non-entity is a non-existent. Relations do not exist as such; they do not constitute a mode of being; when two entities are relatedwhether as knower and known, as father and son, as double and half, or any other waythe relation exists entitatively as an accident in each of the relata. It does not exist as something in between them, not inhering in either of them. There is in short no inter-subjective mode of being; for everything that exists exists either as a subject (that is, a substance) or in a subject (i. e., an accident)." Despite his words, it is not clear whether Adler really has to deny the existence of relations as such; for what he seems to be insisting is that everything must exist as either a substance or an accident. Yet to claim that relations as such exist does not require running afoul of the claim that everything is either a substance or an accident. Relations exist only as accidents (and are only founded in other accidents), but their nature as a respect or ordination to another is still irreducible to the natures of other accidents. Thus, relations as such exist. Yet Robert W. Schmidt, S J., notes that "though we some times speak of a relation between two things, more properly it is of something, to something." The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 138. So, one should be careful not to let an image of a relation as a kind of metaphysical cord or string between a subject and a term dominate or replace one's intellectual apprehension of a relation's character as a respect or ordination of something to something. Deely expressly addressed this misbegotten image comparatively early in his work on Poinsot ("Semiotic' as the Doctrine of Signs," Ars Semeiotica 1/3 [1977], 60 n. 12): "we must be wary of picturing relations to ourselves ... as if they were lines or 'metaphysical tightropes' between subjects. If Poinsot is correct, they would be better imagined as a kind of field or zone consequent upon interactions and resulting formal structures." See, in TDS, the Second Preamble, Article 1, 80-87, and Appendix C, 378-89.

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existence on something physical or something mental, but as such it is indifferent to the cause or foundation of its existence. These last two points are crucial to understanding how logical relations, which are, of course, relations of reason, can nonetheless have the very character of a relation (and thus the intrinsic capacity to refer or signify) which does not result from their being cognized. Returning to our discussion of universal concepts from the previous section, we can recall that a mental process of abstraction is necessary for the essence of a particular thing to be apprehended and that the nature or essence as such provides the foundation for the universal. Further, the universal itself is just the relation of the essence expressed as one to many particulars. It is nothing more. Now a universal's status as a relation, that is, as a respect or ordination to another, is not dependent on its being cognized, even though, of course, it cannot exist without the mental or psychological activities which make abstraction possible and even though it is only the universal as a relation in which something is apprehended that is independent of being cognized. Obviously, that which is cognized cannot exist as an object without being cognized, for example, the concept "horse." Yet, the relation in and through which this being of reason is formedthat is, the very "of-ness" or "aboutness" that characterizes concepts as intentions or formal signsis an RSE. It was Poinsot's genius to see that formal signs, though founded in the subjective means of knowing, are nonetheless able to present objects other than themselves without first having to be identified as objects, because of their character as relations and because that character is both independent of cognition and indifferent to being realized inside and outside cognition. Concepts as psychological states are modifications of a knower, indeed; but as formal signs they are nothing more than a respect or ordination to an object superordinate to that modification. They remain incapable of being identified without presenting what they are of. Thus, according to Poinsot, the signifying character of formal signs is not determined by the knower even though the foundation for the relation is caused to exist by a process of abstraction, and even though the essence as such (the foundation of the relation of signification) exists according to its manner of existence in cognition that is, abstractly and universally. Poinsot's view remains the syste-

31

Tractatus de Signis, Book I "Concerning the Sign in Its Proper Being," question 2 "Whether the Sign Relation in the Case of Natural Signs is Mind-Independent or Mind-Dependent," esp. 15V9-15; Book I, question 3 "Whether the Relation of Sign to Signified Is the Same as the Relation of Sign to Cognitive Power," 163/12-36; and see also Book II, question 3 "Whether an Impressed Specification Is a Formal Sign," 261/12-36.

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matic alternative to both Kantian and neo-Kantian views of cognition.32


5.

"Postmodernism" has yet to be given a positive characterization. The only thing that is sure about its meaning is that it refers to that which comes after modernity. Thus, whatever the character of postmodernism may ultimately be, it is one that is informed by an historical perspective. In epistemology this means that postmodernism cannot ignore the record of modern thought. This record reveals, however, that the modern "way of ideas" is bankrupt. Nearly every major thinker of this period, with the notable exception of Thomas Reid, shared the assumption that "ideas" are the direct objects of cognition. Be they Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas" or Humean "impressions," it was nonetheless assumed that knowledge began first with ideas which were private and internal. Even Kant's grand synthesis was not an overcoming of this assumption, but the final integration of its meaning and scope. Kant took the logic of modernity's epistemological starting point to its inexorable conclusion: the realization that we cannot know the truth about real beings. Much of contemporary philosophy operates in a neo-Kantian context. It attempts to defend, without much success, the possibility of truth and knowledge against versions of ontological and epistemological relativismversions which grow more extreme and virulent with each new incarnation. Yet what is becoming clearer and clearer is that much of philosophy or, at least, philosophy that has its origins in modernity, is dead or dying. We need to make a new start, but we cannot, as Descartes seems to have supposed, ignore the history of philosophy. It is here that the importance of Poinsot's thought enters, for he provides a gateway through which we can discover the insights of premodern thought. In Poinsot's hands these insights can aid us in transcending the dichotomies that have resulted from both premodern and modern philosophy, which is the basic argument of Deely's latest book33 subtitled "early modern philosophy and postmodern thought." The set of oppositions between thought and things, thought and language, culture and reality, and discourse and being, ultimately has its source in a view that treats "ideas" not as essentially relative. Poinsot defends, of course, the view that "ideas" are essentially relative, and, if he is correct, there is in principle no problem as to our ability to have knowledge of real beings. Yet, since thought is not caught up within some Cartesian ego but expressed in human action in various ways, the
32

See Edward Pols, Radical Realism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992) for a discussion of the Kantian spirit of contemporary antirealism. ^New Beginnings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

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world we inhabit is much richer and complex than either the premoderns or the moderns ever imagined.34 We seem to have reached a point where the insights of John Poinsot can no longer be ignored. St. John's University Jamaica, New York

34

See note 6 above.

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