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The Restoration
ofylmerican
Politics
POLITICS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
VOLUME
II
III
Morgenthau
THE
Xj^tX VTj;^
The
The
Canada
Parts of this
the
title
Dile??mias of Politics
1958 by
1962
The
Coftiposed
by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published 1962 and printed by
Preface
The
essays
Academy
Atomic Scientists, Challe?jge, China Quarterly, Commentary, Committee for Economic Development, Co?mno?i Cause, Confluthe
ence, Encoimter, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Foreign Policy Association,
Republic,
New
Affairs
Washington
Contents
Introduction
PART
1.
The Rediscovery
of Politics 7
15
2.
The Demands
Death
in the
of Prudence
3.
Nuclear Age
19
PART
4.
5.
II.
The Attempts
at Restoration
The Corruption
of Liberal
29
36
The Surrender
The Evocation
to the
Immanence
H. Carr
6.
44
7.
The Rediscovery
Arnold Toynbee
54
8.
The
Lippmann
63
PART
9.
III.
The Restoration
of Domestic Politics
71
Freedom
10.
11. 12.
The The
The
New
New
Feudalism
83
90
101
13.
The
Empiricism
109
PART
14. 15.
V-A
CONTENTS
16. 17. 18.
Has Atomic
War
Really
Become
Impossible?
134
142
Disarmament
155
162
19.
PART
V-B
The Restoration of Foreign Policy: The Methods Old and New of Foreign Policy
167
21. Alliances
22. 23.
176
198
Diplomacy
The The
Qualifications of an
Ambassador
209
213 231
24.
25.
26. 27.
New
Atlantic
Community
Positive
Approach
to a
Democratic Ideology
237 248
The Economics
of Foreign Policy
28. 29.
Preface to a Political
Theory
of Foreign
Aid
254
What Can
Nations?
Do To
Our
National Interest?
276 279
285
An Approach
to the
Summit
PART iv-c.
33.
34. 35. 36. 37.
The The
The World
Situation
Prospect for a
New
Foreign Policy
300
308 315
323
What
the Big
Two
The Problem
The End
of Berlin
38.
39. viii
of an Illusion
328
Neutralism
334
Contents
40. 41.
The
Political
342
Polycentrism
348
42. Asia:
The American
Algeria
351
43.
,
The China
359
365
44.
EPILOGUE
45.
The
President
379
Index
385
IX
Introduction
Of
The great political philosophers, from Plato onward, have been moved by the defects of the existing political order toward thinking about the nature of politics and of the right political order. By so
doing, they sought to guide the powers-that-be toward the realization of that order. In that immediate task,
most
political philosophers
have
failed.
They
work
tends to demonstrate
al-
about
Both
and their
successes are the result of the peculiar relationship that exists be-
tween
political
The
ferent
ity
rules
by which
dif-
from those by which political reality is formed. Political realgrows from empirical contingencies, but incompletely and in-
adequately directed by
human
reason.
must present
a rationally consistent
them to spoil its rationality. Thus theory of necessity proceeds by way of eUmination; it must neglect what does not fit into its rational scheme in order to maintain itself as theory. Theory cannot help being partial in a dual
the contingencies without allowing
sense:
it
its
rational
it.
scheme
fit
into
is
of necessity
is
fail
as a
blueprint
Thus
political
philosophy
constantly exposed
two kinds of corruption: either of becoming subservient to the by justifying- and rationalizing it or of becoming subservient to an anticipated and desired future political reality by justifying and rationalizing it. In other words, political
existing political reality
As
between
own
rationality
its
chance to succeed
is
element in
of
its
but
politics carries
mind
a political philosophy,
Thus up
part
same
They
that pvirpose
is
theoretical svstematization
life; in
suc-
which must take those contingencies into account. An argument can, then, be made in favor of a political philosophy which is systematic in substance but takes its form from political life itself. As far as its form is concerned, it is what might be called an issues-oriented political philosophy, which applies the theoretical
principles of politics to a succession of political problems as they
arise
on the
political scene.
Edmund Burke
is
The thought
tion
mois-
by
concrete political
sue both for the sake of elucidation and for the benefit of the political actor.
Thus
is
moved by
war
to reflect
its
own
it,
to fash-
ion political action. Similarly, the concrete economic issues of the day
move
tions
freedom and
pre-
requisites in the
political action
the actor.
Introduction
The sum total of such reflections constitutes a poHtical philosophy in substance; for these reflections seek in an issues-oriented
form the same kind of coherent
theoretical understanding
They
try to
which is compen-
more obvious
PART I
THE REDISCOVERY
OF POLITICS
proposition that
are organ-
growing as must appear to the modern mind paradoxical, if not completely absurd. For power as the domination of man by man, pleasurable to
as the
human
nothing in
common
Where two
it
hu-
man
seems
the the
modern mind, in the relation of love. The inability of modern mind to see this connection between love and power is
to the
measure of
its
love or power.
As Paul
Tillich put
is
it
in the
introductory chapter to
word
'confusion'
of a chapter. But
if
love,
power,
and
becomes
The modern mind, both in its Marxist and non-Marxist expressions, sees in the power of man over man not an ineluctable outgrowth of human nature but only an ephemeral phenomenon, the product of
a
dis-
lust for
power and
its
man by man
liberal
will be replaced
by
is
thought,
power
less
politics
regarded
as a
kind of atavism, a
residue
from the
is
which
destined to be superseded
by the
institutions
and practices
of liberal democracy.
lust for
between the
all
historic configit
Love
as the
reunion of
1962.
my-
more or
is
understanding misses
of the
It is
commitment
phenomenon
aware only of surface phenomena which may or may not be manifestations of love, because it is unaware of that very element in
of
man on which love is built: his soul. And it is unaware of that quality human existence which is the root both of the lust for power and
Of
is
all
creatures, only
man
is
in
need of not being alone, without being able in the end to escape
It is
being alone.
which
or for
gives
power and
more
than
moment,
of achievement, which
existential loneliness
fulfill
power and
itself.
love. In that
He
cannot
himself, he cannot
effort, in isolation
own
become what he is destined to be, by his from other beings. The awareness of that
in search of love
his self
insufficiency drives
him on
and power.
It
drives
in offspring the
work
his
of his
in the
hands;
lit-
mind; in
art
and
eraturethe
work
work
of his
to
overcome
love,
loneliness,
this loneliness,
through duplica-
Through
man
seeks another
human
a
his soul, to
form
union
which
his will
will
make him whole. Through power, man seeks to impose upon another man, so that the will of the object of his power
What
man
as a
cal manipulation.
power must create through the artifice of psychologiLove is reunion through spontaneous mutuality,
quality of love and
power
It is
the
common
power
as its fulfilment, as
is
Power,
is
consummation,
love
ultimate corruption, is the same as power, albeit power is redeemed by an irreducible residue of love. Love is a psychological relationship which in its pure form is marked by complete and spontaneous mutuality. A surrenders himself to B, as B surrenders himself to A; and both do so spontaneously,
in recognition of their
loved;
is
what
is,
feels,
and wants, B
is,
feels,
and wants,
too.
Love
Symposium
himself
them meets with his other half, the actual half of amazement of love and friendship and
I
may
say,
even
moment:
who
pass their
whole
lives together;
what they desire of one another. For the inwhich each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has this meeting and melting into only a dark and doubtful presentiment one another, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is
yet they could not explain
tense yearning
.
called love.
Love in its purest form is the rarest of experiences. It is given to few men to experience it at all, and those who experience it do so only in fleeting moments of exaltation. What makes love as commonly experienced fall short of its pure form is the element of power with which love begins in triumph and ends in defeat and which corrupts it throughout. Love typically begins with A trying to submit B to his will, that is, as a relationship of power, and frequently it does not progress beyond it. As Socrates puts it in the Phaedrus: "As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves." And it is significant
that Socrates, in his first speech in that dialogue, in parodying Lysias'
is
tantamount to what
we would
call a relationship
of power.
What makes
For
if
love
is
what makes, in other words, the power relationship is the inevitable a reunion of two human beings who
belong together, that reunion can never be complete for any length
of time. For, except in the Liebestod, which destroys the lovers
uniting them,
ualities
it
by
of the lovers.
and B want to be one, yet they must want to preserve each other's
it is
their
way
That inner contradiction the lovers endeavor to overcome by letpower do what love is unable to do by itself. Power tries to break down the barrier of individuality which love, because it is love, must leave intact. Yet in the measure that power tries to do
ting
the
work
it
An
irreducible
element of power
make a stable relationship of love, which without it would be nothing more than a succession of precarious exaltations. Thus without power love cannot persist; but through power it is corrupted and threatened with destruction. That destruction becomes actual when A and J5, by trying to reduce each
requisite to
for
power
is,
as it
What man
tries to
And
this
Be resident
divine.
And not in me: I am myself alone. ... And am I then a man to be belov'd?
O, monstrous fault, to harbor such a thought! Then, since this earth affords no joy to me, But to command, to check, to o'erbear such
As
I'll
make
my
approximate and in
a fleeting
moment
Power
is
a psychological relationship in
man through
men
or institutions.
may
man
or of an
It is in
power
of the
B;
two
ambivalent.
seeks to exert
power and
seeks to exert
resists.
Thus
is
same
power of others. While he seeks power over others, others seek power over him. Victory will fall to him who marshals the stronger
the
weapons of influence with greater skill. Yet a poHtical victory won with the weapons of threats and promises is likely to be precarious; for the power relation thus established
depends upon the continuing submissiveness of
a recalcitrant will,
The
and tenuously
as
long
master
How
all
to
overcome that
from without and against the latter's resistance. resistance and make the will of the subject of the master is one of the crucial issues with which
must come to terms. and
their
It is
political orders
stability.
The
potential,
and on
all
levels
of social interaction from the family to the state, have sought to meet
that issue
power upon the spontaneous consent of the subject. If the subject can be made to duplicate spontaneously within himself the master's will so that what the master wills the subject wills, too, not through inducement from without but through spontaneous consent from within, then the will of the master and the will of the subject are one, and the power of the master is founded not upon the master's threats and promises but upon the subject's
by basing
So
it is
power
monar-
and autocracies,
make
full
monThat
monarch
as
which John Durie, Scotch Presbyterian and worker for Protestant unity, wrote in 1632 to the British Ambassador, Thomas Roe, explaining the decline of the power of Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden, then fighting for the Protestant cause
in
Germany:
increase of his authority is the ground of his abode; and love is ground of his authority; it must be through love; for it cannot be through power; for his power is not in his own subjects but in strangers; not in his money, but in theirs; not in their good will, but in mere necessity as things stand now betwixt him and them; therefore if the necessity be not so urgent as it is; or if any other means be shown by God (who is able to do as much by another man as by him) to avoid this necessity; the money and the power and the assistance which it yieldeth unto him will fall from him and so his authority is lost, and his abode will be no
The
the
which was
at first
is
gone.
and
ritual of
relationship
good measure
able.
an actual
fact,
Obviously,
this
power
in the political
sphere, at least in
attainable goal.
modern
Thus
beyond
their
From
men
seem
more com-
munion which the lack of love withholds from them. Yet the acquisition of power only begets the desire for more; for the more men
the master holds
12
bound
more he
is
aware of
his lone-
His success
in
his
There
is
is
in the
Don
Juans
who
when
man
words of William Blake, "is than all cannot satisfy man." Thus the cry of a mistaken soul; less the heights of the master's power signal the depths of his despair. For the world conqueror can subject all inhabitants of the earth to his will, but he cannot compel a single one to love him. The master of all men is also the loneliest of all men; for his loneliness, in spite of the totality of his power, proves that it cannot be cured by power. That fruitless search for love through power leads in the most passionate of the seekers of power from a despair, impotent in the fulness of power, to a hate, destructive of the objects of their successful
power and
frustrated love.
Thus
whom
they
command
and, hence,
whom
may
may impose
of
his will
even
in the crudest
power
What
both
which remedies the awareness of insufficiency born of loneliness and which only love can give. But they have chosen the wrong track of power and are doomed to failure. Thus they master and subject must search forever and in vain
for that other
human being
I
to
whom
love you, to
The power
relationship
relationship of love.
power would
their
bottom of
who
The
which
at the root of a
type
De
his
harangues to
his generals,
Many
of the powerful
Beneath that
artificial
community which
power
least a
and
manifests
itself in
Nowhere
Homer
is
The loneliness of man is, then, impervious to both love and power. Power can only unite through the unilateral imposition of subjection,
which
leaves the master's isolation intact.
whom
which
to unite his
souls
moments
when two
see the
Adam
They
only
promised land
it
to be expelled
from
it.
who
find in their
embrace
its
moments even
real-
ects
Thus in come
thirsting for,
and
forsaken by, love man peoples the heavens with gods and mothers
who
love
him and
whom
whose power he can subject himself spontaneously because their power is the power of love. Yet whatever he expects of the other
world, he must leave
this
world
as
he entered
it:
alone.
14
from the way man is compelled by his natural aspirations to act. That conflict is foreordained by the nature of Christian ethics and the nature of man. Christian ethics demands love,
Christian ethics
self;
man
aggrandizement of
self
the tragedy of
man
that he
is
incapable,
by
what Christian
ethics
It is
demands of him.
the guilt of
by dint of his corruption, to do what he could do to meet the demands of Christian ethics. The best man is capable of is to be guided by the vision of a life lived in compliance with the Christian code and to narrow the gap between
that he
is
man
unwilling,
his
conduct and that code. The closing of that gap through complete
Christian ethics and man's con-
not a problem for ethics but for theology. Only divine grace
What
litical
is
true of
man
in general applies
sphere
and there
no difference
in kind
by
definition the
demands of Christian
No
compromise
is
possible
commandment
of thy power."
man
to be at the
same time
good politician complying with the rules of political conduct and to be a good Christian complying with the demands of Christian ethics. In the measure that he tries to be the one he must
a
No
politician
it is
power
that
itself.
Few mor-
From Worldview,
15
intellectually
more
attractive
and socially
more
To
face
eyes
to
it.
He
eralizing" them.
pel did not
He
has
made
it
it
mean what
make
it
they
make
forgiveness easy.
He
it
has watered
as
is
down
the
demands of Chris-
making
is
appear
The
tween
other escape
They approach
the prob-
side of
human
action.
They
and
politics
Man
is
here presented as
is
as naturally
moral; this
assumed
and one's
own
to belong and of
ern
man
has undertaken to
make
its
there be
any truth
in this necessarily
moral problem of
Given the
existential incompatibility
between
politics
and Christian
ethics,
how
While he
is
precluded
best he can do
is
political act.
He must
one which
likely to
do the
least
violence to the
politics
is,
commands
it
of Christian ethics.
The moral
strategy of
This strategy,
than
is
should be added,
is
no more peculiar
to politics
and the
human
choose the
lesser evil
is
it is
moral
man
can do.
\6
The Demands
It is at
of Prudence
and
political calculation
is
more or
less
morally
evil
must be determined through anticipation of the probable consequences of different courses of action. Obviously, Father John
Courtney Murray
view
. .
.
finds nuclear
morally supeis
rior to rior to
latter, in turn,
supe-
war
is
war.
On
the
No
right
morally
We
all
act
may
may
uncertainty of
which creates those "ambiguities" and "dilemmas" which Father Murray so dislikes. These ambiguities and dilemmas were not invented by theologians, Protestant or otherwise, but they grow inevitably from the nature
both moral judgment and
political calculation
The
and
which we
which he was unable to cope, were not peculiar to the prince of Denmark. They are but the ambiguities and the dilemmas which no morally sensitive actor on the political scene can
the dilemmas with
escape.
This being
intellectual
so,
and moral
To
man must
act
is
wide
as the gulf
which
and
separates the
demands of Christian
ethics
from the
relation to ethics
us with
And
join Father
Murray
rational
However, it is not secular liberalism alone which ought to be blamed for that decline. Defenders of natural law must share in that responsibility. For natural law has been intellectually and politically discredited in good measure because it has been made to bear a burden which it could not carry. The attempts to apply natand
actions.
ural
law
directly,
political
action were
bound
we
have
Thus
and
fruitful
poli-
has deepened
I
and morality.
know
all
or cynics ...
power
in
And
must have
to Father
moralities
in
if
Murray
my
"basic
view
seems to be that
all
judgment
terms
of universal principles."
fifteen years.
which endeavor
to invest the
principles.
i)
Death
in the
Nuclear
Age
It is
changed man's
relations to nature
and to
his
fellow men.
It
has enor-
themselves.
It
has
made popular
it
has
made war an
giving death a
new meaning.
human person after a finite span of time is man experiences as specifically human in liis consciousness of himself and of his world, the rememall
Death
is
a crea-
to,
and approximates,
his specifically
the eternal.
Thus man
ence
as
human
by transcending
death.
He
narrow limits, the master of death; by denying the reality of death through the belief in the immortality of his person; by conquering the reality of death through
ferent ways:
himself, within
by making
Man
long
as
live as
he wants
to,
While
its
he cannot choose
logical limits, he
life
when
reached
bio-
life
He
"suicide with a
death, especially at
19
He
is
where,
man triumphs
He
tri-
body
is
ready to
die,
it.
but he
when
his
Yet that
triumph
is
incomplete because
its
coming.
Man
by
This
belief
may
take the
cal existence
body
will live
on
in anis
other world.
specifically
It
human
man
in
body
body or reincarnated
on forever, either separated from any someone else's. This belief in personal imlive
is
world which
is
world of the
what
is
truly
human
in
man
is
It is a distinctive characteristic
it
has re-
the
Man
his
by adding
to that existence
way
or another inde-
pendent of that
tality.
it.
finiteness.
his
They
immorit.
He
can extend
his
by remembering
anticipating
He
can extend
by
As
ho7770 faber, he
imbeds
within techno-
logical
and
social artifacts
which survive
of religion,
tion creates
new worlds
art,
live after
their creator.
By
of immortaUty to be granted
upon the past, man assures himself by future generations who will rememon in his historic recollection, so will he
of his successors.
continue to
live in the
memory
The
continuity of
20
Death
the collective
in the
Nuclear Age
memory
be
of mankind. Those
so, aspire to
who
lieve themselves to
able
them
The
ability to
remember and
the aspiration to be
remembered
call
now. A4an on
levels of civilization
is
moved
his
to create
monuments
founds a
he bears his
which
and
He
family and
father's.
on
in his sons,
who
bear
name
as
He
sumed but to be preserved as tangible mementos of past generations. Over his grave he causes a monument of stone to be erected whose durability, as it were, compensates for the impermanence of what lies beneath. Or he may even refuse to accept that impermanence altogether and have his body preserved in the likeness of life. At the very least, he will have pictures made of himself to perpetuate his
physical likeness.
this
world manifests
itself
on
He
lives in
such a
us,
him. All of
way as to make sure that his fame will survive from the peasant and handicraft man to the founders
cities,
the
tamers of the forces of nature, seek to leave behind the works of our
wills
and hands to
a
testify to
our existence.
^''Ronia
eterna,''''
"the
Reich of
perpetuate
man
in his deeds.
The
that he has built, have been given a life likely to last longer than his
own. At
best,
he as
person will
live
on
in his
works;
at worst,
he has
what he
has created.
his
imagination that
specifically
body
in the
most
and poets, the philosophers and the writers, can point with
degrees of assurance to their
diflFerent
work and
say,
"I
have finished a
monument more
pile,
lasting-
no furious
north wind can destroy, or the countless chain of years and the
ages' flight.
it is I
shall
not altogether
die.
mind
not just
that
is
and
why
shall
grow,
man endowed
is
made
mind
is
is
capable of
participating
and perpetuating,
is
mind's creation.
will be
He may
his
be
not,
and so he
immortal in
works.
This
is
Our
its
we
of
give to death.
death; for
What we make
of
life is
we make
we
it
we
not what
We
we
that
seek deter-
life
we
lead.
is it
The
that
radically
affects the
meaning of death, of immortality, of life itself. It affects meaning by destroying most of it. Nuclear destruction is mass
It signifies
the simultane-
and
whole
societies
by
killing
their
members, destroying
and therefore
reducing the survivors to barbarism. Thus nuclear destruction destroys the meaning of death
by depriving it of its individuality. It by making both society and destroys the meaning of life by throwing life
back upon
itself.
Sacrificial
vidual decision
his life
or dies
which chooses death over life. The hero who risks for a cause is bound to be one man, an identifiable in-
22
Death
dividual.
in the
Nuclear Age
in
There
is
meaning
in
mur-
of, say,
is,
fifty million
meaning between
man
risking death
by an act of will and fifty million people simultaneously reduced by somebody switching a key thousands of miles away to radioactive ashes, indistinguishable from the ashes of their houses, books, and animals. Horace could say, thinking of the individual soldier
ready to
die, "It is
Yet Wilfred Owen, describing the effects of a gas attack in the First World War, could call Horace's famous phrase "The old Lie," and
beholding a victim of modern mass destruction, could only bewail
the futility of such a death and ask in despair,
"Was
is
it
clay
grew
tall?
toil to
break earth's
sleep at all?"
The
the assertion of
a limited
triumph over
The
meaning
as well.
Man gives
and
his
his life
his ability to
make
dies
himself
to be
if
works remembered
and
all
those
who
what would become of the meaning of would lose their meaning. They would die, not like men but like beasts, killed in the mass, and what would be remembered would be the quantity of the killed six million, twenty million, fifty million not the qualsimultaneously,
Patroclus' and Hector's deaths? Their lives and deaths
ity of
as
Of
faint
hope of
re-
membrance
in distant places.
of fame
nothing to report.
What
man would be
perish.
dissolved like
man himand
23
Civilization itself
would
men who
created
it.
that
would be
left
of
the immortality
persistence of his
works.
the belief in the immortality of the individual person with the imits
civilization,
we
and vain
on
this earth
life in
would come
most of us and
a secular age,
which
aware
has
world and
it
is
tries to perit
is
left
it
without
remedy. Once
is
become aware of
of our age that
it
condition,
must
despair. It
its
become aware of
life
condition.
We
of us
and death. In
spite of
what some
as
know
in
our reason,
we
though
tension of the mass destruction of the past and not a qualitative trans-
formation of the meaning of our existence. Thus ^ve talk about defending the freedom of
incr
cs
West
Berlin as
we
American
colonies.
Greeks used to
Persians.
talk
Thus we propose
shame.
Yet the
life
by destroying
is
the meaning of
yesterday.
To
absurd
when
to
is
To
die
with honor
nobody
is
left to
a society that
conditions in which
in
we
live,
view of the
with the
24
Death
less
in the
Nuclear Age
nuclear
as a
war
so absurd.
An
been radically transformed by the possiof nuclear death evades the need for a radical transformation
as
of
its
though nothing
of
new
is
doom
men and
civilizations before. It
do so
again.
25
PART II
THE ATTEMPTS AT
RESTORATION
4
ism
is
general philosophy,
which contemliberalism
at
What
it
had
is
odds with
specifically,
latter-day philosophy of the administrative and welfare state. Professor Laski, the
last
most
brilliant, erudite,
and
exponent of the
political
He
Liberty in the Moderfi State makes these points in ways quite un-
The book was first published in 1930; it was republished with a long, new introduction in 1937, then republished again in 1949.^ The Introduction to this last
its
author.
edition
in 1947
a substantially
once
demonstrates the
initial
weak-
tion of that philosophy, and the reasons for the decline of liberty
itself.
The only
substantial deviations
editions occur
in the Introduction,
less significant
than
body of
The
Introduction to the
From Common
1
New York:
Viking
29
by
with only
turn.
ills
few
significant changes, to
one of which
we
shall re-
The
by
new
discussion of the
means of production is no longer compatible (p. 17) and that "the principle of naits
When
the
body of
praise.
this
book
first
appeared in 1930
its
it
was received
erudition are
is
with deserved
vidual, the
The
its
nobility of
cogency of
Its
indeed impressive.
strength,
no
less
than
its
is
weakness,
in large
this
There
is, it is
which
is
with
it.
In his
own
words,
no
restraint
modern
civiliza-
liberty without
There
without per-
suading the latter that there are reasonable grounds for the control. For,
I have argued, since each man's experience is ultimately unique, he alone can fully appreciate its significance But no man, of course, stands alone. He lives with others and in others. His liberty, therefore, is never absolute, since the conflict of experience means the imposition of certain ways of behavior upon all of us lest conflict destroy peace. That imposition, broadly speaking, is essential to liber-
as
ty, since it
is
The
is
to be
found
in the
weakness of
common
and
relative
good.
of liberty in relation to the state concerns, in the
The problem
30
The Corruption
of Liberal Thought:
Harold Laski
words of John Stuart A4ill, "the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." Its perennial theme is "the struggle between Liberty and Authority." A concept of liberty as broad and indefinite as that used by
Laski carries within
tive
itself
which
problem of
and
liberty.
This problem
to be free
in others.
is
intelligible
man ought
subject to
from
it
The
the rights of the individual in the face of political authority, and the
make
it
The conception
of
art, religion,
own may
it
or psychology, but
certainly
of political experience.
However
may
be in
his
theory of the
all
state,
founded upon
consensus of
or at least of
is,
political convictions
which are the very negation of that uniqueness and privacy upon which Laski dwells. Such consensus may be the product of a common religion, a secular tradition, the national mores or it
may
out
be
with
fire
it
there
by
the majority as
Here
as
is
anarchy.
promote,
happiness,
and of happiness
the satisfaction
of
individual desires.
We
whether such
conception of happiness
it
psychologically valid.
it is
Even
if it
were,
would
still
a distinc-
of individual morality, to
as
good and
As a
is
philosophic conception, happiness has meaning only within the context of a system of selective values
which
define
what happiness
in
31
defined
by the accident of
is,
is,
by
the prefer-
Laski
flict
arising
personalities
and
their valuations
He
However,
rea-
son in the abstract has nothing to say about the solution of social
conflicts. It
is
a specific philosophic
and so-
us
which
interests
tected and
which
sacrificed. In other
social conflict, in
concept of the
common
good, or
with
com-
total
the problem
where we encountered
last
it.
These weaknesses of
connected with the
of the weaknesses
that
we
have pro-
fruitful,
must make
what
is
ideally
good under the circumstances. It is one thing to provide an ideal between liberty and authority, a solution
to anarchism. It
is
quite another
what
as
is
1930 or of
Laski
American society
does,
all
To
is
may
lead, if the
author
condemnation of
the author
inconsistent but
is
quite naturally
moved by
strong
is,
systems by the
ideal, others
by the
it,
he prefers to obtain.
are the defects of the intellec-
These
tual
which Laski belongs. The faults of the Introduction of 1937 and 1947 are all his own. To point all of them out and analyze them would require a book. Let us limit ourselves to
tradition to
32
The Corruption
of Liberal Thought:
Harold Laski
two
On
the very
first
dation for any rational discussion of the problem of liberty disintegrates with the statement that "the future of liberty depends
." It is
upon the realization of such vague and unattainable ideals as freedom from fear and freedom from want. Given this conceptual starting point, no demonstration is needed to show that these ideals,
whatever they
and
is
may mean,
not likely to
exist.
There
with
nothing
do but to bewail
comment on
To
the
it is
phenomenon
"The purpose of
fascism
is
harmony with the forces of production; for that prevention, and increasingly, the method of coercion is inescapable" (p. 30). Can anything be simpler, or more absurd? One must, then, I suppose, assume that the wave of pseudoa natural
religious fanaticism
with
its
its
own
sake,
industrialists as a
all
bandwagon
discovered
settled
down upon
its
material foundations,
as a dialectic
afterthought.
To
call this
kind of reasoning
by
Marxism would be an insult to the memory of Marx and Luxemburg, Lenin and Trotsky. Call it "Pravdaism" or "Browderism," if you wish. But let us consider simple matters, matters of fact. On pages 20cliche
today than
and it is still more true of the great corporations was when General Negrier wrote of them nearly forty years ago that Hes societes financieres estiment que les goiiveme21
we
read:
".
it
33
pour assurer
leiirs benefices'^
make war so that they may be assured of their profits']-" The general, whoever he was, may plead ignorance, for he could not have been
the governments' duty to
myth
On
Union." This
is,
Un-
ion as of
all
statement
is trivial.
On
ex-
in the Soviet
is
that,
we
can speak of
as
no such thing
fear,
in the classic or in
any
or
not. Laski
it.
Thus he suggested
do not
that,
doms
How
possible?
was such
a descent
The answer
The
rise
The
their desires in
harmony or
settling conflicts
among them by
the ap-
of Western society
new
34
The Corruption
face of this
continue to reassert
by standing still while become the spokesmen for the tories of the 1950's; or they embrace, sometimes without knowing it, one or the other of the
the laissez-faire principles of 1850 and thus,
totalitarian creeds.
Laski,
who
cannot be
Fascist
and can no
becomes
a Marxist
who
tries to interpret
He tries to do for what thirties his countrymen bolshevism in the so many of tried to do for fascism, that is, to prove that totalitarianism is really a kind of advanced liberalism, disfigured by some blemishes of which time
bolshevism in terms of the liberal philosophy.
will take care.
such a
He showed
and reform
ence wanes.
scured the
absolute
itself,
hold upon
as
voluntary obedi-
He
realities
power which identifies its monopoly of power with a monopoly of truth, whose monopoly of the most effective weapons of warfare makes popular revolution impossible, and whose totalitarian control no private activity can escape. Here lies the real threat to
liberty in our time.
The
may
be
said,
Pro-
Restoration.
They
ing.
Comparing the Laski of 1947 with the Laski of 1930 one cannot
little
35
to the
Immanence of Power:
which
constitute
Mr. Carr's
Years'
major contribution to
Crisis,^
is
The Tioenty
and After,^ and The Soviet Impact on the Wester?! World,^ are intended to be primarily constructive and
tions of Peace,^ Nationalism
The Twenty
built
is
In
"in
its
period of immaturity,
which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyze facts and means weak or non-existent" (p. 8). That initial stage is succeeded by a period of realism which is able "to distinguish the analysis of what is from aspiration about what should be" (p. 13). Realism "places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences" (p. 14). The experiences of the interwar years revealed the weakness of the Utopian
realistic analysis
approach to international
politics
a
and made
its
mature
political
and
politics.
According to
exposure by
is
realistic criticism
of the
mo-
ment in international thought" (p. 113). "Clearly all popular postwar theories of international politics are reflections, seen in an America mirror, of nineteenth-century liberal thought" (p. 37). Mr. Carr finds the Utopian element in the belief that "nineteenth century liberal democracy was based, not on a balance of forces peculiar to the economic development of the period and of the countries concerned, but on certain a priori rational principles which had
only to be applied in other contexts to produce similar results"
37).
(p.
From World
1
Politics,
October, 1948.
3
4
London: MacmilJan & Co., 1940. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942.
1945.
1947.
36
The Surrender to
the
Immanence
of
Power: E. H. Carr
analysis, in the
The League
of Nations,
harmony
of inter-
which
and
lute principles
of universal application.
"What
matters
is
but the
unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interests at a particular time.
. .
The bank-
its
failure to live
inability to
lute
thought, he
knows
that realism
is
which appear
a
of
all
and
(p. 113).
"Hav-
need to build a
to the
we new Utopia of our own, which will one day fall same weapons. The human will, will continufe to seek an esit
cape from the logical consequences of realism in the vision of an international order which, as soon as
political
Thus Mr.
all his
new
Utopia,
and
phenomenon of power and longs to transcend it. principles which can give moral meaning, and set normative limits, to the struggle for power on the international scene brings Mr. Carr back to where he started from: to power itself. That return to power takes on four different aspects in different periods of Mr. Carr's thinking: appeasement of Germany in The
discovered the
37
and After, fascination by the Soviet Union The Soviet hnpact on the Western World.
in NationalisTn
in
The
the
word
of international moralis
demand
for self-sacrifice.
That demand
addressed par-
some of
within the framework of the existing status quo, but also and primarily to those
who
quo
itself.
"The
Those who
profit
it
make
it
tolerable to those
most by that order can in by making sufficient conceswho profit by it least. And the
the defenders as on the
responsibility for seeing that these changes take place as far as possible in
an orderly
way
rests as
much on
must
oscillate
appeasement"
The Munich
comes
fined,
modem
paradigm of
statesman com-
in that settlement.
"The
common
in itself
The change
in the
to a
change
European equi-
The Twenty Years' Crisis was in page proof when World War broke out; Conditions of Peace was in the
the attack on Pearl
the Second
press
when
Harbor brought the United States into the war and Germany and Japan were at the summit of their power. The
Twenty
century philosophy of
democracy
to international affairs;
all its
manifestaseriously
is
and finds
it
wanting.
than even
38
The Twenty
perme-
The Surrender
to the
Immanence
of
Power: E. H. Carr
is
fundamentally-
it
outworn
ideas
to bolshevism
new
political order.
many, found
gained the
servative
xx).
in 'planned
by
The
away
set in
by
which
new
first
order in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917" (p. 7). Hitler, the Napo-
consummated the work, which Marx and Lenin had begun, of overthrowing the nineteenth-century capitalistic system and in this sense his work, like that of Napoleon of the twentieth century, "has
.
leon,
The
cannot and will not be undone" (pp. 9-10). revolution of the twentieth century is directed against
laissez faire
liberal
economics.
The
The
met by
planned
economy.
is
It is
impotent to
nomic power.
has
come
much
in
and
minor degree
by the opinions of
and
which they purport to represent, interests which supply the bulk of the party funds. In other words, national policy on vital issues is
major degree by the vested
39
Marx
alleged, not
by
a democratic counting of
by the result of a perpetual struggle for power between ." economic interests (pp. 27-28). "Democracy must be re.
.
(p. 23).
To
make planning
erful
possible,
we must
pow-
enough
to generate self-sacrifice
on the
Communism, like Christianity, "The cooperation between the Western in the war should help to resolve the anbetween the secular
(p. 121). In
ideals of Christianity
both
upon
and
rights
stress
on obligations
and After,
services.
between the Soviet Union and the Western world had reached unprecedented depths. Mr. Carr makes a convincing case for the assertion that twentieth-century nationalism differs profoundly
from
its
is
new
mem"The
(p.
18).
two
installments of the
in a single genera-
a peculiar quality of
embittered ex-
would be difficult to find a precedent in any war in history" (p. 27). "The failure to create an international community of nations on the basis of international treaties and international law marks the final bankruptcy of nationalism in the West"
asperation for
which
it
(p. 52).
a retrogression of
World War, such as the widespread collaboration with the German conqueror and the acceptance of a new, supranational order. The nation as the final unit of international organization has been made obsolete
which have become
visible
40
The Surrender
to the
Immanence
of Power: E.
H. Carr
by modem
military and
self-sufficient
nation can no longer assure to its members military security or economic well-being. National self-determination, in particular, applied without regard to such military and economic considerations, has
international order.
The
Mr. Carr,
lies
from
political authority.
The
nation
may
Germany and
the Soviet
Union
In
The
Union
As Hitler was saluted as Napoleon of the twentieth century in Conditions of Peace, so now Stalin appears to Mr. Carr as the Wilson of the Second World War. "The missionary role which had been filled in the first World War by American democracy and Woodrow Wilson had passed in
takes the place of the pioneer of the future.
the
the second
(p.
3).
World War
Carr
to Soviet
calls
Stalin"
What Mr.
"Soviet democracy"
according to
democracy and
dle class
social
after the
mid-
had achieved
order.
tory.
The bourgeoisie of the West led political democracy to vicThe Russian proletariat achieved social democracy. "The chalwhich Soviet democracy presents
to the
lenge
Western world
is
"There
has
is,
therefore,
no
essential incompatibility
Union
become
it is
the
champion of democracy
in the
mid-twentieth century,
not
fashion-
perhaps a
(p.
12),
"The broad
lines
may
human
and
it
has
shown
itself as
well 41
the whole
rate
is
community
Here
at
any
a challenge of Soviet
democracy
tions about
ponder"
of
(pp. 18-19).
What
is
is
public discussion
trines
in
minds
of his
the Soviet
Union"
as a
normal instrument
men
Western world
not that
it
is
moral.
"The gravamen
of the
Marxist revolution
is
them to be a reflexion of the interests of a privileged class" (p. 94). "The fate of the western world will turn on its ability to meet the Soviet challenge by a successful search for new forms of social and economic action in which what is valid in individualist
declaring
by
that
a contri-
order.
No
contemporary
of Western political
more more acute brilliance the essential defects thought. Even in so monumental a failure as
The
World
2l
failure because
is
it
concriti-
much
have seen,
analysis
which Western thinkers might well ponder. Yet, as we was Mr. Carr's purpose not only to give a critical of the Western tradition of political thought but also to
it
new
utopianism, theory and practice, ethics and politics; and the main
42
The Surrender to
bulk of Mr. Carr's work
is
the
Immanence
of
Power: E. H. Carr
one of
failure.
What
so
The fundamental reason is philosophic. Mr. Carr sets out to discover a new morality in the political world without a clear notion of what morality is. The philosophically untenable equation of Utopia, theory, and morality, which is at the foundation of The Twenty Years' Crisis, leads of necessity to a relativistic, instrubecomes "an escape from the logical consequences of realism, which, once it is achieved, must once more be attacked with instruments of realism" {The
mentalist conception of morality. Morality, then,
Tiventy
Years''
Crisis,
p.
118).
In
World
relies
his
work he
Moral
Man
title indicates.
which
phenomenon
power
of power.
Thus
Utopian of power.
Whoever
becomes
Power
This
is
thus corrupts, not only the actor on the political scene, but
ethics.
by
whom
Adam
Miiller
It is
and Carl
Schmitt. It
a disastrous
In Foundations for
43
The Evocation of
the Past:
Bertrand de Jouvenel
Bertrand
at
all.
The
It
must be borne
mind
is
with power
as a general
as a general
phenomenon
Hobbes, no Western
with power
phenomenon, and Hobbes himself remained an incident rather than the founder of a tradition. It was only in the historiogra-
was
established,
political science
of the twentieth century have taken up the theme. Yet they have
distorting, obscuring
and
this
as it
Its
power
as a
general phenomenon.
Of
it,
modern tendency
to face the
M. de
Its
On
Foiver:
Growth,^
and
an outstanding example.
outstanding in
its
originality
its
diagnosis. It
will
become
is
fully ap-
not "on
power"
ever
it
at
all.
According
word
'Power,'
when-
."
(p. xiii). In
is
concerned
only with
a particular
governmental power,
book
its
From
1
the
1950.
New York:
44
The Evocation
observes with striking clarity what
is
sees either
not at
all
But
all
the time,
by means
govern-
as such, that
is,
as a
mind
and different
as
ob-
moral evaluation.
central
state.
The
modern
years
total
is
is
The modem
state has
more cempletely a nation's activities, is responsiextension of war" (p. 7). Democracy, in turn, is reble for the sponsible for the extension of Power. "Democracy, then, in the centralizing, pattern-making, absolutist shape which we have given
to
it is, it is
clear, the
11
It is
the
in
purpose of the book "to examine the reasons why, and the
which, Power grows in society"
(p.
way
13).
lies
At
aristocratic
effects of Power are what is beneficial and harmless in Power derives from the former. The modern history of the Western world is generally conceived as a progression toward liberty and, in turn, toward limitation on government, liberty becoming greater and government growing weaker as we approach the twentieth century. According to the author, the exact opposite is true. "The idea that
Power
not a
is
of
God
buttressed, so
it is
said, a
word
of truth in
all this.
.
Let us
,
monarchy that was both Dark Ages. There is remember that Power in
. . . . . . . . .
limited and that, above all, it was not sovereign. ... In fact, so far from having been a cause of greatness in Power, the conception of divine sovereignty was for many centuries the companion of its weakness" (p. 28).
. . ,
the Middle
Ages was
Power
as tied
45
down and
as little arbitrary as
we
can conceive.
law,
his
i.e.,
He was
simultane-
ously constrained
by standing human
court of
j>eers
own
about anything.
The
The common
is
an
illusion.
"The reason
is
well,
which
also claim
from the
human being
and
their
due of obedience
and
services.
And
to a social authority
may
more
authority"
was needed to
God
the sov-
With
God
ally of
ally of the people against Power into an Power against the people. With that transformation the absolute monarchy came into existence. Yet at the same time there arose the doctrine that Power is conferred by the people,- thus barring the
is
"the great
33).
By quoting
is
extensively
and Rousseau, the author reaches the conclusion that the unlimited
character of
Power
is
"What
St.
a contrast
here," he exclaims
Augustine, "between a
by Power which is
itself!"
the divine law and one which, after subsuming every individual
right, has
become
law to
(p. 35).
a right of
which, though
it is
unlimited,
power whether
be
God
which cannot by
state
rules:
its
itself.
Therefore they
it.
Both
more or
in
by
46
The Evocation
Divine Will or the general will" (p. 39). Yet the holders of Power
tend to usurp the sovereignty which in theory they exercise by delegation.
their
"They
will in the
as
resuming in
own
XIV, for instance, claimed the rights of God, and Napoleon those of the people" (p. 39). Control of Power, either through the Church or through parliament, is bound to remain inbe; Louis
effective; for sovereignty,
(p. 40), cannot be shared
may
by two different sets of agents. Thus the monarchy wins over the Church at the end of the Middle Ages, as in our age either the executive or the legislature comes to dominate
the people.
is
likely to
be more formi-
Law
Eternal, to
command whatever
primarily in
origin, so that
it.
good because
its
they want
end,
Medieval Power
just for
limited
by
the conception of
which must be
Power
to be legitimate.
When
the con-
as
own
transcending that of
members and
is
an end
which the individuals are subservient. This is the heritage it democracy takes on a new meaning. "In the sense of individualist social philosophy it is the rule of the Rights of Man; in a political philosophy divorced from social individualism it is the absolutism of a government which draws its title from the masses" (p. 47). Here, then, the end is no longer, as it was in the Middle Ages, justice in the sense that each individual must obtain his due. Justice, now, becomes a postulate of society, and to realize this end
in itself, to
of Hegel. In
Power
is
is
justified.
is,
Underlying
the state and
sociability"
this discussion
its
(p. 99).
is,
They owe
domination, that
power (with
arch
is
not in the
He
is
growth which
parasitic
it
con-
and
keep
it
supplied, binds
him
is
to a course of
conduct which
profits the
To
democracy
a fantastic illusion.
The
king,
who
is
but
in
human
ing at
end to be motivated by
affection.
The
come
of
its
essence;
must be egoist and social at the same time. To prepare for Power which has rid itself of its egoism and has become completely virtuous
is
become the
a
great disturbances
which
noteworthy
fact that
all
from defective
egoism, had
it
appraisals of the
to
dimensions, and
in
The growth
respects:
of
manifests
itself in
human and
make
material
resources
its
own
Power
of, as in the
by which
last
all
capacity
Power
As
modern
state
undermines the
always the
Power
is
ally of the
48
The Evocation
common
people.
"The
inevitably, in con-
(p. 177).
all
"Where
will
it
other
commands
for
the benefit of one alone that of the state. In each man's absolute
social authority, a
state.
which is between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master the state. In the disappearance of every constraint which does not emanate from the state, and in the denial of every pre-eminence which is not
complete submission to the
approved by the
society,
state.
In a word,
it
and
in the rupture of
is
every private
their
now
common bondage
is
The extremes
though
borne.
it is
will in the
has
The beneficiaries of the state leave it, taking with them a veritable dowry of wealth and authority, leaving the state impoverished and powerless. Then it becomes the turn of the state to break down these new social molecules, containing as they do the human energies which it needs. And so the process of the state's expansion
starts all
over again.
is
"Such
up,
the spectacle
which history presents to us. Now we see down what other authorities have built
state bursting like a
its
now we
its
see an
ripe spore
it
and releasing
from
midst a
new
of
And
is
taken in the
name of
liberty,
man,
(p. 235).
is
Of
this
development, democracy
it
paves the
way
for tyranny.
Born for the purpose of standing as a bulwark against Power, it ends by providing Power with the finest soil it has ever had in which to spread itself over the social field" (p. 238). It amounts to "the substitution of the arbitrary will of a body or of a crowd for the arbitrary will of a monarch as the principle of rule" (p. 252). This
49
particularly obvious in
a
modern parliamentary
interest,
insti-
body
zens
is
now
and has
legislation.
... In the
come
parliamentary
aris-
Here again, monarchy gains by comparison. "The royal will was, and was known to be, that of a crowned head, his favourite, or his minister; it was in that respect as human and personal as that of anyone else. The will of democratic Power goes by the name of
general. It crushes each individual beneath the weight of the
sum
by
it; it
name
of
general interest
which
incarnate in
itself.
The
this:
the whole that both wills and acts" (p. 257). "It comes to
that the
'Power of the
people,' so called,
is
to
all
people,' a
this
Power
cord"
which
is all
authorization from
(p. 280).
now no more
the
The end
into a
a
inevitably a totalitarianism
destroys liberty.
power of a small gang" (p. 275). which promises security and Power, erecting the fragments of its knowledge
itself in
dogma
Thus
to bring happiness to
mankind, transforms
itself into
limits.
democracy
West-
known how
delicate
to preserve,
how
we
are
The
sis
book
lies
in a penetrating
power
in
pitfalls that
50
The Evocation
book
is
name of academic
system, however,
suffers
its
so major as to vitiate
philosophy.
from
"Power" with
a capital
is
"P"
but a
Power
as a metaphysical abstraction
its
which has an
11).
essence, a
life,
a behavior of
"it is
of
Power (with
a small p)
we
has
power over B or that B fears the power of A. It is also possible to abstract from certain individuals as points of reference for power
and refer to certain
the United States,
offices
and
Thus we can say that the President of whoever he may be, has a certain kind of power with regard to the members of the cabinet, whoever they may be. It is also possible to attribute to such power certain qualities which it has in common with, or in which it differs from, power in general
viduals connected with them.
What M.
tradition
de Jouvenel does
is
which has rendered useless so much of German social phiThe method of that metaphysics consists in endowing a metaphor, such as Power or Leviathan or Minotaur, or a legal abstraction, such as the government or the state, with certain qualities which are meaningful only when they are attributed to real persons.
losophy.
From
retical
conclusions
has
first
is limited only by the imagination of the author who endowed the metaphysical entity with certain qualities in the
place.
Bad metaphysics
leads of necessity to
bad
it
political philosophy.
The metaphysics
reality of
of
Power
is,
distorts,
is
if
power.
What
vaUdity
Power
limited
in the
was
power of the Church and of the feudal lords bepower and not Power? The test of the author's
as
which,
we
have seen,
this
is
at the
core of
his
philosophy,
by
common man
and eighteenth
in the
M. de Jouvenel prepared
than he
is it
common man
tion
is
To
to
answer
it.
It
philosophic
method
that
incapacitates
him even
M. de Jouvenel achieves the same result of the glorification of medieval monarchy and of the damnation of modern democracy by yet another, more common and also more vulgar device. He rightly stresses the enormous increase in the power of the state in
our time and the concomitant threat to individual liberty.
trasts
He
con-
with
and
arrangements of times
tices of
past.
The
other, however,
By
this
device
Communist
exists
calls
only
Union and
that
democracy
but
a fraud.
And
more democratic any more convincing to tell us that the medieval state, in contrast to modern democracy, was limited by the divine law without telling us to what political uses that divine law was put? Or that in medieval times Power, that is, the royal authority, was limited by the power of the feudal barons without asking whose will regularly prevailed in case
that the provisions of the Soviet constitution are
Is it
many
are vitiated
52
The Evocation
effort. All
power, however
freedom of the
indi-
viduals over
whom
it is
exercised,
power of the modern state is particularly dangerous to individual liberty. That danger does not stem from the innate metaphysical qualities of Power, nor from the disappearance of intermediate social authorities, nor from the enfeeblement of the belief in divine law
as a limiting factor
intel-
The
in
its
secularization of thought, as
manifests
itself in
the spirit
modem mind
an unprecedented confidence
efforts, unaided by supernatural powers and virtually by the obstacles of nature, a confidence which, under the conditions of modern technology, is transferred to the government
own
unlimited
as
mass
civilization,
Western
est
is,
civilization
is
number,
in
all,
which
is
the prerequisite
of
ment.
The modern
powers of good measure the result of the character of modem technology which, by giving the state a monopoly of the most destructive weapons of warfare, has made popular revolutions impossible. Of this phenomenon, which bears so heavily upon his central theme, the learned author has, strangely
turn, has called into being, as a corrective, the centralized
is
in
To
call attention to
evils
of centralized power,
is
a great merit
raises others
indeed.
The modem
state,
by
solving
some problems,
That the mechanical repetition of democratic incantations will not solve them is certain. It is no less certain that they will not be solved by a backward-looking romantic aristocratism which follows in the footpaths of Bonald, De Maistre,
in turn.
De
as
Religion:
philosophic relativism,
sweeping not
very existence,
a frontal
mood
prevailing in
Study of History Mr. Toynbee tries to restore the claims of historic imagination and spirituality. Yet by doing so, he raises anew and
in matters political.
He
does
tory
is,
at
what Mr. Toynbee is doing is a valid writing of is going by the name of academic hisworst, irrelevant or, at best, mere preparation. On the
most of what
if
other hand,
is
a science
with
all
that the
word
A^r.
Toynbee
is
not
is
a historian.
tions of history
argument; for within that argument the philosophic assumption predetermines the conclusion.
Method being
means
to an end, achieve-
ment
is
What,
then,
is
it
that
we
us
it is
make
its
not clever for one day but wise forever." History imparts
wis-
dom by giving a meaningful account of the who came before us. This account receives
establishes
life
its
of man.
If this
not in
this
The Rediscovery
of Imagination
The
Toynbee
dogma
from history questions which are meaningful for him and, through him as a man, for other men as well and to force history to answer him. Never mind that history may have no answer to some of the questions Mr. Toynbee asks, that the facts are sometimes arranged to produce the answers expected, and that
not
all
Toynbee
has
awakened the historic imagination from its dogmatic slumber; he has communicated his own wonderment about the ways of man to his
readers,
terpretations, and
own
manner.
Compare with
The
What
have
To
demonstrated, not through argument but through example, the richness of philosophic historiography,
as against the
however problematical
its
in detail,
is
What
in
come
mere
historic recollection,
is
He
and
of civilizations.
On
the face of
it,
For
it
sophic assessment of the difl'erent civilizations from an over-all world view, but rather the empirical analysis of the morphology of
zations,
civili-
similarities to
ever
broadening generalizations.
ploys, such as challenge
The main
categories
in space
And
in
the
work
customed
by
the
is
sets
out to do
is
beyond
The
perspective of
pirical science
Astronomy
as
em-
same percep-
tive
and rational
planetary perspective.
ture into the
The deeper we move from the world of naworld of man as the subject and object of valuations,
find the objectivity of empirical science qualified
the
more we
by
common
perspective.
For astronomy
man
the
common
to
all
science,
is
distorted
by the inevitably partial perspective of the observer. That impairment is minimized when both the object and the per-
itself
from the
is
perspective of
its
own
Impairment do
maxi-
an
justice to
such
own
to
civilization
This, however,
is
It is this
impossibility
which Mr. Toynbee has endeavored to achieve. of but a few of Mr. Toynbee's basic concepts impossible to verify them empirically but that
if
at
we
two extremes of
izations as
civilization
civilizations.
The Rediscovery
say that a civilization
of another, or that
is
of Imagination
autonomous, that
has
a derivative "offshoot"
no autonomy of its own, being a mere variety of a dominant one? Obviously American civilization is both distinct from, and similar to, British civilization. An Englishman might well try to comprehend American civilization in the terms of his own, or at best regard it as a mere "offshoot" of his own, while the American might assume its autonomy; for the Chinese observer,
it
on the other hand, the differences between the two civilizations, obvious to both Englishman and American, might be hardly worth
From the point of view of imperial Rome, Roman civilizawas the culmination of the civilization of Greece; for Hellenism it might very well have looked like Greek civilization in a state of decay; and Western Christian civilization has seen the civilization of Greece and Rome as a mere preparation for itself. Can one speak of one Chinese civilization as a continuum extending through the whole history of the Chinese state, or is it possible and necessary to speak
noting.
tion
of a
number of
civilizations following
graphic and political space called China.? Here again, the answer will
differ
is
no need to
is
show
mere
verification than
do the
latter.
What
is
What
a
are the
and death of
civilization,
when
does
it
flower,
disintegrate?
Did the
Greek, Roman, and Jewish civilizations ever die or were they but
transferred
by
die
political circumstances
to another? If
died, did
it
from one geographic locale we should assume that Greek civilization actually
its
inner life-substance,
by military assassination, which in view of its own inner potentialities was a mere accident? If Western civilization should dissolve tomorrow into radioactive rubble, would it have died a "natural" death because of inner exhaustion or would it
or was
it killed, as it
assassin? If
if it
Western
should
civilization should
move
who
is
to prove
scientifically that
such
a civilization
would be
matter superior,
centuries of
to, say,
Western
civilization?
The answers
to
all
these questions
we mean by
civilization.
To
speak
who
see nothing
but decay from the fifteenth century onward; there are others
see nothing but darkness before the fifteenth century
who
and nothing
still
others.
Western
a
whom
all
history preceding
Marx
man.
is
mere
The concept of civilization and of its different stages, then, which we apply to other civilizations, cannot bat be a function of the valuations of our own. The very simile of life and death has an objective,
is
still
However, when
we
speak of the
life
and death of
we
sacrifice, in a
situ-
become
concept
total
is
when we
bound to which as a
of a
member
particular civilization.
The
own
is
world view
From Vico
self-confiits
in
judgment over
all
different
what appeared to be their rightful place. Our age has transferred its confidence from philosophy to science. Thus it must endeavor to prove scientifically what other ages have tried to demonstrate
through philosophy.
is
This
still
able to
by
and Toynbee could not but founder. For, unlike Marx, they have
58
The Rediscovery
of Imagination
fall
no philosophic system to
spect
Mr. Toynbee
is
philosophically
more
sophisticated
than
Spengler.
come
it.
aware of the dilemma without being able to overSpengler, with that Hegelian consistency which takes abis
He
surd conclusions in
its
stride as long as
premises, forces the history of civilizations into the biological straitjacket and, again not unlike Hegel, finds in the apparent trends of
as
sweeping
as
any of the
sys-
much common
if
He
life
allows
human
all
creativity to modify,
cycle
of
civilizations,
concession
which
is
a function of
human
If a
still
another dilemma.
can escape
it
its life
cycle
if it
by an
act of
other words,
so wills and
reversed?
Or were
echo of
Roma
eterna might
what Mr.
it
Toynbee's concession to
lost for
common
has
philosophy.
It is a
human freedom
life
to qualify,
if
is
cycle but he
also
aware of the
se-
He
standards in philosophy; for our age has lost the rational boldness
which still allowed a Comte and a Marx to build a which pretended to explain the laws by which history proceeds. Instead Mr. Toynbee turns to religion. By doing so, Mr. Toynbee raises three issues: the meaning of the return to
philosophic system
religion, the value for civilization of a return to religion, the ability
by an
act of will.
civiliza-
59
movement,
United
States,
which
from the
evils
rising;
prominent
and the display of religious observances has begun to become standard practice for public men.
Much
He
is
in
new
cult, a
kind
of Billy
Graham
This popularity
it
illumiillu-
by
for
He
calls
not so
much
gious faith
which might
find confirmation in
any established
religion
that
is
However,
upon
is
new
understanding of the
reli-
we
have
that
most of the
would support the argument of the modern age and many of its accomI
Mod-
become a self-sufficient entity who knows what he sees and can do what he wills. He has lost the awareness of his dependence upon a will and a power which are beyond his understanding and control. To warn modem man against the irreligious self-glorification, which in a sense is his self-mutilation, for it deprives human experience of mystery, tragedy, and guilt, is
one thing; to advocate a kind of religious eclecticism
other.
is
quite an-
a direct
bear-
The Rediscovery
ing
of Imagination
is
central to
What makes
a civilization live
to religion
by reviving your
religious faith.
Mr. Toynbee answers: Return Yet this answer is open not from metaphysical speculaitself. Is
evidence to
derstood?
And
weakening of
commonly under-
stood?
We
bound
zation
we
civili-
it
upon
religious faith.
it
Yet
if
we
give to civilization
common
secular meaning,
can hardly be
open to doubt that from Plato to Kant, from Sophocles to Dostoevski, from Michelangelo to Rodin, the weakening of religious faith
and the flowering of
civilization
ments of
civilization
owe
owe much,
if
modem
which assumes the limpowers of man and demonstrates them within self-chosen
limits.
But even if it were true that the return to religious faith can save Western civilization, can a civilization recover its religious faith by an act of will? Here it is necessary, paradoxical as it may seem, to invoke the very spirit of religion against its most learned advocate. It requires nothing but an act of will to join a church and to perform its rituals. To have religious faith demands an act of grace, for
which, however,
man may
more
par-
6i
ness
The
it
blasphemous in man's self-identification with the deity, which popularizes the trappings of religion
stance of
its
religiosity.
To
restore
man
his civilization a
new
lease
on
life
men
like
their teaching
must seek to
to
all
common
men
common
to
all
men. Neither
teacher nor a whole civilization can by an act of will create the symbolic and ritualistic expressions of religiosity thus restored; least of
all
decline has
place.
made
first
What
religions will
grow from
this
new
religiosity
man must
appear.
leave to fate.
He
them
aright
when they
tries to
do
as a
philosopher of his-
reduce truth
religious faith
What Mr. Toynbee has been trying to do as a herald of no man could have achieved in any age. One hundred
last
of the
great scholastics or mystics. Such achievements are not for this age.
both pre-
spirit
perennial truths
by which
all
belongs to
all
own
and, hence,
is
ours
as well as his.
62
democ-
racy today?" Professor Alfred Cobban of University College, London, asks and answers this question in an important article,
"The
Democracy, for lack of thought, has ceased to be a live political idea. For the most part it has ceased to be discussed seriously and in relation to the concrete problems of practical politics. It has largely become a mean.
.
condemned
seem scarcely able to open their mouths without some platitude flopping out, wet and flappy, and slightly repulsive, but is this political theory? If it is, no wonder that practical men prefer to ignore it. Coins can remain valid currency even when they are worn quite smooth. Political ideas need periodical recoining if they
to the oracular utterances of frogs,
is
his-
toric contribution, of
Public Philosophy,^
in
that
it
democracy again
terms
is
let
upon
To
do
comto a
commitment both
It also
requires a philosophy
is
grounded
nally,
it
edge of what
what needs
to be
If these qualities
the New Republic, February 21, 1955. Boston: Litde, Brown & Co., 1955.
63
Lippmann
has again
proved that he
one.
The
decisive experience
which
in this
book
has
mann's thinking on its course, is the derangement of the relationships which ought to exist in a democracy between the government and the people: "The people have acquired power which they are incapable of exercising, and the governments they elect have lost
ers
powmass
if
Where
morbid derangement of the true functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to govern. This breakdown in the constitutional order is the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of Western society" (pp. 14-15). More
opinion dominates the government, there
a
powers which which they are unable to exercise properly. Representative government tends to become paralyzed government. The people, then, must choose between freedom and authority: "They will choose authority, which promises to be paternal, in preference to freedom which threatens to be fratricidal. No ideal of freedom and of democracy will long be allowed to stand in the way of their being governed" (p. 61). In this fashion the very weakness of democracy as a viable, political order
particularly, legislative assemblies have usurped the
Democracy which
day
is
which
is
is
threatened towill of a
equates
legislative or
good because
popular.
By making
the
all
ultimate standard,
it
evil itself
all
from
a continuous onit is
traditions
and
a Christian heresy
which seeks
a religious
undergo the
religious experience.
To this degenerate and doomed type of democracy, Mr. Lippmann opposes another type which is represented by the English political system. The English type of democracy presumes an objective
order within which the political process takes place. Majority rule
it
presupposes
it.
documents such
as
64
The Revival
Lippmann
first
amendments of our Constitution. Yet the better part of that It lives on in what Lippmann
"the traditions of civility" and has been formulated and applied
is
identical
men once
by
virtue of
How
its
effectiveness as a stand-
ard for political action be renewed? "In order to repair the capacity
to believe in the public philosophy," answers
Mr. Lippmann,
"it
and the
It is
almost impossible to
is
deny
its
The
difficulty
to see
state
how
."
. .
affairs
of a
modern
way
can deny their validity and only the "wilfully subversive" can reject
the obligations deriving
from them.
philosophy results from the
as-
The
positivist climate of
The modern age is no longer satisfied with ordering sphere by the standards of the public philosophy and
possible. Instead, "it promises,
life
this
of heaven."
It
confuses the
two realms
of
this
world with
its
That combination of
man
powerless to order
his
Since Mr.
Lippmann
which the
be arrested
if
come back
But
do contend that
the decline
cannot be arrested
if
65
."
(p. 178).
With
I
this last
word
it
can be the
last
is
word.
animated by
a
This book
reminiscent
power of reason
through
it,
by which
men
that
live and,
men
in their political
foundation of the public philosophy. Yet Herbert Butterfield, Reinhold Niebuhr, myself, and others have tried to
more ambiguous and involved the relations between reason and politics are than is suggested by this simple rationalistic faith. It must suffice here to point out that the public philosophy was not destroyed by its own rational deficiencies or by the hostility of the intellectuals, but and Air. Lippmann says as much by the modern conditions and problems of life which the public philosophy, as it
has
come down
all,
to us,
is
First of
form
in
has been transmitted to us, has riot only been th& reflection of the
it
quo. In other
words, the existing political order was identified with the objective
its
via-
through
a
its
lost its
plausibility. It
terests
became
mere ideological
by which
partial in-
and objectivity.
We
self-
contained intellectual
movement can
is
is
obliterate
its
philosophic effects.
political
in
which all ages have in common, upon the political experiences of the day before. The task of political philosophy in our age, then, is to apply the perennial truths of politics to the political world for the
dual purpose of understanding
task A4r.
it
and of solving
its
problems.
To
this
Lippmann
Yet the
by
all
men. As that
66
The Revival
order has been weakened and
so
its
Lippmann
defects,
its
its
destroyed by
its
own
by
political action
remedying
and contrast
it
with the
hoping to mold
it is uneasily suspended between consummated action of the past, which it reflects, and the hopedfor action of the future, which it propounds. It is its dilemma that it knows in a general way what ought to be done but cannot do it. There is its strength and its weakness, its victory and its defeat, and
it
On
it is
it
without philosophy
is
blind;
losophy
it
measures of political action must be bridged not by the logical deductions of a Utopian rationalism but
cal experience.
by
is
the
trial
and error of
politi-
The
philosopher-king in
is
whom
dissolved
king, that
The
not
all the philosopher knows, would still what action the concrete situation requires. No theoretical knowledge but only the experience of acting can teach him that. Yet even that experience will teach him only how to avoid the repetition of yesterday's blunder, not how not to com-
he
knew
know
for certain
mit
Here, in this inescapable tension between reason and experience, between theoretical and practical knowledge, between the light of political philosophy and the twilight of political action, is indeed the
ultimate dilemma of politics.
67
PART
III
THE RESTORATION OF
DOMESTIC POLITICS
9
dom
Freedom
During the Civil War, which was a war for freetruer sense than most of the wars which have been so
in a
Abraham Lincoln laid bare the essentials of the dilemma which has baffled the philosophic understanding of freedom and which has made it appear that there was always something left to be
called,
desired in
brief
its
political realization.
On
April
18, 1864,
Lincoln gave
at the Sani-
"The world
he
said,
good
definition of the
word
liberty,"
now, are much in want of one. We all desame word we do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; whUe with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible names liberty and tyranny. The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destrover of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails today among us human creatures, even in the North, and all professing to love libe^t^^ Hence we behold the processes by which thousands are daily passing from under the yoke of bondage, hailed by some as the advance of liberty, and bewailed by others as the destruction of all liberty.
and the American people,
just
Political
ings according to
political
whether
we
power
signifies
Not only
are these
two conceptions
of action.
the
One can
is
more there
bound
From
71
of freedom
is
ambivalent in
most members of society are not simply one or the other, masboth
at the
same time. B
is
is
the master of
and
A, and C,
in turn,
Most men play a dual role with regard to political power, subjecting some to it and being subjected to it by others. When they claim freedom for themselves, what do they mean: their freedom to dominate others or their freedom from domination by others? Perhaps they mean one; perhaps they mean the other; perhaps they mean both.' This ambivalence makes inevitably for continuous confusion, manifesting itself typically in ideologies which rationalize and justify the freedom to dominate in terms of the freedom from domination.
It
*
is
a contradiction in
is
by
somebody
else.
The
if
political
have
freedom of those
the master
is
who
made
are
to
What
which
applies to the
freedom to exercise
political
power
also re-
political truth
power.
He who
monopoly of truth in matters political is free to propound his "truth," which to him appears to be all the truth there is, and to act upon it only if the non-believers are not free to
believes that he has a
his;
On
many
his
to
compete
in
the market place for acceptance of their different truths requires the
conception of
upon
all.
else.
Every society must decide for itself who The kind of freedom a particular society is
lar
shall
period of
its
poKtical
The
72
Freedom
ety identifies
itself
and which
it
dium of
kind of liberty
it
enjoys
is
de-
seeks. Liberty
cannot be
a particular
justice:
one, minori-
The
ity,
achievement,
The
majority, not
its
endowed,
is
own
From
and
Plato and
modern
justifications of aristocratic
political
totalitarian
derived from a conception of political justice which limits to a minority the ability and, hence, the right to enjoy political freedom.
its
institutions. It claims
if
not in good
faith,
good
logic.
To what Lincoln experienced in the controwe can add our experiences with totalitarian
claims that the government
arguments.
Communist theory
monopoly of
in-
freedom of the press and the only freedom of the press there is, while what we call freedom of the press is but a sham. The absurdity
of the argument does not
lie
logical necessity.
is,
so the
Communist argument
how
can
we
who
refuse to recog-
by
is
in the
West
error as truth.
The
decisive
freedom
to a
come
to terms
That argument
It
is
two-pronged.
a
monopoly of
political
monopoly of
political truth or
can even
members of
political truth,
however dimly
seen.
From
this
equahtarian political
which
all
politically so
monopoly of
wisdom.
No
possesses absolute
wisdom.
When Crom-
Church of Scotland, "I beit possible you may be sphere the equalitarian mood.
explicit minoriits
corruptibility.
Here
is
The
minoritarian claim to a monopoly of political freedom derives from the overt assumption of a monopoly of political wisdom and of necessity implies a monopoly of political goodness. For the minoritarian claim can be defended by the minority and accepted by the
majority only on the assumption that the minority will not abuse
absolute power.
its
The
nature of man,
as
it
tion and through the evidence of history, militates against the cor-
74
Freedom
rectness of that assumption.
is
The
inevitable corruptiveness of
sin.
power
Equahtarian-
power
to institutional limitations
and
legal
The
power
The very
power
is
granted only for limited periods of time limits the duration of po-
power with mechanical sharpness. But it also limits the freedom with which political power can be used as long as it lasts. For since the holders of political power have a natural tendency to keep themselves m power by having themselves re-elected, they must use
litical
their political
tions.
freedom
in
elec-
Thus
power
free to
to use that
power
as
they would
like to.
The
is
absolute ruler
is
govern
as
he sees
fit,
nature.
The freedom
of constitutional government
as it
is
hemmed
in not
democratic, by the
political
also
by the
dy-
It is
this contrast
between the
government
tional
at his discretion
and the
limits
government must operate which Theodore Roosevelt had in mind when he expressed the wish to be for twenty-four hours President, Congress, and Supreme Court at the same time.
The democratic
dom
policies of the
two
sides of the
latter
democracy
that loses
75
as
the nature of
democracy and of
a
totali-
and always
sham and
Italy
that they
They may
undoubtedly
did, expressing a
consensus between the popular will and the govthe decisive difference between traditional auits
ernment. Here
lies
will
upon
suc-
and
may
However, what sets totalitarianism apart from genuine democracy is the manner in which the government attains the consent of the governed. Totalitarianism creates that consent through the monopolistic
government but
is
function of
its
The government
it
whatever advantages
may
have by virtue of
prestige, influence,
Thus a genuinely democratic government can never be certain whether it will survive the next election to be replaced by another which, in turn, must subject its personnel and policies to the popular judgment in still another election to
principle of free competition.
come.
to
totalitarianism.
While democracy
dom
ment
to intrench itself
a small step
permanently
76
in the seat of
only
from
Freedom
the destruction of the freedom of competition, that
is,
imperfect deis,
itself,
that
totali-
The freedom
their
The
if
alternative policies
by choosing
among
power
people
office are
as
an end in
still
itself,
not
as a
means for
a particular policy.
The
may
The
people,
if
candidate
as such, will
and
in the
measure
in
which
this
majorities to act
upon
approxi-
the repositories of
act, as
all
the political
last as
They
long
as
they
malimit
as
though
The
majority, as long as
tends to
body
politic, stifling
the vital spirit of questioning and initiative and evoking instead the
is
no higher standard
tyrant with a po-
for thought and action than the will of the majority, in theory at
least
may produce
political
new
litical
own. One
by another, calling forth a new conformity, and the very relativism which is the philosophic mainspring of the supremacy of the majority will
also a
succession of tyrannies,
justified
by
While
self
this
is
possible in theory,
it is,
77
make
itself
must
also
into a
permanent major-
by
permanent one.
This development not only reduces the minority to
a
one but
is its
also deprives
it
of
its
democratic reason to
exist.
ability,
for
upon it; hence its claim to compete freely becoming the majority tomorrow. The assumption that the ma-
jority has a
litical
monopoly of
its
po-
existence an anachronistic
quality. Since
jority's
monopoHstic claims,
a living
and
policies,
become
a politi-
the destruction of
its
With
ited
its
destruction,
is,
democracy
itself
comes
to an end.
The unlim-
freedom, that
it
out
by emptying
spirit of free
of part of
substance:
it
of choosing policies
by choosing men. Then it substitutes for the political competition, which derives from a pluralistic
Then
it
which put
It
at a decisive
nent minority.
the majority
The
process of degeneration
sole legitimate
is
consummated with
organization,
becoming the
political
which combines the claim to a monopoly of political truth with a monopoly of political power. Against these tendencies toward self-destruction, inherent in the
dynamics of democracy, the
78
institutions
and the
spirit
of liberalism
Freedom
stand guard. Liberalism has erected
two kinds of
safeguards: one in
Liberalism holds certain truths to be self-evident, which no majority has the right to abrogate
macy
however formulated
the ultimate point of reference for the political order and, as such,
to
owes nothing
It is
institution.
on
this absolute
ophy of genuine democracy rests, and it is within this immutable framework that the processes of genuine democracy take place. The
pluralism of these processes
is
subordinated
to,
It is this
relativism of
is
its
lat-
of what
is
politically true.
its
What-
point of view
gains thereby also the attributes of political truth, and the content
Out
of
which makes
power
develops, as
we
have seen,
unHmited
by an
absolute, tran-
As
is
oriented
order
is
Yet
as a
very earmark of
ends.
politics that
men
use other
is
it is
the
to their
That
this
cannot be otherwise
79
it
finds
man
everywhere
than the
a slave.
Thus
it
first
own
eff"orts by cre-
which
and
limit the
freedom of some
in order
freedom of
legislative
and their
lib-
eral defenses of
freedom of
political competition.
While the
will of
how
will.
under
which the
majority.
is
to be
formed and
exercised.
They
establish the
rule of the
Yet the very need for these safeguards limiting the freedom of the
majority points up the dilemma that liberalism faces.
If
the majority
its
power, the
liberal safeguards
its
would be un-
cannot be so trusted,
Lincoln in the individual relations between the wolf and the lamb
reappears in the collective relations between majority and minority.
It
manifests
itself
omy between
eral
some
The
lib-
may
stand in the
way
of the maxi-
mization of such a collective good, and the greater the need for the
full realization
is
the
sake. Is individual
be no freedom
of Rights
if,
at all?
What
benefits does a
the
it
apples in the
This dilemma
lies
which
in the
twentieth to the
Thus
which
The
and practice
is
the result.
80
Freedom
Liberalism conceived of the problem of freedom in terms of a
state. It
saw the
sole
freedom
had
people, behind
The
ual
smaller the sphere of the state, the larger the sphere of individbe.
However, the aspirations for power, and the struggle for power from them, could not be so neatly confined; for these aspirations are not the exclusive property of any group but common
resulting
to all
men, ruler and ruled, oligarchs and democrats. The autonoforces of society, left to themselves, engendered
mous
lations of
power
as
power of the government had ever been. And while liberalism had assumed that the weakness of the government assured the freedom of the individual, it now became obvious that it also assured the unhindered growth of private power, destructive of individual freedom. Against these concentrations of private power, which derived primarily from economic controls, the state was called back from the comer in which it had been confined to do battle. The state, which had just been relegated to the inconspicuous and relatively innocuous role of a night watchman by a society fearful of its power, was now restored to power as the protector of individual rights. Thus the modern state bears a Janus head: one face that of a monster lusting for power over the individual, the other with the benevolent
mien of the
individual's defender against his fellows' infringements
of his freedom.
The
modern state has thus become a dilemma reappears in a new and in-
new
economic power
form of corporations and labor unions vies with the old tyranny of the state for limiting the freedom of the inin the
dividual, subjecting ever
new
action to ever
more stringent restrictions. That new feudalism calls into being the "new despotism" of the administrative state, which, for the sake of individual freedom, superimposes its restrictions upon
8i
From
the latter's
vantage point,
this
is
champion of freedom.
It is
of nineteenth-century liberal philosophy and the measure of the inner contradictions and ambivalences of freedom
erates in the
istrative
as
it
actually op-
modern state that both sides have a point. The adminstate can become a new despot to some and a new liberator
in a
freedom
unassail-
10
age
is
The
New
most obvious
in the
hands
good measure in order to restore its freedom threatened from within. Thus the economic sphere has lost whatever autonomy it has had in the past: it is subject to political
economic sphere,
control as
it,
We
are in
political in nature.
political
is
in the nature
The monetary,
as
tax,
and
tariff policies
a direct
men
as criminal
conspiracy. Yet the ideal of strict separation served the political pur-
What
tics
is
is
and
as
its
all-persuasiveness.
The
it
state
the
umpire
who
sees to
game
who
game favor one player to excess and thereby threaten to game itself. In our age, aside from still being the umpire, the state has also become the most powerful player, who, in order to make sure of the outcome, in good measure rewrites the rules of the game as he goes along. No longer does the government or socirules of the
disrupt the
Committee for Economic Development, Probems of United States Econo7nic Development, 1958.
83
game are oriented toward the pluralistic objecAmerican society. Thus they seek to prevent any sector of the economy from gaining absolute power vis-a-vis other sectors of the economy, competitors, or the individuals as such, by controlling
rules of the
tives of
The
and limiting
trolling
its
legislation
tariff
con-
and
monetary
While the
^\game
main
employment,
and
stability of
agricultural prices.
World War,
technological research
and
industrial
The
by the government of
fense,
its
on national deshift
from one
sector of the
economy
to another,
all
upon the economic life of the nation. They have made the government the most important single customer for the products of the national economy. In addition, many tax and monetary policies and price and wage policies are determined by considerations of
fluence
national defense.
With
iting,
enormous
controlling, lim-
life,
the ability to
in-
government becomes an
itself
The
political influence.
the
New Feudalism
two
This
political influence
exerted through
government personnel.
is
The most
has
its
eff^ective
political influence
exerted
by the
direct
The economic
organization which
political in-
representatives reaches.
In so far
as
not decide the issue by themselves, the competition for political influence and, through
it,
economic advantage
interests.
economic
rect control
is
typical in Europe,
United
While this relationship of diit is by no means unknown in the have been controlled by mining
many
individual
mem-
come under the sway of the economic which they were intended to control. The large-scale interchange of top personnel between business and the executive branch of the government cannot help but influence, however subtly and intangibly, decisions of the government relevant to the economic
administrative agencies have
forces
sphere.
However,
ence
is
in the
political influ-
The
deci-
sion of the
member
by
sion
is
virtue of the
in doubt, for he
The
among
economic
Only
among
is
way
in doubt.
political struggle, ostensibly
The
test
elections
by
good measure
as a
con-
at worst, to give
nomic
interests of, their manon behalf of them. 'The result is a new feudalism which, like that of the Middle Ages, diminishes the authority of the civil government and threatens it with extinction
forces, defending
by parceling out
its
several functions
among economic
organizations
just like the
And
new
concentrations of private
citi-
power tend
zens
to
command
their livelihood
constitutionally
established
government tends
become,
in
the
words of Chief
If giant
vital to
body
politic
economic system.
in its
For the
tered
vitality of the
renew itself on new technological opportunities, unfetby the interests identified with an obsolescent technology. Seen from the vantage point of the individual enterprise, this is what
ability to
we
call
has;
been
game
in order to assure
the survival of the economic giants which, in turn, tend to take over the functions of the state.
possible but not inevitable,
The consummation
of this development,
would be a state of affairs in which for those giants the rule of life would not be freedom of competition, which might jeopardize their survival, but freedom from competition in order to secure their survival.
The dynamics
of the capital-
86
The
istic
the
New Feudalism
would then give way to a gigantic system of vested interests in which the established giants would use the state to make themselves secure from competitive displacement, only to
and creating
die the slow death of attrition.
It is
faces in
as
this
grave
the
disease.
That cure
exists. It is
is
a state strong
enough
to hold
its
own
against
already
the state
good measure, such a state whose importance for the economic life
as this state
is
of the nation
we
able
it is
state,
capable
power in check. Yet such by being strong enough for this task, cannot fail to be also strong enough to control, restrain, and redirect the economic activiof keeping the concentrations of private
a state,
ties
may
be able to ac-
economic sphere.
Thus modem society is faced with a real dilemma: a government which is too weak to threaten the freedom of the individual is also too weak to hold its own against the new feudalism; and a government which is strong enough to keep the new feudalism in check in order to protect the freedom of the many is also strong enough to destroy the freedom of all. What, then, must it be: the new feudalism of private power or the new despotism of the public power.' The problem thus posed cannot be solved by any simple formula which endeavors to restore the juxtaposition of society and state from which the philosophy of nineteenth-century liberalism evolved. Rather, the solution of the problem must start from the terms in which it poses itself in the twentieth century. A fruitful approach to this dilemma is suggested by the principles
underlying the constitutional devices, institutional arrangements,
dynamics of the American system of government by which The Federalist successfully tried to combine, in the simple
and
political
relations between society as a whole and the state, a strong government with a pluralistic society. The same combination, in the com-
87
on all levels of social interaction, private and governmental, the freedom of all for the sake of everybody's freedom.
so in
They do
sis
two
different respects,
The
5
1
classic analy-
of these
two functions
is
provided by
Number
of
The Feder-
alist.
As concerns
system:
ter motives,
This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of betmight be traced through the whole system of human affairs,
see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner, as that each may be a check
We
on the other;
may
be a sentinel
And
It is
among
different systems:
of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: The one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very imThe second method will be exemplified probable, if not impracticable. in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from, and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security of civU rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of
.
interests
and
sects.
modem
state is
rangement
reposes
may
well
secure.
Freedom
rather
upon the
social order as a
88
The
values to
which society
is
committed.
liberty,
and the
free-
The
dom
of both the wolves and the lambs will in the end depend
upon
the values
which society
attributes,
What
is
their due?
How
far can
they be
al-
lowed to go? Since neither, and especially not the wolves, can be
as far as
they would
like
and
interests
sphere and
mode
of action. That
intervention
may
More
likely
it
will result
totality
may
be, in ever
web
rests in the
89
11
declined
by
political
judgment and
Under
a
dominated, by
in the
as a
nomenon,
The
phase of social
standard
by which
se
and man
as
which
theme of Western
political
good man
is
identical
good
a
citizen
citi-
good
This philosophy
tics as
is
is
American
poli-
personal honesty.
politician
may
is
be wrongheaded in judgment,
weak
sincere he
"He
at least
how "He
he cherishes
From
90
the
New Republic,
December
16, 1957.
The Decline
same standards he applies
spheres.
to himself
of
Democratic Government
and
The
values
both in verbal
conform to these popular standards, and popularity owes much to this identity of
and again measured
his public actions
virtually unshakable
political standards.
The
by the yardstick of
private
values and expressed his conviction that since he did not find these
when
tested
by
life,
test as well.
He
summarized
his phi-
losophy in
news conference of August 8, 1957, in these terms: "I, as you know, never employ threats. I never try to hold up clubs of any kind, I just say, 'this is what I believe to be best for the
his
United
States,'
and
is
by
I
the logic of
my
position. If that
just
I
wrong
then
have to say
try to do."
life,
I am wrong, but that is my method, and that is what The public sphere appears here as a mere extension
of private
contests of power,
by employing
threats
traditionally associated
same
rational rules of
When
July
31, 1957,
news conference of about the circumstances under which Mr. Gluck was
".
. .
in
anybody
is
basis
that
as
man
never heard
it
it
mentioned to
suggesting
I
me
a consideration,
and
don't take
very kindly
as
would
The
hinged exclusively
upon
there
his personal
knowledge of
In this philosophy
conflict of
interests to
which the
state of the
may
well be irrelevant.
91
government
And
Wilson
was
Humphrey,
political context.
Of
the
many
Armed
Services Subcommittee
on Air Power:
I
The
a great
I
have
known through
a
many
qualities that
Americans have. As
matter of
we have
is
They wanted to get rid of the czar and bad or worse, temporarily. It is very interesting. One of the troubles, they think of our type of free competitive society as the same thing they had under the czars, and of course it is not that thing at all. They have replaced in what you might
got a dictatorship on their hands.
just as
call their
It is
point of hate.
If some of them were still left in one piece of Russia so they could hate the czars, they would not be hating our people so much.
is
interest in a
world of conflicting
the dominant
interests
members of
and acted
in
terms of a philosophy
many
which go
into the
making of
ticularly, of a
good businessman, go
good
statesman. Indeed,
many
men
like
Eisenhower, Ben-
son,
many
in
all
men have
and the
political life
92
The Decline
political interests
of
Democratic Government
of their
less
many
worthy
alone
life, let
politics.
The
more
and
failure in politics
this
is
means limited to
at the records
nor even to
country.
by no Look
all
country
it is
particularly illuminating to
compare the
uniform
Why
is it
that
the Knudsens and the Wilsons have failed and the Forrestals, the
Lovetts, the Nitzes have succeeded? Because the excellence of the
investment banker
is,
as it
alien to
it.
an actor on the
rules of politics
political scene
is
without
like a
it
who
drives
Yet while
it is
well recognized
it
that society
must protect
itself
feels
no need
The
though were anxious to atone for the sacrifices of private virtue which the political sphere demands and to take out insurance against
even a well-nigh
irresistible fascination. It is as
society
who
men
in its stride
and even to
against those
who know
game
only too well and use them to the detriment of society. Society will have to learn,
if it
it
from the good men who are too good even to take note of the rules of the political game. And it must reconcile itself to the uncomfortable paradox that bad
men who
good men
selfishness
a nation."
From
two
politics
is all
about
weeds have grown: Utopian liberalism and Utopian conservatism. This country has had its share of the
intellectual
and
political
former;
it
is
now
latter.
As the
nihilists
of the Right,
who
now
try to monopolize
test
of the authenticity of
is,
conservatism
is
its
re-
straints
individual.
By
this test,
German
Naziism was
its
conservative as
McCarthy-
claim,
was
not.
its
purposes.
these
two
long
likely to
politics in the
run than
political nihilism,
The
Federalist
its
greatest
monument, Alexander Hamilton is its greatest theoretician, John Quincy Adams and Abraham Lincoln are in different ways its greatest practitioners, and Woodrow Wilson is its greatest antithesis in theory and practice. That conservatism holds as we saw the realist philosophy of international relations to hold that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must
work with
ciples
world of opposing
realized,
The Decline
of
Democratic Government
all
pluralist
and aims
absolute good.
be made,
it
method
a
presents poit
as
it
ought
to be dealt with.
Scientific
decade ago in
in passing,
it
Man
vs.
Fower
Politics,
when,
might say
and method.
a special dignity
On
politics
endows the
status
it.
quo with
and seeks to
This conservatism
if it
can conceive of
a different
world
at
all,
finds that
world not
has
in the future
but in the
its
past, a
golden age to
Europe;
it
no place
in the
American
known
classes,
determined by
in
compo-
and
social status,
a stake in
defending the
what
status
quo could
American conservative
fight.^
state's rights,
this
politics.
The
great issues of
American
politics
vation of the present nor the restoration of the past but the creation,
without reference to
American
in
politics does
not defend the past and present against the future but one kind of
future against another kind of future.
While
philosophy and
method conservatism
politics, the
is
unique and revolutionary, not only in the narrow political sense, but
also in the
oblivious to tradition.
They
95
which were dominated by a conservatism of purpose and, hence, in the context of American politics spelled stagnation. In other words, the point of reference of American politics has never been the
present, and only in a historically inconsequential
way
has
it
been
the past.
relatively speaking,
States
moved
forward again
left it
it
set the
many
respects
behind.
Today
is
States
which
being
left
moves ahead and the United behind. All around us the world is in
political revolution has
violent transformation.
state system,
The
destroyed the
which for half a millennium had provided the political girders for Western civilization, and has brought to the fore two superpowers threatening each other and the world with destruction. At the same time it has dissolved the old order of empire into the anarchy of scores of feeble sovereignties, whose uncontrolled frictions
may
by adding
to
modem
civilization
from
been
still
civi-
militant support.
How
by
a
have
we
We
have reacted
revolutionary
defeating as a
is
dynamism of our national tradition but weapon in the international contest in which
the nation
engaged.
We
tive
we have formed of our national life to the national we proceeded to adjust the international realities to that pic-
96
The Decline
ture.
of
Democratic Government
Thus we
are looking at a
unheard-of
The world
cries
it; it
What we
the garb of a Utopian conservatism. Faced with the moral and virtually certain danger that soon a great
number
weapons,
we
which
cies in
is
Europe and Asia are stagnant; we continue unwilling either to status quo of which we disapprove or to recognize it. Latin America has become our forgotten back yard which we think we can take for granted. Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are for us primarily opportunities for the conclusion of military alliances and
change the
the expenditure of
money
our society and the revolutionary nature of the world with which
we must come
Union
capabilities,
to terms,
we
a national habit of
Power," published
telligence reports,
if it
had,
in 1949 by the Infantry Journal, to our own inmade no impression upon the official mind; for we would have had to discard a whole philosophy which
we
by
way
of
life.
conservative
is
line, to
keeping things
less
as
of an expendi-
That
this
its
dynamic and imaginative policies atrophy of government, inevitably resulting from the
purposes, has been acutely aggravated
is
atrophy of
by
the lapse of
it
made
in
purpose.
When we
we
obviously do
activities
which
97
its
and execution of
policies. It
is
also
by the govern-
Democracies create
it
ideally
majority emerges.
From
two
different atti-
non-democratic govern-
ment can afford to conceal and misrepresent because there are no autonomous social forces which could expose it to scrutiny and propose factual and political alternatives. Under certain conditions,
it
will
it
will
have no other
way
its
policy.
democratic
in the contest of
it.
need to conceal
and misrepresent.
ion force
the
it
to lay
its
anybody
ety
monopoly of truth in matters political minimizes the government to impose its version upon soci-
It is
United States that the administration has not on occasion but consistentlyconcealed from the people and
its
elected representatives
trivial
vital
matters and
While the administration was aware of the deterioration of American power in comparison with that of the Soviet Union, its most eminent spokesmen assured us time and again that our strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was unimpaired if not actually increased. What we were told officially was,
to
known
98
The Decline
at best,
ial
of
Democratic Government
but
To
learn
his visit in
but
we
have spoken
earlier.
The
ad-
and
politically
committed to stagnation
and, hence, unable to lead and educate, has put appearance in the
place of substance.
Thus
it is
by
ad-
The
ministration has been popular, and the people have been happy. Yet
of a
crisis
lest it
turn into
themselves.
Before
men want
to be
at the
helm.
The
in Italy
owed
and
it
power, to hold
it,
and to use
to
firmly.
The modern
some
Of
the failures
first
which
we
have had
only a
and very
partial glimpse.
We
it
fortunes, as taxing as
any
99
What
it
needs more
is
government
that restores
its
its
latent energies
by giving them
future.
The
nation
ICG
12
ologist
The
and
On
and columnist
September
Raymond Aron
Kennedy. This
It is
addressed in Le Figaro an
letter is
open
letter to President
both
moving and
an important document.
moving because
calls
it is
man who
is
important because
raises
which
if
Kennedy
them
of Cuba.
The
two incompatible
an invasion of
by
which
would have
Confronted with
a choice
it,
"the half-
two
possible policies."
still is,
might
again,
For here
recommending
diametri-
which is bound to weaken the American position in West Berlin and West Germany, and an intransigent position which, at the very least for the immediate future, increases the risks of war. As Mr. Aron sees it,
opposed courses of action:
a negotiated settlement
line;
yet in
also to
From CoTwnentary,
lOI
In
Kennedy
assuming
we
have
What
is
deeply em-
bedded
in
To
put
it
is
know what
politician's,
to accomplish the task of the statesman with the tools of the politician.
politician
when
It is
The
a
commitment
It is a
commitment
to a particular action
that precludes
It is a
face of the
unknown and
the unknowable.
words for deeds, and in so far as his words seek to influence people to vote for him or for his measures, his words actually are deeds. He can make promises without keeping them,
politician can take
The
and
his a
promises
may
in
He
can run
on
stand on quite
different
ground
between.
He
by embracing them
from voting.
both.
if
He
another
abstain
he can't
make up
mind he can
the un-
He
minimum
by preparing
his action
The
ver-
What
still
moves us today
is
in the
recorded oratory of a
Churchill or a Roosevelt
as the
not so
much
we remember
we
are
moved.
The
from
is
to the exclusion of
others.
He must
it
cross the
Rubicon or
If
risks.
refrain
crossing
it,
both ways.
still
he goes forward
he takes certain
risks,
and
if
he stands
he takes other
There
no
riskless
middle ground.
Nor
can
he, recoiling
He
The
or
what he
will find
He
must commit
of
its
the nation
upon
hunch.
still
impenetrable darkness
it,
drawing the
the leading
is
part.
The
extent to
which the
it
style of the
Kennedy
administration reis
revealed not
more particularly by its mode been divorced from action and has tended
it.
To
committed himself
gram of
fallout shelters,
much
at variance
Yet the President cannot help making decisions and the method
by which he
distinction
has reached
them
is
suffers
from three
It
defects. It
is
in-
between what
nobody else, and what is only important enough by the President but by somebody else. It has the
it
is
beyond
its
reach.
The
which
with the
an unmanageable variety of
and opinions.
The
to
who
talk
him
it,
making the President familiar with all shades making it either too easy or too difficult for the President to make up his mind. The President may well be swayed by a particular counsel, especially when it is presented with that subjective self-assurance which some mistake for objective certainty, and with that facility for expression and brilliance of formulation which some mistake for depth. Impressed with these qualities of form, he may commit himself to the substance of the advice without being fully aware of the meaning of that commitment. It has been reported on good authority that the President was once presented with advice concerning a
of
has the virtue of
It
of opinion.
He
ment within whose jurisdiction the policy fell to put it into operation. This was done. When the head of the department some weeks later informed the President of the progress made in the execution
of that policy, the President questioned
its
it
and ordered
its
way
up
his
moment with
is
all
kinds of people on
issues to
kinds of
issues,
the President
overwhelmed with
mind can no longer perceive clearly the vital distinction between the paramount issues he alone must settle and the merely important ones which others may decide with or without
In consequence, his
his guidance.
The
that exists
with secondary
issues
effectively disposed of
many months
of deliberations
by a
The
great
many
it.
officials that if
we
have
to Berlin,
neither the
American
aware of
The
New
To Get
Moscow
Talks."
The
result
is
may
or
may
States.
Times reported on October 26 as the official position of the United States government that "the United States could not get nearer to war than the West Germans wish to go, and could not get nearer
to peace than they
were willing
to go."
Many months
of contingency
planning did not prepare the administration for the possibility that
a wall.
Germans might effectively seal East Berlin off by erecting Hence the administration did not know what to do when the wall went up in August, and did nothing. The show of force through which the United States in October tried to maintain the
the East
status
its
The
own
mind.
That mind
domestic
politics.
cise planning,
in victory in the
and the
elections.
small
for.
it was compared with what one knew and had prepared and planned
To
The
He
tries to eliminate
mind
as his
the
the President's
mind
hestitates
and
when
he seeks the
The
employment of
astrologers and
soothsayers did for the princes of old: to create the illusion of certainty
where there can be no certainty. The more facile the dent's advisers are with words and the more self-assured they their convictions, the more adept they are in encouraging the
dent in such
futile search.
else:
Presi-
are in
Presi-
They cannot
than anything
philosopher
The
President,
history, will
remember
among
and
man who
limits of their
fate.
He
has created
it; it
in this
way and
is
so again.
The
and
live
with
it
one
way
or another.
It
The
issue
is
As Tocqueville put
States:
those in which
it is
deficient.
Democracy
it
is
favorable to the
diffuses wealth
and comall
promotes public
all
spirit,
and
law
in
classes
of society:
indirect influence
over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await
their consequences with patience.
. . .
The
1
06
The
prudence, and to abandon mature design for the gratification of momentary passion, was clearly seen in America on the breaking-out of the French Revolution.
Confronted with
this
The dilemma
is
tragic
because
it
If
Woodif
row Wilson
did,
at
home;
The
the people the requirements of sound foreign policy the facts of political
life
by
telling
upon them
in
The
President
knows
sound, but
our disadvantage.
The
President
knows
that
what we
call
man
commitment
them.
To
the President
commit himself
words
has
to a fallout shelter
program
a policy
now
committed himself to
who
New
York.
he does for
feel
his
cannot but
It is
where
his true
for the President to reassert his historic role as both the initiator
It is
shrewd President can marshal to the support of wise policies the strength and wisdom latent in that slumbering giant American public opinion. Yet while it is true that great men have rarely been elected President of the United States, it is upon that greatness, which is the greamess of its people personified, that the United States, from Washington to Franklin D. Roosevelt, has had to rely in the conduct of its foreign affairs. It is upon that greatness that Western Civilization must
rely for
its
survival.
I
These words
Truman and
in 1956 to
Mr. Eisenhower.
A4r.
Kennedy
io8
13
The
Perils of
Empiricism
American foreign policy has in the past suffered from one great defect: the belief that a great power could somehow
escape the risks and
liabilities
of foreign policy.
It
could escape
by isolating itself from the affairs of the world; if it abstained from pursuing active foreign policies vis-a-vis other nations, other nations would reciprocate. It could escape them by promoting a grand design, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, which, in the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, would make an end to "the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries and have failed." In other words, the United Nations was expected to put an
them, so
it
was
believed,
itself.
We
risks
a great nation
and
of foreign policy
it
by an
act of will,
by choosing
either to retreat
from
or to soar above
it.
Yet
we
are
now
in the
by
as
else to
foreign policy but this particular set of empirical facts, say, of Laos
The President has admonished us to "look at things as we are following his advice. We are doing so in the name of pragmatism or empiricism. Nowadays these terms are used in Washington with pride. They are used as though to be pragmatic and empirical when faced with a political problem were to be rational almost by definition. The idea which the pragmatists and emor of Cuba.
piricists
want
to
convey
is
no
illusions
as
design to change them; they have the courage to look the facts in
the face and the wilHngness and ability to deal with each issue
on
its
own
terms.
There
is
more truth
From
109
new
attitude
intellec-
tual disposition
which
bows
to the facts
lie."
which
own
It
works.
It
world
problem proves
obstinate,
it
new
empirical attack,
derstood.
That theory of social action, however persuasive it may sound to our ears by virtue of apparently being supported by our domestic experience, is in truth without foundation. Facts have no social meaning in themselves. It is the significance we attribute to certain
facts of
fears,
our
as social
The
social
world
itself,
then,
is
Every
social act
as social
facts presuppose a
they
Rather
we must
and
as
choose between
philosophy consistent
as a
within
itself
guide
to understanding
implicit
own way,
uation.
sit-
On
by
the other hand, the empiricism of our day has been led
astray
its
tions. It
Thus we
on
its
on
its
own
terms;
own
terms;
we
deal with
Taiwan on
its
its
deal with
ize Laos,
Communist China on
even
own
terms.
We
want
to neutral-
no
The
nation.
Perils of
Empiricism
the civil war in Vietnam, even at the risk of commitment on the part of the United States. We want to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, even at the risk of war with China. And we want to contain Chinese power within its present territorial limits by committing ourselves to the
a full military
We want to win
of a hierarchical nature.
The paramount
is-
is,
at the
very
least,
of China. Will
military
it
power
and,
more
power by continuing
to
commit American
military strength
Or
will
it
then be necessary to
power?
will,
If this
essary, as
indeed think
it
if in other
fail
words our
present
or involve us sooner
war with China, it is necessary to ask now, not five or ten years from now when circumstances may have given the answer and left us no choice, two fundamental questions. What is
the place of the containment of China within the hierarchy of the
objectives of our foreign policy, especially in view of our relations
And
if
we
until
China
must
we
it
wait to fight
war
China
feels
strong enough to
wage
it
on terms favorable to
herself, or
ought
we
not to fight
in
consequence of the
to raise
them
in public.
Nor
has
in its secret
councils,
policies.
The
War
crisis are
The Chinese
Korean
a
pro-
Western one,
and the
the
our ambassador
CIA
upon
Laos
quo in favor of forth from the Communist neighbors of counterattempt, more likely to succeed in view of the disstatus
call
As our
Strait
must be
seen in the context of our over-all relations with China, so our policies in the different nations of southeast Asia are organically inter-
connected. Since
we
are
Vietnam,
commitment
we
at the
very
least
doomed
which provides the Vietnamese guerillas with a supply and staging area beyond the borders of Vietnam. The Greek and Algerian civil wars have shown in different ways that guerillas who have the support of the indigenous
policy,
by our Laotian
and retreat
to, areas
What
ails
fragmentation,
compartmental-
and of an
in
the total
which would assign them their proper place scheme of things. That ailment, however, is not limited
It
to
very style of our foreign policy. Berlin and the relations with our
allies
It is
Western presence
States
in
West
no more be
dealt
with
as a local
problem, isolated
from the
over-all relations
States
112
The
Perils of EmpiricisTn
concern of Soviet foreign policy since the end of the Second World
and to which the very origin of the Cold War can be traced: American recognition of the Western boundaries of the Soviet em-
War
pire.
With
regard to this
issue,
two
quo
it
in Central
as a
Europe
as a
matter of
in the
upon
embark
its
with
its
implicit recognition of
Our
is
symbolic manifestation
of our over-all
German
German
issue,
problem,
we
we
quo
in Berlin with-
quo
in Central
is
at
moment of this writing as unresolved as it was when it was first raised by Khrushchev in November, 1958, and our position with rethe
gard to the
biguous
territorial status
quo
in Central
Europe remains
as
am-
as it
was
Germany and
it
this
tendency to
isola-
issue as
though
are in
to the vir-
tual veto
Germany policy and stalemate our relations with the Soviet Union. Our relations with West Germany are duplicated by our relations with many of our other allies, such as Taiable to paralyze our
allies
either
we would want
to pursue, or 113
own which
own
in-
terests
and
we
from that
folly. President
Diem
cies.
communism, but we have been unable to make him change his poliThe policies which Pakistan has been pursuing toward its
we
The
policies of
any
Great
Britain
own and
in theory
we
through
political
path
We
demic
this en-
of our alliances in
two
different ways:
through inef-
We
have made
by
our
lies
allies
tolerable
by
with
a peculiar virtue.
We
Chiang
and
policies of the
isolated acts of
in personnel.
by changes
is
We
sistent pattern
which points
what an
alliance
such
114
as
The
larly,
Perils of Empiricisfn
of the relationship
which ought
to exist
between members of
in a re-
modes of thought and action which we have brought to bear upon our alliances throughout the world. We could do worse than remember the warning of Washington's Farewell Address:
So
duces
of
evils.
Sympathy
illusion of
an imaginary
common
interest, in cases
where no
real
common
and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nainterest exists,
.
own
country,
without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligations, a commendable deference for
public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish
pliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.
com-
Our
be
it
must be
paralleled
tration,
low, chapter 37 [in this book]) "the equalitarian diffusion of the advisory function" to dissolve the powers of decision-making into a
series
we
no middle ground;
ahead
and leave
it
behind.
The
states-
history the Washingtons and the Lincolns, the Richelieus and the
in
a conscious
"5
respect for facts and the ability to change them, foreign policy
is
lame;
it
ii6
PA Kx
IV-A
THE RESTORATION OF
FOREIGN POLICY
The Overriding Issue
Nuclear War
14
H-bomb
has cen-
moral
by way of disarmament.
On
few
is
the
first issue
little
to say.
questions.
He
likely to succeed;
whether
we
production of
H-bombs with
this
whether
comparison of
avail-
commitment of necessary for the production of H-bombs; whether, the character of the probable targets against which
able instruments of
war
justifies
the resources
in particular,
the
H-bomb
it
upon
and the
political
one of the
peculiarities
be able to formulate
It is
modern war that the layman may few relevant questions, but that he is
The
fail
to be answered
in the affirmative.
the
H-bomb
con-
the
modern instruments
is
of
insoluble on
the technological level, for, short of a universal moratorium on scientific progress, there entific
sci-
Nor
is
ble
on the
level of
pure morality.
Atomic
On
all
levels of
1950.
technology the
From
Scientists,
March,
119
THE OVERRIDING
means of
S S
UENU
CLEAR
WAR
bound to be commensurate with the means modern state can no more afford to be without all the weapons which modern technology puts at its disposal than could the medieval knight afford to be without a sword since his potential adversary was thus armed. In June 11, 1938, Secretary of State Hull declared with reference to the aerial bombardment of Canton by Japan that the administration disapproved of the sale of aircraft and aircraft armaments to countries which engaged in the bombing of civilian populations; on December 2, 1939, President Roosevelt declared a similar moral embargo against the Soviet Union in view of the bombing of Finnish civilians. A few years later the ruins of bombed cities on either side of the battle lines gave eloretaliation are
rise to the
H-bomb
mechanism which
who
selves.
Even
is little
if
we
should continue to
in
there
moral
satis-
humanly possible to stave off the calamity of a war fought with H-bombs. Undismayed by almost uniform failure, the Western world has, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, been fascinated by the hope that the threat of war can be met by disarmament. It remains only consistent, while dooming itself to renewed failure, when it seems to be able to think of only one answer to the threat of the H-bomb: disarmament. Yet while one must sympathize with the psychological compulsion to break out of the vicious circle of the armaments race, one cannot but recognize the grievous error in the means employed and the objectives sought. First of all, even if atomic disarmament were possible, it would not mean peace but only the elimination of cerfaction of having done everything
I20
by-product of
a political settlement
not
as a
Both
historic experience
and
political analysis
bear
The
men
have arms.
if
It
men would
peace
is
stop fighting
war and
dis-
from
that
armament assume
to be.
Men
do not
They have arms because they deem it necessary to be prepared to fight. The cause of war must be sought in the social conditions
which make
it
which may make war appear to be the lesser of two evils. In these conditions must be sought the disease of which the desire for, and the possession of, arms is but a symptom.
The
it
bombs, would
the
conduct of
The
bombs
war
in the field of
when
the
first
atomic
bomb was
Under
the
employ
would be
humanity
in view,
warfare
is
tion of atomic
bombs by
it
itself
would
war
exactly
where
was before.
level
only
at the
it is
legally possible
bomb,
it is
why
effec-
121
From
1816,
when
more than a score of major attwo resulted in genuine disConvention the Rush-Bagot of 1817 and the Washington armament: Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments of 1922. Both were
kind," to the present, there have been
tempts at disarmament.
Of
these only
disarmament lasted
as
lona
to
their existence.
predicated
the United
upon
States
power between
itself into
an armed quest
upon
this
conflict
upon
in 1817, depends.
of capital ships between the United States and the British Empire,
EngUsh-
It
was furthermore
by 1942
Here
again,
it
political
which made
politiissu-
cal conflict,
disarmament yielded to
States sought parity
ing in war.
The United
strength. She
rior
in battleship
was bound
would achieve parity by way of bitter and by way of mutual agreement. Since there was no political conflict between the two countries which would have justified such competition, the two countries agreed upon a practiquestion was whether she
costly competition or
cally identical
maximum tonnage
122
the prepon-
power
in the
the United States and Great Britain in that region and inviting
them
Great
was anxious
Japan by
to avoid.
tied to
a military alliance.
More
tween Japan and the United States. Thus, Great Britain and the United States not only were not separated by political conflicts
which might lead to war; they had also an identical interest in avoiding an armaments race with Japan. By dissolving the alliance with
Japan and agreeing to parity with the United States on
could
afl"ord.
a level she
By
from
Ja-
pan and reaching parity with Great Britain cheaply, the United
States, too,
field.
embarking upon
a ruinous
armaments
race,
mentioned above.
When
the
Anglo-American reaction
to Japan's in-
showed
that the
united front of Great Britain and the United States with regard to
the Far East,
ble,
the
possi'
no longer
Japan
at
As far as the Japanese position vis-a-vis the AngloAmerican naval supremacy was concerned, the disarmament proviof that treaty.
Washington Treaty were the product of a peculiar political situation. These provisions could not survive the political conditions which had created them. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over
sions of the
';
'
;;
i;
too, as a
reflection of
essentially a
fi
j;
123
United States
Union which
the
in return for
adequate
when
to be in
working order.
The
es-
which
mig^ht
If this state
would have given the Soviet Union two it would have wiped out with superiority of the United States over the Soviet Unit
On
On
it
gaininir superiority in
atomic
Union would also have atomic weapons under the American plan, that
Soviet
The
the equality of zero, even though only in the future and with the
The
Russian plan would have given the Soviet Union the equal-
it
which determined the policies of the were the temporary American mo-
Union on the continents of Europe and Asia. The paramount Union was to make the period of American
124
in
atomic weapons
as short as possible
while perpetuating
was vitally interested in maintaining her monopoly of atomic weapons as long as possible and in reducing the Russian superiority on the two continents. The policies
preponderance.
States
The United
The
conflict
thirties,
on the
superficial level of
disarmament
power.
On
the level
itself into a
first,
security later.
On
The American inupon security is the equivalent, in terms of atomic disarmament, of the American policy of the status quo, as the Russian emphasis upon equality is the expression, in terms of atomic weapons, of the Russian policy of expanding and making unassailable the ascendancy of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia. Such is the nature of the power conflict between the United
quo
overthrow of the
status quo.
States
controversy on
atomic disarmament
form
into
which
it is
The
political factors
at
atomic
disarmament will inevitably militate against disarmament with regard to the H-bomb. As long
United States and the Soviet Union rages unabated and unsettled,
the impasse with regard to disarmament will continue whatever
type of weapon
a legal
may be
chosen
as
may
be contrived to make
I:
disarmament
sist
could
led the
it
we
then per-
i'^
in an error
which
condemned
the
ComWorld Disarmament
125
j!
a half has
pointed hopes and ever more frequent and destructive wars? Are
we
symptoms and
is
let
the disease,
unattended, take
deadly course?
indeed an
illusion.
As
in in
which he had
so prominent a part:
true thing
may
armaments
to
from
it
made war
inevitable.
produce a sense of security in each nation that was the justification put forward in defence of them. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred; it is hardly too much to say that, between nations, it stimulates all that is bad, and depresses all
that
is
good.
nation increases
its
One
strategical railways
towards
says this
is
The second nation makes counarmy in reply. This first nation own military preparations were
only precautions; the second nation says that its preparations also were only precautions, and points out with some cogency, that the first nation
it
goes on,
till
is
an
strategical railways.
Germany had no
with armaments and the Triple Alliance in order that she might never have reason to be afraid in the future. France naturally was afraid after 1870, and she made her militarv' preparations and the Dual Alliance
a verv small Army and a very large Empire, uncomfortable and then (particularly when Germany began a big-fleet programme) afraid of isolation. She made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, made up her quarrells with France and Russia, and entered into
became
Germany became
would presently
still
be afraid, and struck the blow, while she believed her power to be
invincible.
. .
.^
But
it
is
no answer to the
with the
illusion of
illusion of
competitive armaments to
counter
it
is
in-
(New York:
53, 54.
126
cannot be the
its
precondi-
Union advance contradictory claims for the domination of Europe, of which the focus at present is Germany, it is idle for them to talk about disarmament, for they are forced by the very logic of this power contion.
As long
test to
arises, that
is,
the politi-
settle the political conflicts which threaten war with the Soviet Union regardless of the prevailing technological conditions, we must face, as we must threaten, destruction with the latest technological means of destruction available to men. If the United States and the Soviet Union can settle these conflicts peacefully by safeguarding their vital interests and compromising on secondary issues, the technological progress of mankind will, by that very fact, have lost its threat. They can then afford to agree upon limitation of their armaments. Disarmament, in
we cannot
to involve us in
upon
will be the
measure of the
political
understanding achieved.
There
settled:
ways by which
at
ing
power
no longer
some of
American
States
indeed in the success of such negotiations that the sole hope for
peace resides.
conflict in
If we do not dare to face the realities of the power which we are engaged, and if we cannot hope to settle it peacefully on its own level, we cannot hope for peace. The concen-
upon
becomes
issue of life
in primi-
stance,
symptom with
a
127
15
Massive Retaliation
The
"instant
12,
retaliation"
speech of Secretary
a
Dulles, delivered
definition of
on January
major reIts
it
imhas
portance,
if
Sir
has amplified
it;
ford and
plaining
trine
is
his colleagues
it
have
set
out to "explain"
it
not
new
doctrine at
all;
its
newness
in a
Through
asked
clear lines of
argument can be
seen.
allies
have
as-
who
will decide
on "instant
retaliation"
is
necessary.
Army
are
and
still
weapons
the rigidity of the Dulles formula and in turn the Secretary of State
acknowledges that
the facts. For
all
its
these modifications
and
qualifications,
however,
by those
in
power. The
January
step
12
speech stands in
its
major
by
is
af-
army
divisions, to
that, in the
event of
new
aggres-
sion in Korea, our counteraction will not stop short at that nation's
With
From
128
this in
mind,
let
us start over
29, 1954.
by re-examining
the January
the
Massive Retaliation
12 address, setting aside interpretations of Secretary Dulles' address
by
his colleagues
said.
which serve
as the
keystones
new
policy.
action,
First,
"emergency
emplified
by
a
the Korean
War
re-
placed
by
"maximum
deterrent
at a bearable cost."
Second,
we
is
made by
the
upon
by means and
reliance
at places
of our choosing."
Third,
as
corollary to "placing
more
on deterrent
being limited
power,"
we
shall
depend
less
on
"local defensive
power."
is
where
it
war
we then we
work
for us.
The
fundamental, on our
side,
then
is,
sets
up."
in the
Thus "we shall confront dictatorship with long run, beyond its strength."
a task that
it is
nec-
States
must prepare:
aggression
by
striking at
its
The new
to (5).
relevance
The new
threat, or
answered by the
reality, of
atomic
retaliation.
assumption, the
the
new
American monopoly of the atomic bomb or at least of a stockpile of atomic bombs sufficient to wage successful atomic war stabilized the line of demarcation of 1945 between East and West. The virtual certainty that any step taken by the Soviet Union bevond
129
would
may
have prevented
It
may seem
official
trite,
somnambulistic quality of
much
argumentation
deterrent only
if
monopoly or
if
at least a
the
power
to
be retaliated against
^or to
is
make retaliation impossible by prevention? The new policy is intended in future to make
government
in
its
local aggression,
senses will
embark
words,
upon
knowledge
that
its
industrial
and popuannouncethis
is
reduced to rubble
in retaliation. In other
its
by
its
implementation. However,
not
by the
importance to
an atomic war.
must be undertaken
One can
which
Union
which come
local aggression.
The
crisis
advocates of the
new
"In a situation
like, say,
the
Czech
"the
a solution
did
would be a clear warning in secret that any attempt at by force would bring the guarantee into operation. If that not work the people concerned should be told clearly by
step
. .
from the air what government uses force and warned to evacuate a
...
will
happen
list
if
their
specified
of cit-
ies.
At
we
should
move
the
bomber
forces to
war
stations
we were
strat-
For what
does the Air Marshal expect the aggressor nation to do in the face of
Once
things have
gone so
Marshal an-
ticipates
start a
atomic
130
retaliation.
war of atomic prevention against the threat of a war of A new Korean or Czechoslovakian crisis, then,
Massive Retaliation
will not start
bombs on
the mili-
This being
so,
by
its
very
which under
certain circumstances
might
well-nigh be
irresistible, to
make
retaliation impossible
through an
it-
less attractive
through
the
new
Dulles,
New
about what
President
we would do
would
soul-searching, hesitation, and doubt. Yet a policy of atomic retaliation will prevent an atomic
is
war
only
if
there
not the shadow of a doubt in the minds of friend and foe alike
If the pros-
be no local aggression
But
if
we
kind of miscalcu-
lation that has so often in the past led to the outbreak of a general
war which nobody wanted and which would not have broken out had the potential aggressor known in advance how the other side was
likely to react.
The new policy shifts the emphasis from the conventional weapons to the new instruments of atomic power. By doing so, it recognizes what, at least in theory, has not always
namely, that the United States has not the resources to oppose more
than one local aggression
at a
able to fight
THE OVERRIDING
time.
S S
UENUCLEAR
WAR
new
pol-
By
may
we
have no answer
at
all, e.g.,
swer
is
the atomic
bomb. The
from the
local
traditional
weapons of
limits
our
meet
local aggression
by
means, as
we
did in Korea,
bomb
new
policy tends to
we
locally, or
by
striking at
its
source with
The new
at all
between
new
policy in-
arises not from local aggression, Soviet inspired or othfrom atomic war deliberately embarked upon by the Soviet Union, but from the revolutionary fire which is sweeping
of the
may West
erwise, nor
through
much
of Asia, Africa,
Atomic
Peking
retaliation
Moscow
or
in Italy or
The crucial problem of national and social revolutions, that Moscow did not create but which it exploits, Mr. Dulles fails to face. The generalities of freedom are offered, of course; it is the
Indochina.
specifics of
in doubt.
now
new
Nothing
its
predomi-
nant concern with military matters than Mr. Dulles' assurance that
"foreign budgetary aid
is
it
clearly
a far
full
American
taliation
political
its
and of
132
Massive Retaliation
is
revealed only
if
in
new
policy
is
to be sought not
words there
it is all
are
no
less
policies
mat-
money. Perhaps the London Times is right in saying: "It is indeed hard to see where and how the great strategic change has taken place, though it is not hard to recognize the economic reater of saving
son
why it
has
become
politically desirable to
assume that
is
it
has
done
and
so." If the
correct,
much
point to
may
again seem
a
trite,
not super-
fluous, to
fought in perpetuity,
The
President no doubt
would
agree,
his press
"new
owes
look,"
The doubts
The
President
to the nation
in a speech as for-
as the
133
16
July,
1955, generated
was not
so
much an
reason-
The
uncritical alacrity
Geneva
as
the swallow
more
which astounded and disquieted those who had been proud of the speed and thoroughness with which the American people appeared to have learned the most important politienthusiasm over the
spirit
of
Geneva stemmed from the assumption belonging to that political nursery school which some of us thought we had outgrown that the intractability of the political conflicts between East and West and
the Cold
War
power
to a transformation of hostile
As
the Cold
War,
modicum
Russian policy has cured us of most of the illusions which the Ge-
Nobody
Eisenhower did on
dence of
that the
a
his
Geneva Conference,
"evi-
new
Nobody
Geneva Conference
From
Atomic
Scientists,
January, 1956.
Really
Become Impossible?
If it has
achieved
made it for the time being somewhat easier for persons and ideas to make contact across the Iron Curtain. However, in one respect the spirit of Geneva lingers on, perpetuating a misconception which threatens to become a basic assumption of our political and military policies. This is the idea that at the Geneva Conference of July, 1955, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, at least implicitly, not to resort to all-out atomic war in support of their respective interests. Even the few sober observers who were not at the time taken in by the other illusions of Geneva have continued to maintain that the Geneva Conference has made atomic war "unthinkable" and has for all practical purposes outlawed
has
it
as
there
but
a part of the
situation and,
taken as the whole, will confound rather than aid our un-
All-out atomic
agreed upon at
weaken our policies. war has not become unthinkable. Nor has it been Geneva or anywhere else that it would not be re-
war
a
has also
made
it
such
war.
The
which
for
all
two
not to the Geneva Conference that the credit must go for the certainty that neither the United States nor the Soviet
liberately start an all-out atomic war.
It will
Union
will de-
be noted that,
when
speaking of
this certainty,
it is
we
have
made two
this
qualifications, the
importance of which
the purpose of
paper to elucidate.
We
of the atomic stalemate, implying that there might be conditions under which there
would be no atomic
stalemate,
and
we
have referred
by
deliberate action
ways for an all-out atomic war to begin than by either the United States or the Soviet Union.
135
THE OVERRIDING
The
for
S S
UENUCLEAR
is
WAR
factors: the
capabilities; the
all
similarly
matched
matched
United
atomic
States
and the monopoly, vested and the Soviet Union, of the capability to wage
as
in the
all-out
war. Only
long
as these
atomic stalemate
influence
itself persist
and continue to
States
modern
technology, so
permanence threatened by the very same dynamics. While some of the four factors of which it is composed appear to be more permanent than others, the permanence of none can
its
from the technological point of view for one or the other side to gain however temporarily superiority in aggressive or defensive capabilities, which it might be tempted to use
It is
certainly possible
in order to
all.
One can
ancy
also
blow
It
must
also
be borne in
of actual performance
may
be as
as
reveal
to
be of
atomic race
may
war
may
war because
convinced that
it
has broken the atomic stalemate; and in view of the prospect of the
outbreak of such
viction
is
war,
it
unfounded.
far
While thus
we
turn
may
of the future,
we
now
to a
much
less
speculative development:
monop-
wage
all-out
atomic war.
its
When
atomic power
was
first
were considered
136
to be so great as to warrant a
government monop-
Really
Become Impossible?
moved toward
relinquishing
its
to
its
own
citizens
and other
nations.
The same
fissionable material
may
ing a
power
be put.
It
is
this technological
monopolistically controlled
sible
by two frightened
if a
number of
all-
other nations should have the capability perhaps not of waging of blowing
up some of
population centers of their neighbors and, for that matter, of the two
Union and keeping each other's destructive capability in check, is a force for peace, however precarious. Atomic power, haphazardly distributed among a number of nations, is bound to be a source of unprecedented insecurity, if not
by
of panic.
It is certainly
all
the possible
be
sufficient to point
out that any nation not operating under the restraint of certain destruction through atomic retaliation
in pursuit of
its
is
likely to use
atomic weapons
To illustrate
in
would
Un-
among,
a particular nation.
The
all
constant threat of
at least partial
live, will
THE OVERRIDING
Caliatory action,
S S
UE
N U C L E A R WAR
it
will hit.
Compared
as a
which then
decade of the atomic era might well appear in retrospect uneasy atomic peace. Yet perhaps even more
kind of golden age in which the atomic stalemate between two nations guaranteed an
disis
power
them on the part of a government and seem to be satisfied that all-out atomic public alike, both of which war has become impossible. The atomic stalemate is a function of the two-nation monopoly
of atomic power; the former cannot survive with the disappearance
of the
latter.
it
likely to arise
from
two interconnected
really important
quarters: the
of maneuver, the
atomic war.
We
we made at the outset about the impossibility of all-out atomic war when we referred to an all-out atomic war being started through
other than the deliberate action on the part of either the United
States or the Soviet Union.
It is trivial
stale-
with
which the great powers are identified and of the political problems to which the antagonism of those interests give rise. It has only modified, as long as it lasts, the means by which they pursue these interests
all-out
in
its
and try to solve these problems. In the shadow of the threat of atomic war and of the universal destruction it would bringr
wake, the age-old problems of foreign policy
still
occupy the
closer.
staffs:
which might bring the materialization of this threat measurably And what is true of the chanceries applies to the general
they, too, plan for military support of national policies in the
The
War
opportu-
methods of
either
diplomacy or war-
Really
Become Impossible?
and military
During
main
policies of
both
was
established at the
in the
by
step taken
by
beyond
that line
would
necessarily lead
all-out
atomic
1955,
do not deceive, the Geneva Conference of July, political stalemate of the first postwar
era in international relations
is
decade.
ized
The new
likely to
be character-
by greater flexibility within the two power blocs, tending toward a loosening of their inner coherence if not their dissolution, and, consequently, by greater flexibility between the two power blocs as well. Four facts are in the main responsible for this fundamental change in international relations: the decrease in the dependence of the great powers of second rank upon the superpowers; the
impending
rise
of
to great
power
status; the
im-
a multitude of nations,
power, will
gain or regain the status of great powers; and finally, the spread and
America. These
the Soviet
new developments
Union to embark upon policies of vigorous competition. The problem which their foreign policies must solve is no longer to hold a certain predetermined line, but to establish a new line by gaining the allegiance of powerful uncommitted nations and by weaning committed nations away from the other camp. It would be surprising if the diplomacy of maneuver which this
new
its
counterpart in a
new
military
How
United States and the Soviet Union meet the military chal-
lenge of the
new
political situation?
Committed
as
going the deliberate resort to all-out atomic war, they must limit
themselves to the use of conventional forces and tactical atomic
between them. The Soviet Union can rely upon its superiority in conventional forces, unchallengeable in their
own
THE OVERRIDING
S S
UENUCLEAR
WAR
The United
States,
retaliation.
this this
all-out
this
and
its
inner logic
The United
because
it
wage an
can
it
all-out
atomic war
war.
its
Nor
afford to
wage
conit
war
and fight
very
if
interests
where the
advantage
only
at
such
The very
it
idea of such a
war ever
deter?
Can
The
graduated atomic war, a war with just the right atomic dosage, de-
On
the one hand, the pohtical and military leaders of the United
States
must bring to
and daring,
proven themselves to be
capable of for any length of time. Similarly, these leaders must apply
problem of limited atomic war good political and military judgment to such an extraordinary degree of excellence as to border
on the
If
unfailing.
On
one side were to push the other into defeat, in reliance upon the
not to start an all-out atomic war,
If
it
latter's resolution
might pro-
would
it
would condemn
itis-
self to a
war fought
in despera-
140
Really
Become Impossible?
They can
political
dilemma only
if
war by
Yet what,
and
capabilities?
is
dox to which
we
we
assume the
war and
act
141
17
me
ic
is
Disarmament
Let
me
first
make
a distinction
which
it
is
seems to
the dis-
tinction
between disarmament concerning weapons for all-out atomto weapons for what is generassume under the term "weapons of
atomic war,
seems to
to
weapons for
all-out
it
From
points of
to
me
to be obvious,
armament
That
is
is
is
world government.
which
is
able to init
spect, control,
life
of the nation,
field. I
would
also
long
as
war have atomic weapons, there seems to me to be very little chance for an all-out atomic war breaking out through the deliberate action of either the United States or Soviet government. There is, of course, the possibility of an all-out atomic war breaking out in connection with a local war out of circumstances which nobody is able to control. But this is, I think, a risk with which we must live for the time being, and I shall say in a moment a few words about
how
There is, however, one problem with regard to all-out atomic war which is not yet acute, but which is likely to become acute in a few years' time and which will arise when more than two or three nations will have the ability to wage all-out atomic war, for if I am corStatement before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign RelaJanuary 10, 1957.
tions,
142
Disarmament
rectly informed
a
by
scientists, it will
be possible within
five years
or
decade for
six
who
this
Once
less
it
seems to
me we
by
self-restraint
exists to-
day.
Today if an atomic bomb explodes in the port know who only could have planted it and could
tion in order to operate against
it
it;
of
New
York,
we
we know
we
if
such an atomic
bomb from
what
is
an atomic
are
bomb
ex-
New York?
know
or
Against
are
whom
we
to
we
going to use
whom
bombs? Nobody
will
I
nobody needs
know
at least
who
perhaps even the panic, which will exist then in the relations
nations, the first decade of the atomic age
among
may
this
think there
is
terialized to reflect
contingency
regard
many
which have been suggested in recent times and in the last one hundred fifty years or so as Utopian, as not susceptible to realization, I think here is one area of disarmament where the vital interests of
the United States and the Soviet
there
is
Union
coincide.
And
it
seems to
me
and to control
purposes.
Senator Humphrey: Yesterday Mr. Kennan said there are times when you can find an identity of interest between even alleged enemies; therefore the agreement
becomes
self -enforceable
because of
You
it
may
finally
H3
THE OVERRIDING
S S
UENUCLEAR
WAR
and the distribution and
it
if
they don't do
it
now
while the
field is
may
never be able to do
at all
when
enlarged.
unknown
attack.
Mr. Morgenthau: Destruction, because the U.S.S.R. will be in the same boat as the United States. Senator Humphrey: Wouldn't this be particularly true if a major power outside the United States Germany, for instance becomes an atomic power. Let's say the Argentine becomes one. Let's say that Japan becomes one. Let's say that China becomes one. Let's
add Indonesia and
A4r.
India.
Morgenthau: France.
all
them have
entirely
someone
else. It is
you woke up some day to learn that an attack had taken place you would have to be somewhere else to learn that it happened the question confronting you is where did the attack come from, particularly with the intercontinental ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. Is that what you
not,
under your
thesis that if
are saying?
Mr. Morgenthau: Exactly. Senator Humphrey: Therefore, the time may be more propitious
now
Mr. iMoRGENTHAU: Exactly. The whole mechanism of mutual dewhen more than two nations are able to
will
impact of
this dispersion
of the ability to
I
wage atomic
v/ar.
Senator Pastore:
I
May
is it
concede the
world.
We
as
are living in a
realistic
What
that
do have
fissionable material
from developing
we
have or
as
it
to
stop
it?
industrial establish-
Disarmament
into fission-
Senator Pastore: She doesn't have it today. It doesn't mean she it ten years from today. She can develop the indusproductive capacity.
How
is
That
dis-
would
like to ask.
Maybe
it
would have
it
if this
may prove
It
to be a boon.
On
may
Now
here and
all
the nations of
all
the world
know
the nations
for
for peace
is
so small
and so slight as
this
morning
like
this
plutonium which
by-product of your
a
making
come
and
that could be
made
into
bombs,
how
wheels of progress?
con-
This
is
nical question
available or
possible of
may
Furthermore,
the Soviet
it is
if
Union
development
which
if it is
not stopped
likely to destroy
envisage
be established
from occurring.
didn't understand
you
to
international agreement.
H5
THE OVERRIDING
S S
UENUCLEAR
WAR
reaches a point where
Senator Humphrey:
can't get
it.
Now before
it
you
Mr. Morgenthau: That is correct. If you get it. The international atomic energy statute which probably will soon be before the Congress for consideration contains provisions for control which in my
Whether they could be strengthened and by what means they could be strengthened is in my opinion an open question. But what I want to point to is the enormous importance of this problem and the very little discussion in public which has
opinion are very weak.
taken account of that very importance.
ample, says
"Not
we produce
our weapon."
The French
are
now
They
some
have had their fissionable material and their peacetime use for
time, but the
is
Mr. Morgenthau: Especially under the impact of their weakness which has been revealed recently in the venture in Egypt. The question then is what should the United States do if such agreement is
not obtainable, and
the very reasons
it is
it
you have
it
country such
France,
which
realizes that
cannot be regarded
as a great
Let
seems to
the
me then, if I may, turn to the other area of problems which it me must be distinguished from the first and which concern
I
include
tactical
it seems to me that here exists a wide field of possible measwhich could be proposed and might be taken and which are all related to the political problems which await settlement. I think there exists not only an intimate relation between unsolved political problems and the armaments race; there exists also a priority which clearly points to the paramount importance of political problems.
Now,
ures
Why
146
is it,
all
the
many disarmament
proposals
which have been made, only two have succeeded one permanently
Disarmament
a previous
settlement.
am
by-
And
was the Washington Treaty of 1922 limiting naval armaments between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, which also followed, especially in the relation between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and Japan on
the other, a political settlement.
lasted, the
As long
was
it
by invading Manchuria,
armament. And
that a
political
is it,
I
also
its
freedom of action
make another
test in
order to
show
Why
arms?
we
we
Nobody
Britain of
an atomic attack,
political issue
no
would make
it
And
so
think
it is
imperative that
we
which
dis-
political settlements
armament.
It
seems to
me
is
high-
The enormous
all
intellectual energies
and
came
There
is
we
the unification of
Germany,
all
we
can imagine
moment
that
were
settled,
nobody need worry about the fact that nations have arms because there would be no incentive, no issue for which those nations might
147
THE OVERRIDING
want
S S
UENUCLEAR
I
WAR
wanted
to say in this
suppose
this
is all I
context.
upon
Air.
there
was
Mr. Morgenthau: That is true, of course, to a certain extent. If you could induce both parties to withdraw troops from the center of Europe, you would thereby have contributed to the alleviation of tension. The question, however, arises whether you can do that without having first tackled the political problem. So you are really here facing the old problem of the chicken and the egg. Certainly, there exists a relationship, but I would still say that disarmament itself, meaningful disarmament, becomes impossible as long as there exist unsolved political issues which the participating nations regard
as vital to
themselves.
late that
there has been an increased role for the Secretary General of the
in the
He
little
instruction or
recall that
he had very
little
policy to guide
Do you
by which
make recommendations
such
as demilitarized
and
well
as
Morgenthau:
would regard
U.N.
this
itself.
We
do
able to
Suez Canal
crisis
it
was
Disarmament
made
What your
litical
statement refers to
itself.
is
settlement
You could
tralized
the earth
from the
no
own a
political substantive
solution of
its
own for
The
I
Secre-
think
come from
And
crisis
crisis
between the
the functions
which the U.N. is able to perform with regard to them. Senator Humphrey: This is a very important observation that you have made, Doctor, and I want to say that this is one that bears
a
good
deal of study
its
policy and
direction. It
which
the
U.N.
is
to
And
I
is
think
too
little real
policy guidance.
is
He
more or
less
to find his
way. This
one of the
pitfalls, it
activity or of
up
I
to.
also think
it
may
result in a
all
weakness
is
in
our
own
national foreign
the
U.N.
is
work and
jective of
map
idea
our journey, we can get into the mechanism but have no where we are going. Mr. Morgenthau: In other words, the U.N. is not a substitute for national policies. It is simply a channel through which Senator Humphrey: It is a new channel or instrumentality for
the utilization or direction of national policies.
149
THE OVERRIDING
S S
UENUCLEAR
WAR
Mr. Morgenthau: Yes, indeed. Senator Humphrey: I don't think this has been able to sink home yet. The U.N. is really but a structure. As such it does not have
spirit
in so far as the
I
member
is
states give
and purpose.
think
it
very
important, as
we
U.N., that
we understand unless
U.N.
and the
to our
to agents in the
responsibilities
own
nationals
and which
may
security.
Mr. iMoRGENTHAU: And you might get results at variance with your national objective. Senator Humphrey: Exactly. Once you put the process in motion,
it is
pretty difficult to
call it
who
abides
by the charter even though it may get out of hand. I want to ask Dr. Morgenthau just a word about arms traffic. Do you think that in certain areas I asked this question of Mr. Cohen the problem of arms traffic is acute; and secondly, should some attempt be made to control it through interSenator Humphrey:
national agreement?
Mr. Morgenthau: I answer your first question in the affirmative, and I would answer your second question with a shrug of the shoulder. I must say that I doubt, at least on the basis of all precedents, that the control of
arms
traffic
can be successful
when one
great
power
is
And
too
much
attention
find that
if
think this
is
really a
able,
minor
issue in the
me
what you would then have is exactly the same incentive to war you will have with the arms traffic going on, only that it would
a
be fought on
150
lower
level of
weaponry,
either
with obsolescent
Disarmament
arising out
it
was.
in an article
clear
we were
to be used in
would have an advantage over the conventional forces of the Communist bloc because it is precisely in the ability to develop and utilize modern weapons, or modern weapons systems of convenStates
tional warfare, that the
utilized in
Do you
be-
when
may
The
first
may, or should be
utilized in case of
Mr. Morgenthau: I doubt that such a proposal is feasible at all. First of all, I would question the assumption upon which this proposal is based, to wit, that the United States has an advantage, would have an advantage if the use of atomic weapons were outlawed. The whole evidence of our new or the latest military look is against it, because we are trying to make up for our inferior mmpower by the use of tactical atomic weapons. Our whole strategy in Europe is based upon that conception. Furthermore, I don't believe for a momentand again I think history bears me out on that that you can make such an agreement stick. When it comes to war, that is to say, to victory or defeat or survival or destruction, all nations will use all the weapons which they deem to be serving their interests, with or without agreement. They will refrain from using certain weapons which might become selfdefeating or useless, such as was poison gas in the Second World War, or they may use other weapons only in a limited way. But legal agreements, I think, are virtually useless when it comes to such
questions of survival.
were not worth the paper on which they were written, because they were violated wholesale in the first war under protest and in the second war they were violated without any
may
safely say
protesting.
Senator Humphrey: Dr. Morgenthau, there is just this one observation I would like to get from you. Do you feel that we have
security
world than
is
in the capacity of
Do you so
understand?
Mr. Morgenthau: Yes, I am just trying to phrase my answer in such a way as to make myself clear. If you consider those diff^erent
security agreements, the different alliances, in terms of the different
local situations, the different areas to
it
is
cer-
tainly
that
we
I
Certainly
it is
inconceivable, and
tary planner,
would conceive of
all
it,
we
of our
allies
However,
whatever military
The actual purpose has been we will resort to either atomic measures may be necessary beyond
local defense if
ter served
by some kind of
such
as is
unilateral
United
States,
now
which
and
its
less
ambiguous
and
burdensome
United States
Senator Humphrey: Now, speaking of the Middle East, there is the Baghdad Pact there. I was looking at the map the other day as we were listening to some of the preliminary discussions on the
152
Disarmament
present proposal relating to the Middle East, and the only country
which has any immediate geographical relationship to the Soviet Union that is not covered in a security treaty with the United States
is
Iran,
Mr. Morgenthau: Is Iran not covered by security arrangements? Senator Humphrey: Iran may have some kind of a mutual assistance pact
don't recall.
technicalities are really not
Mr. Morgenthau:
very important.
Senator Humphrey: I agree. Mr. Morgenthau: For if war breaks out nobody is going to look up the different treaties and compare one provision with the other.
Everybody
and
if so,
we do
anything,
what?
And
it
will be
done within
I
couple of hours.
is
Senator Humphrey:
that
What
am
getting at
the President
now
we
am
we
already
made
I am confident SEATO is concerned. What I am saying is, there was one country Iran to which I wasn't sure we had made it openly and publicly. What is the need of a unilateral declaration
far as
NATO
is
concerned.
here? Isn't
it
understood that
if
the Soviet
moves
it is
where American
to be
presumed that
we
certain circumstances
it
may
it
be
We
before
Middle East
good measure because of our own policy. So there is a vacuum which has been partly filled by the Soviet Union, as in the case of Egypt and Syria, and I think a demonstration is needed in view of the difficulty that foreign statesmen have in understanding the processes of American policy sometimes Americans have such difficulties, too to say in unmishas disappeared in
we
and that
we
power which
THE OVERRIDING
I
S S
UENUCLEAR
WAR
not directed against
fortunate.
is
in truth
Russian aggression.
in
in
Middle
as to
East,
and
have difficulty
define subversion,
way
why
been done.
think that
agree to do what
is
That
is
to say,
we commit
ourselves to see to
is
it,
if
necessary with
if
be restored in
maintained or
need
154
18
No-
4, 1957,
French governments
national policy.
1956, that "it
. . .
on one
point: re-
When
11,
no longer possible to threaten and brandish weapons [and] any military measures directed against sovereignty and
is
. .
territorial integrity
when
he wrote to
Mollet on the same date that "in the age of atomic weapons, one
must not threaten to use arms or brandish arms," he anticipated Eisenhower's statement of
proud and
cases
trust that
November 1: "I, as your President am you are proud that the United States dein,
draws the
practical conclusion
from
is
these statements
by
establishment
ing them.
which
What
tion
and
Swords
are to be beaten,
true, into
Contemporary Western
easily
tempted
accepting
it
would
necessitate a great
moral and
that
intellectual effort
a result.
war
is
of
its
logic
and assumptions.
,
From Conmientary
June, 1957.
^55
THE OVERRIDING
The new
differs
S S
UENUCLEAR
^W A R
logg-Briand Pact
modern
manifestation. Tradi-
from
its
that
irrational
way
War
won
War
Nobody
17,
has ever
war.
War
is
min Franklin wrote to Josiah Quincy on September good war or a bad peace."
ments against war, especially
lied their protestations.
Nevertheless, while statesm.en paid lip service to the pacifist arguin the interwar period, their actions be-
War
a
continued to be regarded,
as
it
had been
policies.
throughout history,
as
employ-
peaceful
They might
be mistaken
or
if
they
lost the
because the risks they took were not out of proportion to the objectives sought.
mit only
as
By and large, statesmen acted like gamblers who commuch of their resources as they can afford to lose. If they
justifies
if
they
lose,
them
back but not necessarily beyond possible recovefy. Even the Second World War conformed to this pattern: the risks taken were commensurate with the objectives sought. The feasibility of all-out atomic war has completely destroyed this
rational relation
war itself. In the pre-atomic age, it would have been perfectly rational for the United States to go to war in order to liberate the nations of Eastern Europe, provided that
also the material objective of the
among American
national
American power appeared sufficiently strong in power to have a chance of success. In the
atomic age, however, the United States has emphatically ruled out
the use of force to liberate the satellite countries; she was afraid,
rightly or wrongly, that the threat of force in Eastern
Europe might
156
The
Soviet
Union
rean
which cannot be defended against War, both sides refrained from committing, qualitatively and quantitatively, more than a fraction of their resources and from exand thus granted
"privileged sanctuaries" to each other, fearful as each
same Western Euthe Red Army. In the Kohas for the very
was
lest
one
on
function which
is
is
novel at
least in its
in the effectiveness of
lies.
its
primary
function
making
tive
its
by
While
The
inevitability of their
own
this
worth noting
and the
place.
the
be-
The
ability
it
is
will
be noted,
is
political rather
essential
atomic war. As
reality
long
irrelevant
157
At
raise a
most
se-
No
is
only
nor can
it
afford to stand
is
up
to
bound
be
if it
yields to
the bluff, or to
is
existence,
stands
up
not a
bluff.
And
is
the trouble
when
performance
which
it is
which
either the
Union justified in believinCT that the United States will really blow up the world in defense of Western Europe? Was the United States correct in assuming in November, 1956, that the Soviet Union would be willing to blow up the world in defense of Hungary? And would the Soviet Union in November, 1956, really have taken the chance of an all-out atomic war by sendthe Soviet
ing volunteers to the Middle East and attacking Great Britain and
France
in defense of
Egypt?
assumes that no nation will resort to all-out
The philosophy
the negative, for
That
is,
no nation
atomic war;
become "impossible." However, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has pretended to act on that assumption. The United States has refrained from certain actions because she feared the Soviet Union might reply to them with all-out atomic war, and the Soviet Union has threatened certain actions which at least implied the possibility of all-out atomic war. Thus the pacifist confidence of the official pronouncements is belied by the positive or negative concern w4th all-out atomic war rehence, all-out atomic
has really
flected in official actions.
war
The new
cal attitudes of
governments
in so far as all-out
atomic war
is
con-
a satisfactory
answer.
It
employed
atomic
war: deterrence.
The
falls
called conventional
is
sup-
threat-
The
use of force
is
to be prevented
by
graduatd deter-
rence with conventional force likely to operate with the same degree
of reliability that has thus far enabled all-out atomic deterrence to
but
madmen
what are the conventional weapons in the arsenal of the Western powers by which they hope to deter prospective opponents from using conventional force? They are two: a rudimentary conventional military establishment partially armed with tactical atomic weapons and what has been called "moral suasion." The unilateral partial disarmament of the Western nations as regards conventional forces, coupled with their primary reliance upon tactical atomic weapons, casts doubt on the feasibility of graduated deterrence. It does so for two reasons. First of all, tactical atomic weapons are obviously not of the same broad, well-nigh universal applicabiHty as are bullets, shells, and bombs. In street fighting, guerrila
little if
any
avail.
To
all
by
the nation to be
bound
all-
much more
What
tactical
warfare
is still
No
employ such an untried weapon, especially in view of the choices before it should tactical atomic weapons prove to be ineffective. These choices are three, all of them unsatisfactory in different ways. The nation can accept defeat and give up the fight. Or it can continue fighting with non-atomic conventional armed forces, run159
unpreparedness in
this respect.
Or
it
can resort to
it
until in the
end
finds itself
policies
which
all its
were intended to obviate: all-out atomic war. We should not have to remind ourselves, though the prevailing complacency makes it necessary to
do
so, that
by
may
also
be provided
tactical
and
strategic. In other
words, "gradu-
is a two-way street. That under such conditions a nation would follow up its threat with actual atomic warfare, however limited initially, is possible but certainly cannot be taken for granted. Yet, to the degree in which it is not taken for granted by the nation to be deterred, the threat must
lose
its
deterrent effect.
it
The
has let
be
known
which
to the brink
it.
counteracted by retrospec-
someone
is
the brink
bv the official rhetoric of pacifism. Sooner or want to know whether the statesman approaching serious or bluffing, whether he will jump or pull back.
will
Then
by appeasement. Let
us
Germany
1939 on the assumption that Great Britain was bluffing and would
not
fight,
However, the new pacifism claims to provide still another alterwar or appeasement: "moral suasion." Little need be said to show that "moral suasion" is a euphemism for impotence. There are only two ways in which men, acting for their
native to the alternative of
nation, can be dissuaded
from
No man
has ever
60
More
particularly, a statesman
who
it is
backed up by promises or
threats.
as it
The dilemma
con-
the
makes
its
it
West
its
is
own
tendency, created by
new miUtary
policy, to identify
force with atomic force. Yet the use of atomic force, however nar-
the
enormous and
may
The
lemma
nations of the
if
this dies-
non-atomic military
They have
wage non-
one designed
To
say this
is
still
earth cannot afford to protect their interests without running the risk
of universal destruction.
Which
at
is
another
way
all,
is
The
truth
is
demand of their peoples the sacrifices necessary to protect and promote their national interests under the condition of atomic peace. In
a
word: the
deficit
is
political
financial.
With
arm
its
may
well
have passed the point of no return. At the end of the road that the
new
may
indeed
lie
peace, either
total destruction.
i6i
19
Negotiations
sion in the
Union has just made another concesGeneva negotiations on the cessation of atomic tests. It
its
has
ited
dechred
identified
number of
which together
constiis
from
of
course
rife
why
raised
my
spirit
of
spirit
of
Camp David
have always
Union with a sense of reality. A realistic evaluation of the world scene has convinced me since 1955 that if the nuclear armaments race cannot be brought under control before any number of nations will have nuclear weapons,
credited the leaders of the Soviet
The
armaments race
not agree on
this field.
Union canelse in
this,
We
we
fail
here,
we
have in
all
issue
how
and when
we
shall
be doomed.
Is it
on
want
to survive?
Letter to the
New
17, 1960.
162
admit,
is
make things complicated and, hence, unmanageable. But it may well be worthy of some consideration by that unfortunate interdepartmental committee which, for lack of guidance from above, must
hammer out
as best it
this
momentous
issue.
163
PAR
xIV-B
THE RESTORATION OF
FOREIGN POLICY
The Methods
of Foreign Policy
20
relations
International Relations
In
its
nations,
among the autonomous political units which today we call or among individual members of such units. On the collecsuch relations can be
all
tive level,
tural;
political, military,
economic, or cul-
members of
different nations.
Yet when
we
refer to international
human
we
have in mind only those collective or individual relations, transcending national boundaries, which affect the position of nations vis-a-vis
collective
and individual
relations
political position of
is
The term
in this sense
synonym
name
"senate for-
shown throughout
policies,
governments,
cipalities, ecclesiastic
The
consistency of patterns
Thus we are able to understand the international relations of the Greek city-states that Thucydides describes, the international relations of the Indian states of the fourth century B.C. from which
sible.
Kautilya derived his philosophy, the international relations of the ancient near east of
tells, as
well as those of
the
more recent
past.
By
different cultures
and
challenges,
we
1961.
167
to be
power of autonomous
political units.
These
keep one's
prestige.
The
trying
to change
it
at the
expense of
A leads
power which characterizes all international relations. This struggle for power can be fought by two different means: diplomacy and military force. It leads of necessity to the balance of power through which nation A, either alone or in conjunction with other nations
similarly threatened, tries to maintain itself against B.
When A
and
upon a policy of alliances. When nations carry on the struggle for power by military means, they engage in an armaments race or war. When they try to justify and rationalize their positions in the power struggle by reference to universal values, typically of a moral nature,
they develop
political
ideologies.
Continuous
peaceful
contacts
among them
macy.
Throughout the
by
side
with
little
or no contact
among them.
ence.
with others.
Three
ple,
is
distin-
changing alignments.
Its
main
The European
in
War
World War
leonic
1
in 1914,
Wars, conformed to
68
International Relations
The
other
bipolar system
is
characterized
members
is
are
grouped
system
tion of
rigid
and
power between
persists.
Any
marked
tion.
The structure of international relations that emerged from the Second World War exemplifies this pattern. The imperial system consists of one predominant nation with a number of subordinate members clustered around it. The stability of
such
a
system
is
great,
it
tend to be marginal.
Its
by the disintegration of the predominant member, the rise of a number of subordinate members to a position from which they can challenge the predominant one, or by a challenge from outside the system. The system of international relations dominated by the Roman empire is the classic example of this pattern. International relations have undergone in modern times four drasexistence can be threatened
tic
possibility
and actuality of
While the
first
we
have
known them
last
The
nents
expansion of the European state system into the other conticolonial empires, starting early in the sixteenth
by means of
century, broke
down
They were
all
state system,
and through
it
name
to the
number of
169
The
a
last
phase of
this
the First
a radical
World War
change
with
in the distribution of
From
World War
power
now two
Union have
taken
its
place.
as the political
may
owed
ally
virtu-
consummated
Second World
War
of European nations, one after the other, have gained their national
independence, and
cal
many
The
two
eman-
The
such
decline of
Europe
resulting
from the
rise to
The
Europe as the political center two world wars of the twentieth century. At they weakened the main European nations in their
non-European
human and
the First
World War,
Union
in
con-
170
International Relations
differed
Western world
in
modern
times.
Most
to
of the latter were limited wars in that only a fraction of the total
human and
was committed
with these wars and suffered from them, and each war was waged
The two world wars, and those for which the most powerful nations have continued to prepare, were total in all these four respects. The actuality and threat of total war have been, indeed, the most important distinctive characteristics of
only for limited objectives.
international relations in the mid-twentieth century.
power
sulted
The accumulation
of
power has
re-
from
and tech-
nological
power
nationalism.
period, with the exception of the wars of
leonic
no
combination of
states
its
gain
more than
adversaries.
The
drastic
reduction in the
centration
number of sovereign states and the of power in the hands of a few nations of
resulting con-
the
first
rank,
War
and the
total
The treaty of Westphalia of 1648, for instance, reduced the number of sovereign states of which the German empire was composed from 900 to 355. The diet of Regensburg of 1803 eliminated 200 more. When the German confederation was founded in 1815, only 36 sovereign states were left to join it. The unification of Italy in 1861 and that of Germany in 1871 eliminated 31 additional sovereign states.
At
the
Wars
first
fol-
lowed toward the end of the century by Japan. At the beginning of the First World War in 1914, eight nations were of the first rank,
with Germany having replaced Prussia. After the First World
the trend toward reduction of the
reversed; their
War
number of sovereign states was number almost doubled because the Ottoman, Austroand French empires were broken up. Yet the
continued.
Hungarian,
British,
states
At
Second World
War
the
number of
nations of the
first
of threatening each other with total war are also most advanced
technologically and industrially.
The mechanization
of warfare in
terms of weapons, supplies, transportation, and communications requires, in case of actual hostilities, the virtually total
in
economic produc-
brought about by
a series
By
riods of history,
had
little was left for Thus premodern technology could support only limited war, while modern industry is productive enough to allow the commitment of the lion's share of its products for military purposes. One incentive for the great nations to use this enormous productive power for the purposes of mutual destruction was provided by a change in international relations which can be called the disap-
The
in
from the end of the middle good measure due to the opwith each other
172
International Relations
all
all
weak or empty
nations.
formed
European
From
then on,
as the
the the
and they
These
stakes have
become
total,
the belligerents with total destruction, but also in that the issue over
fight has
become
total.
That
of
issue
is
no
philosophy and
way
life,
which
common
mon way
gle for
of
life,
which imposed
effective limitations
upon the
strug-
a universal
dominion to
all
man-
and each
identified
left in
the world.
ized
come
to be character-
on
by
a struggle
The proponents
life,
of the
two
antagonistic phi-
ways of
eign aid and foreign trade, have endeavored to gain the allegiance of uncommitted nations.
By
and ways of
are at stake.
While
and on
limited scale, especially in periods of religious conflicts and wars, international relations after the First
recorded
Throughout history, there has existed a rational relationship between the threat and use of military force and the ends of foreign
173
was
whether
it
could
achieve
its
it
whether
Yet
all
belligerents
and thus to
is
No
possible
end can
justify
it; it
two interconnected
first
dilemmas upon the solution of which depends the survival of Western civilization and perhaps of mankind
sists
itself.
The
dilemma con-
in the contrast
with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities.
in the contrast
consists
their interests
by
resort to violence
If a nation
own
destruction,
how
can
it
support
its
interests in a
world of sovereign
nations
which is ruled by violence as the last resort? These two dilemmas put into question the very survival of the existing system of international relations. The first dilemma suggests a
higher principle of international organization, transcending the nation-state, in the
form
European communi-
threats to peace
and
of regional resources.
world
state
monopoly of
However
inarticulate
and sub-
International Relations
merged,
this
by the
threat of
also sup-
all
form,
been great-
by
all
175
21
Alliances
Alliances are a necessary function of the balance
A and
B,
in maintaining
and
power
positions.
They can
increase their
own
adversary.
When
race.
own power the power of other power of other nations from the first choice, they embark upon an
armaments
tives,
When
a
they pursue
policy of alliances.
is,
Whether
ances
if it
then,
alli-
own
unaided
is
from entering
from
concluding an alliance with each other even though, from the proc-
Monroe Doctrine
they were
bor
in 1941,
pean nations,
It
occurs
when
form of
a treaty
of alliance
appears to be redundant.
States have
war
in 1914
and 1939
European balance of
From
176
Confiiie?ice,
Winter, 1958.
Alliances
first
con-
Had
by a formal treaty of alliance in 1914 and 1939, it might have declared war earlier, but its general policies and concrete actions would not have been materially different than they actually were. Not every community of interests calling for common policies
and actions
foundation.
also calls for legal codification in
an explicit
alliance.
On
community of
Under what
commu-
What
to
An
The
interests nations
have in com-
mon
objectives,
and appropriate
policies as has
Nor
and limitation
prospective
common enemy,
directed
group
of nations, the
enemy
his
of the Anglo-
American community of
interests
who
at the time, so
during the
Wars Great
Britain
and the
who
posed
at the
moment
mind
by the func-
which
is
whoever he may
be.
The
typical interests
as
centuries,
Glancing through the treaties of alliance of the seventeenth and eighteenth one is struck by the meticulous precision with which obligations to furnish troops, equipment, logistic support, food, money, and the like were
defined.
177
N E W O F FOREIGN POLICY
was opposed to Germany and Russia was opposed to Austria, while Austria was allied with Germany against France and Russia. How
could the interests of France and Russia be brought to a
denominator, determining policy and guiding action?
in other
common
could,
How
foe would
know what
alliances of 1894
Had
and
policies of
Anglo-American co-operation
necessary.
in
Europe, no alliance
as indeter-
treaty
Had
the
enemy been
feasible.
when
the
common
terms
required to
make them
ing them and the policies serving them, can be distinguished in five
different ways: according to their iritrinsic nature-
and relationship,
common
policies
and ac-
consequence,
we
and
policies.
We
can fur-
The Anglo-American
classic
alliance
and Pakistan
is
one of
serves primarily
words for
178
Alliances
the purpose of increasing her political, military, and economic potential vis-a-vis
her neighbors.
The pure type of an ideological alliance is presented by the Treaty Holy Alliance of 1815 and the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Both documents laid down general moral principles to which the signaof the
tories
realiza-
Much more
typical
is
the ad-
commitments
and the
same treaty of
sia in
alliance.^
Thus
among
Austria,
at the
sized the solidarity of the three monarchies against republican subversion. In our times, the ideological
commitment
Commua similar
performs
function.
The
interests.
The conception
of the
Anglo-American
alliance,
common
Egypt
in
1956, as all-inclusive
common
and
As concerns the
upon an
stillborn;
must be
distinguished.
purely ideologi-
cannot but be
none.
The
ideological factor,
interests,
when
it is
munity of
also
support.
It
weaken it by obscuring the nature and limits of the common which the alliance was supposed to make precise and by raising expectations, bound to be disappointed, concerning the extent
interests
last possibilities,
the
Anglo-American
alliance
as
ideal
is
most
ought to be pointed out that both the Holy Alliance and the Atlantic Charter actually supplement material commitments contained in separate legal
instrtiments.
179
responding to
The
one-sidedness, in
which one party receives while the other bears the main bulk of
is
the preservation
an alliance
is
indistinguishable
from
a treaty of guarantee.
easily to this
Compleand their
mentary
most
kind of dispro-
by
is
comparative assessment
pretation.
by
subjective inter-
The
distribution of benefits
and determination of
policies
is
thus
power within an alliance. It is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak nations against making alliances with strong ones except by necessity.* However, this correlation between benefits, policies, and power is by no means inevitable. A weak nation may well possess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable. Here the unique
likely to reflect the distribution of
is
may
give
it
a status
within the alliance completely out of keeping with the actual distribution of material power.
States
The
relationships
can serve
as examples.
The
before,
misinterpretation of the
is
both with regard to the waging of the war and the peace
set-
tlement.
On
signatories.
specific points.
common
policies
and
measures.
4
Some
The
80
Alliances
others
still
Whether and for how long depends upon the strength of the
value and the chances of an
alli-
underlying
it
as
The
ance,
however limited
in scope,
which
it is
expected to operate.
The
overriding
common
interest in
winning
war and securing through the peace settlement the interests for which the war was waged is bound to yield, once victory is won and
the peace treaties are signed, to the traditionally separate and fre-
On
the
interests
it
serves, for
only
such a
enough to probetween
The
alliance
Great Britain and Portugal, concluded in 1703, has survived the centuries because Portugal's interest in the protection of her ports
by
the British fleet and the British interest in the control of the Atlantic
it
can be stated
as a
gen-
twenty
been more
common interests which they were intended to serve. The dependence of alliances upon the underlying community
interests also
of
in-
members must
Many
alliances
community of
interests did
The Franco-Russian
The
i8i
W O F FOREIGN
POLICY
alliances.
Western
alliances outside
The
vital interest
nations of
Western Europe
this
identical
The
Atlantic alUance
1956,
is
beset
by
did
a crisis
not create.
The conjunction
of these factors
and military
alli-
no longer
as close
nor
as
obvious
as
it
used to be.
The atomic
monopoly of the United States provided the nations of Western Europe with absolute protection against Russian conquest. With the Soviet Union having become an atomic power equal, if not superior,
to the United States, the Atlantic alliance
is
no longer
solely a pro-
also
become
The atomic
two super-
powers but
it
may
power
has
drastically
alliance.
The
if
Soviet
Union has
Western
chance for
it
man
in the street in
to understand, that
there
is
Western Europe
may
in not
all,
at
Thus
had a
Communist propaganda, or of
Alliances
new objective conditions under which the nations must live in the age of the atomic stalemate. Western Europe of Secondly, the economic recovery of the nations of Western Europe has greatly diminished their dependence upon the United
heart, but of the
States.
Steel
Common Marstill
ket,
likely to decrease
in
it still
no longer
a question of at least
and death,
as it
They can
own
feet again
ment
for
new
These factors
alliance
West Germany's
strengthened
by
is
been presented to
official
The Western alliance has West Germany, both by American and German
as
spokesmen,
which
unification
of confidence which
is
likely to
deepen
The
ever
from being supported as the instrument of more loudly and widely blamed as the main
has been eager to use these
obstacle to
The
tary,
Soviet
Union
new
political, mili-
Europe
"new look"
of Soviet
foreign policy
place of the
threats,
is
essentially a
new
flexibility
monotony of
was
had any
The new
the occasion seems to require, but always seeks to hold before the
much
of
its
urgency and
vitality.
no longer
feel that
common
and sometimes
common
interests of
the alliance.
They have
it.
also
begun
their lack of
fluenced
tary,
by
The
rise
of
Germany
the
new
As viewed from
lantic alliance
is
undergoing
a subtle
change,
which
in the
end
bound
to be drastic.
States, the
its
Atlantic alliance
this
interest
is
new technology
of warfare.
As long
atomic
bomb
delivered
by
United
nations of
ing them.
To
attack, the
will
American mihtary
Western Europe
further
when some
on
a
of the nations of
atomic
installations of their
own.
When
this
new
munity of
Britain
interests like that which tied the United States to Great from 1823 to 1941. However, the interests of the United States and the nations of Western Europe are not limited to that continent. Those of the
is
en-
gaged
in Africa.
And whatever
the
community
The coincidence
pean
interests has
had a strengthening or
might
184
be, eifect
alliance itself;
and the
vital inter-
Alliances
est of all
members of
The United
lutions
which
are
directed
primarily
against
France, has been continuously confronted with a painful and inherently insoluble dilemma.
est
The horns
allies
and France
her principal
interest in pre-
communism.
its
If the
did in Indochina,
its
it
may
strengthen
European
allies,
and Africa.
If the
United States
sides
as it did in the
crisis
United Nait
of autumn, 1956,
the other respect, the United States has inevitably been reduced to
straddling the fence
by
al-
Cyprus exemplify
no
at present the
dilemma and
evasion. In such situations, then, the Atlantic alliance does not opall,
erate at
its
common
interests
operation.
That such divergencies of interest and policy have not imposed greater stresses upon the Atlantic alliance and have left it essentially
unimpaired
testifies to its
The common
have thus far prevailed over the divergent ones only because
members of
common
But
grown
weaker.
If this
would indeed
alliance.
Common
Yet upon
rock on which
all
this
rock
all
kinds of structures
may
alliances:
It is in this latter
respect
the
crisis
date that
November, 1956, has made obvious defects which antecrisis. Three such defects have continuously and to an ever
of
of
by some of
its
leading statesmen.
The common
interest of the
members of the
Atlantic alliance in
its
organiza-
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The which underlies NATO is the assumption that the European members of the Atlantic alliance are able to defend themselves through a co-operative effort against a military attack by
strategic conception
NATO
NATO
Is
are agreed
upon
But
how
is
this
purpose to be achieved?
-primary reliance
to be placed
upon atomic
aggressor
to
NATO
is
be
deterred
of
by
the
inherent
military
The members
on
this
More
NATO
sistently at variance
members
for
and the
drastic
number of
is
Alliances
itself conducive to political disunity and day-by-day operations, has been magnified by the elab-
which
is
NATO into
friction
practice.
states,
cir-
much
too ambitious
NATO.
source of weak-
Since an alliance, in
its
day-by-day operations,
rests in
good measits
leading
shown
itself
deficient.
is
its allies, as
War,
upon
factors are in
In foreign policy
it is
But to keep
bound to erode the foundations of confidence upon which an alliance must rest. The allies of the United
allies
guessing
of our leaders and the actual policies pursued, which appear to them
to have evolved into a consistent pattern of unreliability.
loss
not
of America's principal
allies.
For the
vital interests
of the United
is
States
and her
allies
to coincide in
vital interests
allies
elsewhere
quite another.
To
the
former, the
'w
allies
ith relative
them
187
worth
in the affirmative
the
vitality-
by
cies of their
own
one or the other of the superpowers. Thus, under the dramatic impact of the experience which saw the interests and
allies
power of our
destroyed in
them from an
association of like-
minded nations
into a
As
among
their
of interests.
As concerns
day-by-day
relations,
we must
also think in
terms of personalities.
We
say that the United States and Great Britain have agreed on a
certain policy, but tend to forget that Great Britain and the United
States are abstractions
and that
and Secre-
tary of State of the United States and the Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, speaking in the
their respective nations,
name of
The smooth
depends
in
good measure
upon the maintenance of trust and respect among its principal statesmen. There is no grainsayino- the fact that the' absence of such relations has become a great handicap in the day-by-day operations
of the Atlantic alliance. Regardless of the objective merits of the
case, there
allies
thority of the President of the United States they had in times past,
have increased the strains under which the Atlantic alliance operates
at present.
Our
strain.
reactions,
similarly negative,
The
instability of
Eden
Cyprus and Algeria, the failure of their intervention in Egypt, all have produced some doubt regarding both the power of our principal allies
i88
Alliances
The
on both
made
is.
it
smoother and
also
it
actually
It is
is
common
crisis
interests,
of
the great
of
November,
all
1956, has
done to
more
limits
consider-
able strength.
identical interests,
While the Atlantic alliance reposes upon the firm foundation of no such general and reassuring statement can be made about the Western alliances outside Europe. Considering Asia and the Middle East, it can be said that of the American alliances
only those with Formosa, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Japan
are based
upon
identical interests.
their
These
nations,
of Japan,
owe
very existence
and
power of
not
all,
of these nations
States.
policies at variance
Thus
upon
identical interests
Our
first
alliance
with Japan,
like that
World War,
upon
can power. Yet neither foundation can be any longer taken for
granted. Three factors have combined to restore Japan's freedom
of choice.
First,
still
would be the
nomic and
on Japan
as
on Western Eu-
become
not a
liability. Finally, to
Stalinist
War
policies
is
replaced
by
new
flexi-
bility
which
and Japanese
interests,
Japan
may
States.
The
type.
SEATO
They have
three characteristics in
common: complementary
interests tending
toward
on the face of them, were conceived in terms of common action on behalf of common interests. However, in view of
These
alliances,
is.
Communist
to
upon
act in
common, commitment
common
bers, this
alliance;
distilled
commitment. Of the Asian memcommitment requires nothing more than membership in the
requires
at
it
no
common
it
anticommunism
home and
The
States.
Many
treasury,
political
However
membership
and measures
it
bears
a unilateral burden.
The United
States
is
allies,
Their foreign
policies,
if
be more different
In
common
SEATO
with membership
United Nations.
West wants the maximum number of Asian allies and the Asian allies want the maximum amount of Western support, the interests of the two parties can be said to complement each other.
In so far as the
190
Alliances
bound to disintegrate whenever a latent contwo allies or an ally and another nation becomes acute. The conflicts between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, between Great Britain and Greece, and Turkey and Greece, over Cyprus, and between Iraq and Israel are cases in point. It is only because these alliances limit a commitment to common action to the very unlikely event of Communist aggression that they have
This compatibility
is
flict
of interests between
The United
States, in particular,
is
else to
interests to
alliance, as
Thus, by virtue of
alliance, the
armed strength of Pakistan and thereby forces India to expenditures for armaments from thirty million pounds
in 1955 to
engages, as
left
it
itself
alliance,
aiding India
by
virtue of
its vital
interests.
Western Hemisphere, appearances are deceptive. As long as the supremacy of the United States within the Western Hemisphere provided unchallengeable protection for the independence of the American nations, these alli-
As
among
ances could indeed be taken for granted. For the United States, these
alliances
its
unchallenge-
able
oceans,
by
non-American
nation acting in concert with an American one. For the other Ameri-
power domination since the United States would use its superior power only for the protection and not for the subversion of their
national independence.
implement
can
state
this day.
it
have provided the rationale and lifeblood of the Ameriintercontinental guided missile confronts this system
191
The
unchallengeable
as ever from within, is weapons of tomorrow. The United States can no more protect its American allies against these weapons than it can protect itself. The
American
view
cal
lies
allies will
come
to
view the
alliance
and Japan
already.
They may no
to,
may
While
may
The Communist
alliances
which
alliances of the Soviet Union and North Korea and North Vietnam, on the other; the alliances between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe; the alliances of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, with China, Egypt, Syria, and probably Yemen, on the other. The position of North Korea and North Vietnam within the Communist alliances is identical in the particulars which interest us here with the position of South Korea and South Vietnam within their alliances with the United States. There is complete identity
The
alliances
Warsaw
class
by
is
themselves. Thev^ are not true alliances in that they do not transform
a pre-existing
community of
It
community of
interests
is
irrelevant
for their existence and operation and that they are founded on noth-
Power
is
here not
superimposed upon
common
interests
tions subjected to
modern version of protectorates, and the nathem are correctly called satellites rather than allies.
it
The
by the development of a community of interests between the Soviet Union and certain satellites, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, resultino- from the emergence of Ger192
might well be
Alliances
many
as the
predominant power
have had to seek protection either from one neighbor against the
other or from Western Europe against both. Their present relationship to the Soviet
Union provides
this protection.
Given
change in
function might
While
this
development
is
of an
atomic stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union
has loosened the ties of the satellite relationship.
tual
threat of
mu-
vation in the form of neutralism and the aspirations for national inde-
These
latent
dormant under the yoke of the Red Army. tendencies were brought to the fore by the "new
lain
Stalin. In
response to
Hd
They
rehabilitated
who had
in-
measure of national
and
At
Union
paramountcy of
interests
by
the supremacy of
power.
The
Soviet
community of
a
interests
between the
is
common
They
Chi-
Communist and
politi-
The
alliances
complementary
interests.
The Middle
by
Eastern
Union
are enabled
with
regard to
Israel,
Turkey,
a state
of
tension
in
still
which keeps the Western nations engaged and handicapped another region and threatens them with economic stress.
as
it
emerges
analysis,
one
is
The
seemingly irreversible
war
era has
been arrested,
if
not reversed.
The uncommitted
the other hand,
nations
not only want to remain uncommitted but also have, with a few
exceptions,
shown
On
many
of
which are committed as allies of one or the other of the superpowers would like to join the ranks of the uncommitted nations but have, with the exception of Yugoslavia, been
so.
unable to do
They have
at best
which they belong. In consequence, the twobloc system is in the process of loosening but not of breaking up. The satellites may become even more unwilling and unreliable
confines of the blocs to
which
is
And
The weakening
The
fate that
its
may
is
simi-
larly not
The common
communism,
from within or an aggresive one from without, and the common dedication to the values of Western civili194
Alliances
common
inabil-
alliance intact.
The demonstrated
this out-
ward
The
real
danger
lies
in this
an empty
shell,
drained of
its vitality.
in-
Holy
words of Chief Justice Marshall, "a solemn mockery," without any longer being capable of directing the interests of men into the channels of common policies and actions. The danger with which the German situation threatens the Atlantic alliance is, however, far more serious. The tension between
the
German commitment
goal of unification,
inevitably raises in
mitment and
this
to the Atlantic alliance and the national which can be achieved only on Russian terms, German minds the question of whether that comobjective are truly compatible and whether the
in
latter.
This
The danger
of
German
then, raises in specific terms the general issue of the merits of our
alliance policy
Our
alliance
legalistic,
and
policy.
These
in a
new
on
among them
in
view
have
we
alliances:
document declaring their support for our policies, the better. While once we were, on principle, against all "entangling alliances," now we are, again on principle,
nations to sign a legal
in favor of all alliances.
more
N E AV O F FOREIGN POLICY
advantages actual or illusory has tended
allies
upon
their military
have turned
withor,
at
weak members
of
it,
of the alliance,
to get out
their,
policies,
and economic
cost.
This tendency to see intrinsic merit in any alliance has been most
pronounced
tation
in Asia.
SEATO,
by the United
States to join,
mem-
by the United States in view of its but by the other members in view of theirs. Nor has the
and
liabilities
which except
political rather
than military.
SEATO
in that
it
is
from the
mili-
NATO,
on the other
may
by
when
it
NATO was
cre-
may
the obvious identity of interests between the United States and the
nations of
Western Europe could not have been adequately served guarantee on the part of the United States, fashioned after the model of the Monroe Doctrine. While the very existence of NATO has made this question obviously academic, the rationale
by
a unilateral
underlying
useless
it
could
still
is
in
NATO
is
useful,
essential,
problem
world
facing a nation
is
primarily military,
not to be mastered by
is
Europe and
is
in certain
the task
political,
196
Alliances
and imagination,
is
be
useless, if
not
political alleits
policy of alliances, in
its
doc-
upon
legalistic
concern with
which
may
is
temporarily conceal.
What
it
off
the failure
punishment
197
22
Diplomacy
The
traditional
methods of diplomacy have been under continuous attack since the First World War and have to a considerable extent been discarded in practice since the end of the Second World War. Three main arguments have been directed
against them. First, they have been held responsible for the political
catastrophes
so;
which have
befallen
mankind
must be
re-
as-
sumption that democracy makes for peace and autocracy, for war
it has been concluded that diplomacy must be "open," that
is,
ex-
all its
horse-trading,
themselves
traditional
diplomacy
arise
from the
basic
changed
at will.
In
evil or, for that matter, wise and good men even though they have certainly been used and abused by such men but have grown ineluctably from the objective nature of
things political. In their essence, they are the reflections of that objective nature, to be disregarded only at the risk of political failure.
in political relations
we
methods of diplomacy.
a family,
And
it
two
busi-
On
all
levels of
From The
iq8
Diplomacy
No
negotia-
of a piece of property,
tional treaty can
be carried out
common
parties.
methods of diplo-
which
must
constitute the
whole
these practices per se but, at worst, to their incorrect use. This logical
deduction
is
World
it
War
ing,
While
is
would be far-fetched
times,
it
diplomacy
re-
sponsible for the catastrophes that have befallen the world in recent
in-
outgrowth of
a deep-seated dis-
Both the arguments that democracy means peace and that diplomacy is immoral and therefore undemocratic have grown from an
intellectual attitude hostile to the
as
an
They assume
that the
domestic institutions
it
phy
to
which
it
that assumption.
The
powers and,
as
in
good
As
far
back
Our
experi-
ence of
total wars,
waged by democracies
199
diplomacy
is
particularly
one can escape from the moral dilemmas of foreign policy by forswearing foreign policy
is
itself.
At
politics
caping foreign policy altogether. Both philosophic analysis and historic experience
raises are
show
moral problem of
Taking
politics
is
man
What
human
is
situation in
identical
on
all
levels of
human
is,
under which
There
its
then,
politics,
domestic or international;
we
down
by changing not its substance but the social environment within which it is bound to arise in one form or another. It is not by accident that those who have tried to do more have taken a negative attitude toward foreign policy; for in the traditional methods of diplomacy
sharp edges and to mitigate
practical consequences
politi-
and moral
liabilities
of foreign policy
is
itself.
Opposition to
methods of
di-
plomacy
at best superfluous
itself.
re-
itself in
up the
Diplomacy
tional
again,
we
other, a
bilities
methods of diplomacy and some other way of dealing with each way that somehow leads to freedom from the risks and liaof foreign policy. In truth, of course, the procedures of the
as
United Nations,
ization,
do not
differ in substance
from the
traditional practices of
latter
is
diplomacy.
What
distinguishes the
nothing
but the social setting and the legal requirements which influence the
way
in
which the
traditional business of
diplomacy
is
carried
on
tween which nations must choose. Rather, they supplement each other, serving identical purposes and partaking of the same qualities and characteristics. The secretary-general of the United Nations, in his Annual Report on the Work of the Organization for July 1,
1954 through June IS, 1955, has called attention to
in these
this relationship
words:
Nations
have only begun to make use of the real possibilities of the United as the most representative instrument for the relaxation of tensions, for the lessening of distrust and misunderstanding, and for the discovery
We
and delineation of new areas of common ground and interest. Conference diplomacy may usefully be supplemented by more quiet diplomacy within the United Nations, whether directly between representatives of
.
.
Member
States, the
and
pal organ of the United Nations for the purpose of upholding and serving
the international interest all these can provide help not to be found else-
where,
if they are rightly applied and used. Within the framework of the Charter there
are
many
is
possibilities, as
yet
progress can be
contact,
tion.
made
in the
coming years
in
my
of deliberation and
new
that have occurred outside the United Nations could often be fitted into
its
framework, thus
at the
20I
these considerations
we
per-
nation, existing as
it
does
as
an equal
among
other
in
and
own importance for them and retreat into the impotence of isolation. Or it can deny the equality of the other nations and try to impose its own will upon them by force of arms. In either case, at
least in its pure,
extreme realization,
a nation
with diplomacy.
tive contact
Or
nation can
want
to pursue
interests in ac-
and on the
basis of equality
cannot do without
it is
facts
of
all societies,
Diplomacy
in
all its
the
technique of accommodating such conflicting interests. That technique proceeds in two stages: the ascertainment of the facts of conflict
Nation
interests of
in conflict.
Both na-
tions
it?
want
How
They have
may
lead
them
what
vital to itself
its
endangering
intrinsic
issue,
interests or
diplomatic accommodation
impossible.
When
Francis
of of
why
he always
made war
against Charles
we
both want
As long
as
war over
by allowing
202
DiploTnacy
time to take the sting out of their conflicts. Yet in such cases
it is
to
must go.
itself
Nation
tion
A may
is
which
For
Union
Germany from
joining the
Western
in
alliance,
preventing such a
the Soviet
bloc.
Taken by
the im-
which
German
to the interests
unification of
this, it is
would form an organic part, satisfactory of both sides which could not be reconciled to the
settlement
Germany
as
make them
compatible.
is,
as it
yields in pracis
typically
this
seeks an objective
which nation B
all
either
way
of negotiations.
The
power
avail-
The same
ment of
conflicts
among
203
common
performs
its
classic
common
purpose
two nations, diplomacy must create out of the conflicting interests a community of interests, a compromise, which cannot satisfy all parties completely but with which no party will be completely dissatisfied. When the representatives of two nations meet to negotiate a treaty, say, of commerce or alliance, they must discover and make precise an already existing community of interests. This community of interests, before it is crystallized in legal stipulations, is amorphous and inchoate, obscured and distorted by seeming and real conflicts.
It
is
community of
mentioned
and to express
it
in
need only be
identical
function of diplomacy
with
on
all
ditional
vital
importance to
nation
interests successfully
and peaceably.
A
is
nation
of ne-
interests or to pursue
them by
among
Which one
was
a priori
of these
a matter of
on
rational
grounds.
Modern technology,
form of
all-out
atomic war,
re-
in renunciation
or in victory in war.
From
World War
were com-
mensurate with the advantages to be expected. Nations would misit was never rationally War, in particular, was a rational means to a rational end; victory would justify the risks and losses incurred, and the consequences of defeat were not from the outset out of all proportion to the gains to be expected from victory.
204
DiploTnacy
The
possibility of all-out
relationships.
When
war
universal destruction
defeat alike,
itself is
no longer
becomes an instrument of
interests short of all-out
suicidal despair.
The
pursuit of a nation's
preservation.
atomic war, then, becomes a matter of selfEven on the assumption at present a moot one that
still
risk of
such
all-out
atomic
war
gives, at the
of a nation's interests
we
is
know,
spells
As
all-
A nation which
under
to
The
receive
vital
from the
first
atomic war
is
underlined by
well
the
more
specific political
developments which
as
may
mark
the
end of the
postwar decade
the beginning of a
new
era in in-
ternational relations.
The
first
World
War
was characterized on the international scene by three basic political phenomena: the bipolarity of international politics, the tendency of this bipolar political system to transform itself into a twobloc system, and the policy of containment. These three basic facts combined in minimizing the traditional methods of diplomacy, both
as a
able.
effective
power
was concentrated
in
two power
power. Whatever they might have preferred had they been free to
choose. Great Britain and France, Poland and China had to lean
upon one or the other of the superpowers for political, military, and economic support. Such countries could not have remained neutral,
let
sides
is
very
best, to
advance
it
power
which
made
sides
to a policy of containment
for
all
advancement
at the
expense of the
other side while at the same time preventing the other side from
advancing.
Such
a situation of
little
two power blocs or between them. The inner coherence of the two blocs resulted primarily from the ineluctable necessity which made their members
use of diplomatic methods
either within the
seek shelter under the roof of one or the other of the superpowers.
During
other,
on the
who
would dare
little
was very
interests.
The
by was
relations
less clearly
defined
The
main
in the
The
services
this policy of
tra-
war.
It
could announce
War
macy
war waged against the enemy, not for the purpose of accommodating conflicting interests, but for the triumph, however verbal, of one nation over the other. Thus it is not by accident that during the first decade following the Second
into a
mere
auxiliary of a
World War
206
Diplomacy
between East and West and that the moves carried on under the labels and with the personnel of diplomacy at the many East- West conferences and within the United Nato operate in the relations
tions served purposes not only far
dia-
being re-
by an
blocs a
marked by greater flexibility within the two power tendency toward the loosening of their inner coherence if
era
flexi-
as well.
To
are
this
new
era the
War
As
War
new
era of
of these practices.
Four
this
change
in interna-
of
Germany
status; the
power among
great powers; finally, the spread and sharpening of the colonial revolutions in Asia, Africa,
Viewed from
these
new
oly nor extreme dependence upon American support can any longer
method of fashioning
interests out of the
a legally
and
politically viable
community
of
ill-
one that
exists objectively in
an inchoate and
defined form.
Germany and
West
tor's dispositions,
Thus the
United States
at the
moment
The
possibility of
its
The new
made
its
restoration
208
23
The
Qualifications of an
I
Ambassador
made
at his press
conference of August
I
6,
1957.
am
elated because
if
anybody who
public service"
qualified to be an
American
who
so qualify.
Napoleon
one of
baton
say
in his knapsack. If
now
spats
am
also depressed
have tried
to impress
upon
are.
my
I
how
ambassador
he must
How
profound
And how
must
know, and do, like Richelieu, Callieres, Mably, John Quincy Adams, Cambon, Jusserand, Harold Nicolson, and many
be,
who men
stood in
awe
of
what an ambassador
others.
Mr. Dulles'
own
grandfather, John
W.
a Senate
"no man can pass from other pursuits directly into the
take Mr. Dulles
need to
tell
my
13,
students
1957,
now
is:
"Boys,
New
August
1
6,
1957.
John
W.
Foster,
The
209
laid
down
principle
which
is
all
men
by doing
done great harm to the morale of the Foreign Service and to the
public understanding of foreign policy. For he has given authoritative
support to those
a
still
which have
have
in-
proven to be such
American foreign
policy, his
own
included. Citizens
who
may
it is,
well
is
a fleeting forensic
triumph,
if
such
not too highly paid for by the lasting damage done to the
interests of the
issue of
tween Senator
lat-
The
first issue is
is
qualifications, to
amounts
to.
Within
and
in
so far as
it
affects positions of
system
may
be tolerated
mocracy.
When
vital
as a
it becomes indeed intolerable, for the bound to operate in an utterly haphazard fashion, since the considerations which determine the appointment have no bearing upon the qualifications necessary for the successful discharge of the
system
official duties.
The The
2IO
it
The
Mr. Gluck not only
affairs
is
Qualifications of an A?nbassador
foreign policy
is all
is
about
as
know
nothing).
While I am confident that he will learn how name of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, I doubt know what an ambassador is supposed to do.
pronounce the
The most
serious issue of
all,
however,
is
ence of the Senate, with the exception of Senator Fulbright, not only to the nefarious results of the system in general, but also to the
demerits of this particular appointment.
Of
the fifteen
members of
Gluck was
against confirmation.
The plenum
appointment of
one can shrug
it
as a
the
postmaster
is
it
off in
and
general
who commands
World, and
survival of the
what an ambassador
icy,
is
experience
Ambassador
and
in
complete innocence, he
is
bound
most
to
do
a great deal of
harm.
This
brilliant sons to
Washington,
deserves better than that and must resent the implicit slight.
When we
very
folly
by
is
the Senate
much
interested.
Would
it
Senate to interest
itself in
either
propaganda or foreign
aid?
it is
represented in
galaxy of ex-
What
can
212
tasks
America
and only
now
new
circumstances of
the hour; to revise the pattern of foreign policy which was established in 1947 in the
which confronts us today on the from that which existed immediately after the Second World War and which persisted approximately for a decade? Four fundamental changes have occurred. First of all, the balance of military power had radically changed. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States was
In
respects
is
what
the situation
um-
implementing the policy of containment. The atomic moa virtually absolute protection
which
felt
themselves threatened
by Communist
ag-
been replaced by an
able to destroy
to say, the
United States
is
is
United States
States as an
is
allies
of the United
unmixed
provides
a certain protection,
but
it
upon
to
come
destruction?
seal the
And would not such aid, even if it doom of the ally, since it would in all
//
213
by
the
enemy? The
own,
move away from the United States into a neutral, more detached, position. The second great transformation which has occurred
to
cal
or at least a
in the politi-
world
in recent years
is
ern Europe. Fifteen and even ten years ago, the alliance with the
as Italy,
independent national
and would
have been
in great
economic
and
obvious.
field; it
has
become
we
have seen,
its
Union has fundamentally changed. Ten years ^go, the greatest upon which the foreign policies of the nations of the Atlantic community could bank was the foreign policy of Stalin. Whenever there was a slackenino- in the Western effort, whenever there apviet
asset
alliance, Stalin
could be
to every-
a drastic
American connec-
The
ture.
is
His
Even the Berlin threat is which Stalin would have uttered under similar circumstances or would even have followed up by action, as he did in the case of the Berlin blockade in 1948. Khruaggression or of direct military threats.
quite different
from the
threats
much
at the
conquest of territories
214
The
threats as at the subversion of the
New Atlantic
Community
through the impact which the power and the technological and eco-
nomic accomplishments of the Soviet Union make upon that world. This is obviously a much more insidious and subtle way of undermining the Western position than were Stalin's crude challenges. To these three fundamental changes which have occurred in the world during the last ten years must be added a fourth one, the rise of the former colonial nations in Africa and Asia, These enormous masses of land and populations are no longer under the control of any of the great powers but they will have to seek the support of
stronger nations and to fashion their poHtical, economic, and social
life in
prize in the
Whoever can
his
will in
all
whoever can impress them form of government, of his probability win the struggle
in-
community
faces.
The
crisis
of
community
and,
more
particularly, of
American foreign
policy
lies
in the
eign policy has been the success of the original policy of contain-
ment. That
is
which
static,
has been
widely criticized
only been sound
viet
has not
as a
Union and of communism being the very minimum which American foreign policy had to be committed it
eminently successful.
It
was
American
States to
The United
in
work
It
215
work
as well. It
could not
work
simple reason
which the United States had to meet in Asia was essentially different from the threat with which it was faced in Europe. The threat in Europe was primarily the threat of military aggression. It was constituted by the fact that the Russian armies stood in the heart of Europe one hundred miles east of the Rhine. It is this stark fact which still constitutes the major threat to Europe today, and against this threat Europe has to be protected. The primary threat outside Europe, that is, to Asia, to the Middle
that the threat
East,
and
is
not
military;
the
much more
And
One
against this
subtle and insidious threat the policy of containment, of military alliances, of military barriers,
is
entirely ineffective.
this
has only to
most
clearly.
The Bagh-
dad Pact was established by Great Britain and some of the Middle
Eastern countries at the instigation of the United States in order to
Communist penetration. But this barrier did not prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in Egypt. It did not prevent the Iraqi revolution and the Communist gains attendant upon it, for the Communist gains were not due to any threat of military aggression emanating from the Sovdet Union.
create a military barrier against
Yet even
if
by
the
Not only
been
tive,
cited
own
terms,
for
evils
which
it
was intended to
within
prevent.
It
many
nations and
many groups
many
which tended
to look
were, mercenaries
tary purposes.
among the indigenous peoples for its own miliThe United States was suspected of wantingr to bring
Union could pose
as the
war
cham-
pion of peace and the nation interested only in ending the Cold War.
The
classic
containment and of
the case of Pakistan.
was conceived
in recent years,
is
The United
216
The
It is difficult, if
New Atlantic
know
Connnunity
you
against
whom
this alliance
imaginary enemy,
its
infinitely
in order to
make up
really
engaged
in
an arma-
itself.
With
it
The United
Baghdad
States has
been led to
this disregard
of
its
own
interest
by what amounts
The
is
Pact, the
SEATO
United
were
all
open-ended
alliances.
That
to say, they
were based on
unilateral declarations
whoever wanted to join to come in and join. Of necessity, the nations which joined did so not on behalf of the interests of the United States, but on behalf of their own interests. I remember vividly a discussion I had a couple of years ago with the
States, inviting
He made no
bones
alli-
about the fact that for him the main purpose of the American
ance was to establish
a special
can treasury.
It is also
worthy of note
that quite a
number of
allies
policies
it
Where
they
they have, in
many
instances,
been
policies of the
United
States.
What
and determination,
good
217
alliances
impose upon
Wherever
at the
as
there
is
need for
new
departure, there
If
also
an ally pulling
to keep
American
ally,
coattails
you want
lady
me
your
you
can't
do
who
weapon, the
will simply
threaten to collapse.
Thus the relations between the United States and its allies and among the allies themselves, especially those of the Atlantic community, are in urgent need of being rethought and revised. The rethinking and revision must aim at coming to terms with four fundamental
issues.
What
terests
among
the
members of
init?
the Atlantic
community which
will reflect
We
must create
tions,
common
their
interests into a
common
power of
individual na-
commensurate with
interests
Second,
tic
how
can
we
bring about
a relationship
community and
the
the Soviet
Union which
its
will
by
in
enclosed
German problem,
acute manifestation in
Berlin.
Third,
how
can
we
establish a relationship,
The
satellites
of the Soviet
membership
Fourth,
in
Western
civilization,
common
how do we
create a relationship
community and the uncommitted new nations of Africa and Asia which would further the latter's domestic and international stability?
The
Atlantic
community
members
to establish a
new
rela-
The
Atlantic
common
218
interests
community as a unified social force derives from which can be safeguarded and advanced only
The
New Atlantic
Community
through co-operation between the nations of Western Europe and the United States. Its paramount power imposes upon the United
States a particular responsibiUty to initiate policies
their execution.
and to lead
in
The
interests
of
two
kinds:
those
as
which arose
in
were,
we
have seen,
met by the
initiative of the
United
States,
and permain
common membership
Western
be
left to
civilization.
The
Three new
factors dominat-
made
reduction
nation-state as a principle of
community
that
has been
common
interests of
it
members.
It is
has
Thus
the Atlantic
community
its
common
left
of
Its
common
institutions
other
common
interests either
have been
have
Had
of
its
common
interests
States
would have
very
little
short of,
to, a
vital activities in
fields
kind evolved. For the United States proved incapable of playing the
role
it
as
the paramount
member
of the Atlantic
are re-
219
to
the
principle
of
The two
power beyond
in that they alit
beyond them. The liquidation of the conquests of the Spanish- American War began virtually as soon
failed to establish itself firmly
as
The The
left
failure of Wilson's
attempt to
make
democracy rendered
Europe.
of American
after the
power
in
Second World
its
War
power in permanence at the circumference what terms was that power to be established? Should it be the supremacy of American power, which in its consistent application would reduce America's allies to the status of satellites, or was it to be the equality of all members of the alliance, which, in its ideal realization, would issue in the harmonious
choice but to establish
of the Russian empire. But on
to operate not in
saw
fit,
whose consent,
if
American presence. The purpose of that presence was the defense of the freedom and territorial integrity of the allies. The United States,
in
reducing
its allies
the very purpose for the sake of which the become its allies. On the other hand, the establishment of the alliance on the basis of complete equality \^as feasible only on the unreal
allies
and their
was
common
these
ends witli
common
co-operation.
Of
two
alternatives, the
latter. It re-
fused to bring
its
common
interests that
common
framework of permanent and organic co-operation among allies who would relinquish their equal status in return for the common pro220
The
tection of their essential interests.
New
Atlantic Cormnunity
When
Western Hemisphere, it it its military and economic power but not its creative imagination or its constructive will. Sigcarried with
nificantly enough, this imagination
American tradition in foreign affairs: that is, in the military sphere; and NATO is presently its rather forlorn and brittle monument.
is
which
closest to the
The United
States
emerged from the Second World War as the it assumed the leadervirtue of necessity. In conseits
community by
quence,
its
will
power, responsibility,
result of
and opportunity.
Had
these attributes of
it
aspired to
tasks
came
unbecoming humility and unwarranted self-restraint. It nobody else could. Thus the Atlantic community remained an inchoate social fact incapable of becoming a political reality, and its solitary concrete maninity with
festation,
NATO,
declined.
The
principle of equality
among
its fif-
teen members, applied to the political operations and over-all military planning of
the
NATO,
put
a virtually
insurmountable obstacle in
way of new policies to be pursued by the fifteen allies in response to new opportunities or new threats. The principle of equality would have been compatible with new departures in policy only if all members of the alliance had an equal interest in such departures,
were
open threat of
members of
NATO
in the late
cannot be expected to
is
to translate
common
of
denominator of agreed
is
interests into
common
itself
That denominator
likely to tend
minimum
would
common
policies
jective conditions
221
N E W O F FOREIGN POLICY
NATO
was designed
at its inception to
be
NATO
become
less
less
distinguishable
from
a traditional alliance,
a far
new
common
The
willingly
committed
to
from the pattern of thought and action established both by its tradition and by its successful reaction to the threat of Russian power in the aftermath of the Second World War that is, to conto free itself
ceive of
its
world primarily
in military terms.
Thus
allies, by uncommitted nations that become allies, and by satellites that Russian power prevented from becoming its allies. From this picture of the
it
saw
surrounded by
The
allies
had to be
drawn
join
it.
into
it,
and the
satellites
These
policies
pic-
at
the facts of experience and with the interests of the United States
militarily oriented
community remained
effective
with regard to
which
is
of a
Germany. Yet
been
Union
has indeed
been contained.
unification
is
Politically,
Western policy
as distant as ever,
firmly
very unsettled
state
The
Soviet
nations of Eastern
Europe support the German policies of the Union primarily because they fear Germany's new military
222
The
strength. President de Gaulle alone of
all
New Atlantic
Covtmunity
the
by declaring
make such
would would make it appear a hopeless undertaking for any German government ever to recover the regions east of the Oder-Neisse line the present community of interests between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe would thereby be weakened, if not destroyed, in so far as their policies toward Germany are concerned. And, I think, the nations of the West would also greatly contribute to the stabilization of order in all of Europe and to the promotion of freedom in Eastern Europe. These considerations have, of course, but an indirect and negative bearing upon the unification of Germany. They deal with policies and conditions which would make the continuing division of Gera declaration in other
nations
many
bearable for
all
cannot be
uni-
is
obviously, in terms of
it is
German
But
ognition of the legitimacy of the Oder-Neisse line and of the inevitability of the division
of
Germany
of
all
concerned.
Once
quo
a
by
meaning.
From
symbol of irredenta
a symbol Western presence in
and
of Europe.
Thus
the
The
lites
community toward the European nations east of the Iron Curtain. policies which the Atlantic community, with the United
its
States as
satel-
of the Soviet
Union have
failed.
They have
policies
ties.
have been unaware of both their limitations and opportunipolicy of liberation and the explicit inaction on the occa-
The
sion of the
The
concern with the limitations; inaction on the occasion of the Hungarian revolution demonstrated unawareness of the opportunities.
223
Western
satisfied
European conit
The United
what
it
go
at that,
limits
reached in
1945,
and that
essentially
did
up
But once America yielded to the impulse to go beyond this negative, static policy of containment and non-recognition and to give it a
positive,
dynamic implementation,
it
it
terms that
is,
as the
evacuation of
Eastern Europe
by
the
the risk of
it
on August
30, 1952,
when
the
proclaimed:
"Unhappily
'liberation'
war
or
it
it
means nothing.
'Liberation' entails
no
official statements,
liberation
was
to be achieved
could not be
achieved.
new dynamic
was taken
satellites.
as a threat
As
such, far
of the
viet
satellites, it
by the Soviet Union and as a promise by the from contributing anything to the liberation served, on the one hand, as a pretext for the Soits
Union
to maintain
Europe and, on
with Ameri-
States
might do and to be
disillusioned
when no
The
test in the
ready achieved.
circumstances,
would demonstrate
as
224
The Neiv
a policy of liberation
Atlantic CoTnjnunity
is indeed what hapfrom the outset through its most authoritative spokesman, the President, that it would abstain from active interference. While it is a moot question as to how much the
pened.
The United
States declared
in
view of the dissension within the Soviet government over the use of force revealed in the meantime by Khrushchev that it could have done more than nothing.
The United
Atlantic
commitment of
the
community
to
its
cies
which it was called upon to words gave the appearance of novelty and daring to polithat were at best routine and at worst out of tune with what the
its
failure revealed
strength of
its life,
its
said
its
and
past
deeds.
moments
freedom
had
by home
as
elemental a
human
power or
words
When
when
fall
of that year
popular enthusiasm that was meant not for themselves but for the
They were
greeted, as
Woodrow Wilson
as living
symbols
of what the nation was thought to stand for; and the enthusiasm that
its
representatives
was due,
it is
from
all
nations to emulate.
When
America ventured
They came
home, but
of historic
as
at
also of
was to achieve abroad. Thus an ironic twist development made the outside world appear to under-
what
it
itself,
and
through
call
the
American message
clear to the
making
world what
world
message, relating
it
traditional
very ex-
The
living presence of
its
world carried
that message
back to America.
community, second
the establishment of
With
Its
primary
foreijjn aid.
Thus
far,
the
members of
the
Atlantic
community have
basis.
ex-
There
endeavor, founded
upon
mon
rived
community
to foreign aid.
aid has de-
In particular the
by and
large
part of the
tablished a
American folklore of
has es-
correlations be-
tween foreign
social
standard of living,
and
political stability,
and
The
simplicity of these
correlations
so reassuring
much
the
226
The
New Atlantic
Community
as the following,
concerning the
re-
What
are the social, political, and moral effects of foreign aid likely to be
in various circumstances?
To what
what conditions
is it
possible for
and technological
committed,
life
how
is
one to create
in the
mind of the
its
recipient the
positive relationship
between the
aid
and
beneficial results,
on the
of the giver, despite the aid he has received, the political effects
lost.
but
a natural, if
not inevita-
long
"Aid
bad," or "Aid
is
politics of the
with
it."
Questions such
desires in the
is
uncommitted
dothe
That correlation
a projection of the
West onto
and
Yet these
and administration.
It is
Commonwealth
of Nations, must
uncommit-
ted nations.
It is especially in
uncommitted nations
community
we
have
left
which the indiscriminate search for allies the collector's approach to alliances was a logical consequence. Having recognized that political non-commitment is the only policy many of the new nations can afford to pursue, we must find a positive relationship to these neutralist nations. A number of uncommitted naneutralism, of
tions are
weak
That Balkanization runs counter to the technological requirements of the age, which call for political units larger than even the traditional
nation-states of Europe.
What
is
required
is
Communism
offers such a
all
may
well
side in their
sympathies, economic interests, and even, when the chips are down, military support. International communism seeks exactly this
commitment.
new
tection against
tions
as a
them afraid that if they did they would thereby be drawn into the Cold War on the side of the West. For them the paramount issue is not communism but colonialism. The invocation of anticommunism pure and simple, then, is a self-defeating policy toward the uncommitted nations. What is needed is a posidedication to neutralism makes
tive alternative to, rather than a negative
Com-
It
new
order to be
promoted and supported by the Atlantic community must be unequivocally anticolonist and must meet the material aspirations and
The
New Atlantic
new
all
Community
order must
be a
political
room
for
of political non-commitment.
The uncommitted
may
well
incline toward one or the other side in their moral preferences, political
port.
The
commitment,
will put
Western
statesmanship to
its
supreme
test.
is
Even
so,
likely to persist
among
tion,
it
neutralist nations
and with
it
West.
To
counteract
community
matter
by trimming the
of
its
policies to the
wind of
we must
pursue
policies to a
concerned that
we know what we are about and that it does not pay to cross us. Only so will we gain the respect of the neutralists and have a chance to win their support as well. And we might well remind the uncommitted nations
their neutralism
is
munity.
Were
that
to containing the
Comat
exist as a policy
and would
It is a luxury which certain power of one antagonist cancels out the power of the other. Weaken the power of one or the other and the neutral nations are at the mercy of the stronger power.
The
First,
members
of the Atlantic
community
to-
gether are not only and not even primarily of a military nature.
They
are first of
all
common
Western
The
pursuit
229
N E AV O F FOREIGN POLICY
by common
institutions
and
policies.
is
community must keep the awareness of a common Western civilization alive in the European nations behind the Iron Curtain by impressing upon them the vitality of that civilization. Fifth, the Atlantic community must enter into a positive relationship with the uncommitted nations by respecting their uncommitted status and conveying to them the benefits of its
the Atlantic
membership
in
political,
230
25
shall
approach
my
topic,
what
less
now
That
nity,
is
to say,
shall
pay
rules of
law contained
I
and Steel
Commupolitical,
and
shall
social,
Plan stands or
as neo-Machiavellian, a
at
once moral
shall
but
shall
make
just
intellectual
Oppenheim, contained
very
brilliant
and extensive
chapter on the relations between the balance of power and international law, trying to
rules
show and
a
leigral
exist-
treatise,
took
this
Perhaps soon
it
Let
me
take
my
man
is
Plan from
from the
two speeches which most of you have heard. One Secretary of State's speech of last night, in which he said:
Organization, whether national or international, is merely an instrument and must be used by skillful craftsmen. The existence of an instrument does not eliminate the need for craftsmanship, nor does the existence of international organization eliminate the need for statesmanship.
From
1952.
want
to refer
is
contained in the
by the
The
Assistant Secretary
I
of State
made
the
all
depends for
This
its
efficacy
as a legal
instrument upon
cussing the
Schuman
Plan.
The Schuman
Plan
is
While
interesting
to
know what
its
gone into
to
making,
seems to
it is
me
know
to
what
social uses
Schuman Plan
not be used at
organization
it
sausages, but
all.
may
also
may
No
descrip-
tell
purposes
it is
likely to
be used.
The Schuman
it
That problem
is
is
characterized,
facts.
One
Germany among
the un-
fact.
Since
1870 the great convulsions and the diplomatic moves precedmg those
convulsions on the European continent were
all
dominated by those
two
facts.
World War
to
solve this problem, to meet those two facts, by the methods which were suggested by the balance of power as it was practiced in
is
to say,
it
tried to
make up
for
its
own
by
saved neither by
particularly, of the
This
is
another fact
must keep
Plan.
in
mind
we want
I
Schuman
The Schuman
232
Plan,
have
said,
power
on the part of an
potentially superior
is
inferior
power by
is,
system of
alliances,
what France
into
its
now
trying to do
as
it
were, to draw
Germany
own
it
Germany
superior
innocuous.
It
is,
words, an attempt
at fusing a
power with an
common
purpose of recreating a
German hegem-
ony on
in
The Schuman
which France
it
Plan
is
way
at-
Europe was
tempted, as
is
to say, an all-compre-
work for an over-all government was The Council of Europe today moves in
from the bottom rather than from the
The Schuman
It starts
first
of
to a
community of
and
that this example will then spread to other functional fields, such as
agriculture, transport, electricity,
fields
all
those
unification. Finally, so
unities, political
series
of functional
unity will
grow
will have
been transferred to
of functional governments
it.
Once
all
common European
government.
seems to
me
fundamental factors,
power among
is.
them.
The
first
What
is
the
internal distribution of
power
to be within
is
the
power
to be
Community and
fields
the
member governments?
nations?
What
is
is
among
the
member
And
finally,
What
the
distribution of
and
Steel
power going to be between the members of the Coal Community, on the one hand, and the other main coal and
is
to say.
few minutes
first
left I
must
limit
To
cerning the
question:
What
is
High
going
Community going
taking
from
their
their
member governments, but being unable to banish interests of the member nations and
High Authority and High
own What is
dedication to them?
the relation going to be between the
member
nations?
What
is
governments concerned?
What
kind of use
is
make
of
its
enormous powers,
at least
activities of the
High Authority,
what
the distribution of
power going
to be
among
Plan? In view of
all possibilities.
is
probably the
most
the
of
all
Community. What
member governments, on
High Authority
as the
Comal-
It
has
most no direct administrative powers within the territory of the constituent nations. Its main power lies in the field of investment; and here its power is primarily the negative one to withhold investments, loans, and guarantees for loans from recalcitrant
nations.
member
But what
if
those recalcitrant
member
them elsewhere?
that of the relationship
The
for
third question
is
community of
nations.
and the
and
member
vital
question of Germany,
here as elsewhere.
all
To what
tions of
Germans
way
I
Schuman
Plan?
interests, in so far as
they
is
Germany
in the
Community
Finally,
and
this is the
all
from the
What
more
particularly, the
we
are face to
Community, on the one hand, and Great Britain United States, on the other? For here face with the same fundamental problem which we
political
is
encountered in the
and military
to say, the
fields
First
there
was no
What
is
the purpose
to maintain a balance
power
in
power between East and West regardless of power within the Atlantic community?
It
Community
Western com235
N E W O F FOREIGN POLICY
Germany and
France.
would submit
in
inter-
236
26
Positive
Approach
to
a Democratic Ideology
we need
is
Unfortunately, what
of necessity
good and true by the standards of philosowin out in the political contest of the
as in
Our
Europe, in the
men
is
fusion of these
two
is
Since democracy
tains
which
it
con-
and
in the
good of which
carries the
the fulfilment,
also
this
we
must
prove
itself
must be maintained.
relative
There
ivhich
is
is
good
is
To
the
job of philosophy;
of, the latter.
it is
make
use
There
are the
is
at the
bottom of
all
political contentions
traits
and
conflicts
an irreducible
minimum
of psychological
all
common
beings
possession of
want the
things
which
life.
human
ticular
want
want
human
beings seek
power
above
an
men.
men,
rises
Upon
From
and
political
Academy
237
might be shared by
all
men under
certain
level.
on the verbal
They might be
similar
all
shared
by
all
if
live,
to be free,
if
satisfaction
were
everywhere.
of
a
If this were so, the experience, common to all men, what men seek and of what they are able to obtain would create community of valuations, postulates, and aspirations which would
provide
common
The
variations
to abundance;
from tyranny
rule
nomic slavery
inequalities
from extreme
to wide distribution of
power
still
dom, yet
political
common
political
actions
show wide
divergencies.
poUtical con-
move on
by one
traits
group
as
praised
by another
as the opposite.
Thus
community of psychological
and elemental
common
political asdis-
tinction
Not
values
the
it
number
and moral
contains, but
satisfactio7i
litical
ideology
238
A
The
imagination of
Positive
Approach
to a
Democratic Ideology
the ideas of the American and French Revolutions and the slogans
whom
no one
The economic
interpretation of im-
Yet, as
war is obviously at odds with all the known facts. anybody who has tried to teach the truth about these matpopular belief in
it is
well-nigh ineradicable.
The
or failure.
What was
was
their ability to
and
political needs.
The
German
of
all
would become superior in fact. In anticipation of that ascendancy of Germany, the race theories made it virtually imperative for the
German
their borders
trial
seemed to pro-
vide experimental proof for the truth of the race theories themselves.
Similarly,
satisfies
war
rela-
deeply
intellectual
and
political
needs.
The popular
which
is
The economic
rest.
interpretation,
by providing
puts the
popular mind at
What
"A
series
of
The
a
seems to be cleared up by
field
of political action,
by
239
symbol which
political action
can
use, as
it
restrict
commerce
about
accordance with
knowledge.
it
two
political
ideology,
i?i
experiences
of those nxhoin
e?ideavors to reach.
Communism
economic, and
wherever
its
tenets of social,
whom
the
other needs.
minds of men
and Western Europe, and democracy has by and large been defeated in Asia. In Central and
experiences
which the peoples of Central and Western Europe had with the
tyranny of the Red
regions
Army
life
police. In those
communism
population in whose
cially in the
for liberty.
democracy has
lost
its
experiences of the
is
peoples of Asia.
What
is
want
freedom from
What
chance
there for
democracy
democratic ideology
contradicted by
the
life
experiences
last
democracy
allied
A
ology divorced from the
1950, in the
Positive
Approach
to a
Democratic Ideology
of a political ide-
The impotence
experiences of the
common man
is
30,
Chicago Daily
News
The other day I visited a small farmer near Saigon. Through my interpreter I asked him to tell me what he thought
.
of the
Americans coming to Indochina. He said: "White men help white men. You give guns to help the French people. We want to be rid of all foreigners and the Viet Minh
kill
. . .
my
was
slowly putting out the French." I said: "Don't you know there is a white man behind the Viet Minh? Don't you know that Ho Chi Minh takes Russian orders?" He said: "In Saigon I have seen Americans and I have seen Frenchmen. I have never heard of any white men being with the Viet Minh."
What makes
extent
it is
is
Western
ideologies.
Nowhere
more
drastic
with dire consequences for the West than in China, for nowhere
has the contrast between ideology and the Hfe experiences of the
The
had created
in
China for
were wiped out with one stroke when American to kill Chinese and when American planes
coastal cities of China.
As
a report in the
it
air raids
on Shanghai:
the
much
work
"American imperialists" as that of the "reactionary, remnant lackeys" of Taiwan, and while the raids drove out any faith in Chiang which might remain amongst the less educated they no less effectively drove out any faith in America in quarters where it was still harboured.
Here
of
its
American ideology
it is
in
terms
good of which
issue
warfare of
ideas.
What
mon
to support
made
success in the
is it
Ideological warfare
war of ideas impossible. mere function of political policy. It is meant to support; it can never be
ca?i
be
better.
241
for ideological
objectives and
it
which
it
aspirations of those to
whom
the ideo-
to be
to
its
ods. Third,
it
from the other reasons alfrom the weakness of our political policies. Since we have not been sure of our objectives and of the methods to reach them, our ideological appeal was only too prone to seek refuge from the uncertainties of policy in democratic generalities. Moreideological weakness in Asia, aside
results
Our
ready mentioned,
over,
we
in a
holy
two world
we
waging
power
Union, which uses the ideology of world revolution for the purpose
of expanding Russian power.
are
dem-
policy,
calculus of
shows
sake,
own
and truths of democracy and the vices and falsehoods of bolthe same propensity for such moral and philosophic abstrac-
shevism.
It is
tions
which has impeded the objective investigation of what other people want. Assured as we are by and large of the protection of our lives from the vicissitudes of death through violence or lack of food
shelter,
and
we
for granted.
life,
good measure of the protection of we concentrate our thoughts and efforts upon the preservation
erect this limited experience, subject to the conditions of time
a universal principle
we
which claims
to be valid every-
Positive
Approach
to a
Democratic Ideology
where and at all times. Thus we assume, at least by implication, that what we are allowed to take for granted all men can take for granted, and that what we are striving for is the object of the aspirations of all mankind. In consequence, since Woodrow Wilson we have made the insistence upon democratic elections everywhere in the world
one of the mainstays of our foreign policy.
At
lie
One
is
the
which does not need to detain us here, that democracy and peace are synonymous and, hence, that to establish democracy everywhere is tantamount to making peace secure everywhere. The second error lies in the assumption that democracy is a kind of gadget which is capable of being installed in any poHtical household
belief,
The
historic
is
by
implication dis-
democracy
as a universal principle of
government.
The
final error
is
processes
last analysis it is
government and
concepfeasible
ful-
tion of
what
is
right and
in a given society.
The
and procedures
may
ate.
or
may
is
moral and
It
social
context that
indifferent or hostile to
democracy.
remains again
for policy to create the moral and social conditions receptive to the
ideals of
It is
democracy.
human
beings
which have focused public attention upon piercing the Iron Curtain and bringing "the" truth to the peoples under Russian domination.
243
again,
is
we
no such thing
move
would by no means be assured. Those who believe that peace and good will among nations are the direct result of the free flow of news and of ideas fail to distinguish between the
the triumph of our ideas
technical process of transmission and the thing to be transmitted.
They
latter.
However,
We have seen that there is no idenmankind above the elemental aspirations tity of experience uniting which are common to all men. Since this is so, the American and the Russian will each consider the same news item from his particular
conceptions of different peoples.
philosophic, moral, and political perspective, and the different perspectives will give the
news
a different color.
The same
report on
Korea
weight
it,
as a
newsworthy
item, aside
from
any opinion
to be
formed about
is
and experiences.
lived in a
Thus, even
if
we
nology with men, news, and ideas moving freely regardless of national boundaries, the
political action
meeting
and
aspirations.
So
it
is
as
democracy, peace,
freedom, security.
The
minds
their
most firmly
members of
interests.
and strengthened
their
244
A
The
ples of
ability of
Positive
Approach
to a
Democratic Ideology
ability to establish
two
different relationships:
one between the aspirations of those policies of the West, the other between those
situations
where
The waging
Germany
in
a relatively
by the United Nations. Both sought the deof Nazi Germany, and it was easy to put that aim into
political
quo
in
Europe
Truman
Doctrine, the
Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic pact. Neither in Eastern Eu-
rope nor
warfare
in Asia
itself is
as simple.
Two
basic
dilemmas confront
One concerns
The
other di-
political
lemma
policy
by means of
first
political
is
warfare altogether.
The
is
dilemma
often considered to
by the relations between what be the objective of American policy in Eastbest illustrated
ern Europe and the objective of our political warfare with regard to
the Soviet Union.
The
Europe
as the liberation of the peoples of Eastern Europe from Russian domination. The objective of our political warfare with regard to the Soviet Union is to appeal to the Russian peo-
may
be defined
government
in terms of
our
real
pressure of Russian public opinion. Yet the objective of the liberation of Eastern Europe, especially in so far as Poland and the Baltic
states are
as-
which no cleavage between government and people has ever existed. A policy in Eastern Europe which seeks to thwart the aspirations of both the Russian government and the Russian people is bound to cancel out the chances, which otherpirations of Russia, regarding
245
government by means of
it is
such
as these,
warfare to those
may
is
faced
with
a similar
dilemma
in
its
policies
ern Germany.
Neisse frontier
The
is
bound
condemn Russian
political
it
Eastern
Germany
would have
the same effect in Poland. Faced with this dilemma, Soviet policy
it is more important for Union to maintain and strengthen its political control over Poland by making the Soviet Union appear as the champion of Polish
the Soviet
Eastern
Germany by
satisfying in
some measure
dilemma
been
in
pirations.
is
provided by the
American intervention
in the
Korean War.
However
terms of international
Korean
people themselves,
its
where the
in devastated
What
is
the
inability of the
liability
of
The
affairs of
manner of Western imperialism can be refuted at present not by means of political warfare, but only by subsequent political, military, and economic policies which will establish in the life experiences of the Korean people the anti-imperialistic, democratic objectives of American policy. In situations such as these, the immediate
answer to the ideological
246
liability
A
policy
is
Positive
Approach
to a De?nocratic
Ideology
The
tlety
is
easier,
more
port,
and
also
more
task in the spirit and with the techniques of a Fourth of July oration.
The
ful
lic
and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling pubopinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in
the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men. This
not a struggle between good and evil, truth and falsehood, but of power with power. In such a struggle virtue and truth do not prevail simply upon being communicated. They must be carried upon the steady stream of political policy which makes them both relevant and plausible. To conceive of the ideological task of democracy in
is
eternal
democracy
to
is
all
the world
is
in large
which
it
seeks to support. It
is
the
mere
methods of these
its
policies.
From
it
it
draws
call
strength.
With them
wins or
fails.
To
be effective, the
for victory in
as a
men must
policies
be conceived primarily
and military
which have
the makings of
247
27
Policy
Nine
factors
power: geography, natural resources, national morale, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, quality
Of
these,
come under
the
government
available
upon
nation that
food has
a great
advantage over a
power of
al-
in times of
war has
ways depended on
lanes.
the
Royal Navy's
ability to
On
such
as the
United States and the Soviet Union, need not divert their
national energies
their
from
their
primary objectives
in order to assure
food supply.
They
much more
What
which
is
more particuwaging of war. With the increasing mechanization of warfare, national power has become more and more dependent upon the control of raw materials in peace and war. "One drop of oil," said Clemenceau during the First World War, "is worth one drop
are important for industrial production and,
larly, for the
It is
modern
industrial pro-
raw
materials
From
248
The Economics
Yet while control of raw materials
it is
is
of Foreign Policy
but
a potential
source of strength
industrial capacity.
The technology
of
modern war
made
in-
heavy industry, an
the competition
indis-
Thus
among
implements of
The quality and productive capacity of know-how of the working man, the skill
hence,
on which the industrial capacity of a nation and, power in international affairs depend. Thus the great powers are bound to be identical with the leading industrial nations. The spectacular rise of the Soviet Union as a world power, and the
these are factors
its
aspirations of
States
which inhow-
ever,
that
economic strength
capacity
is
industrial
strength
is,
as
it
power. In order
different operations.
its
must bring
economic
these
resources. Second,
different claims
upon
The economic
are limited
resources of
all
nations
amount of the available resources. A nation must estimate how far it is able to go in its relations with other nations in view of the available economic resources, and it must choose the ends and means of its foreign policy in the light of that estimate. Its task is completed only when it has distributed wisely the sum total of its economic resources among the different ends and means of its foreign policy. How much ought to be devoted to the armed forces in relation to the foreign aid commitment? How much ought to be allocated to the instruments of atomic war in proportion to
by
the
conventional weapons?
And how
should
we
What
kind of
249
the national
civilian
economy
able to support in
it?
How
many guns can the economic system provide for the nation, and how many guns and how much butter can it provide for other
nations in view of the
for itself?
amount of butter
The United
ground of
bloc, the
States
a triple challenge:
which
oped
is
West and
The Soviet Union has been explicit in its resolution to prove Marx and Lenin correct in their prophecy that capitalism is doomed. While Marx and Lenin believed that disaster would result from a
series
tions themselves,
because of
its
it
inferiority in
As he put
Soviet
to the noted
years of
its
greatness."
The
Union
is
by demonstrating
it
its
economic
will set an
They
will
way
of
life.
Further-
more,
this
economic superiority
wage away
full-scale
its
States
Union to by taking
economic and
political system.
Thus, without
States.
Union
will
How
has conexisting
aid,
and concludino-
as
many new
Foreign
too, has
been primarily of
a military nature.
Only
a small fraction
of the resources earmarked for foreign aid has been used for eco-
assistance.
Our
pattern:
The Economics
domestic producer against foreign competition.
of Foreign Policy
The
subordination
Union and
traditional pattern.
The
Union
threatens the
United States
total,
both
as to the goal to
total eco-
nomic resources in order to bring about the downfall of the United States. The American response has been for the greater part misdirected and for the remainder halfhearted and piecemeal.
Our diplomacy
selves.
its
The
its
ability of the
through
own
retaliatory
power
is
minimum
up>-
been
useless
been
which
vulnerable to
what
tional
it
is
essentially a political
also tends to
in
an
irra-
manner;
it
damages the
United States
in that
creates political
Soviet Union.
If
is
suffer
from
a
different but
no
less serious
weaknesses.
We
have not
developed
political policies
fields.
What
To
keep our
allies
on our
To
true that
all
251
which ask
to
it
it?
To what
extent
is
ernments?
And
it
perform the
politically useful
development?
tionality of our foreign aid policy that the answers have largely
We
it
than base
upon
which has
the obsois
Our
carried
still
another
way
gain.
diplomacy
is
a case in point. It
is
it is
widely
government
to further pri-
ment used
overwhelming
terests, has
in
ment, shackled by ancient shibboleths and sectional domestic innot dared to develop
a
American foreign
all its
Our
in
manifestations
is
deficient
di-
in
good measure
vorced both
We
still
regard foreign
economic policy,
as
we
own
course according to
political
its
own
laws,
considerations.
Second,
We
unaware of the
though
it
we
act
upon
as
could
The Economics
be successfully met through a relatively minor domestic economic business being carried on
of the matter
is
of Foreign Policy
effort,
with our
as usual.
its
economic
life
we
rich and
this total effort, let alone to win by making only minor and haphazard
The answer
nomic policy
is
is
A
as a
organization, this
in the
hands of
two
things. It
apply
a political standard
aid,
and that
we must
and
less
or nothing where
political goals
And
it
means
first
of
all
more
the public interest in the survival and the safety of the United States
gain.
would be an
can
we
shall
have
much
that
is
important and
much
it
peared to us even
that
is
essential.
We must do
the nation
253
28
Preface
to
a Political
Of
modern age
has proven
more
baffling to
foreign aid.
an instrument
opinion
is
of foreign policy
an end in
itself,
carrying within
of,
itself
foreign policy.
which the
the other
On
many who
see
no
They
The
little
to under-
on almost exclusively
in terms of the
amount of
money
stantive purposes
which
is
suposed to serve.
The
administration
tries,
were, to
sell
certain
amount of
buy
less
that amount.
requested,
amount
tion
ered,
as,
as it sees fit
within the general categories of the appropriaglaring abuses and inefficiencies are uncov-
bill. It is
only
when
raised in public,
and
even then
it is
and
what kinds of
From
by Public
254
Aid
even to
To
ask that
States
as pointless as to ask
ought to have
United
military
methods of diplomacy.
What
is
we
As
it
fundamentally weak.
and
responding haphazardly to
all
The United
States has
been in the
has yet to
more than
a decade,
but
it
The
by
first
of foreign aid
one thing
common:
the transfer of
to another.
They
Of
aid
is
per se non-political.
The
aid
tradi-
falls
private organizations, such as churches and foundations, have traditionally provided in Asia, Africa,
manitarian aid
is
per se non-political,
it
a political
function
when
The
foreign
emanating from
foreign country
is
Thus
many
years
likely to take
it
on under con-
function which
The same
may
have
political
is
as
those
command
the resources to
The
up the
down
It
performs the
it
It
maintains
is
Where
there
a political alternative to
its
aid diminishes
chances of materializing.
Bribes proffered
by one government
armory of diplomacy.
for a
No
statesman hesitated
to
bribes.
Thus
it
was
proper and
common
government
to
a bribe.
Lord
Robert
Sir Flenry
Wotton,
British
ambassador to Venice
in the seventeenth
century, accepted one from Savoy while applying for one from
Spain.
published in 1793
The documents which the French revolutionary government show that France subsidized Austrian statesmen
livres,
it
with the
regarded
Nor was
to
any
less
proper or
less
usual for a
government
1716, the
Stanhope 600,000
He
reported
by
virtue of
which
Prussia
2S6
Hard-
enberg received from the French government valuables worth 30,000 francs and complained of the insignificance of the gift. In 1801, the
in the form of "diplomatic which the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand received 150,000. It was originally intended to give him only 100,000, but the amount was increased after it had become known that he had received from Prussia a snuffbox worth 66,000 francs as well as 100,000 francs in cash. The Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed
rule of this
to his govis
who
here on
it
ment of gain will often work wonders." Much of what goes by the name of foreign
nature of such bribes.
aid today
is
in the
The
transfer of
money and
services
from one
a price paid
by
rendered by the
traditional ones, of
respects:
former. These bribes differ from the which we have given examples above, in two
they are
justified primarily in
are
transferred
aid.
The compulsion
eign aid for economic development results from a climate of opinion which accepts as universally valid the proposition that the highly
money
money and
services
which seems
to be legitimate
the one
made
economic devel-
money and
and
services
other
is
rationalized
justified.
propo-
sition, economic development can actually be promoted through such transfer of money and services. Thus economic development
as
money and
level
and whose
effects
order
an instru-
ment
The government
of nation A,
trying to
buy
political
B
is
also
what
it
actually doing
ernment of nation
to
which
are
bound
to be disappointed.
Old-
fashioned bribery
is
know what
in the
to expect. Bribery
in a play
which
from
reality.
The
ideology,
way
and neither
has received
what
it is
Until recently, military aid took the lion's share of the foreign
aid
States.
shift in favor of
non-military
when
to a
over
2 bil-
aid,
for
all
amounted
over
billion dollars.
1
To
the latter
billion dollars
from the
258
is
a traditional
way by which
seventeenth and
Rome
it
provided.
The
by
which Great
treaties of
one
struck
by the meticulous
defined.
precision
logistic sup-
like
were
The
loans
which
tra-
understood
as a division
of labor between
two
and
allies
who
manpower.
is
extended to
allies
The
is
The purpose
is
here not so
much
military as political.
The
former to
from
a political course
aid.
in
jeopardy the
continuation of military
of a bribe.
Military aid
What
may
also
of prestige
be discussed below.
The
increases the
home and
abroad. Being in
the possession of
ern warfare, a
a
some of the more spectacular instruments of modnation can at least enjoy the illusion of having become
in the guise of aid for
economic devel-
and
it is
259
This
mode
readiness to
vote virtually any amount requested for military purposes. Yet the
when
as military assistance, as
we saw
aid
is
the purposes of
when
economic development.
The
which such
bound
to operate,
even though
authorities,
is
from
its
genuine purposes.
More
particularly,
common
its
true
purpose, too,
is
development.
out
traffic
The
highway with-
personnel and at a loss but under the flag of the recipient country
these ostensibly serve the purposes of
many underdeveloped
nations, for
what
industrialization," an industrialization
monuments
to, industrial
We
tions, that
by means of
this
trend
is
underdeveloped nations
want
within
it,
and are willing to take the measures necessary to achieve them. For
many
260
Aid
the
a function that
is
not pri-
political.
They
They perform
castle or the
monarch's
said,
Nehru
is
reported to have
"It
is
when
I
is,
Chou
is
En-lai a
new dam:
worship."
And
the
viable a nation
the greater
likely to
urge to prove to
it,
itself
The advantage
aid,
is
threefold.
He may
very
for a bribe.
much after the model of the advantage received in return The spectacular character of prestige aid establishes a
The
giver's prestige
is
patent relationship between the generosity of the giver and the increased prestige of the recipient.
as
it
enhanced,
aid
comes
relatively cheap.
limited
commitment of resources
in
mo-
dernity
may
The
between prestige
It is in
the
justified
by
unaware of the
distinction,
one of two
by mistaking
either waste
economic development, he
will
human and
much
a re-
else
it
cannot be
justified in tei'ms
of
political
advantages
prestige aid
The
classic
example of
this error
is
the
American rejection
as
eco-
nomically unsound.
It
may
paved the
261
None
practical manipulation
sense tested
which can be successfully met by common by experience. Foreign aid for economic development
economic nature. Economic thought,
be achieved
has been the primary area for theoretical analysis and speculation,
which
true to
as
though
were
And
since
first
industrial revolution
tal
we
have tended
two
factors
impetus for the economic development of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa,
and executed
as a strictly
this success
in disarray.
it,
The
much
of
from
certain
unexamined
assumptions, no
less
American folklore of politics. Thus the popular mind has established correlations between the infusion of capital and technological know-
how
social stability,
between
social stability
between democratic
attractive
institutions
and
However
by the by general
The
262
is
Aid
know-how. Underdevelopment
at
is
regarded
kind of accident or
worst
as a
some natural and insuperable, others social and remediable, which no amount of capital and technological know-how supplied from the outside can cure. The poverty of natural resources may be such as to make economic developnation
suffer
may
from
deficiencies,
ment
all
that reason.
Many
may
of the nations
which
permanent recipients
fall
in the
same category,
deficiencies
nation
also suffer
from human
which preclude
qualities of
make
it
impossible for
them
to
so are there
To put it bluntly: as there are bums and beggars, bum and beggar nations. They may be the recipients of
is
not
economic development.
into the
Some
intelligence
which goes
making of
modern economic
are, to
sys-
use a
still
rough analogy,
which
in the sixteenth
we
industrialization of the
West would
world because
it
stands in the
way
which
a
foreign aid
by
itself
is,
the preserva-
263
hard for us to
in the
underof
who
mode
in
which
is
We have
which
come
continuum
the individual
owner or manager
many
it
regarded primarily
when
has
performed
not likely
the
will be forced
by
mold
The economic
interests
which stand
in
in the
way
of foreign aid
being used for economic development are typically tied in with the
distribution of political
power
underdeveloped
societies.
The
good
power
in
status quo.
is
control
in
many
trialization are in
political status
quo. In the measure that they are successful, they are bound to
affect drastically the distribution of
economic and
political
power.
Yet the
beneficiaries of
political status
quo
are the typical recipients of foreign aid given for the purpose of
changing the
status quo!
this
purpose
history.
likely to fail in
likely
and
political evils
forth.
264
Given
must go hand
in
hand with
politi-
On
by
the
Communist
revolupoliti-
cal change in opposition to the ruling group, one must identify the
alternative
group
as the
one
may
and not infrequently, the absence of any alternative group either forces one to create one or else leaves one no choice. Finally, the promotion of drastic social change on the part of the giving nation creates the precondition for economic deunattractive. Sometimes,
velopment, but
revolution.
it
also conjures
In
many
monopoly of
violence
by
may
not find
move
hard to weaken the power of the ruling group or to refrom power altogether. While it may be able to control events up to this point, that is, to instigate drastic reform and revoluit
it
tion, it
itself.
may
is
More
United
in
States,
Communists
as
The
revolution
may
start,
did the
Cuban
States,
by
the United
and
may
in the course of
its
Communist minority,
the only
may
have simiespecially
Economic development,
265
industrialization,
is
By
trib^, in
which the
at least
And
by
it
will
this
not be able,
lost social
world.
The vacuum
filled
social
begun
economic
enough
through
to
is
it,
bound
social
economic
quo
but,
quo
as well. If the
change
drastic
enough, the
and
political
effects
of economic
development
amount
may
The United
in the
sult
States faces a
moot question under whose auspices it will be ended. number of formidable handicaps in the
social
and
political
change
or a reall,
as a prerequisite for,
of,
the
United States
Western
capitalistic nation. It
is
a conservative
internationally,
Both
it
nations
ca,
which
were
Ameri-
in a condition of colonial or
semicolonial dependency.
and while
it
lonial policies,
has actively
in the
semicolonial exploitation of
against the former colonial
backward nations. Thus the resentment powers attaches also to it, and its policies
its
pluralistic political
by dediby totali-
266
Aid
with
the
a revolutionary situation,
for
Communist powers. They which is bound to cause us embarrassment, while the Communists are able to direct a revolution into the
are, as it
we
is
inevitable
and therefore do
it
not oppose
since
we
cannot
will take.
still
on the
Soviet
The
Union
Communist
through
oped nations
rapid industrialization.
trol as their
and
justification.
underdeveloped na-
by
the methods
which brought
West
achieved
much
to them.
That appeal
lessened even
more by
the economic
in large
degree of moral
political sophistication
which
are largely
Thus we
the recipient's
and
political stability. In
some
American
aid for
in disguise in that
tinuing stability
Such
aid,
Here
again,
ment of the giving and the recipient nation. It is equally a moot question whether or not successful foreign aid for economic development is conducive to the development of
democratic institutions and practices. This
is
between democracy
exists
clear.
The most
impres-
example
is
Its
could well be made for the proposition that the former would have
latter. It
is
more
where the
intellectual
opment
in a small elite, as
they are in
many
of the population
is
nomic development but also for sustained economic growth. As concerns the promotion of a peaceful foreign policy, economic
development
is
likely to be counterproductive,
is
provided a
political
present.
The contrary
conclusion derives from the popular, yet totally unfounded, assumption that "poor" nations
make war on
they have what they want. In truth, of course, most wars have been
We
Union
a military threat as
long
as it
was economi-
its
it became such a threat at the very moment economic development had transformed it into a modern industrial power. Similarly, Communist China today is only a potential
cally underdeveloped;
military threat
by
virtue of
its
economic
potential,
both of which
by economic development.
much
generally
and
its
success depends in
soundness in strictly
good measure not so much upon economic terms as upon intellectual, moral,
268
Aid
and
political preconditions,
which
economic
manipulation if
side at
all.
Furthermore, the
aid for
may
to be
it
it
was intended
To
risk as to
do too
little,
may
sometimes be
The major
drawn from
this analysis
the light of the six different types of foreign aid and of choosing the
differ-
ent types of foreign aid to each other in view of the over-all goals
The
them
is
a task for
Can
this
government
favors?
likely to
exchange
political
nomic
Would
by foreign
this
aid?
Are our
be served by giving
Can
a case
human
suf-
fering?
What
To
rectly demands
first
of
all
and
it
does so in
two
On
necessary
269
upon
the country.
it
is
On
when
from
are
a
been performed,
great
number of
which
most
likely to suc-
ceed.
is
number of
situations call-
One type
it
way
of the
latter.
may One
have upon each other. Bribes given to the ruling group, for instance,
are
bound
and economic
tary aid
cal
is bound to have an impact upon the distribution of politipower within the receiving country; it can also have a deleterious effect upon the economic system, for instance, by increasing in-
bound
quo
in all
its
aspects. In so
far as the giving nation desires these effects or can afford to be in-
do not matter
in
terms of
its
But
embarked
re-
upon
economic
its
way.
This problem
tige aid
is
between pres-
may
seek quick political results and use prestige aid for that purpose; yet
it
may
which
at best
is
economic development;
actually impede
to choose? If
it
it.
it is
more often
or
it
may
What
development
270
in
such
way
Aid
coming, Afghanistan,
ple of this dilemma.
as
earlier,
is
The
by paving
irrelevant to
economic de-
velopment.
The United
States,
by
building a hydroelectric
is
dam m a unknown
benefits of
which
to come, chose
It
economic development.
that
effect
from the very political orientation of foreign aid upon the prestige of the giving nation must always be
in the
cies.
minds of the formulators and executors of foreign aid poliIn particular, foreign aid for economic development whose
and patent
is
more
potent political
weapon than
foreign aid
whose
and
lie
Furthermore, the
is
foreign source
its
not aid
as
such or
on the part of the recipient, but the positive relationship that mind of the recipient establishes between the aid and its beneficial results, on the one hand,. and the political philosophy, the political system, and the political objectives of the giver, on the other. That is to say, if the recipient continues to disapprove of the politialties
the
The same
is
but
a natural,
is
In order to be
between giver
given, and the
and
is
subject matter to
which
it
is
which
reflects credit
upon the
latter.
is
The problem
soluble only
of foreign aid
insoluble
if it is
considered
as a selfIt is
economic nature.
in
view of the
271
are
all
is no from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They weapons in the political armory of the nation. As military
policy
is
left to
the generals, so
is
for-
left to
the economists.
The
a political function. It
It
political expert.
it is
not a
science but an
disposition
is
facts, present
by way of mental prepolitical sensitivity to the interrelationship among the and future, and ends and means. The requirements by
It
What
way
requires
first
of
all
a discrim-
inatory judgment of
effects
upon
its
the conclusions from the analysis in terms of policy can only in part
at
facts.
When
all
clusions
The
is
his
right.
Here
where
in the formulation
intui-
will
272
29
What
What Can
the
United States
Do To
Strengthen
First,
What
do? Third,
aspirations
free world?
politics, that
is,
traditionally pur-
new
forum on which the old conflicts among nations are fought out, more or less effectively, more or less peacefully, as the case may be.
In other words, the United Nations
is
a club in
which
setting.
all
kinds of
all
of international politics
played again in a
new
The
do,
setting
is
as old as history.
In order to understand
it is
nec-
exists today,
is
essentially dif-
was intended to be according to its Charter. The Charter bases the United Nations upon the continuing unity of
ferent
it
from what
cannot
itself
create
it.
The
g^reat
rest of the
world.
this
The
ever widening
intention of the Charter from being realized. Not harmony but permanent discord among its most powerful members is the overriding fact which has paralyzed from the very outset the United Nations as a political organization; and the U.N. possesses no instrumentalities of its own to remedy this discord. The remedy to the
From
must be sought
in the traditional
methods of dip-
The Charter
There
is,
macy
as
own
success.
what is obvious from the very what has become routine promethods
offices:
by using
new
new
unity of the great powers but of their discord, using not the Security Council but the
General Assembly
as its
main
vehicle. It
is
com-
posed of
at least
two-thirds of the
members of
grouped around the United States and the other members of the
Western
This
alliance, as its
hard core.
new and
living
body of
and
fight the
is
To
as
im-
to
be
strengthened only
it
was never
at pres-
cannot
is
To
but
not neces-
may
well be a virtue
if
Thus
the
in a
pragmatic
using
it
for purposes to
its
which
use
if
its
is,
in a
still
more
United
States. In
an age domi-
What Can
nated
Do To
defines itself in
it
has
become
a repository of those
interests
States has in
common
By
275
30
Is the
United Nations in
Our
National Interest?
is
To
tional interest of the
in the na-
United States
like asking
whether diplomatic
United
States.
The answer
is
is
bound
and sometimes they are not. The U.N., seen from the vantage point
of the United States,
as
much
test
of their
moment.
It is
which the United States happens no more sensible to approve the U.N.
condemn
it
as
"bad,"
than
it
would be
Nations for the United States, the intrinsic capabilities of the organ-
Whether
to use a knife or a
fork depends on circumstances, but the fact that knives and forks
are suited only for certain purposes and not for others limits
U.N. is capable of serving, which the United States might profitably avail itself of its services? The political purposes which the United Nations is able to serve, by virtue of its Charter and its political dynamics, are four: greatpower government. General Assembly government, diplomatic negotiations,
from What, then, are the purposes and what are the circumstances under
and propaganda. The Charter intends the U.N. to be a government of the great powers operating through the Security Council. But because the Cold War destroyed the unity of the great
this
Council
is
bly,
From
276
Is
Our National
Interest?
from performing
U.N.
need be
interest of the
United
about the
third,
existence as
which both the United States and the Soviet Union might avail themselves at some future time with regard, for instance, to the paramount problem confronting both: the supranational control of
atomic weapons.
The United
it
had
less
of the
do not
foreign policy.
Such
problem, however,
is
decade of the
that
States
through the instrumentality of the General Assembly. The culmination of this period
The United
States
and
its allies
can no
and U.N. measures taken through the General Assembly has been
reversed.
will
ests
The United
its
States
now
run counter to
chance to protect
its
inter-
no longer
lies
from forming
against
them.
Consequently, the United States will in the future have to use
277
serves
its
a certain issue. It
was exactly
of discrimination, strengthened
by
the popular
a
kind
which the United States pursued November, 1956. This tendency, while al\vays wrong intellectually, was politically tolerable as long as the U.N. was likely to be a weapon in the hands of the United States
found objectionable
during the Suez
in the policies
crisis
of
of
its
enemies.
With
more neces-
278
31
The The
Threat
to
is
in crisis.
Will
it
survive?
diseases
from which
is
suffers are
congenital disease
cohesion
among
its
the
new
and the
Union.
The U.N.
insistence of
from
inception
by the
in-
members upon
demands
that the
governments of
dividual countries decide for themselves the domestic and international issues that
concern them.
An
international organization, in
to an interna-
The U.N.
has tried to
this conflict
by
kind of compromise.
equality" of
all
its
On
members; on the
other,
U.N.
Its
the intentions of
tried to use
it
its
Charter.
members,
o-reat
and
small,
have
own
it.
interests
their interests
seemed to require
Among
the great powers, the Soviet Union and Gaullist France in particular
have insisted upon the precedence of their interests and decisions over those of the U.N.
Council, and
The
when
the Soviet
"troika" system
Secretary General,
ing
else
into the
Secretariat.
The
ascendancy of
membership
New
29, 1961.
279
E \V
O F FOREIGN POLICY
members to 101, has drastically changed the disof voting power in the General Assembly and has caused a similar to that in the Security Council. That increase has
The Afro-Asian
if it
ly half the
son,
it
were
to vote in uniits
interests
or
else,
by
bloc,
become
the core of
however, the
been
ers
split,
By
splintering
its
vote,
it
power of
As
the
to op-
pose the will of a simple majority with the veto of more than onethird of the membership.
a result, the
investigations and
good
offices.
At
best,
such
as the restoration of
The impotence
of the Assembly gives the Soviet Union the opa frontal attack against the
portunity to launch
U.N.
as
an
efl^ective
by attacking the
late
Mr.
Ham-
marskjold personally and by trying to divest the office of the Secretary General of
all
office of the
has taken
on
is
which
policies
He became
the
as "a
dynamic instrument of
last
annual report. In
280
Threat to and
that capacity he
was bound
to
come
Union,
This conflict was inevitable because the long-term objectives of
Soviet foreign policy are irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of the
U.N.
such
as the
U.N.
is
The
Soviet
power of our time, which seeks the radical transformation of the status quo by whatever means at hand. Thus the U.N. has been a stumbling block in the path of the Soviet Union's march toward world domination, both during its first decade when Western influence prevailed and under the stewardship of Mr. Hammarskjold. It was not surprising that the Soviet Union would attack Mr. Hammarskjold as it had attacked his predecessor, Trygve Lie. However, the Soviet Union has today at its disposal two new weapons which allow it to attack not only the Secretary General
is
it, the U.N. itself as "a dynamic instrument of governments." One weapon is the new dis-
which
Union
tile
at the
very
least a
The other and more potent weapon is the power of the Soviet Union. Fifteen and even ten years ago, the power which the U.N. could muster in defense of the status quo, with American power as its backbone was superior to the power of
two-thirds majority.
actual
Today
quo
are
more nearly
the Soviet
in balance.
at
is
What
for
its
Union aims
not so
much
to succeed to the
own
These are the dangers that today threaten the very existence of
the
U.N.
as a
working
political organization.
What
way
of these threats?
They
are es-
new
in
its allies
In spite of
cesses,
its
number of
sucits
ability to act
it
all
of
its
members
to have
act
now
a
from
without
Palestine
prolonged war.
It
war of
1953. In 1948,
it
sent observers.
its
And
it
what
most ambi-
and order
in the
Congo.
its
become
Afro-Asian bloc.
Many
They
lack political,
them
new
If it
many
of the
new
them only
and
The United
U.N.
destroying
it.
its allies
have
a vital interest in
an effective
The U.N.
is
an obstacle,
way
of the
Communist
bloc.
are
committed
The United States and its allies They want what the
terri-
torial status
quo from
of the
U.N. and of
allies
coincide.
Thus
282
Threat to and
Hope
the latter cannot help defending and trying to strengthen the for-
mer as an effective organization. The U.N. is their natural ally, too. However, there is an interest that all nations, big and small. Communist and non-Communist, have in common: the avoidance of a nuclear war. That interest overrides all the other purely national interests that oppose or support the U.N. The United Nations was
created in 1945 for the purpose of ridding the world of the scourge
still
When
the chips
down and
may
U.N.
that
And
what
present
crisis?
The answer
upon the
ity of the
qualities of the
new
new
U.N. was
was
collective organs.
Had
its
an average
Thus
of a
new
Dag
Hammarskjold.
The U.N.
is
That challenge
is
the fashioning of a
new twoIts
The
bound
to be the
new
purpose
must be the avoidance of a nuclear war and the peaceful development of these nations in opposition to any latter-day imperialism. If
new members can accomplish this task, they will give the U.N. new lease on life. By doing this, they will have taken a big step toward assuring their own survival. They will also have demonstrated to all the world that they have come of age politically.
the
a
Once
limit the
the
U.N.
its
ability to act,
it
can make
a local
war,
as it
did in
283
two
from extreme positions without appearing to do so. Finally, and most important, it will have the opportunity to point the world in
the direction of replacing national sovereignty with supranational
decisions and institutions, for the fundamental
argument
in favor of
is
U.N.
will live
up
its
predecessors into
impotence
Assembly.
will in
284
32
An Approach
The
to the
Summit
London, and
ber.
The Premier
of the Soviet
in
Union
United States
Septem-
West Germany visited London in November and Paris in December. The Italian Prime Minister visited London in December. The President of the United States visited eleven na-
The Chancellor
of
and Europe
in
December.
Western summit
the Soviet
Union
in January.
The
France in March.
ington, and
visit
The
London, Wash-
Ottawa in April. The Union in May or June. And there will be an EastWest summit meeting in April or May. What is the purpose of these constant movements of heads of state and prime ministers? What have they achieved thus far, and what are they likely to achieve?
President of the United States will
the Soviet
The
declared purpose of
all
these travels
is
the
improvement of the
There can of course be no doubt that the international climate has in good measure been improved. To what extent this improvement has also increased the chances of preserving peace is
moot; but
It
this
is
must be noted
issues
which
at all
by
Khrushchev
all
changes no
common ground
the
Union and
a
lin is a
West could
policy.
common Western
From
On
negotiable issue at
the
all
the very question as to whether Berfrom the Western point of view, there
4, 1960.
285
N E W O F FOREIGN POLICY
no agreement between the United States and Great Britain, on West Germany, on the other.
left
the substan-
as
West
is
be-
cause
as
we
though
it
achieves,
good
in itself.
we
ward summit meetings, but toward negotiations with the Soviet Union on any level. Both attitudes, I submit, are irrational. There is nothing intrinsically good or bad in negotiations either at the summit or at a lower level. Negotiations are a means to an end. Under certain conditions, it is wise to negotiate; under others, it will do neither good nor harm; and under others still, negotiations will impair your cause. The wisdom of negotiations depends on three fundamental factors: the relative power position of the prospective negotiators, the susceptibility of the outstanding issues to a
Union and especially against equating negotiations with appeasement. At that time I cited former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Sir Winston Churchill in support of the proposition that the time was then ripe for a negotiated
settlement.
Among
ber
the
Winand Decemsaid:
former he
"I
now
a
me
to be very
come Government before it is too late. This would imply that the Western democracies, who should, of course, seek unity among themselves at the earliest moment, would
chance of preventing
war
is
We
. .
may
There are very grave dangers ... in letting everything run on and pile up until something happens, and it passes, all of a sudden, out of your
be absolutely sure that the present situation cannot
last.
.
286
An Approach
control." In the other speech he stated: "Finally,
I
to the
Summit
word
all
we
bomb
as well as
hope of avoiding
12,
world war."
also cited
which "record an
exist-
it
which
to
which
exists in
many
quar-
Acheson and Churchill were right ten years ago, as I still bethey were, they are right now. Yet the application of their principles to the present situation must lead to the conclusion that
If
lieve
Cold
War
moment
present.
The
we
are
no
another
way
we
are negotiating
this reversal
upon
view of Soviet
interests.
from weakness, and it has conit might well do The issues which by their very nature
of our position, as
ago
are,
with
one exception,
were then.
tion of the
now less susceptible to such a settlement than they And if we have a foreign policy beyond the preservastatus quo and of peace whose objectives we intend to
is
not aware of
it.
we we
sufficient to
we were
frightened
it
by
the
power of
the
uses to
which
ward
relations
Khrushchev ultimatum of November, 1958. Khrushchev frightened us, and so we invited him to come here and set the sequence of
into motion.
a feeling of
287
we meet
at the different
now we
reap
and
alas,
we
tary policy
which
what
it
Thus we have concentrated the national effort upon an allout atomic capability, mistaking what must remain one of the indisbudget.
pensable foundation stones of foreign policy for
strument.
its
day-by-day
in-
is
is
threat to use
it
in
is
both
insuffi-
you
sit
down
having
H-bomb, you only too seriously. In the former case, you will negotiate from utter weakness; in the other, you will provoke your destruction. Thus it is exactly because we are strong only in the most irrational and least flexible weapon of modern war that we are negotiating from weakness and not from
nothino- to threaten with but the
else take
strength.
we
What
which by
their
Not
all
issues outstandingr
between
in
the United States and the U.S.S.R. are, in terms of their objective
nature, susceptible to a negotiated settlement. Their nature
is
This being
at first
so, it
may sound
States
negotiated settlement
icy than they are now. For Stalin's objectives were limited; they
were by and
imperialism.
by
one.
map and
dealt
with one
by and
politics.
They
consisted of
both.
An Approach
and methods of
his predecessor.
to the Suvrmit
as
un-
Lenin
in that
main instrument
tion
Union
as
the most
on
earth,
which
will establish
its
it
version, aid
negotiate a settlement of
objectives
some of the outstanding issues; for since his were essentially limited and his methods essentially ortho-
room
what can you talk about with a is to bury you? What negotiable middle ground is there between your desire to stay alive and the other fellow's desire to put you six feet under? Shall we settle on three feet only? Obviously the fundamental issue which Khrugive-and-take of compromise. But
shchev's
new
is
in
its
ble to negotiation.
The very
issue
we
stay
or
we
perish.
Among
Western presence
in Berlin,
ment.
it is
Of
first is
by
cessfully through
continued improvement.
That improvement
is
The
Soviet
Government
to be,
own
citizens to
compare con-
political relations
States
For even
if
on
a massive scale,
we would
still
bury us that
is
to say,
whether
we
will
The
the
modalities of the
Western presence
in Berlin, in contrast to
Western
Un-
Western presence. The danger is considerable, however, that, seduced by the virtue of negotiations per se and compelled by our military weakness, we shall step by step first imperceptibly, then drastically- retreat from the substance of our position in Berlin. Spectacular meetto the
The outcome
proof
as to
provide ultimate
whether
Union
is
For nowhere
States
else
the
community of
interests
by
narrowly defined.
of atomic
If the
two
tests, it is
else.
hard to see
how
anything
where, of
stance of
Yet
this issue
up
American foreign
is
divided within
The Deconsist-
fense
in favor of
Department seems to have been weakening in its support what appears to be official American policy, the policy conflict within the government has never been authoritatively resolved. The President has committed himself in words to a policy seeking cessaof
tion,
departments.
And
no perfection
in ar-
An Approach
such an agreement have been able to sabotage
fection
to the
Swmmit
agreement
at
all.
While
capped
Asia?
in the field of
atomic disarmament
we
are handicapped
by
we
are handi-
by
What
are
we
after in
What
are
we
we
all
those meetings at
What
objectives are
we going
to pur-
what policies are we going to put to the test at those meetings? There is no positive answer to these questions beyond the preservation of the status quo by whatever policy requires the least
effort
and expenditure.
sterile
policies
demonstrations of summit meetings; the ordinary diplomatic procedures are perfectly sufficient to carry them through. But in a sense,
these
a dual
On
where there
is
only the
ini-
They
where
there
is
poHcy, become
a substitute for
it.
They become
part
make-believe
we
On
growth of
mutual
very
that
were true
relations
and that
to
such
visits
were bound
improve them
more,
we might
summit meetings. This argument, temptbecome irresistible among our allies. Two examples of this trend toward neutralism and accommodation with the Soviet Union have only recently come to my attention. Under
ing at home, threatens to
291
Democratic party
it is
is
split
One
of the
most
number of
end,
New
is
Year's edition.
me a One
War
about to come to an
why
In truth,
the policy of
act of es-
new
it
our
To
negotiate at the
summit with
is
a feeble head,
an unclenched
fist,
ways: Either
we
shall negotiate
to defend, or
we
will only
all
tiating at
down
the
292
PART A
V "VJ
THE RESTORATION
OF FOREIGN
POLICY
The
Specific Issues
33
is
The World
It
Situation
rash indeed to assume that the world
would be
moving
is
East-West
tensions.
What one
sions
is
While the
armed
obvi-
ous in view of both the interests of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev's
new
is
likely to
aid,
take the
and trade for gaining the allegiance of the uncommitted nations and
of some vacillating
It
on
either side.
seems to
me
issues,
it is
sons
most
importance from
good beginning
made
if
in this respect,
in the future.
But even
movement
remain open as to who shall conEurope and whether or not the whole world will go
still
will
bury
us.
The
not susceptible of
a negotiated settlement,
but
its
modali-
sian
There can obviously be no compromise between the Rusposition telling the West to get out of Berlin and the Western
if
they want
to,
Union
measure of satisfaction
in
Western
The
prob-
lem of disarmament
tests.
is
This issue has a very great symbolic importance, for the inter-
ests
of the Soviet
Answers
to questions posed
Tokyo, January,
weapons
is
con-
cerned. Furthermore, the cessation of nuclear tests constitutes a relatively simple and limited technical problem. If the United States
and the Soviet Union can reach agreement on this issue and make the agreement work, they will have taken an enormous symbolic
toward more important measures in the field of disarmament. If they cannot agree on this simple and limited issue it is difficult to visualize any other of the outstanding issues on which they could
step
agree.
As pointed out
already, the
new
America
intrinsic
would suspect
tition rather
compe-
In other words,
rather than
sue and
It is
is
by
themselves.
The West
is
aware of
this
paramount
isit.
in the process of
as
come To what
to re-
extent
moot
come to resemble each other in would simply lose its submass societies would then compete for
at present take
any
initiative
improvement of the
I
relations
with Communist
be
I would have welcomed such recognition ten years ago. In view of the present Chinese attitude, I cannot see what useful purpose recognition would serve, even if it were possible. In order to understand this argument,
a look at the position in which the Western which have actually recognized Communist China find them-
selves. It has
point of view.
296
The World
Situation
The
division of
is
indica-
West nor
terms.
as
It
the East
is
capable of
its
own
seems to
me
that nothing
long
prevails.
The
is
tion adequately,
like to
attainable
There
like
may
not be a
in the
because the interest of the belligerents to see their neutrality maintained outweighed their interest in seeing their neutrality destroyed.
There can be no doubt in anybody's mind that Japan vis-a-vis East and West is not in the same position in which Sweden and Switzerland found themselves vis-a-vis the belligerents of the two world wars. Japan is today again, potentially if not actually, the most powerful nation of Asia.
Anybody who
travels
and potential power of Japan. The United States has only one interest with regard to Japan: to withhold that power from Communist China and the Soviet Union. In other words,
States could be confident that the Soviet
if
the United
would be delighted
its
stride
would
But
least is
it
at
must
China
could add to
its
industrial potential
and
itself in a relatively
297
exactly
quality,
What
has
changed are only the auspices. Twenty years ago it was Japan who wanted to use the manpower and resources of China for the purposes of
it
its
imperialism.
Today
and,
more
particularly,
tomorrow
which
human
and material resources of Japan for its purposes. The neutrality of Japan would open the door to Chinese imperialism and would make
it
Only
way
is
of these designs.
That
this
is is
is
which China
genuinely neu-
tralist nation, a
commitments
its
as a
kind of standing
territorial objectives
Considering
how much
is
more
it is
attractive Japan
India,
as
not
difficult to
Japan were
militarily
uncommitted
can escape the
today.
is
The
or not
its
of
existence but
whether
risks
by
retreating
would of course
think
it
This being
so,
is
how
it
can
minimize the
I
States.
development for
as well.
An
as
inde-
in the
hands of
a nation
such
Great
me
to be a self-defeatina absurdity.
Japan
298
is,
very
much
in the position
The World
of Great Britain.
It is
Situation
few well-placed H-bombs. It can have no defense of its own must be defended against it by the only nation which has the power to do so, the United States. Yet, while Japan cannot defend itself against a nuclear attack by nuclear weapons of its own, it ought to be able to defend itself against a
by
a
How
large
these
how
whose auspices they ought to operate are technical questions which do not feel competent to answer. However, I am prepared to state that Professor Sakamoto's idea of a combined Japanese-United NaI
me
as original
299
34
Prospect for a
New
Foreign Policy
I
sat
down
to write an
why
On
in the conduct of American foreign policy. was reasonable. The President-elect enjoyed marshal popular support for any foreign policy
unilateral
disarmament to preventive
uniquely prepared,
The new
and
War
as
fore
was able to
what the new foreign policy was likely to be had already appeared. The article was never finished, and the history of the last eight years has shown how mistaken my original estimate was. These sobering reminiscences provide an appropriate background
of
for evaluating the prospects of
new
administration.
On
at
American foreign policy under the paper, again. Rusk, Bowles, Stevenson, and least as good as Dulles ever did, and Mr.
Kennedy's The Strategy of Peace is as sound a statement of the requirements of American foreign policy for the sixties as was Mr.
Dulles'
book
for the
fifties.
The
high-powered
team,
every
member
of
which
state.
is
qualified, in his
own
particular
way, to
be secretary of
those
carry
out
is
policy,
Regardless of their
They may
at
little
freedom of movement by
loosenina some
From
300
Prospect for a
chains, but they cannot break
down
walls. Whatever they may have worked for when they were not
office,
they are
in
prison,
and
their
ability to
like to
do depends only
in part
upon
themselves.
left to
a heritage
much
to the
was
still
its
in
owing
military role of
dispensable to
it;
new circum-
(The
policy
is
indicated,
in
think,
by
book of
mine published
for the A4inds of
It
1951:
"The Struggle
Men.")
failing of Dulles that he
ments of
in
the foreign policy he had inherited while at the same time resisting
its
adaptation to
new
conditions.
When
a
resolved that
to him.
to
policy,
ticularly,
by
made
it
his first
order of business
and
policies the
But
as a result
freedom of action to
world-wide Maginot
image of
line
fast
manned by invincible American military might and its steadallies. However popular that policy was, it proved unsuccessful
outside Europe,
military policy
which
vacillates
fectual response,
on the other,
is
communism. And
so far as the
acute threat of
coexistence"
is
Communist
response but actual ammunition for the enemy. Meanwhile, with the
essentially futile,
and even
self-
world
situation has
changed
in at least
The
as
now
an atomic power.
And
if
number of
now
it
in the process
above
its
all, is
likely to
become
a first-rate
power:
gun
in Latin
extent at the
new
expana
com-
and
potential, of the
Com-
munist system.
The
task of the
new
administration,
if it
lies
and
re-
with our
tion
allies,
uncommitted
between domestic
the
ic
Communist
atom-
power.
The
ropean
302
several alliances of
States
is
member owe
their existence to
allies, as
two
Prospect for a
New Foreign
Policy
to have American economic, military, and and the United States objective of containing by military means the Soviet Union and Communist China in the Mid-
the Second
World War
political support;
dle East
first
type
The economic
recov-
ery of the nations of Western Europe and the former enemies has
made them less dependent upon American support than they once were. As a consequence, they have at times been able to pursue their own narrower interests regardless of indeed, to the detriment of the common interests of the alliance. The Kennedy administration must find a new foundation for these alliances, one which reflects more faithfully the present underlying community of interests of the major nations of the non-Communist world. These alliances were
They must now be given an economic, political, and cultural content as well. The transformation of the Cold War into what is now called "competitive coexistence"
primarily conceived in military terms.
has revealed the essential unsoundness of the policy of military con-
tainment
as
between East and West has taken on more and more the aspects of
a struggle for the
in the
uncommitted na-
and foreign
minds are
If the
likely to be at best of
worst a
political handicap.
United States
is
to
wage
minds of men
for: the
new grand
strategy.
all
Two
integration of
particular, the
Kennedy
The uncommitted
also
Kennedy
administration
with
problem
in political organization.
Many
of the
new
na-
tions
owe
their existence to
mere accidents of
303
become
and
now
new
imperialism
new
com-
the
It
new
is
administration.
bound to have a upon our ability to wage the struggle for the minds of men with any chance of success. The new administration needs
States, especially in the field of race relations, are
direct influence
to be fully
aware of
conduct of domestic
policies,
it
policies.
Where
it
must
at least give
Throughout the better part of American drew strength and its attractiveness to
The
in-
American experiment
beingr so
in
government and
social organization
bv^
was
It
other nations as
was
meant
as a
to emulate.
The new
administra-
which we must look to the Kennedy administration to undertake, will depend upon the kind of relations which are established with the Communist bloc;
The
ultimate
outcome of
these
new
policies,
for, if in the
relations
might
in the
self-
defeating in so far as
it
would bring
world war fought with atomic weapons. Thus the Kennedy administration
fully
without
risk of
war.
The
first
pre-
bloc.
The second
if
need
be,
Western atomic
The
risk of
war
304
Prospect for a
will diminish only in the
New Foreign
Policy
might
ignite a
war can be reduced, at the same time that deterrence war is strengthened. even if the Kennedy administration should be successful
all
world
can
weapons
world.
number of
we
in co-operation
The
bound
to
become
a reality
it is
reversed;
if
like-
which
be beyond the
To
Kennedy
if
administration
it.
by
its
approach to
this
task
and
its
success in accomplishing
Nevertheless,
even
the
new
I
administration
were
to
devise
sound
good measure depend upon factors, such as the policies of other nations, over which the government of the United States has no control. It would also depend upon the ability of the American
would
policies,
is
This problem
stemming
from our constitutional arrangements and political system. The problem arises in four different areas of policy formation: in the relations between the President and the Secretary of State; between the Secretary and the Department of State; between the President and Secretary of State, on the one hand, and other executive departments, on the other; and, finally, between the President and
Secretary of State, on the one hand, and Congress and public opinion at large, on the other.
The
President
is
Amerhis
supposed to be
main aide
lations
between the President and the Secretary of State have conformed to this constitutional intent only when the President was in
effect his
own
State
Department
or
tinius relations;
case of
Roosevelt did Math Hull, or given him a free hand, normally ratifying his decisions, as Eisenhower did with Dulles.
When
both the
President and the Secretary of State have had their strong and different convictions about foreign policy, conflict has
result.
Within the
when
The
relations
pursued in the
thir-
by Ambassador Kennedy in London and Ambassador Dodd in Berlin come to mind. That problem is superimposed upon the ever
present task of fashioning a bureaucracy, set in
ble instrument of a
its
ways, into
a plia-
new policy.
if
The new
trant,
not recalci-
department.
He
also
impose their
new
foreign policy
upon other departments of the executive branch which may be committed to a diflrerent policy. The official Far Eastern policy of the United States, for example for all practical purposes, the policy of two Chinas not only is being obstructed by the government of Taiwan but has also been opposed in practice by
certain groups within the State and Defense Departments.
The
offi-
cial
been openly challenged in word and deed by the Atomic Energy Commission. The new administration, which must soon make crucial decisions on this latter problem, minimizes its chances
tests has
for successful negotiations slim as they are in view of the objective nature of the issue
it is
unable to com-
mit
its
own
agencies to a
is
common
position.
Finally,
it
can only go
as far in its
as
Congress and
The
is
task of
always
latter
former to the
irresistible.
The
foreign policies
new
fer
administration must embark are not only new in that they from those which have been pursued up till now. They are
also
306
Prospect for a
startling in that
tions.
New Foreign
Policy
The
words
first
of
all
restore a sense
of reality to the
American people.
and
The demands which these tasks make upon the courage, wisdom, ability of the Kennedy administration are superhuman, in view
less
predecessor.
Whoever
be disappointed.
We
Ken-
spirit
nedy administration if it can give American foreign policy and awareness and a consistent movement in the right
new
direc-
tion.
307
35
istration
months
in office, the
has registered
two
Cuban
The Republidis-
can opposition
naturally,
are
disenchanted because
Lebanon and Guatemala. The Demoall that was wrong with United
States foreign policy has not been set right since January 20, as they
Most significant, the administration is disenchanted with itself; it has come to recognize that intelligence and initiative are not enough to vouchsafe success in foreign policy. Quite a number of Hamlets must have walked the battlements of the White House in recent nights, debating with themselves the rethought
it
would
be.
lation
action.
Two
toward
One
is
We
all
share to
to
new
administration
its
all
the achievements
in vain
from
predecessor.
We
expect dra-
bound
to be disappointed.
unsuccessful the
preceding administration
may
be, the
upon the
freedom of
is
action.
An
new
administration's
freedom of
As long
as
Khrushchev
insists
upon
a Soviet veto
on the
political decisions
of
Ken-
From
308
the
3,
1961.
dead
letter.
As long
as President
and an independent position for Europe, under French leadership, it will remain impossible for the Kento
nedy administration
the Atlantic alliance.
do what
as a
it
wants to do,
e.g.,
to strengthen
Furthermore, in so far
start
new
new
policies
cies are
tion, for
aid. It will
take
new
policy to
it
down through
field, if
officials
tive assumptions,
tics,
about the relations between foreign aid and economic developstability, social stability
and
They
are not
political sophistication
and
manipulative
late the
Yet even
after
how
to trans-
new
may
new
policy to show.
is
Our disenchantment
which
it
also
Kennedy
if it
One
That
of these tasks
is
war
in the
from
operation of the
Communist powers
a similar
in covering
up
may soon
treats.
be faced with
As concerns American power vis-a-vis they are living in a dream world which
especially in
its its
strength to get
Kennedy administration that it moment when the veil which had hidden an
obstreperous
309
some of the contours of a disturbing reality. The reassuring slogans which for eight long years we had taken to
enough
to
at least
show
now
Since
nobody
American people
is
what the
is
administration
widely susit
aggression because
The
people
Kennedy
administration for
its
failure to
do what
it
was expected
to
do but was incapable of doing in view of What is worthy of blame here is the
also
is
Its
com-
mission
is,
What
sensibilities
but
we were shocked by
failed. It
is
that
man-
When
it
Cuba,
it
up
against Fidel
if it
it
they
live
un-
der
pro-Communist government,
such
as
danger of do-
ing
so, as is
South Vietnam,
it
needed, then,
rriilitary
from Communist
administration
is
warfare,
we must
what
reply in kind.
it
The
therefore emphasizing
calls
"paramilitary operations,"
to
of Nazi
Germany and
power on
regimes
came
to
totalitarian
have come to
freedom and self-government, actual or potential, for order social justice. Such regimes cannot be
invasions, but only
overthrown by counterrevolutionary
by
the vi-
Where
it
guerrilla warfare
is
as
was
in
But where
ular revolution, as
was
in
by seeming to look to counter-guerrilla warfare as its main answer to Communist revolution, falls into the trap of assuming that what works well for the Communists must work equally well for us, if only we make the
popular base, must
fail.
The
administration,
effort to imitate
it.
official
up another
real
Kennedy
from
made
To
a
that purpose,
at least
on the top
level,
number
of in-
it is
not likely to
work
The
recommenda-
no substitute for the dialectic confrontation of such views and recommendations in a group which can put differing opinions to the test of empirical verification and logitions
isolated individuals
cal analysis. Also, in a contest
by
among
who
can boast of
a small
i.
men
men
unchecked by practical
Thus
when
he had to
make
a decision
its
original function as
raises
another
We
who
all
smile in
ment: that a
definition
memory of what was once a maxim of our governman who knows how to run General Motors knows by how to run the Department of Defense, and that a man
a payroll
has
met
must
It
is,
also be capable of
ments of government.
man
to run a university
knows how to lecture and write books knows by to make foreign policy.
definition also
who how
The
of,
is
frequently devoid
that quality
which
is
wisdom.
It is possible
which
is
another
way
of saying that one can be very intelligent and very foolish at the
same time.
the very
practical
essential
Woodrow Wilson
was
Harry Truman had wisdom without being an intellectual. Two qualities are in the statesman which are not necessarily present in the
least,
knowledge, of judgment, of
to a grand design
commitment
intellectual
is
born of
which
by the
awareness of
fied
limits.
The
triumph in
his little
world. In the world of the intellectual, ideas meet with ideas, and
is
wrong
one's
ideas
To
stand
ground
is
which
of history
mind
and character, from that innocuous and frequently irrelevant pastime which
we
call
Perhaps
it is
by
deal about purpose but appears to lack a sense of direction, and calls
upon the people for sacrifices without being able to tell them what to do. Here indeed is the administration's failure of omission. And
it is
first
of
all
When
first in
sending a
man
to
game according
And when-
in beautiful prose.
The quandary
of the administration in
a
knowing
that
it
must give
new direction and instil it with a new how to go about it stems from the contasks before
it
its
dismay
it
thought
it
had when
tests
assumed
The
The
positions
on Berlin appear
The At-
Our
riorating.
This being
so,
the administration
naturally tempted to
stakes
its
upon
the un-
knowing
It is
it
in the
back of
of the worst.
ular,
but
cannot
to lead
mind the inevitability bound to be popto disaster. Here the administration is put its brain power to work on a task
its
collective
it is
of constructive statesmanship.
It
sterile
313
which equal
in
boldness the novelty of our tasks and the urgency of the dangers
that face us.
The
tasks of greatest
urgency are
national
administration were to
it
embark upon
with
sufficient boldness,
money
or of
toil
The
on the
altar of
but
in the
long run
it is
of our national
Our awareness
is
We
have been
told
and
we know
that there
is
life
and certainly
our
ills.
tradi-
What
the dis-
policies
of thinking which apparently goes into them, on the one hand, and
led to believe about our condition and what we know to be true. History will judge the Kennedy administration on how well it meets the challenge of bringing its thought and action
up to the
314
36
uals,
What
the
Big
Two
some
through
came before King Solomon, each claiming the baby as her own, raised an issue which in its very nature could not be settled through
negotiations.
The
all
as
though
it
could be
possi-
by
could not.
The
bility of settling
upon the intentions and skill of the negotiators. The limits within which the negotiators can usefully operate are circumscribed by the objective nature of the outstanding issues. Only in so far as the conflicting interests from which these issues have arisen can be
in part
reconciled
terests are
is
not concede even in part no amount of talk will make either party
yield.
What,
States
and the Soviet Union, and to what extent do they lend themselves
to a negotiated settlement, assuming that one can be reached with
allies?
The momentous
It arises
issue of the
all
others in
from the challenge which communism has flung in the face West and from the West's response to it. This challenge and that response concern the future political and social organization of the world. Communism is convinced that it will inherit the world
of the
after
it
we
Union
New
20, 1959.
(as
as
all
Western foreign
its
triumph), and
world-wide triumph of
see, to the
it.
That
shall
we
We
belief
by negotiating
in 1933
else
do
its
is
one of the
the world,
them
in turn:
Of
atic
the issues
which might be
settled
The
system-
West
in
all
the essentials of
economic, and
social life,
had to shun
all
contacts which
inv^idious comparisons.
rise
With
and the
by
Union
has opened
its
gates to a
Western persons and ideas, and the United States has responded in kind. Nothing of an objective nature stands in the way of the United States and the Soviet Union's agreeing upon the
mxodest degree to
scale.
As long
as the
Union maintains
it
its
mass media of
communications,
citizens.
It
must be
re-
membered
may
be desirable in them-
which separate the two nations. Even if every adult American and Russian were to visit the other's country and learn the other's language and understand each other perfectly, the question as to whether the world is fated to be transformed by communism would still
divide the United States and the Soviet Union.
316
What
the Big
Two
The issue of Europe and Berlin is contained in the question, Where ought the western boundaries of the Soviet empire to be? The Soviet Union has consistently claimed that they ought to be
where they
are today, following
at the
by and
demarcation fixed
was only
provisional
political
The Western
presence in
the tangi-
Union
symbol of
unresolved
issue,
Western
permanence of the
division of
empire
is
based.
West
side has
Yet
provided the
discussion can be
moved from
world of
political
and military
The
Soviet
these
boundaries westward, and the United States will not push them back
east. If proof for the latter proposition were needed, American abstention during the Hungarian uprising of 1956 provided it. Why, then, must Mr. Khrushchev, as did Stalin before him, reopen an issue which the facts of life have settled? Why must he get excited over our "Captive Nations Week," as though he did not know that a nation which relies for the attainment of an objective upon nothing but divine intervention induced by organized prayer
toward the
know
Theodore Roosevelt, "to treat elocution as a substitute for action, to rely upon high-sounding words unbacked by deeds," to combine "the loose tongue and the unready hand." If he does not know he ought to be told. But he ought also to be told even though
know it by now that when we speak as a nation we mean what we say. While we shall continue to hope and pray for
he ought to
a retraction of the Soviet empire without doing anything about
it,
we
shall
prevent
its
If the
United States
317
political
and military
facts
by implication the
status
States, both, as
it
were, until further notice, which both sides would expect to be very
in
coming.
Khrushchev have
upon
of
Cobden
century ago,
our
own
what foreign trade can do for private profits and internaBut the Russian leaders are not liberals. They want foreign trade, and they want it very badly, because they need it to
praises of
tional peace.
implement
the Soviet
ty.
their domestic
and foreign
political
and military
policies.
upon
his ability to
make
Union
economic productivi-
That productivity,
trade, will be the
and
Union means
if it
The United
Soviet
States has
shown a spectacular lack of interest in Union for exactly the same reason that the
its
Union
is
it so,
too. It can
do so the more
per cent of
Union
is
cantamounting
if
its
total
unlikely to
become
significant
even
much more
than
it
some or all of its statutory reUnion wants to buy from the United States can expect to sell, so that it would have to finance
with gold or through massive
credits.
American imports
either
This
ac-
is
centuated by the fact that the United States already obtains from
other sources the commodities which the Soviet Union could
sell.
Yet
318
it is
What
Soviet
the Big
is
Two
Union poses an
it
issue
which
political that
could be affected by a
political
agreement.
An Amer-
form of increased trade might be a proper Russian guarantee of the status quo in Berlin, especially
as cira
is
by
its
very nature
most
much
The
manner that
has not even
is,
as a
political
United States
bargaining
power of which
it
begun
to take advantage.
What
conflicts
a general proposition,
divorced from a settlement of the political which have caused the armaments race, is as futile as its attraction seems to be ineradicable. Disarmament has proved viable,
however,
when
it
was
and
Why
if
do the United
States
Union
favor
by
can
force of arms.
As
longr as that
mutual fear
would
create con-
fidence in the stability of the status quo, the United States and the
Soviet
Union would be
at least in a state of
mind
to consider serious-
form of disengagethan
as a
ment or otherwise.
The
is
is
important
less in itself
symbol.
case
which
will
show whether
there
however technically limited and however strongly supinterest, on whose settlement the United States and the Soviet Union can agree. That common interest is the common fear of atomic destruction, the danger of which is inherent in the atomic armaments race and is enormously increased by the impending dispersal of atomic weapons into the hands of any number
any
issue,
ported by
common
of governments.
On
319
man-
provide
earnest
on anything.
other great world issues which confront the Soviet
States
Two
Union
rea-
are at
least at
negotiated settlement.
They
are the
son they cannot be settled between the United States and the Soviet
neither
bargain.
we nor
much
of anything
last
year,
when
defined with
automatically excluded.
Union had repeatedly proposed, could not have been It must be excluded now, for with political
flux,
and the Soviet Union have nothing to dispose of because they have
nothing to control: the
Soviet
West no
Union
Egypt
it
once
did.
The
state of the
uncommitted na-
Soviet Union.
The same
Asia.
Even
if
to eye
on how to
for
which
it
is
the prin-
United States
and
Union cannot speak for a ominously growing in power and ambition, when
vious that the Soviet
terests are at stake.
How will
aff'ect
the prospect
of negotiations?
to neutralize the
As the common
United
States'
ought
common
fear of a
China which
320
may
well be on
its
way
to
What
the Big
a
Two
800 million
in possession of the
in
power
must have
a vital interest in
seeing
two
nearest competitors
mind emso
by
not
sfettintr
The mood
United States and the Soviet Union approach each other ought to
be tempered by the awareness of
this
new
configuration whose
that
just
begun
in
to appear
mood
tempered,
it
ought to be
easier for
them
to envisage settle-
ments of the
issues
which
The mood
of
more than
just
a subjective state
on our
challenge
communism
and,
on the Russian
desperation.
side, the
Communist conviction
world might While their common anxiety over the potential threat of China must draw the two sides closer together, mutual fear and suspicion must pull them farther apart. Obthat a capitalism defeated in peaceful contest for the
resort to a
war of
viously, that
dispelled
mood cannot
It
it
to be
by
from which
it
springs
it.
remain unchanged.
And
so
we end where we
States
fear
and
two
The Cold
War
is a cancer, feeding the unsettled issues as it is fed by them. That vicious circle can be broken only in the realm of facts, through making a beginning with the settlement of a concrete issue. Of the
Curtain
is
both
the
Trade
is
politically
and
militarily.
Disarma-
the short run and the cessation of atomic tests in the long run are
By
now.
321
two
were
would
its
threatens to
as a
War
lease in
issues,
is
armed
conflict.
Remove
is
that focus
its
by
War
deprived of
no longer anything to
be, but of
still
a difi^erent sort.
They would
We
would
and ingenuity were not equal to the task upon whose achievethe fate of the world depends.
ment
We
would suspect
that
we
has
might not possess the determination and courage the task required,
for the Cold
War would
a
it
two conceptions of man, two principles of social and political organization, two visions of mankind's future. That contest cannot be settled by the give-andalways been primarily:
take of negotiations.
their \\'ork
It will
on the
political plane,
by
of performance.
Which system
will
human
Cold
War
be
settled.
322
tJ
The Problem of
Berlin
Premier Khrushchev did not raise the issue of November, 1958, and again in June, 1961, for purposes of propaganda or to meet demands from China or from within the Kremlin. He raised it as a means to the ends of Soviet policy. As concerns Germany, the Soviet Union pursues three ends: the removal of Berlin as a provocative reminder of Communist weakness, the separation of West Germany from the Western camp, and the
Berlin in
stabilization of the territorial status quo.
The main objective of Soviet foreign policy in Europe since the Second World War has been the stabilization of the western frontiers
as
two
by
the Soviet
Union
He viewed
which
divides
Germany
as the definitive
boundary
line
between
the
two
spheres. Stalin
made numerous
The United
military demarcation
boundary of Germany
line. It
if
has
achieved
frontiers of
if
not
it may seem, Khrushchev has called into question quo of Berlin because he seeks the stabilization of the territorial status quo of Europe, and the United States is committed to the defense of the status quo of Berlin because it refuses to acknowledge the territorial status quo of Europe as definitive. The
Paradoxical as
the status
German
symbolic manifestation
latter,
raised the
From
the
W ashmgton
Post, July
1961.
once-united
The Western presence in Berlin the former capital of a Germany and the potential capital of a reunited Gerdivision of
Ger-
By
to force the
West
i.e.,
what
it
The
issue
shall
Khrushchev has
rule
who
what and whether what is ruled by the Soviet Union now shall be ruled by it in perpetuity, its rule being recognized as legitimate by the West. This is the issue from which the Cold War arose and which has divided the United States and the Soviet Union ever since. It is the stuff of which hot wars are made as well.
It is in
accord with
his
terri-
torial
directly but, as
Khrushchev has not raised the Berlin issue as a by-product of recognition of the East German government. It is true that he has told the Western powers,
status
quo
that
it
were,
form of the Berlin blockade, "Get out!" But how does he propose to get them out? He plans to do it by replacing the
rests
a
with
tell
he can
Western powers, "Whatever rights you are going to have in Berlin you must negotiate with the East German government, to which we are transferring our control over the access to Berlin." Khrushchev is a much more subtle and ingenious adversary than Stalin was. He tries to make it appear that what is at stake is not the freedom of West Berlin and the freedom of Western access to it but only a change in the legal title which would leave the substance of the present rights intact. In truth, of course, the freedom of West Berlinan island in a Red sea and of the Western access to it derives not from a legal document but from the Western military presence
the
in
West
its
Berlin.
West
on
military establishment in
West
Berlin,
in
West
Soviet
The
Union
324
The Problem
avoid such a direct military confrontation in
of Berlin
else-
Germany and
its
objectives rather
by
indirection, especially
through the interposition of proxies. The attempt to interpose the German government between the Soviet Union and the West
a typical
technique to
policy:
Germany
the face of
for
it
raises
an issue of the
afraid of a
as the
instrument of a
East
line.
German policy which would recognize neither German government nor the legitimacy
For
this reason,
of the Oder-Neisse
status
quo
in
Europe
On
he
may
Chancelhap-
Adenauer
East
German
unguarded moments.
He
by
its
is
frontiers. It
made him
it
seemingly
peremptory form
in
November,
is
1958.
Khrushchev, then,
to peace
quo
in
stemming from
greater and
much
less
remove. This dilemma provides the Western powers with an opportunity for constructive statesmanship.
However, they
are handi-
capped by
dilemma of
their
own.
not subject to negotiations; the
325
The
Western
quo
in
Europe
is
West German
from the
West
to the East
is
The
Western
implies a denial of
its
symin the
That the
territorial status
quo
in
Germany
its
will
remain
is
eastern frontier,
is
admitted by
all
concerned
in the
loud-
by Khrushchev.
15,
"We
June
with
Germany
by
the
now
atives
simple operation,
It
is
seems to put
to
a seal
on what already
exists."
Western dilemma comes into play. say bluntly what the statesmen of the
West, those of Germany included, can only whisper among thembecause, with regard to the
German
question,
the Soviet
Union holds an enormous advantage over the West. The Soviet Union has it in its power to unify Germany and move the frontiers of Germany eastward whenever it wishes. It only needs to withdraw its support from the East German government and divide Poland with Germany again for the fifth time in two centuries. What the Soviet Union would ask of a united and restored Germany in return would not necessarily be its communization but as a minimum the transfer of its support from the West to the East. West Germany has joined the Western camp because it mistrusts the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union and has confidence in the aims and power of the West. If the West were to speak of the frontiers of Germany as Khrushchev has spoken, West Germany
326
The Froblem
of Berlin
to choose
in
terms of
West Ger-
many what it wants, the advantage would remain with the Soviet Union. West Germany would then be tempted to strike a bargain
with the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev has indeed voiced the expectation that sooner or later this will happen.
sake of the very same prize the allegiance of
What,
First, it
West do?
It
presence in
West
Berlin with
Its
munications.
whoever effectively controls the lines of comaim must be the preservation of the symbolic sig-
upon
its
Second,
it
Germany, it can try to contribute to the stabilization of quo in Europe without increasing the danger of
war. Finally, in doing
its
German
civil
this,
the
West must
it
try to
own
dilemma. Whatever
contributes to
quo must be compatible with commitment to the unification of Germany. It must somehow manage to bridge the gap between what it has so often declared it will do in Germany and what it can do.
the stabilization of the territorial status
its
verbal
It is
difficult to
achieve
achievement
qualities of statesmanship,
both
come by and
if
less
certain of
popularity in the short run than that verbal bravery which the
crowd
is
forthcoming, the
West
will be faced
war on behalf of
Berlin and
its
West
Berlin
which
will destroy
West
freedom
as well.
327
38
make
The End of an
Illusion
historian
great
of naif it
boon
at
The
Berlin
crisis, if
we come
out of
it
alive,
One
of them
the short-
Thus
we may
sight
it
crisis in
Khrushchev but
crises of the fu-
own
ways.
And
\\t
may
turewhich
day if we
Western
skill
Rather
it
will be
interests
inevitable.
That
power which
has occurred during the last decade has increased the Russian ad-
vantageso Khrushchev seems to think decisively. The effectiveness of the legal arrangements safeguarding the
in Berlin
Western
position
perform
the
prospective
capital
of
united
Germany were
locally,
West. That distribution was always unfavorable to the West and it has now turned against the West in the world arena.
From Coumientary, November,
328
1961.
The End
It is
of an Illusion
many was
no exaggeration to say that the fate of Berlin and all of Gerdecided on the battlefields of the Second World War and
not by the war and postwar agreements which have borne most of
the blame. Both Churchill and Stalin
should
have
known that
is
in
possession
another
way
ment you will be able to obtain after the conclusion of the war will in good measure be determined by the kind of military strategy you
are willing and able to pursue during the war.
The
ability of the
Soviet
Union
to
conquer
all
The
location
the
mercy of
It
whole
on the assumption
absence of extraor-
by
a victorious
torious
a legal
war could be changed by anything but another vicwar and, more particularly, that these facts would yield to
exist.
The
failure
doomed
to
from the
outset, to maintain a
modicum
of Western influence
Army
had con-
which most of Eastern Europe had traditionally reacted to the colossus from the East, free elections in Eastern Europe could be considered by the Soviet Union only as a weapon with which first to limit, and then to destroy, Soviet control. Thus it was Utopian to
expect that the Soviet Union would jeopardize
to
its
conquests in order
make good on
a legal
promise to
competitor
who
had
lost his
ability to enforce
such
It
has as-
which was
established
in 1945 dividing
Germany
into Soviet
line
many and
The
329
upon
free elections. It
is
of course a fore-
gone conclusion
Germany would
in, say,
bring
Poland would
mean the end of Soviet control there. The Soviet Union could not be expected
mantling of
irresistible
its
West was
unwilling to
make or
it
re-
West which
was not
West's power to
line in
offer.
Oder-Neisse
favor of
envisaged in
in East-
consequence of
radical change
power
ern and Central Europe which the West was unable to bring about by peaceful means. The liberation of Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany on Western terms could have been accomplished only by a victorious war. However, the United States shrank from the risk of war even when it possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons and when the issue was not to liberate a nation of Eastern Europe but
to support a liberation already accomplished, as in the case of the
policy
it was willing to use. Between words pronounced and the actions contemplated there has been gap which could remain invisible only so long as the West was
its
actions with
its
It
now
with
forces the
West
its
to face
two
alternatives,
dangerous
its
in
different
ways: eating
relations
West Germany,
gering
its
very existence.
The
chancelleries of the
Western
nations, that of
it is
Bonn
included,
many on Western
diplomatic or mili-
upon the Soviet Union. Why, then, have they years refused, in the historic words of General Clay
330
The End
spoken
in Berlin
of an Illusion
on September
twofold.
The
illusion of
our
by-product of
foreign policy
itself.
more fundamental illusion about the nature of It was as a protection against having to face
we
illusion of
our
That fundamental illusion soothes our collective ego, and it is much more pleasant than the reality which it has superseded. Furthermore, it has been the most important ingredient of
policy.
German
West Germany
to the
Western
alliance.
Our
leaders
saw
in the Yalta
futile
attempt
it
was to undo with words the actual expansion of Russian power, but the beginning of a new and noble chapter in the history of international relations. As President Roosevelt put it in his report to Congress on the Yalta Conference:
spells the
unilateral
We propose to substitute
To
which
own
upon
By
continuing to
elections,
all
fault.
or coherent action;
it
ac-
Thus
it
illusion
of
having
a policy
and
liabiHties
which
in that
a policy entails.
this illusion
While
it
had but
a negative
had
upon the
of West Germany. We induced West Germany to join NATO and make herself the strongest European member of the Western alli-
this
unification and to
331
What
all
the governments
a
a verbal
commitment and
solemn undertaking to
inability of the
West
its
way
commitments has suddenly brought the illusory character of what it Germany opinion home to West thought was a policy of unification and revision of the eastern fronverbal
tiers;
is
is
which
West is now forced to admit, at least by way of achieving the objectives for the many joined the Western alliance.
This
is
sake of
it
The West
frontiers
is
incapable of unifying
its
is
Germany and
I
revising
its
eastern
through
own
initiative,
the Soviet
Union
not so incapable. As
years ago:
Only
will
the Soviet
Union has
it
in its
power
minimum
of
German
Germany. Nobody
doubt that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to throw the munists of Eastern Germany overboard if it could buy with so
nificant a sacrifice the neutrality,
if
Cominsig-
not the support, of a unified German nation. Looking at the international scene through the distorting lenses of ideological animosity, we tend to forget that other nations are much
less likely
than
we
Germans nor
as seriously as
port
we do. The mutual supthen Germany, and Russia in challenging the rest of Europe is older than the issue of communism. tradition of two centuries testifies to its persistence. If Stalin was able to come to an underof, first, Prussia,
communism
much
to
regret he can be expected to deal with whoever may succeed Hitler as the head of a united Germany, on terms advantageous to both and surely for Germany less disadvantageous than to serve as the battle-
ground
world war.
Furthermore, only the Soviet Union is capable of satisfying to whatever extent it wishes a probable objective of a united Germany which ranks second only to unification itself: the rectification of Germany's
The End
eastern frontiers.
of an Illusion
The
Soviet
grandizement of Czechoslovakia and, more particularly, of Poland at the expense of Germany for reasons of power politics. There is no stronger cement sealing the alliance between the Soviet Union and its two strongest neighbors to the west than the latters' dependence upon Russian protection for their new frontiers. What ties Czechoslovakia and Poland to the Russian chariot is not national sympathy nor is it the affinity of po-
power of the Soviet Union, must defend the western frontiers of these two satellites against a Germany allied with the West. However, if the Soviet Union could advance the western limits of its sphere of influence from the Order-Neisse line and the Elbe to the Rhine by winning a united Germany over to its side, what reason would there be for the Soviet Union to protect the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia and Poland
litical
ideologies. It
in its
is
the overwhelming
which
own
interest
against a friendly
Germany,
especially
if
Germany
could be bought by the surrender of these frontiers? Faced with a choice between the potent enmity or sullen indifference of a resentful Germany and the hapless enmity of its abandoned satellites, Stalin would not hesitate to do what the tsars did time and again, and what he himself did once before: sacrifice the interests of Poland on the altar of Russo-Ger-
man
friendship.
What
Stalin
will
do
if
the oppor-
tunity presents
By
commitments for
preciably closer.
policies,
we
Thus
the iceman
cometh
to nations, as he does to
men.
1
(New York:
Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1951),
pp. 196-97.
333
39
world
Neutralism
Neutralism, the desire not to be aligned with
Cold War,
all
is
today
in
Virtually
it
the
it
new
openly espoused
and made
less articulate,
the trend
strong even
which belong
as
two
blocs.
Nations such
England, France,
their
Japan,
who
were masters of
own
fate
alliance
masses of their peoples wish they were not so committed. That such
tendencies are not limited to this side of the Iron Curtain was clearly
revealed
by
which
at least
temporarily
year,
by the Hungarian revolution of the same which produced the Nagy government's declaration of neutrality between East and West. This world-wide trend toward neutralism has baffled the United States. On the one hand, challenged by a communism which seeks the dominion of the world and is convinced that it will attain it,
international scene, and
many
nations as
way
of
life
and support
its
point of view.
On
the
other hand,
it is
many
nations
The United
moved from
a speech
a nation
John Foster Dulles expressed the then prevailing mood when, in on June 9, 1956, he defined neutrality as the pretense "that
can best gain safety for
itself
by being
27, 1961.
indiff"erent to the
From
334
the
New
Neutralism
fate of others.
an immoral
because
it
go to the other pole of finding virtue in neutralism ahgnment with the Soviet bloc.
Eisenhower to fifteen African 1960 "indeed, we do not desire that you
the other.
"We
leaders
camp or
You cannot
afford to waste
is
roads that your people need you cannot afford to put that
into costly armaments."
money
being
The new
fashioned
it is
now
by
new
administration, should
first
of
all
recognize that
which require
may mean political non-commitment; it may mean moral indifference. And it may mean surreptitious alignment with
and simple;
the Soviet bloc.
The
is
in Japan.
which would
mood but is repelled by the awful risks which the atomic age imposes upon nations of the second rank, and by such nations' impotence in the face of these risks. But could those
tralism expresses a popular
nations not escape these risks and at the same time restore their
freedom of action
States?
if
ties
majority of delegates to
so.
British
They went on
record in favor of
And many
out-
their desire to be
bases
on
is
new
As
such,
it is
new
their inde-
maximum
minimum
of political
political
commitment of
new
other bloc would run counter to the interests derived from these
facts.
They
feel
their
member, without endangering and they could not join the Communist
is
could not join either bloc without being reduced to satellites that
is,
colonies
by
a different
name.
And by
remaining uncommitted
they play upon the fears of both sides in order to gain maxi-
mum
litical
advantages.
at times tried to
non-commitment and
tralist
common
a
policy.
The
declaration of
Bandung of
July, 1956, to pursue a
common
policy in the
while some of these nations have been able to act in unison with
regard to certain specific problems,
all
common
what
policies
on the
is
have
failed; for
unites
them
mit themselves to either bloc. Beyond that, their foreign policies are
conflictincr ambitions
is
and
interests as are
It
in spite of
commanding
majority of
the votes, have been unable to substitute for the policies of the
blocs a
two
common poUcy
a
ways:
ing.
Neutralism
as political
non-commitment, joined
is
to the attempt to
by
Nasser's United
com-
new
nations of
NeutralisTn
been
much
less
common
The
policies
between East and West. More parjudgment upon the policies of ei-
ther side.
It sees
blocs and
social
ent ways.
"A
wilhng to go by
way
of moral commitment.
its
The
neutralism of
in
Nehru
worthy of note
way
is
not
uncommon
England and
bloc
is
world balance of
power favoring
States to retreat
from
is
the prime
no genuine function
terms of neu-
West
in
Neutralism has been growing in recent years due to four factors which have transformed the international scene. First, many of the
nations
who
and
fifteen
years ago
had to
ally
United States for the sake of survival have regained their economic
strength
political
stability.
American
Soviet
Union
as a
nuclear
power of
as
the
first
United States
strikes
some
no longer an
is
asset,
but a
liability.
While
in case of a nuclear
war no nation
safe
from nuclear
destruction,
337
allies
of
the other
way
around, there
may
be
chance for
a nation
not so
allied to
escape nuclear
"new look"
world by pro-
nations as an alternative to
the Cold
War.
It
threatens the
allies
atomic destruction and holds out the promise of disarmament, foreign trade, and foreign aid to those
who keep
at least a neutralist
al-
considerably enhanced
uncommitted
What more
can such
a nation
hope for than to have the best of both worlds without belonging to
either?
This
is
of neutralism
we
it
make
sense
from
the point of
view of the
neutralists?
This
is
some
And
in
view of
their in-
yes.
neutralist policy
by playing the
is
versa, obviously
if it
were
to
commit
itself fully
it
it is
able to use
the support
receives
from both
ing
for
its its
very existence
if it
were
Most
of the new,
weak
nations of Africa,
being reduced
to a
new
colonial status.
As
since
Western Europe,
why
should
we
we
are
338
Neutralism
all Americans,
sense, for
Englishmen,
Japanese neutralists
in
the
escapist
we
all
way
The
difference
is
only that
we
Americans, by
vir-
know
some of our friends how futile it is to try commitment to which there is no viable alternative.
to opt out of
The
American
reactions.
To
we ought
to bring
it
human sympa-
we
shall
respond to
most effectively
when we pursue
nate, the risk of
atomic destruction.
To
in
our deeds.
We
its
plausibility if
our policies
at
However,
sents
neutralism as political
its
dent
Fischer on
Kennedy recognized this when, in his interview with John December 9, 1959, he called neutralism "inevitable" and
He
continued:
this
is likely to be an increasing trend America. In Asia, however, there may be some movement away from a wholly uncommitted neutralism as a result of the growing awareness of the Chinese threat. The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States. have to live with that, and if neutrality is the result of a concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the people and so on, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, I would accept that. should look It's part of our own history for over a hundred years. with friendship upon those people who want to beat the problems that almost overwhelm them, and wash to concentrate their energies on doing that, and do not want to become associated as the tail of our kite.
also in Latin
We
We
However,
it is
we
have
left
behind unqualified
al-
Having recognized
that political
non-commitment
is
many
of the
new
we must
tive relationship to
them.
number
339
sources of disorder. That Balkanization runs counter to the technological requirements of the age,
which
What
is
required
"new order"
a
it
Commu-
"new
We
this
Com-
munist attempt
at establishing a
the Cold
War
on the
side of the
is-
sue
is
The
invocation of anticom-
self-defeating as an
American
pol-
What we
ing that the
need
is
than a negative
promoted and supported by the United States must be unequivocally anticolonialist and must meet the material aspirations and requirements of the uncommitted nato be
tions.
"new order"
also
be
a political
room
The
side
moral preferences,
political sympathies,
economic
interests,
dif-
without compelling the neutralists to enter ino an explicit commitment, will put the statesmanship of the Kennedy administration to
its
supreme
test.
Even
so,
is
likely to persist
among
States
neutralist nations
and with
it
To
counteract
the United
its
by trimming
on
this
kind of weak-
Rather,
we must
thereby dem-
Neutralism
onstrating to
that
it
all
concerned that
us.
the neutralists
and have
we know what we are about and Only so will we gain the respect of chance to win their support as well. And
their neutralism
is
we might
sions,
but a func-
tion of the
power of
Were
as
committed
exist as a
to containing the
Communist
Union but
wants
it
a stepping stone
toward communization.
is
nation can
power of
the Soviet
sufficient to absorb
It is a luxury which certain nations can afford bepower of one antagonist cancels out the power of the
341
40
The
Political
Problems of Polyethnic
States
The
rests
on
a dual
if
Groups within a state are unable to disturb peace and order if the power of the government cannot be challenged. They are unwilling
to
a loyalty to
it,
the
state as a
their loyalty to
any part of
and
state at least
an approximation to justice
through the
Overwhelming
power, suprasectional
As long
as
in dynastic
terms and justice primarily in religious ones, the polyethnic composition of a state did
not affect
its
It
com-
became
for the colonial empires and the principle of integration for the
nation-states.
new
as a sectional
of course, existential.
Whether
or not
more
particularly,
upon
which an ethnic group expects from the cendepends upon the reputation for unchal-
government.
It also
lengeable
this
power
is
the central
reputation
move an
ethnic
group
government; and
in the
measure that
Paper presented
World Congress
The
this
Political
reputation
is
justified
by
group
will either be
It is
cowed into submission or extinguished altogether. only when the reputation for unchallengeable power has been
government has
is
as actual or
po-
tential conflict. It
and military
conflicts
which have
international repercussions.
The
dissolution of the
French colonial empire exemplifies the interconFrance emerged from the Second
reputation for unchallengeable
nection of these
difll^erent factors.
its
colonial subjects
by
virtue of
its
defeat in
and,
a
more
The
fact that
drastically
so by an
and
the the
Asian one gave the latent conflict or loyalties and frustrated expectations of justice of the people of Indochina a sharp political
French.
swing
in Indo-
was but
in
its
French army
in Indochina. For,
full revolt,
many North
the ethnic
from
polyethnic state
its
is
may
disintegrate into
its
polyethnic compois
nents because of
to say,
while
its
breakup
bound
to have an impact
upon
international redissolution of
lations,
it is
The
the Asian and African empires of Great Britain and of the African
empire of France
is
may
the case
when an
Germany used
in that
way German
minorities throughout
343
German
of
German
rule
The
destruction
of Czechoslovakia
This technique
by ethnic
and the
affinity
hostile
ethnic group and the central government of the polyethnic state that plays a part, but also the fact that the loyalty of the ethnic group
is
The
conflict
is
state
and the
hostile
power
which the ethnic group holds an advance position. The interests of the hostile power and the ethnic group are identical. The same relationship between a hostile power and a group withfor
in a polyethnic state
tile
can also
exist
without ethnic
affinity.
The
hos-
own
positive purposes
may
be.
The
support which the European subjects of the Ottoman Empire received in their struggle for independence from European nations
exemplifies this situation.
It is also
diff"er-
Congo have
"balkanization," that
component groups
new large-scale political unit based on ethnic affinity. The polyethnic state is, then, under modern conditions
ble political unit
an unsta-
which tends
to disintegrate
It
new
imperialisms to fashion
new
check by new concentrations of unchallengeable power and by new loyalties and expectations of justice overriding the ethnic ones. The new polyethnic states which were formed out of the fragments
in
by
and
which
these empires
owe
their existence
which
344
finally failed
The
power
exercised
by
a military dictatorship
alty to a
itself as
common
Union maintains
The
ca, will
future of the
new
polyethnic
states, especially
those of Afri-
depend upon
and
a
power, com-
mon
loyalties,
common
common
loyalties
and expectations
of
justice,
which
form of tyranny or
totalitarianism.
Even
im-
this desperate
remedy, however,
may
new
perialisms
which may
either spring
up
conquer
from without.
In consequence of the dissolution of the colonial empires, polyethnic states have proliferated in our time. Their polyethnic character
either
is
in
drawn
by
principle of compensation
between
rival
colonial
powers. These
new
by two
para-
doxes.
On
owe
of nationalism;
by
from
colonial rule.
now
threatens their
self-
components
now
invoke against
the
threatens the
new
from the contradiction between the triumph of a nationalism unqualified by any other principle of order, on the one hand, and techwhich have rendered nationalism obsolete as a principle of political organization, on the other. The actual political organization which corresponds to nationalism as a principle of political organization is, of course, the nation-state. Yet the new polyethnic states, too, owe their existence to the same principle of
nological developments
nationalism, and
nation-state
the
345
ability to
of these functions
the
common
defense of the
live.
no longer
industrial
and
Under
weak
nation-
were similarly protected by the operation of the balance of power which added the resources of the strong to those of the weak. Thus, under normal conditions, no nation-state was able to make more than marginal inroads upon the life and civilization of
its
neighbors.
The modern
dustrial production,
this
protec-
tion-state
become
new states fashioned from the fragments of the colonial empires. The number of sovereign states has approximately doubled since the First World War. Many of these new states would not have been
viable political, military,
and economic
entities
even
in the
heyday
They could
The
which the
in its
dissolution,
first,
the
brought
wake
name of
nationalism, to
ever wider areas of Africa and Asia. In our age, even the infinitely stronger nation-states of Europe are no longer viable political, military,
and economic
entities,
two remaining
of
rank,
which
continental states.
The tragedy
Hungary and
the collapse of
346
The
Political
Egypt
in
November,
1956,
new
nations,
some of them
among
neighbors?
How
evils
can these
new
of
ism to
anarchy and a new imperialism? The principle of nationalwhich they owe their existence and which remains their
main
justification
must be replaced by
new
states
moot
question,
which cannot be answered by theory, whether this new principle of order will develop from the policies of the United Nations or
regional groupings or whether
will be imposed by the benevolent However, it must be clear from a of the forces which created them, and which
it
now
which
347
41
fest
Polycentrism
Communist camp, made maniCommunist party, is another stepping stone in the process of repudiation to which Marxist doctrine has been subjected by historic experience almost since its insplit in
The
the
by
ception.
A'larxism assumes that conflicts
among
nations are a
mere by-
bound
It
itself.
to the nation to
which he happens
must
latter.
World War
Europe never Europe
was
blow
in
1914,
when
in
the proletarians of
They
sufl^ered their
second blow
not
come
by
starting
place.
its
national environment
as a class in
upon the
Stalinist
stage of
its
development
in
Marxist
The
development of socialism
this historic experience.
pragmatic
seal
upon
The
and
loyalties
is
now
in the
From
348
the
New Leader,
March
19, 1962.
PolycentrisTn
process of suffering
its
with the
rise
more acute
conflict
disposed of so simply.
Nor
can
it
development
in different
countries.
ests
We
are
now
by
Communist
societies.
The divergent national interests of the Soviet Union and China have come to the fore in three different areas. (1) The Soviet Union has attained a degree of power, especially in the
which allows it to beheve that munism throughout the world will be achieved by Under present conditions, China cannot expect to
tige,
imme-
accentuated by the
compared
toward the question of war. (2) Having completed the StaUnist phase of forced economic development, the Soviet Union can affordor may even be pressed by
hazards of the
its
by
the
economic development,
The
Soviet attempt to
nomic development through Russian experts, management of the Eastern European economies, called forth a reaction through which the national autonomy of China reasserted itself against the prospect of being made a Russian satellite.
This
last
source of conflict
is
also a source of
hght illuminating
Those of us who believe in the continuing monolithic character of the Communist camp are victims of a Marxist illusion, which the Marxists themselves, by dint of historic experience
and
throw-
ing overboard.
The
naire assumptions
and ideological
349
Wars). The monolithic character of the Communist camp, derived from identical social conditions and interests and based upon ideological affinities, has
always been an
illusion,
Army's conquest of Eastern Europe and by the dependence of Communist parties throughout the world upon Soviet support.
has not been able to impose
Where
will
upon
it is
eign policies of
likely, that
Communist
nations.
And
indeed possible,
if
not
to
very
least, will
not
or China.
The United
the extent that
munist government
as
Com-
Such
policy
is
of course
at
much
much
easier to
defend
home than
its
merits that
in
also self-defeating. It
is
in the nature
It
350
42
Asia:
Two
the true nature of the Algerian problem. Their persistence has de-
war.
One
as integral a part of
France
as
The
not to
many
intelligent
Frenchmen. Nations,
men, need
illusions
to sustain
them
in their relations
do
such
as the
French
con-
a nation's
its
thoughts, corrupt
its
actions.
They
made
of.
this kind.
What
And
it
is
probably the
in
illusions
Laos have
fore.
at the
tempting to look
Laotian debacle
an isolated instance
we must
Thus we
in the
self-contained local
what has happened in Laos is not a defeat which must be regretted but can be forfirst
gotten; rather,
it is
the
not cured,
is
bound
to bring
more
serious
symptoms and
will in the
The
disorder
From
two
that the
Com-
its
present
by surrounding
its
local mili-
tary strongholds.
policy of containment was eminently successful in the area which it was originally applied, that is, Europe. It was this success which led to its transformation into a general principle of American foreign policy. What has worked so well in Europe was expected to
to
The
work
as
did not
work
as well. It
as
tainment
as a general principle
It
it
understanding.
in
Europe, and
is
ment
The
Soviet
Union
has
NATO
itself.
NATO. The
its
use.
The United
upon
States built
its
were containing the Soviet Union in Europe, so local forces could contain communism outside Europe. Thus the United States embarked upon a policy, for which John Foster Dulles bears the primary responsibility, of collecting allies and clients wherever it could find them at the periphery of the Sino-Soviet empire in order to build up their
the mistaken assumption that as local forces
is
How-
taining
power nuclear or conventional is incapable of concommunism outside Europe; for the primary threat compresents outside
munism
as
Europe
is
politi-
cal penetration
The
build-up of
an answer to
this threat.
Laos
a case in point.
war ended in 1954, the two northeastern provinces of Laos bordering on North Vietnam were under the conthe Indochina
When
352
Asia:
trol of the
The American
Algeria
the
being incorporated into the royal army. That army was to be trained
This personnel
was supported by a total of $310 million in foreign aid. The infusion of such an amount of money into a poor economy, whose annual consumptive capacity was estimated at $24 million at the most, thoroughly corrupted the Laotian
elite
agriculture,
we
The
administration of our
economic
to
on the part of our officials and American contractors. The June 16, 1959, report on United States Aid Operations in Laos by the subcommittee of the House of Reppetence, and large-scale corruption
resentatives
like a dea
by crooks and
misfits against
whom
very
few honest and competent men never had a chance. Despite this American policy which blindly played into the hands of the Communists, the design which the Geneva conference of 1954 had developed for Laos remained, however precariously, intact.
for all practical purposes divided between Lao and the royal government under Prince Souvanna Phouma. The relations between these two groups ranged from
was reached
in 1958
At
this
came apart. The United States withdrew its aid from the new government and brought about its downfall. It shifted its support from Prince Souvanna Phouma, whose policies had been proWestern in fact and neutralist in aspiration, to a succession of inefficient and unpopular governments whose main claim to American support was their vociferous professions of anticommunism and their attempts to suppress the Pathet Lao by violent means. The shift was in the main engineered by the CIA and opposed both by
353
The
in fact.
The attempt
to replace a covertly
at its disposal
led by Americans called forth a drastic reaction from the outside. While the clashes between the royal government and the Pathet Lao had been perfunctory and of a local nature up to 1960, the Pathet Lao now staged what amounted to a strategic offensive whose obvious goal was the conquest of Laos and the overthrow of the royal government. And while up to 1959 the Communist powers
now
started in earnest
Lao with
As
these
tion of Laos
What
has
happened
w^ill
happen
hap-
removed.
It
pened before
in
China when
we
ineffi-
cient, corrupt,
by
The same
Vietnam and
tries,
is
in the process of
emerging
a
both coun-
we
The
bestowed upon
of political
life
Communist reputation by the powers that be, and the same polarization which we have noticed in Laos and in China in the
354
Asia:
last stages
of
civil
war
is
The United
once
States, of course,
by supporting
most
reliable
those groups
ruthless in that
concomitant of
military force
conception of the
political
is
becomes
military aid
is
still
further supported
by
the
war,
bound
by Communist
military intervention.
Thus when
up
in 1959
by
the royal
reasons,
proved to be
without foundation.
This emphasis upon military
assistance,
a plausible
is
To
improve
the lot of the Laotian peasant the main economic problem of Laos
from the outside requires a subtle understanding of alien economic conditions and a delicacy in social and political manipulation far beyond the ken of most of the administrators of foreign aid
through economic
we
It also
requires awareness
is
supposed to
Where
that context
is
blurred, as
it
its
simpler in-
military sector.
Any army
money.
way
is
army
support,
if its if
training
its
likely
to operate,
build-up
politically
counterproductive all of
355
is
self-defeating
it
in that
powerful factor
in the
expansion of what
intends to
Europe our policy of containment has thus far not been put to the test because of the plausibihty of the American atomic deterrent, it has been tested in Asia. It has worked uncontain. Yet, while in
mistakably only in Korea, albeit at the cost of war, and for the time
being in the
straits
it
of Taiwan. In Indochina
It is
it
did not
work before
long run
work now.
another.
In the short run, the inner weakness of our position in the territories of
loss
our Asian
it
allies
and
clients has
of Laos,
it
Iran;
may
The
administration
itself
going to reconcile
tomorrow
Iran? If
it
to the loss of
does,
it is
likely to face a
home,
and only
to face
it.
itself to
further
Communists,
it
will be
upon
it is
upon
What
is
the
its
own
by
power
States
in Asia.
When
moment
its
and -udll face the United on the grand scale with the choice between retreat and war choice which has faced us already on a very limited scale in Laos.
crucial test
That war
war but an
it
Once
will be
contained if
it
can be
Asia:
contained at all as
is
the Soviet
And
even
if
should consider
it
to be fully persuasive,
as
how
will
it
assess
the
It
damage is upon
it
might suffer
ment
may
well depend.
has such fateful implications
which
policy toward
odds with
politicians
who
be-
The very
tion
mili-
from
reality.
Nor
is
The
great
ignorance of the
realities
The popular
is
American people stem from the pre-atomic age and that short-lived period when the United States had an atomic monopoly. Nobody in authority has told us how radically the bipolarity of nuclear weapons has affected the position of the United States and
further proliferation of nuclear weapons
is
how
it,
the
to
likely to affect
what extent the commitments of the United States are out of tune with its power, and what changes in our thinking and actions are necessary to cope with the new conditions. How will the American
people react
life,
not
by way of
reverses?
reasoned and
The memory
of
political
its
Algerian
illusions.
Yet
as
France owes
man, so must America rely upon the mind and character of one man
to
awaken
it
from
its
Asian
illusions.
The
358
43
States
The China
toward China
it is
civil
war.
It is at this
When
cope
became
was unable
to
supported by American
One was
military intervention
on such
a scale as to
be sufdis-
kind
incal-
would have
entailed military
and
political
commitments of
of,
among
others,
action was predicated on the assumption that the triumph of the Communist revolution in China was inevitable. It would then have been incumbent upon American poHcy to reconcile itself to the inevitable as policy, being the art of the possible, frequently must
potentialities there
communism
little
the ideolog-
Moscow,
its rise
to
power owes
itself in
power.
Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, which would not have come to power nor could have stayed in power without Russian support, allows the Communist government of China a freedom of action in international affairs which the Communist governments of Eastern Europe almost completely lack. Consequently, the Comthe
if it
which
is
From
359
in orders
traditional in-
These
interests
may
or
may
may
or
may
It
not be
parallel.
in the
Union cannot look with equanimity on the economic and Communist China; for if Communist China should add to its enormous superiority in manpower the achievements of modern technology under the firm political direction of the Chinese Communist party, it would then become of necessity the most powerful nation on earth, overshadowing by far the
Soviet
military development of
Soviet Union.
they face
at
The rulers of the Kremlin, considering the opposition home and their uncertain relations with the satelUtes
of Eastern Europe, must also fear and probably already have rea-
son to fear the influence which China can exert in the struggle for
Union and in the struggle for a certain measure of independence which the satellite nations are waging against Moscow. Whether there will be further
ruling group of the Soviet
depend
in
policies of the
non-
Communist domination of
power in Asia. The United States chose neither of two courses open to it, or rather, it chose both of them, pursuing them sometimes simultaneously, sometimes alternately, but
the balance of the
civil
war
on the
limited
commitments
in materiel
and men so
which,
if
it
360
The China
war by form-
comby misunderstanding the character of Chinese comIt was grounded in two false assumptions. One was that the Chinese Communists were really agrarian reformers at heart using iMarxist slogans without believing them. The other was a misall
pounded munism.
it
at that
was to misunder-
communism,
its
as it manifests itself in
power
as a
means to
Marxism.
this
essentially contradictory
War
a
and influenced by
policy of counter-
domestic
politics, the
se.
revolution per
That
its
to say, the
recognize the
Communist regime
as the legitimate
government of
Na-
On
Formosa
as the
it
only authentic
political,
voice of
all
China.
The United
eco-
assuring
its
very existence
States.
The United
its
States has
Chiang Kai-shek forces against the Chinese mainland and has given
active military support to the Nationalist defense of the offshore
islands.
The
been inconclusive
is
in
terms of the
policy has strengthened the Nationalist forces on Formosa, that policy being the very precondition for their survival,
tually nothing to
it
has
done
vir-
weaken the Communist domination of the Chinese mainland. Thus, on the one hand, the United States refuses to recognize that the Chinese Communists are here to stay, and on the
361
has
revolutionary measures.
tive because
The United
it
States has
done nothing
effec-
there
is
nothing
it
against China
which
an all-out world
war destroying
had one positive
has kept
Communists.
It
has had
two major negative results: it has from its allies, and it has
The
its
difficult
position in
by
virtue of
own
policy.
States has tried to extricate itself
From
their point of
view
it is
much
more advantageous
web
than to co-operate with the United States in the search for a com-
promise settlement.
ficult
The
dif-
American
position,
and they
also
know
that time
is
on
their
side, for
power is bound to tilt more and Communist China will become an inpolitics,
in
world
grow
stronger as
grows weaker. Thus, paradoxically enough, the main issue is today no longer whether or not the United States wants to recognize Communist China. The issue is, rather, whether Communist China wants to be recognized by the United
America's
States,
and obviously
it
if it
has to
quo
in the
Formosa
Strait.
What
States
is
which has led to such unfortunate results? That policy based upon two fundamental assumptions: first, the use of force
in
as
The
first
however
may
leap
by
weapons and
362
The China
zation
itself.
quo which
is
reasonably acceptable
by
Far East. The other assumption holds that the threat that confronts
the United States around the world
is
where
it
originated,
must then be applied around the world. The is subject to very serious doubt. What
is
more
slow and
To
by
mili-
Furthermore, even
from Communist
States' mili-
United
would be inadequate. power between Communist China and the United States is quite different from that between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. The Soviet Union has thus far been deterred by the retaliatory nuclear power of the United
tary policy in the Far East
The
balance of military
States;
tactics,
its
particular position
and with
its
particular
China
tral
is
is
to
Cenin-
deny
Whoever wants
power. The
United States has never been willing, and for good reasons, to contemplate such a
a contradiction
it is
strike.
Thus
between what
Only
a radical
it
The
chances that
upon which its China policy is from that contradiction. the government of the United States will take
its
nil.
con-
number
of high
officials are
aware of the
facts of life in
363
more than
expecting at worst an
quo and at best some kind of make the Chinese Communists go away. The
has not been forthcoming in the past and cannot be expected in the
foreseeable future.
changed not by
likely
from without. One of these to emanate from the United Nations; the other,
States canit
confront
with the
Wise policy would anticipate these alternatives and try to avoid them by creating conditions opening up different and more favorable alternatives. It would expainful alternative of retreat or war.
it
politically, militarily,
and
of
would
became
acute, prepare
with a
minimum
of
risk.
To
do
nothing and wait for something to happen and then react by improvisation
to
its
is
it is
tantamount
altar of a
upon the
is
bound
to
364
44
The involvement
with which
to terms
come
Vietnam and
weakness
elsewhere in an even more acute form. These issues are the unqualified
support
we
whose
political
issues, as
first
necessary to
Vietnam.
That history has been determined by a number of paradoxes. The war which France fought in Indochina until the Geneva agreement ended it in 1954 was for her essentially a colonial war, no different
than the wars that France and Spain had fought in Africa in the
1920's.
war was a war for national liberation. However, for the United States and Communist China, without whose intervention the Indochina war would have taken on a different character and might well have had a different outcome, the war had nothing to do with national liberation or colonialism. As far as Communist China was concerned the war was an attempt to extend the area of influence and domination of communism. For the United States, too, the main issue of the war was the expansion of communism. Certainly the
the
United States did not support France for the purpose of maintaining
French power
china
in Indochina.
The United
by
the
interests of the United States were directly afoutcome of the Indochina war, the United States
1962.
war
effort. It did
it
par-
On
On
did not
War
ended to intervene actively in that war, to take over the military burden which France had shouldered so long, with such enormous habilities and such lack of success. While the United States is committed to the containment of communism everywhere in the world, this commitment is obviously subject to quahfications; the limited involvement of the United States in the Indochina war and
its
Geneva negotiations
its
France and
why
it
was
that
From
a strictly
marched south and forced the French to evacuate. Why, then, did the Communists agree to hold a conference? Why did the Soviet Union, in fact, emphasize at the Berlin conference of 1954 the necessity for such a
conference?
it
Com-
munist powers, for the sake of agreement, made important concessions to the
North
parallel.
They wanted
elections six
months
We
ment
have heard
much
Geneva
to
in 1954, the
Communists had
which they agreed was much more advantageous to the West than was warranted by the actual military situation. It would certainly be absurd to suggest that it was magnanimity which induced the Communists to make these concessions, or that it was simply for the sake of an agreement per se that they were made. It
seems to
sions
me
why
those conces-
366
compromise agreement to terminate it will give us an inkling of the place that South Vietnam has today in the over-all world situation, particularly
its
States
and
interests.
Communist China pursues in Asia an over-all military which parallels the objective of the Soviet Union in Europe. It is to remove the power of the United States from the continent of Asia; for American power on the continent of Asia, especially in the form of military strong points, constitutes a permanent challenge to the power of Communist China on that
First of
all,
and
political objective
continent.
with
have led to
it
as a
power within the traditional sphere of influence of China. Second, what the Communists conceded at Geneva both they and many Western observers viewed as only temporary concessions. It was then generally believed that South Vietnam was doomed; that Mr. Diem was the creation of the United States, pulled out of a hat by desperate American officials; that he would be unable to master
the chaos then prevailing in South Vietnam; and that elections,
whenever
munists.
held,
Thus
the
would give an overwhelming majority to the ComCommunists expected, and in view of the facts
a right to
Vietnam would
over the
Finally,
fall
Red River
its
em-
barked upon
into a
new policy
War of position
a
Cold
War
of maneuver,
which was
in
east Asia
key position
power
Europe.
attitude
by not humiliating France to the limit Union must have hoped to prevent France from ratifying EDC. For whatever reasons, France did not ratify EDC, and in that measure the expectations of the Soviet Union
ing a concession to France, of
its ability,
the Soviet
were
justified.
However, the expectations of friend and foe alike, which anticipated the absorption of South Vietnam in the Communist orbit as
367
Vietnam
colony.
set
new
state
French
The
American support,
The United
relate
its
States,
its
getting involved in
its
ability to cor-
commitments
its
communism, the United States embarked upon a concerted policy of political, military, and economic assistance to President Diem's regime. Without that assistance, President
Anybody who
with
These
aid
raw
temporary
political
good and
I
South Vietnam,
I
don't think
the report
. . .
The first impression of loftv impracticality is belied by the concrete achievements of President Diem. In little more than a year Diem has
gotten rid of the
lished
his
armv; he has purged the police of the gangster element; he has pushed back, and in part eliminated, the independent power of the religious sects and of the Communists; and he has thus been able to establish something approaching efficient administration in a considerable part of the territory of Vietnam. He has done
control over the
so entirely
by
totalitarian
means.
Of
of
two
is
Socialist
and Republican
open.
The
others,
which the Communist party, called Vietcong, work underground or else are engaged in open
the press does not exist.
rebellion.
Freedom of
the
When
recently a
368
blowing off the legs of the foremost actor of Vietnam, the press was not allowed to print the news. On the other hand,
on December
Saigon press:
12
in the
On
DUY HINH,
HINH
The only incident during the meeting [of newspaper owners and writers] was the throwing out of Mr. THU, owner of the now-closed weekly paper CAT TAG. As he rose to speak in defense of his position, the majority protested and demanded his expulsion. was unanimously blamed for serving the Vietcong and Colonialist cause.
PHAM VAN
THU
This repression
is
papers report the shooting of some rebels or Communists. But nobody knows how many people are shot every day by the armed forces of the
regime and under what circumstances. There have been popular trials of suspected subversives in the villages with the death sentence executed on the spot. When one tries to engage private persons in political conversation, one meets a furtive glance and silence. Nor are the positive puritanical and ideological elements of totalitarianism missing. Diem has embarked upon a successful "Anti-Loose Living" campaign which has transformed Saigon, the former Paris of Southeast Asia, into the dullest of French colonial towns. A most intricate and elaborate system of propaganda and control has just been instituted in the villages. In its essence it is a cell system the lowest unit
of which
sentative
is is
five families.
Each repreand
is
on which he
reports,
re-
ported on, to a higher unit. I have seen the organization charts of this "five houses" system. If it works, hardly anything a Vietnamese peasant does will remain unobserved, uncontrolled, and unreported. Considering the enormity of the task which confronts Diem, it would certainly be ill-advised to be squeamish about some of the methods he has used. However, if he should try to establish a totalitarian regime in permanence rather than as an emergency measure, he will have given his
people
little
to choose
between the
totalitarianism of the
North and
his
own.
It
was obvious to me
then,
and
told President
Diem
so to his
would
by an oligarchy whose
to
were
would have
govern
po369
frustrated
and,
hence,
indifferent
population,
while the
By
equating
opposition with
communism, he would force the popular aspirations for change into Communist channels. This is what happened. Having to choose between President Diem's personal totalitarianism and the totalitarianism of communism, which at least can justify itself by a forwardlooking philosophy, the Vietnamese people at best abstain from choosing and at worst choose communism.
The known
Diem regime
is
not
American public opinion, which, following the example of the government, prefers to think of the problem of South V^iet-
nam
in
dom. This
classes
particularly
widespread among
those
which
such
as business
armv
officers.
strong
among
the refugees
after
Kennedy
aspirations. It
significant
and bodes
ill
that the intensity of disaffection increases with the degree of education and political sophistication.
The
is
marked by indifference
to the
as a
They
tend to look
at
Diem
Communism means
What
submit
at
interests
Thus they
a particular time,
as a
the fortunes
How
370
has
American policy
tried to
cope with
this situation?
It
by two simple
expedients,
support for the domestic political status quo and military defense
against the foreign
enemy. Both
compared
political risks to
the
impediment to successful military defense, short of commitments in men and materiel on the part of the United States
out of
all
must be supported come what may, despite one's misgivings about its philosophy and policies. Nothing can be simpler than to reduce
the political and military instability of South
Vietnam
to the result
of
to be countered
by
military
action.
ceptions are
bound
to
was obvious
lost
could
upon the
must be sought
in the
is
com-
its
civil service
guerillas
would not be
outskirts of the
it is
capital. Guerilla
a political
problem before
a military
one.
Both
in
guerillas
remained
ineffective
drastic
political
The
case of
Greece
is
a situation
which confronts
today
in
quo were
Greece
as
thev are
now
in
The argument
of a
that there
is
no alternative to Diem
is
in the nature
self-fulfillincr
Diem only
ago,
I
because
we
have placed
all
quality- of public was impressed with both the figures who took a passionate and intelligent interest in establishing a free and decent pohtical order in South \'ietnam. It is. of course, impossible to sav from a distance whether such men are still avail-
number and
able todav.
if it
had
mind
who
through
cal,
whom
The United
political
reforms
order in South
Metnam
The former
skills
\\hile
likely to require
limited military
commitment.
On
is
the
but there
no
and almost bv
This policy
is
era. It
bv
Communist po\\er
and location.
\\"as
size
calamity which
was considered
row
of dominoes'";
if it
all
of Indochina
would
fall.
too. In
fact, of course.
North \*iemam
nam
did not; nor did the other states of Indochina. This unexpected-
ly favorable
outcome
ot the Indochina
372
territorial gains
can be
localized and can affect the interests of the United States adversely
in differing degrees.
The misconception
tutes for the
its
that each
Communist
United States
magnitude has
as
its
commit
power to the defense of any territorv^ that might be threatened by Communist subversion or aggression. The indiscriminate
military
was wilHng
trine),
to accept
it
(i.e.,
SEATO
reflects
that conviction.
However, when
chips
were
down we were
ests
all,
which did not require any American military which required a limited military commitment, and those which might require an all-out military commitment. Thus we did
those
among intercommitment at
of
Vietnam
to the
Communists.
We
did
Cuba and
it
Tibet.
We
in
most
who
liquidated the
bellmii.
It
is
Korean
War
on the
therefore incumbent
of the United
States to
determine with
interest in
all
American
commitment must depend upon that political determination. Is South Vietnam as important to us, or more or less so, than Korea
or Cuba?
Or
is
it
as
important
as
political
is
assigned
its
matic solution to the problem of South \'ietnam. Such a solution could be envisaged after the model of the diplomatic solution of the
Geneva agreement of
its
1954, to
after
all
owes
is
very existence
as
an independent
The United
States
not
373
so
do our
allies.
The
certainly
worth
exploring, and
it is
now
is
officials in
the field
because
frees
which they
stinctivelv^
are
them from the burden of political manipulation, to unaccustomed and from which they shy almost inof the political risks involved.
It
is
away because
also
it
an irksome problem
is
in the
form of
acutely
Yet
mous
risks
States, for
raises
military means.
a repetition
less
It
conjures up the
of the Korean
its
War,
than
conclusive in
results
war was. It should not be forgotten that, fought under much more favorable political conditions, the guerilla war in Greece lasted five years and the one in Malaya twelve. It is an illusion to think that Communist China is being contained today by the military power which the United States can bring to
bear locally in Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or that
it
Communist China
little
its
has
it
in
its
power
ments
commitbeyond its own. It will stop, as it has stopped in the past, at the point where the escalation of American conventional military commitments conjures up the possibility of an all-out war initiated
military
by
It
is
effective.
In other words,
over-all
weakness
vis-a-vis the
United
this
States.
Yet barring
is
a catas-
weakness
likely to be re-
make
from
Communist China
nist
power
in Asia. It
is
Commu-
374
nam must
be viewed.
primarily military approach
is
If the present
persisted
in,
we
are
likely to be
under
and miUtary conditions much more unfavorable than those that prevailed in Korea and in the world a decade ago. Such a
political
it
can be
won
at
all,
and
may
well
haps only to end again in a stalemate as did the Korean War. Aside
tribution of military
view of the
is
dis-
today and
likely to exist
bound
to have a
profound imelec-
pact upon
change
in the political
tions of 1952
of the Korean
as
War. The American people are bound to be deeply affected by the frustrations of a Vietnamese war.
sufficient regard for its
The
without
likely
own
its
politics at
home and
the
American
The only
commitments
to,
and thereby
our
political objectives in
objectives
order,
must be defined as the restoration of a viable political which constitutes the only effective defense against Commuis
nist subversion. It
a political
It
lished only
would be
it
is
intervention;
afltairs
we had
of
would not
exist.
The
between intervention and non-intervention, but between an intervention which serves our political interests and thereby limits our
military
bitter
commitments and an intervention which supports to the if their policies, by being coun-
375
EPILOGUE
45
The
President
"It
is
upon
Woodrow Wilson
makes the
of the President's
in chief of the
He
is
power commander
armed
of his party.
this
Our
constitutional
and
political
system culminates in
one man.
What
irresistible;
its
when
President
it
and the country never feels the zest of action so much as is of such insight and caliber. Its instinct is for unified
action,
and
To
bility"
who
be-
classical
dreds of
officials
and
assist
members of Congress
him
his
Yet
this variety
of his
human
contacts and
From
the
New
13, 1960.
379
EPILOGUE
must spend the most important hours of
decision.
his
classic
account of Presidential
loneliness,
a
proc-
his
Cabinet
in these terms:
I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined by
myself.
I
others might in this matter, as in others, was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constimtional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here; I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take.
know very
well that
many
if I
do better than
can; and
Of Woodrow
of March, 1917,
last
three
I.
weeks
Cobb's
we
have
Ray Stannard
few
accounts. "For about ten days," reports Baker, "he remained almost
visitors:
he wrote scarcely a
dozen indispensable
message on April
letters.
Even
after he
had completed
his
1st,
him were
talk
all
but
Cobb, of The
New
said he hadn't.
lying
awake going over the whole situation. I know what war means," he said, and he added that were any possibilitv of avoiding war he wanted to try it. "What
. . .
"I think
if
there
else
can
do?" he asked.
President
"Is there
anything
else
can do?"
Truman
bomb:
380
The
I
President
had counseled. I wanted to Here was the most powerful weapon of destruction ever devised and perhaps it was more than that. Conscious of how great a responsibility had been placed on me, I suggested to Secretary Stimson that we give Japan a warning in advance by
advisers
my
weigh
sending Japan an ultimatum to surrender. ... I then agreed to the use of the atomic bomb if Japan did not yield. I had reached a decision after long and careful thought. It was not an easy decision to make. I did not like the weapon. But I had no qualms if in the long run millions of lives could be saved.
This
in the
is
much
work, and many proposals have been made for lightening the
dent's load.
Presi-
is
qualitative the need to aid and sustain the President in those lonely
moments of
When
Committee on Administrative
stated in 1937 in an
it had the work Brownlow Report were
Management," known
load in mind.
in
Brownlow Report,
of the
The recommendations
institutions as-
sist
the
White House
staff
Economic
Agency.
It
has been
that during
Mr. Eisenhower's
periods,
major
illnesses,
The
Budget made decisions of high policy by allocating or withholding funds. And the routine of the White House was hardly affected. In
brief, the
The Presidency
much
in the
manner of
modern corpo381
EPILOGUE
ration.
this
bureaucratic appadid,
ratus
but can
no longer do. They stand between him and the government departments transmitting information, problems, and proposed solutions
to him,
his
work
They have
in
him.
But by curing the ailment of overwork we have paradoxically enough aggravated the ailment of isolation. The President has been cut off from direct and full contact with the great issues which he alone must decide by layers upon layers of agencies and interagency
committees. Thus,
its
as a rule,
he
is
all
dehydrated conden-
sation
and
a solution
which
satisfies
is
no one
and, hence,
acceptable to
and susceptible of
never even
Presidential approval.
The
alternative solution
may
come when
as
the
choice
made
on lower
levels
two
missiles.
The danger
present. It
is
must
always
aggravated
if
some of
own
would be made
branch for the establishment of an executive vice-president, or a number of them, or of a new Office of Executive Aianagementwidening still more the gap that separates the President from the
great issues.
The
real
problem
is
and decisively. In
this
he needs help.
Where can
he get
it?
In order
to perform the supreme task of his office, the President needs three
qualities:
from
others;
which
re-
382
The
President
were
to
make
it
rule it
is
now
hut
exists, if
ticular field,
and
if
steps
his
The
sources of informaofficial
tion and
or pri-
would
duplicate
make
for
as
the price
we
Once
that
it
executed.
Here
his
power
on
this
blend. All
modern
The Treasury
is
its
I
practices that
find
it is
[Morgenthau] there. But the Treasury is not to be compared with the You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy. The Admirals are really something to cope with and I should know. To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.
Professor Richard E. Neustadt, of Columbia University, reports
similar reactions
by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. "He'll sit here," he quotes Truman, referring to President-elect Eisenhower, "and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' Ajid noth'mg will happen:' Neustadt quotes an aide of Eisenhower as having remarked to him in
1958:
"The President
still
feels that
when
he's
decided something,
383
EPILOGUE
that ought to be the
end of
it
and when
it
What
Jonathan Daniels,
members of
the Cabinet:
Half of
a President's suggestions,
which theoretically carry the weight by a Cabinet member. And if the Presi-
dent asks about a suggestion a second time, he can be told that it is being investigated. If he asks a third time, a wise Cabinet officer will give him at least part of what he suggests. But only occasionally, except about the most important matters, do Presidents ever get around to asking
three times.
The
stick,
help the President needs for the task of making his decisions
He
can make
is
vail
willing and
able to
employ
the
power of
is
his office
and of
by
his subordinates,
he
He
needs
its
substance to
ther
its
ei-
dissipation or
is
abuse.
There
liness.
no remedy outside himself for the heaviest burden lonehe makes one of the great decisions which Presidents
is
When
have to make, he
is
reserves of his
us beware
lest,
mind and soul, springs the President's greatness. Let by hemming him in with still another batch of assist-
ants or managers,
we
384
Index
Topics,
if
Acheson, Dean,
306
f.,
301,
Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal
142
proposals,
of,
Achilles, 14, 23
114
Pact, 152 f., 190, 216 f. Baker, Ray Stannard, 380 Balance of power, 36, 168, 176
207,
f.,
f.,
184,
139,
185,
215
ff.,
f.,
206, 231
f.,
235
f.,
260,
291,
302
334
338
ff.,
345
ideological,
334, 337
179;
as
policy,
105, 112
f.,
f.,
115,
fT.,
317
ff.,
321,
302
178
f.,
331
f.,
ff., 328 ff., 373 of Rights, 65, 80 Bipolarity of world politics, 169, 172, 205, 309, 357 Bismarck, Otto von, 115
Bill
140, 286
39, 99,
348
f.;
political philoso-
phy
of, 73
Aristophanes, 9
Aristotle, 32, 73, 90
Arms
traffic,
150
f.
of Nations, 228
Aron, Raymond,
Art, 8, 20'f Asia, 97, 111
f.,
101
139, 185, 188
f.,
132
ff.,
f.,
ff.,
250
f.,
Burma,
263
352
356
Butterfield, Herbert, 66
Astronomy, 56
Atlantic alliance, 182 ff., 194 ff., 207, 213 ff., 309, 313 f. Atlantic Charter, 179 Atlantic community; see Atlantic alli-
Camp
ance
Atlantic union, 174
David, spirit of, 162 Canada, 114, 122, 147 Canning, George, 199 Capitalism, 30, 86 f.; and war, Captive Nations Week, 317
33
f.
Carr,E.H.,
36ff.
Atomic power;
INDEX
Ceylon, 212 Chamberlain, Neville, 38, 93, 102 Charles V, of Hapsburg, 202 Checks and balances, 88 f., 95
Daniels, Jonathan, 384
Democracy,
63
ff.,
30,
38
ff.,
41
f.,
45, 47
ff.,
ff.,
Chiang Kai-shek,
China,
306,
1
114, 361
f.,
75
ff.,
10
ff.,
192
f .,
90
ff.;
98
ff.;
f., 249, 268, 282, 297 f., 302 f., 320 f., 337, 339, 356 f., 359 ff., 365 ff.; recognition of, 296, 361; and Soviet Union, 349, 359f.
205, 241
elections,
75
243;
English,
64
f.;
and foreign poHcy, 106 ff.; Jacobin, and propaganda, 237, 240 ff.; 64;
totalitarian, 50, 76, 79
Chou
16;
En-lai, 261
Christianity:
ethics
15
ff.;
liberal,
Dictatorship, 41
52
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 114, 367 ff. Diplomacy: American, 114, 195, 209 ff.; and democracy, 198 f.; traditional,
138
f.,
168,
ff.,
231, 274,
277
War, American,
concept
71
of, 56
fi.;
Disarmament,
97,
120
ff.,
142
ff.,
f.,
295
142
f.,
Civilization:
West-
120
ff.,
ern, 61 f., 96, 194 f., 219, 228 Clay, General Lucius, 330 f. Clemenceau, Georges, 248
ff.
313
Disengagement, 148
Dodd, Walter
P.,
306
Cobb, Frank I., 380 Cobban, Alfred, 63 Cobden, Richard, 318 Cohen, Benjamin, 148 Cold War, 113, 134, 138, 206
324, 334, 338, 340
f.,
Don Juan,
Dulles,
13
Dostoevski, Feodor, 61
ff.,
160,
f.
188,
209
f.,
f.,
216, 228,
f.,
321
Durie, John, 12
Eccles, Mariner, 383
f.,
367
Economic development,
in the
257
83
f.,
261
ff.;
Common
48 Communism, 24, 34 f., 39 ff., 73, 96, 132, 154, 173, 190, 192 ff., 215 f., 219, 228, 237, 239 f., 247, 251 ff., 265, 267, 289, 295 ff., 302 ff., 310 f., 315 f., 321 f., 332 f., 334, 340, 348 ff., 352 ff., 365 ff.
32, 37,
good,
ff.
347; see also Suez Canal crisis Eisenhower, Dwight D., 91 ff., 108, 128,
134,
Competition:
llOf.
economic, 86;
political,
153
f.,
155,
f.
f.,
306,
ff.
Constitutionalism, 75
f.;
f.,
Containment,
215 362
f.,
110,
205
f.,
213,
Europe,
f.,
365
f.,
368, 374
Central, 113, 130, 148, 240, 330; Eastern, 132, 192, 218, 222 ff., 291, 295,
Council of Europe, 233 Cromwell, Oliver, 74 Cuba, 101 f., 109, 114. 308, 310ff., 373 Cultural exchange, 289, 316 Cyprus, 185, 188, 191 Czechoslovakia, 130 f., 192 f., 333, 344
329
f.,
Westf.,
182
ff.,
338
f.;
see also
individual
nations
386
Index
European Coal and
231, 234f.
Steel
Community,
Geneva Conference of
Genghis Khan,
13
1955, 134
f.,
162
Germany,
38f., 41,
107,
113
f.,
124
f., f.,
of, 23
f.,
232
f.,
235
f.,
239, 246,
123, 362
286,
dividual nations
ff.,
East, 324
76,
239
f.
ff., 334; 332; unification of, 147, 183, 195, 203, 222 f., 235, 323 f., 326,
297,
317
f.,
323
ff.,
328
ff.,
Federalist,
330, 332
f.
Ford Foundation, 256 Foreign aid, 97, 114, 173, 211, 226 f., 251 fF., 254 flF., 303, 309, 336, 338, 355 f.; as ideology, 257 f.; poHtical conditions for, 264
ft.;
Ghana, 337 Gluck, Maxwell H., 91, 210f. Government: committee system
103,
of,
311;
ff.;
and
economics,
and
individual,
262
ff.;
types
of, 255
269
ff.
46 f.; and intellectuals, 312 f.; and people, 19, 64; power of modem, 44 IT.; by public relaions, 99, 291; secrecy in, 98 f
Foreign policy: conduct of, 291, 305 ff.; and domestic politics, 106 ff., 161, 199; and economics, 248 ff.; escapism in, 109, 199 f .; force as instrument of,
155
ff.,
f.,
Grace, divine,
15, 61
Graham,
Great
176
ff.,
f.,
Billy,
60
f.,
183
IT.,
169,
173
ff.,
362
f.;
limits of,
of,
234
308
313;
f.,
military conception
260, 372, 375;
Union
in 1942,
222, 250
lem
of,
with United
States,
176
ff.,
184
191;
pubhc opinion,
Foreign trade,
321, 338
357, 364
Greece,
civil
ancient,
and
Persia,
f.,
24;
f.
173, 250
303, 318f.,
war
Formosa,
356, 361
Guatemala, 308
Guerilla war, 112, 159, 310 Guillaume, Augustin, 97 Guinea, 337
f.,
374
33
f.
f.,
371
Foster,
Four Freedoms,
France, 113
298, 309,
ff.;
124
144, 146
f.,
f.,
183
ff.,
Gustavus Adolphus,
Haller, Karl
12
235
343,
f.,
279, 286,
334,
337,
of,
351,
357
f.,
Ludwig von,
94
365
alliance
1894, 178,
Soviet Union in 1935, 181; revolution of 1789 in, 99, 239 Francis I, of France, 202 Franco, Francisco, 114, 311 Franklin, Benjamin, 156 Freedom, 2, 30 IT., 45, 49, 64, 71 ff., 83, 88 f., 225 f., 242 f.; from biological
necessity, 19
f.,
Hamilton, Alexander, 94 Hamlet, 17, 308 Hammarskjold, Dag, 280 f., 283 Happiness, 31 f.
Harmony
of interests, 37
Harriman, Averell, 300 Hayek, Friedrich von, 30 H-bomb; see Nuclear weapons
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 47, 50, 58 f., 94 Herter, Christian, 301 Historiography, 44, 54 ff. History, 23 Hitler,' Adolf, 13, 39,41, 332 Hobbes, Thomas, 44, 46
23
f.
Gas warfare,
General
373
151
f.,
309, 327
Geneva agreement of
f.,
185
387
Honor, concept
Horace, 21
ff.
of,
24
f.,
323
ff.,
f.
King, James E., 151 Korea, 189, 192, 196, 297, 320, 356
Humphrey, Hubert,
Hungary,
337,346
Iceland, 180
Idealism, 198
143
ff.
Korean War,
lllf.,
130ff.,
153,
157,
ff.
ff.,
ff.,
ff.,
374
18, 42, 66, 168; conflict
Ideologies,
1 ff.,
Laski, Harold, 29
ff.,
63
ff.,
296,337
f.,
281
f.,
288, 298,
f.,
246, 343,
Latin America, 97, 132, 139, 207, 216, 249 f., 256, 260, 296, 302 f. Lauterpacht, H., 231 League of Nations, 37, 42, 109 Lebanon, 282, 308 Legislature, usurpation of power by, 64 Lenin, V. I. Ulyanov, 33, 39, 250, 289
Liberalism,
79ff., 87;
18, 36, 39,
ff.,
78
ff.,
94;
dilemma
ff.,
Manchester, 318
245
f.,
modthree
ern transformations
t)'pes of, 168
f.
in,
169
Intervention, 375
Iran, 153, 356
Trygve, 281
Lincoln, Abraham, 71, 73, 80, 94, 115, 380 Lippmann, Walter, 63 ff., 250
Literature,
8, 12 ff. 8, 13 f.
f.,
214, 292
Loneliness,
Japan,
189,
f.,
192,
207,
f.,
232,
292,
297
ff.,
302,
334f.,
338
343;
alliance
f.
of,
with
United
Jefferson,
States, 297
Thomas,
177
ff.
311, 342
f.,
345; equalif.
minoritarian, 73
.Magna Carta, 64 Alaistre, Joseph de, 53 Majority rule, 48, 64, 75 f. Malaya, civil war in, 311, 371, 374
Alali,'337
f.
Man, nature
/Marshall,
of, 15
ff.,
19
ff.
George,
359, 361
F., 143
F.,
101
f.,
ff.,
116,
.Marx, Karl,
7, 33,
39
f.,
58
f.,
251
308
ff.,
339
370
Alarxism,
361
7, 33,
348
f.,
214
f.,
225,
.Methodolog)% 54 Michelangelo, 61
Index
Middle
East, 97, 150, 152
ff.,
189, 216,
spread
of, 97,
137
ff.,
142
f.,
Disarmament
222
ff.
ff.,
Ludwig von,
ff.;
30
Oder-Neisse
philosophy
325
ff.,
line,
f.,
246,
323,
Monarchy, 45
of, 12
political
329
331
Monroe
Oppenheim,
Lassa, 231
23
158, 160
Owen, Wilfred,
Pacifism, 155 Pakistan, 113
f.,
f.,
Morocco, 337
Moses, 14
Muller,
f.
f.,
Adam,
43
17
178
f.,
191, 216
344
f.
Munich
settlement of 1938, 38
f.
Parliamentary rule, 50
Pastore,
John
O., 144
f.
Nagv, Imre, 334 Napoleon I, 12 f., 39, 41, 47, 209 Napoleonic Wars, 171, 350
Nasser,
345
f.
Gamal Abdel,
336
f.
220,
National interest,
275, 276
f.,
37,
ff.,
348
f.
National purpose, 225 f., 313 National Security Council, 312 National self-determination, 39, 41, 345 Nationalism, 40 f 342 ff.
.,
f.,
266
330, 333,
NATO,
352
153, 186
f.,
196, 221
f.,
301, 331,
f.,
205, 245
f.,
Natural law, 17 f., 65 f. Naziism, 12, 33, 76, 239, 245, 343 f. Negotiated settlement, 127, 134, 203,
286, 288
ff.,
formation,
103
ff.,
115,
311
f.,
Political
economy,
ff.,
83
1 ff.,
315
ff.,
374
f.
Political philosophy,
51
f.,
12
f.,
32, 48,
63
237
ff.;
Western
tradition
of, 42
Neutralism, 182, 228 f., 291, 297 f., 334 ff.; types of, 335 ff. Niebuhr, Reinhold, 42 f., 66 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 19 Nixon, Richard M., 128 Nuclear power: age of, 19, 309; as a deterrent, 157 ff., 184, 304 f., 352, 356 f., 363; and retaliation, 128 ff.,
152, 302; stalemate,
189,
theory,
and
practice,
1 ff.,
42
f.,
67
f.
moral problem of, 15 ff., 42 f., 200; nature of, 90 ff., 198 f.; objective
in,
standards certainty
Politics,
64
f., f.,
79
105
f.,
198
f.;
unf.;
in, 102
f.
135
ff.,
144,
f.,
182,
f.,
American: character
ff.;
of, 95
162
290
decline of, 96
revolutionary tra-
295
f.
Nuclear war,
135ff.,
22
f.,
ff.,
120, 129
ff.,
ff.
156
174
283
362, 131;
f.,
f.,
Portugal, 144
f.,
181
Positivism, 54, 65
374;
defense against,
moral problem
ff.,
ff.,
71
ff.,
threat
absolute,
ff.,
35,
46
ff.;
ff.;
centralizaf.,
288
ff.,
tion of, 48
142, 170;
53;
economic, 39
private,
81,
con-
85
ff.;
national, 248
389
Pragmatism, 109
f.
f.,
f.
by man, 110
Propaganda,
272, 277
42,
173,
206,
211, 237
flf.,
Socialism, 49
Sociology, 44, 55
Socrates, 9
f.
Sophocles, 61
f.
concept
of,
47;
divine,
ff.,
64;
34;
and
civilization,
61
f.;
political,
in the
United
States, 60
Revolutions: colonial, 170, 185, 302; popular, 19, 35, 49, 53; of twentieth century, 39, 96 f., 99, 129, 132 f., 139, 310 Rhetoric, political, 102 f.
46 f., 50 Soviet Communist party. Twenty-second Congress of the, 348 Soviet Union, 30, 34, 38 ff.. Ill, 120, 123 ff., 127, 129 f., 134 ff., 142 ff., 158, 161 f., 170, 192 ff., 203, 214 ff., 220, 222 ff., 242, 245 f., 248 ff., 261, 279 ff., 285 ff., 295 ff., 302 f., 315 ff., 323 ff.,
329 ff., China,
124
f.,
341,
193,
345,
349,
354,
360;
182
ff.,
194, 203,
Richard
III,
10
many,
East,
of,
323
153
ff.,
329
f.;
ff.,
f.,
193
underestimation
Rights of Man, 47 Robbins, Lionel, 34 Rockefeller, Nelson, 107 Rockefeller Foundation, 256 Rodin, Auguste, 61
97 Spain, 354
f.,
365
Roe, Thomas, 12 Roman Empire, 169; tribute to, 259 Romanticism, political, 43, 53
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 33, 102, 108, 109, 120, 305 f., 329, 331, 384 Roosevelt, Theodore, 75, 317 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 46 Rush-Ba^ot Convention of 1817, 122 Rusk, Dean, 300 f., 379
Spinoza, Benedict, 46 Stalev, Eugene, 34 Stalin, Joseph, 12 f., 41, 183, 189, 214, 288 f., 301, 316f., 323 ff., 329, 332 f., 348 f. State, Department of, 306
,
State,
foundation
Gov272,
ernment
Statesmanship, 93,
312
101
ff.,
115
f.,
f.,
Soviet,
192
ff.,
222
ff.,
311,
113,
125,
218,
223,
230,
245,
264
ff., ff.,
359 f.; see also individual nations Saudi Arabia, 194 Schmitt, Carl, 43
Edward
R., 305
Schuman
Science:
Plan, 231
ff.
Schumpeter, Josef,
34,
239
f.;
objectivity in, 56
psycho-
Stevenson, Adlai, 128, 300 Submarine warfare, 152 Subsidies, military, 259
Suez Canal
Suicide, 19
187
ff.,
Scientism, 54
f.
SEATO,
390
Shakespeare, William, 10
Sulzbach, Walter, 34
Index
Summit
meetings, 285
fF.
eral
new,
148
280
f.;
as
world government,
273, 277
ff.,
42
f.,
Taine, Hyppolyte, 53
Technology:
military, 119
f.,
136, 172,
1873, 179
Vatican, on negotiated settlement, 127 Vico, Giambattista, 58 Vietminh, 366 f. Vietnam, lUff., 189, 192, 196, 297, 309 ff., 320, 354 ff., 365 ff.; totalitarianism in, 368 ff. Viner, Jacob, 34 Virtue, private, as substitute for public virtue, 90 ff
War:
limited,
cause of, 268; concept of, 168; 17, 129 ff., 138 ff., 142, 146, 151, 159 ff., 171 f., 299, 363; total, 45,
171
ff.;
see also
Nuclear war
53, 106
f.,
34
50,
64,
73,
ff.
Wars of Warsaw
Pact, 192
76
ff.,
96, 267
171
Washington, George, on alliances, 115 Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments of 1922, 122 f.,
147
Truman, Harry
383
Wedemeyer, Albert C,
Welles, Sumner, 306
359
f.,
Truman
Truth,
98, 243
Western Hemisphere,
191
220
f.
94,
f.
107,
110,
Turkey,
205
Uncommitted
215
f.,
nations,
222,
f.,
96,
ff.,
218,
226
f.,
251,
257
ff.;
303
336, 339
see
also individual continents and nations United Arab Republic; see Egypt United Nations, 109, 148 ff., 174, 200 f.,
World government, 142, 145, 174 f. World revolution, 39, 242 World War 1,41, 176 f. World War II, 40 f., 156, 176 f., 329 World wars, 40, 170 f., 173, 232, 297
Yalta agreements, 329, 331
207, 273
fT.,
276
ff .,
279
ff .,
364;
Energy Commission,
123,
Yemen,
192
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