WHAT ROLE (IF ANY) DID DOMESTIC FACTORS PLAYED IN ENDING THE COLD WAR

Roger Pallars Sastre Prof. Diego Muro International Relations Theory Blanquerna School of Communication and IR

The aim of this essay is to analyse if domestic factors had a role in ending of the Cold War, and, in case this hypothesis is demonstrated, to figure out their specific position in this process. Before conducting the whole essay, we need to establish an operational definition for domestic factors. Our essay would assume that domestic factors are the set of concrete foreign and domestic policies made by Soviet leaders, that could or could not explain the end of the Cold War1. We will begin by trying to show that domestic factors did have an influence in the ending of the Cold. To continue, we will then try to find out the causes that better explain how domestic factors influence the end of Cold War. As we stated above, we believe that domestic factors had an influence in the end of the Cold War. As Checkel states, systems-level explanations define the universe of possible outcomes but do not explain why particular ones occur2. In the ending of Cold War case, this means that these systems-level such as realism or liberalism3 could explain the framework in which Soviet decision-makers were working, but could not justify the outcomes of these decisions. Because of this black hole that systems-level approaches are not capable to fulfil, it may be needed to include a domestic level of analysis. Three main reasons may be applied to demonstrate this issue: firstly, because of the need to understand why actors make specific choices instead of others (RisseKappen, 1994, pg. 192). Secondly, due to the necessity to figure out the dynamics between variables from different analytical levels: international and domestic ones. (Checkel, 1993, pg. 273). Thirdly, because of the importance of taking into account the concrete timing in the process of change of independent variables, which would consequently have an impact on how the dependent variable shifts (Checkel, 1993, pg. 274). So, having demonstrated that domestic issues had a role in ending of Cold War, we will now discuss which specific influence had these issues in this process. In order to do so, we have to ask what type of independent variables causes domestic issues: as these independent variables will be different between them, so will be the domestic issues
1

The reason for this operational definition is underlied from the fact that specific policies are the meeting point of all the theoretical explanations that try to explain from which independent variable these policies derive.
2 3

We are referring to realism and liberalism as system-level approaches since they see they do not take into account any different level than the state system. In other words, they are not interested in how states are internally structured.

result in each of them. Without very specific and technical distinctions, we can see a theoretical dispute between those who claim a material approach and others who prefer an ideational way of explaining how domestic issues were applied4. Brooks and Wohlforth (2000/01) argue that the set of domestic issues that the USSR leaders applied during the last years of its existence should be causally related to a twodimensioned economic situation: on the one hand, the Soviet relative decline in economic terms, and, on the other, the changing structure of global production. These two structural situations constrained so much the decision-making framework that the USSR leader at that time, Mikhail Gorbachev, had only a single way to proceed: the way he did5. So, this approach creates two so clear independent variables that, once USSR leaders acknowledge them, the dependent variable can only shift in that way. All in all, shifts of the economic structure both domestically and internationally clearly shape domestic issues. Differently, another set of independent variables can be created in relation to ideas, so that a remarkably shift in the set of values produces a change in domestic issues. Much literature has been done regarding this issue: Risse-Kappen (1994) suggests that a transnational network was able to promote a new set of ideas which was embraced by Gorbachev when he took power, so that the reforms he promoted should be understood from this causal relation. Lvesque (1997) argues that ideas of more democratic legitimacy within the USSR and a more social-democratic ideology shaped concrete political outcomes produced by Gorbachev. Checkel (1993) defends an alternative idea of not influencing directly domestic factors by the ideas of a changing external environment and the appearance of a reformist general secretary, but that this idea shapes a framework, that is to say, a political structure, in which new concrete ideas are more likely to be championed to concrete policies. In conclusion, we have firstly demonstrated the need for a domestic level additional approach due to the insufficient theoretical scope that system level theories have. It is now time to establish the concrete role of domestic factors in the Cold War ending, that is to say, until which level the Cold War could be explained by domestic factors. As we
4

This distinction constitutes a methodological procedure in order to discuss whether material incentives or ideational ones better explain how the USSR domestically acted, and, in doing so, why happened as it did the ending of the Cold War. 5 As Brooks and Wohlforth state, because of the economic structure, Gorbachev had to engage in unilateral retrenchment economically and military, regarding foreign policy.

tried to underline above, domestic factors cannot explain per se this historical phenomenon. Thus, we have discussed two different approaches: the one lies on material evidences as the independent variables and the other believes in ideas as the causal agents of the dependent variable. However, it is not a debate only in the ending of Cold War issue, but it can be also traduced into a structure/agent constructivist debater. As in this field, sociologist Anthony Giddens tried to conciliate this dichotomy in his well-known The Constitution of Society6. Applying Giddens principles to the ending of the Cold War, we may be aware that both material and ideational approaches were partly right partly wrong. Following Giddens principles, ideas as the translation of agency may have a space to try to be championed by their political entrepreneurs within a framework both determined by international and domestic structure, with economic, as Brooks and Wohlforth suggested and political constraints (Risse-Kappen, 1994, pg. 208-212). By setting this agency and structure framework, domestic issues can explain, in partnership with international ones, how the end of Cold War was. 1066 words.

See Anthony Giddens (1984), The Constitution of Society, University of California Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Jacques Lvesque (1997) The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe, University of California Press: Introduction and Conclusion. Jeff Checkel (1993) Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution, World Politics, Vol 45 (2): 271-300. Robert English (2005) Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol 7 (2): 43-80. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth (2000/01) Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas, International Security, Vol. 25 (2): 5-53. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994) Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coallitions, Domestic Structures and the End of the Cold War, International Organization, Vol. 48 (2): 185-214