Part II LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS I. A.

INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS PUBLIC OFFICE AND PUBLIC OFFICERS public officer one who holds a public office Art 11, 1987 Constitution Sec 2b, RA 3019 Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt service [ now career and non-carrier] receiving compensation, government even nominal from the

No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. In addition, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide that every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest.

By his acts and misdeeds, respondent has undermined the public's faith in our courts and, ultimately, in the administration of justice. The same make him unfit as a court employee. His employment must therefore be terminated at once Court personnel must adhere to the high ethical standards of public service in order to preserve the Court's good name and standing. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.

Art. 203, RPC Public officer is any person who by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority shall take part in the performance of public functions in the government of the Phils. or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official of any rank or class

Fernandez vsSto Tomas public office the right, authority or duty - created and conferred by law - by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power - an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government - to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public Elements of a public officer 1. Must be treated by law or authority of law 2. It must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of the government to be exercised for the benefit of the public 3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined, directly, or impliedly by the legislature or through legislative authority 4. The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power other than the law unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the legislature and placed by it under the general control of superior office or body 5. It must have some permanence and continuity and be only temporary or occasional Characteristics 1. It is not a party and cannot be subject of a contract 2. It is not a hereditable possession 3. It is personal to the holder

Concerned Citizens of Laoag City vsArzaga being notoriously undesirable A court employee being a public servant must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his duties but also in his personal and private dealings with other people to preserve the court's name and standing. Therefore, it becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice." (Paredes vs. Padua, 222 SCRA 81). The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the office charged with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.

We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the Commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," "as the need [for such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission Appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks.

2. validstatutoryenactments ( office of the insurance commissioner) 3. by authority of law (david commission)

Laurel vsDesierto salary is not a necessary element of public office theelement of continuitycannot be considered as indispensable for public office Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not themost important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment is that the creation and conferring of an office involvesdelegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public and that the some portion of the sovereignty of the country eitherlegislative, executive or judicial, attaches for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit thus, unless the powers so conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. NCC performs executive functions; created by an Executive order; Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. 24 But it is a public office, nonetheless. Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body" make said commission less of a public office.

ELEMENTS:

1. created by law or by authority of law 2. possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public 3. powers conferred and duties imposed must be defined, directly or impliedly, by the legislature or by legislative authority 4. duties must be performed independently and without the control of a superior power other than the law Unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the legislature And by it placed under the general control of a superior office or body 5. must have permanence or continuity

Creation

1. constitution (office of the president)

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and localcannot ordinarily be consideredan office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer." At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior." Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss. 26 There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.) To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. 28 The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define "public officers."

In certain proceedings of an administrative character, the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. A public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law but is a public trust or agency. For this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as property. public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property Power to suspend temporarily may be exercised without notice to the person suspended. Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing. The basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents. "The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to suspension unless required by statute and therefore suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due process of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he is not given an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses." "The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively requires the suspension, pending his trial, of a public officer, especially a custodian of public funds, charged with malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but merely prevents him, for the time being, from performing the functions of his office; and from the very necessities of the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the analogies of the law. It is a constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of his liberty or property except by due process of law, which includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never claimed that in criminal procedure a person could not be arrested and deprived of his liberty until a trial could reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex parte and temporary injunctions might not be issued and retained in proper cases, until a trial could be had, and the rights of the parties determined. We have no doubt, therefore, of the authority of the legislature to vest the governor with power to temporarily suspend a county treasurer pending the investigation of the charges against him, of official misconduct."

Segovia vs Noel Though there is no vested right to an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated. Public office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract.

Cornejovs Gabriel Ordinarily, a public official should not be removed from office without notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. ITC: we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles.

'The duty of suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the highest motives of public policy to prevent the danger to the public interests which might arise from leaving such great powers and responsibilities in the hands of men legally disqualified. To leave them in full charge of their office until the next biennial session of the legislature, or pending litigation which might be continued for years, would destroy the very object of the law. [d]

one acting under color of right and with apparent authority but who is not legally a corporate officer the corporation is bound by all acts and contracts of an officer de facto in the same way as it is with those if de jure officer

AbejavsTanada We also find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, EdiltrudesRadovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for damages. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 561 [1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office (Dela Victoria, supra).

one who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be irregular may have reputation of being an officer he assumes to be but is not a good office in the point of law appointment is valid on its face one who continues in the exercise of the functions and duties of the office without legal authority or after his term or title has ended one who performs the functions of the officer in good faith and under color of right to the position involved policy and purpose o protection of the public and individuals insofar as they become involved in the official acts of person discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers

B.

KINDS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS DE JURE

By right; by right in law validly appointed an officer who exercises the duties of an office for which the holder has fulfilled all the qualifications DE FACTO SampayanvsDaza

BLACKs [d] w/o appointment or election but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people w/o injury to submit or invoke his action supposing him to be an officer officernot eligible want of power in election or appointing body An officer who exercises the duties of an office under the color of an appointment or election but who has failed to qualify for office for any one of various reasons as by being under the required age, havingfailed to take oath havingnot furnished a required bond or having taken office under a statute later declared unconstitutional

ITC, congressman was a greencard holder and did not renounce his status as a permanent resident of US Appropriate remedy was to cancel COC or quo warranto But term already expired As de facto officers, he cannot be made to reimburse the funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts were valid as those of a de jure officer. As de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

General Manager vsMonserate In this respect, while petitioner Anino'sappointment to the contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular. In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a

de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, this Court allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services renderedbut only when there is no de jure officer, thus: ". . . in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office." In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith. ITC: This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such office. While her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials for the period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of his retirement on November 30, 1997. BE PUBLIC OFFICERS: ELIGIBILITY AND

2. may refer to the act of entering into the performance of the functions of public office (e.g. taking the oath of office) C.1. WHO MAY PRESCRIBE QUALIFICATIONS When the qualifications are prescribed by the Constitution, they are generally exclusive, except where the constitution itself provides otherwise Relative to public offices created by statute, Congress has virtually plenary powers to prescribe qualifications, provided that o the qualifications are germane to the objective/s for which the public office was created AND the qualifications are not too specific as to fit a particular, identifiable person because that would deprive the appointing authority of discretion in the selection of the appointee

C.2. TIME OF POSSESSION OF QUAIFICATIONS Must possess the qualifications AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT or ELECTION AND CONTINUOUSLY for as long as the official relationship continues

FrivaldovsComelec LGC does not specify the date when the candidate must possess Filipino citizenship Philippine citizenship is required in order to ensure that no alien shall govern our people An official BEGINS TO GOVERN ONLY UPON HIS PROCLAMATION AND ON THE DAY THAT HIS TERM BEGINS LGC speaks of qualifications of elective officials and not of candidates Loss of any qualifications during incumbency will be a ground for termination Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: a citizen of the Philippines;

C. WHO MAY QUALIFICATIONS Qualification:

a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

1. may refer to endowments, qualities or attributes which make an individual eligible for public office (e.g. citizenship)

In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day." From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. ITC: Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li SengGiap& Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter much less a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration. The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not the actual voting is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else. Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized and Lee has not disputed that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the

Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible. But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. (curative/ remedial in nature; when create new rights) Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held: "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands." In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected

President o o o o o Natural born citizen of the Philippines Registered voter Able to read and write At least 40 years of age on the day of election A resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election

Vice president o Same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the president May be removed from office in the same manner as the president May be appointed as a member of the cabinet and such appointment requires no confirmation

Art 9, B, C, Sec 1(1) Civil Service Commission o o o Chairman and 2 commissioners Natural born citizens of the Philippines At least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment With proven capacity for public administration Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment Appointed by the president with the consent of the commission on appointments Term of 7 years w/o reappointment Chairman 7 years, a commissioner for 5 years and another for 3 years No member shall be appointed/ designated in a temporary or acting capacity

C.3. USUAL QUALIFICATIONS Art. 6, Sec 2 & 6 Senate o 24 senators elected at large by qualified voters of the Philippines as may be provided by law o o

House of Representatives o o o o Natural born citizen of the Philippines At least 25 years of age on the day of election Able to read and write Except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected Resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election o o

COMELEC o o Chairman and 6 commissioners Natural born citizens of the Philippines

Art. 7, Sec 2,3

At least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment Holders of a college degree Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections A majority including the chairman shall be members of the Philippine bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years Appointed by the president with the consent of the commission on appointments o

o o

prescribed by the Constitution therefor, cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property necessary for said counterbond; o disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective offices, persons who, although possessing the qualifications prescribed by law therefor, cannot pay said premium and/or do not have the property essential for the aforementioned counter-bond; imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office and that the people could validly vote for him;

Sec 22, Book V, E.0. 292 Art 3, Sec 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof Free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship w/o discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights

property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned

SJS vs Dangerous Drugs In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36 (g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36 (g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test". Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting

MaqueravsBorra Property qualifications may not be imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office The law is declared unconstitutional for requiring each candidate to post a bond of P20,000 upon the filing of COC, subject to forfeiture if he did not obtain at least 10% of the total votes cast in the constituency where he ran Republic Act NO. 4421 requires a candidate to post a surety bond equivalent to one-year salary of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the government, if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office, there being not more than four candidates for the same office. The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is to impose property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office, which property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same. Consequently, Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void. That the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421: o toprevent or disqualify from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although having the qualifications

elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement. It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

No senator or member of the HR may hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision or agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the tern for which he was elected. No member of the constitutional commission shall during his tenure hold any other office or employment ( sec 2, art 9a) The same disqualification applies to ombudsman and his deputies ( sec 8, art 11) The ombudsman and his deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office (sec 11, art 11) Members of the constitutional commissions, the ombudsman and his deputies must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment (sec 1, art 9b, sec 1 art 9c, sec 1 art pd, sec 8 art 11) Member s of the constitutional commission, the ombudsman and his deputies are appointed for a term of 7 years without reappointment The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity th within the 4 civil degree of the president shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the constitutional commissions or the office of the ombudsman, or as secretaries, undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCCs. (sec 13, art 7)

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

C.4. DISQUALIFICATIONS c.4.1 under the constitution No candidate who lost in the election shall, w/in 1 year after such election be appointed to any office in the government (sec 6, art 9b) No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure ( sec 7(1), art 9b) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other position in government (sec 7(2), art 9b) o Like when another office is held by a public officer in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office because such other office does not comprise any other position The ex officio position is actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office

c.4.2 under local government code c.4.3 other laws Provided that the prescribed disqualifications do not violate the constitution o Law declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the constitutional presumption of innocence: when laws said the filing of a criminal information for disloyalty was a prima facie proof of guilt (dumlaovscomelec)

The president, VP, members of the cabinet ad their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the constitution hold any other office or employment during his tenure (sec 13, art 7)

c.5. Effect of pardon Pardon is forgiveness and not forgetfulness hence it will not bring restoration to the civil and political rights of the person being pardon. Civil and political rights can only be restored when it is expressly stated in the pardon or when the pardon states that the person did not do the crime. ( sounds absurd, being pardon even though you did not commit the crime) ... Italics supplied..

Art. 36, RPC - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

MONSANTO V. FACTORAN ISSUE: w/n a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by 25 reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that 26 office. The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness . It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

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