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The Social Dimension European Developments in Social Psychology Edited by Henri Tajfel Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511759154 Online ISBN: 9780511759154 Hardback ISBN: 9780521239783 Paperback ISBN: 9780521283878
Chapter 25 - Social identification and psychological group formation pp. 518-5 38 Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511759154.008 Cambridge University Press
25. Social identification and psychological group formation1

JOHN C. TURNER
i . Introduction: what is a psychological group? The social group is a fundamental but currently neglected topic in social psychology. Group affiliations are a universal feature of human social life. With only the rarest exceptions all human beings live in groups and act as group members. Moreover, the latter may be true psychologically even when an individual chooses to live in physical isolation. Group memberships are basic determinants of our social relations with others (whether positive or negative), our attitudes and values, and the social norms and roles that guide our conduct. In a larger sense, they are vehicles of culture, ideology and social and historical change. A social psychology without an adequate analysis of the group concept is, to a very real extent, like Hamlet without the prince. This chapter considers the problem of psychological group formation. What are the minimal conditions for a collection of individuals to constitute a psychological group - not a sociological, political, biological or some other form of group, but a state of affairs where they feel themselves to be and act as a group, where there is some kind of psychological acceptance of the group membership? The chapter will review some research and outline some tentative hypotheses on the topic. There is a reasonable descriptive consensus in social psychology about the important empirical features of psychological group membership. There are three: firstly, there is the perceptual or 'identity' criterion: that a collection of people should define themselves and be defined by others as a group; they should share some collective perception of themselves as a distinct social entity, of 'us' as opposed to 'them'. Secondly, there is the 'interdependence' criterion: that they should be (positively) interdependent in some way, for the
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Much of this chapter is based upon work conducted as part of a three-year research project into social identification and intergroup behaviour funded by the British Social Science Research Council.
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satisfaction of needs, achievement of goals, consensual validation of attitudes and values, in terms of social influence, social interaction, mutual attraction, etc. It is usually assumed (e.g. Sherif 1967) that interdependence for need-satisfaction tends to produce cooperative or affiliative interaction, mutual influence, and social cohesion between individuals. The interdependence criterion is closely associated with the hypothesis that the essential requirement for group formation is some minimal degree of mutual attraction (cohesiveness) between members, since it is assumed that attraction to others is based on the rewards which they mediate (e.g. Lott & Lott 1965). Thirdly, there is the criterion of social structure: that social interaction between the individuals should be stabilized, organized and regulated by a system of role and status differentiations and shared norms and values. Few researchers would be unwilling to describe a collection of people sharing a common identity, interdependent for need-satisfaction and mutually attracted, and organized into a definite social structure of power, status and communication, as a psychological group. There is somewhat less consensus over which of the above criteria embodies the basic psychological process in group formation. Which comprises the essential constituent in group-belongingness and which are the derivatives? However, there is still wide agreement, even if sometimes implicit, that interdependent social relationships are the foremost component (e.g. Cartwright & Zander 1968; Lott & Lott 1965; Shaw 1976; Sherif 1967). Shared identity and social structure are assumed to develop almost inevitably over time from mutual interpersonal interdependence. The forces acting upon group members to maintain their association are described by the concept of cohesiveness. Traditionally it was hypothesized that cohesiveness derived from three sources: attraction to the individual members of the group, attraction to the group as a whole, and attraction to the activities of the group (Festinger 1950). Currently (and for a long time in practice) cohesiveness tends to be equated with interpersonal attraction, i.e. attraction to individual members. The rationale for this is quite straightforward. Firstly, there is the influence of the individualistic thesis that the 'group as a whole' is a nominal fallacy; 'group' is merely a convenient label for the individuals that comprise it and nothing more (Allport 1924; see Asch 1952; Sherif 1936; Turner & Giles 1981 for a critique of this thesis). Thus, attraction to the group can be nothing more than attraction to individual members. Secondly, insofar as group activities are rewarding they should contribute to attraction to members. The widely accepted reinforcement theory of attraction states t h a t ' attraction will follow if one individual either directly provides another with reward or need-satisfaction, is perceived as
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potentially able to do so, or is otherwise associated with such a state of affairs' (Lott & Lott 1965: 287). In other words, we may come to like fellow group members because they reward us directly by virtue of, for example, their personality traits or similarities in attitudes, or because they are associated with rewarding activities such as cooperation for common goals. Thus, attraction to activities is merely one source of intermember attraction; it is not a theoretically distinct category. Indeed, it seems doubtful that a collection of people who associated for purely instrumental ends without being attracted to each other could be referred to as a psychological group. The dominant view of cohesiveness is made explicit by Lott & Lott (1965): they define it as that group property inferred from the number and strength of mutual positive attitudes among the members of a group. In sum, the accepted theory of a psychological group is that in essence it is some collection of individuals characterized by mutual interpersonal attraction reflecting some degree of interdependence and mutual need-satisfaction. 2. Social categorization and the external designation of group membership There are a number of problems with the above theory. The most obvious is that it would seem to apply primarily and perhaps solely to small face-to-face groups whose members can interact on a personal basis. Shaw (1976), for example, summarizes various definitions of the group by means of a variant of the interdependence criterion as follows: 'two or more persons who are interacting with one another in such a manner that each person influences and is influenced by each other person' (p. 11). He is explicit that the definition applies only to small groups (20 or fewer members and usually less than five). Yet it is evident that some of our most important and psychologically significant group memberships refer to large-scale social affiliations such as sex, nationality, race, religion, class, occupation, political party, and so on. These kinds of group membership may influence interpersonal interaction, but they do not seem to develop from cohesive interpersonal relationships. Nations, for example, do not emerge from friendships between individuals; they are cultural and historical givens imposed upon us by socialization and social consensus whether or not they satisfy our individual needs. Indeed, national loyalties are sometimes at their fiercest when nationality is associated with intense deprivation and sacrifice. The members of a given nation are rarely united around some single common goal, but are normally divided by numerous issues, relevant or irrelevant to nationhood. There is not one consensual system of norms and roles; members tend to belong to numerous
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organizations and subcultures, not one of which has complete sovereignty. Finally, members do not interact with more than a small minority of their fellows and their relations are not universally amicable. Nevertheless, nations can constitute psychological groups: the members tend to define themselves and be defined by others as a nation, and, under certain conditions, the vast majority will feel psychologically involved in the group membership, share similar emotions and attitudes and act in a relatively unitary manner towards their environment. As Emerson wrote in trying to define a nation: 'The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation: and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well' (cited in Tajfel 1978: 28). Thus, there seem to be at least some significant group memberships characterized only by the identity criterion. This fact is also recognized in the related process of group formation on the basis of 'external designation'. Cartwright & Zander (1968) describe it as follows: For some groups the original impetus to their formation derives neither from the desire to accomplish some objective nor from the needs of those who become members, but from the fact that certain people are treated in a homogeneous manner by others ... People can be placed into categories on the basis of the colour of their skin ... sex ... language ... occupation ... and many other attributes. Under certain conditions, which unfortunately are not well understood, one or more of these personal traits become socially relevant, and individuals possessing them are clustered into perceptual or cognitive categories... Others behave towards people in these categories on the basis of their inclusion in the category; perceptual or cognitive segregation leads to behavioural segregation. The members of a socially defined categoryfindthat certain kinds of behaviour are expected of them and that certain opportunities are available to them or denied them simply because of their membership in the category. Inter-dependence among members develops because society gives them a 'common fate', (pp. 56-7) It seems that the external designation of people as members of a group may produce private acceptance of that group membership. This is so despite the fact that there is no interdependence for need-satisfaction and indeed in some cases, such as the external designation of minority group membership, that cognitive segregation may be associated with, and serve to justify, discrimination against - and the deprivation and derogation of- members. Cartwright & Zander speculate that external designation instigates the development of interdependence, and they hint that this remains the basic process inducing subjective acceptance. In this way, they attempt to bring the phenomenon back within the orbit of their favoured theory. Some recent research, however, confirms the problematic nature of external designation. The relevant experiments (Brewer 1979; Tajfel et ah 1971: Turner 1980,
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1981) impose social categorizations upon people in isolation from even the most minimal determinants of group cohesiveness. Social categorizations are cognitive divisions of people into distinct classes or categories. The subjects are divided into two distinct groups (such as group X or group Y) on the basis of trivial ad hoc criteria or even explicitly randomly (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Brewer & Silver 1978; Locksley, Ortiz & Hepburn 1980); there are no group goals, nor other links between group membership and personal self-interest; there is no social interaction within or between groups, and group membership is completely anonymous. The members' task is simply to make decisions about rewards for (or ratings of) anonymous other individuals identified ostensibly for administrative convenience solely by personal code numbers and their group affiliations. The basic finding is that instead of being fair or maximizing the joint profit of the recipients, they discriminate in favour of ingroup and against outgroup members. They also seem to demonstrate mutual cohesion in the form of more positive attitudes to ingroup than outgroup members. These responses represent shared or collective reactions to others, systematically related to one's own and others' group memberships, and so it seems plausible to describe them as group behaviour. Similarly, it seems more appropriate to refer to the obtained positive intermember attitudes as group cohesion rather than interpersonal attraction, since they seem to arise as an effect of social categorization even where members are personally anonymous. Thus, these data imply the private acceptance of imposed group memberships in the absence of interpersonal interdependence and attraction, and indeed without any social contact or social structure between members at all. The sufficient condition for psychological group formation seems to be the recognition and acceptance of some self-defining or self-inclusive social categorization. The above results have now been extensively replicated at the level of both behavioural discrimination and social evaluation (Brewer 1979; Turner 1980, 1981). In the first paradigmatic studies (Tajfel et ah 1971) common category membership was confounded with perceived intra-group similarity. The subjects believed that they had been divided into groups on the basis of some trivial criterion such as their differential preferences for paintings. Since similarity is a well-established determinant of interpersonal attraction, this procedure could have created some minimal cohesiveness between members of the same group. Some later studies controlled for this factor and disconfirmed its importance. Billig (1973), Billig & Tajfel (1973), Brewer & Silver (1978) and Locksley, Ortiz & Hepburn (1980) all included conditions where people were divided into groups on an explicitly random or arbitrary basis and there
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was no a priori reason to like ingroup more than outgroup members. Nevertheless, the usual intergroup discrimination occurred. Brewer & Silver (1978) also compared the effects of random and criterial categorizations and found no difference: both caused a more positive evaluation of ingroup than outgroup members. Two studies manipulated similarities and differences between people and ingroup-outgroup membership orthogonally. Billig & Tajfel (19 7 3) categorized people either explicitly randomly or on the basis of criterial similarities and differences (the categorization:non-similarity and categorization:similarity conditions); or assigned them random or criterial code numbers without explicitly dividing them into groups (the non-similarity: non-categorization and similarity:non-categorization conditions). There was significant ingroup favouritism in the two categorization conditions but not in the noncategorization conditions. There was some effect for similarity - the members of criterial groups tended to be more discriminatory than members of random groups - but, overall, categorization was the more important variable. Allen & Wilder (1975) divided all their subjects into groups on the basis of a trivial criterion and manipulated the ingroup and outgroup similarities or differences from the subject in terms of more important general beliefs. There was ingroup favouritism in all conditions, i.e. subjects even favoured dissimilar ingroup members over similar outgroup members. Outgroup similarity did not reduce intergroup discrimination, but ingroup similarity significantly increased it. Thus both studies imply that group membership per se, rather than interpersonal similarities and differences, is the crucial determinant of social categorization effects. They also both suggest that intra-group similarity may tend to enhance intergroup discrimination. This is perhaps not surprising, since similarities and differences between people are an important basis for spontaneous social categorizations and hence this variable probably functions to reinforce cognitively the division into groups. Another possible explanation of the basic finding that has been investigated is in terms of demand characteristics. Perhaps subjects discriminate because the experimental situation is unfamiliar to them and they are anxious about how to behave; they may search for clues to the hypothesis and conclude from references to group membership that they are expected to discriminate and then comply. There are three relevant studies: Tajfel & Billig (19 74) familiarized one group of subjects with the experimental setting prior to the study proper. Contrary to their expectations, the presumably less anxious subjects discriminated more than unfamiliarized subjects. Billig (1973) allowed one group of incoming subjects to talk about the study with a group that had just completed it. He assumed that the latter would communicate their beliefs
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about appropriate ways of responding to the former and so increase their adherence to the social norms inherent in the situation. In fact, the second group discriminated significantly less than the first. St Claire & Turner (1982) tested the demand characteristics hypothesis directly. There were three conditions: the control group who were categorized in the normal way, the simulation group who were present in the same session but were not divided into groups, and had to predict the responses of the categorized subjects, and the 'prejudice' group, who were the same as the control group except that they were given an explicit cue that the experimenter expected them to be prejudiced. There was no significant difference in discrimination between control and 'prejudice' subjects and both were significantly less fair than simulation subjects. In other words, non-categorized observers exposed to exactly the same demand cues as categorized subjects expected the latter to be fair and not discriminatory, and categorized subjects did not increase their discrimination even when explicitly told the hypothesis. Finally, in line with the data from other studies, the results of a post-experimental inquiry conducted by St Claire & Turner provided no evidence at all for the demand characteristics interpretation. The various replications and extensions of the original studies seem unequivocally to confirm their import: social categorization per se is sufficient for intergroup discrimination and the minimal conditions for group formation do not seem to include cohesive relations between members or any degree of interdependence. Studies in other paradigms, too, suggest that positive interpersonal attitudes are not necessary for group formation. These experiments seem to illustrate cohesion as a result (and not a precondition for) group formation under conditions where there are or should be negative interpersonal relations and attitudes between group members. Shared threat seems to engender favourable attitudes to group members despite racial prejudice against them (Burnstein & McRae 1962; Feshbach & Singer 1957). Members of dyads that should dislike each other because they have failed on a cooperative task display more favouritism to their own group than do members of successful dyads (Kennedy & Stephan 1977). Proximity and social interaction create intra-group cohesiveness despite strong and relevant attitudinal disagreements between members (Rabbie & Huygen 1974). Prejudiced whites conform less to an incorrect majority in the presence of black supporters, providing that a common reference group membership is salient (Boyanowsky & Allen 1973; Malof & Lott 1962). Intergroup competition and intra-group cooperation induce positive attitudes to group members who are in fact frustrating and detrimental to the collaborative effort (Kalin & Marlowe 1968; Myers 1962),
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and members of low cohesive dyads that dislike and compete with their partners as individuals nevertheless rate their group as favourably as a collective entity as do members of high cohesive dyads (Dion 1973). In these experiments individuals seem to be defined as group members despite their negative personal attributes, and once so defined they are evaluated favourably. The implication may be that one may like people as group members at the same time as one dislikes them as individual persons. It is hard not to suspect that the same process is operating, whereby imposed social categorizations induce attraction to group members who are personally anonymous. If interpersonal attraction is not necessary for group formation, is it at least sufficient? There is much evidence that variables usually assumed to increase interpersonal attraction, such as attitudinal similarity, shared threat or anxiety, common fate, proximity, verbal and social interaction, cooperation, etc. do tend to increase intra-group cohesiveness (Lott & Lott 1965; Turner 1981). However, there are also data which raise some doubts. Some experiments in the social categorization paradigm, for example, find that similarities and differences between people without an explicit categorization into groups are not sufficient for intergroup discrimination (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Chase 1971; Deutsch et ah 1969). Some in other paradigms have failed to increase ingroup favouritism by manipulating variables expected to increase within-group attraction. Kennedy & Stephan (1977) found, contrary to prediction, that cooperative dyads that failed on a task were more discriminatory than dyads that succeeded. Dion (1973) observed no difference between high and low cohesive dyads in ratings of the group as a whole, despite expected differences in members' evaluations of their partner, i.e. low cohesive members evaluated the group favourably but the partner unfavourably. Three field experiments on altruism conducted by Sole, Morton & Hornstein (1975) are particularly striking. They varied the degree of opinion similarity on important and unimportant issues between a stranger who needed help and potential helpers. With important issues (experiment 1) attraction to the stranger increased directly with similarity, but helping depended on total similarity. With unimportant issues (experiment 2) helping increased with similarity but attraction did not. With mixed important and unimportant issues (experiment 3), both helping and attraction depended on total similarity. They concluded that similarity led to altruism insofar as it functioned as a cue to social categorization, not as a determinant of attraction: it mattered to the degree that it enabled the subjects to classify the stranger unambiguously as a member of the ' we-group'. In other words, similarity may well be an important basis for group formation, but perhaps because of its role as a cognitive cue to the formation
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of social categorizations rather than because of its effects on interpersonal attraction. It is tempting to generalize this idea to some of the variables mentioned above. Common fate, proximity, social interaction, common goals, etc. can all be conceptualized as bases for the perception of people as distinct, cognitive entities, for the emergence of self-defining social categorizations (Campbell 1958; Dion 1979). Perhaps, therefore, the effects of such variables on group formation are not unequivocal evidence for the attraction hypothesis. It seems that psychological group formation can take place purely through external designation. Imposed and emergent social categorizations seem sufficient for group behaviour and attitudes. Interpersonal interdependence and attraction do not seem to be necessary, and under certain conditions may possibly not be sufficient. If it can be assumed for the moment that the social categorization experiments provide valid insights into group formation, how can these effects be explained? 3. An identity theory of the group What follows is a tentative and provisional theory of group behaviour in terms of an identity mechanism (see Turner 1982). The basic hypothesis is that group behaviour depends upon the cognitive effects of social categorization on self-definition and self-perception. Initially, some working assumptions about self-conception will be outlined. The self-concept, ' the system of concepts available to a person in attempting to define himself (Gergen 1971:23) will be conceptualized as a hypothetical cognitive structure that mediates in appropriate circumstances between social situations and behaviour. It selects and monitors incoming information from the environment, processes the data by means of specific cognitive operations, and produces a cognitive output that serves to regulate behaviour through its perceptual representation of the social situation. It may be considered as a relatively enduring and organized system of self-schemata. However, it is also functionally differentiated. The subjective self-images which we may assume represent the cognitive output of the self-concept, are highly variable and situation-specific. Different parts or combinations of parts of the selfconcept are able to function relatively independently of each other to produce the endless diversity of subjective self-experience across differing situations. The self-concept system seems to comprise at least two major components, social and personal identity. The former refers to self-descriptions related to formal and informal group memberships such as sex, nationality, occupation, religion, etc. Social identity may be defined as the sum total of a person's social
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identifications where the latter represent socially significant social categorizations internalized as aspects of the self-concept. Personal identity refers to self-descriptions that are more personal in nature, reflecting personality traits and other individual differences, specific attributes of the individual such as feelings of competence, bodily characteristics, intellectual concerns, personal tastes and interests and so on. The distinction between personal and social identity is not fully satisfactory since there are doubtless subtle and complex interconnections between the two, and, of course, there is no implication that personal identity is not fully social in nature. The distinction is advanced as an approximation. Its main merit is to recognize the simple fact that sometimes we seem to perceive ourselves primarily or solely in terms of our relevant group memberships rather than as differentiated, unique persons: social identity is sometimes able to function to the relative exclusion of personal identity. The situational specificity of self-images (see Gergen 19 71) implies that people have a capacity to regulate their behaviour in terms of different self-conceptions in different situations. Different situations seem to 'switch on' different self-schemata so that social stimuli can be perceived and social behaviour controlled in the appropriately adaptive manner. What is the adaptive function of social identity? The suggestion is that it is to produce group behaviour and attitudes, that it is the cognitive mechanism which makes group behaviour possible. It does this by virtue of the categorization process, the relatively automatic cognitive process that comes into operation whenever some specific social identification becomes salient in social perception. The categorization process has been discussed in some detail by Tajfel (19 5 9,1969,19 72; Tajfel & Wilkes 1963). He proposes that the systematic superimposing of a classification upon a stimulus dimension such that there is a perceived correlation between class membership and stimulus values, leads to the perceptual accentuation of intra-class similarities and interclass differences between stimuli on that dimension. There is an inductive aspect to the process such that the defining or criterial attributes of class membership tend to be inferred from the correlated (common, modal, typical, etc.) characteristics of class members, and a deductive aspect such that the characteristics of individual stimuli tend to be inferred from the attributes of the class as a whole. Thus, the categorization process refers to the perception of stimuli in terms of the common attributes perceived to define their class and the consequent enhancement of their similarity to members of the same class and dissimilarity from members of different classes. Tajfel and others argue that this process explains the cognitive features of
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social stereotyping, the agreement amongst members of one social group that certain attributes are possessed by all or most members of some other group. Social categorizations into black-white, male-female, English-French, etc. are subjectively associated by members of a given culture with clusters of behavioural dimensions ranging from personality traits, attitudes and values to social norms. Where individuals are perceived solely or primarily in terms of their relevant group membership, they are assigned the stereotypical attributes associated with their group and become perceptually interchangeable with other members of their own group and perceptually distinctive from members of other groups. The stereotyping of outgroup members leads to their depersonalization and homogenization, to their perception as'identical', since they are perceived on the basis of the shared characteristics of their group, in terms of which they are interchangeable rather than unique and differentiated. The hypothesis is that the categorization process produces exactly the same effect in self-perception. The cognitive output of a salient social identification is the stereotypical perception of oneself and others in terms of the relevant social categorization. Self-stereotyping produces the depersonalization of the self, i.e. the perceptual interchangeability or perceptual identity of oneself and others in the same group on relevant dimensions. It is this cognitive re-definition of the self - from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes - that mediates group behaviour. Let us consider in a little more detail how this hypothesis works. Some of the distinctive features of group behaviour are (i) perceived similarity between members; (2) mutual attraction and esteem (cohesiveness); (3) cooperation and altruism; (4) shared uniformities in attitudes and behaviour (collective or unified actions and beliefs, conformity to group norms, etc.) and (5) emotional contagion and empathy. The categorization process directly predicts the enhancement of perceived similarities between group members as a function of shared self-stereotyping in terms of the same social category membership. Such self-other identity should also promote mutual cohesion. There is much evidence (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner 1981) that individuals not merely define but also evaluate themselves in terms of their group memberships. They seek to establish positively valued differences between their own and other groups to maintain and enhance their self-esteem as group members. In other words, there is a tendency to define one's own group positively in order to evaluate oneself favourably. To the extent that we like ourselves as exemplary of the positive attributes of the group, we cannot but like others perceived to share
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the same characteristics. Thus, mutual attraction and esteem follow directly from motives for positive self-esteem linked to the relevant social identification. Tajfel (1972) and Turner (1975) hypothesize that the group behaviour produced by social categorization in the studies described above is discriminatory precisely because of the need for positive self-esteem. The discrimination or ingroup favouritism represents an attempt to achieve positive distinctiveness for one's own group in the social situation. Two experiments support this idea directly. Oakes & Turner (1980) found that such intergroup discrimination does increase subjects' self-esteem compared to a control group who were categorized but who did not discriminate. Turner & Spriggs (1981) had their subjects cooperating or competing with each other on an interpersonal (self vs. individual others) or intergroup basis (ingroup vs. outgroup). They found that both interpersonal and intergroup competition increased self-esteem; that the latter was as effective as the former suggests that categorized individuals do evaluate themselves in terms of their group memberships. Both studies also provide evidence that social categorization effects are associated with changes in self-perception (specifically self-esteem). To the extent that others' needs, motives and goals are perceived to correlate with their group membership, they should become stereotypical attributes of the group that, under appropriate circumstances, we assign to ourselves. Through common category membership, group members should tend to perceive their interests as identical, assigning their own goals to others and others' goals to themselves. Shared social identifications, therefore, should tend to induce a form of cooperation between group members that verges on altruism, since others' needs are perceived as one's own. Hornstein (1972, 1976) and his colleagues report several studies demonstrating that common category membership provides a basis for altruistic cooperation where others' goals seem to become motives for one's own behaviour. Numerous other experiments (cited in Turner 1981) also illustrate the corollary: that members of different groups tend to act and perceive their interests more competitively than do members of the same group or unaffiliated individuals under the same objective conditions. Finally, within the social categorization paradigm, Turner (1978) found that conditions which increased the salience of group membership reduced self-favouritism against ingroup members and enhanced it against outgroup members in the distribution of money between oneself and others. He interpreted the former reaction, in which subjects gave themselves less money in relation to ingroup members, as evidence of an altruistic orientation induced by group membership. Shared uniformities within groups can also be simply explained as the
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outcome of the shared attribution to self by members of the social norms that define their group. In this respect the identity mechanism provides the basis for a distinct form of social influence termed' referent informational influence' (outlined in more detail in Turner 1982). Some evidence for this process comes from studies which demonstrate increased adherence to group norms merely as a function of the cognitive salience of group membership, sharp changes in social norms depending on the situational salience of specific reference groups, and the sometimes dramatic impact of social roles on behaviour due to the occupants' tendency to enact the shared stereotype of that role (see Turner 1982). The unified or collective character of group behaviour would be reinforced by the general attribution to self of other characteristics such as personality traits, emotions, goals, etc., which should tend to instigate action on a common basis. In parallel, the stereotypical perception of others should further unify group behaviour by providing interchangeable stimuli to which to react. Obviously the specific nature of collective action would depend on the content of the stereotypes associated with the particular social categorizations. Enough has been said to illustrate the general principle that is being hypothesized. (The reader should have no difficulty applying it to emotional empathy and contagion.) A psychological group is being defined as a collection of people that share the same social identification or define themselves in terms of the same social category membership. To the degree that this identification becomes salient in a situation, there is a shared or collective depersonalization of members' individual selves which produces self-other identity, mutual cohesion, cooperation, and unity of attitudes and action in line with the stereotypes that define the social category membership. Let us now return to the problem of group formation and some related research. 4. Psychological group formation as a process of identification From the present perspective, group formation represents a process of identification: the formation and internalization of self-defining social categorizations. There is no reason to think that the internalization of pre-formed or imposed social categorizations presents any great mystery. If the self-concept is conceptualized as a system of self-attitudes, then changes in self-definition should follow the well-established laws of attitude change. We may define ourselves as a member of some group either as a result of persuasive communications and social influence from credible and/or attractive others, or on the basis of the positive or negative consequences of our overt behaviour
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as group members. It seems likely that both processes are at work in the social categorization experiments discussed earlier. On the one hand, the subjects are defined as group members by the experimenter, a prestigious, credible and hence persuasive source. On the other, the imposed categorization helps to make sense of the situation and provides a relevant basis for behaviour - insofar as the subjects begin to use it to guide their decisions, they should tend to internalize it to justify and explain their discriminatory actions (i.e. private acceptance should follow from the internal attribution to self of group responses and associated dissonance-reduction). To the degree that subjects accept the imposed categorization for self-definition, then mutual cohesion and discriminatory collective behaviour should follow in consequence of the categorization process and the need for positive distinctiveness for one's own group. The spontaneous emergence or formation of self-defining social categorizations is more problematic. We can speculate that variables such as similarity, proximity common fate, etc. (and other indices of the perceived 'entitivity' of social groupings: see Campbell 1958) contribute to perceptual unit formation, but research is necessary to specify precisely the determining conditions. At the least, we can hypothesize that self-defining social categorizations are more likely to emerge to the degree that (1) perceived similarity between oneself and some collection of others increases, at the same time that (2) perceived similarity between those others and some other collection of people decreases; and (3) that the relevant dimensions of perceived similarities and differences increase in salience in the total perceptual field. There is some evidence supporting these ideas (e.g. Hensley & Duval 1976, as discussed by Brewer 1979). The important point, for the time being, is that identification and not interpersonal interdependence and attraction is the basic process in group formation. This does not imply that intra-group relations are not characterized by cohesiveness. On the contrary, as we have suggested, group formation and interpersonal attraction may sometimes be correlated effects of the same variables (as in Sole, Morton & Hornstein 1975), and social identification should tend to produce mutual attraction between members, as in the social categorization experiments. This should be the case even with explicitly random categorizations, since for any subject there will nevertheless be a systematic correlation between ingroup-outgroup membership and the salient aspects of the person's own self-concept (one class includes one, one excludes one) from which stereotypical attributes of group membership can be inferred and generalized to others. In this respect it is necessary to distinguish between interpersonal attraction, i.e. liking for others as differentiated individual
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persons, and inter-member attraction or group cohesion proper, i.e. liking for others as the interchangeable exemplars of the common attributes of the group. Social identification induces the latter but not the former. Thus, to hypothesize that group formation is associated with social cohesion does not necessarily imply positive interpersonal attitudes within the group. Similarly, attraction to others may be sufficient for identification where it is based upon some common attribute shared by oneself and the others, for in this case there is some minimal cognitive basis for spontaneous social categorization. One may go further, and suggest that emergent group formation is more likely with attractive than unattractive others, since people tend to have positive self-concepts and are motivated to maintain their self-esteem. Thus, they are more likely to perceive and accept shared similarities between themselves and attractive others, and to perceive dissimilarities between themselves and unattractive others. Nevertheless, it is the perception of identity and not attraction per se that is crucial in the final analysis. Under appropriate conditions, where distinctive shared attributes cannot be denied it should be possible to produce group formation on the basis of negative similarities. Turner, Sachdev & Hogg (1983) attempted to test this hypothesis. They explored whether it was possible to create a psychological group through categorizing people as unattractive, dislikeable, or unpopular in contrast to positive others. The external designation of minority group membership sometimes seems to take place on this basis, but there has been no controlled demonstration. This study was a version of the standard social categorization experiment (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Tajfel et ah 1971). It employed the usual procedures for manipulating social categorization and measuring intergroup discrimination. The subjects were 80 schoolchildren of mixed sex, and there were three independent variables: categorization/non-categorization (or group vs. individual conditions), criterial/random code numbers, and the type of code number (40s vs. 50s), manipulated in a factorial design. In the first phase the subjects were shown individual photographs of themselves in a series of pairs and expressed their personal liking or preference for the members of each pair. In the second phase they were assigned individual code numbers in the 40s (40-49) or 50s (50-59) on an explicitly criterial basis (the 40s were ostensibly people who were liked, and the 50s the ones disliked) or explicitly random basis (the numbers were not based on their interpersonal preferences in phase 1, but were decided by the toss of a coin); they were explicitly categorized into groups or not on the basis of these similarities and differences in code numbers. They then made private decisions about rewards for
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Table 1. Social categorization and attraction as determinants of discrimination in favour of similar others {from Turner, Sachdev & Hogg 1983)
(A) Categorization (B) criterial random 40s: * ' 50s: 0.86 0.74 0.35 0.26 Non-categorization criterial random 0.27 1.44 -0.55 0.51
Notes: 1. In the criterial conditions people with code numbers in the 40s are liked, the 50s disliked. 2. The cell means are factor scores representing distribution strategies which discriminate in favour of similar over dissimilar others. 3. Significant effects are A, F (1, 72df) = 48.40, p < 0.001; C, F (1, 72df) = 8.74, p < 0.01; AC, F (1, 72df) = 5.00, p < o . O 5 ; BC, F (1, 72df) = 7.80, p < o . o i ; ABC, F (1, 72df) = 7.09,
p <
0.01.
4. Planned comparisons: non-categorization: criterial: 50s < 40s. t (72df) = 5.32, p < 0.001; categorization: criterial: 50s < 40s. t (72df) = 0.43, ns.; categorization:random < criterial, t (72df) = 2.21, p < 0.05. Tests are two-tailed.
anonymous others identified by their code numbers and group memberships in the categorization conditions. There were 20 subjects in a session. It was assumed that group formation would be expressed in discrimination in favour of similar over dissimilar others. The main results are shown in table 1. These can be summarized as follows: (1) interpersonal similarities and differences assigned on an explicitly random basis produce little or no discrimination; (2) both liked and disliked individuals favour attractive others, i.e. the former favour similar and the latter dissimilar others; (3) social categorization on any basis, positive, negative or random, increases ingroup favouritism; and (4) members of disliked groups discriminate as much as members of liked groups, and both more than members of neutral, random groups. The most striking result is the impact of a negative categorization. Disliked, non-categorized individuals seem to demonstrate a form of 'self-hate'; they favour people different from themselves; but once defined as a group, they display as much mutual favouritism as members of attractive groups and more than people categorized randomly. (It is worth noting that checks on the independent variables reveal that the ' liking' manipulation was effective.) Thus, it does seem possible to create group-belongingness from shared unattractiveness: what seems to matter is the sense of identification rather than attraction to the positive characteristics of others. In the non-categorization conditions, attraction was a sufficient condition for emergent group formation. The simplest explanation is to assume that the
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subjects formed a categorization into 'liked' and 'disliked' but internalized it in a way consistent with their existing self-concepts. Attractive individuals formed a group on the basis of their positive similarities, but unattractive individuals acted as if they had been mis-classified, as if they identified with the other group, presumably because in their own minds they were likeable people. Two experiments by Turner et ah (in press) attempted to demonstrate the internalization of a group membership as a process of self-attitude change on the basis of overt behaviour. The central prediction of the interdependence theory is that group formation depends upon mutual need-satisfaction. Thus, group cohesiveness should increase to the extent that group membership is rewarding. Failure, defeat or other costs associated with group membership should decrease group cohesion. However, Turner et ah hypothesized that both success and failure can increase cohesion, providing that they occur under appropriate conditions to induce self-definition as a group member. Specifically, following research in the forced compliance paradigm (Wicklund & Brehm 1976), they predicted that where individuals feel personally responsible for acting as a group member, then failure will produce more cohesiveness than success, since they will change their private self-attitudes in the direction of the group identification in order to explain and justify the negative consequences of their actions. In this instance, identification with the group serves to reduce the dissonance aroused by the group behaviour. Under other conditions, group success should promote identification. In the first experiment, 80 undergraduates of mixed sex either succeeded or failed on a cooperative task in small, interacting groups of three or four members. They also had high or low choice about doing the task under conditions where they expected (veridically) to succeed or fail. After performance feedback they rated their group on several scales. The main result was the predicted interaction in group cohesiveness. High choice subjects evaluated the group more favourably on sociometric dimensions after failure than success, but low choice subjects did the opposite. In the second experiment, 64 schoolgirls experienced victory or defeat in an intergroup competition (the groups were non-interacting and were constituted explicitly randomly) under conditions of either high or low commitment to stay in their group for another two tasks. Again, the predicted interaction was obtained: high commitment members displayed more positive attitudes towards their group after defeat than victory, but the opposite was true for low commitment members. There were also some other interesting data. Under high commitment, defeated groups had higher self-esteem and attributed their performance more to themselves than did victorious groups; low commitment produced the opposite results.
535
Thus, under some conditions failure and defeat can increase group cohesiveness. These experiments are certainly not conclusive evidence that an identification process was responsible, but the results are congruent with such an idea, and they do illustrate that theories of self-attitude change can be fruitfully applied to the explanation of group identification. They also help to demonstrate that group formation is not a simple matter of mutual need-satisfaction. Just as defining oneself as a group member seems sufficient for group behaviour, so merely acting as a group member probably can, under appropriate conditions, induce people to define themselves as such. 5. Conclusion This chapter has advanced the tentative hypothesis that psychological group membership is based upon the sharing of a common social identification rather than cohesive interpersonal relationships. It has also outlined some ideas about how social identification may mediate group behaviour. There is much that deserves a more systematic treatment or has been omitted altogether. In particular, it has not been possible to include the research currently being conducted on various aspects of the identity theory. These include the determinants of group membership salience in social perception and the role of identifications in social conformity, group polarization, crowd behaviour, and group formation.2 It must suffice to say that the intent of the chapter was introductory and not exhaustive. To conclude, it may be useful to summarize some of the important and distinctive implications of the identity perspective. Firstly, it reinstates the group as a psychological reality and not merely a convenient label for describing the outcome of interpersonal processes and relationships. The 'group' in the form of an identification, a social-cognitive system in the self-concept, represents a genuine psychological process that has specific behavioural effects. Secondly, this process is adaptive. Group behaviour should not be construed, as it is so often, as a regression to more primitive and irrational modes of functioning, as an unwelcome deviation from the sovereignty of the conscious individual personality. As a psychological process, the group can be thought of as the adaptive mechanism that makes social cohesion, cooperation and collective action possible. Furthermore, and in direct contrast to the individualistic thesis, its capacities in this respect may reside in the fact that it provides a means of depersonalizing individual behaviour. Depersonalization in this analysis should not be considered a loss
2 Much of this research is being conducted by past and present colleagues at the University of Bristol, namely John Colvin, Mike Hogg, Penny Turner, Steve Reicher, Philip Smith and Margaret Wetherell, and their work has contributed greatly to this chapter.
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(as in the concept of de-individuation) but a change, and perhaps even a gain, in identity, as the individual assumes the characteristics of a culturally constructed entity. Thirdly, group behaviour does not represent a one-way street from the psychological to the social. Identifications are cognitive structures but they are also social products. They are shared and defined by stereotypes with a specific socio-cultural content related to members' collective purposes and the explanation, justification and evaluation of concrete historical and social contexts. The group is both a social reality and a psychological process and there is a constant reciprocal determination between these two sides of the phenomenon at play in group behaviour. Purely cognitive analyses of social perception and behaviour, currently in fashion, are only part of the story. References Allen, V. L. & Wilder, D. A. 1975. Categorization, belief-similarity and intergroup discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 971-7. Allport, F. H. 1924. Social psychology. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Asch, S. E. 1952. Social psychology. New York: Prentice Hall. Billig, M. G. 1973. Normative communication in a minimal intergroup situation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 339-43. Billig, M. G. & Tajfel, H. 1973. Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 27-52. Boyanowsky, E. O.&Allen, V. L. 1973. Ingroup norms and self-identity as determinants of discriminatory behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 23, 408-18. Brewer, M. B. 1979. Ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situation: a cognitivemotivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307-24. Brewer, M. B. & Silver, M. 1978. Ingroup bias as a function of task characteristics. European Journal of Social Psychology, 8, 393-400. Burnstein, E. & McRae, A. V. 1962. Some effects of shared threat and prejudice in racially mixed groups. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64, 257-63. Campbell, D. T. 1958. Common fate, similarity and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities. Behavioural Science, 3, 14-25. Cartwright, D. & Zander, A. 1968. Group dynamics. London: Tavistock. Chase, M. 1971. Categorization and affective arousal: some behavioural and affective consequences. Dissertation Abstracts International (Dec), 32, 6-A, 3420. Deutsch, M., Chase, M., Garner, R. & Thomas, J. R. H. 1969. Social perception of similarity and dissimilarity and preferential treatment of a similar person in money allocation. Unpublished paper, Teachers College, Columbia University. Dion, K. L. 1973. Cohesiveness as a determinant of ingroup-outgroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 163-71. 1979. Intergroup conflict and intra-group cohesiveness. In W.G.Austin & S.Worchel (eds.) The social psychology ofintergroup relations. Monterey, Calif.: Brooks Cole. Feshbach, S. & Singer, R. 1957. The effects of personal and shared threats upon social prejudice. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54, 411-16.
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Festinger, L. 1950. Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 57, 271-82. Gergen, K. J. 1971. The concept of self. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Hensley, V. & Duval, S. 1976. Some perceptual determinants of perceived similarity, liking and correctness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 159-68. Hornstein, H. A. 1972. Promotive tension: the basis of prosocial behaviour from a Lewinian perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 191-218. 1976. Cruelty and kindness: a new look at aggression and altruism. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Kalin, R. & Marlowe, D. 1968. The effects of intergroup competition, personal drinking habits and frustration in intra-group cooperation. Proceedings of the 76th Annual Conference of the A.P.A., 3, 405-6. Kennedy, J. & Stephan, W. G. 1977. The effects of cooperation and competition on ingroup-outgroup bias. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 7 (2), 115-30. Locksley, A., Ortiz, V. & Hepburn, C. 1980. Social categorization and discriminatory behaviour: extinguishing the minimal intergroup discrimination effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 773-83. Lott, A. J. & Lott, B. E. 1965. Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: a review of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. Psychological Bulletin, 64, 259-309. Malof, M. & Lott, A. J. 1962. Ethnocentrism and the acceptance of Negro support in a group pressure situation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65, 254-8. Myers, A. 1962. Team competition, success and the adjustment of group members. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65, 325-32. Oakes, P. J. & Turner, J. C. 1980. Social categorization and intergroup behaviour: does minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity more positive? European Journal of Social Psychology, 10, 295-301. Rabbie. J. M. & Huygen, K. 1974. Internal disagreements and their effects on attitudes towards in- and out-group. International Journal of Group Tensions, 4 (2), 222-46. Shaw, M. E. 1976. Group dynamics. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill. Sherif, M. 1936. The psychology of social norms. New York: Harper and Row. 1967. Group conflict and cooperation: their social psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Sole, K., Morton, J. & Hornstein, H. A. 1975. Opinion similarity and helping: three field experiments investigating the bases of promotive tension. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 1-13. St Claire, L. & Turner, J. C. 1982. The role of demand characteristics in the social categorization paradigm. European Journal of Social Psychology, 12, 307-14. Tajfel, H. 1959. Quantitative judgement in social perception. British Journal of Psychology, so, 16-29. 1969. Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 25, 79-97. 1972. La categorisation sociale. In S. Moscovici (ed.) Introduction a la psychologie sociale, vol. 11. Paris: Larousse. (ed.) 1978. Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations. European Monographs in Social Psychology, No. 14. London: Academic Press. Tajfel, H. & Billig, M. G. 1974. Familiarity and categorization in intergroup behaviour. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 159-70. Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.) The social psychology of intergroup relations.
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Tajfel, H. & Wilkes, A. L. 1963. Classification and quantitative judgement. British Journal of Psychology, 54, 101-14. Tajfel, H., Flament, G, Billig, M. G. & Bundy, R. F. 1971. Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149-77. Turner, J. C. 1975. Social comparison and social identity: some prospects for intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 5-34. 1978. Social categorization and social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. In H. Tajfel (ed.) (1978). 1980. Fairness or discrimination in intergroup behaviour: a reply to Branthwaite, Doyle and Lightbown. European Journal of Social Psychology, 10, 131-47. 1981. The experimental social psychology of intergroup behaviour. In J. C. Turner &H. Giles (eds.) (1981). 1982. Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In H. Tajfel (ed.) Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Paris, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de THomme. Reprinted in Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive, 1981, 1, 93-118. Turner, J. C. & Giles, H. (eds.) 1981. Intergroup behaviour. Oxford: Blackwell. Turner, J. C. & Spriggs, D. 1981. Social categorization, intergroup behaviour and self-esteem: a replication. Unpublished MS, University of Bristol. Turner, J. C, Sachdev, I. & Hogg, M. A. 1983. Social categorization, interpersonal attraction and group formation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 227-39. Turner, J. C, Hogg, M. A., Turner, P. J. & Smith, P. M. in press. Failure and defeat as determinants of group cohesiveness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 22. Wicklund, R. A. & Brehm, J. W. 1976. Perspectives on cognitive dissonance. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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25. Social identification and psychological group formation1

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

Social identification and psychological group formation

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