Narratives

Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAli e !"0 #hili$$ines license"

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)ccena vs" Commission on *lections +G% L-,025-. !/ 0anuar1 /2-34 5 / In %* *dillon +AC /22-. ! Au&ust /26-4 5 / 7oard o( 8irectors o( %otar1 International vs" %otar1 Club +3-/ 9S 5!6. 3 Ma1 /2-64 5 !

This collection contains three (3) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester school year !""#$!""% in the &olitical 'aw (e)iew class under *ean Mariano Magsalin +r. at the ,rellano -ni)ersity School of 'aw (,-S'). .om/iled as &*F Se/tember !"0!. 1erne Guerrero entered ,-S' in +une !""! and e)entually graduated from ,-S' in !""%. 2e /assed the &hili//ine bar e3aminations immediately after (,/ril !""4).

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454 Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-60258, 31 Jan a!" 1#84$ En Banc, Plana (J): 9 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part %acts& Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay lection !ct of "#$2, be declared as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of "% &ay "#$2 'from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party or prohibits a political party, political group, political committee from inter(ening in the nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or gi(ing aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, fa(orable to or against his campaign for election.' On this basis, it is also prayed that ')udgment be rendered declaring the "#$2 Barangay elections null and (oid ab initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the in(ol(ement of political parties, political committees, political organi*ations and other political group.' 'ss e& +hether the ban on the inter(ention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is (iolati(e of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law. (el)& ,he right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable- it is always sub)ect to the per(asi(e and dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to ser(e appropriate and important public interests ./on*ales (s. Comelec, 2% SC0! $12- 3mbong (s. Comelec, 12 SC0! 2$4. +hether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. 5amining Section 4 of the Barangay lection !ct of "#$2, the right to organi*e is intact. Political parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their acti(ities, i.e., their inter(ention in the election of barangay officials on "% &ay "#$2 is proscribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. 3t operates only on concerted or group action of political parties. &embers of political and kindred organi*ations, acting indi(idually, may inter(ene in the barangay election. !s the law says6 '7othing .therein4 shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of indi(iduals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office.' &oreo(er, members of the family of a candidate within the fourth ci(il degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the personal campaign staff of a candidate .not more than " for e(ery "88 registered (oters in his barangay4 can engage in indi(idual or group action to promote the election of their candidate. ,here are reasons for insulating the barangay from the di(isi(e and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign. ,he Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislati(e and consultati(e powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. ,he Barangay Captain, together with the members of the 9upon ,agapayapa appointed by him, e5ercises administrati(e super(ision o(er the barangay conciliation panels in the latter:s work of settling local disputes. ,he Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle local contro(ersies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. 3t would definitely enhance the ob)ecti(e and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded from political party loyalty. 3n fine, the ban against the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislati(e response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and social structure. 455 'n RE E)illon [*C 1#28, 3 * + st 1#,8$ Resolution En Banc, Castro (CJ): 11 concur %acts& &arcial !. dillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On 2# 7o(ember "#%2, the 3ntegrated Bar of the Philippines .3BP4 Board of /o(ernors unanimously adopted 0esolution %2;<2 in !dministrati(e Case &==;" .3n the &atter of the &embership =ues =elin>uency of !tty. &arcial !. dillon4 recommending to the Court the remo(al of the name of the respondent from its 0oll of !ttorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the 3BP since the latter:s constitution notwithstanding due
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notice. On 2" ?anuary "#%<, the 3BP, through its then President 9iliano B. 7eri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and appro(al, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, !rticle 333 of the By;9aws of the 3BP. On 2% ?anuary "#%<, the Court re>uired the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter ad(erted to abo(e- he submitted his comment on 21 @ebruary "#%<, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On 2 &arch "#%<, the Court re>uired the 3BP President and the 3BP Board of /o(ernors to reply to dillon:s comment6 on 24 &arch "#%<, they submitted a )oint reply. ,hereafter, the case was set for hearing on 1 ?une "#%<. !fter the hearing, the parties were re>uired to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. ,he matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. 'ss e& +hether Sections ", #, "8 of the 0ules of Court "1#;!, and the pro(isions of par. 2, Section 24, !rticle 333 of the 3BP By;9aws, constitute an in(asion of dillon:s constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre;condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the 3BP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a conse>uence of this compelled financial support of the said organi*ation to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being depri(ed of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. (el)& !n '3ntegrated Bar' is a State;organi*ed Bar, to which e(ery lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organi*ed by indi(idual lawyers themsel(es, membership in which is (oluntary. 3ntegration of the Bar is essentially a process by which e(ery member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the ob)ecti(es of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organi*ed by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are re>uired to be members. ,hey are, therefore, sub)ect to all the rules prescribed for the go(ernance of the Bar, including the re>uirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effecti(e discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for in(estigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. ,he integration of the Philippine Bar was ob(iously dictated by o(erriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an e5tent as more than constitutionally and legally )ustifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal con(enience of indi(idual lawyers. !propos to the abo(e, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar ha(e been uniformly and uni(ersally sustained as a (alid e5ercise of the police power o(er an important profession. ,he practice of law is not a (ested right but a pri(ilege, a pri(ilege moreo(er clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State A the administration of )ustice A as an officer of the Court. ,he practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this pri(ilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the e5tent of the interest he has created. +hen, therefore, Congress enacted 0! <1#% authori*ing the Supreme Court to 'adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,' it did so in the e5ercise of the paramount police power of the State. ,he !ct:s a(owal is to 'raise the standards of the legal profession, impro(e the administration of )ustice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effecti(ity.' Bence, the Congress in enacting such !ct, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its 0esolution promulgated on # ?anuary "#%1, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the 3BP into a body corporate through P= "$" dated 4 &ay "#%1, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and moti(ated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and (alidity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the e5plicit une>ui(ocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 2 .24 of !rticle C of the "#%1 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads that the Supreme Court shall ha(e the power to .24 'promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar.' ,hus, when dillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his e5ercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were and are sub)ect to the power of the body politic to re>uire him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, e(en to the e5tent of
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interfering with some of his liberties. 3f he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not ha(e clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. 3ntegration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. Be became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar e5aminations. !ll that integration actually does is to pro(ide an official national organi*ation for the well;defined but unorgani*ed and incohesi(e group of which e(ery lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. Be is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his 3ntegrated Bar Chapter or (ote or refuse to (ote in its elections as he chooses. ,he only compulsion to which he is sub)ected is the payment of annual dues. ,he Supreme Court, in order to further the State:s legitimate interest in ele(ating the >uality of professional legal ser(ices, may re>uire that the cost of impro(ing the profession in this fashion be shared by the sub)ects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program A the lawyers. !ssuming that the >uestioned pro(ision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the 3ntegrated Bar, such compulsion is )ustified as an e5ercise of the police power of the state. ,he pro(isions of 0ule of Court "1#;! and of the By;9aws of the 3ntegrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. 456 -oa!) o. /i!ecto!s o. Rota!" 'nte!national vs. Rota!" Cl 0 [481 12 53,, 4 3a" 1#8,$ Powell (J) %acts& 0otary 3nternational .3nternational4 is a nonprofit corporation founded in "#82, with head>uarters in (anston, 3llinois. 3t is 'an organi*ation of business and professional men united worldwide who pro(ide humanitarian ser(ice, encourage high ethical standards in all (ocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world.' 3ndi(idual members belong to a local 0otary Club rather than to 3nternational. 3n turn, each local 0otary Club is a member of 3nternational. 3n !ugust "#$2, shortly before the trial in the present case, 3nternational comprised "#,%$$ 0otary Clubs in "2% countries, with a total membership of about #8%,%28. 3ndi(iduals are admitted to membership in a 0otary Club according to a 'classification system.' ,he purpose of this system is to ensure 'that each 0otary Club includes a representati(e of e(ery worthy and recogni*ed business, professional, or institutional acti(ity in the community.' ach acti(e member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or profession. ,he general rule is that 'one acti(e member is admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose an additional acti(e member, who must be in the same business or professional classification.' ,hus, each classification may be represented by two acti(e members. 3n addition, 'senior acti(e' and 'past ser(ice' members may represent the same classifications as acti(e members. ,here is no limit to the number of clergymen, )ournalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to membership. Sub)ect to these re>uirements, each local 0otary Club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new members. 3nternational has promulgated 0ecommended Club By;laws pro(iding that candidates for membership will be considered by both a 'classifications committee' and a 'membership committee.' ,he classifications committee determines whether the candidate:s business or profession is described accurately and fits an 'open' classification. ,he membership committee e(aluates the candidate:s 'character, business and social standing, and general eligibility.' 3f any member ob)ects to the candidate:s admission, the final decision is made by the club:s board of directors. &embership in 0otary Clubs is open only to men. Berbert !. Pigman, the /eneral Secretary of 0otary 3nternational, testified that the e5clusion of women results in an 'aspect of fellowship that is en)oyed by the present male membership,' and also allows 0otary to operate effecti(ely in foreign countries with (aried cultures and social mores. !lthough women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, gi(e speeches, and recei(e awards. +omen relati(es of 0otary members may form their own associations, and are authori*ed to wear the 0otary lapel pin. Doung women between "4 and 2$ years of age may )oin 3nteract or 0otaract, organi*ations sponsored by 0otary 3nternational. 3n "#%% the 0otary Club of =uarte, California, admitted =onna Bogart, &ary 9ou lliott, and 0osemary @reitag to acti(e membership. 3nternational notified the =uarte Club that admitting women members is contrary to the 0otary constitution. !fter an internal hearing, 3nternational:s board of directors re(oked the charter of the =uarte Club and terminated its membership in 0otary 3nternational. ,he =uarte Club:s appeal to
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the 3nternational Con(ention was unsuccessful. ,he =uarte Club and two of its women members filed a complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of 9os !ngeles. ,he complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Board:s actions (iolated the Enruh Ci(il 0ights !ct. ,he Club sought ."4 to en)oin 3nternational from enforcing its restrictions against admitting women members, re(oking the =uarte Club:s charter, or compelling deli(ery of the charter to any representati(e of 3nternational, .24 a declaration that the board:s actions had (iolated the Enruh !ct. !fter a bench trial, the court concluded that neither 0otary 3nternational nor the =uarte Club is a 'business establishment' within the meaning of the Enruh !ct. ,he court recogni*ed that 'some indi(idual 0otarians deri(e sufficient business ad(antage from 0otary to warrant deduction of 0otarian e5penses in income ta5 calculations, or to warrant payment of those e5penses by their employers'but it found that 'such business benefits are incidental to the principal purposes of the association to promote fellowship and :ser(ice: acti(ities.' ,he court also found that 0otary clubs do not pro(ide their members with goods, ser(ices, or facilities. On the basis of these findings and conclusions, the court entered )udgment for 3nternational. ,he California Court of !ppeal re(ersed. ,he California Supreme Court denied the Board:s petition for re(iew. 'ss e& +hether the law allowing inclusion of women as members of an association depri(e the 0otary Club its right of association. (el)& ,he freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or pri(ate relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of 0ights. Such relationships may take (arious forms, including the most intimate. ,he Court has not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional protection. ,he intimate relationships to which it has accorded constitutional protection include marriage, the begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with relati(es. Of course, it has not held that constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among family members. 3t has emphasi*ed that the @irst !mendment protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose 'deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other indi(iduals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, e5periences, and beliefs but also distincti(ely personal aspects of one:s life.' Still, determining the limits of state authority o(er an indi(idual:s freedom to enter into a particular association una(oidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship:s ob)ecti(e characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.' 3n determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or pri(ate to warrant constitutional protection, the Court considers factors such as si*e, purpose, selecti(ity, and whether others are e5cluded from critical aspects of the relationship. ,he relationship among 0otary Club members is not the kind of intimate or pri(ate relation that warrants constitutional protection. ,he si*e of local 0otary Clubs ranges from fewer than 28 to more than #88. ,here is no upper limit on the membership of any local 0otary Club. !bout "8 percent of the membership of a typical club mo(es away or drops out during a typical year. ,he clubs therefore are instructed to 'keep a flow of prospects coming' to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge the membership. &any of the 0otary Clubs: central acti(ities are carried on in the presence of strangers. 0otary Clubs are re>uired to admit any member of any other 0otary Club to their meetings. &embers are encouraged to in(ite business associates and competitors to meetings. ,he application of the Enruh !ct to local 0otary Clubs does not interfere unduly with the members: freedom of pri(ate association. ,he Enruh !ct does not re>uire the clubs to abandon or alter any of these acti(ities- nor to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian ser(ice, high ethical standards in all (ocations, good will, and peace- nor to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross section of the community. On the other hand, the right to engage in acti(ities protected by the @irst !mendment implies 'a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide (ariety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.' @or this reason, 'impediments to the e5ercise of one:s right to choose one:s associates can (iolate the right of association protected by the @irst !mendment.' Berein, howe(er, the e(idence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to 0otary Clubs will affect in any significant way the e5isting members: ability to carry out their (arious purposes. 3ndeed, by opening membership to leading business and professional women in the community, 0otary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representati(e cross section of community leaders with a
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broadened capacity for ser(ice. (en if the Enruh !ct does work some slight infringement on 0otary members: right of e5pressi(e association, that infringement is )ustified because it ser(es the State:s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. On its face the Enruh !ct makes no distinctions on the basis of the organi*ation:s (iewpoint. &oreo(er, public accommodations laws 'plainly ser(e compelling state interests of the highest order.' ,he application of the Enruh !ct to California 0otary Clubs does not (iolate the right of e5pressi(e association afforded by the @irst !mendment.

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