Spec Pro Cases Rule 77-79

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994 SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ZOTICO A.
TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, Respondent. Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
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Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
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We grant the petition. II Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
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On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41). Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31). On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
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On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
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On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administration.
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As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.
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Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
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In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
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On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
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Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
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On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process in
violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
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Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
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In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
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In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24,
1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
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Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanans executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
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On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogates Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
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On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
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On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
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On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records, p. 302).
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On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
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On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
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Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
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On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
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On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he
conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
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The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
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On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
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On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan
heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
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On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
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Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings. II Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills: (a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
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(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
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(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
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(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" - "G-6");
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(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
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(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
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(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
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(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H3" and "I-10");
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(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I5");
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(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
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(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each others signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16). Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
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The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
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The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
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Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
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A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would
only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
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What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
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The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
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The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . . "
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WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED. [G.R. NO. 139868 : June 8, 2006] ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, v. CANDELARIA GUERSEYDALAYGON,Respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Spouses Audrey O Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan's Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard's renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3 In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin. On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audrey's estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey's name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worthP64,444.00.5 On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan's Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator. Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8 On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey's estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the - undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10 The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (' undivided interest) and Kyle (' undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12 Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13 Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard's -
undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire - undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. The trial court found merit in respondent's opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard's entire - undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15 On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey's estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely - thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent. Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent's allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland's laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside. On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision provides: WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering: (a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
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(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey. SO ORDERED.18 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19 Hence, the herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that: A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED. B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O NEIL GUERSEY'S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20 Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey's will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22 Respondent argues that petitioner's breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey's estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey's will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws. Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey's will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard's estate. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26 The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29 In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent's cause and found that petitioner's failure to follow the terms of Audrey's will, despite the latter's declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey's estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey's estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey's adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Petitioner contends that respondent's cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey's will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner's acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31 It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent's knowledge of the terms of Audrey's will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner's failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent's discovery thereof. Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard's estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner's acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed. Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary." There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34 The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35 Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith
in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36 Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey's estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld. It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey's death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan's Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan's Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
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Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to
succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states: SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
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While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38 Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey's will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner's protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey's will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable
diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties. Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey's heirs, and distributing Audrey's estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property. In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus: In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam v. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins v. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter. The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove
the national law of Audrey O Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit: xxx It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff's adopted daughter Kyle Guersey. Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's action appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant's position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent's last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter's last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)
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This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner's abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner's pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner's omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner's omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42 The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, as follows: Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43 In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey's death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.: We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n.
pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard's estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent. Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote: A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said. Honorable as it seems, petitioner's motive in equitably distributing Audrey's estate cannot prevail over Audrey's and Richard's wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46 x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47 Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property. Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits nonFilipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen. In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18,
1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, G.R. No. 153798 Petitioner, ALELI 'CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent. September 2, 2005 In this' petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules' of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 2002 [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli 'Corazon Angeles-Maglaya. The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition [2] for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged, among other things, the following: 1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties; 2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco's estate; 3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent's wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and 4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco's estate. [3] In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal
Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent's claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate. In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. [4] Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988. [5] She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles, [6] Francisco Yaya, [7] Jose O. Carreon [8] and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.[9] Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word 'Yes appears on the space below the question 'Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during respondent's wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records. After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a 'Motion to Dismissunder Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed 'to state or prove a cause of action', it being her stated position that '[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her
evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis--vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles. [10]
To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioner's reply, to which respondent countered with a rejoinder. Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999, [11] the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the
[respondent] to state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word in bracket added]
Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of December 17, 1999. [12] Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037. As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002, [13]reversed and set aside the trial court's order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli 'Corazon Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. SO ORDERED.
The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises: 1. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33; [14] 2. Petitioner's motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence to rebut respondents' testimonial and documentary evidence; and 3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco. Hence, petitioners' instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in reversing the trial court's order of dismissal; [15] (2) in treating her motion to dismiss' as' a demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in decreeing respondent's appointment as administratrix of Francisco's intestate estate. We resolve to grant the petition. The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint respondent as administratrix of Francisco's estate. We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court's conclusion on the legitimate status of respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: 'Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of Appeals,[16] stated that since petitioner 'opted not to present any contrary evidence', 'the presumption on respondent's legitimacy stands 'unrebutted. [17] Following is an excerpt from Tison:
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked
the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption thatchildren born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise: 'The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. xxx xxx xxx xxx Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be easily available. xxxxxxxxx Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .(Words in bracket added; Emphasis ours)
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally. A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. [18] For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, [19] the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code [20] may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondent's supposed legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent's gratuitous' assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent's marriage to respondent's mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract ' doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized [21] ' was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he
solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco's daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas') father and her (Paulita's ) mother, who are both Francisco's siblings, told them so. [22] And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in Francisco's house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war. [23] In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details. While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as manand-wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut. Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion ' as well as the appellate court's conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva's death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, [24] in which case petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a 'surviving spouse of the decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:
4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old, and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . ' (Emphasis and word in bracket added)
We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by: 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. 'E'). In it, her birth was recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word 'married is written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva. Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that ' [I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that [respondent's ] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that
she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married.
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child. [25] Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. [26] Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:
xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.[27]
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes ' and 'indubitably at that - not only respondent's filiation to Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In the apt words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician who merely certified having attended 'the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ' , created ' a marriage that of ' Francisco and Genoveva', and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of 'Francisco [28] It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. [29] It cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the
putative father's name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:
Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima facie evidence ' when and if the 'father dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx [30]
Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records' which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving respondent's hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition. [31] And needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva. The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records and the testimony of respondent's witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous possession of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at issue in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of administration on her being a legitimate child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier refuted herein. If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for another compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of. As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and two others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned 'Aleli 'Corazon Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T.
Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco Angeles and Belen S. Angeles' , respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of
the adoption proceedings. Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to RTC, Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision [32] dated December 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary to her claim, a 'legitimate daughter of Francisco, nor 'a child
of a lawful wedlock between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. Wrote the appellate court in that case:
Petitioner [Aleli 'Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument that she is a legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . . In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the record to support petitioner's claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938 While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . . . Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment. To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner's birth certificate and even her marriage contract.. . . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential are petitioner's school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and Genoveva . . . . Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)
Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying Aleli 'Corazon Maglaya's petition for Review on Certiorari, [33] and Resolution dated October 20, 2004, [34] denying with 'FINALITY her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated January 24, 2005 resolved to 'NOTE WITHOUT ACTION Maglaya's second motion for reconsideration. In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, [35] one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle. Following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent's legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter's marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court
of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter. [36] Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court's order of dismissal in Special Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to Dismiss [37] interposed by herein petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot and academic. It need not detain us any minute further. Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. [38] When the law speaks of 'next of kin', the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; [39] one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, [40] or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED 'and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C2140 REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 139868 : June 8, 2006] ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, v. CANDELARIA GUERSEYDALAYGON,Respondent. DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Spouses Audrey O Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan's Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard's renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3 In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin. On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audrey's estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey's name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worthP64,444.00.5 On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan's Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator. Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey's estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the - undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10 The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (' undivided interest) and Kyle (' undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12 Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13 Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard's undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire - undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. The trial court found merit in respondent's opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard's entire - undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey's estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely - thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent. Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent's allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland's laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside. On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides: WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering: (a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
cralawlib rary
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey. SO ORDERED.18 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that: A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED. B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O NEIL GUERSEY'S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20 Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21 Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey's will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22 Respondent argues that petitioner's breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey's estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey's will, and his denial of knowledge of
the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws. Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey's will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard's estate. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26 The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29 In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent's cause and found that petitioner's failure to follow the terms of Audrey's will, despite the latter's declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey's estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey's estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to
equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey's adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Petitioner contends that respondent's cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey's will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner's acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31 It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent's knowledge of the terms of Audrey's will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner's failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent's discovery thereof. Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard's estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner's acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed. Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34 The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35 Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36 Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey's estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey's death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan's Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan's Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawl ibra ry
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states: SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlib rary
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38 Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey's will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner's protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey's will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties. Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey's heirs, and distributing Audrey's estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property. In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the
client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus: In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam v. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins v. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter. The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit: xxx It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff's adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's action appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant's position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent's last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter's last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlib rary
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner's abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner's pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner's omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner's omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42 The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows: Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a
fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43 In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey's death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.: We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of
by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard's estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent. Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote: A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said. Honorable as it seems, petitioner's motive in equitably distributing Audrey's estate cannot prevail over Audrey's and Richard's wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46 x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47 Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits nonFilipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen. In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001 PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents. DE LEON, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts 5 are as follows: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
1wphi1.nt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein. On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge. On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus: A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof; B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding; C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge; E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition. Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12 The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed. Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit: Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO. Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx. Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs. Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court. Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The instant petition is not impressed with merit. It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit; PRAYER WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court: a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix. b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law. c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18 Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code. It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate. Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings. The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit: Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22 The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus: It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25 It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 9263626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
1w phi 1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994 SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ZOTICO A.

In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24,

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