Germany 1813 1849

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe Vol. 17, No.
4, August 2010, 605628
German liberalism and the militarisation of civil society, 1813 1848/49

Doron Avraham*
Department of General History, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel (Received 19 November 2009; nal version received 12 February 2010) From the beginning of nineteenth century German liberals endeavoured to reform the armies of different German states, subject them to constitutional authorities, open their ranks to members of civil society and turn military service into a civic obligation. After rz years, the liberals struggle for the Wars of Liberation and during the Vorma democratically oriented armed forces was combined with their opposition to restorative regime and their hopes for the national unication of Germany and the formation of civil society. The liberals campaign, however, turned military service and military values into authentic manifestations of the ideal civil society. Military service was admired for the qualities it bestowed on those who bore arms and the values guiding its members as citizens. Paradoxically, military service became the founding institution of civil society. This process found further expression upon the renewed establishment of rgerwehren) during the Vorma rz and the central role they played in the civil militias (Bu the 1848 revolution. They were intended to introduce alternative forces into the army, but they ended up performing popular military and policing activities. Through this process, the Bildung ideal in the formation of civil society declined considerably, and the liberals actually contributed to the militarisation of society. Keywords: militarism; liberalism; civilian; Germany
For decades it has been widely considered that militarism was a dominant characteristic of German history until 1945. The Prussian heritage and the leading role that Prussia played during the unication process of Germany and afterwards were among the factors that helped foster this historical image of Germany. This militaristic nature is frequently attributed to the traditional ruling elites of the Prussian monarchy. Together with the agrarian aristocracy and the bureaucracy, the ofcers corps constituted the central pillar of the old regime. From the early nineteenth century, members of those elites became the social backbone of the emerging conservative ideology.1 The close correlation between conservatism and militarism that developed during this century was a serious obstacle to the liberals aspiration to change the division of power and reform the political system. The liberals attempts to restructure German society and its political system still form the basis of the investigation of German liberalism, since its beginning in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. Many studies have tried to explain the hesitant course taken by liberals towards fullling their ideological aims, and their ultimate capitulation to Bismarck upon national unication in 1871. The latter won the liberals support with his realpolitik and the formation of a nation state, which they longed to establish for decades. They were willing, though, to compromise about civic and
*Email: doron591@bezeqint.net
ISSN 1350-7486 print/ISSN 1469-8293 online q 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13507481003746511 http://www.informaworld.com
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political liberties instead of posing a real liberal and democratic challenge to the new state.2 Alongside their limited political achievements, the liberals inability to thoroughly address social problems has been attributed to the movements failure to engage with the lower strata of society and its prime focus on its own interests as members of the rgertum. In their adherence to laissez-faire economy these liberals discard the peasants Bu and the artisans who especially in 1848 needed their political leadership and left them to the conservatives manipulation. The unsuccessful handling of the liberals with social problems drove them into cooperation with the conservative aristocracy during the Empire period at the cost of civic democracy.3 Indeed, in comparison with the development of liberalism in France or England, the relatively conservative nature of the German liberals and their limited ability to act as a political opposition are striking. Nonetheless, the constellation in those two nation-states differed from that in the loose German Reich and later the Confederation. The latter, that is, the Confederation, was also confronted with other kinds of challenges and problems that stemmed from the political fragmentation of Germany.4 In this article I focus on one of the objectives that German liberals sought to realise an objective whose meaning and consequences have not been sufciently appreciated by historians that of a thorough reform in the structure, composition, and tasks of the armed forces. I argue that after the defeat by Napoleons army and until the 1848 revolution and beyond, liberals from different German states supported the democratisation and liberalisation of the military but at the same time incorporated militaristic values into their vision of ideal civil society. It was this admiration for the formative and educational values perceived in military service, and their transfer from the military to the civil sphere, that contributed to the militarisation of German society well before the foundation of the German national state. This process, however, was different from the militarism that emerged in the Empire period. From the last third of the nineteenth century militarism was a result of the popular respect and approbation the army won as a result of a series of military victories that brought about national unication.5 But German liberals in the years discussed here did not admire the armed forces only for their specic achievements, if any. Rather, they conceived the military itself and military service as the founding agents of ideal citizenship. The two main concepts around which this article revolves liberalism and militarism have a variety of denitions. Here, I will employ two theories that seem to be most suited to the context of this discussion. Since political parties in the modern sense did not exist in Germany until the early 1860s, liberalism and liberals cannot be dened according to a single coherent platform. They belonged to a framework of the kind described by Ludwig Wittgenstein as a family of ideas and behaviour patterns. This so-called family of ideas includes complicated network of similarities, overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.6 Quite often republicans and democrats were also counted among the liberals, although their worldviews and actions went beyond those of the mainstream liberals and were combined with a revolutionary agenda. These divisions imply the multifaceted nature of liberalism, but do not sufce to understand its essence as a political ideology, nor its particularly German features. It might be useful therefore to turn to the theory of liberalism elaborated by the Bavarian jurist Johann Christoph von Aretin in 1816, which also considers the specic German political context of the rst half of the century. In an article published under the title What is liberal? (Was heit liberal?), Aretin tried to forge a synthesis between the main principles of liberalism and the political reality of Germany, while basing his denition on es libe rales. His discussion of liberalism a French essay published a year earlier, Les Ide
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focuses rst on its more universal appeal: the essence of the concept does not derive from its French or English version, but rather from the Latin expression liber (free or liberated). Hence it can be applied to everything that is free rst and foremost the freedom of human beings.7 In a more concrete manner, Aretin believed that liberal political ideas should manifest themselves in a constitutional system whose ultimate embodiment is the State of Law (Rechtsstaat). It is to be governed by the rational general will and strive for the welfare of the people and the freedom and security of civil societys members. This denition does not seem to deviate from the classical principles of liberalism. However, later in his argument he reveals the more particular German aspects of this ideology. In England, he claims, the liberal element emerges in a gentlemanly appearance or in the person of the gentleman. But Aretin fails to nd any appropriate German equivalent to these concepts.8 And there is also a difference as regards the French version of liberalism. While the French essay that Aretin draws on speaks of the institutionalisation of criticism against the government in the form of a parliamentary opposition, the German jurist is satised with the mere articulation of criticism.9 Accordingly, his political vision seeks a limited popular sovereignty. He thinks that monarchism should continue to prevail as the main form of political government, one that will secure civil liberties resolutely.10 Though Aretins perception of liberalism reects some of its main German characteristics, it cannot be considered as a paradigmatic denition. Among German liberals there were those who sought a reform from above without being conned to a popular constitutional system, while others believed that the power of the monarch should be considerably limited and that the peoples representatives should be allowed to make decisions on crucial issues such as war and peace. Nevertheless, if one follows Thomas Nipperdeys judgment of the liberals in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, it might be more appropriate to treat German liberalism as a movement of the political centre, not of the left,11 and therefore view Aretins denition as corresponding with this judgment. Militarism, a word that acquired common usage in the 1860s,12 also has a variety of denitions, and in many of them a clear contrast is evident between what are considered militaristic values and liberal principles. An early conceptual contrast of this kind, one that designates the modern division, was made as early as the eighteenth century by Immanuel Kant. Following practical and moral reason, claims the philosopher in a somewhat utopian belief, war should not take place, neither between individuals nor between states, as this is not the appropriate way to seek the individuals rights. In his essay on Eternal Peace Kant considers the republican political structure as the ideal one for guaranteeing peaceful relations between states and securing the interests of the citizen. He predicts that standing armies will eventually disappear since they generate a constant arms race and pose too heavy a burden on states. Improving citizens welfare, based on a private property economy, will ultimately necessitate pacism. Moreover, for Kant the mere idea of soldiering, of sending people to die in a war, violates fundamental human rights because it treats the soldiers as machines, not as human beings. At the same time Kant does not ignore the need for armed defence, but he maintains that it should be performed only according to republican principles, i.e. following the citizens decision and through their voluntary recruitment for a limited period of service.13 The core of Kants concept forms the basis for the various modern theories of militarism. One of these denitions, which also reects the argument presented here, is found in Alfred Vagts discussion of militarism. Vagts differentiates between the military way and militarism. An action conducted according to the military way is directed towards accomplishing specic missions with the minimum cost to life and other resources, and therefore it is the rationale of every army. Militarism, on the other hand,
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constitutes a diversity of customs, interests, symbols and practices, which, though connected directly to the army, are transferred to politics, economy and culture. It denotes the prevalence of the military spirit, ideals, and scales of values in the life of a state. Moreover, militarism values military institutions and ways above those of civil life and carries the military mentality and modes of acting and decision into the civilian sphere. Therefore, Vagts concludes that the opposite of militarism is civilianism.14 One implication of this denition is that military service bears qualities that are essential for the appropriate conduct of civil society. A similar perception of militarism can be seen in the denitions made by other scholars who contrasted militaristic conduct with modes of thought and actions that are closely connected to paradigms and ideologies such as modernism and liberalism.15 Otto Hintze, for example, recognised a growing tension between military command, militaristic behaviour, and monarchical regime on the one hand, and the aspirations to establish a republican constitutional system on the other.16 Militarism was also contrasted with pacism, since the rst concept, according to Gerhard Ritter, reects a preference for using force and military techniques, instead of applying peaceful solutions in cases of conict between states.17 In her study about the military service and civil society Ute Frevert interprets militarism as effects of military socialisation on civil societys mentality, rituals and conduct in peacetime.18 The dichotomy created between militarism on the one hand and civilianism and liberalism on the other hand might be reduced if the developments in the military forces and armies in Europe since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are taken into account. General conscription marked the emancipation of the individual from the old compulsory service system, and the transformation from absolutist states and armies into modern ones. In principle, the duty of military service did not distinguish between aristocrats and common people. It put an end, even if only theoretically, to the social and political arrogance that was part of military service in the old armies and blurred the separation between civilians and soldiers. The soldier did not cease being a civilian during his military service. As shown by Max Weber, the state retained the sole authority to order the use of force, but from then on civil society also possessed military, violent strength, as wars were conducted not merely between rulers but also between peoples. In this regard, the obligation of military service might appear similar to general voting rights, since the two systems are evidence of a democratisation process that awards rights in return for duties.19 This democratic transformation, however, should not necessarily dull the difference between military service and the liberalisation of civil society. The citizen who served in the army and the free citizen had a different status, with signicant variations. A citizen who functioned as a soldier had to obey his superiors orders and to act according to rigid rules, using the devastating force at his disposal in a war situation. As a soldier, that citizen was subordinated to one ethical system that determined his personal patterns of behaviour and the values he was obliged to comply with. On the other hand, the civilian, when released from service, was a private person who put his trust in the law and the judicial system, and their authority in the life of state and society. Unlike the unied military ethic, there were diverse civil ethics and concepts, suited to the specic political ideologies within which they had developed.20 The independent citizen had the freedom to choose among different modes of conduct, politically as well as socially. Attempts at military liberalisation Early attempts to inuence changes in the armed forces could be discerned within the emerging German liberal circles in the late eighteenth century. Liberals called for the
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rationalisation of political authority and the legal system, the abolition of social privileges, the creation of parliaments and reform in the armies. A constitution should secure the civic status of the individual as an equal citizen and annul the correlation between the estatestructure and its legal manifestations in the army, as well as the special military jurisdiction. Such changes were intended to considerably limit the dominance of the aristocracy in the army, especially in the ofcer corps, and consequently dismantle it as a bastion of the old regime. The creation of alternative armed forces of this kind meant that citizens would be entrusted with arms and the conduct of war; the political rights they were to enjoy also entailed the obligation to defend them by force of arms.21 In this period, however, liberals were unable to bring about any transformation in the army, and the rst challenge posed by liberal conceptions to the militarys dominance within the state occurred in the wake of the defeats by Napoleons armies in the battles of Austerlitz (1805) and Jena (1806), which brought about the collapse of the German Reich. Though many German states underwent a reform process as a result of Napoleons occupation, some of the most comprehensive reforms regarding the military forces, as well as in other areas, took place in Prussia. The reorganisation of state and army also coincided with the German national awakening and German liberals hopes to create a new, modern framework for the conduct of national political life. And it is at this point that liberal tendencies could also have gained practical expression in the formation of new, modern armed forces, modelled on the French version of the peoples army. Attempts to create a modern nation-state, as reected in the French Revolution, necessitated the construction of a popular-based army whose soldiers would perform their duties on the basis of civic consciousness and national solidarity. Such an army would guarantee the existence of the national state, or, in other words, the national state would serve as the rationale of the army whose members were citizens of the state. All aristocratic privileges within the army should be abolished. However, the process by which the peoples army in France came e en masse) in into being the army that had been formed through mass conscription (leve order to defend the nation and the achievements of the revolution was not repeated in the German lands. In the French case, mass conscription and the wars were the completion of the revolutionary act aimed at emancipation from an absolutist regime and the application of liberal civic principles. In France, therefore, revolution and war were interlinked.22 On the right bank of the Rhine, events took a different course. There was no liberal revolution in which an emancipated society and a nation were forged together with the army. Rather, change was the result of a limited and controlled process conducted from above. The new direction could already be perceived in 1807, with the personal changes in the armys command. The Prussian Armys new generals not always of Prussian origin, some not even of aristocratic descent were entrusted with the task of rehabilitation. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, joined by Grolmann, Boyen and Clausewitz, conducted the military reform process. Under their command the Prussian Army underwent thorough changes. More than 200 ofcers of aristocratic descent were coerced to resign, and the ofcers ranks were opened to other classes. New structures and tactics were applied, and for the rst time a Ministry of War and the position of Chief of the Prussian General Staff were established. One of the most important changes took place in February 1813, when all exemptions from military service were terminated and the road toward universal conscription was paved. In March a royal decree announced the creation of the Landwehr militia. It was to comprise men aged 17 to 40 who did not serve in the regular army, the Heer. Subsequently the Landsturm was established as a guerrilla unit, to be joined by men who had not taken part in other armed forces. In September 1814 the Wehrgesetz was promulgated, declaring all males eligible for military service upon reaching the age of 20.
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The organisation of these two institutions, the Landwehr militia and the regular army, and service within their ranks, were considerably different. Unlike the rigid, hierarchical structure of the army, its professional command and stiff discipline, the militia had less tightened regulations, and was conceived as a volunteer force. It had its own commanders, and an independent middle class ofcers corps. Its members did not wear uniform on a regular basis; they were legally committed to exercise in their home area, and only twice a year in a more distant location. Unlike in the army, in which training and various activities were preformed also in times of peace, service in the Landwehr was only during wars. Moreover, members of the militia were subject to civil jurisdiction and not to military law, as were the soldiers. As to the duration of the service itself, when joining the Heer every recruit had to serve three years, and another two years in the army reserves. Then he would join the rst reserves of the Landwehr for six years, and serve an additional seven years in the second reserves. Service in the volunteer corps was only one year.23 Unlike reforms in other elds, the armys reorganisation seemed to prove its efciency in a relatively short period of time, as Prussia, together with its allies, nally defeated Napoleon in 1814. This victory was not a result of the military reforms alone. Yet for many at that time, especially liberals with national aspirations, the new course taken by the armed forces, together with the recently created Landwehr militias, was of crucial importance. Armed forces of that kind expressed the republican idea of the armed people (Das Volk in Waffen). They were not manned by aristocratic ofcers but by the people who supposedly embodied the idea of civilian life. These German liberals associated the arming of the people with the republican sense of freedom: the emancipated citizen who is supposed to enjoy equal rights also has a duty to protect his nation-state, the very state that guarantees his freedom. Yet the liberals ideal of republicanism did not correlate with that of democracy or popular sovereignty. Rather, it was based on the free will and active participation of the citizen for the bonum commune (common good).24 In this regard one can nd a basic resemblance with the argument of the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson about the need to create a militia of citizens, and who, like the German liberals, had national orientation but not a national state. Arguing against his compatriot Adam Smith who believed that in order to avoid damage to the economy, and to ensure effective military operation, only a professional army should be employed Ferguson maintained that republican patriotism should manifest itself in the active participation of the citizen in war. Since the individual was not an end of the society but part of its specic historical development, he should act in accordance with it. War, thus, is one of the last integrative bonds left to hold society together and save the national spirit in a period of economic individualism.25 For Kant (mentioned above), Ferguson, and German liberals, membership in civil militias had then reasserted the rights of the citizen who acted for the common good, and established a republican ideal. For the German liberals, however, a joint action of citizens for the benet of all did not entail a classical republican or democratic constitutional structure. Their constitutional ideal was an amalgamation of monarchical and parliamentarian principles an ideal that combined absolutism and democracy. Republicanism of this kind was a result of classical political theories adapted to specic historical circumstances. The address of the Prussian king before the outbreak of the war in the words An mein Volk was perceived by the liberals in the same republican manner: the people were called upon to ght the French armies and perform their civic and political rights and duty. The creation of volunteers regiments as well as the hasty recruitment of the Landwehr militias were seen as steps in this direction. The growing number of recruits also encouraged an unprecedented number of women to actively join the war. Following the French example, where 50 women in male attire joined the Revolutionary Army in 1792 93, 22 similarly
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disguised women and some undisguised others participated in the Prussian anti-Napoleonic wars between 1806 15. This experience in itself might serve as an indication of the gendering process of the nation, and of the interdependence between the military service and the civic status and rights of the individual. The duty to ght for state and nation brought with it the demand for civil rights. It is this correlation, as some historians argue, that was among the reasons that drove also women to join the armed forces, although their zeal and patriotism did not change the way in which those female warriors were accepted by men. The latter saw the carrying of arms by women as a threat to the natural, social and gender order. Therefore, those who have to ght and consequently win their rights as members of the nation and the state, those who actually embody them, are male alone.26 The reforms in the army improved Prussias military abilities, and its armed forces became better organised.27 However, universal conscription met with some opposition. Members of the propertied bourgeoisie lamented the damages that absence from productive activities would create in the wake of military service; others expressed their concern over the spiritual and cultural emptiness that accompanies soldiers lives. Desertion was not a rare phenomenon. Some of those who participated in the Wars of Liberation were more concerned about protecting their own particular Heimat than about the national German cause. But these discrepancies could not obscure the achievements of the reforms and the victory of the German states over Napoleon, which in itself was regarded as a clear popular demonstration of German nationalism. These wars became the founding myth of German nationalism and were followed by increasing activities at this early stage, mostly intellectual aimed at creating a German national state.28 Some liberal-minded nationalists maintained that the popular, national and democratic-like aspects of the military reforms and the wars of 1813 15 also had educational signicance.29 A few years before the wars, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the founder of the gymnastics movements, the Turnerschaft, and later the Burschenschaft wrote in his Deutsches Volkstum (1810) about the importance of masculine training. In the chapter dedicated to peoples education, he maintained that the physical instruction of young men was indispensable for the future defence of the fatherland.30 It was a precondition for the establishment of a national militia, constituted by the Volk. Through gymnastic exercises the Volk would become manly and patriotic; according to democratic principles, social differences among members of the Turnerschaften and Burschenschaften would disappear. Such training and activities, as Matthew Levinger argues, reected a new kind of popular politics.31 This is the background to Jahns assertion that he who abandons the ag (while ghting) without being injured should be denied his civil rights.32 Similar ideas were expressed in 1813 by the poet and writer Ernst Moritz Arndt, who sought to awaken German men and mobilise them for a Volkskrieg against Napoleon. Liberation from the French yoke was possible, according to Arndt, only if the whole rger should nation, represented by its masculine part, bore arms. The peasant and the Bu aim to follow the old German model, that of the Niebelungen. True Germans should re-acquire the warriors qualities that characterised their forefathers. Therefore, in war rger acted like men would regain the proper education that had been lost. Only when the Bu a man, like a warrior, would he be able to protect his state. It was essential, he argued, to educate citizens in the art of war.33 In his essay on the Wehrmannschaft, Arndt added that the rst and most important aim of the Defence Troops was to return every citizen to the framework of his natural right and natural duty.34 Jahn and Arndt, like liberals in Europe and America during the revolutionary age, believed that arming the people is the best guarantee for its political freedom. Yet the importance ascribed to the armed citizen by these German liberals seems to overshadow other political and civic qualities acquired
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elsewhere by the people through revolutionary process. For these Germans, the ultimate framework for civic qualication was to be found within the armed forces and through war itself, not necessarily by civil, political actions. The Congress of Vienna and the subsequent age of Restoration did not follow the course of political development that the liberals had envisioned. A German national state was not formed, and the conservatives reasserted their dominant positions. They viewed the Landwehr as a politically unreliable organisation that ought to be subjected to the loyal Heer. From 1819, and under the pressure generated by the higher command of the regular army and the conservative aristocracy, the Landwehr was considerably restricted. The number of its training days was reduced, 34 regiments were dismantled, 16 divisions were appended to the standing army, its separate supervision was abolished, and ofcers of the Heer were appointed to various commanding positions within its ranks. The armys ofcers had occasionally behaved in an insulting and arrogant manner towards their counterparts in the Landwehr whom they treated with disdain as unqualied soldiers. Such a conduct on behalf of the army was intended to bring the Landwehr in line,35 thus reasserting the dominance of the traditional forces. And it is here that a difference can be discerned between the German and the British model. Though the civil dimension in the British case was manifested mainly in the formation of volunteer corps since 1794, and not merely in militias like the Landwher (which in Britain were very similar to that of the regular army), it acquired other status. Similar to the Landwehr, these corps of armed British civilians was committed to full time military service in case of invasion or local insurrections, and had their own command and administration. But unlike the Prussian armed civilian organisation, they won various benets on behalf of the authorities, and in the next decades grew in numbers and activities. Unlike the suspicious attitude of the Prussian army and government towards the Landwehr, the British civilian corps turned into the largest of the auxiliary military forces, and became the reliable force of the established authority. Most of the British volunteer corps was disbanded in 1814 and many of their members joined local militia. However, this act was not a result of a political distrust, as in the Prussian case, but stemmed from the governments decision to establish more systematic organisation and administration of the armed forces.36 In Prussia, on the contrary, keeping the strength and the special supervision of the militias had clear political aspect. For the liberals, therefore, the struggle against the dominance of the Heer and in support of the Landwehr became closely connected with their efforts to transform the political and constitutional structure of the German nation. Liberal reaction to restoration: accommodating militaristic values The beginning of Restoration and the consequent decreasing autonomy of the Landwehr in Prussia marked the end of what many German liberals regarded as signs heralding liberalisation. At the same time, however, it was obvious that recent developments had left their mark on the state society military relationship, and a renewed denition of the division of power was necessary. The position of the standing army as a social elite and the main tool of the monarchical executive was challenged by the idea of Volksbewaffnung. But while this idea was widely acknowledged, there were uncertainties regarding its real meaning. The conservatives insisted on the subordination of the Landwehr to the standing army and declined any attempt to subject the military to any constitutional framework. The only authority they were willing to recognise was that of the monarch. Those who served in the army, especially ofcers, were expected to avoid any criticism against the authorities; Hugo von Hasenkamp, a former Prussian ofcer, wrote that loyalty meant
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approval of any political worldview that guided any of the governments measures. Such an attitude was also manifested in public activities: the period 1815 48 witnessed the formation of conservative veterans associations (Kriegervereine), which disseminated militaristic values throughout society, mainly via their newspapers, and took issue with the liberal persuasion of civic rights.37 The conservative organisations, however, were not the rz the Landwehr only ones whose actions acquired public attention. During the Vorma militias participated in festivals arranged by local population in different districts. These events turned into a kind of a militaristic folklore that included feasts, demonstration of patriotism through donation of ornaments to the soldiers uniforms, and other kind of equipment. The presence of civil servants was also part of these events.38 Such folklore became part of the militaristic cult developed during the Empire years, though in the later period it lost its spontaneous atmosphere, and were carefully arranged by the state as part of the calendar of national events and celebrations.39 Beyond these popular aspects, the liberals approach differed from that of the conservatives in other respects, though not radically. While taking steps to organise a national liberal movement, they expressed criticism against the restorative regime and the conservatives concept of army and Volksbewaffnung. And though it is difcult to clearly assess their practical conduct regarding actual recruitment since some of the educated and propertied bourgeoisie tried to avoid conscription, while others acknowledged its advantages rgertum advocated the steady democratisation of the for their status both parts of the Bu armed forces, which they saw as a crucial step towards modernising the political system and creating a national state. One of the leading voices in this campaign was that of Carl von Rotteck, the historian and liberal politician from Baden. In 1816 he published his rst essay on the ideal form of the military in a state that has undergone transformation from an absolutist into a more modernised organisation. As a liberal who comprehended the lasting changes created in the wake of the French Revolution, Rotteck believed that one of the main features of the post-revolutionary epoch was the inclusion of the people in a decisionmaking process regarding issues that concerned its very existence, such as the conduct of war, through constitutional political institutions. In this regard, he thought that the whole nation, every citizen, should take part in the defence of the fatherland. Such military service reected the organic relationship between state and nation, and therefore every citizen is obliged to perform it.40 Rottecks perception integrated the ancient ideal whereby active civic participation in public life requires readiness to defend the fatherland in time of danger. However, he did not support the complete dismantling of the standing army, but called for its reform. He envisaged a regular army consisting only of volunteers, which would thus reduce its size considerably. Alongside this army, local militias should be founded that would elect their ofcers in an independent manner. This reorganisation of the military forces would eliminate both the aristocratic character of the Heer and the ofcers corps privileges.41 Civil values were to replace the harsh orders and discipline. The advantages brought about by democratisation of the armed forces were also acknowledged by those liberals who, unlike Rotteck, supported mass conscription. Wilhelm Schulz, a former ofcer from Hessen and a publicist who belonged to democratic circles, saw, like Rotteck, the importance of Volksbewaffnung as lying not only in its constitutional signicance but also in its moral and educational values. In 1825 he wrote that when people nde) serve together in the army, they are introduced to belonging to different estates (Sta nde become acquainted with progress. For example, peasants who serve with other Sta innovations they could not have learned had they remained within the traditional connes of land cultivation. When everyone performs military duties, then a blending of spirits of all estates in one common form is produced, thus giving rise to the esprit de corps.42
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The constitutional and civic-formative aspects of democratised military service rz. They acquired a continued to occupy the attention of German liberals during the Vorma certain formal expression during the 1830s with the publication of the Staats-Lexikon, edited by Rotteck and his close associate Carl Welcker. Under the entry Heerwesen: Landwehrsystem, Welcker himself wrote that parents should aspire for their sons to full military duty, as it educates and enriches them. A warlike education (kriegeriche Erziehung) is benecial to their bodies and health, for acquiring a capable and free personality and physical dexterity. It provides a serious education in civic sense, courage and patriotism. It is the most excellent educational tool (das trefichste Erziehungsmittel). The army, according to Welcker, enhances the concern for the fatherlands and its own honour; it should not be regarded as brutal and immoral training, but rather as a blessing and a noble educational framework.43 More explicit appreciation of these educational and formative qualities for citizensin-arms was expressed by Wilhelm Assmann, a liberal historian and politician from Braunschweig. In an essay written in 1831, entitled Die Bedeutung deutscher rgerbewaffnung, he identies what he denes as the noble nature of man as a citizen Bu not only in his participation in the conduct of church and state, but also in the bearing of arms and the defence against any obstacle to progress. Since the power of reason wins dominance on earth, it is essential that everyone who ghts for rights and truth should utilise not merely the sword of the word (das Schwert des Wortes) but also the iron sword of violent action (das eiserne Schwert der Gewaltthat) wherever violence hinders right. It is unlikely, according to Assmann, that someone would give up what he cherishes as sacred without violently ghting for it.44 The idea that military practices reect the true essence of the people as citizens also appears in the discussion on the conduct of German liberalism during the Napoleonic Wars. Under the entry Liberal, Liberalismus in the Staats-Lexikon of 1840, written by the rttemberg, Paul Achatius Pzer, liberalism in Germany is compared liberal jurist from Wu with the revolutionary practices of the French. The latter pursued radical ideas of freedom by brutally violent methods, where every kind of weapon was legitimate. In contrast, German liberalism, as it emerged and evolved through its early years (die erste Jugendzeit), during the Wars of Liberation, demonstrated a different sort of conduct. It displayed patriotism, responsibility and loyalty. In this period liberals proved their devotion to their princes, while presenting modest and just requests. Had the German rulers acted in the spirit of 1813 15, writes Pzer, German citizens would not have had to resist the states authority by force later on.45 It appears that, on the one hand, Rotteck, Welcker and other German liberals envisaged the formation of a popular, democratic and highly motivated army. One can argue in this regard that the ideal military service conceived by these liberals reected the great importance they attached to the concept of citizenship. The soldier, accordingly, is a citizen who performs a civic obligation, not a person whose military service sets him apart from the rest of civil society. On the other hand, this concept of military obligation also implies a deeper militarisation of society: instead of treating the army as a special institution with exclusive functions and an organisational structure that differs from that of civil society, though constituted from its members and obliged to protect it, these liberals gradually narrowed the gap between mere citizenship and the military. They thus blurred the demarcation lines between soldier and citizen as individuals, between army and society as organisations guided by diverse values and objectives. For them, soldiering and citizenship were two closely interconnected existential situations, which in fact dened each other. Moreover, it seems that the ideal type of citizenship, as characterised by
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liberals, is forged during military service, where the recruits are trained to be worthy citizens. The formative function of the military paves the way to the ultimate proper civilian life. These perceptions also mark the change in the liberals ethos of the individuals genuine personality. The enlightened and progressive concept of Bildung humanistic and aesthetic education and self-formation as part of an organic unity was partly discarded in favour of a more militant view of the individual as a worthy citizen, as explicitly articulated by Assmann. In a similar manner, the warlike education envisioned by Welcker was gradually perceived to be no less adequate for training a national liberal citizenry than the humanistic and universal ideal of Bildung. The gradual detachment of liberals from humanism might also correspond with what Nancy Rosenblum dened as romantic militarism, embraced by a liberal such as Wilhelm von Humboldt. It does not oppose liberalism but introduces another variation of it by imagining war as the ultimate occasion for self-expression. Self-assertion and heroic individualism employed through militaristic conduct thus replaced classical liberal principles of conventional civil society.46 rz conceived the popular German liberals during the Restoration and the Vorma foundations of military service as being essential to the development and sustenance of civil society. Enlisting in the armed forces was in itself the fullment of a civic duty. At this point, the difference between the liberals and the leaders of the armys reforms was clear: the latter generals such as Scharnhorst and Boyen sought to soldier the citizens (turn citizens into soldiers), while liberals strove to civilianize the soldiers (turn soldiers into citizens). The soldiers would be inspired by a civic consciousness that would prevent them from being totally subjected to individual rulers.47 However, the importance that the liberals attached to the peoples army as a substitute for the old standing army points to an opposite, perhaps unconscious, course of development inherent in this liberal vision. Their new conception of military service as embodying civic qualities introduced militaristic elements into liberal concepts of civil society. The historical circumstances reinforce this impression. During the Restoration and the rz, unlike during the French Revolution, there was no real and immediate need for Vorma mass, universal conscription or for the maintenance of a large army, since there was no concrete danger that threatened German lands or any major political development resembling the French situation in 1793. On the contrary, the military ethic in German civil society was adopted in times of peace, which explains how in 1843 Arnold Ruge, who was one of the radical liberals in that period and belonged to the young Hegelians, was able to write about the arming of the people in a purely civil context. The peoples education and peoples armament (Volksbildung und Volksbewaffnung), the school and the army, he claimed, should merge.48 This ideal integration of values and institutions actually epitomises the essence of the new citizenship conceived by German liberals. Nonetheless, the liberal conceptions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, imbued with the universal and pacist elements of the Enlightenment and the notion of Bildung as dening rz, to more national and militaristic free, modern citizenship, gave way, during the Vorma standards in prescribing appropriate German citizenship. In the wake of the Wars of Liberation, liberals perceived the war fought by the people, and the mere bearing of arms, as formative factors of national and civic consciousness.49 Military force was now seen not just as a means of liberating the nation from the yoke of foreign occupation and defending it against enemies from outside, but as a precondition for securing basic civic freedom. The cry for Volksbewaffnung or the arming of citizens, however, did not remain on a declarative level, and the monopoly of force held by the conservative-oriented standing armies was once again challenged. Political and social unrest encouraged actual deeds in rz years there were several riots in different German states, and this matter. In the Vorma
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the governments, especially the Prussian, used the army to crush them. Apart from the 1830 events, there were riots in Posen (1832), Cologne (1838), Schildesche (1845) and Berlin (1847). In these and other cases, the government employed the citadel practice, i.e. sending in the army, sometimes hundreds of soldiers, to violently suppress the rebels, as the state was conceived as a citadel under siege.50 These acts reinforced the militarys reactionary image and encouraged the formation of alternative armed organisations that would embody the ideal of citizens-in-arms. rz, therefore, liberals advocated the establishment of civil militias, From the Vorma rgerwehren, in order rst and foremost to protect citizens and their property against the Bu violent attacks by the lower classes, and thus prevent also the armys deeper intervention in the civic sphere. These militias were not a new pattern of armed organisation. Initial formations of this kind had been already created under the old regime, and after rgergarde based on the model of the French Napoleons occupation of Germany Bu Garde Nationale created in 1789 were established in Berlin and Brandenburg. Their main task was to keep order. In the wake of the 1830 revolution and in light of the armys use of force discussed above, the civil militias were re-established. Yet from the early phase of their renewed activity, and especially during the 1848/49 revolution, as will be rgerwehren discussed below, some crucial questions regarding the exact aims of the Bu and their social composition hindered their coherent function. This simultaneous development the reassertion of the armys dominant traditional status and the creation of the civic militias as an alternative force seems paradoxical: the same liberals who criticised the increasing interference of the military in civil life simultaneously advocated arming civilians and military service as the best ways of teaching proper civil conduct. This paradox was the outcome of the liberal postulate to create a modernised state and emancipate society from absolutist patterns of rule while seeking to construct controlled citizenship that would restrain that emancipated society through militaristic values. This paradox and its results were clearly reected in the 1848 revolution. Militarising the revolution For many German liberals, the revolution was a means of solving a variety of national, political and social problems. Divided by specic orientations, most liberals hoped to reintroduce some of the changes that had been accomplished in the Reform period but reversed during the Restoration, and to realise their demands, already raised during the rz. Among the overwhelming majority of the liberals, however, there was a Vorma relatively wide consensus that a new army should be formed an army whose structure, composition, status and subordination to political authority should be redened. Building a new army, therefore, was one of the major revolutionary demands in the upheavals of 1848. Liberals from German states hoped for the establishment of a peoples army in which national solidarity between the soldiers, not class orientation and rigid discipline, would dominate. Such trends were also manifested in a series of civic petitions to the German governments, in the Frankfurt Parliament debates, and in efforts to rgerwehren that were supposed to perform some of the armys functions, strengthen the Bu on the one hand, and confront its oppressive acts, on the other. Even before the outbreak of tumult, the Saxon liberal Robert Blum gave a speech on 6 March in which he lamented the division of the German people into those who bore arms and those who did not. The former, acting like machines, turned against their brothers when commanded to do so. The hope lay in the arming of all German citizens: that alone might bridge the divides between Germans. As soon as an armed people (bewaffentes Volk)
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was created, there would be no need for armed force (bewaffente Macht).51 At a rgerbewaffnung in revolutionary gathering held in Berlin in April 1848, speakers called for Bu a form that could serve as a counter-model to all the deciencies of the standing army. In such organisations, values like brotherhood, freedom and the safeguarding of civil life would replace the supremacy of uniform and arrogance that had characterised the old army.52 In the National Assembly of Frankfurt, liberal delegates reasserted the civic merits of carrying arms. The Prussian representative from Trier, Ludwig Simon, advocated the idea of general armament as a means of protecting constitutional liberties and confronting any attempt to violently breach constitutional rights. The military should be subordinated to the Reichsverfassung. For Simon, the creation of a peoples army (Volkswehr) could be an effective instrument against Prussian despotism.53 The democrat from Dresden, Franz Wigard, presented a more radical approach. He held that every German was entitled to have his own weapon, including those who because of old age or physical disability could not serve in the military. This is an original, real, German right that no one would never be able to deny a German.54 In the parliament of Karlsruhe, a lawyer from Mannheim, Friedrich Hecker, expressed a similar view. Every citizen, he claimed, should have his own weapon, buy it with his own money, look after it and eventually bequeath it to his son. For Hecker, owning a weapon was both a manifestation of patriotism and a precaution against unjust conduct by the authorities, expressing the ideal of an armed people defending its freedom and rights.55 Efforts to bring about an immediate change in the nature and structure of the armed forces could be discerned as soon as the revolution broke out. German liberals campaigned for increasing the activities of the civil militias which, as mentioned, had already been rz. In 1848, however, the civil militias faced new challenges. founded during the Vorma In the rst months, different German governments opposed these organised forces and tried to hinder the establishment of independent military groups not subject to the states authority. In numerous German cities, the revolutionaries demand for a transformation of the armies occupied pride of place in their protests. In cities like Offenburg, Freiburg, nster,56 citizens petitioned their governments for the integration of civil Heidelberg and Mu militias with the army in order to create a new, popular defence force (Volkswehr). For the more radical liberals and the revolutionary democrats, the merging of the citizen and the soldier, the civil militias and the regiments of the standing army, was a precondition for establishing a new democratised army which was perceived as a guarantee of the freedom and welfare of the people. Such an army would not be deployed against the people as were the traditional monarchical armies. The military forces, as conceived by many liberals during the revolution, seem, ironically, to embody the main features of their ideal of civil society. The new forces were to constitute the authentic representatives of the national German citizenry. The social diversity and/or solidarity of civil society were to be reected in the most appropriate manner within their ranks. Some of the moderate Prussian liberals, for example, requested that service in the militias be limited to middle-class property owners, white-collar employees and educated rgertum who represented the people. These were members of the Besitz- and Beamtenbu rgerwehr, most members respectable and conforming elements of society. In the Berlin Bu belonged to the bourgeoisie, while workers and members of democratic revolutionary groups were denied admission. Radical liberals, on the other hand, maintained that membership bel, to those among the people who should also be opened to workers and other parts of the Po could not afford to purchase the required personal military equipment.57 In different strongholds of radicalism the cities of the Prussian Rhine such as sseldorf, Krefeld, Cologne, and in Mainz, at the Grand Duchy of Hessen parts of Du the population continued with revolutionary activities in the last phase of the revolution,
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during the summer of 1849. In these cities the militias included members of the bourgeoisie as well as peasants and railway-workers. These were seen as representing civil society. In Mannheim too, in the Grand Duchy of Baden, where bourgeois citizens had been alarmed by the armed insurrection of the lower classes in April 1848, all eventually joined together in rgerwehr. Closer cooperation between the different social strata was also the local Bu manifest in Lower Franconia. In this part of Bavaria, craftsmen, peasants, workers, rgerwehr.58 merchants, clerks and higher ofcials all came together in the regional Bu The social heterogeneity of the militias also had political implications: the mere fact of serving in these forces, which in principle was available to everyone, gave many people their rst-ever chance to actively participate in the political sphere regardless of the individuals social origin, status, or wealth. People were entitled to join these forces because they were citizens performing civic duties. In other words, the militias were the rgerwehr was an afrmation of founding institutions for civic political practices. The Bu the individuals status as a citizen. The newly opened ranks of the militias and their activities are evidence of the popular, democratically oriented alternative to the traditional armed forces, as envisioned by the liberals. Unlike the army, which had to carry out oppressive acts, the militias seemed to act on behalf of the people, with the people. They were also different from other violent forces, such as those evident in 1848 as in other revolutions. In contrast to the spontaneous and uncontrolled revolutionary acts of aggression, activities within the militias during most of this period were organised, supervised and focused, despite their origin in rebellion. Violent rgerwehren and the regular army were not very frequent, confrontations between the Bu though they did occur. After the completion of the imperial constitution by the Frankfurt National Assembly in May 1849, bloody clashes broke out in different cities, especially in rgerwehr asserted their determination to Prussia, while units of the Landwehr and the Bu protect the new constitution against the reactionary policy of the governments. In Karlsruhe and Heidelberg the civil militia declared a defensive war (Verteidigungskrieg) against the governmental forces, while forming (in Karlsruhe) a Generalkommando der Volkswehr. In front of the regular armies, though, these militias had little chance of prevailing.59 However, the socially integrative potential of the militias, their patriotic commitment and the rule of order apparent among their soldiers deepened the sense of national integration. And though they acted independently in every city and usually were not under joint command, their popular basis, as well as their cause and goals, and the understanding that they were operating as part of the more general tendency of the Volksbewaffnung, lent them an apparent national character. Furthermore, the mere armament of the city dwellers introduced the traditional Stadrepublikanismus ideal: by forming the local militia these citizens tried to afrm their protesting stance against monarchical authorities (or even absolutism) and the regular army at their disposal.60 But it is precisely here that an important aspect of the militarisation of society is revealed: a civic consciousness was created not only by civil actions such as demonstrations, strikes, barricades, festivals and so on, but also, and maybe mainly, by bearing arms and performing policing and military functions in other words through disciplining the citizens. The change in the nature of recruits to the militias was also determined by the uctuating mood during the revolution. At rst, as the revolution advanced, it seemed that the German princes had decided to meet the demonstrators demands. However, the fact that the radical and violent wave of the revolution was stalled after several months, as well as the constant fear that its renewal would lead to anarchy, testied to the fact that most liberals were reluctant to exploit the potential of revolutionary action. The threat of renewed outbursts of violence encouraged voluntary recruitment to the militias. The local
619
rttemberg and Saxony issued decrees ordering the reinforcement of the authorities in Wu militias, while entrusting them with the task of keeping order and security within the state. It seems that the evolution of these armed organisations into a genuine military organisation as opposed to the policing force that they had previously been was a result of the revolutionary pressure. The fostering of hostile feelings against external enemies provided many with an additional motivation to enlist.61 Public debates and discussions in the Frankfurt National Assembly portrayed conicts between Germans and French as frictions between the Teutonic and the Romance peoples;62 the war against Denmark was a matter of national honour that overshadowed the European balance of power; and arguments about possible restoration of Poland were justied by the notion that such a state in the east could serve as a bulwark against Russian despotism.63 Moreover, the decision by the Prussian government, as well as by the authorities in other German states, rgerwehren and not to repress them might serve as additional to legalise the Bu conrmation to the premise that their activities did not seriously threaten the political rgerwehrgesetz was issued in Prussia, most order. In the autumn of 1848, after the Bu members of the militias felt that they had not only lost their revolutionary dimension, but had also become a force that imposed order on behalf of the government. This development, however, is not surprising. Many spokesmen for the liberals, in nster, Freiburg and other places in Germany, actually wanted to see the Heidelberg, Mu popular militias as an integral part of the standing army, but not necessarily as a revolutionary alternative.64 Finally, with the suppression of the revolution, the militias were outlawed, in Prussia in October 1849 and subsequently in other German states in rttemberg in 1851. Baden and Saxony in 1850 and in Wu In light of these historical developments, the question arises whether the 1848 revolution in Germany had a clear militaristic character. The political conict between the revolutionaries and the forces of order between liberals and democrats on the one hand, and conservatives and reactionaries on the other was not limited to parliamentary debates, articles in the press or activities by various organisations. The militarisation of the political discourse was also expressed in the initial inclination of both sides, the militias and the regular army, to confront each other.65 Yet confrontations of this kind, between those striving for change and those seeking to defend the existing regime, were not substantially different in Germany from other armed clashes that occurred at the same time elsewhere in Europe. They characterised all the revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and cannot be regarded as an exclusive feature of the 1848 revolutions. What distinguishes the German case is the central place that military issues occupied within the revolutionary discourse: the social composition of the army, its size, structure, subordination, functions and the signicance of military service. This discourse expressed the militarisation of the revolution far more than the violent clashes between the revolutionaries, the militias and the standing army. Although these issues did not overshadow the acute national, political and social problems that emerged in the wake of the revolution, they nonetheless seem to have been reected in the debate about the military: service in the standing army, especially in the ofcer corps or the militias, reected the social divisions within German society and the civic status derived from them; the importance of the constitutional system and its consequent civil rights directly affected the nature of the obligation to military service and the ruling authorities of the army; the participation of larger sections of society in the armed forces helped forge German national identity and foster awareness of civil rights. These circumstances suggest that the militarisation of the German liberal discourse did not begin in the Second Empire, nor as a result of the unsuccessful revolution of 1848,66 but was
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evident in the revolution itself the very revolution that symbolised a struggle for the liberalisation and democratisation of the political and social systems. This militarisation was a reection of the militaristic tendencies that had been developing among German liberals from the beginning of the century and found practical expression in the course of revolution. The failures of 1848/49 and the decade of reaction that followed rendered irrelevant every attempt by liberals to inuence and change the army. Conclusions In his comprehensive book about the army as the Erziehungsschule der Nation, Reinhold hn claims that the armys educational function was not given to it by the people. It was the Ho army itself that embraced this role, as a result of the confrontation with civil society. Since the Wars of Liberation, civil society had imposed challenges on the standing army challenges that led to a conict between army and society and reached a peak in the 1848 revolution. The army could have curtailed these challenges through an educational process implemented during military service. This, he argues, is the only way of understanding why the army constantly prepared the nation for war, not peace.67 While this might be true, it does not provide sufcient explanation for the militarisation of Prussian and German society as a whole. In their struggle to liberalise the political system, liberals thought it essential to democratise the old army and turn it into a peoples army. But the reforms they proposed do not imply that liberals adopted a pacist attitude or were prepared to ght only for a defensive cause. As shown in some recent studies of the post-1848 period, liberals were among the main advocates of war during the 1850s and urged Prussia to actively intervene in the Crimean War and the war between Austria and Italy.68 Yet the role that liberals played in the militarisation of German society must also be measured by what they considered as real citizenship. The victory over Napoleon, as they saw it, proved the importance of modernising and democratisating the army. By ghting the predominantly aristocratic and conservative nature of the old army, liberals hoped that the armed forces would be built by members of an emancipated society. They popularised militaristic values and patterns of behaviour and tried to assimilate them within civil society, thus turning them into criteria of modern civil status. The liberals adoption of values such as discipline, willingness for self-sacrice, national solidarity, respect for authority, patriotism and loyalty by citizens meant that they actually contributed to the creation of controlled citizenship. Such citizenship was not meant to merely serve the personal and political freedom of citizens, but to limit it by appropriate political and social conduct. Consequently, the power of the old traditional army to enforce the authority of the monarchy and to oppress political opposition was to be replaced by that of a popular, modernised and more liberal army that performed educational functions and hence ensured the cultivation of proper citizenship. German liberals, therefore, formulated a new model of citizenship in which military service and values were seen as preconditions for real citizenship. It was this emphasis on military ideals rather than modern, progressive civic values that thwarted their efforts to change the hegemony of the monarchy, the conservatives and the military and, in the long run, during the Empire period, it intensied the militarisation of society.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the Yad Hanadiv Trust and the Minerva Stiftung for their generous support that made the research for this article possible.
enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe Notes

1. 2.
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3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.
On the correlation between political and social elites and the army see: Willems, Der rischer Konservatismus, 35 7. preuisch-deutsche Militarismus, 60 and Trox, Milita The literature on German liberalism is most extensive. Here are some of the main critical discussions about the political vacillation of German liberalism: Anderson, The Social and Political Conict in Prussia, 1858 1864, 440; Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 275 7; Bumann, Zur Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert. On the particular case of liberalism in Baden and its decline after German unication see: Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 475 96. The criticism against German liberalism culminated in the Sonderweg theory, most explicitly presented by Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871 1918. On the decline of German liberalism since the late 1870s see: Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, 181 271 and Langewiesche, Liberalismus in Deutschland, 9 11. Recent research has kept this critical tendency: Backes, Liberalismus und Demokratie Antinomie und Synthese, 498 9, 503 6; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 191 2, 227 9, 239 40; Leonhard, Liberalismus, 54999. Examinations of such social tendencies among German liberals appear in many studies. The following are among the most important: Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, 58 64; Rohr, The Origins of Social Liberalism in Germany, 158 66. One of the most interesting and challenging interpretations of the social vision of German liberals is that of Lothar Gall. Gall analyses the liberal vision of society in the rst half of the nineteenth century regarding the rgergesellschaft. Yet this vision was too optimistic and could not creation of klassenlose Bu survive beyond 1850, when liberals appeared more as Klassenpartei. See Gall, Liberalismus rgerliche Gesellschaft, 99 125 (especially pp. 120 2). As to the close correlation und bu between political liberalism and class interests see: James J. Sheehan, Liberalismus und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1815 1848. Recent research into German liberalism and the welfare state argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century liberals eventually clung to individual economic responsibility with a limited state interference in social matters. See: von Kieseritzky, Liberalismus und Sozialstaat, 481 2. For a comparative analysis of German, British and French liberalism see: Muhs, Deutscher und britischer Liberalismus. Versuch einer Bilanz, 22359. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt und Friedrich Lenger, Liberalismus und Handwerk in Frankreich und Deutschland, 305 31. Regarding the militarisation process of the Empire years see: Clark, Iron Kingdom, 600 3. rster, Der rgerliche[r] Militarismus during the Empire period see: Fo About the birth of bu doppelte Militarismus, 65. See the discussion on this matter by Sheehan, German Liberalism, 5. Leonhard, Liberalismus, 193 4. Backes, Liberalismus und Demokratie, 251 2, 2967. Leonhard, Liberalismus, 197 8. Backes, Liberalismus, 251 2, 296 7; Leonhard, Liberalismus, 1945. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800 1866, 664. Stargardt, The German Idea of Militarism, 19. mtliche Werke in sechs Ba nden, 661. See also Kater, Bu rger-Krieger: Immanuel Kant, Kant, Sa r und Gesellschaft, 2746 (especially pp. 2834). ber Milita Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson u Vagts, A History of Militarism, Civilian and Militarism, 13 4, 17. See also: Vogel, Nationen r eine Belebung der Militarismusforschung, 13. im Gleichschritt, 275 6. Wette, Fu For the various denitions of militarism see: Berghahn, Militarism, 11. For a detailed discussion, see pp. 7 30. Hintze, Staatsverfassung und Heerverfassung, 133 4. Ritter, Staatkunst und Kriegshandwerk, 13. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 12 3. In his recent illuminating book about the centrality of wars and general conscription in the formation of twentieth-century Europe, James Sheehan demonstrates how military service was conceived in many European countries as part of this democratic transformation. While referring to the observations of Hippolyte Taine and Friedrich Engels about the indispensable correlation between universal suffrage and universal conscription Sheehan reveals their insight: since the revolutionary wars of the 1790s, when the whole nation carried arms, universal military service turned into an aspect of the general political participation and civil rights. See Sheehan, Where r, 215. Have all the Soldiers Gone? 167. And see also Kernic, Krieg, Gesellschaft und Milita
622
20. 21. 22.
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For differentiations of this kind see: Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 10 11. And see also Huntingtons discussion about the division between the military and civic spheres: Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 89 90. rischer Tradition im Zeitalter des Absolutismus, Marwitz, Die Grundlagen deutscher milita rger und Soldaten, 47 67. 60 3. And see also: Wolfgang Kruse, Bu On the correlation between revolution and wars as complementing processes of the nations emancipation, see: Fehrenbach Die Ideologisierung des Krieges und die Radikalisierung der sischen Revolution, 5766; Kruse, Die Erndung des Militarismus, 26874, 300, 3702; Franzo Ritter, Staatkunst, 602; Vagts, History of Militarism, 1169. It should be mentioned that the characteristics which Kruse attaches to militarism are similar to those described by Vagts, though he thinks militarism, as it appeared in the French Revolution, was also an outcome of modernism. For a detailed discussion about the different structure and nature of service in the Landwehr militia and the standing army see: Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 81 95; Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640 1945, 59 61, 74 5. ve, rgerideal, Gemeinde und Republik, 609 56 (see especially pp. 618 20). Pro Nolte, Bu Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus und die Macht des Volkes,23 4. Regarding the concept of the republican ideal in Hamburg during the Napoleonic rule see: Aaslestad, Paying for War, 641 75 (see especially 642, 662, 670). And see also the discussion by Hagemann, Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre, 289304. rger-Krieger, 3443; Fania OzSalzberger, Translating the Enlightenment, 11720, Kater, Bu 1478. On the participation of women in the Wars of Liberation see: Hagemann, Mannlicher Muth, 81 3, 416 27. Idem, Heroic Virgins and Bellicose Amazons, 507 27 (see especially pp. 509, 511). The literature about the reforms in the Prussian army is extensive. Some of the important works are: Meinecke, The Age of Prussian Liberation 1795 1815, 44 101; Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1700 1815, 46372; Craig, Prussian Army, 37 53; Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1808 1819, 145 93; Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte, 53 6; Sheehan, German History 1770 1866, 30710. Regarding the reforms in the codes of behaviour and penalty see: Voigt, Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte der rischen Ehrenstrafen und der Ofzierehrengerichtsbarkeit im preuischen und deutschen milita ve, Milita r, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, Heer von 1806 bis 1918, 30 41. Pro 9 12. Some of the latest works that deal with the national signicance of the Wars of Liberation are: Echternkamp, Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus (1770-1840), 216 32; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 89 93; Carl, Der Mythos des Bfreiungskrieges, 63 82. A more theoretical discussion of the formation of war-mythology see Gladigow, Gewalt in ndungsmythen, 23 38. Gru Earlier ideas about the noble features of war and warlike training, combined with liberal political theories, were even expressed by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1792. See von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu Bestimmen, 76, 86 7. Jahn, Deutsches Volkstum, 53 4. Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, 106 7. Jahn, Deutsches Volkstum, 62. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 42 5. Arndt, Die deutsche Wehrmannschaft, 65. hn, Die Armee als Craig, Prussian Army, 74 5; Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, p. 90; Ho Erziehungsschule der Nation, 191 3. For the British case see: Gee, The British Volunteer Movement 1794 1814, 1 3, 99, 153; Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793 1815, 73 6, 93 4. rischer Konservatismus, 85, 93 9. Trox, Milita Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 84 6. Vogel, Nationen im Gleichschritt, 11 17. von Rotteck, Ueber stehende Heere und Nationalmiliz, 234. See the discussion in Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 154, 221 3, 235 6. mer und Wahrheiten aus den ersten Jahren nach dem letzten Kriege, 76 7. Schulz, Irrthu von Rotteck and Welcker, Staats-Lexikon, 593. This entry is based on an essay written uere System der praktischen by Welcker as early as 1829. See Welcker, Das innere und a
23. 24.
25. 26. 27.
28.
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rlichen und ro misch- christlich- germanischen Rechts-, Staats- und Gsetzgebungs- Lehre, natu 5978. rgerbewaffnung geschichtlich enwickelt, 24 5. Assmann, Die Bedeutung deutscher Bu Pzer, Liberal, Liberalismus in Staats-Lexikon, eds. Rotteck and Welcker, vol. 7, 718 9. Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, 9 33. hn, Armee als Erziehungsschule, 43. Ho ve, Politische Partizipation und soziale Ordnung, 113. In this regard see also the Pro importance attached to the wearing of uniform and the correlation between army and civil ndli, Von schneidigen Ofzieren und Milita rcrinolinen, sphere which it symbolised: Bra 205. On Ruge see also Wende, Arnold Ruge: Kavalleriegeneral der Hegelei, 23 32. Becker, Bilder von Krieg und Nation, 95 6. rz, See the discussion on the armys oppression of unrest during the Restoration and the Vorma dtke, Police and State in Prussia, 1815 1850, 160 6, 183 93. in Lu Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArchB), Nachla Robert Blum, Nr. 65, Die Stellung der Soldaten in rz 1848). And see bungsverein am 6. Ma Deutschland. Von Rob. Blum (Gesprochen im Redeu mliches Handbuch der Staatswissenschaften und Politik. Ein Staatslexikon also: Blum Volksthu r das Volk, 75 7. On Robert Blum see also Maentel, Robert Blum, 134 45 (especially fu pp. 141 3). Gheimes Staatsarchiv- Preuischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GStaPK), Rep. 92, VI.HA. Nachlass rgerwehr besonders in Berlin. In der Sitzung des Benedikt Franz Leo Waldeck, Nr. 28: Die Bu r Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg am 12. April [1848]. Vorgetragen von dem Vereins fu rger und Geheimen ArchiRathe und Professor der Staats- Wissenschaft Dr. Riedel, Bu rgerwehrmanne des 13. Stadt-Bezirkes, Berlin 1848. p. 16. Bu ber den Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden NationalStenographischer Bericht u versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, vol. 9, 6866. Ibid. vol. 2, 1328. For Heckers argument, as well as that of Wigrad (mentioned above), see: Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 158 9. And see also Freitag, Friedrich Hecker: Der republikanische n, 45 62 (especially pp. 54 6). Souvera For petitions in Offenburg see: BArchB, Nachla Karl Mathy, Nr. 97, Die Volksversammlung zu Offenburg, am 19. Maerz 1848. For Freiburg see: BArchB, Nachla Friedrich Hammacher, Nr. 71, Die Volkversammlung in Freiburg, am 26 Maerz 1848. For Heidelberg see: idem. nster see: idem. An die Die Volkversammlung in Heidelberg, am 26 Maerz 1848. For Mu Buergergarde der Stadt Muenster [12.11.1848]. Regarding the Prussian case and militias in Berlin see Wolff, Darstellung der Berliner Bewegungen im Jahre 1848 nach politischen, socialen und literarischen Beziehungen, 336. ve, And see also: Becker, Forderungen nach Volksbewaffnung 1848, 1353 4; Pro ischen Revolutionen 1848, 911 2. rgerwehren in den europa Bu rgertum und For these cases see: Sperber, Rhineland Radicals, 366 70; Nolte, Gemeindebu Liberalismus in Baden 1800-1850, 327 8; Harris, Arms and the People, 144 5, 160. ve, Bu rgerwehren, 909 10. Mu ller, Soldaten, Bu rger, Barrikaden. Konikte und Pro hrend der Revolution von 1848/49, 48. Allianzen wa ve, Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus, 183. rgerideal, 6245. Pro For this idea see: Nolte, Bu rgewehren differed considerably from one place to another. In The number of members in Bu Prussia they reached about 30,000 people. In Hannover, a city which at that time had about 30,000 inhabitants, about 3000 served in the militia; 12,000 people carried arms in Leipzig, and ve, Politische Partizipation, 128. in a small city like Heilbronn they numbered 1200. See: Pro Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 170 1. Vick, Dening Germany, 195. And see also Jeismann, Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zum ndnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792 1918, nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstversta 162 3. Vick, Dening Germany, 181 3. Nachla Friedrich Hammacher, op. cit. ller, Soldaten in der On the role of the standing army during the 1848 revolution see Mu deutschen Revolution von 1848/49, 42 54. On the continental level see Langewiesche, Die rs in den europa ischen Revolutionen von 1848, 915 32. Rolle des Milita This argument is presented by Christian Jansen. See Einheit, Macht und Freiheit. Die ren Epoche 1849 1867, 28. Paulskirchenlinke und die deutsche Politik in der nachrevolutiona
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67. 68.
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hn, Armee als Erziehungsschule, 33. Ho Nikolaus Buschmann, Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft, 217 8, 222 3, 227. Jansen, Einheit, Macht und Freiheit, 270 81.
Notes on contributor
Doron Avraham, PhD, is an assistant professor in the General History Department of Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. He also teaches in the German Studies Program of the Minerva Institute for German History at Tel Aviv University. His main eld of research is modern German history, with focus on the development of German political philosophy during the nineteenth t: Der preussische Konservatismus im Zeitalter century. His monograph, In der Krise der Modernita nderung 1848 1876, was published in 2008. He has also published articles in esellschaftlicher Vera r deutsche Geschichte and Gender Difference in European History Quarterly, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fu European Legal Cultures. Historical Perspectives. Dedicated to Heide Wunder on the Occasion of her 70th Birthday.
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enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe Vol. 17, No.

4, August 2010, 605628

German liberalism and the militarisation of civil society, 1813 1848/49

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe Notes

25. 26. 27.

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44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

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58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

Bibliography Archives Bundesarchiv Berlin

Gheimes Staatsarchiv- Preuischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin

Published primary sources

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

enne dhistoire European Review of HistoryRevue europe

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