Page |1 The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008 Puno, C.J.

FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. the On August 13, 2007, brothers escaped and 10 days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security even after they have escaped.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |2 Reyes vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009 Leonardo-De Castro, J. FACTS: In the morning of November 30, 2007, Reverend Robert Reyes together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutor, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion. On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the maintenance of petitioners name on the HDO list is an actual restraint of his constitutional right to travel.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the direct recourse of this case to the SC onsidering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads: Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO. Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo. The Supreme Court further ruled that petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |3 Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999 Mendoza, J. FACTS: Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two reporters. Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the voice recording presented by the prosecution in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena. SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |4 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 Kapunan, J. FACTS: Petitioner alleged that private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. as shown in a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled on the negative. First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator". The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the abovequoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |5 Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996 Mendoza, J. FACTS: On March 26, 1962, petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta, entered the clinic of her husband, private respondent Alfredo Martina, doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |6 Waterous Drugs Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997 Davide, JR., J. FACTS: On August 15, 1988, Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded: With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Saldaa's action of opening the envelope addressed to the private respondent is a violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |7 Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999 Mendoza, J. FACTS: Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two reporters. Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the voice recording presented by the prosecution in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena. SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |8 Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 Puno, J. FACTS: In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A.O. No. 308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It does not simply implement the Administrative Code of 1987. This administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of the citizenry vis-avis the State, as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right to privacy.

RULING: The Supreme Court struck down Administrative Order No. 308 emphasizing that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into the right to individual privacy. This right merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and compelling interests justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

Page |9 TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 Mendoza, J. FACTS: Petitioners, Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. According to the petitioners, while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.

ISSUE: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 is valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirms the validity of Section 92 of B.P. No. 881. Accoring to the Supreme Court, to affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigour of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of Section 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 10 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000 Panganiban, J. FACTS: Comelec passed Resolution No. 98-1419 which states that "RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately. On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with.

RULING: The Supreme Court rules that the issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 11 Social Weather Stations Inc vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001 Mendoza, J. FACTS: Petitioner SWS and KPC brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act). Petitioner states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 900 is valid and constitutional.

RULING: The Supreme Court rules that Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 900 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 12 In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998

FACTS: Petitioners claims that this Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC, entitled, "Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All Other Courts. They charge that this Court amended provisions of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 880, otherwise known as "the Public Assembly Act," by converting the sidewalks and streets within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from every courthouse from a public forum place into a "no rally" zone. Thus, they accuse this Court of violating the principle of separation of powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating promulgating Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC.

RULING: The Supreme Court rejects the arguments of the petitioner. Public places historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be public fora. In other words, it is not any law that can imbue such places with the public nature inherent in them. But even in such public fora, it is settled jurisprudence that the government may restrict speech plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are (1) content-neutral, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Contrary therefore to petitioners impression, B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks , among other places, as public fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly. The existence of B.P. Blg. 880, however, does not preclude this Court from promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a 200-meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. On the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures. Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed resolution complement each other. We so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 13 AM 01-4-03-SC Radio TV Coverage of the Trial in Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001 Vitug, J. FACTS: The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings. On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis: "The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of. "There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings. "Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada." Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the request for Radio-TV coverage of the trial of in the Sandiganbayan of the plunder cases against the former president Joseph E. Estrada.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information outweigh the fundamental rights of the accused along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it DEPRIVES THE COURT OF THE DIGNITY which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. An accused has a RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL BUT IT IS A RIGHT THAT BELONGS TO HIM, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 14 Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996 Puno, J. FACTS: This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board of Review For Moving Pictures and Television that X-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested with such. ISSUE: Whether or not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression. RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner. 2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely: 1. Freedom to believe (absolute) 2. Freedom to act on ones belief where an individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting the public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation authority of the state.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 15 Soriano vs. La Guardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009 Velasco, JR., J. FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. ISSUE: Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 16

Newsounds Broadcasting Networks Inc. vs. Hon. Caesar Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009

Tinga, J. FACTS: On 15 January of 2003, petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayors permit. The following day, the City Assessors Office in Cauayan City noted on CDCs Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002 confirmed that based on the existing file, CDCs property was classified as commercial. Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayors permit. On 16 January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayors permit for the year 2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved. However, on 4 March 2003, respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order. Petitioners were thus able to continue operations until 10 June 2004, the day when respondents yet again closed the radio stations. This closure proved to be more permanent. These are two petitions for review involving the same parties, the cases having been consolidated by virtue of the Resolution of this Court dated 16 June 2008. Both petitions emanated from a petition for mandamus filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, the petition having been dismissed in a Decision dated 14 September 2004 by the Cauayan City RTC, Branch 2. Consequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an appeal to the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled against petitioners in both instances. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the petitioner's freedom of expression. RULING: The Supreme Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1

P a g e | 17 Hector Villanueva vs. PDI, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009 Quisumbing, J. FACTS: On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid. Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature. On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner that the defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective officers are liable [for] damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for malicious and imputing statements to the petitioner.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD-1