A minor follows domicile of her parents.

Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. EFREN ARATEA v.COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J. FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed apetition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground th at Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayorof San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010elections.Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy whenLonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy.

Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and wererespectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Olongapo. On thesame date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification. DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction, and as aconsequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration.In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office asMayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take anoath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to theoutcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running forM ayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first ,Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms withoutinterruption; and second , Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification underthe Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of 4 yearsand 1 day of prisin correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People , before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the sameCode that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio , is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer ," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of

candidacy was void ab initio . In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 1 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated. A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts andpossession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penallaws . There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of thethree-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code,as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.On the other hand, Section 78 2 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may bedenied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy :Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy : Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it isannouncing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office xxx The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor , disqualifies himperpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office . Thisperpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, beforeLonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy .The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of theRevised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to votein any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.

T he duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor .On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification meansthat " the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of hisdisqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual specialdisqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. 1 Sec. 68. Disqualifications . Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance hiscandidacy; (c) s pent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6 , shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, fromholding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for anyelective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country inaccordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. 2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation containedtherein as required under Section 74 hereof is false

. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before theelection. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, andcommits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he iseligible to so run. Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run forMayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because thecancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.Petition dismissed. BADOY vs. COMELEC (35 SCRA 285) Campaign, A. Lawful / Prohibited Election Propaganda Facts: Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. avers that he is a candidate for delegate to theConstitutionalConvention for the lone district of North Cotabato. He prays thatSection 12(F) of RA 6132 bedeclared unconstitutional as the same deniesindividuals, who are not candidates, their freedomof speech and of the press; andcandidates the right to speak and write, discuss and debate infavor of theircandidacies or against the candidacies of others. Section 12 (F) provides thattheComelec shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers, magazines andperiodicalswhich shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate this spaceequally and impartiallyamong all candidates within the areas in which thenewspapers are circulated. Outside of saidComelec space, it shall be unlawful toprint or publish, or cause to be printed or published, anyadvertisement, paidcomment or paid article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacyof anyperson for delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of hiscandidacy, unless all the names of all other candidates in the district in which thecandidate isrunning are also mentioned with equal prominence. ComelecResolution RR-724, as amended,merely restates the ban in Section 12 (F).Issue: Whether the ban in Section 12 (F) is valid or constitutional.Held: Under Section 12 (F), the moneyed candidate or individual who can afford topay foradvertisements, comments or articles in favor of his candidacy or against thecandidacy of another or which mention his name

and the fact of his candidacy, isrequired to mention all theother candidates in the same district with equalprominence, to exempt him from the penalsanction of the law. The evident purposeof the limitation is to give the poor candidates afighting chance in the election. Therestriction is only one of the measures devised by the law topreserve suffrage pureand undefiled and to achieve the desired equality of chances among allthecandidates. Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 12(F) in the light of theotherprovisions of RA 6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality ofchances among thevarious candidates in the same district, the said restriction on thefreedom of expressionappears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on theindividual s liberty of expression.It should be noted that Section 8(a) of the same law,prohibiting political parties from aidingcandidates and thus was more restrictive thanSection 12(F), was previously upheld to be valid.The limitation in Section 12(F) is areasoned and reasonable judgment on the part of Congress. Itis not unconstitutional.

Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004 Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. ISSUE: Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the nature of an ex post facto law? HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

JUANITO C. PILAR v. COMELEC G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759 July 11, 1995 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94040. Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a non-candidate, having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Did Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. HELD: No. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word shall. As a general rule, the use of the word shall in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule. Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that [t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. CASTROMAYOR VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 120426 November 23, 1995 NICOLAS C. CASTROMAYOR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CALINOG, ILOILO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking to set aside a resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which directs the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Calinog, Iloilo to reconvene for the purpose of annulling the proclamation of petitioner Nicolas C. Castromayor as councilor of that municipality and of proclaiming the winner after a recomputation of the votes. Petitioner was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held on May 8, 1995. After the votes had been cast, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened at 6:00 p.m. of that day and began the canvass of the election returns from the different precincts in the municipality. The canvassing lasted well into the night of May 9, 1995. The totals of the votes cast were checked by the Municipal Accountant who acted as recorder of votes. 1 On May 10, 1995, the winners were proclaimed on the basis of the results of the canvass which showed that petitioner received 5,419 votes and took eighth place in the election for members of the Sangguniang Bayan. 2 However, when Alice M. Garin, Chairman of the MBC, rechecked the totals in the Statement of Votes the following day, she discovered that the number of votes cast for Nilda C. Demorito, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, was 62 more than that credited to her. As Garin later explained to the Provincial Election Supervisor, the returns from one precinct had been overlooked in the computation of the totals. 3 Two employees of the Treasurer's Office, who were assigned to post the returns on the tally board outside the municipal building, also discovered the error and reported it to Garin. As matters stood, therefore the total number of votes cast for Demorito was 5,470, or 51 more than the 5,419 votes cast for petitioner. 4 Garin reported the matter to the Regional Election Director, Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza, who advised her to request authority from the COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose of correcting the error. On May 13, 1995, a fax letter was sent to the Law Department of the COMELEC in Manila. The letter explained the problem and asked for authority for the MBC to reconvene in order to correct the error, annul the proclamation of petitioner and proclaim Demorito as the eighth member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

A formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC on May 17, 1995. On May 23, 1995, the COMELEC issued the following resolution: 95-2414. In the matter of the Fax-letter dated 13 May 1995 from Election Officer Alice M. Carin [sic], requesting for an authority to reconvene the MBC of Calinog, Iloilo to annul the proclamation of Nicolas Castromayor for the No. 8 place for councilor and to proclaim Nilda C. Demorito as the duly elected number eight (8) SB member of said municipality, RESOLVED: 1 To direct the Municipal board of Canvassers of said municipality to reconvene to annul the proclamation of Nicolas C. Castromayor for the number 8 place for councilor; and
2 To proclaim the winning number eight (8)councilor, and to submit compliance 5 hereof within five (5) days from receipt of notice.

On May 25, 1995, not yet apprised of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, Garin sent a letter to petitioner Castromayor, informing him of the error in the computation of the totals and of the request made by the MBC for permission to reconvene to correct the error. Petitioner protested the proposed action in a letter dated June 5, 1995 to COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion A. Borra. He questioned the legality of the actuations of Garin as stated in her letter. 6 On June 9, 1995, the MBC was informed by fax of the COMELEC's action on its request. 7 Accordingly on June 14, 1995, the MBC sent notices to the parties concerned that it was going to reconvene on June 22, 1995, at 10:00 a.m., at the Session Hall of the Sangguniang Bayan, to make a correction of errors. Hence this petition to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 95-2414. Petitioner complains that the COMELEC en banc issued the resolution in question without notice and hearing, solely on the basis of the fax letter of the MBC. He claims that even if the matter were treated as a preproclamation controversy, there would nonetheless be a need for hearing, with notice to him and an opportunity to refute any contrary argument which might be presented. He invokes the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC 8 that the COMELEC is "without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing." Petitioner's contention is well taken. That is why upon the filing of the petition in this case, we issued a temporary restraining order against respondents enjoining them from enforcing

the resolution of the COMELEC. Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, now claim, however, that said resolution merely stated the purpose of the reconvening of respondent Board, and that the process and hearing for the annulment of petitioner's proclamation, due to mistake in computing the votes of Sangguniang Bayan candidate Nilda Demorito, will formally take place when respondent Board reconvenes, at which time and place, petitioner was already informed of (see Annex E, Petition). xxx xxx xxx
In the aforesaid reconvening, petitioner would have been free to interpose all his 9 objections, and discuss his position regarding the matter.

To be sure, the COMELEC did not itself annul the proclamation of petitioner, but, by "direct[ing] the Municipal Board of Canvassers of said municipality to reconvene to annul the proclamation of Nicolas C. Castromayor," the COMELEC in effect did so. After all, the authority of the COMELEC was sought because, without such authority, the MBC would not have the power to annul the proclamation of petitioner. Be that as it may and in order to obviate the necessity of remanding this case to the COMELEC for further proceedings in accordance with due process, we will accept this representation of the public respondents that what the COMELEC resolution contemplates is a hearing before the MBC at which petitioner will be heard on his objection and that only if warranted will the MBC be authorized to set aside the proclamation of petitioner previously made on May 10, 1995. We find this to be the expedient course of action to take, considering that, after all, in its notice to the candidates, the MBC did not state that it was going to reconvene to annul petitioner's proclamation and make a new one but only that it was going to do so "for the correction of the errors noted in the Statement of Votes Per Precinct/Municipality." 10 The proceedings before the MBC should be summary. Should any party be dissatisfied with the ruling of the MBC, the party concerned shall have a right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc, in accordance with Rule 27, 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as follows: 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. (a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board

may motu propio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. (b) The order for correction must be made in writing and must be promulgated. (c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation. (d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their votes are not affected by the appeal. (e) The appeal must implead as respondents the Board of Canvassers concerned and all parties who may be adversely affected thereby. (f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a copy of the appeal, to the respondents. (g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing. (h) The appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc. Athough this provision applies to preproclamation controversies and here the proclamation of petitioner has already been made, there is nothing to suggest that it cannot be applied to cases like the one at bar, in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely in question. On the contrary, in Duremdes v. COMELEC, 11 this Court sustained the power of the COMELEC en banc to order a correction of the Statement of Votes to make it conform to the election returns in accordance with a procedure similar to the procedure now embodied in Rule 27, 7. If the Rule was not applied, it was only because it was adopted after that case had arisen. Otherwise, as we said there, this procedure "best recommends itself specially considering that the Statement of Votes is a vital component in the electoral process." Indeed, since the Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation. It begs the question, therefore, to say that this is not a preproclamation controversy and the procedure for preproclamation controversies cannot be applied to the correction in the computation of the totals in the Statement of Votes. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in

computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections. What has just been said also disposes of petitioner's other contention that because his proclamation has already been made, any remedy of the losing party is an election protest. As held in the Duremdes case:
It is DUREMDES' further submission that this proclamation could not be declared null and void because a pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made, the proper recourse being an election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. (Aguam vs. 12 COMELEC, L-28955, 28 May 1968, 23 SCRA 883).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order previously issued is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

the expedient action to take is to direct the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim the winning candidate/s.
UTTO V. COMELEC FACTS: This petition seeks to annul the resolutions of the Commission on directing the inclusion of five election returns excluded by the municipal board of canvassers during the canvass of votes for the May 14, 2001 election in the municipality of Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao and finding petitioners proclamation to be illegal and void ab initio. Petitioner Utto and respondent Angas were candidates for the position of mayor. For the canvassing of votes of the May 14 election returns, the original municipal board of canvassers was composed of Alid as chairman with Abo and Gonina, as members. During the canvassing on May 16, election returns in Precinct Nos. 15A, 25A/26A, 66A, and 68A/69A were presented. On May 18, respondent filed a petition to inhibit Alid and Abo, which resulted in the suspension of the canvassing. Alid and Abo inhibited themselves from the proceeding. Mamalinta took over as chairperson, with Khalid and Gonina, as members of the municipal board of canvassers. The canvassing was again suspended when both Khalid and Gonina inhibited themselves from participating in the proceedings. The provincial election supervisor designated Mangelen and Diolanen as members of the municipal board of canvassers. In an affidavit executed, Diolanen stated that chairperson Mamalinta called him up and informed him that she would convene the board of canvassers, with instructions for him not to attend because he was already replaced. He further stated that Mangelen called him up to tell him of his (Mangelen) decision to inhibit himself as member of the board of canvassers due to pressure exerted by chairperson Mamalinta. The municipal board of canvassers convened with chairperson Mamalinta and member Reneido were present. The other member was absent. Before the start of the canvass, chairperson Mamalinta distributed to the parties present a report on the status of canvassing. Out of the 98 precincts, the municipal board of canvassers issued four (4) separate rulings excluding the above-cited five (5) election returns. Particularly, the municipal board of canvassers ruled that the Election Returns were tampered with or were not original. Despite respondents manifestation, the municipal board of

canvassers proceeded with the proclamation of the candidates for municipal offices. petitioner as the duly elected mayor of the municipality. ISSUE: Whether or not said proclamation is valid. HELD:

The board proclaimed

NO. It is provided that the procedure in the disposition of contested election returns and certificate of canvass. The Comelec precludes the board of canvassers from proclaiming any candidate as winner, except upon its authorization after it has ruled on the appeal of the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation thereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. This provision is mandatory and requires strict observance. Section 20 (i), Republic Act No. 7166 where COMELEC Resolution No.3848 finds basis further states: SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.--(a) x x x(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. Consequently, petitioners proclamation was null and void. It was made on May 31, 2001 after respondent manifested his intention to appeal the ruling of the board of canvassers. On the day of the proclamation, respondent attempted to file a verified notice of appeal, but the chairperson of the municipal board of canvassers refused to accept the appeal. Within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, respondent went to the COMELEC. Pursuant to said section, the municipal board of canvassers may not proclaim any candidate without waiting for the authorization of the COMELEC. Considering that petitioner had a very small margin of 149 votes over respondent, and there were 944 registered voters from the five excluded election returns, the results of the municipal election would be undoubtedly adversely affected by the contested returns. The proclamation thus made is void ab initio. It is now settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. When the municipal board of canvassers disregarded the five election returns, it in effect disenfranchised the voters of the excluded precincts. Time and again, the Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. The fact that a candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such power. It is also true that after proclamation, the remedy of a party aggrieved in an election is an election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive COMELEC of the power to declare such proclamation a nullity