The Study of Translation in View of New Developments in Discourse Analysis: The Problem of Indirect Speech Acts Shoshana Blum-Kulka

Poetics Today, Vol. 2, No. 4, Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations. (Summer - Autumn, 1981), pp. 89-95.
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THE STUDY OF TRANSLATION IN VIEW OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The Problem of Indirect Speech Acts*

SHOSHANA BLUM-KULKA
Communication. Jerusalem

One way of looking at translation which has not been widely exploited is through speech-act theory. This approach is not intended as an alternative to recent theories such as those of Even-Zohar (1975) and Toury (1976), but is probably complementary to them. The theory of speech acts is based on a functional view of languages. It assumes that the use of language is an integral part of social interaction. Speech-act theoreticians like Austin (1962) claim that by uttering sentences we are performing acts, and these acts may be successful or not. An adequate theory of speech acts should be able to formulate the conditions stipulating which acts are successful in which situations. I would like to suggest that a speech-act theory of language use might be applied both to the theory and study of translation. This approach assumes that the act of translation itself can be viewed as an attempt at the successful performance of speech acts. Any utterance -or text, if we extend Austin'sview (Austin, 1962) -performs simultaneously three acts: the locutionary act. which is the act otsayingsomethinginthefull sense of 'say' (the propositional meaning); an illocutionary act, which is an act performed by saying something (the intentional meaning or function achieved, including the poetic one), and the perlocutionary act, the one performed by the hearer as a result of the former two acts. In trying to achieve "sameness in meaning" translation is thus an attempt to re-perform locutionary and illocutionary acts that (hopefully but in fact rarely) will have in the target language the same perlocutionary force (or effect) on the
* Paper presented at Synopsis I: "Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations." held at the Porter Institute for Poetics a n d Semiotics in collaboration with the M. Uernstein Chair of Translation Theory, Tel Aviv University, 27 March - 1 April 1978.
@ Poetics Today, Vol. 2:4 (1981). 89-05

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addressee as they had in the source language. An adequate theory of translation should try to formulate the conditions stipulating the successful (or not successful) performance of such translation-acts. What follows is a preliminary attempt to apply such an approach to the case of indirect speech acts. I will try to argue that by examining the various rules that govern the successful performance in any given language, we might be able to make predictions about the possibility or impossibility of reconstructing the same indirect act in another language. I t is well known that the same utterance in natural languages can serve different illocutionary ends. The phrase "I am hungry" uttered by a beggar is a request for food, but the same phrase, uttered by a child at bed-time, may be a way to delay going to bed. 'The phrase is interpreted on the basis of shared assumptions between speaker and hearer over and above the linguistic content of the sentence used. There is nothing in the phrase "I am hungry" that indicates its various potential illocutionary forces. But as part of their linguistic competence, all speakers seem to know that utterances can convey mess:rges which do not hear any necessary relation to the propositional content of the sentence used. On the other hand, we also have systematic, linguistic ways for indicating potential illocutionary force. I t has been claimed, for example (van Dijk. 1977: 202) that one function of German doch is t o express the fact that the speaker assumes that the hearer knows (or should know) already the proposition asserted by the speaker. Since doch marks the existence of a presupposition, an utterance with doch can have the illocutionary force of either re-confirming the presupposition, or of rejecting it, as in Und die Hibel hat doch Recht, a title rendered in English by "The Bible as History."' All languages seem to provide their speakers with ways of achieving communicative ends by indirect means. From the point of view of translation theory the question is how universal are these ways. Speech-act theoreticians speak about the felicity conditions that govern the successful performance of speech acts in general. Limiting the discussion to indirect speech acts I would like to argue that an analysis of the nature of felicity conditions might provide us with a tool for predicting ease of translatability of indirect speech acts. The felicity conditions for the performance and interpretation of speech acts might be based only on the speaker's ability to relate linguistic content to pragmatic context, as in the case of "I am hungry." Since thisability is part of the speaker's 'pragmatic competence' (Kasher, 1977). it seems reasonable to assume that j'ai faim, or ani ra'eb, o r I a m hungry all share the same potential illocutionary force and are also potential full translation equivalents. On the other hand, the happy performance and interpretation of speech acts might require not only the speaker's general pragmatic competence but also his language-specific semantic competence, as in the case o f doch. Since languages other than German might lack a similar 'linguistic institution,' the quest for a
I

'This 1s the title o f Werner Keller's book (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1956).

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translation equivalent that shares the same potential illocutionary force might become a real problem. In longer stretches of discourse, the felicity conditions for the successful performance of speech acts might include the proper application of universal rules of social interaction. Such a rule for conversations for example is the willingness condition of communicative interaction, what Grice (1975) calls the 'Maxim of Cooperation.' Grice lists four maxims: people expect contributions to conversations to be appropriate in content and manner (Maxims of Relation and Manner) and to include n o more nor less information than required (Maxim of Quantity) and to be genuine (Maxim of Quality). Violation of any of the maxims results in the utterance having an indirect illocutionary force over and beyond its propositional content. In the following scene from Othello (Act 111, iii), lago manages to rouse Othello's suspicions by deliberately violating the Maxim of Relation. Not only does he not answer Othello's questions, but he also avoids them. H e does s o apparently clumsily, suggesting to Othello that h e is concealing something:
D i d Michael Cassio, when you woo'd my lady, K n o w of your love? H e did. from first t o l a s t . . . why dost thou ask? But f o r asatisfaction of my thought. N o further harm. Why of thy thought, Iago? I did not think h e had been acquainted with h e r O yes. a n d went between u s v e r y often. Indeed? Indeed; Indeed: discern'st thou aught in that? Is h e not honest? H o n e s t , my lord? Honest'? ay, honest My lord. for aught I know. What dost thou think'! Think, my lord?

Othello: 1ago: Othello: lago: Othello: Iago: Othello: lago: Othello: lago: Othello:

As Coulthard (1977) observes, Iago's first answer "but for the satisfaction of my thought" is the politest of possible evasions; i t also allows Iago to d r o p another stone into the pond: "No further harm." His second answer: "I did not think he had been acquainted with her" makes his first question seem bizarre, and suggests that it was not meant as a request for information. T h e perlocutionary force o f the whole exchange is strengthened by Iago's "Indeed?" and reaches its peak with the twist given to Othello's question: "Is h e not honest?" by Iago's reply: "Honest, my lord?" Will the dramatic force of this scene be lost in translation? I want to argue that as long as the linguistic content is rendered in exactly the same questionresponse sequence, the passage stands a very good chance of retaining all its dramatic force. In this text, the change of o n e question-mark in translation ("Honest, my lord?") to a full-stop will be much more significant than any

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stylistic variations in the target language. Theoretically, this text's high level of translatability will b e affected only if translated t o a language of a society that does not share the same basic rules of social interaction. S o far we have seen that indirect speech acts that rely for their interpretation on such contextual clues as "I am hungry" and/or on the violation of rules of social interaction seem t o b e high on the scale of translatability potential. T h e theoretical claim 1 am trying t o make is that the more universal the rules governing the performance of any indirect speech act, the easier i t will be t o reconstruct it in a different language. It follows that the more lunguage-bollnd the rules, the lower the degree of translatability. In order t o examine the latter claim let us look at the language-specific ways for performing indirect speech ac:s. All languages seem t o have conventionalized patterns f o r this purpose. In many languages. forexiimple. it is possible t o make a request by questioning thc hearer's ability to perform the required act: Could you (please) I K o n n e n Sie (bittc) I ?ouve7-vou\ (s'll vous plait) ' P o d r ~ a u\ted (porfavor), etc These utterances have both a primary and secondary illocutionary force. I'heq' can b e used - o r choseri t o b e understood - a s a n information seekir~g cliiestili,~~ o r a s a request for action. If someone answers by "Yes, 1 could" t o "Could you turn off the radio," without complying t o the implied request, the effect is o n e of impertinence. In the above examples, it is the double function of a pattern like could you that ensures its being a potential translation equivalent. Since we are dealing here with systematic properties of language use, a full contrastive analysis of two languages should include an analysis of conventional direct and indirect speech-act patterns. T h e first step in such an analysis will b e t o list for each language the conventional patterns used in the performance of indirect speech acts. T h e second s t e p will b e t o try and determine whether the translation of each of these patterns has an equivalent indirect illocutionary potential in the target language. Indirect speech-act patterns a r e linguistically marked, and such an analysis will have t o determine the lexical o r syntactical restrictions that operate foreach. A n utterance like "Are you able t o pass the salt" will b e disqualified, because though perfectly grammatical, it does not carry the double speech-act function of "Could you pass the salt." In listing the possibilities for Hungarian, forexample, it will have t o b e specified that for the parallel indirect requests the lexical choice is a verb of knowledge, not ability. I n trying t o determine equivalence in terms of speech-act potential, i t is important t o n o t e that stylistic variations in o n e language might mean a difference in illocutionary force potential in another. It is possible, for example, both in H e b r e w and in English, t o m a k e a request by asserting thespeaker'swish for a desired action: "I want you t o g o now" o r "I would like you t o g o X C Y . " in

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English, the difference between the two is o n e of politeness, o r degree of insistence. T h e formal equivalent in Hebrew t o "I would like you t o go" (hayiti roza ietelek) might b e intended as a request, but will most likely b e understood a s the expression of a wish. Actually, in certain situations even "I want you to" might b e considered too indirect by Israelis interested in getting immediate results. Another example of non-equivalence in illocutionary force potential a r e Why not questions in English and Hebrew. A question like "Why not stop here" is usually a suggestion. Translated into standard Hebrew it loses its secondary illocutionary force and actsonly as a question. T h e interesting point here is that a slight stylistic variation (using the spoken lama Selo - why not) in Hebrew can give the utterance back the full illocutionary force it had in English, namely, a sugggestion t o stop. T h e third step in the contrastive analysis of conventional speech-act patterns will b e t o arrange all the possibilities on a comparative scale of linguistic and social acceptability. A s Levenston (1971) has noted, speech-act patterns that are perfectly acceptable socially in Hebrew might not b e acceptable at all in English, andvice versa. Thus, it is accepted procedure in Hebrew, at least in informal situations, t o disagree by telling the other directly that h e is wrong (ata to'e, literally -you're wrong) or by denying the facts (lo nakon - not true), while English speakers under t h e same circumstances feel a need t o soften the act by: "You might have made a mistake . . .." o r "I may b e wrong but . . .," o r "Are you sure . . ."? etc. These English indirect patterns are linguistically possible in Hebrew but not socially acceptable. Another example is Japanese speech-act norms as compared with American ones. Americans d o not seem t o mind being commanded t o drink Coca-Cola ("Drink Coca Cola!"), being instructed how t o use their money ("Buy now, Pay later!") o r with whom t o pray ("Pray Together, Stay Together!"). A s Higa (1 970) remarks, such a f r e e use of direct imperatives in advertisements is unthinkable in a Japanese social context. A study of Japanese and American newspapers a n d magazines (Higa, 1970) showed that 70 percent of the Japanese advertisements used some kind of indirect pattern, while 62 percent of the American advertisements used direct imperative forms. A comparative scale of linguistic and social acceptability for indirect speech-act patterns between two languages might reveal translation-gaps on either end of the scale. Thus, often the most direct pattern in Hebrew (a request o r directive opened by the untranslatable ' n u ' . . .) and t h e most indirect in English ("Would you b e s o kind as t o . . .") have n o socially acceptable equivalents in the other language. In such cases the g a p between formal a n d functional translation equivalents seems quite systematic, and it should b e theoretically possible t o specify "instructions for translators" for ways of moving u p and down t h e formality scale between two languages in any given context a n d register. Still, it seems apparent that the more language- and culture-specific the rules

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governing the performance of a given speech act, the more difficult it will prove t o reconstruct it in another language. In analyzing these rules f o r different languages o n e will have t o consider the possibility that each language might possess unique, culturally and linguistically marked speech-act indicators' that make it immensely difficult, if not impossible, t o reconstruct the same speech act in another language. Consider the following example, quoted by Susan Ervin-Tripp (1972) in her sociolinguistic study of rules of address in American English: The scene takes place on a public street in contemporary U.S "What's your name. boy?" the policeman asked. "Dr. Pollssaint, I'm a physician." "What's your first name, boy?"
"Alvin."

Anybody familiar with American address rules will immediately know that D r . Poussaint is black, and will understand why h e felt 'profound humiliation' a n d 'self hate.' T h e indirect speech act performed by the policeman by way of his first question is already a clear insult. By addresung an adult as boy, the policeman uses. as Tripp says (1972: 326), "a social selector for race that neutralizes identity, set, rank and even adult status." If addressed t o a white, boy presumably would b e used only for a child o r youth. T h e policeman is asking for first name. T h e physician ignores this request. H e responds t o the insult (the indirect speech act) by g i v ~ n g his title, family name, and the justification for the title. T h e officer insults the physician a second time by treating his answer as a non-answer, and a third time by repeating the term boy, as if n o name has been mentioned. By ignoring the physician's answer, the policeman is violating a general conversational rule. By calling him boy. h e is deliberately misusing a socio-cultural rule. Both violations play a part in giving the exchange its specific illocutionary force, but while the first violation is repeatable in another language, the second is not. A s in the case of semantic cultural voids, the best the translatorcan hope for is an approximation. A translator striving for functional equivalence might, by violating socio-cultural rules of the target language, b e able toexpress the insult, but the chances are remote that he will also b e able t o reconstruct its specific quality. T o sum up, I am suggesting that: T h e possibility of achieving communicative ends by indirect means seems t o b e a universal property of languages. Hence, theoretically, it should b e possible t o 'translate' indirect speech acts. 2 . T h e actual performance and interpretation of any indirect speech act

I.

For example, as pointed out t o me by Eddie Levenston. one linguistically marked speech act indicator unique t o English is quite! as confirmation since it always has the implication "but it's nothing to get excited about!"

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depends on a variety of conditions, ranging from universal to culture and language specific. 3. The successful reconstruction of an indirect speech act in translation will depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the conditions that govern its performance and interpretation. The main thesis I have presented here is that the translatability potential of indirect speech acts can be predicted. I suggested that the highest on the scale of translatability potential will be indirect speech actsgoverned by universal felicity conditions, and the lowest will be those indirect speech acts that are subject to unique language and culture-specific conditions. In between the two extremes are all the other, mostly conventionalized ways for performing indirect speech acts that future studies in the linguistics of translation will have to analyze and describe.

REFERENCES ALISTIX. J.L., 1962. How to D o Things with Words(0xford UP). C O U L ~ A RMAL.<-OM. D. 1977. A n Introductron to Discourse Analysts (London: Longman). SIJSAN. ERVIN-TRIPP. 1972. "Sociolingu~stic Rules of Address," in: 1.B. Pride, ed.. Sociolinguistics (Harmondsworth: Penguin). EVEN-ZOHAR. 1975. "Decisions in Translat~ng Poetry." Ha-stfrut21, 32-15 (in Hehrew). ITAMAR. GRICE, PACJL H.. 1975. "Logic and Conversation," in: Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan. eds., Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3 (New York: Academic Press). 41-59. HICIA, MASANORI, 1971. "Towards Contrastive Sociolinguistics." 711e PCCLL'Papers.3 4. 21 1-219. KASHER. ASA.1977. "What is a Theory of Use?" Journal of Pragmatics 1 , 105-120. LEVE.NSTON. EDWARD.1071. "Some Thoughts on Contrastwe Analysis and Translation Equivalence," The PCCLL'Papers 3 4, 275-283. TOIJRY. GIDEON, 1976. "Equivalence of Units and Equivalence of Texts: Toward a Description of the Relationships between Translation and Source," Ha-sifrut23. 42-49 (in Hehrew). V A N DIJK,T., 1977. Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics a n d Pragmatics of Discourse (London: Longman).