T7 B7 John Raidt Work Files - Follow Up FDR - 7-29-04 Commission Letter To DHS IG Re Air Marshals - Whistle Blowers - Security Violations

TO: Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security

FM: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
DATE: July 29, 2004
RE: Follow-up Issues
Inspector General Ervin, we wanted to thank you again for the time that you and your
staff spent with us earlier this summer to discuss the work of the Commission and the
ongoing efforts of the DHS Office of Inspector General.
As we mentioned during the meeting, several issues were raised with the Commission
that are in need and deserving of appropriate follow-up. You had noted your willingness
to receive such information.
We have attached three pieces of correspondence. The first regards serious concerns
about the status and management of the Federal Air Marshal Program. The second letter
regards concerns about the treatment of whistle blowers who raise issues of safety and
security which may bear on DHS and TSA. The third involves alleged security violations
by a commercial air carrier.
Finally, we would like to raise an issue that was raised by a former FAA security
inspector: 1) while explosives detection equipment is in place at all but a few airports, the
equipment is not being fully used to screen baggage for explosives; 2) the physical
placement of such equipment within certain airports is degrading the operational
capabilities of the equipment; and 3) the equipment may not be performing as efficiently
and effectively as it should. While TSA denies that there is any truth to the allegations,
this is an issue which merits additional scrutiny by your office.
We thank you for your consideration.
Team 7
MnasHKean
CHAIR
Date:
H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
iiani Ben-Veniste
TO: TEAM
cOeland
i F.Fielding
FROM: Dianna Campagna
ie S. Gorelick
e Gorton The attached correspondence from r~i/ /

i Lehman is being forwarded to you for information and consideration. A copy has
ottyj. Roemer
also been sent to Team(s) ^-- for their information. If you
s R Thompson
have any questions, please call me on 33 1-4082. Thank you,
pD. Zelifcow
3JT1VE DIRECTOR
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-llcommission.gov
i-ayc i ui e. \. I H.iO r-ivi, m I o/ut f(J£ S»-3-OtO3 TLtUA
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

P.O. Box 326 Lewisbeny, PA 17339
www.fleoa.org
Representing Memherx Of:

ACiENCY for INTERNATIOANAL DEVELOPMENT
AORICULTURE
OIO & Forest Service
COMMERCE April 16, 2004
Export Enforcement. OIO
Si National Marinb Fisheries
DEFENSE
Air Force -OIG
To: All Honorable Senate and Congressional Members
Army • CID
Detinue Criminal Investijjative Service
Naval Crimin al InvcstipitiveService The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), which
OIO
EDUCATION - O I O represents over 22,000 Federal Agents, has compiled the following report on
ENERGY -OIO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AOENCY • CID & OIO the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). This will serve as FLEOA's
FEDERAL DEPOST INSURANCE CORPORATION - OIO
FEDERAL EMEROENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - OIG
record of official notice to all Senate and Congressional Members (and other
OENERAL SERVICES ADMIN.
Federal Protective Service & OIG
interested parties), as to the gross mismanagement of the FAMS. FLEOA is
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Food & Drug Administration & OIO
requesting that honorable members immediately initiate an investigation into
HOMELAND SECURITY many of the life threatening policies set down by FAMS Director Thomas D.
Border Patro!
Coast Ouanl Investigative Service Quinn (and other FAMS management personnel), as well as the release of
Customs Service
Federal Air Marshal classified information on national television.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Protective Service
Immigration & Naturalization Service
om FLEOA has exhausted every other option in attempting to address the
Secret Service
Transportation Security Administration
situation, (refer to letters attached) These attempts have met with little or no
HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT-OIO
INTERIOR
response with the exception that Director Quirm has referred to FLEOA
Bureau of Indian Attairs members as "pea brains" and amateurs who will only hurt "his" agency whil-
Bureau of Land Management
Fish & Wildlife Service addressing field offices and training classes. We request our elected official:
National Park Service
OIO to immediately address and solve these safely hazards prevalent within the
US. ParkPnticB
JUSTICE FAMS. In addition to the public dissemination of classified information,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,Firearms & Explosives
Drug En rhrcement Administration
FLEOA also wishes to ensure that every Senator and Congressional member
Federal Bureau nK Investigation
Marshals Service
is aware of the current FAMS policies in place regarding grooming/dress
OIO code standards and boarding procedures. These policies not only
U.S. Attorney's OtfimCI
LABOR- OIG & Racketeering compromise every FAM, precluding him/her from performing their duties in
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. . OIO
NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION - OIO an effective manner, but also place airline security and the American public
POSTAL SERVICE-OIO & Inspection
RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD- OIO in jeopardy.
SECURITIES SL EXCHANGE COMMISSION . OKI
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION- OIO
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION -OIG
STATE DEPARTMENT
The cause of the breakdown within the FAMS is due to poor leadership, lack
Bureau of Diplomatic Security & 010
TRANSPORTATION-OIG
of communication with Agents and incredibly bad judgment by the top
TREASURY officials of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Bureau of
FINSEN & OIO
Internal Revenue Service - CI Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and FAMS. FAMS executive
TIOTA
U.S. COURTS (JUDICIAL) have taken the FAMS, and the American public, down a dangerous road.
Probation, Parole Si Pretrial Services
VETERANS AFFAIRS .OIO The FAMS management has developed an agency with the mindset that is
NATIONAL OFFICERS
dismissive of any safety and security concerns raised by its agents. FAMS
President
TIMOTHY 1. DANAIIEY
management is overconfident regarding its apparent knowledge of aviation
Executive Vice-President
ARTHUR OORDON
security, even though most of management has never attended any FAM
First Vii»J>rBsidBnt training or actually have performed the mission.
JOHN AMAT
Second Vite-President
CHARLES HYACINTHS
Treasurer
JOSEPH D'ORSANEO
Legislative Director
MATT ISSMAN
National Chapters Director
ORIAN CORNELL
National Awards Director
CHRISTINE A. KUSIAK-TAYLOR
Secretary
JOHN ADLER
r-aye e. 01 hLtOA
The threat that exists to aviation security and the American public is valid and ever-
present. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(also known as the 9-11 Commission) has revealed that neither the intelligence
community nor elected officials were prepared for the terrorist attacks that would
occur that day. This report is to make both those entities aware of the problems that
currently exist within the FAMS in order that changes occur before another tragedy
befalls us. Moreover, this report serves as your official notification of the perilous
situation with the FAMS and FLEOA's record of that notification.
FAMS management has elected to further jeopardize the safety of FAMs, impede
their ability to complete a dangerous mission the result is weakened defenses
against the unknown face of terrorism due to the following:
The deliberate and release of classified operational security procedures on

NBC Nightly News on February 5-ih and 6 , 2004. This national prime time
televised program aired a two-piece segment discussing 'The Day in the
Life of a Federal Air Marshal". The NBC piece is undoubtedly the most
explicit description of the methodology of the FAM. FLEOA implores that
each member reviews this NBC piece in order to personally determine what
classified procedures were made public;
( refer to Mtp://myjii^coiiVvide(ydefault.anTax?replace=b2SdeffD.75554af7-8eQ3-
^^^
94b4-cl049426c6S9%2Ceb06Sb47-2dcb-4ccb-b22e-ecd9dl449S83%2C67359a7c-1899-
413f-89ba-a8b0110a8999%2CbeOf94e4-6912~4 .1
The deliberate release of classified operational security procedures via a

local Miami WSVN broadcast. This broadcast was conducted with direct
knowledge and participation from high level FAMS management officials;
(refer to httn://vt^w.wsyaccMiyfeatures/article^specialieT>acVC106/ .)
Director Quirm systematically downgrading the classification of the Federal

Air Marshal position from "undercover", to "covert", to "semi-covert" and
finally to its present "discreet" status;
The implementation of military- style grooming standards and a blanket

"sports coat" dress policy mandated regardless of weather, time of week or
which cabin class FAMs sit in;
Creation of airplane boarding procedures that collectively make the FAM

easy to spot due to boarding in plain view of all passengers; and
FAMS management refusal to discuss critical safety concerns with FLEOA.

RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON NATIONAL
NETWORK
(FAA secretive about air marshals. (Knight Ridder Newspapers) Source: Knight Ridder/Tribune
News Service Date: 9/20/2001Author: Urgo, Jacqueline ATLANTIC CTTY, N. J.)
Richard Bloom, director of terrorism and intelligence studies at Arizona's Embry-Riddle

Aeronautical University, agrees. "These terrorists are part of a sophisticated network
which has Us own recognizance, Us own surveillance. Their moves are undertaken with a
lot of preplanning and they know what the rules of engagement are for our air marshals,"
Bloom said. "And that will he part of their future planning. The terrorists will lake
advantage of (the air marshals') strong points and exploit the weak ones unless tactical
changes are made."
FLEOA members are outraged and shocked by the apparent lack of regard for
aviation safety by the DHS' Federal Air Marshal Service. The recent NBC Nightly
News two-part special documentary, entitled "The Day in the Life of a Federal Air
Marshal" (February 5th and 6th, 2004), not only jeopardized the flying public but
FAMs' safety as well.
FLEOA would like to think that a reputable news organization and journalist would
grasp the potential threat and liability that airing such an expose story could create.
Nonetheless, the responsibility of these pieces hitting the airwaves lands squarely
on the senior managers of the FAMS. In particular, Director Thomas Quinn was
featured in the article and apparently sanctioned the media coverage. Director
Quinn gave journalists' access to individual FAMs and approval to film those
FAMS during an actual mission while they were protecting the flying public and the
country.
Intricate details and security measures employed by FAMs during missions were
divulged to both the public and any organization desiring to do harm to the U.S in
another 9/11 style attack. Terrorist who undoubtedly had access to these programs
can now spot FAMs do to dress, seat assignment and are given a decent blue print
on how FAMs respond to a given situation. Modern technology ensures that
footage of the FAMs training in the background of certain segments can be
enhanced and exhibited for closer examination. This televised operational security
information gives further assistance to those terrorists who continue to monitor our
levels of aviation security in attempts to find weaknesses to exploit at a time and
manner of their choosing. FAMS executives and top-level government officials
within DHS who knowingly released this classified information need to answer for
this disclosure, not when or if there is another act of terrorism, but here and now.
Ironically, Director Quinn has warned FAMs about revealing FAM policies and
procedures under threat of termination, arrest and prosecution. Director Quinn
subsequently revealed the following on the NBC national TV report:
• The number of FAMs that fly a mission;

• The obvious "business attire" that FAMs must wear to maintain a
"professional appearance";
• The military like grooming standards (note that no other non-
uniformed agency follows these standards throughout federal law
enforcement with the exception of the very public U.S. Secret
Service protection detail personnel) that the "discreet" FAM must
follow in order to "blend in with the flying public";
• How the FAM presents his/her credentials to the airline gate
personnel;
• The fact that the airline gate personnel know the FAMs' identity;
• How the FAM is escorted and boarded on the airplane prior to
departure;
• The FAMs meet with and brief the flight crew. This at one time was
unknown to the public and as a result a man was caught posing as a
FAM at the Ontario airport in California when a pilot became
suspicious when the suspect stated he had no brief and was flying
alone;
• The fact that the crew knows the FAMs' identity making them a
target for terrorists to reveal whether or not a FAM is on the flight (if
they could not already figure it out by watching these TV shows) and
who they are;
• FAM seating configuration;
• What FAMs look for on a flight;
• The type and model of PDA FAMs use to communicate on the
mission;
• The type and model of weapon FAMs use; and
• The specific way FAMs handle and deploy during hijacking
situations allowing any terrorist to mimic and pose as FAMs.
This NBC Nightly News segments was an utter breach of security that allows al
Qaeda, or any other fanatical terrorist organization, with the operational procedures
of the FAMS. Director Quinn is personally responsible for blowing the cover of
thousands of FAMs and putting the American public in an untenable situation. They
are given a false sense of security that their plane will be protected when, in fact,
FAMs identities all over the country are being compromised on a daily basis.
Concerned parent of a FAM who felt the need to contact his son's FLEOA representative after
viewing the NBC airing:
ll -would be Interesting to know who gave permission to NBC to do the feature. That person
is certainly not interested in the security of the air marshals. Has the motto of the Federal
Air Marshals been changed from "Invisus - Inaudiiits - Impavidus" (Unseen, Unheard,
Unafraid)? Is it now "Visas - Auditus - Patefaclus" (Seen, Heard, Exposed)? "
Show on air marshals draws fire; Gave 'step-by-step narrative' of security procedure. (NATION)
Date: 3/4/2004 Byline: Jerry Seper, THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The safely of federal air marshals and the flying public was compromised by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) executives during a recent TV news program, says the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, which wants a Senate committee to
investigate "unwarranted security disclosures."
ICE spokesman Dave Adams dismissed Mr. Adler's accusations, saying the TV piece was
"thoroughly veiled through the highest levels of Homeland Security" to ensure that no
sensitive security details were released. "We worked very closely with NBC in the filming
ofihe program la guard against the release of any security issues," Mr. Adams said, "ll
was carefully made la be sure it did not compromise the air marshals or the public.
Accusations la the contrary are totally false." Mr. Adams said ICE owes the public "a
snapshot of this very imporlanl agency," and the NBC program was an attempt to do that.
He said it also gave the agency an opportunity to show would-be terrorists and others
that the air marshals were a significant deterrence to hijackings. "The program provided a
deterrence for those who might think they could make an attempt to hijack an airplane,"
On April 6, 2004, FAMS Director Quinn directly contradicted ICE spokesperson

Dave Adams' above comments while addressing the Las Vegas Field Office
regarding the February 5lh & 6th NBC Nightly News segments: "Some good and
some had came out of that, hut unfortunately we don't have the final editing
authority over the segments. There is nothing different I would do in the future. "
Furthermore, on November 5, 2003, the FAM Miami SAIC Jim Bauer filmed a
three-piece segment with local Miami station WSVN
rhttp://www.wsvn.com/features/articles/speciahieport/C106/)
The third segment displayed the following:
• Where FAMs sit, both class and seat locations
• How FAMs react to a hijacking situation, this includes:

o how they deploy to a position of dominance (POD);
o systematic steps that are taken by FAMs to control the situation;
o exact instructions that are used by FAMs during operational
situations; and
o How contact is made with the pilot and how the FAM utilizes the
crew during an emergency.
DRESS AND GROOMING CODE

Director Quinn is jeopardizing the FAM and the public's safety with his policies
and directives. Mr. Quinn has implemented a military grooming code and dress
policy that states the following:
• no beards;
• mustache will not extend past the vermillion of the lip;
o or ^ i 3n<t:<£» KM, <*ns/iw ^U^ aS3-b46"J hLEOA
• hair worn in a conservative style; and

• At all times FAMs will wear a sports coat (some field offices, i.e. Chicago
and New York, require the FAM to wear a complete suit and tie regardless
of destination or airline). FAM managers station themselves at the airport
to inspect on-mission FAMs for proper attire. Unquestionably, FAM
management personnel could be better utilized in the airport for counter-
surveillance missions or information dissemination for the transiting FAM.
FAMS Director Quinn has systematically downgraded the classification of the

FAMs from "undercover"; "covert"; "semi-covert" and finally to its present
designation of "discreet". Due to this, the FAM is now as easy to identify as a
uniformed police officer. One of the reasons behind this downgrade, according to
FAMS headquarters, is to act as a deterrent. In reality, this practice negates the
unknown element. This allows hijackers to either choose a plane without FAMs or
to permit the FAMS to bring the weapons on board and attempt to eliminate the
individual FAM in order to access their weapon.
Does DHS Director Ridge feel that this classification of "discreet" is enough to
protect the flying public? Do our elected representatives? Does our flying public?
Do the loved ones of the over 3000 civilians murdered on 9/11 feel this is the
program distinction that will ensure that this tragedy will never occur again? Al
Qaeda must appreciate the fact that the FAM is so easy to pick out; especially since
FAMS executives continually disclose top-secret operational procedures.
FAMS management maintains that it desires FAMs to present a professional image

to the public. Nevertheless, FAMs rarely interact with the public as a FAM, rather
as a fellow passenger. In fact, FAMs deal less with the public than most other
Federal Agents and these Agents do not have these overt, restrictive, and ultimately
dangerous codes imposed on them, FLEOA research indicates there is no other
plain-clothes federal agency that has such an inflexible grooming and/or dress
policy, especially in a covert status. These agencies deal directly on a day-to-day
basis with the public employing less stringent polices without affecting their duties
and/or their "professional" appearance.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which the FAMS is
part of, does not require its plain-clothes investigators to follow a military style
grooming policy, nor that its agents wear suit coats and ties. In fact, when ICE
Special Agents are selected to fly FAM missions they are not required to adhere to
FAM grooming and/or dress standards. On the rare occasion that the FAM needs to
deploy and break out of his/her covert status, professional behavior and actions will
enforce and promote the FAM's authority, not the manner of dress. Due to their
manner of dress and grooming, FAMs are constantly getting the "thumbs-up" from
the public who easily recognize the identity of the "undercover" FAM. This
recognition is potentially deadly to the FAM, airline crew and passengers.
KM, t/is/ut fU^ yy3-B4fc>3 hLtOA
On January 30, 2004, Philadelphia FAMS Field Office Special Agent in Charge Liu
Shiang Louw addressed a crowd of 300+ FAMs at the FAMS Atlantic City, NJ
training center. He stated the following regarding the FAMS national sport coat
policy: "In case you need to take over an aircraft during a hijacking, -we want you
wearing a sport coat or a suit so that the passengers do not mistake you as
terrorists and possibly turn against you. "
Not only is the present dress code the issue at hand, but the fact that various field
offices are misinterpreting the dress code is also a major concern. At many field
offices, management is capriciously implementing a more restrictive and potentially
dangerous dress code (i.e. wearing of sports coats, matching suits, ties, etc.
regardless of mission destination). FAMs consider a necktie worn during a mission
as a "hangman's noose" for a potential attacker coming from behind them.
This easily resolvable issue will ensure the safety of all in the future. FAMS
management needs to employ common sense and confidence in the individual FAM
that he/she will dress appropriately. FAMS management also needs to recognize
that passengers, regardless of class of seating, do not have a set standard of dress.
This is 2004, not 1964; airline passengers do not "dress up" for flights in suit and
ties.
FLEOA has consistently tried to address the safety hazards that resulted by the
implementation of these policies. These restrictive policies make the FAM easy to
pick out to a civilian eye, not to mention the trained surveillance teams terrorist
groups employ. FAMS Director Quinn has refused to meet with FLEOA on these,
or any other, issues.
This is not only a FAM concern, FLEOA suggests FAM executives consult with
airline ground security coordinators, gate agents, pilots, flight attendants and/or any
other airline personnel. They can corroborate the assessment that FAMs are easily
identifiable by their dress, grooming and boarding procedures. The ability to easily
identify the FAM by any potential terrorist puts all involved at considerable risk.
The public deserves and expects more than a FAM who is easily spotted. Easy
recognition of the FAM negates their entire purpose and puts all flight in danger.
Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News Network); 8/15/2002; Tony Snow Special Report with
Brit Huine (Fox News Network) 08-15-2002
SNOW: Well, one of the others is, Cecl, that they (FAMs) all have to dress like Mori. They
have a dress code.
KONDRACKE; What about you?
CONNOLLY: Exactly. And the complaint that you hear on thai issue, which is a legitimate
one Li, if we're all in a uniform of sons, we'll slick out. And potential hi/ackers and
terrorists will know who we are and they'll just grab us first, defeating the whole purpose of
being undercover.
Air marshal program in disarray, insiders say USA Today; 8/15/2002; Blake Morrison USA Today
08-15-2002
Although they work undercover, marshals at some regional offices have been ordered to
adhere to a dress code that requires them to wear "conservative male or female business
attire " during most of their trips, documents show. Without special permission, they cannot
dress more casually.
Quinn says working marshals reviewed the dress code before it was issued, and good
marshals "would clearly understand, respect and appreciate" the policy. He says marshals
who provided details of the dress code to USA TODAY "are pulling us all at risk."
Do dress codes threaten cover?
But marshals say making them look and dress alike 'is what threatens their cover, "This is
really dangerous," says one marshal, who left the Justice Department for the air marshal
program five months ago. "We are so obvious, the terrorists don't need to bring guns on the
planes anymore. They just need to gang up on us and lake our guns."
AIR MARSHAL PROGRAM MAY NEED RETOOLING. (EDITORIAL)
The News & Record (Piedmont Triad, NC); 8/19/2002
The government requires a strict dress code for air marshals to wear "conservative male or
female business attire." Air Marshals claim the look-alike dress is a dead giveaway of their
identity.
If these allegations are accurate - and there is reason to think they are credible - then the
air mashal program's "growingpains" must he promptly treated. The program, good in
concept, must prove effective in performance.
Anything less jeopardizes aviation safely.

Air marshals reveal security lapses, but they go unheeded USA Today; 12/24/2002 USA Today
Easy identification. Marshals say they stand out because they are required to wear
business attire. Rodriguez said passengers often gave him and his partner a thumbs-up sign.
Yet marshals are told to keep working even if their cover has been blown.
Mode Hijackings Help U.S. Air Marshals Train Source: Reuters US Online Plus Date: 12/3/2003
Author: Deborah Charles ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. (Reuters) -
Air marshals have complained of... unable to maintain their cover because of a
requirement they dress in business attire Quinn said the service has rectified many of the
problems, ... adjusting the dress code so an air marshal can belter fit in, for example
allowing marshals on flights to vacation spots to dress casually.
Congressional Quarterly Jan. 7, 2004 - Secret Service Role in Air Security
By Martin Edwin Andersen, CQ Staff
Dress Codes - Federal workers, union officials and others, meanwhile, reported thai the air
marshals had grown tired not only of what they said were long work hours and a lack of
overtime pay, hut also of demands thai they wear business attire, like the Secret Service
images or ^'i t>n<n^s KM, <tns/U4 fl)* ba3-B4b:i hLtOA
// difficult for them to anonymously blend In with the passengers they were
supposed to protect.
Air marshals press security issues Agents say dress code, boarding procedures put them at risk
By Brock N. Meeks MSNBC WASHINGTON, Nov. 2, 2003
httoV/www.nisnbc.cona/news/9980S6.aj5p
The head of the federal Air Marshal Service is being pressed to take action on issues
directly affecting the security of Us rank and file members, according to documents
obtained byMSNBC.com. The "issues are raised in a letter from an air marshal identified as
the service's national representative to the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association,
an organization that Intercedes and lobbies for federal agents that are forbidden from
union representation. More than 800 air marshals have now joined the organization,
MSNBC.com has learned.
THE OCT. 28 LETTER from the FLEOA agency president to Thomas Qulnn, director of the
Air Marshal Service, raises longstanding concerns of rank-and-file air marshals such as
dress codes and airline mandated boarding procedures that potentially compromise their
undercover status. Although the air marshals are supposed to operate covertly, the airlines
insist on hoarding procedures that place convenience over security, the letter says
(MSNBC.com is not detailing those procedures because of security concerns}. "This
practice obviously puts the FAMs' (federal air marshals') cover status in jeopardy, " the
letter says.
'BUSINESS ATTIRE'
Air marshals have complained about the service's dress code almost from the first day they
began flying in the posl-9/11 era. Air marshals interviewed by MSNBC.com say they are
required to wear "business attire " even when flying to resort destinations and other areas
in which such clothing makes them stand out. Air marshals have told MSNBC.com that they
are routinely spotted In airports as federal agents simply because of their manner of dress.
The letter to Qulnn notes this issue with chagrin: "[T]he embarrassment It causes the FAM
to have people spot us, due to our manner of dress, and thank us for being there or give us
the 'thumbs-up' sign as they walk by, it is potentially deadly to the FAM, crew and
passengers, " because now their supposed covert status has been compromised.
A spokesman for Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, the agency that now houses the
air marshal service, did not respond to a request for comment.
However, a General Accounting Office report released this week that specifically reviewed
several mismanagement allegations within the air marshal service, including the dress
code and airline boarding procedure issues, is at odds with the complaints raised in the
letter to Qulnn.
BOARDING PROCEDURES
Without question, current airline boarding policies place FAMs and passengers at
risk. Airline gate personnel give FAMs no option but to publicly board in front of
the other passengers, through the same departure gate as general boarding, 3-5
minutes prior to general boarding. This practice obviously puts the FAMs' cover
status in jeopardy by parading the FAM in front of passengers who are waiting for
the very flight the FAM is conducting their mission. These hazardous and poorly
thought out policies prevent the FAM from retaining their covert status and
SS.S-etO.5
obviously place them at great risk during the mission. Airlines should not dictate
how FAMs board. The FAM's safety should be the first concern. Airline
employees should not compromise the FAM's mission due to laziness and/or
ineffective boarding policies. FAMS management exposed FAM boarding
procedures on the aforementioned NBC Dateline exclusive.
The Federal Aviation Administration recently issued a memorandum declaring

FAMs "trusted agents." This memorandum stated that FAMs be granted pre-
boarding access without the necessity of crewmembers being aboard. This practice
provided the FAM sufficient cover to the FAM by allowing them to board the
aircraft prior to any passengers being in the gate area. This also required airline
personnel to board the FAM when the FAM felt it was most opportune to do so.
FAMS Director Quinn ordered all FAMs to disregard any "trusted agent" status
given by the FAA and to follow all airline policies regardless of the peril it placed
the FAM or passengers in. Director Quinn then developed and issued his own
policy that superceded the FAA memorandum and effectively eliminated "trusted
agent" status. This, once again, gave the airlines the power to dictate when the
FAM would board. Simply, if the airline does not want the FAM to pre-board in a
covert manner, they can parade them in front of all awaiting passengers through the
gate area immediately prior to general boarding. Why would Mr. Quinn take this
"trusted agent" status away from FAMs? Why would he subject the FAM and the
public to an unsafe alternative? This is something you need to ask him since he will
not respond to FLEOA, or his own Agents questions.
FAMs currently sign into the Law Enforcement Officers Log Book at the airport
security screening points. Each point is requiring that the "log officer" obtain the
following: Flight number, destination, airline, phone numbers, etc. This is done in
plain view of passengers transiting through these screening checkpoints. It is
obvious that even a novice surveillance agent could sit near a checkpoint and
determine who these logged individuals are and their destination.
FLEOA advocates FAMs board the aircraft along with passengers during general
boarding of a flight. FAMs can arrange a meeting with an airline supervisor or the
flights' Captain. This will allow the FAM to display their credentials in a discreet
place away from public view. The airline crew can have the FAM briefing in their
flight books for review and can instruct the crew that FAMs will be on board and
their seat locations. FAMs can be reached on their mobile phones prior to boarding
to answer any questions of crewmembers. If a Captain insists on seeing at least one
FAM face to face to view his credentials, the FAM can present their credentials
inside the flight deck during general boarding. If warranted, a ground based FAM
can conduct a search of the aircraft before the mission FAMs board. In compliance
with current FAMS policy, FAMs can also inspect lavatories during flight.
Currently, it is very rare that pre-flight searches are conducted. This is due to the
inaccessibility FAMs have at airports where they are not based. FAMs only possess
their respective airports' Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badges;
therefore, FAMs must rely on airline personnel for all other airport access and
r-ayc I I Ul e. I 3. <t.£.y I-IVI, m I 3/LW /U^ SSJ-OtOJ l~LtOA
boarding. In addition, high productivity air carriers also bar FAMs from conducting
pre-flight searches due to rapid flight turn-arounds between destinations. Obviously,
there is no perfect procedure, but this procedure best safeguards the FAM's
identification without capitulation to the airline industry.
Air marshals boarding battle By Brock N. Meeks MSNBC WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 1 , 2003
.com/news/ 1004 130.asp?Ocv=CB10
CONFRONTATIONS
The airline boarding issue resulted in documented confrontations between airline
employees and air marshals. "A detailed review of the data pointed to differences in the
service 's and the airlines procedures for boarding aircraft, " the GAO report says. A
"mutually agreeable solution" for hoarding procedures was negotiated with the airlines,
the report says, to resolve the differences. But several air marshals contacted by
MSNBC.com say that if there was any agreement made, no one contacted them for input.
"We 're still being paraded in front of the passengers, " one air marshal loldMSNBC.com.
"The only 'resolution ' in this whole matter was to make the process more convenient for
the airlines, " the air marshal said.
FLEOA FAMS Agency President Frank Terreri has attempted to contact FAMS
Director Quinn concerning these safety issues; Mr. Quinn summarily ignored these
requests. FAMS management continues to reject the notion that these illogical
policies create hazardous working conditions that place the public in harms way.
On March 12, 2004, FAMS Director Quinn publicly stated the following while
addressing a FAM Phase 2 training class in Atlantic City, New Jersey: "I delete all
email I get from 'FLEA' (sic) and throw away any thing I get from "FLEA" (sic).
They're nothing but a bunch of pea brains and disgruntled amateurs. I'm in charge
of this Agency, and they won't dictate how I run things. All the letters they write to
Senate and Congress won't do any good; this is my Agency and if you don't like it,
leave." Furthermore, high-level FAMS managers continually state during "question
and answer" sessions with FAMs that they don't care about FAM concerns, will not
recognize FLEOA and FAMs "are lucky to be working. If you don't like it, leave."
FAMS Director Quinn has misinformed senior DHS officials and elected officials
about the effectiveness of the FAM service. While it is recognized that the FAMS
has some of the best and highly trained individuals in the law enforcement
community, all that training will prove to be useless if the security of individual
FAMs is continually ignored. These officials need to realize the ineffectuality of
this service and resolve the problems immediately. This time, government officials
need to heed the warnings of the employees' who actually do the job and recognize
the FAMS shortcomings. Not only has Director Quinn jeopardized the safety of the
FAM, he has endangered every American soul that flies or resides in the U.S. (as
we saw on 9/1 1 , most casualties were from citizens who were not flying but merely
a "target" for fanatics.)
Over 250, 000 applicants applied to by FAA after 9/1 1 for the FAM position. The
qualifying process was arduous and many candidates immediately dismissed due to
P*IVI,
various reasons (physical, mental, background, etc.). Candidates were chosen on

their experience in Federal, state and/or local law enforcement. Members of the
elite special operations groups from the U.S. military were also selected. To put it
simply, the Federal Air Marshal Service selected the best of the best and those new
FAMs were eager to fight terrorism in the sky.
Once hailed as the saving grace and "heroes" of the skies, FAMS Director Quinn
has publicly denigrated these troops with the disparaging terms such as "disgruntled
amateurs" and "pea brains" to name a few. Obviously, these FAMs were not the
type to be "disgruntled" or whine at the drop of a hat. If that were the case, their
background investigations would have reflected this with derogatory information
and disciplinary histories and they would have never been granted Top Secret
security clearances.
These FAMs have realized what a farce this program has turned into directly
attributable to FAM Service executives and Director Quinn. FAMs have a job to do
and they want to be allowed to do it safely and effectively. FAM Service
executives are prohibiting this.
The American public (our mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, sons & daughters) are
being mislead by this charade perpetrated by FAMS executives and DHS. Families
of the 9/11 tragedy victims and every American citizen should demand that their
representatives immediately incorporate policies that ensure the safety of the flying
public, not just the perception of safety. This issue cannot be subjected to a round
table discussion. A decision made next year is too late. Make no mistake, the
longer we wait, the longer our loved ones are at grave risk.
The proverbial ball is in your court. FLEOA is confident that the only way change
can occur to these ineffective practices and safely returned to the American skies is
through your direct and immediate intervention.
Please contact FLEOA 1sL Vice President and PIO John Amat with any inquiries at
(305) 491-4687.
Respectfully,
Jon Adler
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA)
National Secretary
CC: All Senate and Congressional Members;

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations;
House Committee on Government Reform;
r-age i o u i < £ i 3. it;ju i^ivi, tnwut /U^ saj-B^bJ t-LtOA
Other interested congressional committees,

Secretary of Homeland Security;
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United State's (a.k.a the 9-
11 Commission);
The Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security;
The Administrator for the Transportation Security Administration;
The Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department;
The Government Accounting Office;
Widows' and Victims Families Association;
New York World Trade Center United Family Group;
A Caring Hand, the Billy Esposito Foundation;
The Skyscraper Safety Campaign, a Project of Parents & Families of Firefighters
and WTC Victims;
Voices of September 1 lth|
HomeFront Hugs USA;
NY State Attorney General's 9-11 Information Office;
NYPD Police Officers Union;
NY/NJ Port Authority Police Officers Union; and
FDNY Fire Fighters Union
CAROLYN B, MALONEY DISTRICT OFFICSfc
HTH DISTRICT, NEW YORK in 1651 THIRD AVENUE
2331 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WaamwaTON, DC 20815-3214 MEW YO*K, NY 10128
(20]) 325-78*4 (212)860-0106
COMMITTEES;
FINANCIAL SERVICES l~l 28-11 ASTORIA BOULEVARD
GOVERNMENT REFORM Congress of tfte 3Hmteb States ASTOKIA. NY 11102

(718)832-1804
WfBsm: www.houia.gai/mAioney
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
ouSe ot afcepre£fEnmttoe0
<ESas jtaaton, ©C 20315-3214
Secretary Tom Ridge

Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20393
March 3, 2004
Dear Secretary Ridge:
I am writing to request a reviev into the possibility of unwarranted security disclosures

made by Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Executives. TheFeleral Law Enforcement Officers
Association (FLEOA) has recently contacted me to expre *s their concerns regarding information
given to the NBC television FAM exe utives regarding ti ,e FAM program I am referring to
February 5* and 6* NBC news segments in which operational security procedures of the FAM
program were showcased. In their attempt ito bolster pub ic confidence, they ultimately may have
put air travel passengers and individua Federal Air Marshals at greater risk.
Apparently, FAM executives have taktn the position that providing the world with a step-by-step
narrative of how Federal Air Marshals covertly pre-boi commercial flights and make threat
assessments is somehow going to imp ove public confid ice. Instead of bolstering public
confidence, I have concerns that they thay haive sacrific the safety of both passengers and Air
Marshals for several sound bites. Since making it easier terrorists to identify flights that do
not have federal air marshals on board will not help the •line industry or the American public.
Making it easier to identify whom the Federal Air Mi are on a particular flight does not
make their job any easier.
Obviously, the NBC news segments w ere not limited to viewing by Americans who might be
apprehensive about flying and interest id in the security ptagrams that protect tbem. Instead, after
viewing these segments, those who warit to do us harm will now have better knowledge on how
to assess whether FAM's are on a part cular flight. FAM executives - apparently contradicting
the media sanctions they imposed on t leir Air Marshals for <discussing matters with members of
the news media - need to continue to upport their employees in their efforts to make aircraft
travel safer, and not focus their attention on broadcasting information that should remain private.
It is important to note that FLEOA dii not wait until after the airing of the program to express
their concerns about these segments and the information that they would release about the
program. Prior to the airing, represenlatives from FLEO.JV attempted to meet with FAM Director
PRINTED ON RECVCLED PAPER

Thomas Quinn to address several security concerns relating to the upcoming NBC news
segments (letter attached). Unfortunately, he did not meet with the field professionals who could
provide valuable input on matters relating to passenger safety. According to FLEOA National
Officers, they believe there were more prudent methods available for bolstering public
confidence.
This situation is particularly puzzling when you consider the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) reaction to previous press reports regarding the inner-workings of the
Federal Air Marshal program. As you may recall, it was reported last summer that TSA was
planning on reducing the number of FAM's on certain flights due to budgetary concerns. This
information was provided to the press via anonymous FAJM's. The reaction to these reports was
twofold. Fiist, TSA made a swift reversal of the decision and did not cut FAM's on cross-
country flights which has made air travel safer. The second reaction was more troubling. Soon
after these press reports an internal investigation was launched and was widely described as a
witch hunt and TSA official vowed to find onl who was talking to the press and punish the
individual or individuals. Mr. Secretary, why is information that makes our air travel safer met
with a "witch hunt" while information that could compromise the safety of air travel fodder for
the network news?
Your swift attention to this letter is anticipated to ensure that our shared commitment to securing
air travel is met. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or have an
appropriate staff member contact Edward Mills of my office at 225-7944 or
edward.mi llsfofrnail .house, eov.
C A R O L B . MALONEY
Member of Congress
Page 16 of 21 5:14:30 PM, 4/15/04 702993-8463 FLEOA

P.O. Box 326 Lewisberry, PA 17339
www.fleoa.org
To: Thomas D. Quinn 28 October 2003
Director
Federal Air Marshal Service
Reprtfsmting Memhers Of:
AOENCY for INTERNATIOANAL DEVELOPMENT The purpose of this letter is to update you on the recent inaugural Federal Law
AGRICULTURE
OtCi it Forest Service Enforcement Officers Association Federal Air Marshal Agency President Election, i
COMMERCE
Export Enforcement. OICi
addition to presenting issues and suggested resolutions of Federal Air Marshals on
& Natinnat Marine Fisheries behalf of FLEOA. 1 am honored to announce that fellow Federal Air Marshals have
DEFENSE
Air Force-OICi elected me to the position of FLEOA FAM Agency President position.
Army . CID
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
Naval Criminal Investigative Service All Agency Presidents serve on the FLEOA National Executive Board (NEB) and
oin
EDUCATION-OIG have the power to represent the FLEOA National President in that federal law
ENEROY -010
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AOENCY . CID & OICi
enforcement agency from which the Agency President has been elected. 1 would like
FEDERAL DEPOST INSURANCE CORPORATION - OK! to discuss with you, at your earliest convenience, the current issues that have been
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - OI«
CiENERAL SERVICES ADMIN. brought to my attention by FAM FLEOA members (see attached issues
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES documentation). These issues affect each and every FAM and, if resolved, would
Food & Drug Administration Si OIti
HOMELAND SECURITY
make a safer and better work/family environment for the FAM. Effective
Border Patrol communication between FAM management and the FAM are vital to building the
Coast Guard Investigative Service
Customs Service both the FAM service and the safe, effective work environment for the FAM. 1 will
Federal Air Marshal
Federal Emergency Management Agency
keep FAM FLEOA members updated via personal email and/or via mass mailing on
Federal Protective Service any current issues that are that being addressed by FLEOA concerning FAMS and
OICi your response to such.
Secret Service
I1OUSINO &. URBAN DEVELOPMENT . OICi 1 would like to stress that this is in no way a laundry list of "complaints from
INTERIOR
Bureau ot'Indian Affairs disgruntled employees." The Federal Air Marshals that have brought up these
Bureau ot'Land Management concerns are the Agents who desire to stay with this Agency through thick and thin.
Fish & Wildlife Service
National Park Service They are the Agents with vast experience in Federal, State, Local and/or Military La
OIG
US. Park Police Enforcement. These Agents want this Service to be top notch. In order to achieve thi
JUSTICE
Bureau of Alcohol Tobscco.Firearms & Explosives goal, the Service needs to retain the best we have and to offer an Agency that will
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
recruit the best in the future.
Marshals Service
OIO
U.S. Attorney's OrHu&CI By presenting these issues to management and having some collaboration in achievu
LABOR- OIO & Racketeering
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. . OIti
the presented resolutions, we believe that this Agency can achieve that goal. Whethe
NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION . Olti the Service wants to acknowledge it or not, there is an us vs. them mentality that has
POST AL SERVICE-OIC7 & Inspection
RAILROAD RETIREMENT DOARD. OIO permeated this agency. This is derisive and. creates animosity amongst Federal Air
SECURITIES & EXCIIANOE COMMISSION - OICi
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION - OIO
Marshals who only want to perform their mission without being compromised by
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION - OIO nonsensical policies. These issues are not necessarily in order of importance, but the
STATE DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Diplomatic Security A OICi issues are the most pressing according to our members and fellow FAM's that 1 have
TRANSPORTATION-OIG
TREASURY
discussed issues/resolutions with. On behalf of FLEOA, 1 look forward to working
FINSEN & OIO with you on these issues and any concerns that may arise in the future.
Internal Revenue Service - CI
TIOTA
U.S. COURTS (JUDICIAL)
Probation, Parole & Pretrial Services Respectfully,
VETERANS AFFAIRS .OIO
NATIONAL OFFICERS
President
TIMOTHY! DANAIIEY
Frank Terreri
Executive Vice-President Federal Law Enforcement Association
ARTHUR CiORDON
First Vice-President Federal Air Marshal Agency President
JOHN AM AT
Second Vice-president
P.O. Box 2311
CHARLES IIYACINTIIE
Treanurcr
Sun City, CA 92586
JOSEPH D'ORSANEO (909) 233-7345 MOBILE
AIRLINE PROCEDURES
ISSUES
>• Certain airline boarding policies place FAM's and passengers at risk.
FAM's are constantly boarded in front of the other passengers 3-5 minutes
before they board. This practice obviously puts the FAM's cover status in
jeopardy. These inept and potentially hazardous policies prevent the FAM
from properly briefing the crew, in addition to denying the FAM the
opportunity to search planes.
> Not being allowed the option of split briefings, especially on A320's
where FAM's cannot utilize any concealment.
> FAM's should not sign the Law Enforcement Officers Log Book at the
airport security screening points. Each point is requiring that the "log officer"
obtain the following: flight number, destination, airline, phone numbers, etc.
This is done in plain view of passengers transiting through these screening
checkpoints. It is obvious that even a novice surveillance agent could sit near
a checkpoint and determine who, what, and where these logged individuals
are and their destination.
RESOLUTIONS
> Airlines should not dictate how FAM's will board. The FAM's safety
should be the first concern, not political correctness. Airline employees
should not compromise the FAM's mission due to laziness and/or ineffective
boarding policies. If we cannot get the airlines to board us properly, assign
FAM's to airports to escort other transiting FAM's. This way we can ensure
FAM's are not compromised.
> To facilitate movement through airports and eliminate the need for
ground airport personnel, universal S1DA badges should be issued to FAM's
for all airports.
DRESS CODE POLICY
ISSUES/RESOL UTIONS
> It is understood that FAM Management wants Federal Air Marshals to

present a professional image to the public; however, we rarely interact with
the public as federal air marshals, rather as a fellow passenger. In fact, we
deal less with the public that most other Federal Agents and these Agents do
not have these very restrictive, and ultimately dangerous, codes placed on
them. Our research indicates that exists no other plainclothes federal agency
has such an inflexible grooming and/or dress policy, especially in a semi-
covert status. These agencies deal directly with the public employing less
stringent polices without affecting their duties and/or their "professional"
KM, 4/1b/U4 f(J4 y93-B4e~J FLEOA
appearance. Our new agency, The Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, does not require its plain-clothes investigators to follow a
military style grooming policy, nor that its agents wear suit coats and tie. On
the rare occasion that the F AM needs to deploy and break out of his/her
semi-covert status, professional behavior and actions will enforce and
promote the FAM's authority, not the manner of dress. Moreover than the
embarrassment it causes the FAM to have people spot us, due to our manner
of dress, and thank us for being there or give us the "thumbs-up" sign as they
walk by, it is potentially deadly to the FAM, crew and passengers on the
flight mission that the FAM has been compromised on. Not only is the
present dress code the Bsue at hand, but the fact that various rogue field
offices are misinterpreting the dress code is also a major concern. At many
field offices, management is capriciously implementing a more restrictive
and potentially dangerous dress code (i.e. wearing of sports coats, ties, etc.
regardless of mission destination). This is an easily resolvable issue that will
ensure the safety of all in the future. All that is needed is some common
sense and confidence in the individual FAM that he/she will dress according
the environment at hand, i.e. Washington D.C, First Class trips as opposed to
Southwest hops from Los Angeles, Las Vegas and Oakland in the middle of
July. If the individual FAM does not follow guidelines, he/she should be
dealt with on an individual basis. This is not only a FAM concern, 1 suggest
FAM management consult with Ground Security Coordinators, Gate Agents,
pilots, flight attendants and/or any other airline personnel who can
corroborate this assessment that FAM's are easily identifiable by their dress,
and by being identified put all involved at considerable risk.
AIRPORTS AND TRANSFERS/SENIORITY
ISSUES
> There were many promises (real and/or implied) made when FAM's
were hired and obviously many of those promises have not been kept. FAM's
were promised new hubs would be opened and transfers would be readily
accommodated once the program was "set up".
> There is no standard set of guidelines on how to rank FAM's in order of
Seniority at the Field Offices.
RESOLUTIONS
> Solicit for non-paid moves (also known as no cost to government moves)
from current FAM's before placing new hires at these available locations.
> Set up a database at each hub, by seniority, of current FAM's preference
for relocation, i.e. 1. Miami 2. Los Angeles 3. New York. Compile this
information to facilitate non-paid/no cost to government moves/swap of
current employees who desire to relocate (i.e. FAM currently at Miami
-aye l^>UI£.l J. I t.-JU I-IVI, H/ 13/UH / U£ 33O-OHOO
wishes to transfer to Las Vegas is linked with a FAM at Las Vegas who
desires to work in Miami. They agree to "swap" their positions, get approval
from management and agree on non-paid move and timetable for move).
FAM's would utilize their annual leave time and fund the cost of the move to
their new duty location.
> A definitive set of rules on how to rank seniority needs to be established
and followed by all field offices
SCHEDULING
ISSUES
> Schedules are not consistent, i.e. one mission may start at 0530 and the
next at 1530 or vice-versa. This does not give the FAM or their family
members any kind of schedule for outside matters, i.e. childcare, spouse
work schedule, etc.
> FAM's would like to fly and train with either set partners or a very small
group of people.
RESOLUTIONS
> Dividing FAM's into shifts and allowing them to bid on shift preference
according to seniority. The shift breakdown can be as simple as start time
before or after OSOOhrs. 1400hrs. or ISOOhrs. (Or later if flights supported
this request). This would eliminate the irregularity of having to report one
day at 0530hrs.and the following day at 1400hrs. Especially when flying out
of your local HUB.
> Allow FAM's to bid on destination location, i.e. FAM #1 preference:
Honolulu, Dulles and Baltimore. FAM #2 preference: Miami, Orlando and
Atlanta.
> Allow trip swapping with another FAM. By allowing a trip swap, FAM's
can choose times and destinations that improve the quality of life and job
satisfaction for all involved.
> All FAM's to select overnight/same-day trip preference by seniority.
> Squads already divide FAM Field offices. It should be simple to make a
schedule that allows these squad members to fly and train together.
LEAVE
1SSUE/RESOL UTION
> FAM'S feel the time-line for submitting leave requests is excessive and
needs to be much more flexible.
I U. 9/ I I r-age

P.O. Box 326 Lewisbeny, PA 17339
www.fleoa.org
6 January 2(X
To: Thomas D. Quinn
Director
Representing Members Of:
AGENCY for JNTERNATIOANAL DEVELOPMENT Federal Air Marshal Service
AGRICULTURE
OICi i Fnreit Service
COMMERCE
Export Entbrcembnt. OIO Mr. Quirm:
&. Notional Marine Fisheries
DEFENSE
Air Force- OIO
Army-CID
I was briefed today by my Team Leader, via phone, of your response to the
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
Naval Criminal Investigative Sbrvicb
FLEOA FAM issues forwarded to your office on 28 October 2003.1 am a litt
OIO perplexed at your response regarding the safety concerns presented by FLEO.
EDUCATION-OIG
ENERGY -OIG FAM members, not only for their safety, but also for that of the American
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACiENCY - CID & OICi
FEDERAL DEPOST INSURANCE CORPORATION - OIO public. None of these safety issues presented were addressed nor were the
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - OIG
working condition concerns. The only issue that was addressed was one that
Federal Pnrtective Service & OIG
FLEOA did not present, that of dissemination of information to the troops. P*
Food & Drug Administration & OIO
HOMELAND SECURITY
done all that I could in attempting to contact FAM Management and to get
Border Patrol
Coast Ouard Investigative Service
responses to these pressing concerns, obviously without success.
Customs Service
Federal Air Marshal
Federal Emergency Management Agency I am only an employee and limited in my options, so the FLEOA National
Immigration 4 Naturalization Service Executive Board will be contacting DHS and members of Congress with thes
OIO
Secret Service
unanswered concerns. It is our belief that the dress code and boarding
IIOUSINO & URDAN DEVELOPMENT . OIO
procedures not only put the FAM in dire straits, but moreover, the flying
INTERIOR
Bureau of Indian Artairs
public. This is due to the fact that not only can enemy surveillance teams pick
Bureau of Land Management out the FAM due to dress (thus determining that the flight is covered by
National Park Service FAMs), but they can also reconnoiter flights and determine what passengers
OIG
U.S. PorkPolice are not FAMs due to their dress (i.e. beards, jeans, sneakers = not a FAM) thi
JUSTICE
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco.FirearmH & Explosives
determining that the flight is not covered by FAMs. Unfortunately, some
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
shortsighted employees felt the need to go to the press and essentially give ot
OIO
Marshals Service dress code to the public and the bad guys. This bell cannot be unrung. Of
U.S. Attorney's OHiiwCI course, if they sit near the gate, they can plainly see us pre-board five minute;
LABOR- OIO & Racketeering
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. . OIO prior to the flight.
NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION . OIO
POST AL SERVICE-OIG & Inspection
RAILROAD RETIREMENT DOARD- OICi
SECURITIES & EXC1IANOE COMMISSION . OIO I have been in Law Enforcement for over 14 years and have been involved in
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION- OIG
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION . OIO
Labor Management relations during my entire tenure. My Bachelor's Degree
STATE DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Diplomatic Security & OIG
is in Labor Management Relations and I finished top 10 in my graduating
TRANSPORTATION-OIG class. I can honestly say that I have never dealt with management officials wl
TREASURY
FINSEN & OIG were so unresponsive to employees concerns, especially valid safety concern:
TlfiTA Once again, let me point out, these safety concerns are not being voiced by
Probation, Parole & Pretrial Services disgruntled employees, nor am I a disgruntled employee. Never in my entire
VETERANS AFFAIRS -OIO
Law Enforcement career have I been disciplined, proposed for discipline or
NATIONAL OFFICERS
President
received lower than an excellent performance rating. I have volunteered
TIMOTHY i. DANAIIEY whenever needed for special missions and will continue to do so.
Executive Vice-president
ARTHUR OORDON
Firm Vice-Presidbnt
JOIINAMAT
SbLond VicB«President
CHARLES I1YACINTIIE
Treasurer
JOSEPIID'ORSANEO
Hage 21 or 21 5:14:31 PM, 4/15/04 702993-8463 FLEOA

P.O. Box 326 Lewisberry, PA 17339
www.fleoa.org
The mentality of the FLEOA members is the same. These are the men and
women who are consummate professionals and are only asking that common
sense policies are employed, i.e. dress code policy. There are offices who ma
Rfprvsenting Mvmhvrs Of:
AGENCY tor JNTERNATIOANAL DEVELOPMENT their FAMs wear full suit and ties, not too practical considering that we are
AGRICULTURE
OIO Si Forest Service issued holsters, magazine carriers and handcuff cases that are all worn on the
COMMERCE
Export Enforcement, OIO outside of our belts. This translates to the FAM flying in full suit during the
& National Marino Fisheries
DEFENSE
whole flight. And what other law enforcement agency makes their "semi-
Air Forte-OIO
Army -CID
covert" agents wear ties (much less follow a military grooming standard); thi;
Detains Criminal Investigative Service
NHVH! Criminal Investigative Service
is an unbelievable safety hazard.
OIO
EDUCATION-OK;
ENERGY -OIO In closing, I consider it a great failure that we are the only Agency in the
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AOENCY . CID i OICi
FEDERAL DEPOST INSURANCE CORPORATION - OIO Federal Government where the FLEOA Agency President doesn't have direct
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - OIG
contact with the head of the Agency, and in this case, no interaction with upp
management at all to discuss employee concerns.
Food & Drug Administration & OKI
HOMELAND SECURITY
Border Patrol
Coast Ouard Investigative Service
How unfortunate it is that personnel outside of our Agency, on both ends oft
Customs Service spectrum, will be discussing and attempting to solve our Agencies problems
Federal Air Marshal
Federal Emergency Management Agency because we were unable to communicate effectively.
OIO
Secret Service
Respectfully,
HOUSINO t URBAN DEVELOPMENT.OIO
INTERIOR
Bureau ot'Indian Afrairx
Bureau of Land Management
National Park Service
Frank Terreri
OIG
US. Park Polite
Federal Law Enforcement Association
JUSTICE Federal Air Marshal Agency President
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco,Fircarmn A ExploniveH
Drug En rhrtemem Administration P.O. Box 23 11
Federal Bureau of Invcrtigation
Marnlialu Service Sun City, CA 92586
OIO
U.S. Attorney's Orriue-CI (909) 233-7345 MOBILE
LABOR- OIG & Racketeering
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. . OKI
(702) 993-8463 FAX
NUCLEAR REOULATORV COMMISSION • OIO
POSTAL SERVICE-OIG & Inspection
RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD. OIO
SECURITIES & EXCI1ANOE COMMISSION • OIO
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION- OIO
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION - OIO
STATE DEPARTMENT
Bureau or'Diplomatic Security & OIG
TRANSPORTATION-OIG
TREASURY
FINSEN & OIG
TKtTA
Probation, Parole & Pretrial Services
VETERANS AFFAIRS .OIO
NATIONAL OFFICERS
President
TIMOTHY J. DANAIIEY
Executive Vice-President
ARTIIUROORDON
First Vicb-President
JOHN AM AT
Second Viiie.President
CHARLES HYACINTHE
Treasurer
JOSEPH D'ORSANEO
y
masHKeau
CHAIR
Date:
H Hamilton
ICE CHAIR
ard Ben-Veniste
TO: TEAM Q-
Oeland
F.Fielding
FROM: Dianna Campagna
5 S. Gorelick
The attached correspondence from C.O/€G,<>?

is being forwarded to you for information and consideration. A copy has
yj. also been sent to Team(s) ^^ for their information. If you
ompson
have any questions, please call me on 33 1 -4082. Thank you.
>D. Zelikow
UTIVE DIRECTOR
$*$W^
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-1 Icommissioagov
84/11/2834 2B:B6 9Bl_368ie3B _ _ COLEEN L TOWERS pflGE Bl
Facshillt ItaiSBlsslM
FROM
Coleen L Powers, CHMM, No. 10507

CERTIFIED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGER
Formerly,
Supervisor, Trainer, oadLeadRCRA SubtitU C (Haianloui Watte) Inspector / lnve*titaur

CtHHHuttial Treatment, Storage, andDitposal<TSD) Operation*
Compliant* aid Zitforcemou
State ofTemteaee, Department oftjmnmmenl **d Coraervaaon (TDEC)

Division OfSotU Warn Management (DSWM)
Memphii EuvinniiUHUlAtsbttMce Center (MEAQ
6399 lake View Trail # 304

Mempha, Te**atee3»llS
TELEPHONE/FACSIMILE: (901) 360-1038

E-Mail CoUatPawm(fff*imittf
DATE: APRIL 11,2004

TO: 9-11 Commission, Chair, Mr. Thomas H. Kean
Cc: US DOL Administrative Review Board, Chair, Ms. Cynthia Douglass ;

Widows of 9-11
FAA Whistleblower Manager, Mr. Gene Kirkendall
Mr. Phil Trenary, President and CEO, Pinnacle Airlines Corporation {PNCL}
Pinnacle Airlines Inc., d/b/a Northwest Airlink, as a contractor for NAVA;
US Senator, Dianne Feinstein
US OSHA Directorate of Enforcement, Mr. John Spear
Facsimile Numbers: 202/ 296-5545; 202 /693-6220; 901/348- 4130; 202/228-3954;

202/693-2369
SUBJECT: PUBLIC REQUEST TO 9-11 COMMISSION:

PLEASE INCLUDE IN YOUR 9-11 INVESTIGATIONS:
TERRORISM & NATIONAL SECURITY IN COMMERCIAL AIRLINE OPERATIONS ARE

THREATENED BY CORPORATE AMERICA RETALIATION, INTIMIDATION, AND THREATS
AGAINST WHISTLE BLOWERS {CREWMEMBERS} IN THE INDUSTRY & US DOL FAILURES
TO HOLD DENOVO HEARINGS ON AIRLINE SECURITY ISSUES, ET AL
Number of Pages Including Cover: 8
Message: Pkase see the attached public request and FAA WHISTLE BLOWER CASE WB 0283;
US DOL OALJ CASE NOS. 2003-AIR-12; 2004-AIR-6; ARBCASE NOS. 04-095 A 04-066;
US DOL OALJ CASE NOS. 2003-CAA-08; 2003-CAA-16; ARB CASE NOS. 03-061 & 03-125
//,
04/11/2004 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS PAGE 02
April 11, 2004
"WHISTLE BLOWERS { CREWMEN BERS}

IN THE COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY ARE PUNISHED BY CORPORATE AMERICA ;
US DOL OAU FAILS TO CONDUCTDENOVO HEARINGS AS REQUIRED BY FEDERAL
REGULATION @ 29 CFR PART 1979 AND 29 CFR PART 1980"
I.
PUBLIC REQUEST TO 9-11 COMMISSION: PLEASE INCLUDE IN YOUR 9-11
INVESTIGATIONS:
TERRORISM & NATIONAL SECURITY IN COMMERCIAL AIRLINE OPERATIONS IS

THREATENED BY CORPORATE AMERICA RETALIATION, INTIMIDATION, AND THREATS
AGAINST WHISTLE BLOWERS { CREWMEMBERS) IN THE INDUSTRY
Ms. Powers respectfully requests this review and investigation on behalf of the public because
persons who work in the airline industry will not file security and safety complaints when they see
that the US DOL refuses to provide them denovo hearings that were timely requested.
If the US DOL OALJ is allowed to deny and refuse whistle blowers the right to a denovo hearing,
the intent of Congress in passing the Whistle Blower statutes has been usurped and the public
interest has not been served as Congress clearly intended.
If the US DOL ARB is allowed to continue to issue Orders that are not supported by the whole
technical record, the intent of Congress has again been usurped.
These are national concerns on the public's welfare as they relate to terrorism, commercial
air transportation safety and security, public investments, and terrorist threats on our
Nation's public water supplies, our hazardous materials storage and waste transportation
facilities, and other environmental regulations that were passed to protect our Nation's
resources, public Investments, and security and safety In the commercial aviation
Industry.
Please include a review of the Appearances of Conflicts of Interest within the staff at the US DOL
OALJ, the US DOL ARB, and the relationships with this Presidential administration and Board
Members ofNWA Airlines Corporation, {NWAC}, Pinnacle Airtines Corporation, {PNCL}, the US
DOL PWBA, and the corporate law firm of Piper Rudnick. LLP.
Our Congress delegated this important role in protecting our Whlstleblowers who report aviation
security, safety, and public accounting concerns to federal authorities including the US DOL. This
federal Department, as the evidence in the technical record of the cases shown below
demonstrates, the US DOL has not complied with the spirit and intent of Congress in passing
these whistle blowing laws.
II.
PUBLIC REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION BY THE 9-11 COMMISSION ON FAILURES OF US
DOL OALJ, US DOL OSHA Region 4 and Delays of the US DOL ARB
in Public whistle blowing on commercial airline security breaches and compromises to public
safety in commercial transportation as initially reported to the FAA and US DOL OSHA Region 4
04/11/2004 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS
PAGE 03
on June 17. 2002 and Sarbanea Oxlev potential violations reported initially on August 28. 2002.
respectively.
Re: FAA Case WB 0283 filed June 17, 2002 and assigned to FAA Investigator in
July 2002; Aug 8,2002 Letter to whistle blower
OSHA Case 4-1760-02-016 assigned July 3,2002
ALJ Case 2003-AIR-12 assigned Jan. 15, 2003

ARB Case 04-035 assigned Jan. 08,2004
ALJ Case 2004- AIR-6 assigned Dec. 3,2003

ARB Case 04-066 assigned March 15,2004
PLEASE NOTE:
1) The whistleblower was DENIED a donovo hearing by the US DOL OALJ; this is US DOL
defiance and violation of Federal Law pursuant to 29 CFR Part 1979 and 29 CFR Part 1980.
2) The US DOL OSHA Region 4 never interviewed any of the complainant's witnesses
3) In the US DOL OALJ, ALJ Linda S. Chapman August 14, 2003 "Status Order", in US
DOL OALJ Whistle Blower case 2003-AIR-12 at page 2, paragraph 2, this federal
public official wrote, in part,
"Thus, it is not within the scope of these proceedings to determine if the Respondent
Has violated FAA or OSHA safety regulations, or committed breaches of airline
security..."
This public statement of a US DOL Administrative Law Judge is a genuine concern

because the US DOL Office of Administrative Law Judges {OALJ} does not want to
investigate complaints of airline security breaches made by US commercial air carriers
and their retaliation to Whistleblowers who file safety and security complaints with the
FAA and simultaneously copied to the US DOL OSHA for investigation of
discrimination against the complainant for blowing the whistle.
The Chief Administrative Law Judge at the US DOL OALJ, Mr. John M. Vittone, has an
employment history directly related to the airline industry, and, to the very best of Ms.
Powers' knowledge and belief, Mr. Vittone is the immediate supervisor of ALJ Judge
Linda S. Chapman.
Such appearances of conflicts of interest in the US DOL do not serve the public in the
full and complete investigation of airline security and safety whistle blowing complaints.
y0i3b0i03s coLEEN L POWERS PAGE 04
III. PUBUC CONCERNS AND INQUIRIES; PUBLIC REQUEST TO THE 9-11 COMMISSION:
Task Force Requested
Dear Honorable 9-11 Commission Chair, Mr. Thomas H. Kean, and US DOL Administrative
Review Board {ARB} Chair, Ms. Cynthia Douglass:
Good afternoon. The primary purpose of this public request is to communicate concerns on the
failures within the US DOL as it relates to the promotion of our Nation's airline security and safety
and our war on Terrorism. In this request for review, the entire record in ARB cases 04-066 and
04035, and especially on it's March 31,2004 Orders that fail to provide specific support to the
whole technical record in the matters of public Whistle Blowing relative to the National Public
Interest in Commercial Aviation Security and Safety as promulgated at 29 CFR part 1979, Final
Rule, March 21,2003.
This public communication request also politely requests the 9-11 Commission delegate »task
force to review and investigate the US DOL in it's unsupported Orders issued March 31,2004, to
Investigate the US DOL OALJ for conflicts o1 interest and its failure to conduct a denovo
hearing as required by Federal regulation, and the US DOL OSHA 4 office for their failure to
Interview and obtain testimony from the complainant's witnesses with regard to the June 17,
2002 FAA Safety / Security Complaint filed simultaneously with the US DOL OSHA 4 office
and Whistle blowing on Commercial Aviation Security and Safety matters. A brief summary of
these public concerns is outlined below: {Amendments were filed as shown in the public record}.
A.
BACKGROUND SUMMARY:
On May 18, 2002,1 was threatened with immediate termination if I did not continue my duties as a
crewmember which were violations of FAA Federal Aviation Regulations located at 14 CFR Part
121.467(b)(4)and(14).
On or about June 4, 2002,1 discovered that the air carrier had falsified required FAA time and
duty records for crewmembers, and times of aircraft departure were "whited out" on operational
paperwork;
On or about June 7, June 17, and 18,2002,1 located FAA required records that showed
the air carrier falsified records, they showed an aircraft, its passengers, and crew members in
another state and city for 2 hrs and 40 minutes, which is a major breach in commercial airline
security.
On June 20. 2002,1 was threatened with potential discipline and the false records of the air
carrier were provided to the air carrier. The air carrier then demanded to know
"how did you get these records?". Thereafter, in my interviews of certain employees, I learned
they were intimidated and threatened by management for disclosure to me of these required FAA
records and their location on company premises.
The air carrier breached security, and they did not make a good faith effort to investigate my
internal concerns within 30 days. Thus, the complaint was filed June 17, 2002 with the FAA and
OSHA Region 4 for compliance with the OSH Act of 1970 and its 30 day limitation to file a
complaint of discrimination for whistle blowing.
The air carrier removed the FAA" AIR21* web pages I posted in our crew lounge in {Sept 2002}.
These were removed by the air carrier on or about Dec. 10, 2003.
On Dec 10.2003, the date of the US DOL OAU ALJ Linda S. Chapman" Recommended
Decision and Order" {RDO} which was issued on an unsupported and unethical Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Piper Rudnidc without anv donovo hearing as required at the
regulations on 29 CFR Part 1979 and 29 CFR Part 1980.
This "RDO" was timely appealed on Dec 22.2003, and the appeal was supported with wholly
detailed and supported objections and exceptions taken to the RDO. {as required at 29 CFR
Parts 1979.110 and 1980.110} to the US DOL ARB and Noticed in an Order dated Jan ,8, 2004.
B.
On April 10, 2004 I received two {2} ORDERS . both dated March 31,2004 and signed by the
General Counsel, Ms. Janet Dunlop, for the Administrative Review Board. {ARB}
Upon close examination and review of these ORDERS. It does not appear that any Board
Member {i.e., Chair. Ms. Cynthia Douglass, Wayne Beyer, Judith Boggs, or Oliver Transue) had
any involvement in these Orders as evidenced by:
1) the lack of any Board Member signature;

2) the lack of specificity or reference to the whole record on file;
3) the tack of reference to named person. Pinnacle's opposing counsel filings dated Feb. 11,
2004 and March 29,2004.
4)Additionally, the March 31,2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal and
Default, does not accurately reflect the caption of the March 25,2004 filing of the petitioner and
complainant:
5) The March 31, 2004 Order also falls to address the "alternative motions" in the Feb 2, 2004
and March 25,2004 motions/ requests which were timely filed, pursuant to the terms of the
Jan. 6, 2004 and March 11, 2004 Orders in ARB case 04-035;
6) it is not signed by any Board Review Member and it vaguely references an "evaluation" made
by the Board of this Summary Reversal / Remand Motion that was filed February 2,2004
pursuant to the terms of the Jan 8, 2004 Order.
7) It falls to even cite or specifically reference Powers' March 25, 2004 Motion for Default and
rebuttal to named person Pinnacle's Feb 11, 2004 opposition filing;
8) On April 1, 2004 Powers' filed a Motion and Request For Expedited Review of her Feb 2,2004
and March 25,2004 Motions for Summary Reversal/ Remand of the Dec. 10, 2003 RDO
premised and grounded in authority by the Code of Federal Regulations at 29 CFR Part 1979
and 29 CFR Part 1980, DOL Secretary Orders, Executive Orders, as welt as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedures, as specifically directed In the Board's own Jan. 8, 2004 and March
11, 2004 Orders
_04/H/20B4 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS
PAGE 06
IV.
PUBLIC INQUIRY AND INFO REQUEST to THE US DOL ARB AND THE 8-11 COMMISSION:
Please kindly provide a copy of the "Board's evaluation" that would support the March 31, 2004
Order Denying The Motions for Summery Reversal end Default,
in ARB case 04-035
This "evaluation" should contain, at a minimum:
1) the details and specify with reference to the whole entire technical record in this case that
would support the March 31, 2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal
and Default,
2) the ORDER itself is approximately 1 and 1/2 single spaced pages, and fails to show with
detailed and supported specificity by reference to the technical record on how the
Petitioner's Feb.2, 2004 Motion for Summary Reversal of the Dec. 10, 2003 RDO, and in
the Alternative Motion for Immediate Remand for a Denovo Hearing is insufficient;
3) There is no indication that the motions and their incorporated by reference exhibits and
citations to the technical record were even considered by the Board's General Counsel, Ms.
Janet Dunlop.
4) There is the inference and causal link that the Board's General Counsel did however, review
the named person Pinnacle's oppositions filed Feb 11,2004 and March 29, 2004 and based
the March 31,2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal and Default .and the
referenced, "evaluation" on these opposing named person Pinnacle's Feb. 11 and March 29,
2004 illogical arguments. The vague and ambiguous language of this March 31, 2004 Order
shows the Order was issued without complete and thorough due regard , review, and
examination of Powers' motions and their cited specific references to the whole |ecfrr>/ca/
record.
5) On Feb 17, 2004, March 11, March 17, 2004, March 19.2004, Ms. Powers' initiated verbal and
written inquiries with the Board staff, Ms. Battle and her responses were that the Board had
not yet made a decision on Powers' February 2, 2004 Motion for Reversal/ Remand motion
that was timely filed Feb. 2, 2004.
6)The nexus of named person Pinnacle's March 29, 2004 opposition to Powers' March 25, 2004
Motion for Default on her Feb 2, 2004 Motions for Summary Reversal/ Remand (included an
alternative motion cited in the caption} and the Board General Counsel, Ms. Janet Durtop's
March 31, 2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal and Default {Filed Feb 2,
2004 and March 25, 2004} plus
the contention of named person Pinnacle's March 29, 2004 opposition to the March 25, 2004
Motion for Default, that he received a voicemail from the Board General counsel on Feb 6,
2004 where he alleges the Board's General Counsel told him he could file a reply to the Feb. 2,
2004 Motion for Summary Reversal if he chose to do so. This certainly shows that named
person counsel consciously chose not to reply to Powers' Feb 2,2004 Motion for Summary
Reversal/ Remand for a denovo hearing on the grossly erred Dec. 10, 2003 RDO and this
material fact is nowhere in the March 31,2004 Order.
V. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND SECURITY / SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE TO THE 9-11 COMMISSION:
In light of the current 9-11 Commission hearings, the relevance of Commercial Airline Security
and safety issues in these Federal FAA / US DOL Whistle Blower proceedings, these concerns
that the US DOL violated Federal regulations at 29 CFR Part 1979 and 1980 by the US DOL
OALJ refusal and failure to provide a whistle blower a denovo hearing as required by federal law.
the material fact that the US DOL ARB Board General Counsel appears to disregard tfie
preamble language of 29 CFR 1979 and 29 CFR Part 1980 and the petitioner's duty to file
specific objections and exceptions to the RDO with his Petition for Review, for the purposes of an
expedited review and to effectuate a less congested docket, are legitimate concerns that affect
all tax payers.
WHEREFORE, this public request to include these matters in the investigation and
Congressional mandates of 2002 to the 9-11 Commission should assist the 9-11 Commission
in it's review and prospective findings of fact, proposed conclusions of law, and the prospective
"Recommendations" for our future Homeland Security, our War on Terrorism and required
recommendations designed to guard against future attacks against the United States by requiring
the US DOL to be:
• accountable to the American public;

• accountable to protect our State public servants who are Whistle blowers;
• accountable to our Whistle blowers in private industry; especially those workers in the
airline industry;
• accountable to our federal regulations at 29 CFR Part 1979, 29 CFR Part 1980, and 29
CFR Part 24 that were enacted by our US Congress;
• accountable to the US Constitution ;
• accountable to protect our Freedoms and our War on Terrorism;
• accountable to protect our Civil Rights, and our Rights to Due Process and Discovery
This would also include 9-11 Commission Findings that should ORDER the US DOL to
immediately comply with the proper and efficient administration of the Whistteblower laws passed
by Congress to protect fnot punish! those who report these activities that ultimately affect all
US citizens in the areas of public safety, security, health, welfare, and public investments.
Congress, our US American citizens, and the US DOL cannot allow States to discriminate against
whistle blowers for their State public servant/employees' nationally protected activities with their
unsupported reliance on bogus "sovereign immunity" claims, and the US DOL OALJ cannot be
allowed to continue to refuse to conduct denovo hearings that were timely requested by whistle
blowers in these matters of national public security, safety, and welfare and the effects on our
Homeland Security.
Thank you for your time and assistance. Please contact me at (901) 360-1038 if you have any
questions on these public concerns and the issues stated herein.
Certified Hazardous Materials Manager

S308 Lakeview Trail #304
Memphis, TN 38115
Crewmember/ Concerned Citizen
NWA/ Pinnacle/ MEM
Fbnrwfy,
Supervisor, Trainer, and Lead RCRA Subtitle C {Hazardous waste} Inspector / Investigator
Commercial Treatment, Storage, and Disposal {TSD} Operations
Compliance and Enforcement
Memphis, TN
for the
State of Tennessee, Department of Environment and Conservation {TDEC"}

Division of Solid Waste Management, {DSWM}
RCRA Subtitle C {hazardous waste) Program
Memphis Field Office
On this 11 th day of April, 2004.
Incorporated by Reference:
1) FAA Whistle Blower case no. WB 0283, assigned on about August 8, 2002
2) US DOL Administrative Review Board technical records, in their entirety, in cases

04-035,04-066, 03-061,03-125;
3) US DOL Office of Administrative Law Judges {OALJ}, technical record in their

entirety in OALJ cases 2003-AIR-12,2004-AIR-6, 2003-CAA-08; and
2003-CAA-16
Cc: US Senator Dianne Feinstein

FAA Whistleblower Manager, Mr. Gene KirkendaU
Widows of 9-11
Mr. Phil Trenary, President and CEO, Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., d/b/a Northwest
Airlink as a contractor through an Airline Service Agreement with NWA; also
A Board Member of Pinnacle Airlines Corporation {publicly traded as
"PNCL", "IPO" on November 25,2003}.
US DOL OSHA Directorate of Enforcement, Mr. John Spear

April 4, 2004
Thomas H. Kean, Chairman & Commission Members

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
on the United States (9-11 Commission)
301 7th Street, SW - Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
Fax: (202)296-5545
info(2>,9-l lCommission.gov
Re: Ignored FAA Safety Report - Passenger/Baggage Matches
Dear Sirs or Mesdames,
Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to the FAA on February 24, 2003, concerning
Northwest Airlines violating FARs, and serious security violations allowing passenger
bags to stay on board after passengers deplane on international flights. I had previously
written to the FAA in July 2001 about these issues, but have never received a response.
Last week I contacted James Whitlow, Deputy Chief Counsel at the FAA, to find out why
the FAA had not responded to my letters and requests. After nearly an hour telephone
conversation, during which Mr. Whitlow made various excuses for the FAA's non-
responsiveness, Mr. Whitlow stated he believed the TSA was now handling such issues.
Mr. Whitlow was going to check to see if the TSA was actually now in charge. This did
not answer the question as to why the FAA had not responded to the safety concerns I
reported in July 2QOI, prior to 9-11 and the existence of TSA.
In my July 2001 letter, I referenced the bag match violations, and I brought up my
concern that letters and Air Safety reports such as mine could be accessed by terrorists
through FOIA; I specifically warned the FAA about Osama Bin Laden's organiaation. I
noted that such reports could allow terrorists the opportunity to become aware of the
various airlines' specific weaknesses, such as the fact that Northwest was violating FARs
in the passenger/bag match area. Logically, terrorists could use such information to
conclude which airlines could be targeted through their weaknesses. An area of concern
would be that the FAA has made a habit of summarily dismissing the security and safety
concerns of other airline pilots or crew.
Two years prior to my letter, a fallow Northwest Captain, Craig S. Friday, submitted
virtually identical safety reports about passenger/bag match concerns to the FAA. The
FAA investigated this through Nicholas A. Sabatini, who concluded that Northwest had
corrected all their problems. Since I experienced the same problem two years later on my
own flights, it is clear Northwest did not, in actual fact, fix the problems.
I find it disturbing that an FAA-certified Captain can make a security report concerning a
serious security issue to the FAA, but cannot get any written response from them for over
two years.
I understand that Captain Friday has contacted Senator Rollings about such security
information, and other safety issues, and that the FAA failed to respond to him. He is
waiting to hear from Senator Ho llihgs 'office about this issue, and other new information
he submitted.
Northwest Airlines retaliated against me for writing the July 2001 safety letter to the
FAA. I attempted to file for protection under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Act (AIR 21)
with the Seattle OSHA office, citing whistleblower status, but District Administrator
Richard Terrill and Assistant District Administrator Dean Ikeda refused to accept my
AIR 21 complaint.
I would appreciate it if your commission could take the time to read the enclosed letter,
and could find out why the FAA does not feel it is necessary to investigate or respond to
safety concerns submitted by FAA-certified airline Captains. I am available to answer
any questions, and I am willing to testify about these concerns.
Thank you for your consideration.
Captain John A. Robinson, Jr.

8038 Highway 79
Panama City Beach, Florida 32413
Cell (734) 673-6334
cc: Secretary Elaine Chao, Department of Labor

Administrator Marion Blakey, FAA
Senator Ernest Hollings
Senator Maria Cantwell
George Jackson, Office of the Inspector General, DOL
Enclosures
February 24,2003
Via Facsimile Transmission (202) 267-5229
Gene M. Kirkendall, Manager

Whistleblower Protection Program
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington DC
Re: Your Letter Dated February 5, 2003 - WB0270

Whlstleblower Complaint # AIR21 Complaint 0-1960-02-020
Dear Mr. Kirkendall,
Thank you for your letter to me dated February Sth.
With respect to international passenger bag matches on Northwest Airlines, I am

deeply concerned about your statement that, "This investigation has not
established a violation of an order, regulation or standard relating to air carrier
safety...the FAA is closing its investigation concerning these allegations."
I am sure you are aware of our yearly training program for all pilots, which
includes new security updates A few years ago, before 9/11, it was revealed to
pilots at NWA that the FBI had uncovered a scheme by a terrorist group to
attempt to blow up more than one major air carrier wide-body aircraft over the
pacific at the same time. We were told that Northwest Airlines was one of the
carriers targeted for this potential attack.
The refusal on the part of NWA to fully comply with FAA rules that all passengers
and bags must match is a serious concern. It concerns me that an investigation
was done in which the FAA found no violation in this area, when I personally
wrote up a violation myself a year or so ago. Upon further personal investigation,
I found that a fellow NWA pilot, Captain Craig S, Friday, was assisting In another
FAA Investigation by L. Nicholas Lacey and Nicholas A. Sabatini in 1998/98.
Captain Friday also witnessed and wrote up International incidents of NWA not
complying with the passenger bag matches on his own trips.
The findings from the report on Captain Friday's concerns were disturbing, The
FAA was satisfied that NWA knew there were passenger bag match problems,
and NWA and NWA Security stated they had already corrected those problems,
and that these problems would not occur again in the future. It is disturbing to
find that the FAA obviously did not follow up, as this report was in 1999, yet I was
experiencing the exact same problems on more than one occasion after this. It Is
even more disturbing that the FAA has apparently decided to ignore my more
recent reports, even after 9/11. In addition, Pan AM and Air India are both
examples/proof that terrorists put bombs on airlines in luggage.
Captain Friday wrote up this problem in 1998. I wrote this problem a year or so
ago. We both have whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA. I was just
informed by Captain Friday that he is being virtually attacked fay OSHA In Seattle
for filing his whistleblower complaint against NWA Involving airline safety I was
under the impression that the AIR21 bill was enacted to Improve airlines safety,
and protect airline employees from retaliation due to their safety concerns. For
the record, trie Seattle OSHA office has all of Captain Friday's and my safety
concerns on file. We were bath under the impression that the FAA used and/or
had access to this OSHA information.
I am requesting that the FAA do another investigation on this passenger bag

match problem, and take it more seriously this time.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Sincerely.
Captain John A. Robinson, Jr.

9650B SW 85th Avenue
Ocala, Florida 34481-9377
Robinson Cell (734) 673-6334
Sandra Somers, POA - Telephone (205) 822-6421
Sandra Somers, POA - Fax (205) 822-2041
cc; Secretary Elaine Chao, U.S. Department of Labor

Captain Craig S, Friday (253) 833-0488

T7 B7 John Raidt Work Files - Follow Up FDR - 7-29-04 Commission Letter To DHS IG Re Air Marshals - Whistle Blowers - Security Violations

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T7 B7 John Raidt Work Files - Follow Up FDR - 7-29-04 Commission Letter To DHS IG Re Air Marshals - Whistle Blowers - Security Violations

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TO: Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security

We thank you for your consideration.

e Gorton The attached correspondence from r~i/ /

TEL (202) 331-4060

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Representing Memherx Of:

The deliberate and release of classified operational security procedures on

The deliberate release of classified operational security procedures via a

Director Quirm systematically downgrading the classification of the Federal

The implementation of military- style grooming standards and a blanket

Creation of airplane boarding procedures that collectively make the FAM

FAMS management refusal to discuss critical safety concerns with FLEOA.

Richard Bloom, director of terrorism and intelligence studies at Arizona's Embry-Riddle

• The number of FAMs that fly a mission;

On April 6, 2004, FAMS Director Quinn directly contradicted ICE spokesperson

The third segment displayed the following:

• Where FAMs sit, both class and seat locations

• How FAMs react to a hijacking situation, this includes:

DRESS AND GROOMING CODE

• hair worn in a conservative style; and

FAMS Director Quinn has systematically downgraded the classification of the

FAMS management maintains that it desires FAMs to present a professional image

KONDRACKE; What about you?

Do dress codes threaten cover?

Anything less jeopardizes aviation safely.

The Federal Aviation Administration recently issued a memorandum declaring

various reasons (physical, mental, background, etc.). Candidates were chosen on

CC: All Senate and Congressional Members;

Other interested congressional committees,

GOVERNMENT REFORM Congress of tfte 3Hmteb States ASTOKIA. NY 11102

Secretary Tom Ridge

Dear Secretary Ridge:

I am writing to request a reviev into the possibility of unwarranted security disclosures

PRINTED ON RECVCLED PAPER

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

DRESS CODE POLICY

> It is understood that FAM Management wants Federal Air Marshals to

appearance. Our new agency, The Bureau of Immigration and Customs

AIRPORTS AND TRANSFERS/SENIORITY

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

The attached correspondence from C.O/€G,<>?

TEL (202) 331-4060

Coleen L Powers, CHMM, No. 10507

Supervisor, Trainer, oadLeadRCRA SubtitU C (Haianloui Watte) Inspector / lnve*titaur

State ofTemteaee, Department oftjmnmmenl **d Coraervaaon (TDEC)

6399 lake View Trail # 304

TELEPHONE/FACSIMILE: (901) 360-1038

DATE: APRIL 11,2004

Cc: US DOL Administrative Review Board, Chair, Ms. Cynthia Douglass ;

Facsimile Numbers: 202/ 296-5545; 202 /693-6220; 901/348- 4130; 202/228-3954;

SUBJECT: PUBLIC REQUEST TO 9-11 COMMISSION:

TERRORISM & NATIONAL SECURITY IN COMMERCIAL AIRLINE OPERATIONS ARE

Number of Pages Including Cover: 8

April 11, 2004

"WHISTLE BLOWERS { CREWMEN BERS}

TERRORISM & NATIONAL SECURITY IN COMMERCIAL AIRLINE OPERATIONS IS

OSHA Case 4-1760-02-016 assigned July 3,2002

ALJ Case 2003-AIR-12 assigned Jan. 15, 2003

ALJ Case 2004- AIR-6 assigned Dec. 3,2003

This public statement of a US DOL Administrative Law Judge is a genuine concern