Sayson v.

Singson, 54 SCRA 282

Facts: In 1/67, the Office of the District Engr. requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8
Bulldozer. A public bidding for the said items was conducted wherein the awards committee accepted the winning bid of P43,530 given by Singkier Motor Service owned by resp. Singson. Said award was approved by the Sec. of Public Works and Comm. who then directed the immediate delivery of the parts. In due course, the voucher w/c covered the transaction reached the hands of petitioner Highway Auditor Sayson who then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. After finding the price reasonable (as was evidenced by the indorsements of the Div. Engr. and the Comm. of Public Highways, the approval of the Sec. of PW & C, and the verification of the representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination), petitioner approved and effected payment of the voucher and withheld the 20% equivalent of P8,706 in order to submit the documents covering the transaction to the Supervising Auditor for review. After making a canvass, the General Auditing Office determined the transaction to be overpriced by at least P40,000. Malversation charges were filed against the district engr. and civil engr. involved. A mandamus suit was filed by the resp. w/c sought to compel petitioner government auditors to approve the payment of the voucher covering the balance. The LC decided in favor of resp. Singson. Hence this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: whether or not the winning bid of 43,530 given by Singkier Motor Service is overpriced by 40,000? HELD: It is apparent that resp. Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the Govt, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State ***, but an ordinary action for specific performance***. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, w/c cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except w/ the consent of the State***. In other words, the resp. should have filed his claim w/ the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of CA 327*** w/c prescribe the conditions under w/c money claim against the government may be filed. xxx It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, in the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor Gen. Even had there been such , the court to w/c the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the LC could not legally act on the matter. Adapted.

Angara v Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936). FACTS: In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all members-elect, with no election
protest filed on or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election protest. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. Who prevailed? ISSUE: whether or not all members elect, with no election protest filed on or before Deember 3, 1935 are deemed elected?

HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the electoral Commission jurisdiction over election protests. In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the solemn and sacred obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights which theconstitution grants to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. xxx Adapted.