THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R.

No. L-24440 MARCH 28, 1968 FACTS: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then ZamboangaProvince. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into ZamboangaCity. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the provinceshall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid forby the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred toconsisted of 50 lots and some buildingsconstruc ted thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte andZamboanga del Sur. Properties and theobligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that all buildings, properties and assets belonging tothe former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. ISSUE: WON Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its private properties without due process and just compensation. RULING: The fact that the 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. Applying, Art. 424 of NCC, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered aspatrimonial properties of the formerZamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service"

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., vs. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES and JOSE L. ESPELETA

G.R. No. L40474 AUGUST 29, 1975 FACTS: In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the citys development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen was the highest bidder @P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal denied it, so did the court later, alleging that the road is part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of man. ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land. HELD: Yes. Under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city council may close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Since that portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygens application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

VDA. DE TAN TOCO vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO G. R. No 24950

MARCH 25, 1926 FACTS: 1. The Municipality of Iloilo appropriated two strips of land owned by Vda. de Tan Toco for the purpose of widening streets. 2. CFI Iloilo ordered the municipality to pay Vda. de Tan Toco for the appropriation. However, the municipality lacked funds to pay Vda. de Tan Toco. 3. As such, Vda. de Tan Toco had writ of execution issued against the property of the municipality. These property are: two auto trucks used for street sprinkling; one police patrol automobile; the police stations on Mabini street; and concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.

ISSUE: WON the property levied upon is exempt from execution HELD: Yes. RATIO: The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable. The movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental purposes, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public use of the municipality be exempt from execution.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAOAY, ILOCOS NORTE vs. TEODORO MANAOIS and EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN G.R. No. L-3485 JUNE 30, 1950

FACTS: Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached the following properties: 1) The amount of One thousand seven hundred twelve pesos and one centavo (P1,712.01) in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendant municipality; 2) About forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality. The petitioner goes on the theory that the properties attached by the sheriff for purposes of execution are not subject to levy because they are properties for public use. It seems that the municipality of Paoay is and for many years has been operating or rather leasing fishery lots on municipal waters. The municipality of Paoay entered into a contract with one Francisco V. Duque for the lease of fishery lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 In 1938, the municipal council of Paoay approved a resolution confiscating said fishery lots on the ground that Duque had failed to comply with the terms of the lease contract Teodoro Manaois being the highest bidder for said lots 3 to 8, was awarded the lease thereof as per resolution of the municipality council of Paoay of December 1, 1938. On January 1, 1939, Manaois paid P2,025 as rental for the said lots for the year 1939. However, when Manaois and his men tried to enter the property in order to exercise his rights as lessee and to catch fish, particularly bagos fry, he found therein Duque and his men who claimed that he (Duque) was still the lessee, and despite the appeal of Manaois to the Municipality of Paoay to put him in possession and the efforts of the municipality to oust Duque, the latter succeeded in continuing in his possession and keeping Manaois and his men out. Manaois brought an action against the Municipality of Paoay to recover not only the sum paid by him for the lease of the fishery lots but also damages. He obtained judgment in his favor in June, 1940 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, civil case No. 8026, which decision has long become final. The writ of execution and the attachment and levy mentioned at the beginning of this decision were issued and effected to enforce the judgment just mentioned.

ISSUE: WON properties in question are subject to execution. HELD: No, SC held that the right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal waters, particularly, the forty odd fishery lots included in the attachment by the Sheriff, is not subject to execution. But SC held that the revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. RATIO: There can be no question that properties for public use held by municipal corporation are not subject to levy and execution. Properties for public use like trucks used for sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public markets, together with the land on which they stand are exempt from execution. Even public revenues of municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the municipality are also exempt from the execution.

Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by great weight of authority as the private asset of the town and may be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, which had been parceled out or divided into lots and later let out to private persons for fishing purposes at an annual rental are clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. What the municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code. All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its property through execution.