Urbano vs. Chavez (1990) 1. Ombudsman: a. Complaint is filed in the Ombudsman against public officials. b.

OSG (through Chavez) entered appearance as counsel in the preliminary investigation. 2. RTC (separate case): a. Civil suit for damages is filed against Chavez, and Businessworld for libel. b. At oral argument: counsel for complainant objected to OSGs appearance on behalf of Chavez. c. Complainant: suing SolGen in personal capacity. d. OSG: i. authorized to represent any public official even if the said official is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of Presidential Decree No. 478 which defines the functions of the said Office, as well as Executive Order No. 300 ii. Precedence: Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Ortega and Solicitor General v. Garrido iii. cause of action against the Solicitor General is for acts committed by him in his official capacity, i.e., as legal counsel of the PCGG (libel is directed against alleged Marcos cronies) iv. Harassment: public officials will hesitate to perform their official functions for fear of being haled to court by almost anybody for the purpose of accounting for official acts, not to mention the trouble of having to hire a private lawyer at his own expense in order to defend himself. e. Order: OSG may represent public official/s. 3. Special civil action for prohibition in Supreme Court: a. Complainants filed this action: there is conflict of interest once Information is filed in the Sandiganbayan, hence they must be restrained to appear as counsel even during preliminary investigation. b. SC: i. QUESTION OF LAW: 1. Both petitioners raise pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no evidentiary matters to be evaluated by this Court. 2. if the only issue is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, then the issue is a pure question of law. ii. the Court resolved to consolidate both Petitions and to treat them as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law iii. ON MERITS: 1. Conflict of interest: appellate counsel and defense counsel in preliminary investigation. 2. Wrongful act cannot be attributed to the State.

iv. Abandon existing doctrine. v. OSG cannot represent accused AT ANY STAGE OF CRIMINAL CASE or CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES arising from a felony. Ortigas vs. CA (1981) 1. Ortigas Co. constructed a residential building for Belmonte. 2. Ortigas Co. filed complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo Belmonte in Municipal Court of San Juan. a. Prayer: (1) vacate, (2) declare residential building forfeited, (3) pay rent. b. Municipal Court granted the relief prayed for. 3. Belmonte appealed in CFI-Rizal. a. Belmonte: (1) Municipal Court has no jurisdiction, (2) objects to exercise of CFI-Rizal of jurisdiction. b. Rule 40: CFI, acting in its appellate jurisdiction, may try case on merits if parties file pleadings and go to trial without objection to jurisdiction. c. CFI-Rizal: affirmed Municipal Court in toto. Served writ of execution. 4. Belmonte filed petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, in Court of Appeals. a. Belmonte: assailed (1) CFI-Rizals jurisdiction, (2) Municipal Courts judgment on pleadings, and (3) validity of Writ of Execution. b. CA: reversed Municipal Court and CFI-Rizal. Municipal Court was no jurisdiction over the case, nor power to resolve issues on pleadings. c. Ortigas: filed MR in CA. DENIED. 5. Ortigas filed petition for review of CA decision in SC. a. the petition for certiorari filed in Court of Appeals involved purely legal questions. b. CA is without jurisdiction. Since appellate jurisdiction over cases involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296), it is readily apparent that the decision under review was rendered by the Court of Appeals without jurisdiction and should, therefore, be set aside. c. Municipal Court is without jurisdiction over subject matter. Ortigas not only sought ejectment, but also forfeiture of the residential building it constructed. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. d. CFI-Rizal has no jurisdiction to judge on appeal because Belmonte objected to its exercise of jurisdiction, hence it cannot decide on merits.

Josefa vs. Zhandong (2003) 1. Zhandong Trading is engaged in the importation and sale of hardboards/staple boards and other merchandise. 2. Josefa is a client, ordering crates of boards. (P4 million) 3. Josefa remitted payment to a middle man (Tan). 4. Tan delivered checks to Zhandong. 5. Checks bounced. 6. Zhandong sent demand letters, but was not paid. 7. Zhandong filed complaint for sum of money against Josefa and Tan in RTC. a. Josefa: i. was transacting only with Tan. Has no obligation to Zhandong. b. Josefa filed counter-claim against Zhandong and cross-claim against Tan. c. Decision: Josefa to pay Zhandong, and Tan to reimburse Josefa. i. Evidence: Delivery receipts and invoices are in Zhandongs letterhead. 8. Josefa appealed to the Court of Appeals: affirmed RTC decision that Josefa is liable to Zhandong. 9. Josefa filed petition for review on certiorari in Supreme Court. a. Josefa: insisted that he is not privy to Tan and Zhandongs transactions. b. Zhandong: i. only questions of law, not facts, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari ii. findings of fact by the trial court, supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed by this Court. c. Exceptions to question of law rule in petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court: 1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are conflicting; 6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; 7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; 8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; 9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; 10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and

11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. d. SC: i. the trial court and the Court of Appeals misapprehended and overlooked relevant and established facts. ii. Evidence overlooked: (1) testimony of President of Zhandong: she admitted that she had no direct dealing with Josefa and that it was Tan who ordered the hardboards from her (2) answer of Tan: admitted such payments as full satisfaction of Josefas obligation (3) testimony of Josefa: Tan represented himself to be the owner of the merchandise iii. Tan bought the hardboards from respondent and, in turn, sold them to Josefa People vs. Sola (1981) 1. The 3 accused (powerful officials) have several criminal cases (murder) in Municipal Court of Kabankalan. a. Municipal Court: without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release b. Accused were released on bail. c. witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized 2. Private prosecutors filed petition for certiorari in Supreme Court. a. Private prosecutors (with Comment from OSG): i. Cancellation of bail bonds ii. petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice b. SC: i. Cancel bail bond because prosecutors were not heard on application for bail. ii. Transfer venue from CFI-Negros Occidental Branch VI at Himamaylan to CFI-Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. iii. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. iv. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue v. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively.

St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC (1998) 1. An employee was dismissed on the ground that he misappropriate funds of the funeral business. 2. He went to Labor Arbiter, who ruled that there was no employer-employee relatioship (he was a volunteer). 3. Employee appealed to the NLRC, which remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter. 4. Employer filed MR in NLRC, which was denied. 5. Employer filed for petition for certiorari, alleging GAD, in SC. 6. Legislative history on mode of appeal: a. NLRC was created by P.D. No. 21: appealable to Secretary of Labor and President of the Philippines. b. Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442) recreated NLRC: appealable to Secretary of Labor. c. PD 1391 amended Labor Code: abolished appeal. No apprellate review has since then been provided. d. Judicial review of SC: must be done through special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, after filing motion for reconsideration in NLRC, on the ground of jurisdictional and due process considerations. e. BP 129: CA has jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies, except those falling within appellate jurisdiction of the SC. (the exceptive clause) i. CAs appellate jurisdiction EXCLUDED decisions of NLRC. f. RA 7902 amended BP 129: the exceptive clause included SCs appellate jurisdiction in accordance to the Labor Code. However, APPEAL DOES NOT LIE FROM NLRC DEVISIONS! This seems contradictory. i. Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. ii. Intent to eliminate the exceptive clause. iii. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress iv. all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be

initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. v. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction / hierarchy of courts: Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

HGC vs. R-II Builders (2011) 1. R-II Builders seeks the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC), which transfers the Asset Pool in favor of HGC. 2. Asset Pool consists of real properties. 3. Complaint prayed for the transfer of possession of and/or control of the properties in the Asset Pool 4. R-II Builders filed complaint in RTC Manila on basis of incapable of pecuniary estimation. It was not an intra-corporate controversy. 5. Case was raffled to RTC Manila Branch 24, which is a Special Commercial Court tasked to hear intra-corporate disputes. a. SC: While it is true that R-II Builders had no hand in the raffling of the case, it cannot be gainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila had no jurisdiction over the case. Rather than ordering the dismissal of the complaint, however, said court issued order erroneously ordering the re-raffle of the case. b. SC: NO JURISDICTION. i. a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees ii. Having only paid docket fees corresponding to an action where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, R-II Builders cannot expediently claim that jurisdiction over the case had already attached. iii. TEST: in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. (CASE-TOCASE BASIS) iv. Having consistently sought the transfer of possession and control of the properties comprising the Asset Pool over and above the nullification of the Deed of Conveyance in favor of HGC, it follows R-II Builders should have paid the correct and appropriate docket fees, computed according to the assessed value thereof. 6. Case was re-raffled to RTC Manila Branch 22. a. Order: action involves title to or possession of real property. Hence, R-II must pay correct docket fees. b. R-II: In obvious evasion of said directive to pay the correct docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which, while deleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the properties comprising the same. c. jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It can be relaxed when there is NO INTENT TO DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT, but this relaxation cannot be applied to R-II because of its bad faith. 7. R-II filed MR in Supreme Court:

a. R-II: i. Branch 22 has jurisdiction. ii. Correct docket fees were paid. Ascue vs. CA (1991) 1. Lessor refused to collect rent from lessees. Aggregate amount: P5,625. 2. Lessees filed complaint in MTC of Manila for consignation. a. Lessor: filed MTD on ground of lack of jurisdiction because the subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation. b. MTC: MTD is denied, because the subject of litigation is P5,625, and is within subject matter jurisdiction of MTC over real property. 3. Lessor filed appeal in RTC of Manila. a. RTC: dismiss appeal. Why? The remedy should be special civil action for certiorari, not appeal. 4. Lessor filed appeal in SC. 5. SC referred case to CA because of concurrent jurisdiction: it appearing that no special and important reason had been cited to justify the Court's taking cognizance of the petition at the first instance. 6. Lessor filed MR in SC, but was denied. 7. CA likewise dismissed the petition filed by the lessor. a. first, that the jurisdiction of a court in consignation cases depends on the amount consigned, consignation being merely a form of payment and the opposite of a demand by a creditor for payment; b. second, that the RTC dismissed petitioner's appeal based on procedural rather than on substantive grounds, is of no moment, as what is decisive is that the complaint for consignation was filed in the proper court (Metropolitan Trial Court). 8. Lessor filed petition for review on certiorari against CAs dismissal of petition in Supreme Court. a. MTC has jurisdiction. In a valid consignation where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of money, the amount of the debt due is determinable. Clearly, the subject matter (i.e. the amount due) in consignation cases is capable of pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to be consigned determines the jurisdiction of the court.

Baito vs. Sarmiento (1960) 1. Wife filed complaint against Husband in CFI Samar for support (P720). 2. CFI Samar dismissed her complaint, alleging that it has no jurisdiction. 3. Wife appealed to the SC. a. ISSUE: which court has jurisdiction over an action for support if the amount claimed or demanded as support is only P720, or not more than P2,000 (now P5,000)? b. Wife: regardless of the amount claimed or demanded jurisdiction is vested exclusively in Courts of First Instance, because an action for support is not capable of pecuniary estimation c. Husband: as the demand for support is only P720 and not more than P2,000 (now P5,000), a justice of the peace or municipal court has jurisdiction over the case d. Action for support is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for support does not involve the determination of the amount to be given as support, but also the relation of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, the needs of the claimant, the financial resources of the person from whom the support is sought, all of which are not capable of pecuniary estimation. For this reason, an action for support falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance under section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613.

Matling Industrial vs. Coros (2010) FACTS o VP Finance (member of Board) was sacked from company. o VP filed for illegal suspension and dismissal in LA. LA o Employer: filed MTD o pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) due to the controversy being intra-corporate o VP: opposed the MTD o Not formally elected as Director. o Does not own 1 share. (blank indorsement; employer has custody of certificate) o Was removed as VP, not as Director o LA: granted MTD o Corporate officer, hence under SEC jurisdiction under PD No. 902. o Employer: appealed to the NLRC. NLRC o NLRC: He is not a corporate officer, hence remand to the Labor Arbiter. o NLRC: denied MR of employer. o Employer: filed petition for certiorari in CA. CA o CA: dismissed petition for certiorari. o What is a corporate officer? For a position to be considered as a corporate office, or, for that matter, for one to be considered as a corporate officer, the position must, if not listed in the by-laws, have been created by the corporation's board of directors, and the occupant thereof appointed or elected by the same board of directors or stockholders. o an 'employee' usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee o Employer: filed petition for review on certiorari to the SC. SC o SC: dismiss petition for review on certiorari. o Who has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controveries? Intracorporate controversies resulting to dismissa of corporate officer is now in the transferred jurisdiction of the RTC, pursuant to R.A. 8799 or Securities Regulation Code, from the jurisdiction of the SEC under PD No. 902.

o Is he a corporate officer? o Corporate officer should be listed in the By-Laws. While the employers By-Laws indeed list down the VP Finance as an officer, it was not a corporate officer. There was a distinction between ordinary and corporate officers. Corporate office must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws. o General Manager hired and determined compensation package of VP Finance. Hence, VP Finance is employee. o Hence, jurisdiction lies with NLRC. o Board cannot delegate power to create corporate office to the President. o Board may create appointive positions not considered corporate officers. o The fact that VP Finance became stockholder does not divest RTC of jurisdiction. o The better policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

UST vs. Sanchez (2010) 1. Facts: Nursing student was included in list of graduation, and attended graduation ceremonies. He sought copy of TOR, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation. The school refused to release his records. Hence, he could not take the nursing board exams. 2. Nursing student filed complaint for damages against the school (Board, Dean, Registrar) for unjustified refusal to release TOR, in RTC. (with prayer to release records) a. School: i. filed MTD, saying he is not enrolled, even though he took exams, attended classes, etc. Student also refused to turn over his class scards for scrutiny. Hence, no cause of action. ii. Filed Supplement to MTD: student sought administrative recourse beofre the CHED through letter-complaint. Thus, CHED has primary jurisdiction. Hence, complaint in RTC is premature. b. RTC: denied schools MTD and MR. Proceed to trial. 3. School appealed to the CA: denied. Go to trial. 4. School appealed to the SC: denied. Go to trial. a. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in this case. i. Action is for mandamus and damages. ii. the CHED does not have the power to award damages. iii. CHED is not even a quasi-judicial agency. iv. No express grant of quasi-judicial power in RA 7722 (Higher Education Act). v. Administrative agencies ARE NOT COURTS. vi. rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions vii. Provisions cited by school on quasi-judicial power of CHED only concern: the conditions and authority of accredited schools to authorize the graduation of students without the prior authority of the CHED. & schools right to withhold the release of credentials due to "suspension, expulsion, or nonpayment of financial obligations or property responsibility." (NONE OF THESE CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT.) b. Not guilty of forum shopping: there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial power, and cannot make any disposition of the case whether favorable or otherwise c. THERE IS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION i. The Complaint makes the following essential allegations: that petitioners unjustifiably refused to release respondents ToR despite his having obtained a degree from UST; that petitioners claim that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue; that as a result of petitioners unlawful actions, respondent has not been

able to take the nursing board exams since 2002; that petitioners actions violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and that petitioners should be ordered to release respondents ToR and held liable for P400,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of suit, and P15,000.00 as actual damages. Clearly, assuming that the facts alleged in the Complaint are true, the RTC would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the Complaint. ii. The complaint includes an allegation that school used intimidation or use of force to force him to admit that he was not enrolled. must be ventilated in trial. Not cause for MTD. d. Go to trial: We fully agree with the RTCs finding that a resolution of the case requires the presentation of evidence during trial. Based on the parties allegations, the issues in this case are far from settled. Was respondent enrolled or not? Was his degree obtained fraudulently? If so, why was he permitted by the petitioners to graduate? Was there fault or negligence on the part of any of the parties? Clearly, these are factual matters which can be best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court.