The eternal return as crucial test Author(s): Eric Oger Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No.

14, Eternal Recurrence (Autumn 1997), pp. 1-18 Published by: Penn State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717674 . Accessed: 06/03/2012 18:53
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Penn State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Nietzsche Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

The

eternal

return as crucial

test

Eric Oger
"Ich woll das Leben mich den Anblick Wie Blick

nicht wieder. Der

habe

ich's ertragen?

aushalten?

Ich habe versucht es selber zu bejahen "Unsterblich is der Augenblick, wo

auf den ?bermenschen, -Ach!" (KSA X: 137).2 ich die Wiederkunft

Schaffend. Was macht der das Leben bejaht.

willen ertrageichdieWiederkunft" (KSAX: 210). Augenblicks

zeugte.

Um

dieses

an even greater extent than with the other important themes of his philosophy, through his of .the "eternal return of the same" des ("ewige Wiederkehr Wiederkunft confronted his readers with an almost inextricable tangle of Gleichen'*) Friedrich Nietzsche To doctrine questions and counter questions, of difficulties and riddles. The fact thatNietzsche was well aware of this situation is evident from the chapter of thus spoke Zarathustra bringing up the issue of the eternal return for the first time in the book. Its title significantly says "Of the Vision even and the Riddle". We should this contradictory interpretations publications concerning are even totally unfounded. One well-known is the attempt subject. Some of them example to relate the doctrine of the eternal return of the same to of Martin Heidegger contemporary Even after technology, more particularly to the mechanical rotating repetition of a machine.3 similar headstrong and peculiar discarding readings, we are still left with an interminable number of interpretations. Within stand out more and more these, two main directions a cosmological and an ethical interpretation. Moreover, prominently as the most plausible: both often blatantly contradict each other. This contradiction is sometimes even considered as symptomatic of a fundamental contradiction of Nietzsche's philosophy itself.4 therefore not be surprised the innumerable among to find the most divergent and

1. The eternal return as a cosmological-ontological doctrine to the cosmological-ontological According interpretation of the eternal return, the world has no beginning or end point. It is endlessly however without becoming, continuously producing new "States of affairs". In time, the same states of affairs repeat themselves. This

In Nietzsche's words, the theory of the eternal return infinitely repeats itself over and over. that "the world as a cycle [...] has infinitely repeated itself and advances plays its game in infinitum "(KSA XDI:376). This event, for example, of my talking to you about the eternal return of the same, number of identical cycles. is an event within a particular cycle that itself was preceded by an infinite I thus already spoke to you about the eternal return an infinite

implies that theworld elapses cyclically: the same cycle covering a certain time span

to this interpretation, you won't get rid by an infinite number of identical cycles. According of me anymore. You cannot prevent me from returning and telling you exactly the same story as the one I am telling you now. Nietzsche doctrines Stoics as a classical existed

of timesbefore.On the otherhand this number whichwe livenow,will be followed cycle in

among

philologist knew very well that a great number of versions of similar Plato and the already in the antiquity: Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, others. This is evident from his autobiography Ecce Homo: "The doctrine of

Heraclitus.

of all things- this doctrineof Zarathustracould possibly already have been taughtby
At least the Stoa, which inherited almost all its fundamental ideas from

"eternal recurrence*,

that is to say of the unconditional

and endlessly

repeated

circular course

Heraclitus, shows tracesof it" (KSA VI: 313 [EH81].5 And yet,he sometimescalls this new (KSA IV: 275; also KSB VI: 112). This could be because - incontrastto the doctrine
philosophical Reduced

of all possible hypotheses"(KSA XIL213). for it. He even calls it "themost scientific
to its simplest form this argumentation consists of the justifications

speculations

from the antiquity

- he tried to provide

a scientific

argumentation

of two theorems.*

from thisvery When I go back in time The firstis thattime is infinite. moment,I can never
the firstmoment of time, the moment when time has a starting point, one inevitably introduces Kant did before him, Nietzsche rejects this notion reach and inapt. It dates from 374). According further go back time came that into being. By accepting in this issue. As the notion of "creation"

At no one moment

in time, I can also continuously go further to the future, or rather, forward. can I reach an end point, an end of time. The becoming has always already started and will never end.

and calls it theological. It is indefinable times long past that were unscientific and superstitious (KSA XIII: the becoming of the world never started. As I can further and to Nietzsche,

of force is finite.The notionof forceby definition is thatthe totality The second theorem
an "infinite force", quantity of force, and thus is incompatible with implies a circumscribed an infinite volume of force. In our world, according to the principle of preservation of force, It is for this force has a constant and finite quantity which cannot increase nor decrease. reason that for Nietzsche of situations the number of constellations and combinations of force centra, i.e. the number

cannot incessantly produce is finite. The world in the world, an over means the same situations time first that infinite This (the theorem), period novelty. infinitely recur, over and over. Nietzsche writes: The total amount of energy is limited, notxinfinite*. Let us beware of such conceptual the number of states, combinations, excesses! changes, and evolutions Consequently,

That means that all possible developments passed away before this present moment. the present development is a repetition, must have taken place already. Consequently, and thus also that which gave rise to it, and thatwhich arises from it, and so backward

but in any case of this energy is tremendously great and practically. 'Immeasurable', finite and not infinite. But the time through which this total energy works is infinite. That means the energy is forever the same and forever active. An infinity has already

times. (KSA DC:523). has happened innumerable

and forward again!

Insofar as the totality of states of energy always

recurs, everything

for an eternal I don't want to investigate the validity of Nietzsche's argumentation Today return. Others have done this with the required accuracy.6 Of greater importance however are a n umber of considerations preceding this critique. First, attempts to prove the eternal return as a scientific theory, to He himself never published his them, exception posthumous work. even though he had ample opportunity to do so during the years before he became mad.7 A great number of these fragments, among which the one I just quoted, date from the period in the summer of 1881. immediately after the revelation of the eternal return in Sils-Maria the texts where Nietzsche all belong

without

Why did he never publish these texts? We

can only make assumptions:possibly he

considered superfluous Second, e.g.

the argumentation

still lacuna! and

and irrelevant to the problems

he wanted

insufficient, or he might have considered to discuss.

them

we know from Nietzsches 223, 226) of Paris that he

208,

University foundation.

contemporaries,1 as well as from his own letters (KSB VI: at the and mathematics intended to study natural sciences or Vienna, to give his doctrine a scientific among other reasons

He however rather quickly let go of this plan, probably because he realised that his doctrine has to be set at a completely scientific argumentation he came forward with his i.e. a literary story about how an imaginary person experiences the eternal return Zarathustra,

ofhis life.

Third,

since the publication of the critical edition of G. Colli and M. Montinari, we are able to accurately study the full context of these posthumous fragments on the eternal return. From this it is evident not only that Nietzsche formulated and tried various thought-experiments, in one and the sane fragment - he doubted, but also at that same time and even sometimes questioned and (partially) retracted them. For example, he criticised the notion of "the same to claim that two things - for example He thinks that it is prejudice two {das Gleiche)". considers them as equal or attempts tomake them equal. leaves - are exactly the same. Man

errors" of Although this prejudice is veryuseful indaily life,it is one of the"fundamental mankind (KSA DC: 531).
Fourth,

themesof his philosophy. I can only briefly mention two of them: other important
If his theory seeks to give scientific argumentation for and the will to power. perspectivism the truth of a particular cosmology, then this implies a realistic conception of knowledge. Such a realism pretends to look at the world from a "God's Eye View" and to know the world as it is in itself (H.Putnam'). This however, is contradictory to the anti-realism of his perspectivism.10

the interpretation of the eternal return as a cosmology

is hard to reconcile with

some

would Nietzsche to a scientific attach such a great importance Why as when science a an considers he itself only argumentation perspective, interpretation of the world next to so many other possible interpretation? "It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that physics too is only an interpretation and arrangement of the world (according cosmic to our own requirements, evolution is mied if Imay

the say so !) and not an explanation implies a determinism: by strict laws, that inevitably lead to the endless repetition of the seem to be in agreement with Nietzsche's same events. This doesn't will to power, i.e. a and exceed itself. Whereas the labouring will to live which continuously has to overcome for the same, of novelty. the will wo power aims at the realisation of the other, at the continuous production

eternal return realises

turns out to be a cosmological one, but quite the contrary. did or sufficiently, taken into account whether Nietzsche himself. This is tied up with the often exaggerated and more in particular of the so-called book manuscripts even postulates [...] His that Nietzsche's proper was "proper philosophy"

his doctrinenowhere Fifth,in a careful readingif the texts publishedbyNietzsche himself,

students have not, or not Many did not publish a particular text of the posthumous appreciation The Will to Power." found Heidegger in his posthumous

is to be

"What Nietzsche himselfis tobe foundinhis creative life was always foreground. writings:
philosophy left behind as posthumous, unpublished work".'2

more in his Untimely Meditations Finally, Nietzsche and of chance eternal return, "that the dice-game murdered

Each person is unique: "In only once discovered America. only once. Columbus his heart every man knows quite well that, being unique, he will be in the world only once and that no imaginable chance will for second time gather together into a unity so strangely

exactlysimilartowhat itproduced in thepast" (KSA I: 262 [UM 70]. Caesar was anything

than once blatantly says that there is no the future could never again produce

as he is" (KSAI: 337 [UM 127]). an assortment variegated

2. The For eternal

these

reasons

interpretation

Meontological' an ethical doctrine resemblance would

doctrine return as an ethical-'deontologicaP - the - and a few more doctrine's probably cosmological-ontological in recent years. In stead a normative is more and more explicitly dismissed to Oskar Ewald" Bernd often is As (from proposed interpretation Magnus"). the eternal

to the Kantian

be prepared interpretation sound, one generally only mention two of them: Not that we want

an unmistakable return formulates an imperative (Showing imperative): act in such a way that at any moment you categorical to want the eternal return of this act. To make this alternative goes back to completely different texts by Nietzsche. I

to look out for far away, unknown blisses and blessings and gifts, but to live such to live again, and to live such in eternity! - Our task comes up to us at each moment. (KSA DC: 503). doctrine declares: the task is to live in such a way that you must wish to live again

My

you will anyway!To whom striving gives thehighestfeeling,let him strive;to whom rest gives the highest feeling, let him rest; to whom ordering,following,
obedience

and sparenomeans" Eternityis a stake! (KSA DC: 505). highestfeeling gives him the

give

the highest

feeling,

let him obey. May

he only become

aware of what

The

Nietzsche

"in any case you will live again!" from the second quote is an indication that It again suggests an unavoidable issue. still struggled with an ontological cosmic event that is hard to reconcile with the pragmatic meaning of an imperative. Indeed, an that it may not be followed, whereas to an in general assumes according imperative exclamation is dropped or in any case threatens to be dropped. I

ontological interpretation this possibility will not discuss this inconsistency here. In these texts Nietzsche is placed

Man

proposes an important "assignment" or "task" for human existence. but - in his words - "at every moment". for this task not only occasionally, No called He he does, it always has to be accorded. is upon. Whatever constantly reprieve is done in such a way that it complies with the imperative's requirements. And yet, what is

pursued through this assignment is not to be situated in an uncertain, unknown and far away future. Paradoxically the fiction of an eternal return of an act in the future exclusively has the role to draw the attention of the actor to the enormous importance of his act here and now. infinite series of identical moments and tremendous irreplaceable meaning very moment counts: are only introduced to illuminate this moment in its In short, at every single moment only this importance. "in me the concept "future' lacks [...]: no wish, not even a little one, no no wanting-it-differently (KSA XIII: 501). interpretation, this normative interpretation points to a

An

planning, As

with the ontological-realistic number of serious problems.

First, both cited texts once again are from Nietzsche's I believe Moreover, they date from the eighties. third part of my speech, I will try to prove

posthumous writings, and once agin as an that an eternal return viewed

were publishedby himself. (In the is not explicitly presentin hiswritingsthat imperative
this for only one text by Nietzsche).

to go more in detail about the second difficulty, the imperative does not indicate what should do, but only that,whatever you do, you should do it in such a way that you could you wish for the infinite return of this act. (Like the Kantian imperative, it is thus a formal I want

KSB

1881 to P. Gast, strive for anything, and preserve an "unshakable rest" (letter dd. 14 August VI: 112). You can conform to the behaviour of others, or you can decide for yourself tells you only in which state which way to go. Rather than prescribing what to do, Nietzsche

when do you want to repeat an act over and over? Nietzsche imperative). But the question is: Only those acts should be says that this is only the case when you "feel most wonderful". "the highest Feeling". Apparently Nietzsche doesn't consider this preformed that give you as a curtailment to the diversity of possible acts, you are still free to do whatever imperative you want. For example, you might strive for a particular aim, but you might as well refuse to

of mind and with which feelingsyou should do what you do.

Song" from Thus spoke Zarathustra it is indicated

In the famous "Night

acts man wants

wanderers's wants cause

which

acts that are accompanied by lust, whereas he flees those that repetition of only those The "greatest feeling" thus is nothing else but an intense sense of pleasure. to this imperative therefore leads to avoiding those acts that Living consistently according a true ethical theory can be constructed sorrow. Whether cause starting from such an pain. I will however not discuss and far too general this complex imperative is very doubtful. an ethic wont's lead directly to crude hedonism and whether such is More important question. epicurism, maximalise ethics as possible i.e. to a way of life that as much lust. The difficulty however is that Nietzsche 200-201): indeed, by eliminating tries to eliminate pain and always decisively rejected pain one would also eliminate lust and

man deeps, deep eternity!"(KSA IV:286 and 404 [Z 333]). This shows that eternityyWants

to

such

happiness(KSA 111:384).
Third, I find it difficult to see how eternal the hammer of Nietzsche's

(e.g. KS A VI:

return - viewed

possibly escape every Sollensethik

critique (e.g. KSA X: 122, XI: 90, 189). How this imperative would weigh as a heavy burden on all human behaviour? Suffice it to refer to "On the three Transformations" where Zarathustra talks about the the well-known passage (KSA IV: 29:31). On the one hand, the "You shall" -imperative is a it tries to impose the same measure to all people. An ethical an arbitrary to an irrational constraint, a suffocating oppression, submits mankind

on "You

- could imperative and more in general on could Nietzsche prevent that also as an ethical shall"

great dragon "You shall" horrible dragon because command also a

a uniformizing reduction is (KSA V: 108:110). On theotherhand, thisimperative tyranny,

ludicrous never be cannot): the enormous yawning abyss between norm and fact can dragon because character (and it is a good thing that it by the imperative's commanding "Let us consider finally what naivety it is to say vman ought to be thus and thus!' removed

wealth of types, theluxuriance of a prodigalplay and change Reality showsus an enchanting and does somepitiful of forms: moralist say at thesight of it: 'No!Man ought to journeyman
be different'?

ST [TI46]).

xYou ought

[...] But even when themoralist merely turns to the individual and says to him: to be thus and thus' he does not cease tomake himself ridiculous" (KSA VI: S?

Fourth,

the arrow of

retrospect and prospect. doctrine thatNietzsche's and now. To

the one that ruled western only to an afterwards,

all imperative point straight to the present, eliminating It extremely focuses on the now-moment." It is not a coincidence of the eternal return is often considered as a philosophy of the here that one has an attitude to life radically opposed live according to this means to this ethical tradition. According a future that however never to this tradition, the present's tole was related arrived, that never became present but

and teleological character of this tradition led to* always remained future. The eschatological a never ceasing tyranny of the future on our lives. For example, in Christianity the present . was denied in favour of an hereafter, a great beyond after death (heaven) to According the sensory perceptual realm was denied in favour for a transcendental Platonic metaphysics, spiritual world was considered ("Hinterwelt"). Similarly, as bad and reprehensible. in romanticism It was denied the present (e.g. Richard Wagner) in favour of an idealization of a far

doctrine however does away past (theMiddle Ages) or of an Utopian future. The Nietzschean not aim at a metaphysics of the "hereafter" ("Jenseits") but at a philosophy of the "herenow"

Thus a life according to this imperative boils down to a plea for an unconditional, objective. life now, for a life that does not bother about the future. Indeed one carefree and unconcerned could find texts (nevertheless posthumous!) "At every moment becoming must appear In which Nietzsche legitimate [...]; suggests something it is certainly not allowed similar:

to come. The discomforts caused by certain events are function of a later moment, a moment no longer placed in a larger context of an action meant to prepare an in the future obtainable

("Diesseits") (KSA VI: 133, 185). Each moment is lived merely foritsown sake and not ion

that the

nor thepast for thesake of thepresent" would be justifiedforthesake of thefuture present whethera life doubtful (KSA Xm:34; see also XIII: 455 andXIII: 493). However, it ishighly
to such a prohibition according seems obvious that a mother themselves, problematic, movie Down but only I would by Law is possible and desirable. it For example, the labour pains for the sake of the pains To illustrate that this prohibition for the sake of the child." is of two characters like to end with an example from the fascinating doesn't want one character made a complete mess of his life by on its radicalness

I think Nietzsche's f in the present! Besides, implies a condemnation philosophy continuously such a way of living: "one lives for today, one lives very fast one lives very irresponsibly"

livingcontinuouslyin the future,the othermade at least as big a mess of it by living (KSA VI: 141 [TI94]).
desirable.

by Jim Jarmusch:

at the peg of the now-moment not even happiness, but he wants

Nietzsche

KSA V: 12-13).
The fifth and

(KSA I: 248), but yet a return to the bestial is not possible and doesn't plea for a state of self-sufficiency and momentary to bend the bow of desire and keep itbent as strong as possible (a.o.

man envies thehappinessof theanimaltied up It is true, sometimes

an act carried out in the the same acts are repeated again and again. Does of its persuasion eternal return in the future, not inevitably tend to the stereotypical repetition of this very act an act which one wishes to repeat not lead to the eternal repetition of over and over? Does find a life as advocated this very act? We won't with such passion and by Nietzsche - an adventurous and most colourful life -, but to the contrary we will come to a eloquence and which runs compulsively life that wants and safety, security, and predictability, monotonously. Freud called Such a life would strikingly resemble a life determined a "repetition compulsion" ("Wiederholungszwang)". Besides, by what Sigmund when Freud

more andmore a life inwhich would not resemble like largely ruledby such an imperative

last problem

that I will briefly mention

here, concerns

the question

whether

Principle 3. The

investigates the repetition he talks winking eternal

compulsion at Nietzsche test

in the mental the Pleasure system in his Beyond - about the "eternal return of the same".17

return as a crucial

After having respective

ontological return as a crucial by Nietzsche. comment on

rather globally these two interpretations of the eternal return and their like to venture a third interpretation that I consider neither difficulties, I would nor Me-ontologicaT. The tenor of this is already indicated by the title: the eternal sketched test. To However, clarify this interpretation Imust confine myself to one single text this choice is not arbitrary: the aphorism I would like to read and of the eternal return that Nietzsche published himself. It

is the first version

Thus

occurs in the book The Gay Science and is the lastbutone aphorism(341) of thebook as it edition. The lastaphorismis almost identicalto the of appeared in the 1882 first beginning
interpretation I want to discuss, also applies to the other stagings of the thought of the eternal return (particularly "Of the Vision and the Riddle" and "The Convalescent from the third part start by reading slowly the complete of Thus Spoke Zarathustra). Let's aphorism: The greatest weight (Das gr?sste Schwergewicht). if (Wie, wenn dir) some What, day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new init, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sign and everything unutterably small or great - even in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence

tragoedia" (KSA 10:571). At the same time, I am convinced thatthe basic idea of the

spoke Zarathustra

and bears

- as we will

see

- not without

reason

the title: "Incipit

moment

this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and myself. eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!1 Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who a tremendous spoke thus? Or have you once experienced The

when you would have answered him: NYou are a god and never have I heard of you, itwould change you anything more divine* If this thought gained possession as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?' would lie upon your actions as the

Or how well disposed would you have greatest weight (das gr?sste Schwergewicht). to become towards yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this

ultimate confirmation and seal?" (KSA III: 570)

This

this case? And is iteven possible ingeneral?) Iwill therefore are thoseaspects that only treat
escapes interpretation, and on the other hand, an attempt, a trial ("Versuch"). that Nietzsche important for what I want to prove: an ontological-cosmological on that the thought of the eternal return as well as an ethical-normative interpretation that it functions as some kind of experiment, a test Nietzsche writes: the "epoch of the trials. I am the one hand

is frequently cited, but almost never important passage interpreted accurately," But also in my exposition a complete "Buchstabierung" is not possible. in (But what is completeness

who can standthethought of theeternalreturn?" (KSA XI: 85).It doing the big experiment:
Sometimes considered his whole as a series of philosophy experiments. he tried out a though to find out its value. But also, he sometimes used a though to put his reader to the test. Nietzsche often calls the thought of eternal return a hammer 109,128, (KSA XI: 295; XII: 132). This hammer not only is the philosopher sculptor's tool for shaping and modelling man, but it is also the philosopher-doctor's tool for asking is known

("Probe"),

questions symptoms Nietzsche crucial

is of "crucible (Feuerprobe)of our communalview of life" (KSB II: 147).This experiment

importance to the framing of a psychology and physiology of our culture.

reactions (KSA VI: 57-58)." These reactions are and provoking meaningful In the aphorism that we just read, of a particular psychic-corporal disposition. or even stronger a physiological-medical a psychological test, a performs such

a. What

the importance of the opposition between light and heavy clearly in Nietzsche's too simply - he made light of it-? In yet Kundera probably viewed this opposition an is life life his opinion, heavy, unbearably heavy, whereas a once-only incessantly repeated It is unbearably circumstance of its passing nature". itself "under the mitigating manifests understood work. And light. Nietzsche Everything

heavy. Milan Kundera in his book The unbearable lighmessof being has very clearly

is the importance of the test? Nietzsche In the title "Das gr?sste Schergewicht" already refers to a number of aspects" as that this thought is in general experienced relevant to the eternal return. First, he believes

of of theeternalreturn "SpiritofGravity (Geistder Schwere)" will experiencethe thought

this life as crushing.

as heavy but also as light. that life can be considered in contrast, believes A the on our life. life as heavy towards disposition spirit viewing depends To this spirit, it is "the heaviest thought". In contrast, to a spirit viewing

(KSA DC: 526), the "Thoughtof Thoughts" (KSA DC: 496). In boxing powerful thought the of all philosophicalthoughts, one could say thatit is for Nietzsche the terms, heavyweight
Mohammed the main

the eternal return in both cases Because It pushes the spirit higher up, gives itwings. are to a colossal enlargement, if has such clear opposite effects on man.30 Compromises no longer possible. the thought is weighty, in the sense of important. It is the most Second, effect. leads

of thistighthas a relieving Zarathustra- theeternalreturn lifeas light- the spirit driving

for balance (KSB say, the center of gravity ("Schwergewicht") provides ("Gleichgewicht") It can change places and even VII: 34). But also, it is not a steady and unchanging point.

new centre of gravity in our culture. A center of gravity is a thought has to fulfill the role of a an object is evenly distributed. It brings rest and stability. the of around which weight point For example, a well positioned center of gravity prevents a ship from rolling.2' As Nietzsche

ofmankind in twohalves (KSB VI: 485). Third, this has enoughpower to split up thehistory

of all philosophical concept of his Zarathustra

Ali

doctrines (KSA

VI:

so to say. It is of the utmost importance. It is It 335), and therefore requires most empasis.

which placed life's centerof landoutside theobject.22 Exactly thishappened inChristianity a an in VI: 216:217). For this in God "Jenseits", life, (KSA otherworldly gravity poutside reason isdoomed. Together with the deathofGod, theold that Nietzsche thinks Christianity
as a result of which human existence lost its direction and center of gravity has disappeared, for two 'Time will come when we will have to pay for having been Christian that let us live, years long: we are loosing our center of gravity (Schwergewicht) new time we don't know how to get in or how to get out" (KSA XIII: 69). Through wants to give a new significance, center of gravity of the eternal return Nietzsche, to our way of life, to our habits and opinions "Infinite significance" (KSA DC: 494). for some the an

meaning. thousand

is the testperson and who the experimenter? In this way addresses each one of us, every possible in this passage reader. of three different characters on stage, which for a good the presence Nietzsche suggests (2) understanding need to be clearly distinguished from one another: (1) a narrator addressing b. Who The narrator me, an arbitary reader, with a story about you will have to live once more". (3) a demon whispering me in the ear: "This life [...]

To

stalks you.

- to the narrator asks to imagine every single reader "you" This situation is at the least peculiar. In any case

a situation where it creates

a demon

uses all textual means irreality. Already from this incipit Nietzsche that he is not dealing with an eyewitness account, as faithful as possible, but with a clearly is evoked, is not our familiar everyday world, but a strange ficititious story. What the narrator chooses the conditional mode: "what if (wie wenn dreamworld. Grammatically, In this way he asks the reader to imagine a particular situation: 'suppose that...', vhow dir)". In any case it should be evident that the scene itbe to ...*, "what would happen if. a the here is of construction of the merely product imagination, a hypothetical presented never calls it a theory that can be true or In talking about the eternal return, Nietzsche mind. or sometimes a "doctrine (Lehre)". false, but mostly a "thought (Gedanke)", would Moreover, we should mention another element in the opening words, which is inevitably lost translation. The narrator does not address the reader in the polite form. The in the English creates a certain distance. formal KSie' unavoidably In contrast, he calls German the n in German: to address with *du\ addressed one by his first name,'duzen' Apparentiy from trust with the reader. He the very start he wants to create a relationship based on mutual undoes every distance between and even them, since viceral reaction he wants to obtain He the. most wants unreflected, answer. At corporal from the reader. spontaneous, a fully sincere

an impression of to indicate to the reader

themoment

awake

as well

unexpected, The

- the demon can loom up. It can happen when you are day or night" are at But if it emerges, it is always you night. asleep totally In an ungaurded moment. - "some as when

incident appears as a complete suprise. You do not consciously aim at it. You don't look for the demon in his cave, but it sneaks upon you. It surprises you. You don't attempt to meet it, but the incident just happens to you, even stronger, it catches you by surprise. Nietzsche similary says in his beautiful letter to Peter Gast from the time when the eternal

was revealed to him (August 1881), thatthe thought return suddenly"emerged"(KSB VI:
112). A thought does not come when when you want it, but when wants it it (KSA V: 31).

Not

the narrator, and certainly not Nietzsche, to us the content of the but a demon exposes thought.34 Ifwe can find out the nature of the demon, we might perhaps understand why he Indeed, what he says is determined by his perspective says what he says and what itmeans. (and at the same time distorted by it). In Nietzsche's writings and probaly mostly in his early often occur. and the whole letters, demons (On this point he is related to Goethe romanticism). Most generally, a demon is a creature that assists and advises you, that wants to get a grip on your acts. (a devil). More Itwants to push you in a paticular direction.25 This influence can

be either good or bad. You cab be possessedby a good demon (a god) as well as by a bad one
aphorism in particular, the voice of the demon is the voice of the instincts. In the "The greatest weight", Nietzsche talks of socrates nd his demon preceding * or better of Socrates as a demon. Nietzsche that with Socrates believes ("daimonion"),

decadence

came about inGreek civilisation. He was the first to state the prevalence of reason in human behavior, which to a great extent led to the repression of the instincts. However, from time to time, these instincts express themselves in Socrates' psyche, although they can do so only in a negative way. so weak and unable to drive or direct They hev become

much This

This is not thevoice of the(philosophical)cosmologistor of thenaturalscienist. It is not so

reason that speaks voice can to us, but rather the will, touch when the desires and instincts (KSB D: 264). i.e. in in a state of "loneliest

behavior; they can only slow down voice of the instincts not only haas

and obstruct it, In contrast, acccording an inhibiting role, but also a pasitively

to Nietzsche stimulating

the one.

[HH 179]). This implies not only that there is no-one to turn to, but that also that one does' not (anymore) Loneliness as a is not experienced ("Einsamkeit") long for the other(s). a not of It the lack. is abandonment of consequence ("Verlaaenhief1), deprivation, being valuable: "choose the good solitude, the free, wanton, easy solitude which gives you too a

loneliness", you only your'e " a stateof the most absolute loneliness, when man [is] alone with himself (KSA II: 317

demon's

an important abandonned it is considered and (KSAIV: 231). To thecontrary, by everybody

It is no longer an enemy, (KSA VI: 276). protected, cherished and defended It can only be obtained by distancing oneself from the others. the Similarly, return thought revealed itself toNietzsche when he had risen "6,000 feet beyond man

rightto remaininsome sensegood!" (KSA V: 42-43 [BGB 56]). It is something absolutelyto

be conquered, but a friend. eternal existence needs radical

and time" (KSA VI: 335 [EH 99] and KSA DC: 494). A radically new vision onn human
can only emerge if one completely isolates oneself from the other people. One also to distance oneself from God. A radical atheism is necessary. An experience of such loneliness is impossible for the worshipper. Even the hermit, in the silence yet - we first invented of his cave

(KSA VI: 297 [EH 67]). He longsfora "dialogue"withGod keeps desiringfor"multitude" ungodly"(KSA HI: 616; also DC: 580).
c. What From is the test protocol? sentence "This and innumerable radical version through prayer. "For a pious person there is no loneliness this, we

the

the demon's

live once more that the most obtain The

reactions which

are as distinct as possible

life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to times more; and there will be nothing new in it", it is evident of return is unfolded. This version is formulated so redically to from the reader-testperson.27

demon says first that it regards "this life", your life, not 'a' life, a life that is neutral and no theoretical The demon makes impersonal, not the life in itself, the life in general. statements of the kind of: 'all history repeats itself, 'there is nothing new under the sun', 'the runs cyclically', world 'life will statements can often be heard Such in return', etc.

aas well as outside the demon asks you to imagine is it. What philosophy, nothing that concern you, nothing that could be considered wouldn't and in detachedly, noncommittally, abstracto. To the contrary, by asking each person separately to apply this thought without any restriction to his life, one is forced to unambiguously take sides. The demon further says that your life "as you now live it and have lived it" wil return. It does not say that a specific period will return, as for example a time full of pleasant event. Of course, we want those to occur again. Neither does it say that only this moment will return. In any case it doesn't command you to live in such a way that you would like it to return infinitely. On the contrary, it does ask you to imagine return. The repetition thus is a repition of your whole event. that the totality of your life would life, without leaving out any single

10

Third,

number of times. The

in Ecce Homo: "The of a change that never stops repeating itself. This is very explicit that is to say of the unconditional and endlessly doctrine of 'eternal recurrence', repeated

return only once, or two times, but an infinite times". When Hietzsche speaks of "innumerable speaks of an "eternal return", "eternal" does certainly not refer to somthing that is beyond temporality, a "Eternal" in kind of timeless-being, but to something that is through and through temporal. this expression does not refer to what escapes all change, but to the change itself, to that kind the demon does not state that this will demon

courseof all things..."(KSA VI: 313 [EH 81]; italics ircular byE.O.).
the demon

moments

of sorrow will return, not only what we desire but also what we dislike, not only the our life but also the frag of daily life. All will return exactly as they important moments of were, to the smallest detail: "every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and or great in your life will have to return to you, and in the same everything unutterably small The thought of a limited return (a finite number of times) or of a and sequence". succession

states that not an analogus life, a life partly the same partly different, will life. The demon's eternal return of the same thus is a return of your returns does not hold a life without the slightest difference from the previous one. What new The "and there will demon be element. says: nothing new in it".28 explicity single Because we are confronted with an identical repition, not only moments of happiness but also Fourth, return, but an identical

return in another (hopefully) better life (such as the reincarnation doctrine in many eastern Such weaker versions of repetition dont't force religions) mostiy causes us fewer problems. take sides. In this case however, the demon subjects us to us so stronly to uncompromisingly the "heaviest" test possible, a crucible: a return of your life, a return of the same identical one in addition, a never ending return. life as an

Finally, the demon states that this life will return you will relive this life in the future. The that is revealed here is not retrospective, it is not directed to the eternal return's perspective not 'this life as you now live it, you already lived it innumerable does demon The say: past. that one cannot do times before'.79 Such a perspective appears fatalistic. The consideration The demon does about it easily leads to indifference, lethergy and defeatism. as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once suggest however: "this life times more". In short, the perspective more and innumerable chosen by the demon is to the future. It incites to unambiguously to determine one's pointed position, prospective, anything make d. a clear choice.

The

evocation

narrator once again addresses every reader separately and asks for his (or her) reaction to the of the eternal return. The reaction to throw oneself on the floor is sometimes seen the police absolutely refuse to do something, or with demonstrators refusing to a It is to unambiguously corporal expression oof rejection here, an to repeat one's life infinitely. This is also evident from the teeth grinding and orders.

is the possible outcome of the testing? statement is one of complete first reaction to the demon's rejection: "Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?" Here the What

with samll children who obey

would

life as heavy, as something which incessantly weighs you down. Through experience the eternal repetition of this existence, this weight will obviously be multiplied by infinte. unbearable. The weight threatens to crush and smash you. The load becaomes

demon. It ishoweveralso possible thatit is thethought itself which throws you damningthe down. This could only be thecase ifyou, like thebeasts of burden (the camel or theass),

unwillingness

ll

The

second

experienced never have agrees

reaction is radically opposite to the first one: "Or have you once possible a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god and I heard anything more divine'"! One wnats the eternal return of his life, one

one welcomes to it, one confirms it unconditionally, and applauds it. The voice which loneliness" seemed as if coining from a hideous demon, from a initially in your "loneliest to be the voice from a god, not the Christian God, but Dionysus. devil, now appears Nietzsche only describes two polarly opposite reactions. Why doesn't he sketch an attitude of the demon's question evokes a problem which is indifference, one of shrugging? Apparently a such vital importance for man that the attitudes towards it are into two neatly divisble extremes. When man gets clutched in the embrace of the thought, it inevitably must change him: either weigh him down and gained possession Thus what matters believes One it. So would of you, it forNietzsche crush, or strengthen and stimulate him: "If this thought change you as you are or perhaps crush you". of the truth of the eternal return, but

is not the demonstration

or effect is on thepersonwho how man reacts to believing its thruth, what its influence
should act "as

Even when

the changes it can evoke in feign the thought, to act "as if itwere true, in order to examine "Let's examine how the tought of somthing repeating itself has worked (for human existence. the year, or periodical and sleeping, etc.). Even if the circular illnesses, waking example the possibility of eternal damnation has worked!" transform us [...]! How (KSA DC: 523 524). In the same way Nietzsche wonders how the thought of a transcendent divine being has in our culture, why this activity in our times is lost more and more, and how man worked reacts to this loss. 'The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire this once more?' would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight (das gr?sste Schwergewicht)". On the one hand, it is evident from this sentence that toNietzsche, this is not an ontological issue, it is not an issue whether the eternal return does or does not not exist. He doesn't ask if the return is ingrained in the nature of things. To the contrary, what matters is the issue of will, the issue whether you do or don't wnat this to occur "once more and innumerable times more". But on the other hand,

that this thought could fulfill such a role, the actor needs to consider is as true. if (Kant30) it were true, which evidently doesn't mean it is really true. the eternal return would prove not to be true, it is still of the utmost importance to

even the thought or possibility, can shatter is only a probability of a possibility and repitiion

it isnot a normative issue either: no command is given as to how each person has to act on is asked, but a question which rakes up an issue vital every single moment. Only a question toman: hi fundamental attitude towards the totality of his life, towards "each and every thing" in his existence.

Someone who is on good terms with himself and with life, accepts confirmation and seal?" his own person and life exactly as they are. In contrast, someone who is not on good terms with himself and with life tends inadvertently towards a pessimistic attitude. From this, it is evident among other things that one is boared and one can "no longer stand oneself (KSA

Only in the very last sentence does Nietzsche make clear what he wants to find out though the test. Whether one loves or hates the eternal return of one's life teaches Nietzsche about one's affirmative or negative attitude towards life. "Or how well disposed would you have to become toward yourself and the life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate

e. What does the thetest? demonaspire to find out though

12

HI:

for suffering and for death. One even wants to commit suicude, a martyr. One does as Since man is a "heroically" penalty and lives ascentic. or laudation he pronounces towards life is merely a sympton living being, the condemnation of the particular form of life he (or she) is (KSA VI: 86). "Judgements, value judgements 418), that onelongs sometimes concerning

(KSA VI: 68 [TI30]). symptoms"

life, for or against,

can

in the last resort never be

true: they possess

value

as

of theeternalreturn "thehighestformula In his Ecce Homo Nietzsche calls the thought of can possiblybe attained"(KSA VI: 335 [EH 99]). The question iswhat that affirmation or longing for ithas todo with affirmation of lifeand evenwith its"the wanting thereturn
belives that one doesn't (really) affirm a particular event unless Nietzsche highest formula". one desires its return. If one does want its repetition, then one does not really want it, one does not fully want it. It belongs to the little pleasures, the half satisfactions, those of which one saya: "it's Let me

all right for once but not again', or also is not active, but reactive and 'See Rome try to clarify this with the example of the well known probverb: negative). I allways -maybe wrongly - interpreted this as follows: When one sees the eternal and die\ one is so overwhelmed by its enchating beauty that one does not city and its monuments, desire anything (else) anymore. One is so fulfilled that one is prepared to die. Indeed, what could desire

one possibly wish to see after having seen Rome? In Nietzsche's-opinion though, the to see Rome or more in general to live life, can never be stilled. When the will is active and affirmative, one never gets enough of Rome nor of life. Never does one say: 'I've had it'. and In short, a wish reaching the highest form of affirmation wants the same thing again and again infinite number of times. Such a wish longs for the "ultimate confirmation and seal to affirm once it is a again what one had affirmed already, and you seal it by repeating it, for example by proclaiming it to do. doing what you promised 'yes' thus already Saying 'yes'.31

To seal is (Besiegelung)". ratification. You say 'I will' to everyone or by solemnly includes the repetition of this Being

a demon which subjects you to a severe test, looks strikingly like an caught by death with confrontation coming to get you but giving you a moment of respite to unexpected this similarity didn't escape Nietzsche: review your whole life. Undoubtedly "Was this life? Is what I want your to say to death. Well in an then, once again!" (KSA XI: 409). Face to face with

with a kind of synoptic death youwould lookback at your life glance. Life would unwind
before and compressed accelerated form: "We know that at times of or at in decisive men compress of their any lives, general danger, exceptional turning point in an infinitely eccelerated and behold inner panorama, together all they have experienced eyes

looked forward. Now that his is no longer possible, you are forced to look back. continuously For the fisrt and also last time you can review your life in its totality. At thatmoment "an evaluation of what has been desired and what achieved in life, an adding-up (Summirung) of

as they eventsas sharply most recent distant do the ones" (KSA I: 343 [UM 199]). Arrivedat theultimate momentof yourlife youcanonly lookback at your you past life. During your life

Otherwise all, your life worth living, then you are also prepared to live again. you don't. if you wnat your life back must prove whether or not you consider it valuable Testing (or even pernicious), whether you have an affirmative or negative attitude towards life. On the basis of whole series of more or less autobiographical remarks we can to this test. It is striking that in general these very two opposite subject a reactions

life"(KSA VI: 135 [TI 88]) becomespossible. Ifyou feel thatthis balance is positive,thatin

number of authors

13

occur

as described by Nietzsche. He himself took on both opposite reactions as is evident from the two texts serving as this paper's mottoes. As for other philosophical authors, I Kant and of course Schopenhauer come to a pronounced restrict to a few examples. negative conclusion:

andwhich of his friends Who hasn't read it inhis {Kant's} writings, has not heard it
under the condition very often from himself, that under no circumstance once more from the start- he would want to repeat his existence.32 at the end of his of his faculties, will of living

But perhaps possession Bertrand

life, no man, if he be sincere and at the same ever wish to go through it again."

time in

the latter with an explicit reference to Nietzsche's and Jacques Derrida, Russell At the same time both authors link thewish general return, come to the opposite conclusion. for repetition to an affirmative attitude towards life: Three

mankind.

wayward [...] This

like great winds, have blown me higher and thiner, in a passions, over a deep ocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair. has been my life. I have found itworth living, and would gladly live it again if the chance were offered me.14 These course,

of longingfor love, thesearchforknowledge,and unbearablepityfor the suffering

passions,

simple

but

overwhelmingly

strong,

have

governed

my

life;

the

I cryover the impossibility When I say: I love repetition, to repeat. I would like to
repeat all the time, to repeat everything: this is what affirmation is. It is even the Nietzschean meaning of affirmation: to be able to repeat what we love, to be able to live in such a way thatwe can say at all times: this I would like to relive infinitely. I in this sense; myself, and in this I am happy, I don't have negative experiences everything could wish that I live, or almost everything, a great deal of what I live is such that I for its eternal return."

Looking

" same intensity, time.36 One praysas the Greek : All beautifulthings twice just like thefirst or threetimes"(KSA TU:569 andKSB V?T. 69). "We want toenjoy a work of art again and
again! One should Nietzsche calls illustrated this with the example of attending a drama or music One performance. out da capo loudly when onw lies it. Similar is the attitude of the person who feels affirmative towards life. He is a person who, like Nietzsche says, "wants to have it again as it and play, and not only to play but fundamentally to him who needs precisely this play -

life is at the same time analogous to looking at a work of art. The back at one's to it and horror-stricken, but he can also it and be thrilled. spectator can be opposed applaud to repeat this experience In the later case one wishes incessantly, one wants it again with the

main thought!" theparts separately! This is the (KSA JX:505). In BeyondGood and Evil

give

shape

to one's

life in such a way

that one has

the same wish

for all

was and is toall eternity, but to the whole insatiably callingout da capo notonly tohimeself
piece

andwhomakes itnecessary"(KSA V: 75 [BGE 82]).

one could compare the demon's

Finally,

She evidently doesn't ask him if he you could start over, would you marry me again?'37 start over again with her in an improved and 'tidied up' version. would She does ask if he would marry her again exactly life she is, with all her qualities but also with her weaknesses,

momentof thegolden jubilee's height: 'if ( a bit likea demon) intoherhusband's ear at the

test to the question

whispered

by

let's say - the wife

14

with hergood sides but also with her little ways,with herbeautyspotbut also with herold
in short with everything without exclusion. If his answer hag's wart, with all her belongings, was good. He is affirmative, if he does want the repetition, he actually means that all in all, it becomes once again the groom saying yes, repeating it and sealing it. To Nietzsche we all are The this groom and life is our wife (KSA IE: 568-569). ring of rings" according ring of return" is "the wedding connecting and reconciling ring. Before have repetition we to Zarathustra

ruttishly long for, "the a (KSA IV: 287:291),

will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustability" (KSA VI: 312 [EH 80]). Niether the
nor the normative interpretation of the eternal return knows how to deal with cosmological the tragic . The eternal return seen as an imperative is even in direct conflict with the tragic. It spontaeously transformation, leads to hedonic contradictory, meaningless. opitmism. These problems do not occur with is false, cruel, But unlike the pessimist the tragic man brings about a strrange transfiguration and inversion: grief becomes joy, pain becomes happiness,

tragic for him is the "affirmation

of lack of time I realising it,we are in themiddle of the theme of the tragic. Because to be short. In Ecce Home (the part where he discusses The Birth of tragedy as well as in the Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche explicitly relates the eternal return to the tragic. The of the life even in its strangest and sternest problems; the

endorses even his doom. To his fate, that what escapes his will, he calls out in ecstasy calls "amor fatC: I 'Yes, that's how I want it'. This is what Nietzsche - such I will want to learn more and more to esteem the necessary at be things as the beautiful dark side of his life. He one of those embellishing things. Amor fati: let this be my love from now on!" (KSA El:

fascination. Unlike the optimist the tragic man desire, disgust becomes loathing becomes does not look away from the worst and ugliest things of life illness, disaster, cruelty, death In contrast, even these phenomena become a source of continuous satisfaction and calamity. for him. These too are an incentive to his life. In Greek tragedy the hero still says 'yes' to the

Whereas

Christianity and pessimism were at odds with life, suffered from it, and therefore took revenge at life, slandered and taunted life, Nietzsche through his philosophy wants to remain faithful, confirm, agree, praise and applaud not only life, the earth, being, senuality, corporality, sexuality, joy and pleasure, but also suffering, sorrow and death.

521). Nietzsche's philosophyaspires tobe theopposite of a philosophythatnegates life.

this crucial test Nietzsche wants to find out which people are capable of a radical Through and unconditional affirmation of life. One could remark that he as well offered such an attitude as an "ideal" (KSA V: 75), abnd therefore possibly as the starting point of an ethnical issue. I can fully agree with this. The question is however whether for Nietzsche this ideal can take the form of an imperative to which each person at each moment of his life should subject. I hope Imade clear that I don't think so.

Endnotes

This is the textof a speech held at a Nietzsche symposium in 1994 in TiIburg (The Netherlands). I did not trytoefface thecolloquial character of the text.

15

I For Nietzsche's texts I have used theG. Colli and M. Montinari's edition: S?mtliche Werke. Kritische S?mtliche Studienausgabe (Berlin & New York: W. De Gruyter, 1980) (abbreviated KSA) and for the letters: For the Briefe, Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin & New York: W. De Gruter, 1986) (abbreviated KSB). English quotes I used the translationsby R. J.Hollingdale: Ecce Homo (EH) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Beyong Good and Evil (BGE) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990); Untimely Meditations (UM) (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Twilight of the Idols (TI) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968); Human, all tooHuman (HH) (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1986). M. Heidegger *Wer istNietzsches Zarathustra?*, in Idem. Vortr?ge und Aufs?tze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), Teil I, p. 118 and Was heisst Denken? (T?bingen: Neimeyer, 1961), p. 47. Fortunately, this is not But probably it is his last. Heidegger's only opinion on Nietzsche's eternal return. 4 This idea was most explicidy pronounced by Karl Lowith: Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen (Hamburg, F. Meiner, 1978), pp. 66-67 and 86 ff.See also from the same author: Nietzsche's Doctrine of eternal recurrence', inNietzsche (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1987), p. 426; and "Nietzsche, nach sechzig Jahren', inGesammelte Abhandlungen. Zer Kritik der geschichtlichen Existenz (Stuttgarte.a.: Kohlhammer, 1969), pp. 139-140. 5 more at lengthduring a series of lectures Nietzsche discusses theGreek conception of the eternal return Philosophy in theTragic Age of theGreeks, held in 1872 at theUniversity of Basel: KSA I: e.g. 822 and further.See also I: 261 andXIII: 375. 6 Itmay suffice here to referto thecritiques of Simmel and Danto: G.Simmel Schopenhauer undNietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1907), pp. 250-251 and A. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Columbis University Press, 1965), pp. 203-209. 7 * 9 Mainly from KSA IX:494 and further. amMain: L Andrea-Salome Friedrich Nietzsche in seinemWerken (Frankfurt Insel, 1983), pp. 256-257. 3

H. Putnam Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge et al,: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 49; and Idem. Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge Mass, & London: Harvard University Press, 1990), among other p. 5. 10 On theanti-realism of Nietzsche's perspectivism: E. Oger'Nietzsches Inszenierungen der Philosopie\ in R. Dunhamel & E. Oger (Eds.) Die Kunst der Sprache und die Sprache der Kunst (W?rzburg: K?nigshausen & Neumann, 1994), pp. 9-36. II It is still necessary to repeat thatThe Will toPower is not a book by Nietzsche himself, but a rather

arbitraryhodgepodge by other? ,: 13

M. Heidegger Nietzsche (Pfullingen:Neske, 1961), Volume

1,p.17.

Die ewige Wiederkunftdes Gleichen und der Sinn des O. Ewald Nietzsches Lehre in ihereGrundbegriffe, ?bermenschen (Berlin: Hofmann, 1903). B. Magnus Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. Ill ff.; Idem. ^Nietzsche's Eternalistic Counter-Myth\ inReview ofMetaphysics, Nr. 4, 1973, pp. 604 616; Idem, 'Eternal Recurrence', in Nietzsche-Studien, Volume 8, 1979, pp. 362-377 and B. Magnus, St Stewart& J.P. Mileur Nietzsch's Case. Philosophy as/andLiterature (New York & London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 25 ff. " By concentrating lifecompletely at thepresent one will live each moment as if itwere the lastmoment, each day as if itwere the last day. This way, everythingone does becomes final. What is done cannot be undone. It cannot be changed, improvedor restored tomorrow. 14

16

16 "

Probably Nietzsche too says something similar inKS A VI:

159.

am Main: Fischer, 1940), Band des Lustprinzips', inGesammelte Werke (Frankfurt S. Freud "Jenseits from theFreudian: 1.Nietzsche's eternal return XIII, p. 21. The Nietzschean approach however stronglydiffers arises from a desire to repeat an act accompanied by lust. 2. The incessant returnof the same act forFreud however arises from a "repetitioncompulsion". An act is repeated not so much because itproduces itproduces lust,but ratherbecause itdoesn't give satisfaction.This "waiting in vain for satisfaction" (p. 19) can lead to a of the same act. compulsive repetition " An exception however is J. Salaquarda ^Der ungeheure Augenblick1, inNietzsche-Studien, Volume 1989, pp. 317-337. 18,

19 Nietzsche et le probleme de la The second aspect was stressed by PatrickWotling in his important civilisation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995), pp. 359-360. 20 Nietzsche's perspectivism makes essentialist statements such as "Einmal ist keinmal* extremely

problematic. 21 22 See M. Heidegger Nietzsche, Volume 1,p. 272. Nietzsche frequently uses theword "Schwergewicht".A few examples from his lastperiod: KS A VI: 23 141.

187,372. As you know, inGerman-speaking regions - and certianly in de nineteenthcentury - one is to verysensitive thedistinction between "duzen" and "Siezen". For Nietzsche as well, thiswas verymarkedly thecase(KSA VIII: 574). In other versions, among others inThus spoke Zarathustra, the theoreticalcontentof the thought is statednot so much by Zarathustra's animals (the snake and theeagle). 25 where he speaks of demons: KSB A few examples inhis letters 234; V: 25,410; VI: 235, 255. II: 232, 240, 262, 282, 330; III: 130, 190, 24

26 man. With his insistingquestions Socrates too put theopinions of The demon is also a creature that tests of their his fellow-townsmen to test He incessantly triedthe strenght knowledge. Already in theperiod of UntimelyMeditations ('On theUses and Disadvantages of History forLife' of was no talkof theeternal return yet,Nietzscge carried out similar experiments 1874), thus ina timewhere there with his friends and acquaintances. He Played thedemon's role: "If you ask your acquaintances if theywould like to relive the past ten or twentyyears, you will easily discover which of them is prepared for this will all answerNo, tobe sure, but they will have differentreasons foranswering suprahistorical standpoint: they will be better' [...]. Let us call them No. Some may perhaps be consoling themsleves: 'but the next twenty historicalmen; looking to the past impels them towards the futureand fires theircourage to go on living and theirhope what theywant will still happen, thathappiness lies behind the hill they are advancing towards. These historicalmen believe that the meaning of existence will come more and more to light in the course of its proces [...]. But our question can also be answered differently. Again with a No butwith a No for a different reason: with the No of the supra-historical man, who sees no salvation in theprocess and forwhom, rather, the more years teach that the world is complete and reaches itsfinalityat each and everymoment. What could ten were unable to teach!" (KSA I: 255 [UM 65-66]). By thisquestion Nietzsche does notwant tofind out past ten whether someone would wish the repetition of his life. Indeed, he believes everybody would answer this question in thenegative, an unmistakable sign of the influenceof the pessimistic philosophy of Schpenhauer. Nietzsche is exclusively interestedin theway this 'no' ismotivated: whether one does or does not believe in progress and thus also in history.What is testedhere is not the attitude towards life,but theattitude towards Therefore, the testdoes not have to be so severe; one has to live its lifeonly once more and thenonly history. the last tenor twenty years. 27

17

* The distinctionmade by Joan Stambauch. ('Das Gleiche inNietzsches Gedanken der Ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen', inRevue Internationale de Philosophie, Nr. 1, 1964, p. 91) between "das Gleiche" and "das Selbe", cannot be found inNietzsche's texts,but without her indicating it - comes from Heidegger: Vortr?ge - such as Gilles Deleuze Nietzsche undAufs?tze (Pfullingen:Neske, 1967), Volume 2, p. 67. Many interpreters et la philosophic )Paris: Presses Universit?res de France, 1962), pp. 52-55 - find itdifficult to consider the return of the same as a return of the identical.The fundamental reason for this is thier ontological interpretation of the return. Deleuze did not see, that the selection is not carried out by the eternal returnas a cosmic event but soley by the thoughttaken for true. of the return), (by the centrifugalforce of the turning 29 In other texts however (for example theZarathustra) sometimes a retropectiveperspective is chosen: KSA IV: 200. 30 On theas if ("Als on")-issue, see I Kant Kritik derreinenVernunft,B 699 ff. 31 This Nietzschean though is found very explicidy inDerrida: Ulysse gramophone. 1987), pp. 90, 108 and Psychi. Inventions de l'autre (Paris: Galilee, Deux mots pour Joyce 1987), among others p.

(Paris: Galilee, 642. 32

Neske, 1974), p. 73.

L. E. Borowski "Darstelung des lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kants',

inWer war Kant? (Pfullingen:

33 A. Schopenhauer Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (Z?rich: Diogenes, York: Dover, 1969) translation E.F.J. Payne, Volume 1,p. 324.

1977) volume 2, 59, p. 405; (NEw

34 B. Russell The Autobiography 1872-1914, (London: G, Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 13. 35 J. Derrida 'Dialangues', inPoints de suspension (Paris:, Galilee, 1992), p. 154.

36 This maybe shows some similarity to Wittgenstein's conduct, as is described inB. McGuinness's biography Wittgenstien A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (London: Penguin, 1988), p. 34.: "He [Wittgenstein] read intensively,ratherthanwidely: he would returnagain and again to a passage otr a poem that 'said something to him* ratheras he would when listening tomusic on the gramophone put the neddle back repeatedly to some musical transition from which he wanted to extract everything". I borrow thisexample from the inspiring book byM. Clark Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge et a;.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 269. 37

18