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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT" Author(s): XIAOXIONG YI Source: The Journal of East Asian
Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005), pp. 74-112 Published by: Institute for National Security Strategy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23257886 . Accessed: 13/12/2013 06:54
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74
THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA S "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT"

XIAOXIONG
Marietta College
VI
ABSTRACT
China is now in the process of transforming itself from a weakling into one of the strong. The view in Beijing, however, is that China still has a considerable distance to travel before it gets there. As a result, the Chinese goal, at leadership's A foreign least for now, is to pursue economic development. has therefore policy of "heping fazhan (peaceful development)" Another important task in goal. is to accentuate China's role as foreign policy a rising power. In this sense, China's new "peaceful development" to learn to policy is a reflection of Beijing' s willingness behave like a great power. The article provides a detailed China's new examination under the assessment of the "heping fazhan" policy s fourth generation leadership and suggests that in the Chinese offers the change-of-guard leadership and China been dovetailed with this
possibility, though not the certainty, that China may increasingly fit more comfortably into the international system in the years ahead. On the issue of Taiwan, however, this author believes China now will not hesitate see the "reunification to act, because Beijing' s new leaders of the motherland" as a necessary, of China. step in the reemergence Leadership, Regionalism, Multilateralism, Soft Power
if dangerous,
Key Words: Development,
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S
"PEACEFUL
75
INTRODUCTION
over as secretary general of 2002 and assumed in November Party the presidency in March 2003, there has been much speculation as to whether there will be any change in Chinese foreign Ever since Hu Jintao took the Chinese Communist policy.1 And ignoring the rhetoric, for the first time since officials, 1949, there also is a real debate among Chinese direction of China's and about the future scholars, analysts foreign policy and what will be the most effective diplomatic its influence to consolidate strategy that will allow Beijing in Asia and improve its position globally. While Premier the Wen Hu Jintao and of President leadership Jiabao has yet to display visions as grand as dual
those of the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping, the "fourth generation" observers with a plethora of Chinese leaders have impressed in the This is most obvious "xinsiwei" ("new thinking"). foreign policy arena. "taoguang yanghui" dictum lead") diplomatic abandoned Zemin's Jiang The new leadership has broken ("keep a low profile and never laid down and "duojihua with the take the
by Deng quietly de shijie" ("a multipolar worldview").2 Beijing' s new diplomatic strategy is now centered in achieving its objectives on a more multifaceted approach and has moved stance
1
significantly from its previous foreign-policy of "petulant moralism"3 to what may be called a more
Its 'Peaceful Rise' Evan S. Medeiros, "China Debates for example, the best route to development?" Yale Is a kinder, gentler Beijing vale, edu/ display. article?id= June 22, 2004, online at http //valeglobal. Global, CNN "Fresh approach from Hu-Wen and Willy Wo-Lap 4118. team," Lam, See, Strategy: online at http: //edition, cnn. com/2004/WORLD/ World, January 6, 2004, column/. /06/willv. asiapcf/east/01 2 from Deng discussion on Hu-Wen's For a Chinese breaking away "China Should Abandon see Zhang s diplomatic Binsen, dictum, Xiaoping' of Chinese Political 'taoguang yanghui'in Foreign Policy online at http://www.ccrs.org.cn/2233/ReadNews.asp? 17, 2003, May NewsID=212 3 Jintao Chinese has characterized the pre-Hu Kenneth Lieberthal the Science,
foreign
76
normal
or
explicitly A new consensus
typical foreign-policy position China's own national interests.4
that
recognizes
generation of Chinese of China's there are no signs Furthermore, foreign policy. of U. S. leadership in Asian and world of Chinese acceptance affairs or narrowing of significant differences on the Taiwan issue.
is beginning to emerge among the fourth decision makers about the future directions
and fragmented Below the surface of an inexperienced which is full of diffidence and preoccupations, we leadership can clearly see the contour of the Hu-Wen team's foreign policy "xinsiwei" as well as continuity and change in their 16th party the fourth strategic thinking. To begin with, convention generation Chinese
at the conclusion
of the CCP
Congress, People's leadership presented a blueprint for China's Its goal is long-term national goal to be fulfilled by 2020. to transform the current Chinese society into what is known as "hexie" society, where the general populace would be able to enjoy a more abundant and "harmonious" life. China plans to fulfill this end by quadrupling the size of its 2000 gross domestic product by 2020. To achieve this, China is banking on securing China's international environment at a time when focused is on and Beijing sustaining economic development stability. political It is true that in order to secure its international Beijing seems to be convinced
and the 11thNational
environment, that there is no choice but to
as a policy on based policy been humiliated and taken last Rose 150 years, correctness Brady, you owe us of our stance?and "A New Face
"petulant advantage a lot, and then on we China's
moralism," of
a notion
that
"we
have
for by the industrial powers the moral you need to recognize can talk about Cited in specifics." Week,
Business Foreign Policy," online at http://www.businessweek.com.pl/magazine/ 4, 2003, August content/03 31/b3844142.htm. 4 For a Chinese account of the traditional "unfair" world order, see
Zhaozhong, Xiayige mubiao shishui?[Who Will Be the Next Target?] (Beijing: China Youth Publishing House, 1999).
Zhang
"PEACEFUL
77
avoid new cannot
leaders
direct confrontation with Washington. However, Beijing' s also see one possible complicating factor: China commit
to any Sino-American that may cooperation it from out reunification s prevent carrying strategy. Beijing' At the bottom of the Chinese of concern lies the possibility a U.S.-led intervention in the Taiwan Strait should there be conflict there. The real challenge for the Hu-Wen is to avoid with the United direct conflict therefore, regime, States "at any price," but not to allow the United States to interfere seemingly Should in Beijing' s reunification plan "at any price"-two incompatible goals.5 these two seemingly incompatible goals become for irreconcilable China's new leaders then there will truly be no possibility of any compromise on Taiwan's independence For reasons to be efforts, be they blatant or step-by-step.6 discussed later in the article, the new leadership in Beijing is prepared to intervene militarily and, as Wen Jiabao stated in November 2003, "the Chinese will pay any price," including to accept a setback in their development program of "one
5 In his interview 21, 2003, of the Jiabao," with Leonard warned, For Washington Downie "China Jr. of the will pay on Post, Washington price to safeguard "interview see, transcript, any 22, 2003, online at
an armed
November the with unity Wen
Wen The
motherland."
a complete Post, November
http //www, washingtonpost. com/ac2/wp-dvn?pagename=article& contentId=A6641-2003Nov22&notFound=true. 6 Yan Xuetong has argued that while "the policy of Hu Jintao's to 'pay
government national with Deng any price to maintain unity' is not inconsistent s principle of 'one there has been an two systems,' Xiaoping' country, obvious on Taiwan since Jintao and Hu Wen Jiabao came to change policy Politically, the image a formal constitute 2003, of the Chinese forces declaration a threat Wen Premier damaged Taiwan, five by overseas which seeks This would in October anti-Chinese will be seriously government that support the independence of of independence within four to to China's came up survival. with the To address that policy
power.
years. threat, will Price
the
China
consideration Any
3(July 20, 2004), p. 39-40.
the reunification of the country without resolutely uphold any of the price." Yan Xuetong, of the to 'Pay "Origins Policy to Contain Taiwan's China Vol. Independence'," Strategy,
78
decade or more" if in the end an armed resolution is necessary And if due to this they to prevent Taiwan's independence.7 with conflict the could not prevent a U.S., they appear willing in economic risk.8 As it increases to take the necessary strength, China U.S.-dominated is momentarily power content structure global into a more advantageous is very much contingent Taiwan The Straits.
with the to cooperate while maneuvering however, across the
position. Such cooperation, on the strategic dynamics
cannot making of Chinese foreign policy, however, United States or focused be reduced to a policy toward the "obsession." The view in Beijing in Taiwan only on China's 2005 takeoff. is on the verge of its second economic dual with a brief summary of the Hu-Wen Starting fazhan" doctrinenew foreign policy "heping leadership's a the article will then provide development"), ("peaceful is that China detailed China's examination of the "heping fazhan" It will fourth generation an assessment of China's leadership. "Peaceful Development" policy conclude under with
strategy.
THE ARTICULATION OF HU-WEN FOREIGN POLICY: DEVELOPMENT"9 CHINA' S "PEACEFUL

Since
7 8 The For
late 2003,
Post,
"heping fazhan"
"Interview on see The with Wen China's Jusuf Jakarta
("peaceful
Jiabao." fourth
development")
Washington an excellent on the
discussion issue,
view
Taiwan
Wanandi, Post,
generation Asia "East July 1, 2004,
leadership's and Bumpy online at
Sino-Taiwanese 9
//valeglobal. vale, edu/display.article?id=4112. http

Although by could and the concept academic Chinese intimidate that of "peaceful rise" in China, circles officials other and Asian
Relations,"
political debated "rise"
in the still enjoys strong currency the term itself has been publicly scholars. Some that the use of argued countries. Others opposed the term in groups that China and social
"peaceful," fearing Taiwan. Still others is not rising and
it could rise
opposed will not
encourage pro-independence the use of the term "rise," arguing given its myriad of economic
'PEACEFUL
79
has been foreign
adopted In
as the motto for the Hu-Wen an excellent discussion
policy. foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, Pei Yuanying, former Director General of the Department of Policy Planning at the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese ambassador to India, has
leadership* s of the Chinese
identified Deng Xiaoping' s policy as "giving to and development as the theme of our prominence peace times" and Jiang Zemin's as "advocating a just and fair new international political and economic a new order, advocating and promoting the concept of civilization security concept, to defend world diversity." As for Hu Jintao's policy position, Ambassador Pei believes that the key signifier is "building up an image of a peace-loving, moderate but resolute, responsible major power," i.e., overcome the deeply embedded Chinese
power."10
history and to develop
"peaceful development." 'victim mentality' in modern a rational mentality as a rising
and - "to
problems. Forum, ("heping Then, "peaceful late Deng stick the tone Hu
As
result, used eleven
in the
April words
2004,
Jintao
fazhan") by using rise"
times,
"peaceful development" but did not mention the word "rise" at all.
during or "peace"
his
speech
at
the
Boao
the expression to replace the term "peaceful development" in his speech at the celebration of the birth centenary of on August Hu again stated that "China will 22, 2004, Xiaoping development." Hu's new articulation has set
new external expression referring to China's For the subtle change in Chinese discussion of the two strategy. analysts' terms - "jueqi" and see People's still "fazhan", Daily, "Deng's legacy influences rest of world: President China, Hu," August 23, 2004, p. 1, Xu Jian, Studies 1-20, debate, and "A Peaceful (China and also The Rise, Institute Song Studies, see Economist, China's Strategic Option," of International Vol. Studies), "China's Peaceful 3 (May 2004), "China Debates rise," p. Its 'Peaceful Jun 24, story of Peaceful in the New CIIS International 2004), CIIS on the p. 2 (March
to the path of peaceful on Beijing' s official
Yimin, Vol. Medeiros,
International
development," 13-29. For more Rise' 2004,
"Peaceful
Strategy," online at and Theory International
http://www.economist.com/displavStorv.cfm? 10 Pei Yuanying, "The Five Principles and Practice of China's
id=2792533. CIIS
Coexistence Era,"
Studies, Vol. 4 (July 2004), p. 6-18.
Diplomacy
80
Since
the end
sum up Beijing'
responsibility." countries that China will not be
of 2003, "heping fazhan" has helped to s goals of "good neighborliness" and "global The term is used primarily to reassure other
s rise in military and economic prominence a threat to peace and stability, and that other nations will benefit from China's in the growth. Explicit doctrine is the notion that China's economic and military development is not a zero-sum rather than threats." opportunities as Robert Radtke noticed, "couldn't Beijing and Washington, have been more striking. In short, China's message is, 'We' re here to help,' while the U.S. is: 'You are either message with us or against us' ."'2 to be a more Designed doctrine to take emphasizes the menace effective diplomatic strategy, the of "soft power" by trying game and that China presents "The contrast in tone between
rapid growth. It is also an attempt to break away from the previous Chinese foreign policy, which has been widely seen as passive and opportunistic. It presents "China's as part of the overall development" development in Asia and in the world.13 In diplomatic practice,
the importance out of China's
See,
Peaceful
for example, "World Sees Chance as China Pursues People's Daily, June 25, 2004, online at http: //enelish.people.com.cn/ Rise,"
200404/26/eng20040426
Road Chosen 12 Robert W. ence in Asia?"
141493. shtml. and "China's

of a Great 'Peaceful Science Nation," Rise'
Peaceful Rise?A
18, 2004, p.7. influ online
for Rejuvenation "China's Radtke, The Christian
February
Monitor, have
US overshadowing December 8, 2003, -coop.html.
Chinese readily provided evidence. China accounted for 21% of U.S. supporting in 2003 and 28% of Germany's, to a report pub export-growth according lished by Morgan in May 2004. China contributed 32% of Japan's Stanley leaders with export said. has 36% of South Korea's and 68% of Taiwan's, the report growth, "One of the lessons of the past several years is that China's growth been for her neighbors," of Straszheim, good says Donald president Global strong," in Los Angeles. See Amit August Prakash, 30, "China 2004, on Bloomberg News, s imports line at
at http //www.csmonitor.com/2003/1208/p09s01 13 Western economists and financial analysts
Straszheim remain
http://www.iht. com/bin/print.php?file=536400.html.
"PEACEFUL
81
the
doctrine
institutions
such as those related to the Nansha (Spratly) Aksai Chin, and Diaoyudao (Senkaku). Islands, In addition, the doctrine seeks to avoid confrontation with the U.S. One of the motivations behind the doctrine is the is not a declining that the U.S. power and that of powers for the first part of the 21st century, no alliance could "constrain" U.S. actions. The other motivation behind conclusion the doctrine been major and is the realization of China's that trade "new with America has will be essential economic growth. A thinking" is a recent, if that the world is for the moment unipolar for China's will persist for decades. As a
Cooperation in border disputes
multilateral emphasizes cooperation through like the Six-Party Beijing Talks and the Shanghai It also calls for less assertiveness Organization.
element
grudging, acceptance and that U.S. preponderance
result, the "peaceful development" strategy seeks to prevent the U.S. from becoming an enemy and also tries to make it for the U.S. impossible vis-a-vis China. Some excluded leaves litmus China watchers as from the Taiwan to follow a strategy of containment
believe that Taiwan is explicitly doctrine - "the concept of peaceful rise a looming contradiction. Taiwan is the
future role in global affairs."14 Others that "as of China's aim of avoiding confrontation argue part with the U.S., the PRC has attempted to portray itself as the advocate of peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, and in test of China's contrast support further Taiwan to practice of the U.S. in the 1990s, has attempted to gain the in restricting Chen Shui-bian's efforts to development" the above
independence."15 While the newly articulated policy of "peaceful will have profound for Taiwan, implications
14 15 Medeiros, Willy "China Wo-Lap Debates Lam, Its "Beijing' 'Peaceful Rise'
s Reaction
Strategy." to East Asia's volume
Alliances," China Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 15 (July 22, 2004), online at http://
chechnva. iamestown.
Changing id=395
&issue id=3025&article id=2368295.
org/publications
details,
php?
82
mentioned are very much off base. On the issue of analyses does not see any "looming contradiction" Taiwan, Beijing and its policy aim no longer "avoids with the confrontation U.S." not does consider Taiwan a Instead, only Beijing domestic that affair, but it also now seems to be convinced will never give up Taiwan as its "unsinkable Washington aircraft carrier" in East Asia and will continue to provide ever more substantial military and diplomatic backing to the Chen Shui-bian "separatist" government.16 While it is true that China does not want a military conflict of any scale with the
16 For a Chinese is the PRC see, for example, view, Ministry intention of the U.S. political Congress Taiwan Relations Act?" November 15, that "the with of Foreign in passing 2002, The focus official and
Affairs, the so at China empha goal of large its allies in the aircraft convinced
"What called
online
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/lizg/3568/tl7797.htm. out in July 2004 News Service (CNS) pointed sis of America's China." tackling of scale series throughout forces The naval have 2004 and shifted to East Summer Operation air exercises held seen by Chinese Chinese to use
Asia,
the eventual
Pulse?unprecedented and by the U.S. seem an to be
the Pacific?is
analysts strategists Taiwan as
as the first salvo "unsinkable
Pentagon's go-east game plan. that America's efforts apparent carrier" U.S. tious 2004, 17 serve its overall and domination"
Asia-Pacific under goal of "maintaining stability that "the U.S. and Taiwan have formed a surrepti July 8,
tent 1583464.htm.
In his meeting July 2004, the U.S. engagement ing Foreign "to stop with
See China Daily, "US drill test of new strategy," military alliance." online at http: / /news, xinhuanet. com/english/2004-Q7/08/con with U.S. National Li
representation Hu Jintao required."
Adviser Condoleezza Rice in Security has demanded "three stops"? Zhaoxiong advanced to Taiwan, arms all official selling stop and stop offering Taiwan its assistance in gain Taiwan, in international where statehood is organizations Minister and Wen the warns Jiabao made the similar remarks in August Taiwan," during 2004. Reuters, their See July with U.S. Senate delegation clash with
separate meetings John Ruwitch, "China 30, 2004, online
of military
at http: / /www,
reuters. co.uk/news new vows ideas," to crush
tvpe=worldNews&storyID=556502&section=news. China visit restated old policies, lacked 2004, Taiwan p.3. Also see Flu Xiao, "PLA
PackageArticle.jhtml? And "Rice's Joy Su, Taipei Times, July 11, Taiwan separatism,"
China Daily, August 2, 2004, p. 1, and China Daily, "US urged to heed
promises," August 5, 2004, p.l.
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S *PEACEFUL
83
U.S., Beijing recently has made a quiet but important shift in its Taiwan policy.17 In July 2004, the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission issued what was believed to be the first ultimatum and discussed Taiwan's reunification? military to reclaim a timetable sovereignty over the island regarding using force to achieve "Taiwan must re-enter the Chinese in the next 20 years."18 now sees that "China's Beijing issue, a long article on to say that: solution of the Taiwan
fold or face
action
What is significant is will be affected by the peaceful development so the issue cannot drag on indefinitely," as in the People's revealed Daily recently, going "while the timetable has been crystallized, the Taiwan issue is now
set forth by the mainland on its own initiative. This is a reflection of the adjustment of our Taiwan It conforms to the This adjustment is well-timed. policy. 'Taiwan independence' and present central task of containing runs parallel with the national policies of focusing on peaceful and seizing strategic opportunity to develop the development mainland for reunification' serves as a circle drawn for Taiwan it is like the center separatists of Buddha's palm, we would like to see whether you dare, and can jump out of it."19 In short, Beijing now is ready to 'timetable take the solution not expecting "reunification" of the Taiwan issue from into its own hands It while views any support both as a component its goal
Presse,
itself first. Our
Washington. of as well as a necessary development."20

to Attack Taiwan
step in achieving
18 See Agence France
of "peaceful
"PRC Says Ready
within
20 Years," July 16, 2004, online at http 1//taiwansecuritv.org/AFP/2004/ AFP-160704.htm. and Goh Sui Noi, "China attack within 20 years 'possi
ble' ," The Straits Times, "China online at July sets 16 2004, clear online at http: //straitstimes. for solving Taiwan asial. com.sgZeveoneastasia/ 19 Daily, People's July 20 28, 2004, story/0.4395.261675.00.html. timetable issue,"
eng20040728 151134.html.
As regards power
http://englishl.people.com.cn/200407/28/ now state
"Taiwan that Beijing Leijun argues, may not understand Tang as the basis of further economic reunification development, and national security." Tang Leijun, "US, Taiwan military
exercises
84
"peaceful
Although team existed has
development''
in its implementation
few perceptions of the Hu-Wen foreign policy in the international arena before they emerged onto the world stage in March 2003,21 China's new leadership a "kinder and gentler" platform with a quickly unveiled series of actions to advance its policy of "peaceful development." s new diplomatic practices have become increasingly confident, and skillful on a rapidly expanding sophisticated, list of regional and international issues. At least seven policy Beijing'
initiatives become Image For
in China's discernible.
new "peaceful
development"
thrust have
Building most of the China had been a period sincel949, and had acted with near total disregard
largely reactive power of how its image played both at home and abroad. Beijing hopes that the world will no longer view China as either a victim in the international arena or an irresponsible and self centered
regional power, but rather as a major and respected which is an active and important member of the country and a constructive and responsible multilateral community, player. China's new leaders appear to be learning the importance see international acceptance as legitimacy. At the CCP 16th
of image building and clearly a way to enhance their domestic
and national power ominous signals,"
Taiwan "US, security." Tang Leijun, Asia Times Online, July 29, 2004,
military exercises online at http: / /
www.atimes.com/atimes/ China/FG29Ad04.html. 21 the confirmation of Hu Jintao as president in March he 2003, Following has taken the helm of the CCP's on Foreign Affairs Leading Group - China's decision mat (LGFA) top policy organ on foreign and security ters. The five members who belong to the group are Vice-President Zeng Qinghong, Vice-Premier Wu
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing.
Yi,
State
Councilor
Tang
Jiaxuan,
and
"PEACEFUL
85
media were given unprecedented Congress, representatives access to some of the proceedings. New Chinese leaders were those with the logos of treating the cameras, particularly broadcast more as allies than intruders. networks, foreign Since the summer to publicize more government have of 2003, there has been a new campaign and promote China's foreign policy. Accordingly, been
white papers on controversial foreign policy issued-all on the internet topics published (www, china, org, cn) - so as to articulate and defend Beijing' s As Beijing begins to interact more intensely with positions. the international press, senior Chinese leaders have also started their promoting country's policies through an ever-increasing number of trips abroad.22 favorable international images has become an Projecting important part of the "peaceful development" policy. A careful reading of Chinese policy statements and academic writings reveal the following themes: of the use - references to the 1. "peace-loving" opposition of force, with the exception of Taiwan 2. "developing economy 3. country" and China's - references to China unity with Third World
as a developing countries
"international cooperation, international
- references to multilateral cooperator" of international and support organizations treaties to Chinese foreign policy
4. "independent actor" - references as being autonomous

22
To
promote Zemin, and Li
China's
Jiang nents
especially Daily's made Dao
Peng, to other and
policies and Zhu
through
internationally People's Committee Daily, www,
oriented over Ren
Rongji, Their successors parts of Asia. have spent far more time abroad. the new members of the trips in the last two Activities)," html.
with frequent trips abroad began who traveled to most of the conti are even According Standing more to
statistics, Huo
Politburo
70 overseas
"Ling people,
Dong(Leaders' com, cn/item/ldhd/zbhome.
See People's years. at http // online
86
5. "major
power, international 6. "human
power" China's
- references
to China national
growing status
as an aspiring great strength, and rising
- references to "people rights and democracy" centered" and poli first") development (or "put people cies
From this list, one can see both change and continuity in of China projected by the new leadership. From the of continuity, the new leadership has continued perspective - to with of a different level enthusiasm though very project the images of China as an independent actor and a developing the images from the perspective of discontinuity, country. Conversely, the Jiang Zemin-era saw the government the emphasizing of China as an of Now the new image opponent hegemony. has all but abandoned such an image. Instead it leadership has focused as a on the images of China unprecedented emphasis an international a nation, peace-loving cooperator, and an advocate of human responsible major power, rights. have a real impact on Chinese projected images For example, China under ex-president foreign policy. and ex-premier Zhu Rongji astounded the Jiang Zemin world with its economic reflected a substantial growth, by increase leadership in the current However, year after year. is making it clear that it has a somewhat different GDP These
The new leadership has presented itself as a emphasis. more "caring" and it calls a advocated what government concept of "yiren weiben" ("people-centered") development. on GDP focusing growth, the emphasis first" And "put people development. they have it made clear that the officially "people-centered principle" is on In foreign policy, for example, practical applications. Minister Li made Foreign Zhaoxing strong representations to the U.S. of State Colin Powell in July 2004 Secretary the assault on a Chinese tourist at Niagara Falls. regarding Li, according to the Chinese media, had done so at the has Instead of blindly
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S 'PEACEFUL
87
behest
of
President over that: around
Hu.23
So
"concerned"
is
the
Chinese
leadership announced, embassies
human
Foreign Ministry rights, the Chinese "President Hu Jintao has instructed Chinese the world Chinese that they have to do everything citizens overseas."24 Today"
they can to protect Regional First:
"China
Is Asia's
starts grand design for its "peaceful development" at the regional where Beijing seeks to reassert its level, traditional leadership role as a "virtuous leader." its Despite global aspirations, Beijing is focusing its interests in the Asia Pacific region; strengthening bilateral diplomacy, developing "constructive of cooperation," and participating partnerships in regional multilateral organizations are three main mechanisms in China's China's diplomacy. "regional first" policy. long-standing preference has been for bilateral in confidence However, Beijing' s newfound bilateral relations with other Asian countries on mutual accommodation, understanding, and a that economic adjustment" recognition the
China's
promoting the basis of "mutual and mutual are interests departure prevailed ties, China
driving force in bilateral ties represent a from the ideological alliance and opportunism that In its bilateral earlier in Chinese foreign policy. now seeks to "chaoyue considerations") events"). yishi xingtai yinsu" and "chao tuo" 2003, ("go ("be
beyond ideological detached from concrete

23
In October
Wen Jiabao
The tourist, a 37-year-old Yan, had been pepper-sprayed 24 PRC of Foreign Ministry with U.S. Secretary of State," 144064. the now has gov, cn/eng/zxxx/t is important and However, and be done
businesswoman and beaten "Li Affairs,
from
by a US Zhaoxing online
named Zhao Tianjin border inspector. Over Telephone Talks
July 26, 2004, htm. In principle, leadership is serious about
Hu-Wen means
if Beijing if "yiren weiben" and Beijing
at http://www.fmprc. value to human life attaching deserves for so. praise doing the welfare of Chinese citizens is a great deal that remains to
there anything, to "walk the talk."
88
put forward bilateral ties: deepening
"four-point"
proposal
"keeping frequent exchanges trade and economic cooperation; mechanisms; and
in furthering China's of high-level visits; setting up effective barriers hindering
cooperation eliminating the growth in bilateral relations."25 Since the start of the Hu-Wen administration China's toward Asian
policies of Japan and Taiwan, have on the verge of settling most of its border disputes.26 In recent in years, China has progressively stepped up its involvement China has deepened its security arrangements. on and engagement regional cooperation security dialogue with its Southeast Asian neighbors through the ASEAN regional Regional processes. policy has Forum The (ARF) and the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1 "judicious regionalism" foreign enhanced China's strategic position in the region and increased its influence over the region's political and security of Beijing' s decision to pursue its example first' is China's new stance on the "regional policy policy North Korea nuclear crisis. Since the revelation of Pyongyang's in October enriched-uranium 2002, development program China has been under pressure to play an active role in tackling the intensified nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. However, for almost ten months, Beijing maintained a seemingly indifferent posture on the issue. In the summer of 2003, the new Chinese leadership suddenly changed its hitherto passive position and began to play an "instrumental role" in brokering the six-nation talks. As proved by its efforts in hosting the Beijing
25 Cited
in 2003, with the neighbors, exception become more flexible. China is
in Chinese
dynamics. A recent
talks,
in China
China
has
adopted,
and
accepted,
the idea
of
November
1, 2003,
Daily, online
doc/2003-11/01/content 26 The dispute with India is the China's new leadership is taking remaining dispute.
links mutual benefit," provide at http //www2.chinadailv.com.cn/chinagate/ 277917.htm. to be settled, only one that remains a proactive in this position resolving but last
"China-EU
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S "PEACEFUL
89
multilateral solution attitude
talks
as the fundamental nuclear China's showed
formula crisis.
of the North Korea on the issue affairs-as
for a peaceful Beijing' s changed
new position regarding of one the major regional powers, China regional of playing a decisive role. At the post is ready and capable summit press conference on July 7, 2003, when China-ROK questioned regarding role a more active multilateral multilateral peninsula. de qudao) Hu's bold and ability to play Beijing' s willingness in in inducing to partake Pyongyang Hu made it clear that China "supports
talks, to peacefully resolve the problem on the dialogue And there is effective communications (changtong at work between of confidence Beijing and Pyongyang."27 were backed up by a series
words
of
crucial oil shipments to actions, including suspending the DPRK, Seoul, envoys to Pyongyang, sending high-level the and around and Moscow, Washington, shifting troops attempts to get North Korea to to resolve the nuclear crisis represents a talk with the U.S. departure from its traditional "buck-passing" approach to the wider in and a transformation Chinese foreign conflict, regional Sino-Korean policy. China wants Beijing a comprehensive "Korean Peninsula road and a role in Northeast Asia. For to play prominent map" with it the blocks which can assemble a Beijing, building is to draw has no intention to "help" the U.S. What border. China's
The first is to press Washington road map are the following. and Pyongyang to agree on "face saving" language that would Then what China provide a framework for future negotiations. wants Korea, Russian and
27
is a U.S.
assurance non-aggression provided for North China. The third is a Chinese and co-sponsored by informal or formal security guarantee for North Korea South Korean and Japanese economic aid
fourth, new
Korea and China Vow "South to Bring North France-Presse, Agcnce to Multilateral online at http: //www.nti.org/ Korea Table," July 8, 2003,
db/china/koreachr.htm#2003.
90
Korea. The goals of a Beijing "road map" would in the transformation twofold: to facilitate be, first, effect, of North Korea into a large economic zone for development and a stable buffer state for China's economic development China's weapons to reduce national of mass line for security, rather than an assembly destruction and ballistic missiles and second, the American influence in South Korea and to create
for North
a strategically neutralized Korean Peninsula. From China's of whether or not the six nations can agree on view, point nuclear program, how to stop Pyongyang's the talks have of China at least one breakthrough: the emergence produced as a more confident major power broker in the region.
Multilateralism
(Not Multipolarization) has little experience with or faith in peripheral involvement in multilateral of its commitment to sovereignty. Like
China Traditionally, multilateralism. ?China's mechanisms is indicative
many Asian countries, national sovereignty has been sacrosanct for China, a necessary condition for international order.? For this reason, Beijing tended to view the world as a collection and did not want to understand the constraints of nation-states that multilateral and institutions can place on national sovereignty decision-making.? As China is expanding
the number and depth of its bilateral relationships, Chinese foreign policy has also come increasingly issues that could to stress the importance of not bilateralizing be addressed In the past more productively multilaterally. several of its years, China has moved to build a consensus and seek remedies supportive internationally through policies and cooperation. As James Muldoon international organizations "China's underscores a permanent shift observed, cooperation in Chinese foreign policy towards multilateralism and a striking self-confidence
28 James P.
of Chinese
"The
diplomacy."28
Impact of 9/11 on Chinese Regional
Muldoon,
Jr.,
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Here, however, one sees a subtle yet significant difference between the third and fourth generations of Chinese leaders. had Jiang Zemin "multilateralism." a foreign policy of feverishly advocated What Jiang had in mind, however, was encountered a term one frequently (duojihua)," foreign policy pronouncements during was aimed to For Jiang, duojihua to American and counter unipolarity
"multipolarization in official Chinese Jiang's
presidency.? the "multipolarize" U.S.
balance
hence a world of multipolarity.29 preponderance, The new Chinese foreign policy team, however, has quietly it with a abandoned focus and replaced duojihua Jiang's
of "multilateralism" which is (doubian zhuyi), standpoint softer than "multipolarization." Such change implies real policy a world order where "Multipolarity" implies prescription. countries balance whereas the power; against the prevailing notion of multilateralism means a kind of foreign policy where even in a world dominated by a single power, other countries still play their role. such a policy line, it is quite remarkable that China has begun to take a less confrontational and more sophisticated multilateral and work hard within the multilateral approach can Under frameworks become to address its concerns. Beijing involved with regional increasingly and since 2003, worked Forum (ARF) the ASEAN Regional hard to reestablish the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation role in and taken a more active (SCO),30 Organization only has forums such as not
China 12 (June Vol. Brief, 4, Issue 10, 2004), Security Cooperation," 004 012.pdf. online at http://www.iamestown.org/images/pdf/cb 29 in December had sum In a major 2001, year-end piece People's Daily in 2001 as marized China's most important foreign policy accomplishment "actively "Yearender: 30 Since and forward multipolarization." pushing global December China's Fruitful," Diplomacy priorities People's 26, 2001, Daily, online at
http://english.people.com. cn/200112/25/ eng20011225 87404.shtml.

Asia states, 11, Washington's September it has established bilateral to some extent has in Central have changed with SCO's member agreements diminished the organization's relevance.
which
92
international Council, weapons
institutions also
such
as the United
Nations
it has
taken
a more
responsible
approach
Security to
control, greatly increased its participation in peacekeeping tried to engage with the European Union and operations, NATO-a departure from the previous practice of criticizing American-led alliances - and even begun to promote initiatives on security issues in forums in which the United States plays a major role.31 As Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel wrote, "China's active participation in international institutions creates more on key issues. Moreover, cooperation more resources and influence to the table. brings As the nation's stake in the international community expands China and now it associates itself with great-power interests, China is becoming more involved in efforts to combat global threats, both traditional and nontraditional."32 his serious commitment to for example, Hu Jintao to accept an invitation by the G7 to attend between the G7 and major developing countries the invitation his accepted predecessor, Jiang As wants would Hu told the leaders of the industrialized the G7. to meet friendly, to develop its dialogue with like to utilize the opportunities of the G7 and establish with them."33 of approach became the first an chances to elicit
gradually
security To show
multilateralism, Chinese leader the discussion in 2003. Zemin, world, China's with personal
31 For
He "China leaders
refused.
the
heads
of state
relationships
where the US and Japan are said to have a dominate ARF, example, ASEAN Chinese At the 2003 Minister Li Zhaoxing summit, Foreign to increase to form a conference communication Asian proposed among role. militaries, cials from under 24 ARF. Then, including in November 2004, China hosted the first
ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC)

states, North ence. 32 Evan
in Beijing. Senior defense offi

attended the Beijing confer
Korea,
S. Medeiros and M. Taylor "China's New Fravel, Diplomacy," December online at http://www. for November/ Affairs, 2003, Foreign affairs, org/20031101 faessav82604/evan-s-medeiros-m-tavlor-fravel/ eign and China: A Chinese Perspective," paper
html. china-s-new-diplomacv. 33 Cited in Yu Yongding, "G20
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"Soft Power" As has
as the "Customer
of Choice"
dimension China's
a policy of multilateralism with a new regionalism has become evident in China's foreign policy, it been underpinned shift in emphasis on by a parallel
"soft power." From a Chinese view, even if its stature has risen considerably, its military prowess still far behind that of the United States and its political clout lags cannot match that wielded by Washington. The new clearly in the world Chinese today power leadership seems to have learned that although China is a "rising" great power, it remains an incomplete in a rapidly changing world where soft sources of
power are becoming increasingly important, and until China can close the gap between its hard and soft power, China's future as a "complete" great power will remain uncertain. As a result, Beijing now hopes that China's rising economic China's cultural clout and power will result in increasing when the vast Chinese market political influence, especially becomes markets mode a testing ground and launching pad for new innovative With "things Chinese" worldwide. a la becoming China is banking on its "soft power" As Chen Guangzhao of the People's "The legitimacy of China's peaceful
internationally,
increasing accordingly. Liberal writes, Daily rise derives s economic of 'soft
from its soft power. Soft power reflects China' The rise strength and its international influence. the development of
in turn will promote power China's 'hard power' ,"34 In China's case, soft power tends
to suggest
a respect
presented Development a/v.2/conf
at
the
Conference Centre,
on
G-20
Architecture February 29,
in 2004,
2020,
Int'
1 at
Research
Ottawa,
online
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cacheI
docs/g20.Ottawa. 22+hu+Jintao&hl=en.
gX6SEX Vlt 1M J:www, cigionline. c

+ G7+summit%
vongding.pdf+%22the
online at http: //english.pladailv. com, cn/english/pladailv/2004/03/09/ 20040309001023 ChinaMilitarv News.html.
94
Lyric Hale wrote, "Thanks to dramatic progress in technology, transportation, and communications systems, China will wield Hughes far more power in the global economy the next time it peaks than it did on the eve of Europe's Industrial Revolution- now has 'soft power' and growing diplomatic clout Beijing and political strength. China is also to buttress its economic better prepared to be a world leader, because its new elite is not isolated Chinese from the Western world, as were preceding leaders."35
recent economic success of, or fascination with China's an accrual of clout as a result. As David Hale and
- and
For Beijing, 2003 was a banner year for China's "soft As Robert Marquand "The year noticed, power" diplomacy. in Asia 2003 has been marked by a steady Chinese expansion but and abroad not only of economic of clout, something with the US akin to 'soft power' - a concept often associated due to its size, culture, and other influence, superpower's nonmilitary verities. Take the unprecedented reception granted in Paris to China's new leader, Hu Jintao. The Eiffel tower is lit a flaming red at night, and the famed Champs-Elysees was the site of a 54-float China parade led by the longest dragon given single ga-ga Davos global China in the world. over state. their two But It was best the first time the French known venues to honor have another
it is not just the French that are currently over things Chinese. Much of the corridor talk at the Economic Forum in Switzerland focused on China's economic cannot The soft power attractiveness of dynamics. the but in Asia. world, especially help change
Beijing has moved adroitly on nearly every part of the Asian chessboard to improve relations."36
35 David Hale and Lyric "China Takes Hale, Off," Foreign Affairs, Hughes online at http: / /www, theodora. com/wfb2003 off.html. 2003, "China's 27, 2004, banner online Christian Science year felt abroad," at http / /www, csmonitor. com/2004/
November/December /china/china takes 36 Robert Marquand, Monitor, January
0127/ p06s01-woap.html.
95
Indeed, Beijing has made the clearest strides in its own Asian backyard with "smile diplomacy," calling for "more reached out to confidence, Beijing greater cooperation." Southeast Asian nations, offering the ASEAN states a special relationship with China and agreed on a declaration for a code of conduct for the South China Sea and joined ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In Asian less." China has conceded to its trade surpluses in line with take the of more, principle "give neighbors These trade surpluses are funneling economic growth addition, countries,
to the smaller
thus confirming China as the heart Prime Minister of the Asian economy today. In Thailand, is considering Thaksin Shinawatra building a pipeline across that would give China quicker In Malaysia, where exports of gas, China have soared, the palm oil and mid-range electronics to new Prime Minister, chose to make his Abdullah Badawi, first overseas visit to China, accompanied by an entourage the southern access Isthmus to Middle East oil. of 800 business executives. One of China's most successful at the Asia-Pacific Economic moments came in fall 2003 summit in Bangkok. Hu Jintao's of message Cooperation investment in the region and Asian solidarity and Chinese his call for a free-market zone in Southeast Asia by 2010 so off-guard that Tokyo immediately caught the Japanese for first ASEAN mini-summit in December to called Japan's own bilateral free-trade ties. As Vietnamese create Japan's reforms are inspired by China's, hard to become a "brotherly example" trying Beijing it had been to Hanoi, just as culturally in the past. "soft power," motorized by trade, Utilizing its diplomatic leaders' is also economic cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges,37 China current economic of Kra
37
Tourism a new from 63.7
professionals generation China reached percent
across of Chinese 16
come bound soaring
and Europe travelers. in the
Asia The
are gearing up to wel number of travelers out months of 2004, of In 2003, the number
million
first seven
from the same
period
in 2003.
96
in the last countries
of years not only recorded success with couple in Europe, Southeast, and Central South, Asia, but also with a country like Australia, America's staunchest ally in the region. Such a "turnabout," to Paul Dibb, according former Australian political ally in the region and its second after Britain. But China world, economic deputy defense for Australia. implications secretary, "has important We are the closest U.S. most important ally in the of immense
is becoming It is now our second to Australia. importance is to market and set become our biggest trade largest export the end of this decade. Australia and China now partner by talk about building up a bilateral On 'strategic partnership.' the surface, that seems primarily and stable resource and energy subterranean
to be about providing secure for China. But the supplies
agenda may be that Beijing requires Canberra to have more of a realpolitik to the changing approach geopolitical map of Asia, and the inevitable rise of China to power. In with Beijing' s already working In Australian agenda." August 2004, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, during his China visit, praised and after talks with Wen Jiabao, Beijing' s "pragmatism" fact, "subterranean Canberra is
Chinese Asia. 63.7%,"
abroad that of Japan, it the largest in surpassed traveling making See Xinhua News "Chinese Outbound Travel Soars Agency, online at http //www.china.org.cn/eng 17, 2004, September htm. As the Chinese tourists heading restaurants overseas continues to grow, economy is expected to grow to and Asia are shops in Europe
lish/2004/Sep/107371. the number of Chinese 100 million
rolling
and Hotels, by 2020. out the red carpet for the influx of Chinese tourists with their huge clout. Patricia Tartour of French tour Maison de la spending operator "Our industry Chine sums it up: is really aware of this new market and
for them as if they were Santa For a detailed Claus." waiting report, see The Straits learns to ni Times, hao," 1, 2004, "Europe say September online at http: //www, straitstimes.com/asia/story/0.4386.270331.00.html. 38 Paul "On the status remains our best bet," The Dibb, Taiwan, quo Australian, news.com.au/. August 27, 2004, online at http://www.theaustralian.
97
treaty involvement."39 automatically trigger Australia's "Downer," "just told the says Paul Kelly of The Australian, it was made truth. It was a blunder over Taiwan because suggested does not public-that Taiwanese meant and it disturbed the left the the Americans, provoked more complacent about Chinese
that "in any war
over
Taiwan
the ANZUS
If Australia were ever from Australia. extracting concessions to exercise its own autonomy to say 'no' under ANZUS, That then that moment would arise in relation to Taiwan. such a pro-American ruminates foreign minister as Downer this way proves the point. This is a powerful recognition that The trend China is becoming more important to Australia. will continue."40 in Australia - an outpost of "From the mines of Newman in a corner of the outback otherwise dotted with 3,000 the prized forests of Myanmar," eucalyptus and kangaroos-to Jane Perlez "China's writes, up rapid growth is sucking in its resources and pulling the region's varied economies wake. and For now, China's presence mostly translates into money, doors it opens- But more and more, China is its economic clout to its leveraging support political preferences. the
Beijing is pushing for regional political and economic groupings it can dominate. It is dispersing aid and, in ways not seen before, pressing countries to fall in line on its top foreign policy priority: its claim over Taiwan."41 In studying Chinese foreign policy today, one should not underestimate its "soft power" As Robert Ross component. at acknowledged recently, "Over the years, I have looked
39 40
Cited Paul
in
Guo
Nei,
"Australia
backs
'one-China' The
China Daily, August 16, 2004, p. 2.

Kelly, "Balancing at act required for Beijing," 2004, Jane online
policy
on
Taiwan," August
Australian,
25, 41
story page/ 0.5744.10556622%255E12250.00.html.

Perlez, "Powered Herald by trade, China August International Tribune,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/ gains 28, political 2004, on strength," line at
http://www.iht.com/bin/print. php?file=536237.html.
98
China's
rising power and I believe importance. This is largely because force-on-force falling power behind. which balance There are more
that I have I have
discounted
its
considered
China's
with the U.S., and it appears to be are other force-on-force balances of relevant."42
"Petroleum
Diplomacy"
China
Just 10 years ago, as the world's fifth-largest oil producer, was self-sufficient in oil and was a net exporter. Now, account for more than one-third of Chinese its need an oil for to double and
imports
and China is expected consumption imported oil between now and 2010. a phenomenal rate of economic consumer demand for cars, China in 2003 its as the world's second
With 1.3 billion
growth, already biggest
people, insatiable Japan And
has overtaken of oil.
is huge and growing. of appetite Yergin Research "China has from it, Cambridge puts Energy gone markets to being being a minor player in world commodity the decisive dynamic factor today. In terms of oil, 40 percent to) of the entire growth in oil demand since 2000 has been (due China."43 By 2025, China is expected to import as much oil as the U.S. does today.44 China's growth in oil consumption
importer As Daniel
42
Robert
Ross, March Some
"The 3,
Rise 2004,
of China online is
and at
the New
Balance
of Power
in East Bush
Asia," ross.htm. Asia. June
http
administration James 2004,
were being 43 Cited in NY 28, 44 of 2004, Another all the
in losing position in an unusually blunt testimony before in Kelly, Congress listed s "aggressive moves" and said they Beijing' diplomatic used to strengthen China's political gains.
high-level that the U.S.
American
//web.mit.edu/ssp/spring04/ are warning the diplomats its once invulnerable
online
reasons to worry about oil," August "1.3 billion Newsday, at http: //www, newsdav.com/news/opinion/nv. that China's will equal that study projects energy consumption and Cooperation Development 2020. See Nandakumar J, "India, Online, February 7, 2004, online
(OECD) China
for Economic Organization countries combined by the year and energy security," Asia Times
at http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/China/FB07Ad0S.html.
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99
is now
running close to 8 percent a year, some analysts that China will need to import some 60 percent of its oil by 2020.45 estimate The gap between China's domestic oil supply and demand means that Beijing must abandon its traditional goal of energy self-sufficiency. Though China is planning to maintain production of about 3.1 billion barrels a day, depending only on domestic oil reserves will not be a long-term practical option.46 Moreover, China's of a Strategic Petroleum plans for the establishment Reserve energy energy Chinese to store up to 18 million tons of oil will keep its for the future. China's imports increasing increasing imports are a matter of great concern to both the seeks to ensure that China has
which government, it needs to sustain economic the energy resources growth, and Western and Asian leaders, who are worried about the strategic implications of China's quest
for energy security. to Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Officially, according "The impact of oil resources will not be large enough to affect China's foreign policy." "Oil and natural gas are strategic resources and the country imports a large quantity Li said, "but China has long ago made year," to diversify its importation channels."47 The new preparations also recognizes that "energy issues are however, leadership, central to China's economic security and sustainable development. of oil every Accelerating development has now caused China's extensive for China
45
See
Erica
Strecker
Downs,
China's
CA: Rand Corporation, Monica, 46 As the world's second largest demand is projected by U.S.
2000),
with total demand of 5.56 million barrels per day (bbl/d), China's oil reach 12.8 million bbl/d by 2025, with net imports of 9.4 million bbl/d.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) to at
for Energy (Santa Security 1. p. consumer of petroleum in 2003, products Quest
See "China online EIA, Briefs," Analysis Country July 2004, html. http: / /www, eia. doe, gov/emeu/cabs/china, 47 Xinhua News "China's not to be influenced Agency, foreign policy oil: Chinese March online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ FM," 6, 2003,
by
english/2003-Q3/06/content762454.htm.
100
shortage of energy, which may worsen before 2020."48 China's of growing future dependence on oil expectation it has to interests in and imports acquire brought exploration in places like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, production And energy Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Peru, and Indonesia. has undoubtedly become an important factor in the transformation of relations Asian and between Latin and China, Russia American states. Given Central energy-rich their closeness and
Siberia's accessibility through pipelines, energy resources start to be one of the major priorities for China in bilateral ties with Russia.49 The west-east from Kazakhstan the energy been keen resources, Kazakhstan to to Xinjiang from Kazakhstan develop especially - China's which is to be built pipeline, will bring and then to Shanghai, to China's east coast. China has to Central Asian relations on energy with
its access
deepening focusing major entry point to access Central Asian China inked an oil deal worth $150 energy. In Moscow, billion and in Astana, Hu (starting in 2005 for 25 years), and Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev agreed to revitalize
a 3,200-km pipeline project between the two countries and increase trade from $2 billion to $5 billion over the next two have become central to years. Overall, four policy objectives - the maximization China's of domestic output energy security of oil, diversification of the sources of oil purchased through international in overseas oil resources, markets, investment and construction of the infrastructure to bring this oil to China.50 In policy
48
terms,
China
does
not want
its rapidly
rising
49
at http: //english.peopledailv. 146171.html.

Russia now
People's
Daily,
"Severe
energy
shortage
warned,"
June
13,
2004,
online
com, cn/200406 / 13/eng20040613

of crude oil through an
overland pipeline 50 For a detailed Dannreuther,
is shipping barrels 400,000 per day in northeast to Daqing China.
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 3 (2003), p. 197~219
of China's see Roland analysis energy security policy, Asian and China's International needs, security energy
"PEACEFUL
101
demand Instead, energy
for imported China hopes markets can
energy to be seen as a cause for alarm. that its increasing involvement in global be seen as an opportunity to enhance
rather than as a threat. In August 2004, Beijing cooperation reacted with unusual restraint to Vietnam's announced plans to begin regular commercial and flights to Spratly Island indicated issue with its willingness Hanoi.51 In to reach an accommodation Hu Jintao on the and his 2004, September Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Philippine counterpart talks in Beijing to launch
to study the potential Despite its efforts to diversify its sources, has become increasingly dependent on Middle 58% the of China's share of Middle
at agreed a three-year joint research project for oil deposits in the South China Sea. however, China East oil. Today,
historically in the Middle most
oil imports come from the region. By 2015, East oil will stand on 70%. Though China has had no long-standing strategic interests
East, its relationship with the region from where of its oil comes is becoming increasingly important.52 With almost 60% of its oil imports coming from the Middle afford to sit on the sidelines to the Middle East; of
East, China can no longer the tumultuous region. China is a relative
newcomer
unlike
it has never played a major role in the other great powers, In recent region. years, however, Beijing has emerged from its seclusion, ties with almost all of the forging significant oil-rich states. Trade data for the past few years reveal that China has increased its exports to the Middle East at a much
51 are
The
Spratly are
Islands in their
are
surrounded
by potential
gas
and
oil
claimed
entirety
tions
claimed
occupied by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Brunei is also

a claimant but has no outposts. 52 Some Chinese contend specialists ence on Middle of East oil may exceed "Energy Analysis Global Security, that the Asia-Pacific 90% by 2010. in Security See East region's depend Institute for the Asia," Energy
by
and Vietnam, Taiwan, by China, and the Philippines. About 50 Malaysia
deposits while islands
and por are
SecurityiAugust 2004), online at http://www.iags.org/n0813042.htm#3.
102
faster rate than other major powers. Between 1998 and 2003, China's to the climbed China's other 38%.53 exports region way of forming a footprint in the Middle East has been and components for weapons through providing technology to regimes of the oil-rich states. Beijing has already supplied ballistic missiles to Syria and plied with missile Libya Iran, now the second largest supplier of China's technology. a particularly oil, has become important trading partner of China. But China's main target in the region is Saudi Arabia, China's bilateral number-one foreign supplier of crude oil. Sino-Saudi trade increased from less than $300 million in 1990
to well over $5 billion
in 2002, with the Chinese side running a large deficit of almost $1.8 billion. China has also begun to engage in military commerce with Riyadh. In addition to selling Riyadh 36 intermediate-range has also helped to build two missile ballistic bases missiles, Beijing south of the Saudi
Chinese security personnel to maintain capital, and deployed them. Politically, of Chinese leaders to Saudi visits high-level Arabia have culminated in a pronounced "strategic oil partnership" between
and Riyadh. Beijing China's recent shift from a net oil exporter to a net oil share of its imports coming from importer, with the lion's one major source? the Middle is a matter of great East, concern to China's new a strategic vulnerability. see that a future struggle over vital petroleum necessarily resources must be won by force of arms and is searching for a level-headed and cooperative strategy of energy security for China, is also concerned about Washington's Beijing the world's attempt to dominate Wars have sent a strong message its heavy dependency on Middle
53
who regard oil imports as leaders, While the new leadership does not
The Gulf energy sectors. to China of the danger of East oil and the growing
See
Nader 25,
Habibi, 2004,
"US online
pays
August
FH25Ak03.html.
a price for its politics," Asia Times at http: //www. atimes. com/atimes/Middle
Online, East/
"PEACEFUL
103
influence views the
of the U.S. U.S. as
in that region. In this regard, the primary threat to China's
Beijing energy
security. Whether activities example, pipelines
China's high-profile international energy security are likely to be successful remain to be seen. For it is doubtful whether many of Beijing' s proposed will be built and China's overseas oil concessions
probably will not yield enough oil to come close to matching China's needs over the next two decades. China Consequently, will probably thus, subject is important remain to U.S. reliant on oil from the Middle East and power for its energy (in) security. It to note, however, that China's "petroleum has been a new and diplomacy" significant factor in explaining with the energy-rich countries Beijing' s strategic engagement in the former Soviet Union, Central and Southeast Asia, Latin and the Middle East. And China's America, growing political and strategic alliances with Middle Eastern oil-producing states could and potentially Washington. Reunification War There is no Peace" Preparation for cause some serious tensions between Beijing
"Without
an Asymmetric For now,
over Taiwan
are neither global nor Beijing' s ambitions rather are national and in ideological; they scope, regional over Taiwan. The focusing on the assertion of sovereignty is prepared real issue is whether China to act on those in a way that would elicit a forceful U.S. response. could hardly object to a peaceful Washington incorporation of Taiwan on terms satisfactory to both the Chinese and ambitions Taiwanese, economic even though it would significantly increase China's and latent military power. However, will China be to use force to seek to reclaim Taiwan?
prepared To be sure, by any rational calculation, China-now and for the foreseeable future - would be foolish to risk war with the U.S. over the future of Taiwan. Yet, as noted, Beijing
104
of as well as a as a component in its "peaceful development" strategy, and necessary step China s nationalism could easily become an enemy of strategic now sees "reunification" prudence. Moreover, important advantage sacrifice. The future of Taiwan the U.S. case than poll, as it is to China. absorb the U.S. in Korea-to would conducted in a fight over Taiwan, over the U.S. - a Chinese can never China China sees an to willingness be as important to is prepared-as was the
a much
According the Social Survey by
higher level of casualties to a March 2004 opinion Institute research of China, group, regarding a asking the
public opinion government-affiliated and cities Chinese from 12 provinces 2,150 an overwhelming issue of Taiwan independence,
opposed independence they "resolutely" to half said they believed in using force to achieve reunification, as even at the risk of war with the U.S.54 Consequently, Air War College of the U.S. pointed out, Jeffery Record "The Chinese are not afraid to threaten or use force, even in is in which the objective circumstances military balance weighted heavily against them, Strait in 1996. and the Taiwan to believe
use force."55
majority said for Taiwan and close
as it was Indeed, requires believe
in Korea the Chinese a superior
in 1950 appear will to
that military China's
weakness leaders
As that
a result,
America, technologically although every area of military power, can be defeated in a fight over controls the timing. So China is in which China Taiwan resources toward for a considerable preparing dedicating In such a conflict, military conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan. China almost
in Goh Straits Record, Vol. XV,
that it is possible in almost superior
certainly
Sui Noi,
would
see 17,
avoid
vote
challenging
as a front
American
54
Cited
"Chinese March
bid," 55
The
Times,
2004,
online
asial. com, sg/asia/storv/0.4386.240632-1079560740.00. html.

Jeffery about China and "Thinking online No. 4 (Winter 2001), War,"
for independence at http://straitstimes.
Journal,
maxwell, af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apjOl /winO1/winO1.html.
Power Aerospace at http://www.airpower.
'PEACEFUL
105
has learned from military power on its own terms. Beijing the Gulf Wars that trying to beat the Americans at their own is a for disaster. In an game recipe pursuing asymmetric war however, against the U.S., Vice President of the PLA Li Jijun, Lieutenant General of Military Science, Academy of the war might be quite different writes, "the outcome the weak will defeat the strong."56 "Foremost in Chinese as strategists' considerations," Larry Wortzel argues, "is the U.S. will not and cannot sustain casualties in pursuit of vital interests. If China could kill or wound American enough personnel, force their defeat service forces or effectively deter U.S. in the event of a military conflict in East it could
Asia, including in the defense of Taiwan. Despite overwhelming U.S. military and technological superiority, China is preparing to defeat the U.S. by transforming its weakness into strength and exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities through asymmetric warfare and preemptive strikes."57 There is another consideration an war with in China's over preparation for Taiwan? in case
asymmetrical Taiwan's pro-independence government provoked a war with the mainland, Beijing seems to be counting on the fact that no other country in the Asia-Pacific region would be likely to offer support to Washington in such a contingency. That includes Australia, South Korea, Japan, and every Southeast
America
Li Jijun, "Notes on Military and Strategy," cited in Michael Theory Chinese Views of Future Warfare D.C.: National Pillsbury, (Washington, Defense Press, 1997), University p. 227. 57 Cited in "Report to Congress of the US-China Review Security Commission?The National of the Economic Security Implications between the United States and China," online at Relationship July 2003, /reports/ch 1_02. htm. http: / /www. usee. gov/researchreports/2000_2003 58 For example, in his National on August 22, 2004, Day speech Singapore Minister it clear that Singapore Prime Lee FIsien made would not Loong Taiwan if it provoked a war with Beijing. "Taiwan's support with China," Lee said, "is inexorable and the cross-strait issue a permanent See Lawrence problem." ment to take note of comments," The Chung, Straits "Taiwan Times, press Aug 25, integration will not be 2004, govern online
56
urges
106
And it is unlikely that any of America's country. would be NATO allies-even Britain remotely interested in sending troops to the other side of the world in a serious confrontation with China.58 Asian Nationalism: Public Opinion Does Nationalistic Chinese an Increasingly now also Shape Chinese Foreign Policy?
The Taiwan Nationalism toward one
issue is, fundamentally, an issue of nationalism. drive has emerged as a rising tide behind China's
It has increasingly become economic development. Chinese of the primary driving forces behind foreign policy. In recent years, nationalistic feeling appears particularly intellectuals and younger generations. strong among Chinese an "anti-Western" nationalism Some analysts emphasize to be factor for the party and a weapon as a legitimating used to support the state.59 Others see a "wounded" nationalism?citing in China's the painful lessons past that show how a "weak From state and divided nation invites foreign aggression."60 can create an independent nationalism yet viewpoint, These "isolated" China. are, however, only interpretations part of the story. There are other important forms of nationalism. this The economic and military clout has fueled rise of China's a gradual increase or surfacing of a tide of chauvinism among Chinese that may be cultivated by CCP authorities, but may also be expanded into a force beyond their control. So instead
at http: / /straitstimes. asia 1. com, sg/eveoneastasia/story/0.4395.268983.00. notes Singapore's one-China The html, and Jason Leow, "Beijing policy," at http: / /straitstimes. online Straits asial. com, sg/ Times, 26, 2004, Aug eveoneastasia/story/0.4395.269237.00.html. such a warning. country to have issued Philippines war with China. 59 See, for example, 60 For this view, have also said James see Maris they would Singapore In recent not support book, Return months, Taiwan China is not the and only the a Australia
if it provoked (New York, China's
NY: Public Affairs, 2004).

Wounded Nationalism
Lilley's Hsia
recent
Hands
(Boulder,
Chang, Colorado:
of the Dragon'Press, 2001).
Westview
'PEACEFUL
107
of suggesting that Chinese nationalism is something manipulated by the leadership to replace a collapsed ideology, the question is: does an increasingly nationalistic Chinese public opinion now also noticed, identifiable: world--ordinary shape Chinese "For Americans, foreign policy? the *bad guys' As Nicholas in China Kristof seem easily Communist hard fingers at the
They are the aging, jackets, wagging that conclusion They wear They Danielle
liners in Mao But Increasingly,
the real hard-liners
people.
risqu? English phrases. U.S. visas. They read
misleading. the West are simply blue jeans and T-shirts with trade gossip about how to get toward Steele novels and revere a
grim-faced their trembling is thoroughly
man they call Qiao Dan, also known as Michael Jordan. But also believe that America is that a (and) many bully Beijing should stand up more firmly to Tokyo and Washington alike, that Tibetan monks should be tossed in jail if necessary and that any move by Taiwan toward independence should result in a Chinese military attack."61 Moreover, as Dave Sheng wrote, "To understand nationalism one has to realize there are two distinct Chinese, concepts in a Chinese mind: Chinese government, and China. The Chinese attitudes toward the two are very different. We among about the abuses and incompetence of Chinese After we are the ones all, government. living through it. On the other hand, we do believe that there is a thing called 'national interests' and we do care about China. No matter how much the Chinese government wants to play the nationalism it it could not do on its own. Help came from unexpected card, outside sources, Taiwan and America. It is even more ironic
61 Nicholas opens D. "Nationalism York Times, in China April 22, becomes 2001, wild online card as the
Chinese
know
Kristof, up," New
country
ulty. moundsparkacademv.org/~mvergin/regional/china/chinese ism, doc. 62 Dave "Who lost China?-The of Chinese national Sheng, resurgence China online at http: //weekly, china-forum, ism," Forum, Weekly org/
at http: //fac national
CCF95/ccf9537~l.html.
108
when
that both Taiwan and America were very not so long ago."62 From a Chinese perspective, to see China's rise Sheng argued, "America's unwillingness that the U.S. will play the Taiwan and the possibility card much admired has China to pick the most powerful country in the as its enemy. It is a scary thought. It is nonetheless a probability that we Chinese should face and China is gearing world forced
one
realizes
up to it. As a response to the Taiwan problem and American hostilities, a resurgence in Chinese nationalism is inevitable."63 All this makes nationalism a particularly motivating force in China, given its potential on the government, but also the influence not just for conferring legitimacy for taking it away. In this regard,
of Chinese nationalism on foreign policy decision a one that can have both positive is and making complex on the of the communist negative impacts very legitimacy regime. A Chinese proverb perhaps provides an apt metaphor for the force of nationalism: "Shui neng zai zhou, ye neng ("Water can both sustain and sink a ship"). In foreign policy terms, the current leadership's search for a new unifying ideology, combined with China's growing fu zhou"
economic key
power and its important, also give nationalism establishment, question here is: can Chinese
if still modest, military new significance. The
nationalism serve the purpose of and its economic course unity advancing maintaining a chauvinistic, without underwriting attitude domineering toward others, possibly with expansionist predilections? Situated in a transitional what believes which can the current leadership therefore, period, China needs is a "rational" in nationalism, show their pride and tell the world about the Chinese and
nationalism that traditions, not a "popular" CCP's on discourse and monopoly political threaten the regime's stability. What the current leaders want is an application of nationalism as a "soft power" - a tool for their policy of "peaceful development." undermine
63 Ibid.
their nation
"PEACEFUL
109
CONCLUSION: "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT" A RISING POWER' S NATURAL CHOICE

China's 1990s economic and growth in the 1980s its emergence as a great power in world and as its economy has continued to expand, China relentless
heralded
politics, now seems the
in poised to become the second-largest economy world. The conventional wisdom is that it would be foolish - and perhaps dangerous - to neglect the rise of China. Kristof warned more than a decade Yet, as Nicholas ago,
"the international community is not giving adequate consideration of the rise of a powerful China. implications It is fashionable these days for people to express wonderment to the colossal at how the changes underway in China are breathtaking, but there is very little specific of the economic and analysis military effects of China's growth. Nor is there much analysis of whether the hostile the natural This attempt to expand its influence reflects of an aggressive regime or is simply of rising power."64 consequence intentions China's
is an attempt to fill the gap. It provides a look of China's comprehensive "peaceful development" foreign to the future, the article suggests that the policy. Looking in the Chinese leadership offers the possibility, change-of-guard fit more though not the certainty, that China may increasingly comfortably into the international system in the years ahead, though not without frictions and mishaps. new leadership China's appears to be remaking China's foreign policy. China has emerged as a more confident power first two years in office, eschewing the during Hu-Wen's strident rhetoric of the past in favor of more articulated diplomacy. Unpretentious and modest, this leadership nonetheless has adopted a firmer and more proactive diplomatic posture.
64
article
Nicholas
D.
Kristof, online
"The at
Rise
of China,"
Foreign
Affairs,
November/ CCF93/
December ccf9322-l.html.
1993,
http://weekly.china-forum.org/
110
it is not shrill," as Paul Harris puts it, "It is not ideological, but "and it is not new for China to take a strong position, it is something very new for China to take a firm, measured, on Chinese national interests."65 Under the mature position Chinese leadership, foreign policy now has a more on orientation, relying carefully presented argument economic and strategic priorities. The to promote China's like their predecessors, still has strongly held new leadership, current discreet are now phrased in conciliatory terms and to produce sympathy support. designed As China's new leaders' foreign-policy approach appears to that of their to be more discreet and subtle compared views, but these views predecessors, international power. the current leadership is trying to rebuild China's image as a more open, tolerant, and cooperative crackdown on Fifteen years after Beijing' s bloody
and two years after Jiang protesters in Tiananmen Square of the severe acute respiratory Zemin's scandalous cover-up new leaders seem to have China's (SARS) crisis, syndrome learned the lesson that the image of a country is its most valuable squander. China a asset; it is very difficult to build and very easy to
is now into
weakling is that China still has a considerable however, travel before it gets there. As a result, Chinese leadership's is to economic at least for now, pursue development. goal, A foreign policy has therefore of "peaceful development" been dovetailed task in China's with this goal. Meanwhile, another important new foreign policy is to accentuate China's
one
in the process of transforming of the strong. The view
itself from in Beijing, distance to
role as a rising and responsible power in a multilateral world. to to the traditional "hard While continuing give emphasis power"
65
tools
of statecraft
(including
military
power),
the
Cited
in
regional power www, newagebd.
"China as more France-Presse, Agence emerges with November Hu in charge," 13, 2003, com/nov2nd03 /141103 /inat. html.
confident online at
'PEACEFUL
111
more weight on are also placing increasingly In a sense, China' 'soft power' of ideas and economy. s new foreign policy is a reflection of Beijing' s willingness to learn to behave like a great power. When all is said and current leaders the to the Melians more than done, as the Athenians explained 2,400 years ago: "The strong do what they can and the weak It is only natural to assume that suffer what they must." China seeks the power to do what it wants instead of what it must. But for now, the dictum of Chinese foreign policy and China's is "peaceful development" grand strategy is to its influence quietly. expand are many reasons, fundamentally economic, against to with In addition to force Taiwan. "reunify" using an China the economic armed conflict between considerations, There China and Taiwan China will will probably set the rest of Asia against Beijing; lose its image of a responsible major power and will be adversely affected; and it will cause an American it will push intervention.
its "peaceful rise" to Japan go nuclear, Yet, China has force if Taiwan this author On the issue because
repeatedly promised that it will use military declares itself an independent country, and believes that we should take Beijing at its word. of Taiwan, China will not hesitate to act, not nationalism in the of a growing "popular" s new leaders now if as a necessary,
only but more importantly, Beijing' mainland, see the "reunification of the motherland" dangerous, step in the reemergence
of China.
112
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Wenxuan 3. Beijing: Daguo
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Zhongguo Liyiyushiming [Major National Interests and International Liaoning People's Publishing "Chinese Liu, Guoli ed. 2004. Hawthorne, 2003. Xiong, Guangkai. in Military Affairs. Beijing: 2000. Yan, Xuetong. Meiguo Hegemony Press. People's Zhang, Be [US and NY: Aldine
Power
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China
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2. Terrill, Ross. 2003. The New Chinese Empire And What It Means for the United States. New York, NY: Basic Books.

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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT" Author(s): XIAOXIONG YI Source: The Journal of East Asian

THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA S "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT"

Key Words: Development,

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S

THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

explicitly A new consensus

typical foreign-policy position China's own national interests.4

and the 11thNational

environment, that there is no choice but to

"petulant advantage a lot, and then on we China's

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S

avoid new cannot

November the with unity Wen

a complete Post, November

years. threat, will Price

3(July 20, 2004), p. 39-40.

THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

with the to cooperate while maneuvering however, across the

position. Such cooperation, on the strategic dynamics

THE ARTICULATION OF HU-WEN FOREIGN POLICY: DEVELOPMENT"9 CHINA' S "PEACEFUL

Washington an excellent on the

generation Asia "East July 1, 2004,

leadership's and Bumpy online at

//valeglobal. vale, edu/display.article?id=4112. http

political debated "rise"

"peaceful," fearing Taiwan. Still others is not rising and

opposed will not

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S

has been foreign

as the motto for the Hu-Wen an excellent discussion

leadership* s of the Chinese

history and to develop

"peaceful development." 'victim mentality' in modern a rational mentality as a rising

result, used eleven

fazhan") by using rise"

to the path of peaceful on Beijing' s official

Yimin, Vol. Medeiros,

development," 13-29. For more Rise' 2004,

Strategy," online at and Theory International

http://www.economist.com/displavStorv.cfm? 10 Pei Yuanying, "The Five Principles and Practice of China's

Studies, Vol. 4 (July 2004), p. 6-18.

THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

responsibility." countries that China will not be

the importance out of China's

141493. shtml. and "China's

for Rejuvenation "China's Radtke, The Christian

US overshadowing December 8, 2003, -coop.html.

at http //www.csmonitor.com/2003/1208/p09s01 13 Western economists and financial analysts

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S

Cooperation in border disputes

grudging, acceptance and that U.S. preponderance

Strategy." to East Asia's volume

&issue id=3025&article id=2368295.

THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Pulse?unprecedented and by the U.S. seem an to be

analysts strategists Taiwan as

as the first salvo "unsinkable

representation Hu Jintao required."

separate meetings John Ruwitch, "China 30, 2004, online

reuters. co.uk/news new vows ideas," to crush

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S *PEACEFUL

itself first. Our