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VICTORIA V. INCIONG (1988) Facts: Victoria was employed in Far East Broadcasting Company.

He later together with other employees organized an employees union. They sought recognition from the company but the latter maintained that they cannot as they are not under the scope of the Industrial Peace Act. Despite conciliation efforts and advice by the NCMB that they cannot be recognized as the broadcasting company is not included in the Industrial Peace Act, they staged a strike. This prompted the company to file for damages and preliminary injunction. Petitioner was subsequently dismissed from the company and he alleged that he was illegally dismissed since prior clearance is needed from the Secretary before the dismissal of employees or cessation of business.

DELTAVENTURES V. CABATO 327 SCRA 521 Facts: Respondent-employees filed a case of illegal dismissal against their employer. The labor arbiter ruled in their favor and ruled for the payment of backwages and reinstatement. The appeal being denied, the employees sought the issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy the judgment. The labor arbiter duly issued one but seeing that there are not enough assets to satisfy claims, a levy was made on one of the real properties. Before the auction sale could happen, petitioner files a third-party complaint as it was allegedly the owner of the property. The auction sale was thereafter suspended. The petitioner then files a complaint with the RTC, making the same allegations in its third-party claim, praying as well for injunction and damages. The employees sought the dismissal of the civil case and the court then ruled in their favor, ruling that the petitioner cannot maintain the two claims both at the same time. HELD: Petitioner failed to realize that by filing its third-party claim with the deputy sheriff, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission acting through the Labor Arbiter. It failed to perceive the fact that what it is really controverting is the decision of the Labor arbiter and not the act of the deputy sheriff in executing said order issued as a consequence of said decision rendered. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. 23 Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. 24 This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Having established that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Commission, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Cabato in denying petitioner's motion for the issuance of an injunction against the execution of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. Moreover, it must be noted that the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly observed by court a quo, the main issue and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven with the execution of the Commission's decision. No doubt the aforecited prohibition in Article 254 is applicable.

Held: Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of employees. However, the rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private respondent's intention to terminate the services of petitioner. This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from employment. The affirmance of the restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision in NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the President of the Philippines signifies a grant of authority to dismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good faith when it terminated the employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of the strike by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to the dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be applied. The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal. This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears the responsibility of guiding the union along the path of law and to cause the union to demand what is not legally demandable, would foment anarchy which is a prelude to chaos. Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers.

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