r)NE T A N K . 31 EOXES @ C . 5 @ C A L , AMD 11 !!E?l: A X ANAIT'ISIC 3F THE ARH3R-INFANTRY TEAH I N KCSEA, 2VNE 1 2 5 2 - 23LP 105E.

A t h e s i s presented tc; t h e F s z u l t y o f t h e V . S . Ar:r!y Csmmand And G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e ir. F E Y ~ ~ S f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e r e q y J i r s m e n t s fgr t h e degree

MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART A!TD
Z-CISNCE

RONALD 3 . OFFUTT, E A J , IJSA B . S . , U n i t e d S t a t e s t l i l i t z r y Aca:?eny. !Q - 7 M.S. American T e c h n o l o g i c a l Univerzity, 1 2 7 7

--

.4;rproved f o r ; c b l i c

r e l e a s e ; distribution :1r,limit+d.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f C a n d i d a t e :
T i t l e of T h e s i s :

Ronald D . O f f u t t

One T a n k , 31 Boxes o f .50 C a l , a n d 11 Men: An A n a l y s i s of t h e A r m o r - I n f a n t r y Team i n K o r e a , J u n e 1950 - J u l y 1952.

A p p r o v e d by:

Committee Chairman

, Member, G r a d u a t e F a c u l t y LTC C h a r l e s D . M c k e n n a , Ph.D.

A c c e p t e d t h i s 2nd d a y o f J u n e 1989 b y :

, Director, Graduate
Philip'J. B r o o k e s , Ph.D.

Degree P r o g r a m s .

The o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n are t h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e views o f t h e U . S . Army Command a n d General S t a f f College o r any o t h e r governmental a( gency. (
) -

A B STXACT
ONE TANK, 31 S@XES OF .50 CAL, AND 11 K E N : An 3 n ~ ? y s i a,:;f t h e A r m o r - I n f a n t r y Team i n K o r e a , .June 1950, thro-g?. J u l y 1951, b y M a j o r Ronald D. O f P G t t , 1J.S. ,4i;:17. 142 p a g e s .
T h i s t h e s i s a n a l y z e s t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t s t e z A?::? t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e l e s s o n s o f h i s t o r y i n t h e evolutic.:: c.0 d o c t r i n e . The a n a l y s i s f o c u s e s o n a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e z x d o c t r i n e and u s e s t a s k forc.9 l e v e l o p e r a t i o n s dL:rizg t h e Korean war t o r e s o l v e t h e a n a l y s i s i s 3 - a .
The s t u d y c o n d u c t s a n a n a l y s i s o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d s r t r i z ? f r o m i t s c o n c e p t i o n i n Army m a n u a l s i n 1 9 4 1 t h r a * ; d k 19". C a p s t o n e d o c t r i n a l m a t e r i a l s u c h as F i e l d Manza? LC'??-, , and b a t t a l i o n l e v e l m a n u a l s a r e examine!. O:C$r r e l e v a n t d o c t r i n a l m a t e r i a l is i n c l u d e d t o c r e a t e a d e t z i :*?.? p i c t u r e of how t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team was t~ :or,-!*..---t operations.

U n i t s t r u c t u r e s and t r a i n i n g a r e a l s o examined tz d:.termi::r. t h e a b i l i t y of committed u n i t s t o implement d o c t r i r . 5 . P o b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e i s t h e n compare;! t c a c t u a l z r n ~ r - i n l ? . n t r : . ' o p e r a t i o n s d g r i n g '.he Korean War.
T h e s t u d y c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e Army e f f e c t i v e l y in,>L:.:!e: :!:,: l e s s o n s s f World W a r II i n t h e d e v e l a f n e n t m : tf a r m s r - i : . f r n r - ; . . d o c t r i n e . R e g a r d l e s s J f t h P l i t e r a t u r e x d t k c :mpir.~~t:. t f s e n o i r m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t h a t d o c t r i z e wzs ' ~ ~ : l s r z : ~t!:? ~..~. f i e l d army f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t s c d a n d i.zF?oae::t I - c z i i a r m o r - i r f a n t r y d o c t r i n e d u r i n g t h e Korea:. !a!zr. ?!:e < .... -..-I . . I a l s c c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t s t i o z -f d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e s a d e q u a t e s u p p o r t s y s t e m s , tzil:?+c! o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and r 9 a 1 i s t i i trs.inin,s.
I.

ili

..

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I w o u l d l i k e t o e x p r e s s n y g r a t i t u d e t o t h i ; s e nhc, made t h i s t h e s i s p o s s i b l e .
T o t h e K o r e a n V e t e r a n who f o u g h t z o t t c
t3

fcrgittec.

To CSH J o e D . O f f u t t who p r o v i d e d p e r s o n a l i : i z i z h z i n t o t h e Army o f 1 9 4 9 a n d t h e K o r e a n War.

T o CSM B i l l y Gray who gave ice f o c u s and a d i f f s r e n t p o i n t o f view.

To Dr. C h r i s t o p h e r G a b e l who t a s k a c h a n c t , c o n t r i b u t e d a sense o f h u m o r , a n d a g e n u i n e d e s i r e t c x s k ? t h e product meaningful.

T J L i e u t e n a n t Colons1 C h a r l e s 0 . McKenni fc:. hie o p t i r n i s t i s l e e d e r s h i p and a n i n v a l z s b l e c ; n t r l S u t i c : ; :I s t u d y s c o h e r e n c e and f o c u s .

To my c o l l e a g u e s w i t h whurn maRy ,f t k . ? i z r : : : : : i: ??.<:; t h e s i s were d i s c u s s e d a n d who, b y t h * i r ic:elLsct 2r-l T..z:c: s u p p s r t , impr:jved t h e 2 r c d u c t .
And, l a s t b l ; t c e r t a i n l y n o t lsrast. 1 cwe 3. tre:::eL2:.:: -~.. . d e b t t o my w i f e BJ a n d my c h i l d r e n f o r t h e i r S S C : ~ C - --=._ - d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c o r n g l a t i s n 3f t t e z t z d y .

-_ -

T -

iv

TAOLE OF CONTZNTS

F 5,z.e

Thesis Approval Page

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i i '

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 1 . Chapter 2. DOCTRINE A N D THE ARMOR-INFANTRY T C M . . . . . . . ARMOR INFANTRY DOCTRINE, 1346-1351: . . . . . . . . .

_.. .
~

; . , -I .

FM 100-5, Operations, 1841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FM 100-5, Operations, 1344 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FM 100-5, Operations. 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

__ -_ _
a .

I?

'3

FM 7-20, Infactry Battalion,

12-14 . . . . . . .

_ . .:-.c

FE! 7-2C, Infantry Battelisn. 1 3 5 0 . . . . . . .

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3. ARMY ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AN? E G U I F W F T 1946-1350 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crgsnisat i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training E.;uipment

.,_ -.
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13

, ."
I -

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=I:

Sunmar7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.-

. ? .

Chapter 4.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT F i r s t Blood

Cases

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E4

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E4

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52
71

Contact

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T a s k F o r c e Crombez Lessons

74

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9 :
I 2r

Organizations

.-.>

Command a n d C o n t r o l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T a c t i c a l Radio Communicstisns . . . . . . Visual Signals

?$

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-_ _ _
CI?
4

. ! , :

, .

T r a i n i n g and S t a n d i n g O p e r a t i n g Procedure ........................

C h a p t e r 5.

DOCTRINAL GARDENS Implications Conclusion

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,
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n?,
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,I?

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3ibliography Initi-l

I?.:
nc

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3 I s t r i b u t i o n List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. ._. ._._

vi

CHAPTER 1

DOCTRINE AND THE ARMOR-INFANTRY TEAM

The P l a t o o n S e r g e a n t t o l d us t h a t when w e went o u t w i t h t h e i n f a n t r y , t h a t we were t o l o a d u p 31 b o x e s o f .SO c a l and t h a t e a c h t a n k would h a v e t o c a r r y e l e v e n men.1 T a n k Commander K o r e a , 1951 I n a s p e e c h g i v e n a t Winston-Salem, North C a r o l i n a ,

on 20 J a n u a r y 1950, S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Army Gordon G r a y d e s c r i b e d t h e Army i n t h e s e g l o w i n g terms:

. . . t h e Army t o d a y is an o u t s t a n d i n g p a r t of t h e f i n e s t peacetime f i g h t i n g f o r c e our n a t i o n h a s ever had. . . . W e l e a r n e d a l o t a b o u t modern a r m i e s d u r i n g t h e war, and we h a v e l e a r n e d a l o t more s i n c e , i n v a r i o u s and c o n t i n u i n g s t u d i e s and e x p e r i m e n t s . W e a r e applying these l e s s o n s a s f a s t a s t h e y a r e p r o v e n , and t h e r e s u l t s h a v e more t h a n j u s t i f i e d t h e time and e f f o r t t h a t we s p e n d on s u c h matters.?
A t t h e same time t h i s s p e e c h was p r e s e n t e d , G e n e r a l
Walton W a l k e r , Commander o f t h e E i g h t h Army i n J a p a n , began

a n i n c r e m e n t a l t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m which would c u l m i n a t e w i t h
division level exercises i n June.

The June t r a i n i n g t e s t s

would b e t h e f i r s t p l a n n e d d i v i s i o n a l e x e r c i s e s i n t h e F a r

East s i n c e World War 11.3

The i n i t i a l b a t t a l i o n l e v e l exercises r e s u l t e d i n d i s m a l p e r f o r m a n c e s and t h e r e l i e f o f s e v e r a l b a t t a l i o n commanders. The o u t s t a n d i n g p e a c e t i m e f i g h t i n g f o r c e o f

S e c r e t a r y Grays a d d r e s s was n o t s t a t i o n e d in J a p a n . 4 I n Montgomery, Alabama, on O c t o b e r 2 5 , 1 9 4 9 , S e c r e t a r y Gray s p o k e on t h e r o l e o f g r o u n d f o r c e s i n modern

war s a y i n g :
The I n f a n t r y - T a n k - A r t i l l e r y team is r e c o g n i z e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d as an e s s e n t i a l element t o any m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s ; and t h i s team c a n n o t a p p r o a c h f u l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s u n t i l j o i n e d by adequate tactical a i r support, f i g h t e r and l i g h t - b o m b e r e l e m e n t s t h o r o u g h l y t r a i n e d i n ground-support missions. Such a c o m b i n a t i o n q u i t e p r o b a b l y w i l l c a r r y t h e f i n a l and d e c i s i v e s t a g e s of a n y war we m i g h t f a c e f o r some time t o come. 5 R e g i m e n t a l t a n k c o m p a n i e s of t h e F a r E a s t Command were c e r e m o n i a l and o b s o l e t e . Lack of t r a i n i n g a r e a s and F a r East

a u s t e r e b u d g e t s p r e c l u d e d combined arms t r a i n i n g .

Air F o r c e u n i t s c o n d u c t e d l i t t l e o r no t r a i n i n g i n t h e
ground s u p p o r t r o l e . The t i g h t , w e l l - t r a i n e d combined arms

team m e n t i o n e d by S e c r e t a r y Gray was a l s o n o t s t a t i o n e d i n

Japan . e

-2-

The rhetoric of the Secretary of the Army paints a picture of the Army of 1950 as a dynamic, robust organization ready for the rigors of war. Initial combat

performance by American units in Korea paints a different picture exposed to the harsh light of reality. Faced with

crippling budgets and a lack of mission, the Army struggled to find a role as a part of the national security policy. .Sixty percent of the offi'cers on active duty were under thirty-five years of age. twenty-two years of age. Enlisted men averaged only

The Army, which had been one of

the largest in the world at the end of World War 11, had rapidly demobilized sending the citizen-soldier home.
The

mass exodus of soldiers also meant that the Army had lost valuable combat experience.7 The most important process with which the military distills and retains wartime experience is through the development of doctrine based on lessons learned in combat. These combat lessons are significant factors in the development of doctrine.

In spite of this recognition, the

impact of military history on doctrine is often overshadowed by other concerns. The emphasis on factors such as the

military budget, technology, and our perception of the threat, often indicate of doctrinal problems.
a

short term approach to the solutior,

This sentiment is exemplified by

-3-

Major P a u l H e r b e r t who d e s c r i b e d t h e impact o f t h e Korean

War on t h e r e c e n t e v o l u t i o n o f m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e i n t h i s

manner :
The Korean war, t h e U.S. Armys most

r e c e n t experience i n c l a s s i c a l c a m p a i g n i n g m i g h t a s well n o t h a v e h a p p e n e d f o r a l l i t s i m p a c t on t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e 1970s.e

M i l i t a r y h i s t o r y is t h e most n e g l e c t e d , and p o t e n t i a l l y t h e most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n t h e e v o l u t i o n o f doctrine.

An examination o f t h e p a s t p e r f o r m a n c e o f

s o l d i e r s i n combat h a s t h e g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l for making d o c t r i n e more e f f i c i e n t b e c a u s e i t i s t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h a t

men a r e added t o t h e f o r m u l a o f war.

T h e r e a r e many

examples, o f t e n q u o t e d b y b o t h m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s and
e d u c a t o r s , o f famous g e n e r a l s who h a v e s p o k e n e m p h a t i c a l l y of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y t o t h e i r s u c c e s s . N a p o l e o n , F r e d e r i c k t h e G r e a t , and G e o r g e S. P a t t o n were

g r e a t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who w r o t e a b o u t , and l e a r n e d f r o m
military history. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s b e l i e f is n o t

u n i v e r s a l among modern o f f i c e r s . * The c o n t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y t o t h e e v o l u t i o n o f d o c t r i n e c a n b e measured i n many d i f f e r e n t ways. The

measure is most c o n v i n c i n g when examining r e c e n t w a r t i m e

e x p e r i e n c e and a n a l y z i n g t h e l e s s o n s learned by t h e

-4-

participants.

Combat i n f o r m a t i o n , examined and a n a l y z e d ,

c a n t h e n be measured a g a i n s t s u b s e q u e n t combat a c t i o n s . F o r c e s u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n must b e s i m i l i a r i n o r g a n i z a t i o n and f u n c t i o n . They must a l s o b e examined w h i l e o p e r a t i n g i n

r o u g h l y t h e same e n v i r o n m e n t . The sum o f t h e s e e x a m i n a t i o n s c a n u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t i n a c o n s i s t e n t p o r t r a y a l o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between men and t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s o f war.

I t is h e r e t h a t t h e i n f l u e n c e

o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y s h o u l d become o b v i o u s and p e r s u a s i v e . T h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s may b e as s i m p l e a s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o c o n t i n u o u s l y m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, o r a s complex

as a f i r e s u p p o r t p l a n f o r a movement t o c o n t a c t .

In either

c a s e , t h i s o V e r r h e l m i n g ' h i s t o r i c a 1 e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of d o c t r i n e . Failing t o

i n t e g r a t e h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e i n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
d o c t r i n e i g n o r e s c o n s i s t e n t e v i d e n c e on how t o succeed i n war. In order t o establish the potential benefits that d o c t r i n e c o u l d r e c e i v e from a p r o p e r a n a l y s i s o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y , two s t e p s must b e t a k e n . F i r s t , you m u s t c o n d u c t a

proper a n a l y s i s of a s p e c i f i c theme o r r e l a t i o n s h i p i n
military history.

T h i s a n a l y s i s should cover s u f f i c i e n t

t i m e and combat e x p e r i e n c e t o r e q u i r e a c h a n g e i n d o c t r i n e . S e c o n d , you must r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n , "Do we l i s t e n t o t h e

-5-

l e s s o n s o f h i s t o r y when we d e v e l o p d o c t r i n e ? " , b y e x a m i n i n g b o t h t h e w r i t t e n d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e and t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of

u n i t s i n combat.

The e x a m i n a t i o n o f h i s t o r y t o d e t e r m i n e

t h e i m p a c t o f warfare on t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and d o c t r i n e of t h e Army is n o t u n i q u e , n o r is i t w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n c e . t h e 1935 Annual R e p o r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army t o t h e C o n g r e s s , C h i e f o f S t a f f f o r 1935, General D o u g l a s MacArthur said: The f a c t s d e r i v e d f r o m h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , h e [ t h e Army O f f i c e r ] a p p l i e s t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p r e s e n t and t h e proximate f u t u r e , thus developing a s y n t h e s i s of a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d , o r g a n i z a t i o n , and d o c t r i n e . 1 0 H i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , a s d e s c r i b e d b y General

In

M a A r t h u r , r e t a i n s r e l e v a n c e f o r most s e r v i n g o f f i c e r s .

f o c u s e s i t s e x a m i n a t i o n on s p e c i f i c d o c t r i n a l c o n c e p t s and

t r a c e s them t h r o u g h o u t t h e h i s t o r y o f w a r f a r e .
The h i s t o r y o f war o f f e r s many s i g n i f i c a n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i m p a c t of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y on doctrine.
O f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e is t h e impact o f

m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y on t h e d o c t r i n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f armor and infantry soldiers. Combat l e s s o n s l e a r n e d by s o l d i e r s a s a

p a r t of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team, form t h e b a s i s of e f f e c t i v e

i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f b o t h c u r r e n t and f u t u r e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y doctrine. The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a r m o r e d and

-6-

i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s d u r i n g t h e f i r s t y e a r s of t h e Korean W a r
is e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s .

F i r s t , t h i s is t h e most r e c e n t example o f l a r g e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s i n v o l v e d i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l war w i t h

l a r g e numbers o f a r m o r e d -and i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s .
a r e , s e c o n d l y , numerous b a t t l e f i e l d examples o f t h e
i n t e r a c t i o n s between armored and i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s .

There

These

case s t u d i e s r u n t h e gamut o f t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s p e r f o r m e d by
a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams i n combat. Additionally, there are

a r w h i c h a r e e v e n more r e a s o n s t o s t u d y t h e Korean W
compelling. I n 1950, when t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o m m i t t e d g r o u n d f o r c e s i n K o r e a , World W a r I1 was f r e s h i n t h e memory o f a l l

Americans.

M i l i t a r y p e r i o d i c a l s of t h e day a r e r i c h i n t h e Contributing

s t u d y o f combat a c t i o n s o f World War 11.

a u t h o r s i n c l u d e S.L.A. M a r s h a l l , J . F . C . F u l l e r , H e i n z G u d e r i a n , and B.H. L i d d e l l H a r t .

T h e i n s i g h t p r o v i d e d by

t h e s e a u t h o r s on t h e b a t t l e s and d e c i s i o n s of World War I1

reinforced the lessons already learned.11

T h e Army o f 1950 was l e d b y combat v e t e r a n s .

e x p e r i e n c e i n war s h o u l d have d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e d t h e

Their

d e v e l o p m e n t and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of Army d o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s . The d o c t r i n a l

employment o f U n i t e d S t a t e s Army u n i t s s h o u l d h a v e been

-7-

s o u n d , b a s e d on t h e s e f a c t o r s a l o n e .

Lessons learned

through hard f i g h t i n g a t t h e Kasserine P a s s , t h e p u r s u i t f o l l o w i n g t h e b r e a k o u t a t S t L o , and t h e b a t t l e o f t h e Bulge, p r o v i d e a bedrock of no-nonsense t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e which s h o u l d h a v e f a c i l i t a t e d combat o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea.

I n o r d e r t o make a d e f i n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g
t h e Army's a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t i v e l y i n t e g r a t e h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s i n t o t h e development of d o c t r i n e , several d i f f e r e n t
areas must b e e x a m i n e d .

The f i r s t r e q u i r e m e n t is t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a h i s t o r i c a l b a s i s f o r t h e employment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y formations.

T h i s c a n be a c c o m p l i s h e d by t a k i n g a s h o r t l o o k

a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f d o c t r i n e t h a t e v o l v e d as a p a r t o f
wartime demand.
A focused examination of t h e d o c t r i n e

d u r i n g World War I1 c a n b e o b t a i n e d by s t u d y i n g t h e A r m y F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , FH 100-5, Ooerations, c i r c a 1 9 4 1 and c o m p a r i n g it t o t h e same Army manual u s e d i n 1944 and 1949. T h i s " b e f o r e and a f t e r " c o m p a r i s o n w i l l p r o v i d e

i n s i g h t i n t o t h e way t h e American Army p l a n n e d t o f i g h t . P r i o r t o World W a r 11, a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e was i n i t s infancy. F o l l o w i n g World War 11, t h e f u l l impact of t h a t

c o n f l i c t s h o u l d have p r o f o u n d l y i n f l u e n c e d d o c t r i n e . While t h i s c o m p a r i s o n w i l l p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t i n s i g h t a t h i g h l e v e l s o f d o c t r i n e , i t may n o t h a v e been

-8-

r e l e v a n t t o t h e s o l d i e r s a s k e d t o d o t h e j o b on t h e g r o u n d .
F o r t h i s r e a s o n t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e 1944 F M 7-20,

, and i t s c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e 1949 manual

w i l l a l s o be conducted.

A c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e s t a t e d Army

d o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment o f t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n w i l l p r o v i d e a worms-eye v i e w o f what o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d men

were e x p e c t e d t o d o a s a p a r t of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams.
A d d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n a l information w i l l be included t o develop a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team was e x p e c t e d t o work t o g e t h e r p r i o r t o t h e Korean War. The s e c o n d m a j o r a r e a t o b e examined is t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army p r i o r t o t h e Korean War. The f o r c e s t r u c t u r e o f an Army m u s t r e f l e c t i t s d o c t r i n e o f employment.

If i t d o e s n o t , t h e n t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e i s

inappropriate t o carry out t h e s t a t e d d o c t r i n e .

The

t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e A c t i v e D e f e n s e D o c t r i n e o f t h e mid

1970s t o t h e Armys c u r r e n t A i r Land B a t t l e D o c t r i n e , is a

g r a p h i c example o f f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s s t r u g g l i n g t o keep up
w i t h concepts.

Today, c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e is a h e a d o f t h e

e q u i p m e n t and o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h a r e c u r r e n t l y d e p l o y e d i n
the field.

U n i t s e x p e c t i n g t o implement Air Land B a t t l e

D o c t r i n e m u s t wait u n t i l new e q u i p m e n t and o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e

on t h e g r o u n d b e f o r e i t can b e e f f e c t i v e l y i m p l e m e n t e d .

-9-

O r g a n i z a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o t h i s s t u d y are t h e s t a n d a r d 1949 i n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . The e f f e c t s o f

d o c t r i n e on t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f b o t h o f t h e s e d i v i s i o n s w i l l b e examined i n t h e s t u d y .

An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e t e c h n o l o g y a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e
employment o f t h e d o c t r i n e i n 1949 will b e made.

The

examination w i l l b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e s t u d y of t h e equipment
of a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h s i g n i f i c a n t l y

i m p a c t e d on t h e i r a b i l i t y t o execute a n a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team mission.

A s a p a r t of t h i s examination of t e c h n o l o g y , t h e

t r a i n i n g c o n d u c t e d by armored and i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s must a l s o b e examined t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e a v a i l a b l e e q u i p m e n t were r e a l i z e d .

All m i l i t a r y
This

o r g a n i z a t i o n s p l a c e a premium on r e a l i s t i c t r a i n i n g . a l s o r e q u i r e s t h e use o f w a r t i m e e q u i p m e n t i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s wartime p u r p o s e . T h i s e s s e n t i a l background m a t e r i a l w i l l form a c o h e r e n t p i c t u r e o f t h e e q u i p m e n t , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and

d o c t r i n e u s e d b y Army u n i t s i n t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s p r i o r t o t h e Korean War. These o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,

t h e i r e q u i p m e n t , and d o c t r i n e s h o u l d have b e e n b a s e d i n
l a r g e p a r t on t h e r e c e n t e x p e r i e n c e o f World W a r 11.

It

s h o u l d a l s o have s e r v e d as a sound b a s i s f o r any f u t u r e combat o p e r a t i o n s b y U n i t e d S t a t e s g r o u n d f o r c e s .

The next

-10-

s t e p w i l l be t o v a l i d a t e , t h r o u g h case s t u d i e s , t h e Army's a b i l i t y o r i n a b i l i t y t o t a k e t h e s e c o n c e p t s and a c t u a l l y u s e them i n a t h e a t e r o f w a r . The e a r l y y e a r s o f t h e Korean War p r o v i d e many case s t u d i e s o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams i n combat s i t u a t i o n s . These

cases i n c l u d e a l l t y p e s o f o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e
operations. Combat s t u d i e s p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s a s t o t h e

adequacy o f t h e Army's d o c t r i n e and i t s a b i l i t y t o implement

d o c t r i n e d u r i n g combat.

S i n c e t h e World War I1 e x p e r i e n c e

o f t h e n a t i o n was so p r o f o u n d , t h e impact o f t h a t h i s t o r y on t h e Army's d o c t r i n e s h o u l d have been a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o Army d o c t r i n e a f t e r t h e war. T h i s p r o v e n d o c t r i n e s h o u l d have

been v a l i d a t e d i n combat a c t i o n s in K o r e a . The e x a m i n a t i o n ' o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s and t h e d o c t r i n e which was d e v e l o p e d a s a r e s u l t o f World War 11, and t h e s u b s e q u e n t use of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s i n K o r e a ,

s e r v e two p u r p o s e s .

I t p r o v i d e s a d e f i n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t on

t h e a b i l i t y o f U.S. Army l e a d e r s t o d i s t i l l t h e l e s s o n s o f

m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y and a d d r e s s t h e i r a b i l i t y t o i n c l u d e t h e s e

l e s s o n s i n t h e development o f f u t u r e d o c t r i n e .

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CHAPTER 2 ARMOR-INFANTRY DOCTRINE, 1946-1950

War i s o f v i t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e s t a t e .
The p r o v i n c e o f l i f e and d e a t h ; t h e r o a d I t is m a n d a t o r y t o s u r v i v a l or r u i n . t h a t it be thoroughly s t u d i e d . T h e r e f o r e ; a p p r a i s e it i n t e r m s of t h e f i v e f u n d a m e n t a l f a c t o r s and make comparisons of t h e seven elements l a t e r named. So you may assess i t s e s s e n t i a l s . The f i r s t o f t h e s e f a c t o r s is m o r a l i n f l u e n c e , t h e s e c o n d w e a t h e r , t h e t h i r d t e r r a i n , t h e f o u r t h command, and, t h e f i f t h d o c t r i n e . 1 Sun T z u , The Art o f War Sun Tzu e n d e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s p r i m e r on t h e a r t of war by l i s t i n g d o c t r i n e a s t h e f i f t h f u n d a n e n t a ? f a c t o r in war. S i n c e Sun Tzu t r a i n e d t h e c o n c u b i n e s o f t h e

King o f W u i n t h e d o c t r i n e o f h i s a g e , war h a s c h a n g e d immensely. The s u c c e s s o f n a t i o n s i n war h a s ~ c u n f i r m e d t h e

v a l u e o f d o c t r i n e i n t h e employment of l a r g e a r m i e s . o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h d o c t r i n e is

In

d e v e l o p e d , s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s of t h c p e r i o d must
be examined.

These e v e n t s p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t background

i n f o r m a t i o n and a framework f o r a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how doctrine evolves.2

-12-

Four s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s influenced t h e development of t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army b e t w e e n 1946 and 1949. T h e s e f a c t o r s w e r e t h e u s e o f t h e a t o m i c bomb t o end

t h e war w i t h J a p a n , the d e m o b i l i z a t i o n f o l l o w i n g World War

11, t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s , and t h e r a p i d
g e o g r a p h i c e x p a n s i o n of communist i d e o l o g y . The d e t o n a t i o n o f t h e f i r s t a t o m i c bomb on H i r o s h i n a a t 8 o ' c l o c k on t h e 6 t h o f A u g u s t , c r e a t e d a t o o l o f immense m i l i t a r y power.
T h e a b i l i t y t o u s e t h e Atomic bomb a s

p r o j e c t i o n o f m i l i t a r y power s e t a d r i f t t h e d o c t r i n a l c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had won World War 11.

W h i l e t h e Air F o r c e and t h e Navy, c a p a b l e o f d e l i v e r i n g t h e

bomb,, r e t a i n e d a v e s t i g e o f d o c t r i n a l i n t e g r i t y , t h e Army had no s u c h c a p a b i l i t y . The Army f e l l i n t o a m a l a i s e ,

apparently unimportant t o t h e n a t i o n a l defense. C o n t r a r y t o t h e " c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n " d e s c r i b g d by Doughty i n h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Ariny d o c t r i n e f o l l o w i n g t h e end o f World War 11, t h e Army scrambled t o f i n d a reason t o e x i s t . P r o m i n e n t Army l e a d ? r s

d i d a r g u e t h a t t h e f u t u r e c o n t r i b u t i o n sf t h e Army t o r.he d e f e n s e o f t h e n a t i o n was i n d i s p e n s i b l e . Lieutenant General

J o s e p h S t i l w e l l , Chairman o f t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t BcNard s ? 1 9 4 6 , d e s c r i b e d f u t u r e c o n f l i c t a s one i n which a s u p r i s s a t t a c k would b e f o l l o w e d by a " r e t a l i a t i o n w i t h bombing,

-13-

l o n g range m i s s i l e s , and b i o l o g i c a l w e a p o n s . "

Aggressor

n a t i o n s p r o s t r a t e from t h e United S t a t e s c o u n t e r a t t a c k , would b e s u b j u g a t e d by t h e " o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e h o s t i l e territory." G e n e r a l Omar B r a d l e y , t h e Army C h i e f o f S t a f f ,

i n a n a r t i c l e i n t h e May, 1 9 4 9 , i s s u e o f t h e Militarv

Review, d e s c r i b e d f u t u r e c o n f l i c t i n t h r e e p h a s e s .

In the

f i r s t p h a s e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would employ i t s s t r a t e g i c
weapons a g a i n s t t h e enemy much i n t h e same manner d e s c r i b e d by S t i l w e l l .

In t h e s e c o n d p h a s e , American m i l i t a r y f o r c e s

would s e i z e key a r e a s t o p r o v i d e b a s e s f r o m w h i c h t o s t r i k e t h e enemy h o m e l a n d ; and f i n a l l y , i n t h e t h i r d p h a s e , l a r g e - s c a l e g r o u n d a s s a u l t s would d e s t r o y t h e enemy homeland. The o n l y b r i g h t s p o t f o r t , h e Army i n t h i s

c o n c e p t , was t h e s t r a t e g i c m o b i l i t y of Army a i r b o r n e f o r c e s which c o u l d s e i z e t h e b a s e s n e e d e d d u r i n g p h a s e t w o . 3

I n a l l o f t h e s e s c e n a r i o s t h e Army p l a y e d a s e c o n d a r y
role. The e x p a n d e d r o l e o f t h e Air F o r c e and Navy decrease:! Enamored by t h e power

t h e power and p r e s t i g e o f t h e Army.

of t h e a t o m i c bomb, t h e Army d e d i c a t e d r e s o u r c e s t o d e v e l o p
t h e i r own d e l i v e r y systems and d o c t r i n e o f e m p l o y m e n t . f o c u s caused d o c t r i n a l i n n o v a t i o n i n t h e a r e a of c o n v e n t i o n a l ground f o r c e s t o l a n g u i s h . D e m o b i l i z a t i o n o f t h e American Army f o l l o w i n g W o r l d
War I1 was a d e b a c l e .

This

The c l a m m o r i n g t o " b r i n g t h e b o y s

-14-

home", t r a d i t i o n a l a f t e r e v e r y American c o n f l i c t , o c c u r r e d

again a f t e r World War 11.

An American war m a c h i n e b u i l t

w i t h h a r d work and d e d i c a t i o n by t h e e n t i r e n a t i o n c e a s e d t o e x i s t almost overnight. The p e r s o n n e l s t r e n g t h o f t h e Army

was r e d u c e d f r o m 8 m i l l i o n men and 89 d i v i s i o n s i n 1 9 4 5 , t o

5 9 1 , 0 0 0 men and 10 d i v i s i o n s i n 1 9 5 0 .

The Army, w i t h o u t t h e

p o p u l a r a p p e a l o f t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t Nazism o r r e t r i b u t i o n f o r P e a r l H a r b o r , was u n a b l e t o i n d u c e men t o e n l i s t .

In

o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n f o r c e s t r e n g t h , t h e A r m y lowered e n t r a n c e requirements. G e n e r a l J . Lawton C o l l i n s s t a t e d t h a t t h e

l o w e r m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r i n d u c t i o n r e s u l t e d i n an Army w i t h 43% o f i t s s o l d i e r s i n t h e l o w e s t

mental c a t e g o r i e s . 4
A s i g n i f i c a n t b y L p r o d u c t of d e m o b i l i z a t i o n was t h e
S e c r e t a r y of War's S o a r d on o f f i c e r - e n l i s t e d man r e l a t i o n s h i p s , h e a d e d by L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J a m e s i!. Doolittle. T h e b o a r d was convened i n 1946 t o s t u d y t h e

i n e q u i t i e s o f w h a t was t e r m e d an o f f i c e r - e n l i s t e d man ' ' ( ~ a : : ?

system".

T h e b o a r d i n t e r v i e w e d 42 w i t n e s s e s and r e a d L e t t e r s reviewed b y thle

I n -,.e

a p p r o x i m a t e l y one t h o u s a n d l e t t e r s .

b o a r d w e r e n e g a t i v e a b o u t t h e Army and i t s o f f i c e r s . m a j o r i t y o f t h e s e c a s e s , t h e e x - s o l d i e r had a r i g h t t o c o m p l a i n and had been i m p r o p e r l y t r e a t e d .

Recommendations

of t h e board r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t r a d i t i s n a l

-15-

o f f i c e r , n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f i c e r , and e n l i s t e d s o l d i e r relationships.
Army l e a d e r s h i p was p a r a l y z e d and s e a r c h e d

f o r a means t o r e e s t a b l i s h a n e n v i r o n m e n t o f m u t u a l o b l i g a t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .

T . R . Fehrenbach d e s c r i b e d

t h e i m p a c t o f t h e D o o l i t t l e b o a r d when h e s a i d : 5 d e a d l y t h i n g had b e e n d o n e t o t h e Army, w h i c h even t h e Army had n o t y a t f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d . . . . I n making a n A r m y o f e i g h t m i l l i o n men, t h e Army had c o m m i s s i o n e d many t h o u s a n d s o f men t h a t s h o u l d n e v e r h a v e r i s e n a b o v e PFC. B a s i c a l l y , t h e r e were two ways t o r e d u c e t h e a b u s e s o f power i n t h e s e r v i c e . One was t o o v e r h a u l t h e o f f i c e r p r o c u r e m e n t s y s t e m , make damned c e r t a i n t h a t no m e r e l y average man c o u l d e v e r b e c o m m i s s i o n e d , and h a v e f e w e r o f f i c e r s , b u t b e t t e r o n e s . The o t h e r way uas t o r e d u c e t h e power t o a b u s e a n y b o d y . The D o o l i t t l e b o a r d , p r o b a b l y t h i n k i n g of a l o n g p e r i o d o f p l e a s a n t p e a c e t i m e coming u p , i n e a r l y 1946 c h o s e t o recommend t h e s e c o n d . I t was a good i d e a . b u t i t d i d n ' t w o r k . The company commanders i n J a p a n had t h e g i r l s r u n i n and o u t o f t h e b a r r a c k s , had men t a l k b a c k t o t h e m , and d i d n ' t know w h a t t o d o a b o u t i t . . . . T h a t k i n d o f t h i n k i n g had gone o u t w i t h t h e h o r s e , w i t h s a l u t i n g e x c e p t on d u t y , w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t you s h o u l d respect a sergeant.0 The g r e a t e s t Army i n t h e World i n 1946 was n o t o n l y b e s e i g e d by e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s , i t a l s o b e g a n t o r o t f r 3 n the inside.

-16-

The Army's b a t t l e f o r f u n d i n g was l o s t .

The r o l e o f

t h e Army i n t h e 1949 D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e was s e c o n d a r y . L o u i s J o h n s o n , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e i n March, 1 9 4 9 , a d o p t e d a n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y b a s e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y on

s t r a t e g i c a i r power.

T h i s d e f e n s e "on t h e c h e a p " a l l o w e d

him t o g e t r i d o f what h e t e r m e d " c o s t l y w a r - b o r n e s p e n d i n g h a b i t s " and r e d u c e d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g b e l o w t h e c e i l i n g s recommended b y P r e s i d e n t Truman.

Army and Navy s t r e n g t h was

d r a s t i c a l l y c u t , w h i l e t h a t o f t h e A i r F o r c e was i n c r e a s e d . Even w i t h t h e p r i o r i t y o f r e s o u r c e s and men, t h e A i r F o r c e

was a b l e t o f i e l d o n l y 4 8 o f t h e 80 w i n g s t h e y f e l t w e r e
required t o defend t h e n a t i o n . A l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s were

p a u p e r s w i t h w o r l d w i d e m i s s i o n s and c o m m i t m e n t s . 7 The t u r b u l e n c e of t h e w o r l d i n t h e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g World War I1 s e r v e d t o r e i n f o r c e t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t America f a c e d a s i n g l e w o r l d w i d e t h r e a t i n t h e f o r m o f communism. F o l l o w i n g World War 11, communist e x p a n s i o n i n G r e e c e l e d t o c i v i l war. communism. T h e r e was t u r m o i l i n I t a l y , again i n s p i r e d t y I n 1947, t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e e a s t e r n b l o c

r e j e c t e d M a r s h a l l P l a n a i d , a f t e r b e i n g b u l l i e d by t h e USSR.

i n s p i t e of t h e i n i t i a l i n t e r e s t d i s p l a y e d b y some menibers.8
I n J u n e o f 1 9 4 9 , t h e USSR moved t o f o r c e t h e B r i t i s h ,
F r e n c h , and A m e r i c a n s o u t o f B e r l i n by b l o c k a d i n g r a i l lines and r o a d w a y s t h r o u g h t h e S o v i e t o c c u p a t i o n z o n e . General

-17-

L u c i u s D . C l a y , t h e American m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r , d e v i s e d t h e
B e r l i n a i r l i f t t o s u p p l y t h e c i t y and e v e n t u a l l y s u c c e e d e d
i n l i f t i n g the blockade.
T h i s s e r i e s of c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n

w o r l d d e m o c r a c i e s and an e m e r g i n g communist e m p i r e c u l m i n a t e d i n S e p t e m b e r of 1 9 4 9 . E a r l y i n t h e autumn o f

t h a t y e a r , t h e S o v i e t Union e x p l o d e d i t s own a t o m i c d e v i c e and t h e s e c o n d s u p e r p o w e r was b o r n . 8

A s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s e a r c h e d f o r a n e f f e c t i v e means
t o d e a l w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b e i n g of t h e w o r l d s l e a d i n g p o w e r , t h e Army s e a r c h e d f o r an e f f e c t i v e d o c t r i n e i n t h e Atomic age:
A s t h e music s t a r t e d up i n S e o u l , i n K o k u r a , J a p a n , Major General William F r i s h e Dean was t h e g u e s t o f h o n o r a t a 2 4 t h D i v i s i o n Headquarters costume p a r t y . Which was o n e way f o r i n f a n r y m e n t o t r y t o f o r g e t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e L o u i s J o h n s o n and h i s f a t - c u t t i n g , t h e s u p e r c a r r i e r , t h e S t r a t e g i c Air Command, and t h e nagging f e e l i n g t h a t i n t h e a t o m i c age f o o t s l o g g e r s m i g h t b e o b s o l e t e . 10

I n s p i t e o f t h e t r a v a i l s t h e Army u n d e r w e n t i n

the

y e a r s b e t w e e n World War I 1 and K o r e a , Army d o c t r i n e d i d

evolve.

The e v o l u t i o n o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e i n t h e s e

years can be found i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s f o r t h e

employment o f t h e Army as d e s c r i b e d i n t h e F i e l d S s r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , FM 100-5,

. T h i s manual,

with

-18-

e d i t i o n s p u b l i s h e d i n t h e y e a r s 1 9 4 1 , 1 9 4 4 , and 1 9 4 9 , d e s c r i b e s t h e d o c t r i n a l employment of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y u n i t s . The F i e l d Manual f o r t h e employment o f t h e i n f a n t r y battalion,

FM 7-20,

, examined a t t h e

same i n t e r v a l s , f u r t h e r r e f i n e s a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e . A d d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e of t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e s i n s i g h t i n t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g a w a r e n e s s o f t h e combat p o t e n t i a l of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m .

FH 100-5,

, 1341

The Army e n t e r e d World War I1 w i t h t h e c a p s t o n e d o c t r i n a l manual, F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , F M 100-5,

.battle.

I t was a c o l l e c t i o n o f c o n c e p t s u n t r i e d i n
S i n c e t h e p u b l i s h i n g of t h e manual i n May o f 1 3 4 1 ,
A

t h e w o r l d , and t h e a r m i e s who had s h a p e d i t , had c h a n g e d .

r e v i e w o f t h e m a n u a l , f o c u s i n g on t h e employment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s , p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e o f t h e i m p a c t ~f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y on d o c t r i n e .
T h e f i r s t n o t e w o r t h y p o i n t is r e v e a l e d an p a g e 111 ir.
t h e T a b l e of C o n t e n t s .

Armor d o e s n o t e x i s t a s an arm o r

service.

The t h r e e p r i m a r y arms o f t h e s e r v i c e a t t h e t i m e
A closer

were t h e i n f a n t r y , c a v a l r y , snd a r t i l l e r y .

e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n t e n t s f i n a l l y r e v e a l s t h e r o l e o f

-19-

t a n k s i n t h e Army o f 1 9 4 1 u n d e r o b s c u r e s u b - t i t l e s i n t h e T a b l e of C o n t e n t s . Tank f u n c t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e

m e n t i o n e d as a p a r t o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s and t h e G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s (GHQ) t a n k battalions. Tanks are a l s o g i v e n d o c t r i n a l r o l e s as a p a r t

o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f i n f a n t r y m i s s i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 1 The p r i n c i p l e arm o f t h e Army i n 1 9 4 1 was i n f a n t r y .

Army d o c t r i n e o f 1 9 4 1 s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t whenever

i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t s f a c e d a f o r c e o f combined arms, t h e l i m i t e d f i r e p o w e r o f t h e i n f a n t r y must b e a d e q u a t e l y r e i n f o r c e d b y t h e s u p p o r t o f a r t i l l e r y , t a n k s , combat a v i a t i o n , and o t h e r arms. The manner i n w h i c h t h i s

s t a t e m e n t is w r i t t e n ' i m p l i e s t h a t i n f a n t r y i n combat would

f a c e enemy combined arms f o r m a t i o n s a s an e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r

than as a r u l e . 1 2 The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e c a v a l r y can b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o s i m i l a r t a s k s conducted by a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s o f t h e p e r i o d w i t h some e x c e p t i o n s . T h e s e e x c e p t i o n s a r e i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c a v a l r y as a f o r c e c a p a b l e o f o p e r a t i n g i n a l l w e a t h e r and a l l t y p e s o f

terrain.

The m i s s i o n and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e c a v a l r y i n tt.e

1 9 4 1 , FH 100-5,

, a d d r e s s e s t h e role o f

m e c h a n i z a t i o n i n t h e c o n d u c t of s e c u r i t y m i s s i o n s . 1 3

-20-

An e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r o l e o f a r m o r e d

elements c a n b e f o u n d i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e m i s s i o n s and
c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n . consisted of f i v e s e p a r a t e echelons. The d i v i s i o n These e c h e l o n s a r e

l i s t e d as command, r e c o n n a i s a n c e , s t r i k i n g , s u p p o r t .and service. C o n c e p t u a l l y , t h e command and r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

e c h e l o n s c o n d u c t e d t h e same t a s k s a s t h o s e o f an i n f a n t r y division. The s t r i k i n g B c h e l o n o f t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n

consisted of t h e d i v i s i o n s tank b a t t a l i o n s . A r m o r e d - i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s were a s s i g n e d t o t h e s u p p o r t i n g e c h e l o n and c o n d u c t e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g

manner :

The i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t of t h e s u p p o r t e c h e l o n is t r a n s p o r t e d i n a r m o r e d
personnel c a r r i e r s . I t remains mobile as long as t h e s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t s . When a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n of f o l l o w i n g t h e s t r i k i n g echelon, i t follows closely; p r e p a r e d t o overcome t h e r e m a i n i n g h o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e i n t h e areas over which t h e t a n k s have p a s s e d , t o occupy and h o l d t h e g r o u n d g a i n e d , o r t o c o v e r t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t a n k u n i t s d x r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e a t t a c k . P r i o r t o t h e a t t a c k by t h e s t r i k i n g e c h e l o n , i t may b e u s e d t o d e v e l o p t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n w i t h a s e c o n d a r y a t t a c k s u p p o r t e d by a r t i l l e r y , combat a v i a t i o n , e n g i n e e r s , a n d , when necessary by some of t h e t a n k s . 14

I t is c l e a r from t h i s e x t r a c t o f t h e manual t h a t t h e
d o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment o f a r m o r and i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t s

-21-

was t o b e c o n d u c t e d i n s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t e c h e l o n s .
T h e s e e c h e l o n s ; w h i l e c o m p l i m e n t a r y , were n o t e n v i s i o n e d a s mutually supporting. Armor was e x p e c t e d t o s t r i k e , l e s s mobile formations, w h i l e

p e n e t r a t e , and o u t - m a n u e v e r

t h e i n f a n t r y o f t h e s u p p o r t i n g e c h e l o n f o l l o w e d and administered t h e k i l l i n g blow. Motorized ( t r u c k borne)

i n f a n t r y elements f o l l o w e d t h e a r m o r e d - i n f a n t r y and r e l i e v e d them so t h a t t h e a r m o r e d - i n f a n t r y c o u l d c o n t i n u e t h e i r s u p p o r t of t h e armored s p e a r h e a d . 1 5 The n o n - d i v i s i o n a l t a n k b a t t a l i o n s o f t h e G e n e r a ? H e a d q u a r t e r s t a n k g r o i p a l l o w e d t h e commander t o d e s i g n a d d i t i o n a l u n i t s c a p a b l e o f f u n c t i o n i n g i n t h e same manner

as t h e armored d i v i s i o n .

The e x p e c t a t i o n , t h a t a comb.ined

arms f o r c e c o n s t r u c t e d i n t h i s manner c o u l d p e r f o r m t h e s a n e
m i s s i o n s a s an a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n , i g n o r e s t h e o b v i o u s t r a i n i n g and command and c o n t r o l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 1 e T h e r e is a s t r i k i n g c o n t r a s t i n t h e l e v e l o f d e t e i l

i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e f u n c t i o n s and C a p a b i l i t i e s o f th;.
a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n when compared t o t h a t o f t h e i n f a n t r y and motorized i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s .

I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t w h i l e armor was n o t an
arm i n 1 9 4 1 , F M 100-5, QDerations, d e d i c a t e s f o u r t e e n p a g e s

t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n and o n l y two t o t h o s e o f t h e i n f a n t r y

-22-

division.

The r e c e n t h i s t o r y o f t h e F r e n c h and B r i t i s h

d e f e a t s a t t h e h a n d s o f German a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s undoubtedly c a l l e d f o r a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e role of a r m o r i n o u r own 1941 Army D o c t r i n e .

A s e c o n d r e v e a l i n g p o i n t i n t h e 1941 manual was t h e

f a i l u r e of t h e d o c t r i n e d e s i g n e r s t o assign armor t h e
p r i m a r y a n t i t a n k r o l e o f t h e Army.

They c h o s e i n s t e a d t o

g i v e t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a n t i t a n k g u n s o r g a n i c t o combat u n i t s and t a n k d e s t r o y e r s . 1 7
T h e 1941, F M 100-5,

, represented the
W h i l e f l a w e d t o some d e g r e . e ,

American Army's b e s t g u e s s o f t h e manner i n w h i c h war c o u l d be s u c c e s s f u l l y conducted.

h i s t o r y h a s shown t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s manual t o b e s o u n d .
T h e b a s i c drawback t o t h e 1941 v e r s i o n of F M 100-5,

, -

was t h e i n a b i l i t y o f t h e d o c t r i n e w r i t e r t o d r a w I t is t r c e

on t h e h i s t o r y o f war t o i n f l u e n c e h i s d o c t r i n e .

t h a t t h e b a s i c m a c h i n e s , which d o m i n a t e d t h e b a t t l e f i e l d

d u r i n g World War I1 were p r e s e n t d u r i n g World War I . b u t t h a dynamic g r o w t h i n t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s c r e a t e d n o v e l i . o n c a p t ~

of e m p l o y m e n t .

I t can a l s o be s a i d t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s o f

" b l i t z k r i e g " and t h e r o l e o f a i r p o w e r e x i s t e d p r i o r t o t h e war. T h e s e i d e a s were immature and r e q u i r e d t e c h n o l o g i c 3 1

advances t o reach t h e i r f u l l m a t u r i t y .

-23-

American d o c t r i n e writers had t o f u r t h e r s y n t h e s i z e t h e s e

c o n c e p t s and s h a p e them i n t o an American way o f w a r .

FM 100-5, Oosrations, 1344

The 1944 v e r s i o n o f FM 100-5,

, had t h e

b e n e f i t o f t h r e e y e a r s o f war i n i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n y e t d i f f e r e d v e r y l i t t l e f r o m t h e 1341 e d i t i o n . The m a j o r i t y o f

t h e m a n u a l is an a l m o s t v e r b a t i m c o p y o f t h e 1 3 4 1 v e r s i o n , t h o u g h w i t h some s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t i o n s . A l t h o u g h a r m o r is s t i l l n o t an arm, t h e m e c h a n i z e d
c a v a l r y b e g i n s t o a b s o r b some o f t h e t r a d i t i q n a l armor

m i s s i o n s s u c h a s r e c o n n a i s a n c e and s e c u r i t y .

The missions

and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h i s t y p e o f Army o r g a n i z a t i o n i n d i c a t e t h e i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n c e o f m e c h a n i z a t i o n on Army doctrine.la The d o c t r i n e w r i t e r s o f t h e 1944 manual r e t a i n e d t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n t o b e augmented by o t h e r members o f t h e ccmbined

arms team when f a c i n g a combined a r m s f o r c e .

The m i s s i o n and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e h o r s e c a v a l r y r e m a i n e d t h e s a m e , and t h e m i s s i o n and r e s p o s i b i l i t i e s c f t h e mechanized c a v a l r y g rew. Even w i t h t h e g r o w t h i n t n e

-24-

c a p a b i l i t y of b o t h cavalry o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e i r m i s s i o n s r e m a i n e d e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same. T h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e armored d i v i s i o n underwent s i g n i f i c a n t change. The The

e c h e l o n m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 1941 v e r s i o n d i s a p p e a r e d .

r o l e o f t h e a r m o r e d - i n f a n t r y i s much more i n t r i n s i c i n t h e
success o f t h e a r m o r b a t t a l i o n s o f t h e d i v i s i o n .
s t a t e s "Seldom w i l l t a n k s o p e r a t e w i t h o u t i n f a n t r y
s u p p o r t . " I t f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s t h e m i s s i o n s of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team when d e s c r i b i n g a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n a t t a c k operations:ls The i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v e o f t h e a t t a c k s h o u l d b e w i t h i n t h e r a n g e of t h e b a s e of f i r e . T a n k s l e a d t h e a t t a c k when t e r r a i n is f a v o r a b l e and h o s t i l e a n t i t a n k d e f e n s e s a r e weak. Infantry leads the attack over u n s u i t a b l e terrain o r against s t r o n g a n t i t a n k d e f e n s e . T a n k s and i n f a n t r y may a t t a c k t o g e t h e r p a r t i c u l a r l y when s t r o n g a n t i t a n k d e f e n s e s may b e e x p e c t e d . When t a n k s e n c o u n t e r u n f a v o r a b l e terrain, or strong antitank defenses, t h e i n f a n t r y passes t h r o u g h t h e a r m o r f o r m a t i o n s , and s u p p o r t e d by t h e t a n k s , c o n t i n u e s t h e a t t a c k . S i m i l a r l y when f a v o r a b l e t e r r a i n and enemy a n t i t a n k d e f e n s e permit, t a n k u n i t s p a s s through t h e i n f a n t r y and c o n t i n u e t h e a t t a c k . z o The manual

-25-

The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team i n t h e a t t a c k d e s c r i b e d i n t h e p r e c e e d i n g t h r e e p a r a g r a p h s is c o m p l i m e n t a r y and m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i n g . This relationship The d o c t r i n e

embodys e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

o f t h e employment o f t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n moved sway f r o m t h e a r b i t r a r y e c h e l o n m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 1941 d o c t r i n e and moved t o a c o n c e p t o f m u t u a l s u p p o r t . T h i s is a n e x c e l l e n t

example o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f d o c t r i n e b a s e d on s u c c e s s f u l b a t t l e f i e l d experience.

I n t h e 1944 v e r s i o n o f FM 100-5,

, the

m i s s i o n and c a p a b i l i t i e s of t a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s and non-divisional t a n k b a t t a l i o n s r e p l a c e d t h o s e of t h e . 1 9 4 1

GHQ t a n k b a t t a l i o n s .

Requirements f o r n o n - d i v i s i o n a l t a n k

b a t t a l i o n s t o p e r f o r m t h e same f u n c t i o n s a s t h o s e i n t h e armored d i v i s i o n r e m a i n ed . O r g a n i c a n t i t a n k weapons an.2 t h e

t a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s r e t a i n e d t h e primary a n t i t a n k m i s s i o n f o r t h e Army.21
Army d o c t r i n e i n 1944, a s d e s c r i b e d i n

FM

100-5,

, -

r e f l e c t e d t h e new t a c t i c a l a w a r e n e s s o f A m e r i c s n

combat u n i t s l e a r n e d d u r i n g t h r e e y e a r s of war. I n r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e mutual s u p p o r t and c o o p e r a t i o n of a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s .

t h e Army b e g a n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s p e c i f i c a r m o r - i n f a n t r y

doctrine.

The b a s i s o f t h i s d o c t r i n e is f o u n d i n F M ?:-3E,

-26-

- ank, published

i n 1944.

The b a s i c t e n e t s of

t h e d o c t r i n e were s t a t e d i n t h i s manner: S u c c e s s i n b a t t l e can be a s s u r e d o n l y when t h e r e is c o m p l e t e c o o p e r a t i o n o f a l l arms. No o n e arm w i n s b a t t l e s . S u c c e s s is a t t a i n e d when each arm, weapon, and i n d i v i d u a l is employed t o a f f o r d t h e maximum s u p p o r t t o t h e r e m a i n d e r i n t e g r a t e d so a s t o a c h i e v e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e enemy. S i n c e t a n k s and i n f a n t r y a r e l i n k e d so c l o s e l y o n e t o t h e o t h e r , i t is n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e , p o w e r s , and l i m i t a t i o n s o f b o t h - b e u n d e r s t o o d by a l l . 2 2 The m a n u a l c o n t i n u e s t o d e s c r i b e i n d e t a i l t h e b a s i c a r m o r - i n f a n t r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s , m i s s i o n s , and c a p a b i l i t i e s which have been d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y . The m a n u a l was a l s o

s u p p l e m e n t e d by a s e p a r a t e manual w h i c h c o n t a i n e d i l l u s t r a t e d p r o b l e m s o n t h e employment o f t a n k s w i t h infantry.

I n a d d i t i o n t o s h o r t s t u d i e s on employment
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams i n t a c t i c s ! s i t u a t i o n s i n a E u r o p e a n c o n t e x t , FH 1 7 - 3 6 , W t r v - T a n k

Tesm, examined
jungle warfare.

t h e u s e of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams i n v o l v e d

ir;

T h i s manual a l s o c o n t a i n s some p r a c t i c a l

g u i d a n c e f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o t a n k s when a c t i n g a s i n f a n t r y transporters.23

-27-

F M 100-5, O p e r a t i o n s , 1949

The 1 9 4 9 v e r s i o n o f t h e F i e l d S e r v i c e , F M 100-5,

, -

shows a c o n t i n u i n g e v o l u t i o n i n t h e The m i s s i o n s and

r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s arms.

c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s t a t e s c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t i n o r d e r f o r i n f a n t r y o p e r a t i o n s t o be d e c i s i v e , t h e i n f a n t r y m u s t b e r e i n f o r c e d by t h e a r t i l l e r y , a r m o r e d c a v a l r y , and e n g i n e e r s . The 1 9 4 9 v e r s i o n r e o r g a n i z e d t h e

arms and shows t h e r e p l a c e m e n t of t h e h o r s e and m e c h a n i z e d

c a v a l r y w i t h an arm c a l l e d t h e " a r m o r e d c a v a l r y " . The

a r m o r e d c a v a l r y arm combined t h e m i s s i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s

of t h e c a v a l r y and t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s o f t h e a r m o r e d
division. The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s

o f t h i s new arm also s u p p o r t e d a combined arms c o n c e p t :

I t c o n c e n t r a t e s i t s f i r e power a t t h e d e c i s i v e area of a c t i o n t o l e a d , accompany, o r s u p p o r t i n f a n t r y i n t h e p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e e n e m y ' s d e f e n s e s , and d e s t r o y enemy p e n e t r a t i o n s . 2 4

I n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n d o c t r i n e i n t h e 1949 v e r s i o n s t a t e s t h a t t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n m u s t be c a p a b l e o f a b s o r b i n g d i f f e r e n t arms i n o r d e r t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e i r a s s i g n e d mission. M e n t i o n was made o f t h e h e a v y t a n k b a t t a l i o n , nfiw

o r g a n i c t o t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n , and t h e i n c r e a s e d combat

-20-

s u s t a i n a b i l i t y t h a t t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n gave t o t h e i n f a n t r y division.
Also,

f o r t h e f i r s t time in d o c t r i n a l l i t e r a t u r e

a t t h i s l e v e l , p r o v i s i o n s w e r e made f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of
" m o b i l e t a s k f o r c e s " made up o f v a r i o u s arms. The m i s s i o n

o f t h e m o b i l e t a s k f o r c e was t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t of t h e a t t a i n m e n t of d i v i s i o n o b j e c t i v e s . The

a r m o r e d c a v a l r y a l s o assumed t h e p r i m a r y a n t i t a n k r o l e of
t h e army.

I n d e p e n d e n t t a n k b a t t a l i o n s and t a n k d e s t r o y e r T h e i r f u n c t i o n s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s

battalions disappeared.

became a n o r g a n i c p a r t o f t h e a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y division.25 The b a s i c u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e o f t h e m u t u a l s u p p o r t of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s as a s u c o e s s f u l t a c t i c a l i n g r e d i e n t ,

was a l s o a b a s i c premise o f t h e 1 9 4 9 , FM 100-5,

.-

When e x a m i n i n g t h e t h r e e v e r s i o n s o f t h e F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , FM 100-5, ODerations, t h e r e i s c l e a r e v i d e n c e o f t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n a l employment of armor-infantry teams. A r m o r - i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s began

3s

d i s t i n c t o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s in 1 9 4 1 , and evolved i n t o t h e m u t u a l s u p p o r t i n g , complimentary o r g a n i z a t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 1 9 4 4 , and 1949 v e r s i o n s .

In

1 9 4 9 , Army d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e d t h e use o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t a a m s a s a p a r t o f combined arms t e a m s t o a c h i e v e d e c i s i v e a c t i o n .

-29-

W h i l e t h e b a s i c g r o u n d w o r k f o r t h e employment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams had b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d b y 1 9 4 9 , s i g n i f i c a n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a r m o r and i n f a n t r y had a l s o become e n t r e n c h e d . D o c t r i n e f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d view of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . d e s c r i p t i o n o f a r m o r employment.

T h i s can b e seen i n t h e
The d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e

m i s s i o n and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n a l l t h r e e v e r s i o n s o f t h e m a n u a l , makes i m p r o p e r u s e of t h e t e r m "tanks". T a n k s a r e l i s t e d i n t h e same v e i n a s m a c h i n e g u n s , They a p p e a r t o b e t h o u g h t o f a s

m o r t a r s , and a n t i t a n k g u n s .

a s i n g l e weapon, and t h e v a l u e o f t h e combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s of armor p l a t o o n s , companies, and b a t t a x i o n s a s s i g n e d as a u n i t t o i n f a n t r y c o m p a n i e s , b a t t a l i o n s , o r r e g i m e n t s , seems t o have been l o s t .

I n t h e 1 9 4 1 v e r s i o n , t h e m i s s i o n and

c a p a b i l i t i e s o f armor o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l s o b e g i n s w i t h t h e i m p l i c a t i o n of t a n k s as a separate system, b u t e v o l v e s i n t o

t h e employment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y

t e a m s by 1 3 4 9 .

The d i r e c t

r e s u l t o f t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f d o c t r i n e were t w o d i f f e r e n t v i e w s on t h e employment of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m w h i c h was t o h a v e g r a v e c o n s e q u e n c e s d u r i n g t h e Korean War.26

-30-

F M 7-20,

I n f a n t r v Rat-

, 1944

The F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , F M 100-5, , -

p r e s e n t a h i g h l e v e l view o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s and s t r u c t u r e o f Army d o c t r i n e . B a t t a l i o n and r e g i m e n t a l commanders from

1946 t o 1 9 5 0 were much more c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of Army d o c t r i n e a t t h e i r l e v e l s .

Army

d o c t r i n e f o r t h e employment of t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i c n is d e s c r i b e d i n F i e l d Manual 7 - 2 0 ,

I n L m t r v Battalion,

This

manual d e s c r i b e s t h e r o l e , m i s s i o n s , and c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e infantry battalion. An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s m a n u a l , a s i t

e v o l v e d f r o m t h e 1944 v e r s i o n t o t h e v e r s i o n u t i l i z e d p r i o r t o t h e d e p l o y m e n t of American combat t r o o p s i n K o r e a , w i l l t r a c e t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team d o c t r i n e a t t h e l e v e l a t w h i c h i t was t o b e i m p l e m e n t e d . The 1944 v e r s i o n o f FH 7-20 had t h e b e n e f i t o f t h r e e y e a r s o f combat i n i t s d e v e l o p m e n t . The r e l a t i o n s h i p

b e t w e e n t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n and a t t a c h e d armor e l e m i t i t s
is c l e a r :

T a n k s a s s i s t t h e i n f a n t r y by d e s t r o y i n g o r n e u t r a l i z i n g h o s t i l e automatic weapons, r e s e r v e s , c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s . . . . and by d o m i n a t i n g objectives u n t i l the infantrys a t t a c k i n g e c h e l o n a r r i v e s and i s prepared t o defend t h e p o s i t i o n . z 7

-31-

T h e manual a l s o a d d r e s s e s t h e r o l e of t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n i n s u p p o r t of t a n k s : I n f a n t r y a s s i s t s t a n k s by d e s t r o y i n g o r n e u t r a l i z i n g a n t i t a n k weapons and t a n k h u n t i n g teams, l o c a t i n g and r e m o v i n g m i n e s and o t h e r t a n k o b s t a c l e s , s e i z i n g g r o u n d f r o m w h i c h t a n k s may a t t a c k , locating d e f i l a d e d r o u t e s of advance f o r t a n k s , o r t a k i n g o v e r an o b j e c t i v e which t h e t a n k s have c a p t u r e d o r are d o m i n a t i n g . 28 The m a n u a l o f f e r s more t h a n j u s t t h e s e g e n e r i c a p p r a i s a l s of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y p r i o r i t i e s . The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n i n t h e a t t a c k
specifically addresses the requirement f o r t h e u n i t leader

t o conduct a s t u d y of t h e t e r r a i n t o t a k e advantage of t h e d i f f e r e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e a r m o r and i n f a n t r y i n t h e armor-infantry team. T h i s s t u d y o f t h e t e r r a i n may i o d i s a t e

s e v e r a l changes i n f o r m a t i o n t o t a k e advantage of t h e s t r e n g t h s of b o t h t h e a t t a c h e d t a n k s and t h e i n f a n t r y . * 9

T h e d o c t r i n a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n i::

t h e defense a l s o d e l i n e a t e s t h e requirement f o r t e r r a i n a p p r e c i a t i o n when o r g a n i z i n g t a n k s a s a p a r t o f t h e d e f e n s e .

In t h e d e f e n s e t h e t a n k s a t t a c h e d t o t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n
w e r e t h e p r i m a r y c o u n t e r a t t a c k weapons o f t h e b s t t a l i c r . .
T h i s c o u n t e r a t t a c k c o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d by maneuver o r b y

fire.

A t t a c h e d t a n k s d i d n o t have t h e primary d e f e n s i v e

-32-

r o l e , nor d i d t h e y have t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o e n g a g e enemy t a n k s .30 The 1944 m a n u a l a l s o o u t l i n e d t h e m e t h o d s b y w h i c h t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s o f t h e b a t t a l i o n would o p e r a t e when c o n d u c t i n g b o t h j u n g l e and a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n s . 3 1

F M 7-20,

M a n t r v Bat-

, 1950

B a t t a l i o n commanders, i n March o f 1 9 5 0 , o p e r a t e d w i t h . a d o c t r i n e much t h e same a s t h a t of t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s i n 1944. T h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l c h a n g e s t o t h e d o c t r i n e w h i c h drew These changes

t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team closer t o g e t h e r .

i n d i c a t e an i n c r e a s e d a w a r e n e s s o f t h e combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s

of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s .
T h e f i r s t i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e is i n d i c a t e d by t h e h e a d i n g of p a r a g r a p h 162 w h i c h r e a d s , " I n f a n t r y - T a n k Team". The

s u b s t a n c e o f t h e p a r a g r a p h is t h e same a s t h a t d e s c r i b e d f o r t h e o f f e n s e i n t h e 1944 manual w i t h s o m e new c o n c e p t s .

Thr

manual a d d r e s s e s a " h a b i t u a l " r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n armor and infantry units. Formation of t h e s e " h a b i t u a l " r e l a t i o n s h i p s

was f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e a d d i t i o n o f a t a n k company t o t h e

s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t and t h e a d d i t i o n o f a heavy t a n k b a t t a l i o n t o t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n . The trrm

" t a n k s " d i s a p p e a r e d and was r e p l a c e d by t h e t e r m "armilr

-33-

p l a t o o n " o r "company."

The paragraph f u r t h e r s p e c i f i e s t h a t

i n f a n t r y c o m p a n i e s w i l l r e c e i v e " a r m o r p l a t o o n s " and i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s "armor companies" as attachments t o form

a combined arms t e a m . 3 2
The s e c o n d i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s u r f a c e s i n t h e d o c t r i n a l

r o l e o f armor i n t h e b a t t a l i o n d e f e n s e .

The p r i m a r y p u r p o s e

o f t h e t a n k was t o d e s t r o y enemy t a n k s d u r i n g t h e b a t t a l i o r . d e f e n s e as well as p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n local counterattacks. The m a n u a l s t a t e s :

The number o f t a n k s a t t a c h e d t o e a c h f r o n t - l i n e b a t t a l i o n is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e t e r r a i n , t h e e x t e n t of f r o n t h e l d , t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n , and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of t a n k s u p p o r t f o r t h e

regiment.33
Employment o f t a n k s i n a p i e c e m e a l manner t o s a t i s f y
t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of d e f e n s i b l e t e r r a i n p o s e s s e v e r a l

l o g i s t i c a l and command and c o n t r o l p r o b l e m s w h i c h c o u l d ultimately cause a f a t a l flaw i n the b a t t a l i o n defense. D i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e d o c t r i n a l employment o f armor elements a t t a c h e d t o t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n can c r e a t e confusion. The s w i r l i n g c o n t a c t o f b a t t l e c a n r e n ? e r t h e

l i n e b e t w e e n o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s m e a n i n g l e s s .

-34-

Summary

T h e impact o f World War I 1 on t h e e v o l u t i o n o f armor-infantry d o c t r i n e can be t r a c e d i n t h e F i e l d S e r v i c e Regulations, F M 100-5, Ooerations, and t h e F i e l d Manual f o r M 7-20, t h e employment o f t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n , F

InPantrv

Battalion.

The c h a n g e i n d o c t r i n e f r o m 1 9 4 1 t h r o u g h 1950

i n d i c a t e s a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e i n c r e a s i n g combat e f f i c i e n c y of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. T h e s e c h a n g e s were a

d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n of h a r s h combat

a r 11. l e s s o n s l e a r n e d d u r i n g World W

-35-

CHAPTER 3

ARMY O R G A N I Z A T I O N , T R A I N I N G , AND ERIIIPHENT. 1046-1850 I f men make war i n s l a v i s h o b s e r v a n c e o f r u l e s , t h e y w i l l f a i l . . . War.is progressive, because a l l t h e instruments and e l e m e n t s o f w 3 r a r e p r o g r e s s i v e . 1 Ulysses S. Grant
The l e a d e r s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y r e c o g n i z e d t h e p r o g r e s s i v e n a t u r e of war and i n 1946 embarked on an

e x t e n s i v e c a m p a i g n d e s i g n e d t o c h a n g e t h e way A m e r i c a n s
waged w a r . These changes influenced t h e d o c t r i n e ,

o r g a n i z a t i o n , and e q u i p m e n t o f t h e g r o u n d f o r c e s t h a t h e l ; e d win World War 11. T h e v i g o r and commitment o f t h e s e l e a d e r s

t o c h a n g e t h e m i l i t a r y b a s e d on t h e l e s s o n s o f war war n o t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a v i c t o r . The r e s u l t of t h i s o b j e c t i v e

a n a l y s i s o f t h e d o c t r i n e , o r g a n i z a t i o n , and e q u i p m e n t d u r i n g World War 11, was p r o g r e s s .

Army d o c t r i n e f r o m 1946 t o 1949 r e t a i n e d t h s saxe

b a s i c i n g r e d i e n t s a s i t s World War I1 p r e d e c e s s c r . There 3s

l i t t l e n e e d f o r c h a n g e u n t i l t h e d e t o n a t i o n by t h e h v i e t

Union of t h e i r own a t o m i c d e v i c e . Most l e a d e r s f e l t t h a t w h i l e Army d o c t r i n e was b a s i c a l l y s o u n d , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and e q u i p m e n t u s e d

-36tc;

implement that doctrine had minor flaws.

These same leaders

felt that these organizational and equipment flaws could be overcome with minor changes. Progress in the areas Gf

organization and equipment manifested itself in the form cf War Department and Theater boards. These boards were

convened in 1946 to gather information from combat commanders to recommend changes to the organizations and equipment of the World War I1 Army.

Organization

The General Board of the United States Forces ir. the European Theater produced a series of studies which resultec! in changes to all Army organizations. Study Number 17 of the General goard, made recommendations for the organization of Army Post-!tar divisions based on a concensas of combat l e a d e r s ' e ~ p e ~ i ~ : - . ' : + and an examination of future Army missisns. While a
~ a e

concensus of military opinion based on cnmhat experiexe relatively easy to achieve, it was only applicab?2 ta theater of operations. 1imitation:z The study conc+rns itself solely with combat experiences in and lessons derived from the European Theater of
-37-

'33.3

This concern was noted

9s a

stc,dy

O p e r a t i o n s . I t a t t e m p t s no a n a l y s i s o f warfare i n t h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r , Africa, o r I t a l y , n o r of t h e most s u i t a b l e t y p e o f d i v i s i o n f o r employment i n t h e s e a r e a s . Consequently, while it enumerates t h e p o s s i b l e g l o b a l missions o f t h e p o s t war Army, i t p r e m i s e s i t s recommended o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e l e s s o n s o f one t h e a t e r o n l y . 3

In a d d i t i o n t o r e c o g n i z i n g t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , t h e s t u d y
a l s o seemed t o s e n s e t h e t e n t a t i v e n a t u r e o f American f o r e i g n p o l i c y as t h e w o r l d s f i r s t superpower. The r e s u l t

of t h i s l a c k o f d i r e c t i o n was a s e c o n d m a j o r l i m i t a t i o n :

The G e n e r a l Board h a s n o a u t h o r i t a t i v e statement of t h e p a t t e r n of t h e f o r e i g n and m i l i t a r y p o l i c y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e m i s s i o n s of t h e Army o f t h e f u t u r e h a v e b e e n b a s e d o n i n t e l l i g e n t e s t i m a t e s . I t is e n t i r e l y concievable, therefore, t h a t the u l t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of t h e United S t a t e s may r e q u i r e t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and maintenance of t a c t i c a l u n i t s p o s s e s s i z g c h a r a c t e r i s i t c s n o t contemplated i n t h i s report .4
W i t h t h e m a j o r s t u d y l i i n i t a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d , :he

s t u d y o n Post-War Army D i v i s i o n s t h e n examined t h e f u t u r e m i s s i o n s of t h e United S t a t e s A r m y . The m a j o r n i s s i o ~ ; ; : or

t h e Army a t t h i s time h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n t h - c:hapt.er :n doctrine.

I n addition t o those already discussed,

9 : .

Arzy

mission t o provide a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Security Council . : f t h e United Nations O r g a n i z a t i o n s u r f a c e s . The z t c d y s

-33-

d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e f o r c e designed t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s m i s s i o n is p r o p h e t i c : Assistance t o the United Nations Organization w i l l probably be provided b y elements of t h e s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e . I f , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , p o l i c y d i c t a t e s t h e c r e a t i o n of a separate " p o l i c e f o r c e , " its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l l r e q u i r e t h a t i t b e a smaller p r o t o t y p e of t h e strategic reserve.5

I t is i r o n i c t h a t i n t h e f a c e o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s a n d
m i s s i o n s t h a t made u p t h e Army's m o s t " i n t e l l i g e n t g u e s s , " t h a t t h e s t u d y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i n f a n t r y and a r m o r . % I d i v i s i o n o f W o r l d War 11, w i t h some m i n o r o r g a n i z a t i o n e l c h a n g e s , w o u l d a d e q u a t e l y s e r v e t h e P o s t - W a r Army. In considering the lessons learned during the employment of t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n i n E u r o p e , t h e s t u d y e m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e " u n i f o r m l y b e t t e r p e r f o r m a n c e ,of
i n f a n t r y when c l o s e l y s u p p o r t e d b y tan!<,- is p r o b a b l y t t . e

s i n g l e b i g g e s t t a c t i c a l lesson of t h e Euroassn zsmpsign. The s t u d y c o n t i n u e s t o emphasize t h e v a l u e o f armor-infant:3 teamwork s a y i n g : T h e p r e s e n c e o f s u p p o r t i n g Armor w 3 s d e m a n d e d b y t h e i n f a n t r y e v e n when i t was n o t e s s e n t i a l t o t h e e s t a b l i s h n e n t of f i r e s u p e r i o r i t y , t o t h e countering o f enemy t a n k t h r e a t o r t o t h e e n g a g e m e n t o f enemy a s s a u l t g u n s . "

-39-

B a s e d on t h i s combat e x p e r i e n c e and f u t u r e A r m y m i s s i o n s , t h e s t u d y recommended t h a t t h e Army a d o p t t h e s p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of G e n e r a l Board S t u d y Number 1 5 . G e n e r a l B o a r d S t u d y Number i 5 p r o d u c e d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for c h a n g e s t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , e q u i p m e n t , and t a c t i c a l employment o f t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n . Two r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h i s s t u d y had s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t s on t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s w i t h i n t h e i n f a n t r y divisions. T h e f i r s t m a j o r recommended c h a n g e was t h e d e i e t i x o f t h e r e g i m e n t a l a n t i - t a n k company. The l o g i c b e h i n d t h i z

d e c i s i o n was b e s t summarized by M a j o r G e n e r a l K i b L a r a t a c o n f e r e n c e on t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n g i v e n 3t t h e Gra-d H ~ 7 t s 1

a t Bad Neuheim on 20 November, 1945, when he s a i d :

I t seems t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y d o n c t want
tank u n i t organic i n the infantry regiment t o r e p l a c e t h e a n t i - t a n k company. A l l seem t o a g r e e t h a t t h e b e s t a n t i - t a n k weapon t o d a y i s t h e medium t a n k . I t t h e r e f o r e seems t o b e t h e c o n c e n s u s of t h i s m e e t i n g t h a t t h e a n t i - t a n k company s h o u l d b e e l i n i n a t e d from e a c h i n f a n t r y regiment and t h r e e t a n k c o m p a n i e s s h o u l d b e added t o t b e tank regiment a t d i v i s i o n level.

The s e n t i m e n t d i s p l a y e d i n t h i s c o n f 5 r e E c e wzc r e f l e c t e d i n t h e f i n a l s t u d y r e p o r t w h i c h recommended 5k.e

-40-

e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e a n t i - t a n k company. the anti-tank

The e l i m i n a t i c n of

co m p any was p r e d i c a t e d on t h e e s t a b l i s h m e c t o f

a tank regiment organic t o t h e d i v i s i 3 n . a

The s e c o n d s i g n i f i c a n t impact on a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t r a n s

was a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t o make a t a n k r e g i n e n t o f t h - e e tan!<

battalions orsanic to the infantry division. This

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was b a s e d o n l e s s o n s l e a r n e d d u r i n g c c m b a t i c Europe which have been p r e v i o u s l y a d d r e s s e d . r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was n o t w i t h o u t i t s o p p o n e n t s .

This
An exchang?

b e t w e e n G e n e r a l O f f i c e r s a t t h e same Bad Ne u h e i m c o n f a r r r c e indicates t h e opposing positions: G e n e r a l R o b e r t s o n : I would p r e f e r t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s i n . t h e d i v i s i o n and t s k e b o t h t h e a n t i - t a n k and cannon companies o u t of t h e r e g i m e n t s . T h i s would p r o v i d e more s c s t a i n e d power. You h a v e t!ie ssme number of t a n k s , b u t u n d e r c e n t r s l i z e d control. M y o r g a n i z a t i o n wculd b e t h r e e tank battalions--no tanks in the r e g i m e n t - - a n d f e e d t h e m u p a s needet:!.
G e n e r a l M c E r i d e : Are we p l a n n i n g zn armored o r i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n ?

G e n e r a l P a t t o n : Apropos o f Genera! M c B r i d e ' s s t a t e m e n t , a r e ile b c i i d i n g a n I n my armored o r i n f a n t r y division': o p i n i o n t h e r e is v e r y l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between them e x c e p t o n e v e r y f n n d a m e n t a l one. I n an i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n t h e purpose of the supporting w e a p o n s - - p r i m a r i l y tanks - _; a t o get the i n f a n t r y forward. I n an armored d i v i s i o n , t h e p u r a o s e o f t h e i n f a r . t r y is t o break the tanks loose.9

-41-

The Armor S c h o o l a l s o o p p o s e d t h e i n c l u s i o n o f a n o r g a n i c t a n k r e g i m e n t i n t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n and i z t'.e "Armor C o n f e r e n c e C o n c l u s i o n s " f o r t h e Armor ? o r i f e r e i x a c'f J u n e 1 9 4 7 , s u p p o r t e d t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f an o r g a n i c . t a n k b a t t a l i o n t o each infantry d i v i s i o n . The Armor C n r i f e r e n c e

approved t h e recommendation w i t h o u t a d i s s e n t i n g v o t s . 1 0

In 1 9 4 7 , c h a n g e s t o t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n
o r g a n i z a t i o n saw t h e a d d i t i o n o f o r g a n i c a r m o r u n i t s .
Thca?

a d d i t i o n s w e r e n c t t h o s e recommended by t h e G e n e r a l P c a r d . b u t r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d f o r o r g a n i c armor u n i t s as d e m o n s t r a t e d b y a c t i o n s i n World War 11. The 1 9 4 7 i n f a n t r y

d i v i s i o n was o r g a n i z e d w i t h a medium t a n k company o r g a n i c tr. e a c h i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t and a medium t a n k b a t t a l i o n o f t h r e e companies under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e d i v i s i o n .

The regiinentsl

t a n k companies gave t h e r e g i m e n t s b o t h a mobile z n t i - t z n ! < . and a l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y . 1 1 The G e n e r a l Bozrd s t u d y o n 3 o z t - W a r r',iviiL:Zz recommended c h a n d e s t o t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n . Combst
2:s:

c a s u a l t y r a t e s f o r t h e a r s c r e d d i v i s i o n , as d e s c r i b e d 5 j r G m e r a l G e o r g e S . F a t t o n a t t h e Bad Neukeiin c s n P e r = c , : c . .
657:
;<?:?

f o r t h e i n f a n t r y , 4 . 7 % f c r t h e a r t i l l e r y , snd 2::i The r e s u l t o f t h e h i g h i r . f s n t r y c a s u r t l t y

F:r
: . i t . ?

t h e armor.

was t h e u s e of

e n g i n e e r s a n d a t t a c h e d c o n v e n t i o n a l ir::sr.try Thc:sa i r 5 i i t

u n i t s t o accomplish srmcred-infantry n i s s i o n s .

-42-

l e s s o n s r e s u l t e d i n a c h a n g e i n t h e amount o f armoredi n f a n t r y o r g a n i c t o t h e armored d i v i s i o n . I n 1946, t h e

a m o u n t o f i n f a n t r y i n t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n was i n c r e a s e d from t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s o f t h r e e companies t o f o u r b a t t a l i o n s

of f o u r c o m p a n i e s . 1 2

I n a d d i t i o n t o c h a n g e s i n t h e i n f a n t r y and armored
d i v i s i o n s , two a d d i t i o n a l t o p i c s were a d d r e s s e d . These

t o p i c s show r e m a r k a b l e f o r e s i g h t a n d a n a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e organizational structures. T h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s e c h a n g e s was

t o synchronize o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structures with t h e c h a r . ~ e si z doctrine. T h e f i r s t t o p i c was t h e c o m b i n a t i o n c f t h e i n f a n t r y a n d a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n i n t o w h a t was t e r m e d a n " a l l - g r o x n n d purpose" d i v i s i o n . T h i s c o n c e p t was t h e r e s u l t o f r e s p g z s e z

0 1 :

from general o f f i c e r s and c o l o n e l s

the srgsnizsticn

'2f

p o s t - w a r d i v i s i o n s c o n d u c t e d i n O c t o b e r o f !945.

C7.e z t ~ t + . 6
a:.:?
. . : . i .

a d v a n t a g e o f t h e c o m b i n e d d i v i s i o n was t h e z i n p l i z i t y

s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of t r a i n i n g which c o u l d be a c h i e v e d ''L?
set pattern."

The a b i l i t y t o d e v e l o p and p r o c u r e eqaipmen?

would a l s o be s i m p l i f i e d .

A s e c o n d a d v a n t a g e w o - l d 5.2

:kc

a b i l i t y o f t h i s t y p e o f d i v i s i o n t o assQme a b r ~ 3 2 . r : rai:Ge of missions. T h e d i v i s i o n c o u l d n o t o n l y d e f e n d in

Y : ' :0 * .~.
.,c-' --r-

t e r r a i n w i t h i t s i n f a n t r y a s s e t s , b u t i t casul.2 alz,: Ss
i n t h e p e n e t r a t i o n a n d p u r s u i t c f enemy f o r c e s .

The

-43-

a d o p t i o n o f combined d i v i s i o n would a l s o r e s u l t i n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e combat b u r d e n . The

more

d i s a d v a n t a g e s of t h i s type of f o r c e k i l l e d t h e c o n c e p t .
was p o n d e r o u s , m e c h a n i z e d , and e x p e n s i v e . 1 3

It

The s e c o n d t o p i c was a d i s c u s s i o n on t h e f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f t h e t a s k f o r c e a s a new b a s i c u n i t . p r o p o s a l was a g a i n b a s e d o n t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f combat l e a d e r s i n World War 11, who d e p l o y e d s m a l l combined 3rms teams t o accomplish v i t a l u n i t m i s s i o n s . The a d v a n t a g e s of The

s u c h an o r g a n i z a t i o n w e r e i t s f l e x i b i l i t y and t r a i n i n g efficiency. The d i s a d v a n t a g e s w e r e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r

s t a f f i m p r o v i s a t i o n t o c o n t r o l t h e s e t a s k f o r c e s , and t t e t e n d e n c y o f t h e s e t a s k f o r c e s t o become f i x e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

No r e c o m m e n d a t i o n on t h i s new b a s i c u n i t c o n c e p t was n a d e b y
t h e Board. The Board s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i ? i + : i t
B

e v i d e n c e t o make t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i t was or w 3 s n c t v i a b l e s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e b a s i c u n i t s t r u c t u r e t h e n Lr. use.

The Board f u r t h e r recommended t h a t t h e c o n c e p t e ? r i t . ; d

further detailed consideration.14 The combined work of t h e G a n e r a l B o a r d . t h e I n f s z t y y C o n f e r e n c e , and t h e Armor C o n f e r e n c e o f 19-16, led t i c1:angl.z
i n t h e t a s i c i c f a n t r y and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s t r u c t x r e s .

These changes were t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t cf t h e l e s s o n s I e a r n e r i

i n combat i n t h e Europear! T h e a t e r d u r i n g World War 1 1 .

?!..I-

-44-

s i n g l e g r e a t e s t l e s s o n o f t h e war i n E u r o p e was t h e i n c r e a s e

i n combat e f f i c i e n c y , w h i c h r e s u l t e d from t h e m u t u a l s u ~ p a r t
of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m . The i n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d

d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n s of 1947 r e f l e c t e d t h e s e i n s i g h t s . The c h a n g e s r e s u l t e d i n t h e c r e a t i o n o f o r g a n i c t a n k e l e m e n t s i n t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n and t h e i n c r e a s e i n a r m o r e d - i n f a n t r y s t r e n g t h i n t h e armored d i v i s i o n . The i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e f i r s t m a j o r c h a n g e s i n t k e a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n s s i n c e 1 9 4 1 t o o k

place i n 1947.

The c h a n g e s r e f l e c t e d a Eurcpear. way o f w s r .

T h e r e was no e q u i v a l e n t G e n e r a l Board f o r t h e Far E a s t , i n s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f Ama-ican o v e r s e a s g r o u n d f o r c e s were s t a t i o n e d i n t h e F a r E a s t .

In

1 9 5 0 , t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e F a r East Command was 1 0 3 , 5 5 0 men.

The E u r o p e a n O c c u p a t i o n F o r c e c o n s i s t e d o f 80,01& rner..lJ

T h e i m p l e m e n t i o n o f t h e 1947 o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c?.angec

were h a l f - h e a r t e d

and overcome by e x t e r n a l f a c t c r z s ~ c h as The i m p a c t

0::

d e m o b i l i z a t i o n and t h e t h e m i l i t a r y b u d g e t .

t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of MacArthurs Far E x t Command was e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h e 1947 o c c u p a t i o n f o r c e s o f J a p a n c o n s i s t e d o f t h e 7 t h . 2 4 t h , and 2 5 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s and t h e 1st CavzLry Division. The 2 9 t h R e g i m e n t a l Combat Team s t a t i o n e d a t The 1st

Ckinawa, was a l s o u n d e r M a c A r t h u r s c o n t r c l .

-45-

Cavalry D i v i s i o n , a l t h o u g h i t r e t a i n e d t h e C a v a l r y
h o n o r i f i c , was a l s o an i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n . s t r e n g t h o f t h e s e d i v i s i o n s was 1 7 , 7 0 0 men. The w a r t i m e

I n J u n e o f 1950

t h e s e d i v i s i o n s w e r e manned a t o n l y two t h i r d s o f t h e i r authorized strength. T h e s e manpower d e f i c i e n c i e s had

r e d u c e d t h e number o f b a t t a l i o n s i n t h e i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s from t h r e e t o two. A r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s m a i n t a i n e d two The d i v i s i o n a l t a n k

i n s t e a d of t h r e e f i r i n g b a t t e r i e s .

b a t t a l i o n s were d e a c t i v a t e d b e c a u s e t h e y were t o o heavy f o r J a p a n e s e b r i d g e s and r o a d s . The t a n k c o m p a n i e s o r g a n i c t : . The s o l e armor

the i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s were a l s o m i s s i n g .

a s s e t i n e a c h i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n was a l i g h t t a n k company
,

placed under d i v i s i o n a l c o n t r o l .

The M24 l i g h t t a n k s i n

t h i s company were p r i m a r i l y u s e d f o r c e r e m o n i a l p u r p c s e s . 1 R
A requirement t o f i l l these organieaticns t u t h e i r

a u t h o r i z e d combat s t r e n g t h s would r e q u i r e 11 i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , 11 a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s , 4 medium t a n k b a t t a l i o n s and 12 l i g h t t a n k c o m p a n i e s . 1 7 I n s p i t e o f t h e work o f t h e G e n e r a l Board and t h e Armor and I n f a n t r y C o n f e r e n c e s , t h e i n f a n t r y and .armored d i v i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army o f 1947 w e r e h o l l o w . T h e s e same o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t h e F a r E a s t Command woul;' c o m m i t t e d t o combat i n K o r e a i n J u n e o f 1950.
be

-46-

Training

In a n a l y z i n g t r a i n i n g a n d i t s e f f e c t on
a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teamwork i n K o r e a , a f o c u s e d e x a m i n a t i o n m u s t be undertaken.

U n i t s s t a t i o n e d i n Europe and e l s e w h e r e ,

w h i c h were n o t c o m m i t t e d t o c o m b a t i n K o r e a , c a n n o t p r o v i d e i n s i g h t on t h e a b i l i t y o f Army l e a d e r s t o l e a r n f r o m h i s t o r y and a p p l y t h o s e l e s s o n s t o d o c t r i n e .

Basic t r a i n e e s i n t h e Army b e g i n n i n g i n 1348. h a d
9

much e a s i e r t i m e t h a n t h e i r W o r l d War I1 c o u n t e r p a r t s . Owing t o t h e s h o r t a g e o f f u n d s , Basic T r a i n i n g had beer. c a t t o a p e r i o d of e i g h t weeks. T h e t r a i n i n g p e r i o d was

i n c r e a s e d t o 14 w e e k s i n M a r c h o f 1949, b u t i n c l u d e d n o s p e c i a l t y o r branch tkaining. One s o l d i e r who r e p o r t e d t o

t h e 3 r d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a t F o r t Benning, G e o r g i a , i n 1942.

described h i s assignment t o a d i v i s i o n a l u n i t i n t h i s manner:

18

One d a y w h i l e we were g o i n g t h r o u g h i n p r o c e s s i n g , we were t a k e n t o a b i g f i e l d were a b u n c h o f e q u i p m e n t was set

up. W e s a t t h e r e i n t h e S l F a c h e r s amrl l i s t e n e d t o some S e r g e a n t s t a l k a b o u t w h a t t h e i r u n i t s d i d . T h e r e were t a n l r z . a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s , and t r u c k s a l l o u t t h e r e on d i s p l a y . A f t e r t!ie s p e e c h s s x e wandered around t h e d i s p l a y s snd t a l k e d t o the Sergeants a t l i t t l e tables. i was g o i n g t o b e a t r u c k d r i v e r b u t , t h e t a n k s r e a l l y l o o k e d g o o d . So 1 Gave t h ? S e r g e a n t a t t h a t t a b l e my n a m e . T h e
-47-

n e x t d a y I was a s s i g n e d t o t h e 7 3 r d Heavy Tank B a t t a l i o n . 1s The s o l d i e r who j o i n e d t h e Army was a l s o n o t combat-minded. Recruiters failed t o s t r e s s the obligations

o f a s o l d i e r s and a p p e a l e d t o t h e i r s e n s e o f f u n and a d v e n t u r e w i t h e n l i s t m e n t p i t c h e s l i k e , " J o i n t h e Army and s e e t h e W o r l d , " o r "Have Fun i n J a p a n . " T r a i n i n g i n t h e E i g h t h Army s t a t i o n e d i n J a p a n i n t h e y e a r s 1946 t h r o u g h 1949 i s a n e n i g m a . The g e n e r a ? concens-Ls

o f many h i s t o r i a n s is t h a t t h e t r a i n i n g c o n d u c t e d was p o o r .

T h e s e o p i n i o n s a r e b a s e d on t h e combat p e r f o r m a n c e o f Eight!:
Army u n i t s upon t h e i r commitment t o combat i n K o r e a i n l 2 5 C .

T h e r e were many r e a s o n s f o r p o o r t r a i n i n g .

These

i n c l u d e d t h e 'rapid t u r n o v e r of s o l d i e r s a s s i g n e d t o f i n i t s . l a c k o f e q u i p m e n t , and t h e l a c k of t r a i n i n g funi!s facilities. a??

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e p r o b l e m s t h e r e w e r e 3:s:
These d i s t r a c t o r s i n c l : d +

numeroiis t r a i n i n g d i s t r a c t o r s .

t h e e x e c u t i o n of o c c u p a t i o n d u t i e s , l a c k c f a s e n s e o f m i s s i o n , and t h e s i n c e r e b e l i e f by many s o l d i e r s th2.t t h ~ y would n o t b e i n v o l v e d i n c o m S a t . 2 0 The p e r s o n n e l t u r n o v e r r a t e o f t h e E i g h t h Army dx:i::g the demobilization crippled u n i t training i n the E i g h t h
Army.

T h e E i g h t h Army l o s t 43% o f its z o l d i e r s a n n u s ? l y .

w30

4.

b u i l d i n g block approach t o t r a i n i n g

doomed t o f a i l c r i .

-48-

T h e r o t a t i o n o f k e y p e r s o n n e l made u n i t s " b r a n d new" i n as l i t t l e as s i x months.21 T h e s o l d i e r s d e p l o y e d t o J a p a n were a s p e c i a l problem. rich. T h e p o w e r f u l d o l l a r made e v e n e n l i s t e d s o l d i e r s

T h i s l e d t o p r i v a t e s w i t h p e r s o n a l s e r v a n t s and z t b e r T r a i n r i d e s from T o k y o , n o r t h on t h e " Y a n k e e Drink?:

distractions.

S p e c i a l , " o r s o u t h on t h e "Dixie L i m i t e d " were f r e e .

a t t e n c e n t s a p i e c e , c r e a t e d a s t a n d i n g j o k e t h a t you

couldn't afford t o stay sober.

T h e E l a c k Market was Japanese occupation duty

lucrative.

D i s c i p l i n e was l a x .

was a s o u g h t a f t e r b i l l e t .

The s o l d i e r s s t a t i o n e d i n J a p a n

were o f low c a l i b e r and m o t i v a t i o n . 2 2

. S o l d i e r s s t a t i o n e d i n J a p a n from

1945 t o t h e s p r i n g

o f 1949 were a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , n o t c o m b a t s o l d i e r s .

They
5s

r e p l a c e d t h e i m p e r i a l g o v e r n m e n t s t all l s v e l s szc! a:tad

a constabulary.

The o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e o c c u p a t i o n f o r ? % were

t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f a r e s u r g e n c e o f m i l i t a r i s m an?. t t e

r e s t o r a t i o n o f J a p a n ' s economy.23 H a c A r t h u r f u r t h e r e x p a n d e d t h e g o a l s o f :he occupation t o i n c l u d e t h e w r i t i n g of a c o n s t i t u t i o n f c r t h e

Japanese p e o p l e . I n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e s t r o n g s u p p ' 3 r t f c r '?is

new c o n s t i t u t i o n , X a c A r t h u r a l s o d e s i r e ? t o i n s t i l l

th.2

p o p u l a c e w i t h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f deadoratis i d r s l s . 2 4

-43-

I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1 9 4 9 , MacArthur r e l a x e d t h e s t e r n
n a t u r e of t h e o c c u p a t i o n . Many a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s w e r e

t r a n s f e r e d t o t h e J a p a n e s e , and a t t h e same time t h e E i g h t h

Army r e c e i v e d a combat m i s s i o n .

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Walton W a l k e r , Commander of t h e E i g h t h Army, d e v e l o p e d d e f e n s i v e p l a n s b a s e d on t h e " T h r e a t " of a S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of Hokkaido. Walker's defense c s l l e d

f o r r a p i d deployment t o t h e beachheads t o r e p u l s e t h e enemy's a t t a c k s . Walker a l s o d e v i s e d p l a n s t o c o u c t e r k i z

f a l s e p e r c e p t i o n o f a massive i n t e r n a l t h r e a t f r o m c c i n m u n i z t s y m p a t h i z e r s and c o l l a b o r a t o r s . 2 5

I n J a p a n , t r a i n i n g a r e a s l a r g e enough t o d e p l o y a
r e g i m e n t a l c o m b a t team d i d n o t e x i s t . produced food t o f e e d t h e p o p u l a t i o n .
A l l a r a b l e land

The few r i f l e a n ?

a r t i l l e r y r a n g e s w e r e a n t i q u a t e d and g r e a t d i s t a n c e s f r g z the troop l o c s t i o n s . * ~

I n t h e f a c e o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s , L i i u t e n 3 r . t Gen*:al
Walker b e g a n i n 1943, a t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m t o c r a a t e as effective fighting force. U n i t s were t o u n d e r g o u o l l a c t i v e

t r a i n i n g t o a c h i e v e p r o f i c i e n c y a c c o r d i n g t c t h e follswinz

schedule:

December 1 3 4 9 , May 1 9 5 0 , J u l y 1350, December 1 3 5 0 ,

-50-

Company Battal ion Regiment Division

In addition t o the collective training, specific

u n i t s were t o r e c e i v e s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g i n a i r b o r n e and
amphibious o p e r a t i o n s .

U n i t s would a l s o r e c e i v e J o i n t

t r a i n i n g w i t h t h e Air F o r c e i n t h e c o n d u c t o f c l o s e a i r support. U n i t r e a d i n e s s i n s p e c t i o n s were c o n d u c t e d w i t h

appalling r e s u l t s .

I n s p i t e o f t h e new e m p h a s i s on t r a i n i n g

and t h e a t t e m p t s by t h e command t o i m p r o v e t h e combat r e a d i n e s s o f t h e E i g h t h Army, t h e command was n o t combat r e a d y when t h e N o r t h K o r e a n s i n v a d e d t h e S o u t h i n J u n e . z 7 The p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e o f American combat t r o o g s i n t h e months of J u l y t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r is common k n o w l e d g e . The

s p e c i f i c f a i l u r e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s and u n i t s v a r y w l t h t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e u n i t and t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .

I n order

t o p r o v i d e a s y s t e m a t i c s t u d y of t h e a c t i o n s i n Kores, t h e O f f i c e of t h e C h i e f Army F i e l d F o r c e s (OCAFF) d i s p a t c ! : ~ ! o b s e r v e r teams t o Korea. These teams r e p o r t e d s i g n i f i c s r t

t r e n d s t o t h e Commander of t h e Army F i e l i Fcrzes f.r;:d i s s e m i n a t i o n t o t h e Army m a j o r commands.

2r:e o f t?,s

G:?.~c?.

t o p i c s of s t u d y by t h e team was t r a i n i E g d e f i c i e n c i e s . C o l o n e l E c k e r t , t h e commander o f t h e f i r s t c b s e r v e r team t c F a r E a s t Command, a r r i v e d i n Korea o i l t h e 'LCtF. o f

July.

T a e j o n had f a l l e n , and G e n e r a ? Dean was n < c 8 i n g x i ; ! A f t e r s e v e r a l d a y s o b s e r v i n g a c t i o n and

5;::

assumed d e a d .

g a t h e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , C o l o n e l Eckert r e t u r n e d t o Tapan

-51-

completed h i s r e p o r t . and is v e r y r e v e a l i n g .

The r e p o r t was s u b m i t t e d on 15 A u g u s t They r e p o r t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g

d e f i c i e n c i e s i n t h e s o l d i e r s and t h e t r a i n i n g s y s t e m :

1.

S o l d i e r s f a i l t o respond t o o r d e r s .

W h i l e t h e OCAFF t e a m d o e s n o t s p e c i f y why t h e y f a i l t o respond, o t h e r s o u r c e s complete t h e p i c t u r e . s o l d i e r s were p h y s i c a l l y e x h a u s t e d . u n p r e p a r e d f o r t h e r i g o r s of c o m b a t . their leaders. lacked cohesion. The

They were p h y s i c a l l y They d i d n o t t r u s t

Units

They d i d n o t t r u s t t h e i r e q u i p m e n t .

T h e s e a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of u n i t s which

h a v e n o t u n d e r g o n e r e a l i s t i c combat t r a i n i n g and a r e l e d by poor l e a d e r s .

2.

S o l d i e r s a r e rosdbound. S o l d i e r s d o n t know how t o i m p l a c s m i x e s . S o l d i e r s d o n t know how t o c o n d u c t n i g h t

3.
4.

operations.

5.

U n i t t r a i n i n g c o n t a i n e d s u b j e c t s i r r e l e ; r e n t t;.

combat s u c h a s Command I n f o r n a t i o n and A c h i e v e n e n t s znd T r a d i t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y .

6.

U n i t s h a v e c o n d u c t e d no Air-Ground t r a i n i r i g . I n f a n t r y u n i t s a r e d e f i c i e n t i n =.-.-. ILkU

7.

p a t r o l l i n g , o u t p u s t i n g , s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i c n zf f i r < r . . g

-52-

p o s i t i o n s , small arms f i r e c o n t r o l , a n d c o m b i n e d arms training.** The m a j o r i t y o f t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s e n u m e r a t e d a b o v e a r 5 basic infantry s k i l l s . The f a i l u r e o f u n i t s t o p r o p e r l y

p e r f o r m t h e m is i n d i c a t i v e of t h e l a c k o f t r a i n i n g o f deployed u n i t s . While t h e i n f a n t r y b o r e t h e b r u n t of t h e i n i t i a l a c t i o n , t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s a r r i v i n g i n t h e month of Aug25t h a d t h e i r own p e c u l i a r p r o b l e m s . The s t o r y of a s o l d i e :

ir.

Company A , 7 3 r d T a n k B a t t a l i o n is t y p i c a l o f a r m o r e d s o l d i e r s and machines committed i n t h e first months o f t k c K o r e a n War. T h e 7 3 r d Tank B a t ' t a l i o n was t h e o r g a c i c h e a v y t a n k b a t t a l i o n o f t h e 3 r d I n f a n t r y E i v i s i o n s t a t i o n e d a t Fc,rt. Benning, Georgia.

Due t o c o s t r e d u c t i o n s a n d t h e b a t t z l i ~ r .

m i s s i o n . Company A was e q u i p p e d w i t h K24 C h a f f e e li2.k.t tar.::s i n s t e a d o f t h e M26 F e r s h i n g . T h e p t i r p o s e o f ? b e t.ltta!i:r.

' _1. -l 4 l L

was t o p e r f 3 r m d e m o n s t r a t i o n s f o r t h e I n f a n t r y S - h o c ? .

t r a i n i n g c o n s i s t e d o f l i v e f i r e p e r f c r m a n c e s r'cr t h + I n f a n t r y O f f i c e r Advanced c o u r s e . T h i s l i v e I i r a exercize

d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e v a l u e o f t a n k - i n f a n t r y c o m b i n e d arns o p er at i o n s

:I t z W h i 1e t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in f a n t r y r..g i :r.e

r o t a t e d , companies frsm t h e t a n k b a t t a l i m always participated in the demonstration. I n f a n t r y r e g i m e r i t a ? tank

-53-

c o m p a n i e s were n o t c a p a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n m i s s i o n i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r low l e v e l of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y .

training.
E n r o u t e t o K o r e a , t h e b a t t a l i o n was o r d e r e d t o d e g a r t f o r O a k l a n d , C a l i f o r n i a , b y 15 J u l y . Company A was

conducting demonstrations f o r t h e reserves a t Fort M c C l e l l a n , Alabama. Upon t h e r e c e i p t o f d e p l o y m e n t o r d e r s ,

t h e company r o a d marched t o F o r t B e n n i n g and b e g a n t c prepare t h e i r tanks f o r overseas shipmezt. Company A r a i l

l o a d e d t h e i r t a n k s a t F o r t B e n n i n g and n e v e r saw them again. I n C a l i f o r n i a t h e y r e c e i v e d men and e q u i p m e n t f r o m t h e 1 5 t h and 3 0 t h R e g i m e n t a l Tank C o m p a n i e s . i n K o r e a 8 A u g u s t 1950. The b a t t a l i o n a r r i v e d

A Company a r r i v e d w i t h o u t t a n k a .

They w a i t e d i n P u s a n f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y s e v e n d a y s f o r t h e . a r r i v a l of M26 P e r s h i n g t a n k s . The t a n k s had Deer. u s e d a s c

p a r t o f a S o u t h American a m p h i b i o u s e x e r c i s e and were I n terrible condition. D r i v e r s l e a r n e d t s d r i v e t h s i r t n r . 1 : ~ ir. The t a n k e r s t o o k on t k e i :

:cn>~:.f

t h e p a r k i n g l o t s of P u s a n .

l o a d o f World War I1 a m m u n i t i o n and g o t a s n a n y s f t h e t n n k z

as t h e y c o u l d k e e p r u n n i n g , 50 m i l e s n o r t h t o K y c n g j c .
Cn

17 August t h e y w e r e c o m m i t t e d i n t h e # d e f e n s e o f t h e P - z s n

p e r i m e t e r i n s u p p o r t o f t h e 2 3 r d R e g i m e n t a l Jcmt.at m .?sn clF

t h e 2nd I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n .

They f i r e d t h e i r f i r s t m u n d s i n Tk?re

combat b y l a n y a r d t o t e s t t h e t a n k s r e c o i l s y s t 5 m .

-54-

was no combat z e r o of t h e t a n k m a i n g u n , weapons were n o t

t e s t f i r e d , no movement o r o p e r a t i o n s o r d e r s d i s s e m i n a t e d . 2 "

T h e commander o f t h e 7 0 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n , L i e u t a n a n :
C o l o n e l B i l l R o d g e r s t e l l s much t h e same s t o r y :

M e a n w h i l e t h e y were s e n d i n g m e tankers from a l l o v e r ; nobody knew anybody e l s e . B u t we l e f t by t r a i n F r i d a y m o r n i n g a s o r d e r e d . About one week l a t e r we s a i l e d f r o m C a l i f o r n i a on n s h i p w i t h two o t h e r t a n k b a t t a l i o n s . [ t h e 6 t h and ??rd!, whose men had t h e same k i n d o f h e c t i z Me l a n d e d a t P u s a n and stories to tell. went s t r a i g h t i n t o conbat, a complete bunch o f s t r a n g e r s w i t h no t r a i n i n g . 3 0
T h e s o l d i e r s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s employed i n combst i n Korea from J u l y t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r o f 1950, were w o e f c l l y unprepared.

The i n d i v i d u a l s o l d i e r s lacked t h e s k i l l s t c
Combined arms t r z i n i n g c ~ f E i g ! : : ! ? ?he t r a i n i ~ gc.f i!;fx:?;'

k e e p them a l i v e i n c o m b a t .

Army u n i t s was also i n a d e q u a t e .

u n i t s w i t h o r g a n i c r e g i m e n t a l and d i v i s i c n a ? a r m c r x n i t s d l i nct aoczr. T h e r e wsre n u a r n 3 r - i n f a n : r y

tams.

?nit

I e a d a r s were i n e p t , a n d a f t e r t h e i n i t s l engagesenis Zazlce?.

credibility.

T h i s u n p r e p a r e d n e s s can b e attriSL1ti.d ir. : a : , ; : +

p a r t t o f a c t o r s e x t a r n s l t o t h e Army i t s e l f ; h a w e v e r , t k e

f a i l u r e o f small u n i t l e a d e r s and i n d i v i d u a l s c 1 2 i e r . s i; 62.1-

t o l a c k of r e a l i s t i c combat t r a i n i n g and p o o r I e m - l s r . c ! *ir '~ .

J o e C o l l i n s w r o t e l a t e r t h a t by J a n e , 1 9 5 0 , " f s w u E i t z .If t h e E i g h t h Army had r e a c h e d a s a t i s f a c t o r y l e v e l . ~ f

-55-

battalion training."

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , t h e wide

d i s p e r s i o n of E i g h t h Army u n i t s , e x c e s s i v e p e r - o n n e l t u r n o v e r , d i d n o t s u p p o r t t h e development of c o k e s i m , e s p i r i t , o r u n i t p r i d e , a t even t h e r e g i m e n t a l l e v e l . 3 1

Equipment

On 8 O c t o b e r , 1346, t h e War D e p a r t m e n t a p p o i n t e d board

J.

". . .

f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e v i e w i n g t y p e s o f eqsipmcr.-!

r e q u i r e d f o r t h e Army Ground F o r c e s i n t h e Post-War Army." The War D e p a r t m e n t Equipment B o a r d , u n l i k e t h e G e n e r a l 933r,li o f t h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , r e c e i v e d i n p u t f r o m m a j o r Army Commands i n b o t h t h e F a r East and t h e M e d i t e r a n e a n T h e a t e r s i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e development of f u t u r e equipment requirements. G e n e r a i Zoseph S t i l w e l l headed t h i s bzz+ The
5d.

on 13 J a n u a r y , 1 3 4 6 , c o m p l e t e d h i s m i s s i o n .

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e r e v i e w b o a r d hall f a r r e a c h i n g s f f e i r

on a l l t h e Armed S e r v i c e s . 3 2
The r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e Eeview B o a r d , which h x ! t k e most s i g n i f i c a n t i m p a c t on t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t o a m . we?? t L : e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r an armored ge--.,,nneL c a r r i e r , and
3

r a d i o w h i c h would a l l o w t h e i n f a n t r y

commander t o communicate w i t h a t t a c h e d armor and 31::~at't f l y i n g close a i r support missions.

-56-

The W a r Department Equipment Rep o rt s t a t e d t h a t a

r e q u i r e m e n t e x i s t e d f o r a f u l l t r a c k e d armorec! pers3nr.a: c a r r i e r t o t r a n s p o r t p e r s o n n e l o r v i t a l c a r g o i n a r e a s u:-:der a r t i l l e r y o r s m a l l arms f i r e . Two d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n n e l

c a r r i e r s were recommended f o r d e v e l o p m e n t by t h e r e p o r t .

One p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r w i t h a t w e l v e man c a p a c i t y , t h e
w i t h a 26 man c a p a c i t y .

SBCOT;~

These c a r r i e r s were t o have p s r t s

i n t e r c h a n g a b l e w i t h o t h e r mechanized v e h i c l e s i n t h e division. The v e h i c l e was

31SO

t o serve a s a mortar c a r r i e r

and a command p o s t v e h i c l e .

The r a p o r t e m p h a s i z e s t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t f o r an a r m o r e d t o p t o p r o v i d e o v e r h e a d

p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e crew.

The r e p o r t a l s o a s k e d f o r a s

e x t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a one-man c a r r i e r where t h e s o l d i e r wculd k,e t r a n s p o r t e d l y i n g down. The r e p o r t a l s o s t a t e s t h a t t5.-

movement o f i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s i n t h e s e p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r = z..: f a r f o r w a r d a s p o s s i b l e s h o u l d become r o u t i n e .

These
ti."

comments a r e f o u n d in r e c o m m e c d a t i o n s f o r e q u i p m e r a t f . : I
t h e a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s .

...

The R e p o r t ' s
; I

r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r was n a t s e e n as .j:zt r e p l a c e m e n t f o r t h e h a l f - t r a c k of t h e World War II armored-infantry,

b u t a l s o as a m u l t i - p u r p o s e m + x s ~ , f

transportation i n the infantry division.33

-57-

The Armor C o n f e r e n c e o f 1846 e n d o r s e d t h i s p o s i t i o i ? and added an a d d i t i o n a l r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t t h e p e r s o n n e l

c a r r i e r a l l o w t h e o c c u p a n t s t o s h o o t t h e i r weapons o u t of
t h e v e h i c l e when f i g h t i n g m o u n t e d . 3 4

I n S e c t i o n I o f t h e War D e p a r t m e n t E q u i p m e n t R e p o r t ,
communications d e f i c i e n c i e s were a d d r e s s e d . The R e p o r t

d e s c r i b e d t h e n e e d f o r an i n t e g r a t e d r a d i o s y s t e m w h i c h would a l l o w t h e i n f a n t r y t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h t h e a r m o r acd

air force.

I n S e c t i o n I1 o f t h e R e p o r t w h i c h s p e c i f i e d

recommendations f o r t h e isprovement of i n f a n t r y equipment,

t h e f o l l o w i n g s y s t e m was d e s c r i b e d : s s

An i n t e g r a t e d
infantry-tank-artillery-air voice radic, and a p o r t a b l e r a d i o t o p r o v i d e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n d i s m o u n t e d men and i n d i v i d u a l t a n k s . 3 s The r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o z s were similar.
? h e Armor C o n f e r e n c e of 194E s u b m i t t e d
3

x:icb

z::?

d e t a i l e d recommendation.

I n t h a t recommendation,

s p e c i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e range, channels, modulation, r e x o t r c o n t r o l , w e i g h t , i n s t a l l a t i o n , t u n i n g , and s e c u r i t y w e r ? a d d r e s s e d f o r b o t h a v e h i c u l a r and man-packad r s d i o .

In

a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e recommendations t h e Conference s t a t e d t h z t t h e p r e s e n t means o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g b e t w e e n a r m o r and i n f a n t r y r a d i o s had t o b e c c n s i d e r e d 3 n i c a d e q u s t i i n t ? r . i : r :

-58-

m e a s u r e u n t i l new e q u i p m e n t was a v a i l a b l e .

The Armor

C o n f e r e n c e a l s o recommeded t h a t f u t u r e r a d i o s a l s o i n c l u d e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o communicate w i t h t h e A i r F o r c e T a c t i c a l

Air D i r e c t i o n C e n t e r and s u p p o r t i n g a i r c r a f t i n f l i g h t .

The

s t a t e d i n t e n t was t o a l l o w t h e a r m o r p l a t o o n l e a d e r s o r t,ank commanders t o a c t a s f o r w a r d a i r c o n t r o l l e r s . 3

I n s p i t e o f t h e f o r e s i g h t of t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s
t h i s e q u i p m e n t was n o t f o r t h c o m i n g . The e c o n o m i c r e a l i t y cf and

t i g h t budgets l i m i t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s t o c l o t h i n g , %od, medical s u p p l i e s .

T h e s e items were e a s i l y s t o r e d and Lezs

s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e e f f e c t s of t e c h n o l o g i c a l chang5.38 A l e x a n d e r B e v i n , i n h i s book K o r e a : T h 9 F i r q t Vsr

Xe.

Last, - s t a t e s t h e g r e a t e s t
ammunition.

w e a k n e s s e s o f American f o r c e s

d e p l o y e d t o K o r e a c o u l d b e f o u n d i n t h e i r e q u i p m e n t 2nd
T h e e q u i p m e n t and a m m u n i t i c n a f ti:+ Cig!it.h A : ? : ; the

began t o show g l a r i n g w e a k n e s s e s b e g i n n i n g wit!-.

e n g a g e m e n t o f T a s k F o r c e S m i t h , n o r t h o f Osar. cn t h s 5 t h
J u l y 1950.

: :
f y - 8 ~

L i a u t a n a n t O l l i e D . Conr.or f i r e d 2 2 r c . z k e t s

a 2 . 3 6 i n c h b a z o o k a , a t a r a n g e o f f i f t e e n yard:

into tk?

r e a r o f T-34 t a n k s a s t h e y p a s s e d h i s p ~ s i t i u n . T h e ammunition i n m a s t c a s e s f a i l e d t o d e t , > n a t a o r 8c:;~li --C.

2 . L

penetrate the t a n k s armor,

T h e i r e f f e c t was : . c g l : g i t ! s .
; : I ,
3

The 105 m m h o w i t z e r which was a c t i n g a s an a n t i - t a r , ! . : c e a s e d to b e e f f e c t i v e when i t had compl+,ted f i r i z g

?????

-59-

o f s i x HEAT r o u n d s .

T h a t ammunition r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t o t a l This

s t o c k of a n t i - t a n k ammunition a v a i l a b l e i n J a p a n .

performance, although shocking t o t h e general public, s h o u l d h a v e b e e n n o s u r p r i s e t o t h e l e a d e r s who s e n t T a s k

Force Smith t o accomplish i t s m i s s i o n . 3 6

M a c A r t h u r h a d c o m p l a i n e d o f t h e s t a t e of e q u i p m e n t ir. h i s command, b u t r e c e i v e d n o r e l i e f f r o m m i l i t a r y l e a d e r r m e s m e r i z e d b y b u d g e t b a t t l e s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l ccmnunisiideology. I n an e f f o r t t o improve t h e s t a t u s o f h i s In tkie

equipment, MacArthur i n i t i a t e d " O p e r a t i o n RGl:-Up."

o p e r a t i o n M a c A r t h u r d i s p a t c h e d teams t o t h e i s l a n d s i n t h ? P a c i f i c t o reclaim r u s t y , a b a n d o n e d e q u i p m e n t l s f t 2 v P r f ' r - . ~ W o r l d War 1 1 . 4 0 T h i s e f f o r t s e r v e d two p u r p o s e s . F i r s t , it providcd

H a c A r t h u r w i t h a s o u r c e o f e q u i p m e n t f o r his c o m b a t ur.S.te. and s e c o n d i t p r o v i d e d a means t o s t i m u l a t e t h e Jspazese

economy b y p r o v i d i n g t h e J a p a n e s e w i t h wo r k r s f u r 5 i s h i n g t ? e old equipment.

" O p e r a t i o n R o l l - U p " was o n l y

:I

stop-gs;.
p,2;r

m e a s u r e t h a t was i n s u f f u c i e n t t o p r e v e n t t h e i n i t i a l p e r f o r m a n c e o f American e q u i p m e n t ir. K o r e a .

T h e sigcs m c f

t , h e s e e q u i p m e n t p r o b l e m s were e v i d e n t t o W a l k e r ' s E i g h t h Army i n s p e c t i o n teams h e a d e d S y h i s C-3, # i l ? i a m H. !?srk:?!! i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1350. I n o n e i n s p e c t e d c n i t , t w o t!-:ir,iz

-GO-

t h e r i f l e s were b r o k e n .

In another they did not find

s i n g l e v e h i c l e c a p a b l e of s u s t a i n e d performance.41 Upon t h e c o m m i t m z n t o f t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n 3 5 t h I n f a n t r y t o K o r e a , o n l y t h e SCR-300 r a d i o i n t h e b a t t a l i o r . command n e t was o p e r a b l e . The 2 4 t h I n f a n t r y Regiment

r e p o r t e d o n l y 60% o f t h e i r a u t h o r i z e d r a d i o s o n h a n d . t h o s e on h a n d , f o u r - f i f t h s were i n o p e r a b l e .

3f

B a t t e r i e s for

r a d i o s were o l d a n d u n r e l i a b l e c a u s i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o c s f a i l u r e s a t c r i t i c a l times i n c o m b a t . T h e 1st E a t t a l i o r .

3 5 t h I n f a n t r y h a d o n l y o n e r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e a n d n o ::Fare b a r r e l s f o r t h e i r machineguns. Many o f t h e 60 mm m o r t n r s

were i n o p e r a b l e b e c a u s e t h e b i p o d s a n d t u b e s w e r e w o r n i-5. F i f t y t o 60% o f t h e a m m u n i t i o n f o z t h e s e m o r t a r s t u r n e d c u t t o be duds. The armor u n i t s a l s o e x p e r i e n c e d numerous T y p i c a l is t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of z

equipment problems.

d i v i s i o n a l G - 3 when h e s a i d : 4 2 T h e d i v i s i c n h a d b a c k o r d e r s two y e a r s o l d f o r r e c o i l o i l , s o t h e 75 mm g a n s h a d n e v e r b e e n f i r e d . When t h a g u n s were f i r e d i n K o r e a , i t was d o n e b y l a n y a r d and p r o m p t l y b l e w o f f t h e turrets.*3 The Army met i t s c r i t i c s ? n 5 e d f o r e q u i p m e n t i:: t h e
e c r l y d a y s c f t h e X ~ 3 r e s r . War by d r s w i n g
XI

Worlmi V z :

II

stocks.

T h i s e q u i p m e n t , o f t e n r e f u r b i s h e d i n .Ja~.a.n,!,:>;:

-61-

t h e A m e r i c a n s and t h e R O X s i n t h e War u n t i l t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s economy c o u l d b e m o b i l i z e d .

Summary

The l e s s o n s o f World War I1 c a u s e d t h e T a b l e of O r g a n i z a t i o n and Equipment of b o t h t h e i n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n t o change. T h e s e c h a n g e s w e r e t h e r e s u l t 3f a n

i n - d e p t h s t u d y o f combat v e t e r a n s i n t o s u c c e s s f u ? c p e r s t i c z r o f t h e war.

The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l changes r e s u l t e d i n s b e t t e r

b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e a r m o r and i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s a s s i g n e l : t o b o t h t y p e s of d i v i s i o n s .
'

The n e w b a l a n c e r e c o g n i z e d t h e

i n c r e . a s e d combat e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m . The a c t u a l d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e s e u n i t s t o t h e f i e l d n o t a c c o m p l i s h e d p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e o f t h e sverpoweri:ip e f f e c t s of t h e a t o m i c bomb, srkich a c t e d a s t h e c o r n e r s t . : n e

of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .
WZP

Army d e m o b i l i z a t i o n s:id dr:.st!c;

CCZE
7

i n t h e Army D e f e n s e B u d g e t a l s o p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a - t r i A c
t h e f a i l u r e t o implement f o r c e s t r u c t c r a c h a n g e s . ? h e s t a t e o f t h e e q u i p m e n t of t h P E i g h t h Army i:pi: d e p l o y m e n t t o K o r e a was c r i m i n a l .

: 1

The f a i l u r e tcf eq2igne::t

t o f u n c t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d t o unnecessary l o s s of i i f e s n i

..

p r e v e n t e d t h e e f f e c t i v e u s e o f t h e combined a r m s t e a n .

-62-

R e a l i s t i c and demanding t r a i n i n g was n o t c o n d u c t e d i n t h e E i g h t h Army i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o p r e v e n t p o u r combat performance i n Korea. The i n a b i l i t y o f i n f a n t r y e l e m e n t s t o

t r a i n w i t h a r m o r u n i t s r e s u l t e d i n m i s t r u s t and decrealced
combat e f f i c i e n c y .

-63-

CHAPTER 4 ACTIONS ON CONTACT

I t is o n l y common s e n s e t o s a y t h a t w e
c a n n o t hope t o b u i l d up a t r u e d o c t r i n e o f war e x c e p t from t r u e l e s s o n s , a n d t h e l e s s o n s c a n n o t be t r u e u n l e s s b a s e d on t r u e f a c t s , and t h e f a c t s c a n n o t be t r u e u n l e s s we p r o b e f o r t h e m i n a p u r e l y scientific spirit.1 L i d d e l l H a r t , T h e s t o f #soale.n r, F i r s t Blood E n g i n e e r s blew t h e b r i d g e s i n fr,;nt of Chonzi cn
r
c

J u l y , f o u r d a y s a f t e r T a s k F o r c e S m i t h had b e e n o v s r r u p . . C o l o n e l S t e p h e n s , t h e Commander o f t h e 2 1 s t I n f a n t - y Regiment of t h e 2 4 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n r e g i s t e r e d : s

..

E: m : .

and 4 . 2 i n . m o r t a r s a n d p r e p a r e d f o r h i s d e f e n s e z o u t h a a s c o f t h e small v i l l a g e . Around noon he r e c e i v e d r e p c r t s I n mLi

:k+
' 1 :

enemy t a n k s m o v i n g s o u t h on t h e main r o a d .

a f t e r n o o n , t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d o f enemy F i r r c c s probs;! b a t t a l i o n ' s forward p o s i t i o n s . *

C o o r d i n a t e d f r i e n d l y a i r s t r i k e s and a r t i l l e r y "irs b l u n t e d t h e enemy a d v a n c e a n d l e f t f i v e a f e l e v e n eneiny tanks burning.

A t d u s k t h e enemy t a n k s were s t i l l !surp.ing

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w h i l e t h e enemy p l a n n e d t h e n e x t a t t a c k .

The regimental

commander a n d t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n 2 1 s t I n f a n t r y n e r v o u s l y prepared t h e i r n i g h t d e f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e inevitaD15 attack.3 C o l o n e l S t e p h e n s m i s s i o n was t o d e l a y t h e a p p r o a c h i n g enemy a l o n g o n e o f t h e t w o m a j o r r o a d s s c u t h from Seoul. T h i s d e l a y would a l l o w t h e d i v i s i o n s u f f i c i e r t

time t o g r e p a r e d e f e n s e s a l o n g t h e Rum r i v e r .

He was t 3 l C i

b y G e n e r a l Dean t h a t h e c o u l d e x p e c t n o h e l p f r o m t.:e

r e m a i n d e r o f t h e d i v i s i o n for f o u r d a y s .

I n o r d e r t;

accomplish t h i s mission, he occupied a blocking positi,Jr. s o u t h o f C h o n u i w i t h t h e r e m a i n i n g c o m p a n i e s o f h i s Is?

B a t t a l i o n ( t h e o t h e r c o m p a n i e s h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d tc: T a s k
F o r c e S m i t h ) a n d f i l l e r p e r s o n n e l , a l l u n d e r t h e corr.ma-d ,-;f Captair. C h a r l e s R . A l k i r e . A p p r o x i m a t e l y SOC! : n ? t t r z
2::~::.

o f 1st B a t t a 1 i o n . s p o s i t i o n h e d e p l o y e d t h e 3 r d Batta!io:-L 2 1 s t I n f a n t r y i n a s u b s e q u e n t b l o c k i n g g ~ ~ i k iI r :~ ~ . a d d i t i o n t o t h e i n f a n t r y a n d s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y . tk..? ?~!:k.:

J f Company A ,

7 3 . t h T a n k B a t t a l i o n e q u i p p e d w i t h 22.1 li2!i7:

t a n k s , wsre d e p l o y e d a l o n g t h e p r i m a r y arrr..ir a v e n u e -f zaproach i n t o the regimental positions.4 E l a m e n t s o f NKPA 3 r d a n d 4 t h D i v i s i o c s EupL:r+.e:!

t h e 1 0 7 t h A r m o r ed B r i g a d e a t t a c k e d e a r l y on t h c mor.;.inp

t:~
25

10 . J x l y .

T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f d a r k n e s s a n d t h a earl;.

! R C ~ : R ~ Z ~

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f o g , N o r t h Korean t r o o p s i n f i l t r a t e d t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n s positions. By 0 8 0 0 . t h e f o g had c l e a r e d r e v e a l i n g t h e

a p p r o a c h o f enemy t r o o p s t o t h e f r o n t o f t h e r e g i n e n t s position.

A t t h e same t i m e , t a n k and s m a l l arms f i r e

C G U ~ ?

b e h e a r d t o t h e rear and f l a n k = o f t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n .

The

Heavy M o r t a r P l a t o o n was o v e r r u n b y t h e i n f i l t r a t i n g e n e n y , leaving the b a t t a l i o n without organic f i r e support.

Wire

c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n was cut.
By 1 2 0 5 , t h e r e g i m e n t a l commander c o a l d n o t !.:rep

the

a d hoc b a t t a l i o n u n d e r C a p t a i n A l k i r e i n p o s i t i o ? . .

?st

B a t t a l i o n f l e d t h r o u g h t h e r i c e p a t t i e s , s t r a f e d by f r i e n d l y

a i r c r a f t and s h e l l e d b y s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y .

R e t r s a t e:-.d&

when t h e y a r r i v e d a t t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n p o s i t i o n s 500 met.ers t o tha southeast.5 T s n k s s u p p o r t i n g t h e r e g i m e n t p e r f o r m e d p o o r l y, ..

1: I

the confusing b a t t l e they f a i l e d t o s t o p t h e nttackir.g enezy tanks.

Lack o f c o n t r o l p r e c l u d a d t h e z f r c n cav?r:zz

tF,e

r e t r e a t of t h e i n f a n t r y .

T a n k s , immune t o small 3 r m ~2 n d

m o r t a r f i r e , c o u l d h a v e c o v e r e d t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e 1st Battalion. The a b i l i t y o f t h e T 3 4 / 8 5 s

t o pecetrsta the

a n t i - t a n k p o s i t i o n s of t!ie 1st B a t t a l i o n r e v e a l s d ti:e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e 324 C h a f f e e , l i g ! i t t x i k a s a n a n t i - t a n k weapon.

-66-

Colonel S t e p h e n s o r d e r e d t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n t o r e g a i n
t h e p o s i t i o n s l o s t b y t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n .
T h e commande: t~f

3 r d B a t t a l i o n , L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l P r y o r , was u n a b l e t o c a r r y o u t t h e a t t a c k a n d was r e l i e v e d as a n o n - b a t t l e casualty. Major

H i s e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r , M a j o r J e n s e n , a s s u m e d command.

J e n s e n w e i g h t e d h i s c o u n t e r a t t a c k w i t h f o u r K24 C h a f f e e
light tanks. T h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k was s u c c e s s f u l

and t h e 3 r d S a t t a l i o n r e g a i n e d t h e r i d g e s c u t h of Chonui around dusk. The t a n k p l a t o o n s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o c n t e r s t t a , : k

p e r f o r m e d b e t t e r t h a n t h e company had e a r l i e r ir; t h e 3sy.e A l t h o u g h t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k was s u c c e s s f s l . T o l o n e 1 Stephen's armor-infantry.team performed poorly. The

i n a b i l i t y o f t h e H24 C h a f f e e t o a c t as a v i a b l e . a r . t l - t a r . k w eap o n gave t h e enemy T 3 4 / 8 5 ' s t h e edge i n combat.

Outgunned, t h e t a n k s s u p p o r t i n g t h e i n f n z t r y wsre

i n e f f e c t i v e a n d c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e g r c w i n g f a s r '.bat
N o r t t K o r e a n a s s a u l t s -auld n o t b e s t o p p e d .
. l L, .

th:?

...-

Y3F

F a r s h i n g and t h e H4A3 S h e r m a n t a n k s , s u p e r i o r ir, P i r e p 2 : r s : t o t h e M24 C h a f f e e , w e r e i m m e d i a t e l y r e q u i r e 3 t o t u i l i i v i a b l e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team.

? .

U n f u r t u n a t e l y , t+? 1 e a d s r s , j P

t h e Fsr E a s t 'Tommand hsd d e c i d e d i n t h e y - a r s f c : l o w i n g !?lorld War 11, t h a k s u c h w e a p o n s were n o t n e e d e d i n t h e E i g h t h Army.

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F o u r d a y s a f t e r t h e N o r t h Korean P e o F l e s Army !NKPA> c r o s s e d t h e 3 3 t h p a r a l l e l , t h r e e H26 P e r s h i n g t a z k w%re d i s c o v e r e d i n t!ie O r d n a n c e D e p o t i n T c k y o . The ~ o 3 r

c o n d i t i o n of t h e t a n k s r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e r e p a i r w h i c h begar. immediately. A f t e r almost a complete r e b u i l d , t h e t a n k s

w e r e s e n t t o Korea u n d e r t h e command o f L i e u t e n a n t Ssmuel Fowler. L i e u t e n a n t F o w l e r and h i s f o u r t e e n t a c k e r s w e r e Upon s r r i v a l .

5.2

drawn f r o m A Company, 7 7 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n .

t h e t a n k crews r e q u i r e d i m m e d i a t e and i n t e n s i v e t r a i r . i n & o p e r a t e t h e M26 P e r s h i n g .

O r i g i n a l l y t r a i n e d on X24 2ti:.ffe?

t a n k s i n J a p a n , t h e crew f i r e d t h e 90 mm maingun f o r t h e

f i r s t time in t h e v i c i n i t y of T a e g u .

During t h i s tr3irLi>g

t h e ' m a k e s h i f t n a t u r e of t h e r e p a i r s made t h e m s e l v e s kngwn. Of s p e c i a l n o t e w e r e t h e e n g i n e ' s f a n b e l t s . f a n b e l t s had r o t t e d . The o r i g i n a l

NG replacement

b e l t s wire a v a i l 3 b l ~

and f a n b e l t s w e r e o r d e r e d f r o m s u p p l y b a s e s i n t h e '!nit24 States. The t a n k s w e r e d e p l o y e d t o Korea w i t h maksshift

b e l t s which o f t e n s l i p p e d c a u s i n g t h e t s n k t o overheat.7 The d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n K o r e a d i d riot u a i : t h e a r r i v a l of t h e proper f s n b e l t s .

On 31 J u l y . w h i l e
5r

d e f e n d i n g s o u t h of C h i n j u . t h e medium t a n k s becalre e!.igs,!d

w i t h e l e m e n t s of t h e

NKPA 6 t h d i v i s i o n .

L i e u t a n a n t Fc.sr?;~':z

t a n k s e n g a g e d t h e enemy w i t h m a c h i n e gun f i r e a n , i 'rli:!idrex. The t a n k s w e r e s t o p p e d by a Slcwn b r i d g e a s t h e y

-68-

headed e a s t .

Two t a n k s became m i r e d as t h e y a t t e m p t e d t~ The c r e w s began t o d i s a h l e t h e i r t a n k s

bypass t h e bridge.

w i t h hand g r e n a d e s , b u t came u n d e r f i r e and e s c a p e d or. t!:e

r e m a i n i n g M26.

S h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d t h e l a s t H26 o v e r h e a t e d . Pursuing North Koreans

s t a l l e d and r e f u s e d t o r e s t a r t .

c a u g h t up w i t h t h e t a n k crews and a f i r e f i g h t e n r u e d . L i e u t e n a n t F o w l e r was k i l l e d and t h e crews s c a t t e r e d .

o n l y t h r e e medium t a n k s i n K o r e a had b e e n l o s t . *

The

The f i r s t e n g a g e m e n t s o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y teams were h a p h a z a r d , d i s m a l a f f a i r s w h i c h showed t h e p o o r s t z t e o f m a i n t e n n n c e and t r a i n i n g i n t h e E i g h t h Army.

Ifi

s p i t e cf

t h e s e i n i t i a l f a i l u r e s , Commanders r e c o g n i z e d t h e p o t e n t i a l combat p o w e r - o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m .

A s t h e war

p r o g r e s s e d , o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat p l a c e d ar. i n c r e s s e d
e m p h a s i s on t h e c r e a t i o n of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e s m s .

Cases

F i r s t i m p r e s s i o n s a r e v i v i d and c l e a r f o r a s ~ Y i + r going t o combat. V e t e r a n s o f K o r e a remember t h e su:r.me? c.f

1950 f o r t h e h e a t , t h e c o n f u s i o n , and t h e t e r r a i n .

In

K o r e a , t h e t e r r a i n c o n s i s t s of a s e r i e s of long nzr:c1w v a l l e y 5 s u r r o u n d e d by d o m i n e e r i n g s t e e p h i l l s .
This terr~i::

-69-

l e d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t o b e l i e v e t h a t K o r e a was n o t s u i t e d f o r armor o p e r a t i o n s . The r a p i d a d v a n c e of t h e NKPAs,

s p e a r h e a d , t h e 1 0 7 t h Armored B r i g a d e , d i s p e l l e d t h e s e beliefs.

A s p e c i a l r e p o r t on t h e p r o b l e m s o f t h e Korean War

s u c c i n c t l y s u m m a r i z e d t h i s new e n l i g h t e n e d v i e w : s The m o u n t a i n o u s t e r r a i n , l a c k o f good road n e t , poor c c n d i t i o n s of t h e r o a d s , d e m o l i s h e d b r i d g e s and l a c k o f b r i d g e s capable of supporting tanks, steep high p a d d y d i k e s , and r i c e p a t t i e s had l i t t l e e f f e c t on t a n k w a r f a r e . The o c l y c h a n g e t h e t e r r a i n imposed on t h e employment of a r m o r WBS t o l o w e r t h e number of t a n k s t h a t could be deployed i n any g i v e n a r e a a t one time.10 T e r r a i n had a p r o f o u n d i m p a c t on t h e R a t u r e c f t h e

war.

I t reduced b a t t l e s t o a s e r i e s of v i c i o u s independent
A b a t t a l i o n i n t h e d e f e n s e c o u l d l s s e 32
3

engagements.

e n t i r e company t o an enemy a s s a u l t w i t h o u t s u s t s i n i n g

s i n g l e loss i n t h e r e m a i n i n g c o m p a n i e s of t h e b s t t s l l s n . Yountains muffled t h e socnds of b a t t l e R a k i n g t h e s t r . i g z l + z o f f l a n k e l e m e n t s i n d i s t i n c t a n d f a r away.

T h e ~ h y s i c s l3r.2

p s y c h o l o g i c a l i s o l a t i o n c f t h e s o l d i e r s f a d t h e i r f a s r s ar.2 broke down u n i t c o h e s i o n . E s t t l e i n K o r e a was a s a r i e s o f s m a l l u n i t acti:ln; r a r e l y larger than

2

regiment.

F o r t h i s r e a s o n t h e sti;d:. c m f

s e v e r a l small u n i t a c t i o n s , o c c u r r i n g d u r l n g t h e f i r s t :C

-70-

m o n t h s o f t h e war, p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r an e x a m i n a t i o c o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team i n K o r e a . The a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s o f K o r e a must a l s o b e examined w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e p e r i o d ' s d o c t r i n e . I n t r i n s i c t o t h i s d o c t r i n e was t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f team c o h e s i o n t h r o u g h team t r a i n i n g and combat e x p e r i e n c e .
G e n e r a l Board and C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t s f a l l o w i n g World War I 1

emphasized t h e i n c r e a s e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s of u n i t s w h i c h o p e r a t e d t o g e t h e r i n a h a b i t u a l manner. Further, the

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s of t h e i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t and i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n were c h a n g e d t o f a c i l i t a t e t h i s association. A r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e f u r t h e r e m p h a s i z e d t!:e

r e q u i r e m e n t f o r team l e a d e r s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f e a c h arm.

Contact

I n November, 1351, Communist C h i n e s e s o l d i e r s :::ad

i:

m u s t a r d c o l o r e d , q u i l t e d c o t t o n u n i f o r m s , d : ? s c o n d a d f r o s tF.e
h i l l s of n o r t h e r n K o r e a .

American and R a p u b l i c . o f Ks,re.?

( R O K j t r o o p s w e r e t o t a l l y u n p r e p a r e t j f o r t h e assac!l;.

S t r u n g o u t i n t h e h i l l s of N o r t h K o r e a , i s o l a t e d u : ; i t s f i n i s h i n g u p t h e i r T h a n k s g i v i n g d i n n e r and ta1b:i:ig r e t u r n i n g home i n t i m e f o r C h r i s t n a s .

!i'z::=

sbou:
k..d

T h e N c r t h Korraii::

-71-

b e e n b e a t e n a n d t h e c o l u m n s o f t h e E i g h t h Army h a d d r i v e n n o r t h w a r d t o t h e Y a l u R i v e r , i n t h e f a z e o f weak r a s i s t s n c e . U n i t s f a i l e d t o even a t t e m p t d i g g i n g i n a n d open f i r e s were u s e d t o f i g h t o f f t h e p e n e t r a t i n g c o l d o f t h e l a t e nountai:! autumn. D i v i s i o n level i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e

C o m m u n i s t C h i n e s e F o r c e s (CCF) i n t h e a r e a w o u l d c o n d u c t a

"screening a c t i o n " as t h e y r e t r e a t e d t o t h e Y a l u . 1 1
T h e " s c r e e n i n g f o r c e s " came o u t o f t h e n i g h t S l o w i n g b u g l e s and h o r n s , s h a k i n g r a t t l e s , and s h o o t i n g f l o r e s i z t o the sky. T h e f e r o c i o u s a t t a c k was u n e x p e c t e d a n d p a n i c American h i g h l e v e l

i n f e c t e d t h e A m e r i c a n a n d ROR f o r c e s .

c o m m a n d e r s w e r e slow t o r e a l i z e t h a t t h e CCF h a d s u f f i c i 5 n t streng-th t o launch a general offensive t h a t could threaten t h e E i g h t h Army.

A s a r e s u l t o f t h i s slow r e a l i z a t i o n

i s o l a t e d u n i t s were f i x e d i n p o s i t i o n . s u r r o u n d e d m d overrun.

I n s p i t e o f t h e i n i t i a l CCF a t t o - k s , X C a r ~ s ,und.?:
L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Almond, c o n t i n u e d t o move i t s f o r c e s n o r t h on w e s t e r n f l a n k o f t h e E i g h t h Army. T h e Loose

c o n t r o l a n d d i s p e r s i o n o f h i s forces mad? h i a t h e t a r g e t zf b o t h t h e n e x t p h a s e o f t h e CCF o f f e n s i v e a n d a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n b y t h e new E i g h t h Army C o a m a n i e r . M a t t h e x Ridgway . 1 2

-72-

A l l i e d w i t h near z e r o t e m p e r a t u r e s and u n i t i s o l a t i o n , t h e CCF smashed X C o r p s . R e e l i n 2 from t h e s h o - k

5:

o f t h e a s s a u l t , X C o r p s l e f t t h e 2 3 r d I n f a n t r y Regiment

t h e 2nd I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n t o h o l d what Ridgway d e t e r m i n e d ts

b e t h e v i t a l l e f t s h o u l d e r o f t h e CCF p e n e t r a t i o n a t
Chipyong-ni. C o l o n e l Freeman, Commander of t h e 2 3 r d

I n f a n t r y , m o n i t o r e d t h e ominous r a d i o r e p o r t s and a s k e d t h a t

h i s u n i t be a l l o w e d t o withdraw t o t h e s o u t h .
was d e n i e d .

H i s rcquest

Anticipating a desperate defense, Colorel

Freeman c o n t i n u e d t o improve h i s p o s i t i o n s and s t J c k F i l e c ! ammunition f o r t h e b a t t l e a h e a d . On t h e n i g h t o f 13 F e b u a r y t h e f i r s t a s s a u l t s on t h e 23d I n f a n t r y b e g a n . The CCF a t t a c k w a s ' r e p u l s e d by t h e

'

p r e p a r e d p o s i t i o n s and f i r e p o w e r .

Daylight revealed t h a t
5

t h e enemy had s u f f e r e d enormgus c a s u a l t i e s snci t h a t coherent regimental defense remained. Dayllght

316.)

c o n f i r m e d t h a t t h e r e g i m e n t was c u t o f f , ir: t h e :::idst : . f f i v e anemy a s s a u l t d i v i s i o n s , s n d had o v e r 2 C O ? r i e r . d l y c a s u a l t i e s who c o u l d n o t b e e v a c u a t e d . 1 3 T h e r e were no r e s e r v e s i n X C o r p s a v a i l a b l e ti: r e l i e v e t h e 23rd i n f a n t r y . G e n e r a l Ridgway d i r e c - e d
the

I . ?

C o r p s Commander, Major G e n e r a l Moore, t o a f f e c t t h e r ? - l i . ; P . Moore i m m e d i s t e l y d i r e c t e d t h e

IX C o r p s r e s e r v e ,

t!-;e

5th
?,L,

C a v a l r y , and t h e Commonwealth B r i g a d e t o b r e a k t h r o u p ! .

-.h,?

-73-

surrounded 23rd I n f a n t r y .

The Commonwealth S r i g a d e

i m m e d i a t e l y e n c o u n t e r e d s t i f f r e s i s t a n c e ar,d was u n a b l e t: p u s h t h r o u g h t h e CCF d e f e n s e .

I X Corps t h e n s h i f t 4

it2

f o c u s t o t h e 5 t h C a v a l r y , whose a t t a c k became t h e C o r p s m a i n effort.

14

T h i s 5 t h Cavalry a c t i o n v i o l a t e d s e v e r a l t a s i c tenet:
of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e . haphazard manner. U n i t s were throwr. t o g e t h e r ir. z

D u e t o t h e r e g i m e n t a l commander's

d e c i s i o n , t h e t a n k company w h i c h hac! b e e n h a b i t - a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e r e g i m e n t , d i d n u t r e c e i v e t h e m i - ,sLc:l ,.-' lead t h e breakthrough force.

C::

Command and c o n t r n l measurss,

a l t h o u g h c o o r d i n a t e d p r i o r t o enemy c o n t a c t , p r o v e d i n f l e x i b l e and i n e f f e c t i v e . Key l e a d e r s a l s o f a i l e d t o

u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e i n f a n t r y element a f t h e breakthrough f o r c e .

T a s k F o r c e Crombe:

A t 1 5 0 0 , 1 4 F e b u a r y , C o l o n e l Mzrcel CromSez r w r i v t . :
t h e m i s s i o n t o r e l i e v e t h e e m b a t t l e d 2 3 r d I n f a n i r y ~t Chipyong-ni. Although simp14 i n c o n c e p t , t h e r e l i e f T h s f i r s t difPi.;.u!ty a t Yoj:.i,
~ Z ; , J . C - ~
I

very d i f f i c u l t C c execute.

t ~ :J"',*-''''?.'. r. ... .
~

w a s t h e a s s e m b l y o f t h e w i d e s p r e a d !!nits

zout::

emf

t h e Han r i v e r .

I n a d d i t i c n t o t h e t h r e e i n f a n t r y t 3 t t s i L : v - ,..T

-74-

o f t h e r e g i m e n t , t h e r e g i m e n t was a u g m e n t e d b y 2 3 t a n k s f r s m

two s e p a r a t e t a n k c s m p a n i e s .
L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l John Growden's 6 t h Tank E a t t a l i o r : s e n t t h i r t e e n t a n k s f r o m Cumpany 9. T h e s e t a n k s were M48

P a t t o n s a n d were n o t o r g a n i c t o t h e 1st C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n .

Given an o r d e r t o b e g i n t h e i r move t o j o i n t h e 5 t h C a v a l r y
w i t h i n 30 m i n u t e s , Company D was on t h e r o a d i n 25 m i n u t e s t o e f f e c t the linkup.

The remaining t e n t a n k s were X4A3s, w h i c h b e l c n g ~ d5:

L i e u t e n a n t Colonel Henry Z e i e n ' s , Battalion. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t a n k s , t h e r e g i m e n t was suf&dl:'te.r! b y t h e 6 1 s t F i e l d A r t i l l e r y , a n d .a b a t t a l i o n o f 155 mm self-propelled guns.15

A Company o f t h e 7 0 t ! : T3r.i;

A t 1 7 0 0 , w h i l e t h e f o r c e was b e i n g assemblrd a t Y,>.j:i,

C o l o n e l C r o m b ez r e c i e v e d t h e o r d e r t o e x e c u t e h i s breakthrough t o t h e 23rd I n f a n t r y .

1;: t h e d n ~ l c n e s s , , Z L L

..

u n i t s b u t t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s c r o s s e d '3ver improvised b r i d g e s t o begin t h e i r a t t a c k towards Chipyong-ni.

T h e u n i t s d r o v e u n d e r b?ackcJut c o n i i t i a n s
tF.5;

3'~e.i'

n a r r a w , r u t t e d , i c e p a c k e d r o a d s u n t i l n i t n i g h t w!?e:-. r e a c h e d a d e s t r c y e d b r i d g e i n t h e v i c i n i t y z f !-!up:'-ri.
W h i l e t h e e n g i n e e r s r e p a i r e d t h e b r i d g e , :he

unit:

fv:;?ie,Il

.?

-75-

defensive perimeter.

By t h i s t i m e t h e y had c o v e r e d h a l f

of

the f i f t e e n miles t o Chipyong-ni.le

A t dawn on t h e 1 5 t h . t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n , 5 t h C s v a l r y
u n d e r L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Morgan H e a s l e y , a t t a c k e d t o s e i c t . t h e k e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e on t h e r i g h t s i d e o f t h e r o a d . h i l l dominated t h e road t o t h e n o r t h f o r s e v e r a l miles. b a t t a l i o n was s t o p p e d i n t h e f a c e o f w i t h e r i n g enemy f i r e a f t e r advancing o n l y one hundred y a r d s . C o l o n e l Crombez This

The

t h e n s e n t t h e 2nd B a t t a l i o n , 5 t h C a v a l r y , commanded b y L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l P a u l C l i f f o r d , t o s e i z e t h e h i g h ground

an t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e r o a d .

Soon t h e e n t i r e r e g i m e n t was

c o m m i t t e d t o a g e n e r a l a t t a c k s u p p o r t e d by two a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s and n u m e r o u s a i r s t r i k e s .
Ey 1 1 0 0 i t became

a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e 2 3 r d I n f a n t r y would n o t b e r e l i e v e d b e f c - c

d a r k n e s s a r r i v e d u n l e s s s p e c i a l m e a s u r e s were inFl?zcr.5e?.1-' C o l o n e l Crombez f a c e d s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t t a c t i c a l considerations. F i r s t , t h e mission of t h e regi3er.t

5 i x

?:

open t h e r o a d f o r s u p p l y a n d m e d i c a l v e h i z l e s t o ! i a l ~?.!I? b e l e a u g e r e d 23rd I n f a n t r y . mission.

He had a l r e a d y f a i l e d . : i

that

C o l o n e ? Crombez r a d i o e d t o C u l c ; n e l J a c k C ! i i ? 2 s .
:P

who had r e p l a c e d t h e wounded C o l o n e l Freeman as UdmnxcIs!: t h e 2 3 r d . and t o l d h i m t h a t he t h 0 u g P . t o n l y t z n l i s

t + : > i > l . i ?:+

a b l e t o g e t t h r o u g h and t h a t t h e t r a i n s would h a v e tcs f c : l ~ r r Later. C h i l e s r e s p o n d e d s a y i n g , "C;me on t r a i n s

.>I' 3 : r

-76-

trains."

S e c o n d , a h e l i o c o p t e r r e c o n n a i s a n c e by C o l o n e l

Crombez showed t h a t t h e t a n k s weuld h a v e t o move u p a n z r r a w r o a d , and a t o n e p o i n t move t h r o u g h an embankment t h s t dominated t h e r o a d .

T h e enemy was e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e 3 . 5 i n c h b a z o o k a ,
c a p a b l e o f k n o c k i n g o u t e i t h e r t h e P a t t o n or Sherman t a c k s of t h e t a s k f o r c e . The enemy a l s o r e l i e d on p o l e ar.d t e a n o as

s a t c h e l c h a r g e s employed by f a n a t i c a l h u n t e r - k i l l e r a p a r t of t h e i r a n t i - t a n k d e f e n s e .

P l a n n e d f i r e s b y t h e s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y coulC: 5 z v e p r o v i d e d t h e t a s k f o r c e an e f f e c t i v e s c r e e n a g a i n s t t h e s e attacks. C o l o n e l Crombez d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h a r e was

2

i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o r e g i s t e r t h e . a r t i l l e r y and t h e r e was c h a n c e t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y c o u l d knock o u t a t a n k on t h 5 c u t t i n g t h e column i n h a l f . H i s c o n c e r n f o r an e r r a n t

,xoa,I

a r t i l l e r y r o u n d c a u s e d him t o o r d e r a r i f l e company B a t t a l i o n 5 t h C a v a l r y t o r i d 3 on t h e t a n k s t a ; . r o t i c : from enemy c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s .

~ Z ~ J ITr? C :?.?..TI

E n g i n e e r s were adiied t c t ! - ~

t a s k f o r c e t o h e l p c l e a r a n y m i n e s t h a t wer? + n c o u n t e r ? 3 . 1 : :

T h e r e were a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s whic?. hsi n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n .

Earlie:

in
t o ti;?

November, t h e 5 t h C a v a l r y had f a i l e d t o 5rc.ak thrc.::gh s u r r o u n d e d 3 r d B a t t a l i s n 8 t h C a v a l r y a t Unsan.

was o v e r r u n and d e s t r o y e d .

"?.at

ynit

C o l o n e l Crombez f e l t p r e c x r e

-77-

n o t t o f a i l a g a i n and l e a v e t h e 2 3 r d I n f a n t r y t o t h e same fate. The e n t i r e c h a i n of command u p t o t h e Army C~mms.n.;ler,

General Ridgway, f o c u s e d i t s a t t e n t i o n on t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e
5 t h Cavalry. C o l o n e l Crombez r e c e i v e d r a d i o c a l l s of By t h e end of

e n c o u r a g e m e n t d i r e c t l y f r o m General Ridgway.

t h e d a y , t h e e n t i r e E i g h t h Army c h a i n o f command f r o m G e n e r a l Ridgway down t o C a p t a i n H i e r s , t h e l e a d t a c k f o r c e company commander, was on t h e same r a d i o n e t . l e L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l E d g a r T r e a c y , Commander uf 3 r d B a t t a l i o n 5 t h C a v a l r y , was v i o l e n t l y o p p o s e d t o t h e commitment o f i n f a n t r y w i t h t h e t a n k s i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n .

He

b e l i e v e d t h e i n t e n s e f i r e t h a t t h e t h e r e g i m e n t had z l r e z r l y r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e enemy a.nd t h e i r e x p o s e d p 0 s i t i o r . s on t h e t a n k s w o u l d , make t h e i r r i d e s u i c i d a l . n c t swayed b y T r e a c y s a r g u m e n t . C o l o n e l Crombet was

Lieatenant .7chnel TI-~c~;.Y

t h e n a s k e d t h a t he a t l e a s t b e a l h w e d t o sccompang t h e r i f l e company o n t h i s d a n g e r o u s m i s s i o n . categorically denied

it.20

C s l o r i e l C~JT.?.::

T h e d e c i s i o n t o s e n d an a r m o r e d t a s k Psrce m e ~ n C 3
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e column. The t a n k s i n 3 Compnny. wit.)

t h e i r h e a v i e r a r m o r and t h e i r s u p e r i o r a b i l i t y t 3 t s r r : a r o c n d i n c l o s e t e r r a i n , w e r e moved t o t h e head o f t:-.c column. They w e r e f o l l o w e d by t h e M4A3s of A 3ompar.y.

t h e i n f a n t r y Coospazy

While r e o r g a n i z i n g t h e column,

-78-

Commander, C a p t a i n J o h n B a r e t t of L Company, 9 r d B a t t a l i o n 5 t h C a v a l r y , a n d C a p t a i n H i e r s o f D Company, 6 t h T a n k B a t t a l i o n , worked o u t t h e s i g n a l s t o b e u s e d t o mount a nd dismount t h e i n f a n t r y . T h e y a g r e e d t h a t when t h e t a n k s

s t o p p e d , t h e i n f a n t r y would d i s m o u n t t o p r o v i d e c l o s e - i n

protection.

When t h e s i g n a l was g i v e n t o c o n t i n u e t h e

a d v a n c e , C a p t a i n H i e r s w o u l d r a d i o t h e t a n k commar;derz ~f

t h e co m p an y who w o u l d i n t u r n r e c a l l t h e i n f a n t r y n e n

.21

C a p t a i n E a r r e t p l a c e d h i s 1 6 0 men on t h e t a n b s ir: t?,i middle of t h e column. This left four tanks a t the beginning

and f o u r t a n k s a t t h e end o f t h e column w i t h o u t i n f a n t r y n i s n . F o u r e n g i n e e r s were p l a c e d on t h e s e c o n d t a n k o f t h e o ~ l : a n . E a c h p l a t o o n . l e a d e r d e s i g n a t e d a s o l d i e r on e a c h t a n k t o t h e .50 c a l i b e r m a c h i n e g u n .

m31i

He a l s o i n s t r u c t e d t h e so!,:!iera . . t h a t t h e r e w o u l d b e a t r u c k a t t h e e n d o f t h e ,solumr: t a p 1 . x
u p t h e wounded o r t h o s e s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e tan!-:s

d u r i : i g :ha

attack.

C a p t a i n B a r e t t t h e n m o u n t e d t h t s i x t h t a c k ir. t h e

c o l u m n where h e was j o i n e d b y L i e u t e n a n t C . 3 l o f i s l Trsaacy wkc

c h o s e t o d i s o b e y C o l o n e l Crombezs o r d e r . 2 2 B e f o r e t h e c o l u m n began i t s m o v e . t h e , ? l a n e s c.f :hiF a r E a s t Air F o r c e {FEAF) s t r a f e d a n d bombed t k i h i l l s a:scg

the road t o Chipyong-ni.

L i g h t o b s e r v a t i o n a i r c r s t ;!>v.~:

c o n s t a n t r e p o r t s o f enemy a c t i v i t y and l o c s t i o n . 2

-79-

C o l o n e l Crombez c l o s e d t h e h a t c h on h i s t a n k , t h e f i f t h i n . t h e c o l u m n , and a t 1545 o r d e r e d t h e column t o move out. The column s t r e c h e d f o r o v e r a m i l e w i t h t a n k s a t 50 The p r o g r e s s o f t h e t a s k f o r c e d r e w o n l y

meter i n t e r v a l s .

o c c a s s i o n a l small arms f i r e u n t i l i t r e a c h e d t h e v i l l a g e of Koksu-ri, a b o u t two m i l e s f r o m t h e s t a r t p o i n t , and t h r e e J u s t as t h e l e a d t a n k reached a

m i l e s from Chipyong-ni.

b r i d g e b y p a s s s o u t h o f t h e v i l l a g e and s t o p p e d , a c r e z c e r . d o o f machinegun and m o r t a r f i r e f e l l on t h e c o l u m n . W-unded

i n f a n t r y m e n f e l l o r w e r e f o r c e d o f f o f t h e t a n k - by e n e n y fire. They t o o k c o v e r n o t t o p r o t e c t t h e t a n k s , b u t t o

survive.24 C o l o n e l Crombez o r d e r e d t h e column t o c o n t i n u e . W i t h o u t warniflg t h e i n f a n t r y , t h e t a n k s of t h e column begar; t a move. T h e r e was a mad s c r a m b l e 9s t h e i n f a n t r y t:i?c! Most o f t h e men made i t , tct
t;

climb back o n t o t h e t a n k s .

a b o u t t h i r t y men, i n c l u d i n g s o m e wounded, w e r e l e f t Se!.in-i. C a p t a i n B a r r e t t shouted t o t h o s e l e f t b e h i n d . "Ztay by t h e r o a d ! We'll come b a c k f o r y o u . " Both L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l

T r e a c y and C a p t a i n B a r r e t t w5re f u r i o u s w i t h C o l a n a l Crombez. L i e u t e n a n t Colonel Treacy t o l d C a p t a i n Barrect.

t h a t he i n t e n d e d t o b r i n g f o r m s 1 c h s r g e s a g a i n s t . C J ~ C I I : ~ . ~ Cromtez f o r h i s a c t i o n s . 2 5

-80-

After p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e v i l l a g e K o k s u - r i ,

znd

t r a v e l i n g a b o u t a m i l e , t h e t a n k s agsin s t o p p e d t o r e t z r n
enemy f i r e .

Captain Barrett and L i e u t e n a n t C c l o n e l Treacy

d e p l o y e d w i t h t h e i r men a b o u t 50 t o 75 y a r d s from t h e t a n k s i n t h e nearest a v a i l a b l e c o v e r . For t h e second time t h e

t a n k s began moving w i t h o u t i n f o r m i n g t h e i n f a n t r y t o remount. C a p t a i n B a r r e t t m a n a g e d t o g e t on a l a t e r t a n k a s

i t d r o v e b y , l e a v i n g L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l T r e a c y a n d a b o z t 60
men b e h i n d . A g a i n C a p t a i n B a r r e t t c a l l e d t o t h s men t c

remain by t h e r o a d u n t i l he r e t u r n e d . 2 6

As t h e t a n k s moved t o w a r d s C h i p y o n g - n i ,
several b r i e f h a l t s .

t h e r e were

T a n k e r s a s k e d p e r m i s s i o n t o er.gs.ge t k e

enemy w h i c h were p o u r i n g f i r e down o n t o t h e t a n k s a n d t h e exposed infantrymen. c o n t i n u e moving.27 C o l o n e l C r o m b e z o r d e r e d t h e tanks t c

Nearing C h i p y o n g - n i , t h e l e a d t a n k p a s s e d t h r z s g b . Chcc u t and w a s s t r u c k by a r o c k e t .

T h e e n t i r e t a n k c r e x was

wounded b u t t h e t s n k was n o t d i s a b l e d a n d c o n t i n u e d n i ~ l n g . clearing

3

v i t a l choke p o i n t s l o n g t h e r s a d .

C a p t a i r . Hi51.e

e n t e r e d t h e . c u t i n t h e f o u r t h t a n k arid was s t r u c k i n t h e r e a d y racks b y a n o t h e r r o c k e t . T h e t u r r e t e x p l o d e d snc! ti:?

t a n k b u r s t i n t o f l a m e s k i l l i n g C a p t a i n k l i s r u nnc! t h a

rem3ir.ir.g c r e w m e m b e r s i n t h e t u r r e t .

I n s p i t e of

wcanis Inl

t h e d a n g e r o f m o r e e x p l o s i s n s , t h e d r i v e r o f t h e C a n k ?+;k

-81-

i t g o i n g u n t i l i t c l e a r e d t h e embanknent and d r o v e o f f o n t 5
t h e s i d e of the r o a d . The remaining t a n k s o f t h e colum?.

moved t h r o u g h t h e embankment w i t h o u t d i f f i c a l t y . 2 I n Chipyong-ni, t h e 23rd I n f a n t r y launched a

s i m u l t a n e o u s c o u n t e r a t t a c k t o assist t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h of T a s k F o r c e Crombez.

T h e e n c i r c l i n g CCF a l s o l a u n c h e d a l a s t

d i t c h a t t a c k and w e r e c a u g h t b e t w e e n t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g e l e m e n t s o f t h e 2 3 r d I n f a n t r y and T a s k F o r c e Crumbez. T1-.r

a t t a c k i n g CCF f o r c e s w e r e d e s t r o y e d and a t 1700, Tazk F o r c e Crombez e n t e r e d C h i p y o n g - n i . 2 9 Captain Barrett's headcount i n t h e p e r i m e t e r t o t a l l a d o n l y 2 3 men, o f w h i c h t h i r t e e n w e r e wounded.

He a s k e d f o r

t a n k s t o r e t u r n and p i c k up t h e men who had b e e n l e f t b e h i n d and was t o l d b y Colonel C r o n b e z , "No, I'm n o t g o i n g b a c k . T h e r e ' s t o o much enemy f i r e . " F o r t u n a t s l y , many o f t h e

s o l d i e r s l e f t b e h i n d managed t o r e t u r n t o f r i e n d l y 1 i r . e ~ without help. The f i n a l c o u n t r e v e a l e d t h a i.0mpar.y had

s u f f e r e d t w e l v e d e e d , 40 wounded, and n i n e t e e n m i c r i r . s . 3 c
A t 1100 t h e n e x t d a y , t h e t a n k s r e t r a z e d t h e i r r ? u l - e

t o r e j o i n t h e regiment without f i r i n g a s h o t .

Solczel

Crombea f a c e d open h o s t i l i t y and b i t t e r c r i t i c i z m ftzir: fellow o f f i c e r s i n the regiment f o r h i s conduct.

Cspt-ln
5th

B a r r e t t and t h e r e m a i n i n g o f f i c e r s of t h e 3 r d D o t t 5 l i : : i C a v a l r y were t r a n s f e r e d o u t of t h e r e g i m e n t . Lieutsnznt

Colonel Treacy died i n c a p t i v i t y .

C o l o n e l Crombez a l s o made

n o t e o f L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l T r e a c y ' s d i s o b e d i e n c e i n ~Pfica! r e g i m e n t a l and d i v i s i o n a l r e c o r d s . 3 1 I n s p i t e of t h e b i t t e r n e s s of t h e s o l d i e r s under C o l o n e l C r o m b e z ' s command, G e n e r a l Ridgway d e c l a r e d t h a t he had made o n e o f " t h e b e s t l o c a l d e c i s i o n s o f t h e w s r . " C o l o n e l Crombez's a c t i o n s a l s o r e f l e c t e d t h e g u i d a n c e g i v e n t o t h e army by G e n e r a l Ridgway who s a i d :

Again and a g a i n , I i n s t r u c t e d b o t h c o r p s commanders t o so c o n d u c t t h e i r withdrawals as t o leave s t r o n g f o r c e s p o s i t i o n e d as t o permit powerful c o u n t e r a t t a c k w i t h a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y teams d u r i n g each d a y l i g h t p e r i o d , w i t h d r a w i n g t h e s e f o r c e s a b o u t d a r k as necessary.32

Lessons

I n o r d e r t o r e l i e v e t h e 23rd I n f a n t r y a t r h i p y c c z - n i ,
T a s k F o r c e Crombez c o n d o c t e d t a s k s e z z s n t l s
a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team.
0

ail

S u c c e s s c r f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y c.:nduct
t h i s opsr2t;i:I.n

t h e s e t a s k s i s l e s s i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e - nod?

p r o v i d e s t o exanine t h e g s n e r a l conduct of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m i n Roraa.

I n e x a m i n i n g t h e acti3r.:::

:::'

T a s k F o r c e Crombez and o t h e r u n i t s , a g e n e r a l s t s t e m c n t

-83-

a b o u t t h e employment o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e i n K o r e a c a n b e made.
T h e e x a m i n a t i o n w i l l encompass t h e a r e a s o f

o r g a n i z a t i o n and command and c o n t r o l .

These a r e a s s r e

s i n g l e d o u t b e c a u s e they a r e i n t r i n s i c t o t h e e x e c u t i o r . of armor-infantry doctrine. The i m p o r t a n c e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n i s s e l f e v i d e n t . O r g a n i z a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e s b o t h t h e p o t e n t i a l and t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f a r t h e use of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e . DurlrLg

t h e Korean War, t a n k s w e r e o r g a n i c t o t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i r i x s
a t t h e r e g i m e n t a l and d i v i s i o n a l l e v e l s .

In order t o t s i ? d

an a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team, t h e s e t a n k s w e r e a t t a c h e d t~
i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s o r a t lower l e v e l s .
_.

In e x a m i n i n g how t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s w e r e b s J i l t
and t h e r u l e s u s e d t o b u i l d t h e m , t h a d r g r e a E ;
~cainp?lw~:?

of u r i t s i n Korea w i t h t h e s t a t e d d o c t r i n e can be
eetermined. While o r a s n i z a t i o n g e n e r a l l y
O C C U ~ Sp

r i a r t c ?he

commencenent of o p e r a t i o n s , t h e command and c o n t r o l - of t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n d u r i n g combat i s . s e t t l e d on t h e b a t t l e P i a 1 . i . H e r e t h e o b j e c t is t o e x a m i n e t h e means o f command 3 n d c o n t r o l i n a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m s and how t h e y were u s e d .

T h i s i n t u r n d e s c r i b e s how t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t a a n
WOL.!~CI?.

-84-

t o g e t h e r and t h e degree t o w h i c h t h e s t a t e d a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e was a p p l i e d .

Organ i z a t i o n

Armor u n i t s a t t a c h e d t o t h e 5 t h C a v a l r y were f o r t h e
most p a r t , d e r i v e d from a normal s u p p o r t r e l a t i o n s h i p .

Company, 7 0 t h ' T a n k B a t t a l i o n , h a d b e e n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 5 t h C a v a l r y R e g i m e n t a n d t h e 1st C a v a r y D i v i s i o n s i n c e t k e

regiment h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e b a t t l e s o f t h e N a k t o n g
B u l g e i n A u g u s t o f 1950. I n c o n t r a s t , D Company, 6 t h T a n k

B a t t a l i o n , was n o t e v e n a u n i t a s s i g n e d t o t h e 1st C a v a l r y

Division.

T h i s t a n k c o m p a n y was o r d e r e d t o j o i n t h e

regiment d u e t o its p r o x i m i t y t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

I n s p i t e of t h e h a h i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n b e t w e e r : A
Company o f t h e 7 0 t h T a n k B a t t a l i o n a n d t h e 5 t h C a v z l r y R e g i m e n t , h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e t a s k .F3~.,.'e commander d e s i g n a t e d D Company, n o t t h e h a b i t u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d A Company, t o c o o r d i n a t e w i t h t h e i n f a n t r y . i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e t a s k f o r c e comnandar placed
2

This

great??

v a l u e on t h e t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e Y46 P a t t o n t 3 1 : ! ( ~ t h a n h e J i d i n t h e i n c r e a s e d c o m b a t e f f i c i e n c y sn: cst..;ior. c r e a t e d by t h e h a b i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n o f t h e o t h e r un i t s

7k-c

-85-

H a b i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n and t h e r e s u l t i n g c o h e s i o n p r o v e d t o be an i m p o r t a n t combat m u l t i p l i e r d u r i n g t h e Korean War. T h i s combat m u l t i p l i e r can b e s e e n i n t h e Task Force Dolvins

a c t i o n s of Task Force Dolvin.

performance a l s o v a l i d a t e d t h e correctness. of p u b l i s h e d armor-infantry doctrine, D u r i n g t h e b r e a k o u t f r o m t h e P u s a n P e r i m e t s r , Tazk F o r c e D o l v i n c o n s i s t e d o f two c o m p a n i e s o f t h e 8 9 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n a n d two c o m p a n i e s o f t h e 32d I n f a n t r y . Both u n i t e

were a s s i g n e d t o t h e 2 4 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n .

The 8 9 t h

h a b i t u a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e 32d I n f a n t r y i n t h e d e f e n s e on t h e P u s a n P e r i m e t e r and t h e T a s k F o r c e Commnader p u t t h e i r c l o c e a s s o c i a t i o n t o good u s e . L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Welburn C o l v i : , ,

Commander of t h e 8 9 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n , d e s c r i b e d t h e T a s k F o r c e s b r e a k o u t from t h e Pusan P e r i m e t e r i n t h i s manner: The s u c c e s s o f o u r o p e r a t i o n showed what teamwork c o u l d d o . T h e t a n k s a l o n e c o u l d n o t h a v e d o n e t h e j o b . tJeitt.er could t h e i n f a n t r y do i t a l o n e . 3 4 During t h e o p e r a t i o n , b o t h t a n k c m p a n i e s used t?.cir s u p e r i o r f i r e power a n d m o b i l i t y t o d e z t r o y f h e i n g ?:;cir.y t r o o p s and d e l a y i n g p o s i t i o n s . The i n f a n t r y c o r p s n i e z

a r e v e n t e d c l o s e - i n Pnemy a t t a c k s m d seize.:! k+y t e r r a i n

w h i c h impeded t h e T a s k F o r c e s a d v a n c e . 3 5

-86-

In s p i t e o f t h e r e c o g n i z e d v a l u e o f t h e h a b i t u a l
a s s o c i a t i o n o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y u n i t s , t h e 8 9 t h Tank E a t t z l i c r i
was l a t e r r e a s s i g n e d t o t h e 2 5 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o r . .

An e x a m i n a t i o n o f a t h i r d t a s k f o r c e f u r t h e r
i l l u s t r a t e s t h e g e n e r a l i n a b i l i t y o f combat f o r c e s i n Korea t o e f f e c t i v e l y organize armor-infantry teams. The t a s k

f o r c e was t h r o w n t o g e t h e r w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o command and control considerations. Key l e a d e r s o f ' t h e c o n t r o l l i n g

8.7

h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e u n p r e p a r e d t o assume t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. T h i s l e a d e r s h i p d e f i c i e n c y was

p r i m a r i l y d u e t o l a c k o f t r a i n i n g and a l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f T a s k F o r c e G e r h a r d t i n Hny

G f

1 9 5 1 , by t h e X C o r p s Commander, L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Alxc:-d.
is t y p i c a l o f t h e way t a s k f o r c e s were b u i l t d t r i z g t k e

Karean N a r .

A t C600, on 2 4 P a y , t h e 73d Tank B a t t a l i ? ?

2

Commander, L i e u t e n a n t Colcrne? E l b r i d g a D r u b s k a r , re'" .:.:_.'I e I!

w a r n i n g o r d e r from t h e 2nd I n f a n t r y C i v i s i c n G 3 , L i 2 i i t e r . m : Colonel Clare Hutchins, t h a t h i s b a t t a l i o n of tvo c o m p a n i e s was t o form p a r t of a t a s k f o r c e .

t 3 R k

A t 3903,

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l B r u b a k e r r e c e i v e d s o n f i r m a t i o c ;P thz o r d e r , and t h a t t h e t a s k f o r c e was t o b e g i n i t s move

1200.
st
tO

T h e o r d e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e b s t t a l i o n was a t t a c h e d

-87-

t h e 1 8 7 t h Regimental Combat Team ( R C T ) ( A i r b o r n e ) who was i n

t u r n a t t a c h e d t o t h e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n . L i e u t e n a n t Colonel Brubaker f l e w t o t h e 1E7th

Regimental Command P o s t t o c o n f e r w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s cf
t h e 2nd I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n and t h e 1 8 7 t h RCT.
A t t h e CP t h e y

met C o l o n e l G e r h a r d t , E x e c u t i v e ' O f f i c e r and t h e 2nd I n f a n t r y

D i v i s i o n G 3 , L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Clare H u t c h i n s . There they

d i s c l l s s e d t h a o p e r a t i o n , and u n a b l e t o d e c i d e who w o u l d command t h e t a s k f o r c e , w e n t t o f i n d t h e 1 8 7 t h P.CT Commander, B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l F r a n k Bowen. F a i l i n g tc. f i n d

t h e g e n e r a l a t h i s F o r w a r d Command P o s t , t h e y r e t u r n e d t -

t h e 1 8 7 t h RCT C P .
A t 1145, L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l B r u b a k e r moved ts X i s E

Company, w h i c h was w o r k i n g a s an i n d i r e c t f i r e e l e m e n t , znd i n f o r m e d t h e Company Commander, C a p t a i n 'dilliam % s s z t h a t !-:e s h o u l d p r e p a r e t o move n o r t h w a r d a t 1250 a s a p 3 r t o f F o r c e u n d e r t h e command of C s l o n e l G e r h a r d t . C a p t a i n Ross i m m e d i a t a l y r e p c r t e c t o t h e 1 3 t h CCT ,?? where he was t o l d by C o l o n e l G e r h a r d t t o d i s p a t ( : h of t a n k s t o a c t a s t h e t a s k f o r c e a d v a n c e g a o z d . a pla:::!-.
C~ptzin
3

t?~!,.

Ross s e n t h i s 3 r d P l a t o o n f o r w a r d t o t h e s t a r t psir.+, a?.i!.

f o l l o w e d w i t h t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e c c n p a n y .
Major G e o r g e Von H a l b a n , e x e c u t i v e o f f i c 5 r
6:

:he

-..
.-.-!

Tank B a t t a l i o n , had b e e n d e s i g n a t e d t h e commandcr o f Cb.e

-88-

advance g u a r d b y L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l B r u b a k e r .

He d i d n o t

know of h i s a s s i g n m e n t b e c a u s e h e was m o v i n g t h e m a i n b o d y o f t h e b a t t a l i o n 20 miles t o t h e s t a r t p o i n t . Lieutenant

C o l o n e l B r u b a k e r was n o t i n r a d i o c o n t a c t w i t h t h e b a t t a l i o r : executive o f f i c e r . M a j o r Von H a l b e n a n d t h e m a i n b o d y c f

the battalion did not a r r i v e a t the start point u n t i l l 4 C O . M a j o r C h a r l e s Newman, A s s i s t a n t E x e c u t i v e C f f i c e r of t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n , was s a l v a g i n g r e p a i r p a r t s f r o m d e s t r o y e d t a n k s when h e ran i n t o t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n commander. T h e b a t t a l i o n commander s e n t him t o t h e l ? ? t h CF

t o r e p l a c e M a j o r Van H a l b e n as t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d c o m n a n d e r

I n a s u b s e q u e n t i n t e r v i e w , M a j o r James 3panr. tb.5 37

s t a t e d t h a t i t a p p e a r e d t o him t h a t t h e 1 8 7 t h RCT t o z k nc. i n i t i a t i v e in organizing the task force or the covering f o r c e a n d t h a t L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l E r u b a k e r was force,? t t a k e c h a r g e of t h e o p e r a t i o n . M a j o r Newman w e n t t o t h e 1 8 7 t h RCT C P , r9ciis.a.' o r d e r s t o s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d ,3vel' t h e 5ohar.g went t o t h e s t a r t p o i n t .
? i - , y ~ r .

. . ::ie

5.r. i

Hare h e f o u n d n o t o n l y a z:i,lld?.c-:!

collection o f o n i t s , b u t I ! Company cf t h e 6 4 t h T a n k

Battalion.

F a c e d w i t h a number o f p r ~ b l e n sh i r n z e l f , he I:....-

t h i s u n F l a n n e d s d d i t i o n t o t h e task f u r c e o r s.!v:ir.~.-cgi:a:.d

t o be s o r t e d o c t by h i s b a t t a l i o n cormander.

He o r g a n i z e d t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d , and w h i l e an e n g i n e e r p l a t o o n t h a t he had " s t o l s n " c l e a r e d t h e r o a d of enemy m i n e s , he a l s o a t t e m p t e d t o g e t a l l h i 5 u n i t s on t h e s a c s radio net. L i e u t e n a n t General Almond l a n d e d i n h i s h e l i o c o p t e r

a t M a j o r Newman's l o c a t i o n and damanded t o know why t h e :nit

was n o t m o v i n g .
doing.

Major Newman e x p l a i n e d t o h i m w h a t ?.e v c s

To t h i s Almond r e p l i e d :

I d o n ' t g i v e a god damn s t o u t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . G e t t h o s e t s n k s or. t h e r o a d and k e e p g o i n g u n t i l you h i t a mine. I w a n t you g o i n g a t 20 m i l e s an hour.

Major Newman c o m p l i e d w i t h h i s o r d e r s .

Lieutenant

G e n e r a l Almond t h e n f l e w t o t h e 1 8 7 t h CP w h e r s t i e dezcendrc! upon t h e 72d Tank B a t t a l i o n S3, Major Spanr. azd sai::

T e l l B r u b a k e r t o g e t t h a t g3d d a m t s n l r column moving w h e t h e r t h e y g o t i n f i n t r y support or c o t .

Major Spann r a c e d o f f t o f i n d C s l o n e l @ r c t . s k - r C o l o n e l G e r h a r d t r u s h e d up t o C a p t a i n Ross, t h e % x : z x ! ~.,F~

B Company, 72d Tan!< E a t t a l i o n , and t o l d him t o g a t

up t h e

t h e La:?!.:.:;

r o a d behir.d t h e a d v a n c e g u a r i 9 s f a s t as ~ c . z s i t l - .

C a p t a i n Ross was f o r c e d t o s e p a r a t e h i s company. which w.?.:; i n t e r m i n g l e d w i t h t h e o t h e r v e h i c l e = of t h e t a s k for.r.e, ? . d

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l o 5 t v a l u b l e time.

C a p t a i n Ross t h r e a t s and t h e use o f

s u p e r i o r h o r s e power, c l e a r e d t h e r o a d and t h e t a n k company moved t o t h e s u p p o r t o f Major Newman.38 Two f a c t s emerge f r o m a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f how t a s k f o r c e s were o r g a n i z e d i n K o r e a . F i r s t , t h e a s s i g n m e n t of u n i t s t o c o n d u c t an a r m o r - i n f a n t r y o p e r a t i o n had l i t t l e t o d o w i t h t h e h a b i t u a l supporting r e l a t i o n s h i p s of t h e u n i t s involved. Although

t h e m a j o r i t y df t h e i n t e g r a t e d t a n k - i n f a n t r y o p e r a t i o n s show i n f a n t r y b e i n g s u p p o r t e d by t h e d i v i s i o n a l t a n k b a t t a l i o n s ,
a c l o s e r examination reveals t h a t t h e p r o x i m i t y of t h e t a n k

u n i t t o t h e p o i n t o f e f f o r t was more r e l e v a n t t h a n a n y o t h e r organizational consideration, S e c o n d , t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team o f t e n f e l l t o t h o s e l e a s t q u a l i f i e d t o make i t work.

In the

case o f T a s k F o r c e Crombez, t h e R e g i m e n t a l Commander t o o k

charge o f a t a s k f o r c e t h a t was b e s t l e d by t h e r e s e r v e

B a t t a l i o n Commander, L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l T r e a c y .

Treacy was

familiar w i t h t h e p r i o r c o o r d i n a t i o n r e q u i r e d of an a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. C o l o n e l Crombezs c a l l o u s h a n d l i n g o f

t h e o p e r a t i o n made t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e i n f a n t r y and t a n k

company commanders useless,

In directing the infantry t o

r i d e on t o p o f t a n k s , i n s p i t e o f h i s knowledge o f t h e enemy and t h e t e r r a i n , h e d e m o n s t r a t e d h i s l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g

-91-

of t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e t a n k s i n t h e t a s k f o r c e .

He a l s o

f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d how t h e i n f a n t r y was t o a s s i s t t h e t a n k companies i n accomplishing t h e i r a s s i g n e d m i s s i o n . L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Welburn D o l v i n , t h e Commander of T a s k F o r c e D o l v i n , is an e x a m p l e of a w e l l q u a l i f i e d l e a d e r executing a successful, c l a s s i c armor-infantry mission. L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l D o l v i n was w e l l q u a l i f i a d t o l e a d a n a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team b y v i r t u e o f h i s World War I1 c c m b a t e x p e r i e n c e and r e c e n t t r a i n i n g . D u r i n g V o r l d War I1 h e

s e r v e d a s a p a r a t r o o p e r w h i c h g a v e him an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i n f a n t r y m a n and h i s s p e c i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s .

He r e c i e v a d

h i s command d i r e c t l y f r o m h i s a s s i g n m e n t a t t h e Comcand and G e n e r a l S t a f f College, w h e r e h e was t h e p r i n c i p l e ' a n t h o r f o r t h e Army manual on a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s . 3 7 The t o t a l c h a o s t h a t p r e c e e d e d T a s k F G ~ G c e~ rl-ardt : s a n o t h e r e x a m p l e o f a l e a d e r who f a i l e d t o L i n d e r s t a n b ? h + r e q u i r e m e n t s of an a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m . Colonel C a r h ~ r d t .

a l t h o u g h i n command o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , l a c k e d t h e kncwler',g:.r. t o c o n t r o l an a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. Who i s i n chars"* 2,s

! : m

o f t e n a s e n s i t i v e i s s u e . and m u s t b e d e c i d e d i n t h e f z v i r soldiers lives. The s e a r c h f o r G e n e r a l Bowden was

u n d o u b t e d l y d o n e by s o l d i e r s who r e c o g n i z e d t h i s . 2nd !-;aged to resolve the issue. Time r a n o u t an,ll t h e f o r m a l -onnia:-i

i1-:t3

r e m a i n e d w i t h t h e 1 8 7 t h RCT, w h i l e c o n t r o l was p l s o e d

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t h e h a n d s o f Major Newman o f t h e 72d Tank B a t t a l i o n .

. L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Almond d i s p l a y e d h i s i g n o r , a n c e by

d e m a n d i n g t h a t t a n k s , n o t t e a m s , move tlj s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d o v e r t h e Sohang R i v e r . I f he had w a n t e d t a n k s t o p c s h an

o v e r e x t e n d e d , t o t t e r i n g f o e , why demand a t a s k f o r c e w i t h

its i n h e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems?
F a i l u r e of key l e a d e r s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team is a r e c u r r i n g s u b j e c t i n o b s e r v e r r e p o r t s and m i l i t a r y p e r i o d i c a l s o f t h e period.
I n an A r m y F i e l d F o r c e s T r a i n i n g B u l l e t i n , d a t e d 2s

November 1 9 5 0 , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f u n i t s i n K o r e a i n c o n d u c t i n g combined arms o p e r a t i o n s , was r e p o r t e d t o b e belbw s t a n d a r d s .

The primary reason f o r sub-standsrd

p e r f o r m a n c e was t h e f a i l u r e of t h e f i e l d csmmandi.r t~ u n d e r s t a n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f e a c h o f r k e - e

arms. 36

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l C a r r o l M c F a i l s , who ccmman?rc! t.:.~' 7 0 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n o f t h e 1st C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n . wrc.te -.hst t h e t y p i c a l small u n i t i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r had l i t t l z sr

I-:#>

u n d e r s t a n d i n g csf how t o t a c t i c a l l y e m p l o y , or i o . g : z t i c a l l ; 7 s c p p o r t . an a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n . L i e u t e n a n t Coi8r;nrl E11t?r

R e a g o r , who commanded t h e 1 4 0 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n o f t k t ? GC?.?.

-33-

I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , d e s c r i b e d t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team i n t h i s manner: F a r t o o o f t e n t h e t a n k - i n f a n t r y team d e g e n e r a t e s i n t o t a n k s o p e r a t i n g i n the v i c i n i t y of an i n f a n t r y u n i t , w i t h a vague m i s s i o n t o s h o o t s o m e w h e r e . 3 8

Armor b a t t a l i o n commanders, w i t h c o m p a n i e s t h a t were

attached throughout t h e d i v i s i o n s , present a p o t e n t i a l l y biased view. I n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n commanders, v h i l e casti::g

f e w e r d i s p a r a g i n g r e m a r k s a b o u t t h e a b i l i t y cf t h e i r p e e r s
t,o make e f f e c t i v e u s e o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m , d a a d d r e s s

i t s v a l u e s and t h e s p e c i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t i t p l a c e d or.
leaders. L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l R o b e r t Demers, L i e u t e n a n t T r e o c y s p r e d e c e s s o r as Ccmmander of 3 r d B a t t a l i o n 5 t h C a v a l r y , wrote, Tank c r e w s and i n f a n t r y m e n a l i k e m u s t 0 9 t a u g h t t h e p r o c e d u r e s and c n g a t i l l t i s z and l i m i t a t i o n s of e a c h o t h e r s W ~ ? . F G : I Z . The i n f a n t r y commander who mskec a s t r o n g a t t e m p t t o s e e t h a t his p a r s t n n . 2 1 a r e thoroughly oriented i n t h e gse cf a r m o r and i n t u r n e m p l o y s h i s a r m o r p r o p e r l y w i l l b e p a i d o f f many t i m r e o v e r . 40

-94-

Major Warren Hodges, who commanded t h e 2d B a t t a l i c n

3 8 t h I n f a n t r y o f t h e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , s u p p o r t s t h e

p o i n t s made by L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Demers: T a n k - i n f a n t r y teamwork is n o t a c h e i v a d by m e r e l y t a l k i n g a b o u t i t . E a c h new r e p l a c e m e n t , b o t h o f f i c e r and e n l i s t e d , must r e a l i z e t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f b o t h t h e t a n k and t h e i n f a n t r y m a n . Most o f a l l t h e i n f a n t r y m a n m u s t h a v e c o n f i d e n c e and knowledge o f w h a t t h e t a n k c a n d o for him.41 The i m p o r t a n c e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c a p a b i l i t i e z : m d l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e t a n k and t h e i n f a n t r y m a n was n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e b a t t a l i o n command l e v e l s . Junior leader?

a l s o r e m a r k e d on t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s a s a p a r t o f t h s armor-infantry team. L i e u t e n a n t R o b e r t H a r p e r , a p l a t o o n L e a d e r i n th.- ?2,:! Tank B a t t a l i o n o f t h e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n w r o t e t h a t a t t a c h e d t a n k p l a t o o n s were u s e d by c f f i c e r s who l a i : ! i e ~ ! f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e employment o f t a n k s .

As a F l a t 1 . 0 7
kc:w

l e a d e r he was n o t c a l l e d upon t o g i v e r e c o m m e n d a t i s n s I:?

a r m o r c o u l d b e s t s u p p o r t t h e o p e r a t i o n . he i n s t e z d r e c . + i v e d
*>rtlers, p a r c e l l e d o u t h i s t a n k s , and execilted t h ? t 3 s k Cc

was g i v e n . 4 2
A l e t t e r by L i e u t e n a n t R o b e r t K e l l e r of t h ? 31?
Infantry

Division, written t o h i s father stationed a t t h r Armc?

-95-

School, i n c l u d e s a r e v e a l i n g p a r a g r a p h of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t e x i s t e d h e t w e e n a t t a c h e d a r m o r and i n f a n t r y u n i t , s :
As a r e s u l t o f t h o s e t h r e e d a y s , t h e 1st

B a t t a l i o n i s extremely p l e a s e d . O u r work t o g e t h e r h a s b e e n a p r a c t i c a l example o f w h a t t h e book t e a c h e s a b o u t combined arms c o o p e r a t i o n . The 1st B a t t a l i o n is n o t o n l y f a r i n f r o n t o f t h e u n i t s on b o t h f l a n k s , b u t a h e a d of i t s own s c h e d u l e . H e r e t o f o r e t h e y forgot a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y a b o u t t h e a t t a c h e d t a n k u n i t ; now t h e y a r e b e g i n n i n g t o g e t some r e a l r e s p e c t f o r armor--including sending m e messages : : when t h e r a d i o is o u t and t r e a t i z g me 3 t h e t a c t i c a l armor a d v i s o r , w h i c h i s p r o b a b l y t h e b e s t complement t h e i n f a n t r y c a n pay a r m o r . 4 3 L i e u t e n a n t K e l l e r s h a r d work p r o v e d t h e v a l u s of t!:e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team.

The high note with which Lieatanant

K e l l e r e n d e d h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h a 1st B a t t a l l o r . was n c t often repeated. o f i e n c

A Far E a s t Command R s p c r t e n t l t l x i . 5

ip

Kp-m, s t a t a s t h a t x c r t
si:pyc r t

. .

armor o f f i c e r s f e l t t h e y had been g i v e n in?de,qu:tfe by i n f a n t r y u n i t s d u r i n g combat o p a r a t i o n s . 4 4

rommand and C o n t r o l

. C o o r d i n a t i 3 n i s n e i t h e r o c c i d e n t a l :-!or a~lt;aif::.
m

I.

. h i s l i n e f r o m Cugelers d i s c u s s i o n of t h e a c t i u c z :I?

T~z!.:
r

F o r c e Crombez i n h i s b o o k , r,Qmba.+
-96-

AL+:,-;.

i7

,-, -,

. c .

~ I .: r. -L=,:,

a b a s i s f o r t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e m e a n s a r m o r - i n f a n t r y tealis used t o c o o r d i n a t e combat a c t i o n s . 4 s T h i s c o c r d i n a t i o n c a n b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o commsnd a n d c o n t r o l and is s u c c i n c t l y summarized by L i e u t e n a n t Colene? J o h n Harris, who commanded t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n 6 5 t h I n f a n t r y
of t h e 3 r d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n :

T a n k - i n f a n t r y teamwork, n e e d l e s s t o say. is v e r y e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s c f an o p e r a t i o n . When, f o r e x a m p l e , a t a n k b a t t a l i o n and an i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n are n o t i f i e d t h a t t h e y a r e t o work t o g e t h e r on a t a s k f o r c e i n t o enemy t e r r i t o r y , i t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e t w o c o m m a n d e r s g e t together a t the earliest opportunity.

A t t h i s time, i n a d d i t i o n t o making c e r t a i n t h a t t h e m i s s i o n is t h o r o u g h l y u n d e r s t o o d b y b o t h commanders, i n c l u d i n g t h e p l a n o f maneuver, r o u t e s t o and f r o n an o b j e c t i v e area, timing, e t c , it becomes a m a t t e r o f g e t t i n g down t c : ! i s a c t u a l mechanics of t h e o p e r a t i o n .

How w i l l t h e a c t i o n b e c o n t r o l l e d ,an;'e
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy i s msd?? I n o t h e r w o r d s , how c a n t h e i n f a n t r y commander g e t t h e s u p p o r t i n g f i r e c c f t h e t a n k w h e r e h e w a n t s i t whsn h a w a n t s it?

I n o r d e r t o do t h i s s o t h a t t h z f u l l s u p p o r t o f t h e t a n k s can be u t i l i z e d , t a n k a n d i n p a n t r y company cornmar:dsrs xh3 a r e t o work t s g e t h e r on t h e o p e r a t i o n a r e p a i r e d o f f t o g e t down t o t h e f i n e P Oi n t s --a! t e r t 1 1 s t a s k f c r c e aomaisni! e I ' bas e x p l a i n e d t h b p l a n o f maneuver > f t h e t a s k f o r c e as a whole and t h e p a r t t h e i n d i v i d u a l t a n k - i n f a n t r y teams w i l l
play.4R

-9?-

G u g e l e r a t t r i b u t e s t h e p o o r command and c o n t r o l i n t h e r e l i e f of C h i p y o n g - n i t o t h e a b s e n c e o f p l s n n i n g ; .
This

f o c u s on p l a n n i n g m i s s e s o n e of t h e t r u e p r o b l e m s o f t h e armor-infantry

team and i m p l i e s t h a t p l a n n i n g i s s u f f i c i e n t

t o a l l o w t h e s m o o t h command and c o n t r o l of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . When t h e l e a d t a n k s t o p p e d a t t h e b r i d g e by pass s o u t h o f Koksu-ri, t h e p l a n began t o f a l l a p a r t . Command and 2 c n t r r . l

w h i c h had b e e n c o o r d i n a t e d a t t h e company ' l e v e l , was overcome b y t h e o r d e r s o f C o l o n e l Crombez. The o n l y

'r1sy t 3

e f f e c t new c o o r d i n a t i o n , b a s e d on t h e c h a n g e i n t h t t s c t i : . a l s i t u a t i o n , was t h r o u g h
3

method o f command and c o n t r o l .

Command and c o n t r o l is c r u c i a l t o t h e p r o p e r i m p l e n e n t s t i c n of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e . Tactical radio, visual signals

o r t h e implementation of s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s a r e
t h e t h r e e most common m e t h o d s o f ocmmscd and c o n t y c ? .

T a c t i c a l R a d i o Communicati;r.s

The t a c t i c a l r a d i o of t h e American Army made

4 1 :

i n s u s p i c i o u s b e g i n n i n g i n K o r e a a s a p a r t of t h e ? . : ; z i ~ m ? r . t of T a s k F o r c e S m i t h . T h r o u g h t h e e a r l y m o r c i z g f 6 g x,?.

d r i z z l e o n t h 2 5 t h o f J u l y 1 3 5 0 , t h e T341'55 t a n k s c m P ti>.? NKPA, 1 0 7 t h Armored B r i g a d e a t t a c k e d and p e n e t r a t e - ' t h e a n t i - t a n k d e f e n s e s of t h e b a t t - a l i o n .

A s t h e enemy t a i i i z

-98-

passed the supporting b a t t e r y ,

they destroyed t h e wire

W i t h f i v e c,f h i s

communications w i t h t h e forward o b s e r v e r s .

s i x o r i g i n a l g u n s s t i l l o p e r a t i o n a l , t h e b a t t e r y commander w a i t e d f o r c a l l s f o r f i r e w h i c h n e v e r came. Lieutenant

Colonel C h a r l e s Smith, seeing t h e t a n k s pass through h i s p o s i t i o n s , assumed t h e a r t i l l e r y t o b e o v e r r u n . no way h e c o u l d know f o r s u r e . T h e r e was

H i s r a d i o s , wet and

a n t i q u a t e d , f a i l e d a t t h e c r i t i c a l moment i n t h e b ~ t t 3 i . 4 ~

I n t h e F i r s t O b s e r v e r R e p o r t by t h e O f f i c e o f t h e
C h i e f o f Army F i e l d F o r c e s , c o n d u c t e d i n A u g u s t sf ?'3JC. k!:+ wealtness o f t a c t i c a l r a d i o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is l i s t e d as a m a j o r c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e of Arny u n i t s . = "
As t h e . war p r o g r e s s e d . t h e r a d i o s i n use by a r n o r a n d

i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s d i d n o t c h a n g e . In s p i t e o f a r a d i o d e s i g n .. which a l l o w e d a n o v e r l a p of c e r t a i n f r e q u e n c i e s , t h e L'X::.CZ of a r m o r and i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s would n o t c o n m u n i c a t e . xas e s p e c i a l l y t e l l i n g in the actions a t Chipyang-ci. Unable t a communicate v i a r a d i o , d i s m o u n t e d i n f a z t r ; ?
re-:+.:

This

.. .
sr;l

on t h e p r e a r r s n g e d p r o c e d u r e s worked o E t by t h e i n f s t : - ; F
armor company commanders. F u r t h e r , t h e i n f a n t r y ccn?.sny

commander r o d e o n t h e a r m o r ccmpany commander's t a z k t r : f a c i l i t a t e t h e exchange of communications.

T h i s ??:':?2~:?+

f a i l e d t o work when C o l o n e l Crombez d i r e c t e d t h e p r o g r s s c , > f b o t h t h e l e a d company and t h e T a s k F o r c e fyom a n i n t i r e l y

-99-

d i f f e r e n t tank.

Commander of t h e 1st B a t t a l i o n 1 7 t h

I n f a n t r y of t h e 7 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , L i e u t e n a n t Colcne? Edwin S a y r e , d e s c r i b e s t h e p r o b l e m s of c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team: P r a c t i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e SCR 300 r a d i o is t h e b a s i c means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o t a n k s and i n f a n t r y , b u t i t s u s e can b e v a r i e d . O f t e n , I have found i t i m p o s s i b l e t o c o n t a c t t h e t a n k e r s on t h e SCR 3 0 0 , s o I h a v e made i t a r u l e t o h o l d one t a n k i n t h e r e a r as a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t a n k w h i c h is u s e d t o r e l a y messages.40 Tank r a d i o s became t h e b a s i s f o r n o t o n l y c o n s a n y l e v e l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , b u t also a s s i s t s d t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team t o communicate . w i t h t h e b a t t a l i o n and h i g h e r headquarters. L i e u t e n a n t Thomas B o y d s t o n o f t h e 7 0 t h T s n k

B a t t a l i o n d e s c r i b e d t a c t i c a l communications i z t h i s x x n ? : : They h a v e a l s o come t o a d m i r e t h e h i g h 1 7 f l e x i b l e and d e p e n d a b l e c o m n u n i - a t i o n s n e t indigenous t o armor. Often. when a c t i o n i s beyond t h e e f f e c t i v e r a n g e : ~ f t h e l e s s powerful i n f a n t r y r s d i o s . tanks h a v e h e l p e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n and r e g i m e n t a l commanders k e e p a b r e a s t of t h e s i t u a t i o n by r a d i o i n g r e p o r t s t . 2 3 . r a d i o - e q u i p p e d .jeep s t a t i o n e d a t t h e i n f a n t r y command p o s t . 8 0 Even t h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s " l a s h c g "
W ~ E~ T ; I S : ~ C .
. >

_..
T c

d e s c r i b i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s of Task Force Dalvin 2fti.r t h e b r e a k o u t Prom t h e P u s a n P e r i m e t e r , t h e t a s k f o r c e ~ r o m m a n ? i ? ,

-100-

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l D o l v i n d e s c r i b e d h i s c o m n u n i c a t i o n s wlt,!? t h e h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s a s t h e w e a k e s t l i n k i n an o t h e r w i s e powerful a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. The r o u t e o f a d v a - c e , the

l o n g d i s t a n c e s , and t h e m a s k i n g t e r r a i n e n c o u n t e r e d by t h e t a s k f o r c e p l a y e d havoc w i t h c o n s i s t e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e command and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e . 5 1

A more p o i g n a n t e x a m p l e o f t h e i m p a c t o f
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team c a n b e s e e n i n ti.5 d e s t r u c t i o n o f T a s k F o r c e F a i t h , e a s t o f C h o s i n , i n ?;overr..;it: of 1950.

In t h e same s e r i e s of X C o r p s a c t i o n s t h a t p r e c a r d e i :
t h e d e f e n s e of C h i p y o n g - n i ,

t h e 31st R e g i n e n t a l Comt,at T ~ . R E

( R C T ) was a s s i g n e d e a s t o f t h e C h o s i n r e s e r v o i r a s r h i . f l 3 n k
g u a r d o f t h e 1st Marine D i v i s i o n .

T h e b a t t a l i o n s of t h e

r e g i m e n t were c a u g h t i n an o v e r e x t e n d e d g o s i t i o z a;-~:! ~i:;:-,+:! against the reeevoir. The i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s were They f i n a l l y s;..!.:.e,?dx!
Cn-5
E

e n c i r c l e d and u n d e r heavy a t t a c k .

t-.

c c n s o l i d a t i n g t h e RCT i n t o a s i n g l e p e r i m e t e r .

i n t!~-iz
J ~

p e r i m e t e r , t h e y r e c e i v e d word t h a t t h e c o r p s c z u 2 c o u n t e r a t t a c k and b r e a k them o u t .

F u r t h e r , t h ? y were

i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e c o r p s p l a n n e d t o r e t r e a t , m a v i n s f?.rr!:+:
away f r o m t h e r e g i m e n t .

T h i s prompted t h e r e g i n e n t a l

conmander t o a t t e m p t a b r e a k o u t .

-101-

On t h e 2 9 t h o f November t h e 31st RCT T a n k Company

Commander, C a p t a i n D r a k e , s e t o u t w i t h t w e l v e t a n k s t o

assist T a s k F o r c e F a i t h i n t h e i r attempt t o b r e a k o u t .
0800, t h e t a n k c o m p a n y , w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n cf a r o u n d 50

At

s o l d i e r s f r o m t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s company, began t h e i r z t t a c k .
I c y r o a d s made t h e movement o f t h e t a n k s t r e a c h e r o u s .

Task

F o r c e F a i t h , l e s s t h a n f o u r m i l e s a w a y , knew n o t h i n g o f t h e a t t a c k by C a p t a i n Drake b e c a u s e t h e i n f a n t r y r a d i o o cf t h e r e g i m e n t c o u l d n o t communicate w i t h t h o s e of t h e tank company.

R e g i n e n t a l h e a d q u a r t e r s a t Hudacg

n ~ o~t

c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h t h e s u r r o u n d e d regiment d u e t o m a s k i n g , a n d t h e l i m i t e d range o f t h e i n f a n t r y r a d i o s .

In f a i l i n g t -

c o o r d i n a t e t.he a t t a c k s o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team u n d e r
Captain Drake w i t h t h e s o l d i e r s of Task Force F a i t h ; t h e

l a s t c h a n c e o f e x t r a c t i n g t h e r e g i m e n t was lost.52
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s e n d e d t h e attacl-r b y C a p t a i r : Drake
h i s a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team w i t h a n i r o n i c twist.
;:able
E?:?

t : .

communicate w i t h t h e p i l o t s of t h e p r e a r r a n g e d a i r s t z i k e z , t h e i n f a n t r y m e n o f t h e team were s t r a f e d a n d bombed L y thi-:r own a i r s u p p o r t a s t h e y a t t a c k e d t h e d = $ - i n CCF.

t h e team l a c k e d s u f f i c i e n t i n f a n t r y m e n t o c o n t i n g e
9 y ncc::
tl-5

assaults.

One t a n k p l a t o o n , c o v e r i n g t h e w i t h d r a w a l c ~ f C.i-:e

i n f a n t r y m e n , was o v e r r u n a n d l o s t t w o t a n k s t o 3 . 5 i n c h bazookas. C a p t a i n Drake c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d

t3

recover tho

-102-

disabled tanks, but f a i l e d .

Using d i r e c t f i r e from t h e

a t t a c k i n g t a n k s , he d e s t r o y e d t h e d i s a b l e d t a n k s and c e t i r e u t o Hudang.53

A t t h i s p o i n t a t a n k r a d i o c o n t i b u t a d t o one o f t h e
most c o n t r o v e r s i a l o r d e r s o f t h e war.

A t 1600 on t h e 3 0 t h

o f November, t h e 5 3 o f t h e 31st I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t , Y a j o r
B e r r y Anderson a c t i n g on o r d e r s f r o m d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s

i n Hagaru r e l a y e d t h e o r d e r t o C a p t a i n D r a k e ' s cc.r.pany and

t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e H e a d q u a r t e r s company t o p u l l b e c k ? c

Hagaru.

The o n l y way f o r t h e m e s s a g e t o h a v e b e e n

t r a n s m i t t e d was t h r o u g h a t a n k o f t h e 3 1 s t R e g i m e n t a l T m k Company d e t a i l e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r this purpose. Who i s s u e d t h e o r d e r i s n o t ' k n o w n .

11: w i t h d r a w i n g

t h e t a n k company f r o m i t s d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s a t Fadang, sny l i n k u p w i t h t h e m e n o f T a s k F o r c e F a i t h was a r s v e n t d

. ? . ! I , :

Major F a i t h ' s " s t e p p i n g s t o n e " t o f r e e d c m d i s s a p p s s r e d . ;'I T a c t i c s ? r a d i o s and t h ? i r l i m i t a t i o n s r e q u i r e d lenders

GI:

t h e ground t o a d j u s t how t h e armor- i n f a n t r y

!??TI

condxcted o p e r a t i o n s .

These L i m i t a t i o n s

laced i x r e a c e c !

a n p h a s i s on t h e u s e o f v i s u a l s i g n a l s mil a t t e x y t c t 3 s t a n d a r d i z e o p e r a t i r . g p r o c e d u r e s t o e f f e c t i v e l y imi3liner: armor-infantry doctrine.

-103-

Visual Signals

Almost a l l of t h e v i s u a l s i g n a l s u s e d i n K o r e a serve.' t o i n c r e a s e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e s and t c e n s u r e t h e s a f e t y of a t t a c k i n g infantrymen. Soldiers

r e p o r t i n g on t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s i n d i c a t e t h a t a l l t y p e s of c o l o r e d smokes and f l a r e s w e r e u s e d . Smoke was o f t e n t h e

means o f s e c o n d c h o i c e d u e t o t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p e r i o r i t y
of American f i r e p o w e r .

S u b s t i t u t i o n s f o r smoke i n d i c n t e

b a t t l e f i e l d i n n o v a t i o n b a s e d on a d e s i r e t o i n c r e a s e t h e combat e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m . 5 "

A l i e u t e n a n t i n t h e 72d Tank B a t t a l i e n , wher:

o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n f a n t r y p l a t o o n s , had t h e a l l t h e t r a c e r ammunition o f t h e p l a t o o n g i v e n t o t h e i n f a n t r y p l a t o o n l e a d e r and t h e s q u a d l e a d e r s . T h i s allowed t h e s:i~'por?-:-i!

platoon t o q u i c k l y d e s i g n a t e t a r g e t s f o r t h e t a n k s tc engage. An i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n commander p l a c e d s.ilaA1

" c e r i s e " c o l o r e d m a r k e r pani.:s

i n t h e b e l t s o f t h e zqoz,?

l e a d e r s of t h e a t t a c k i n g i n f s n t r y m e n .

T h i s 3::;cicd

tsr.iko
ell ?s

' . I

f i r e i n f r o n t of t h e i n f a n t r y a s i t a d v a n c e d , as

f o c u s i n g f i r e s on t h o s e u n i t s which w e r e o b v i o u s l y k e i z z held up. The same b s t t a l i c n corrmander a l s o used t h 5 7 m m

EP,L.~

r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e f i r i n g w h i t e p h o s p h o r u s aminunitior. trm targets.

A s e c o n d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n commsnder s l s o t:se,!

m a r k e r p a n e l s t o a s s i s t h i s t r o o p s a s t h e y a t t a c k e d acrilcs open t e r r a i n t o s e i z e d i s t a n t o b j e c t i v e s . 3 6

T r a i n i n g and S t a n d i n g Operating P r o c e d u r e s

I n t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e cases i n which v i s u a l
c o m m u n i c a t i o n m e t h o d s were u s e d ,
t h e i n f a n t r y and armor

c o m m a n d e r s h ad t o q u i c k l y e s t a b l i s h t h e s a c o m m u n i c a t i o n methods j u s t p r i o r t o t h e beginning o f o p e r a t i o n s .

T h e 1sr.k

o f a s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s f o r c e d a t t a c h e d an,.? s u p p o r t e d u n i t s t o work o u t t h e s e v i t a l d e t a i l s a t t h e c - ~ s t

of more d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g .

I n t r i n s i c i n an e f f e c t i v e

s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e is t h e a b i l i t y cf t h e u n i t t o r e h e a r s e and t r a i n u s i n g t h e s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i n g prccedur-3.

T h i s s u b j e c t i z a common t h e m e i n t h e r e r i o d i c a i e sr.d
l i t e r a t u r e of t h e d a y .

L i e u t e n a n t C o l s n e l C n r r o l McFslls, C o m m a c d a r c.f t ? . ~
7 0 t h T a n k B a t t a l i o n o f t h e 1st C a v a l r y C i v i s i o n , w r o t e t h s c
t . h e l a c k o f a c o h e r e n t u n i t o p e r a t i c g p r o c e d u r e s Pc.ri..::!

u n i t s t c a t t a i n c o m b a t e f f i c i e n c y t h r o u g h t r i 3 1 m-!

E:::?.

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l R o b e r t Demars, C o n m a n d e r , * zrd Sst:~:.i.t.n 5 t h C a v a l r y , d e s c r i b e s t h e t r a i n i r . 8 r e q u i r e d t.0 s e t i k l i ? ! ? stantding o p e r a t i n g p r o ~ a d u r e s : ~

-105-

Too much e m p h a s i s c a n n o t b e p l a c e d on
one subject--continous training d u r i n g t h e l u l l s i n t h e f i g h t i n g and a c t u a l l y during the fighting. Continuous t r a i n i n g of i n f a n t r y t r o o p s i n conjunction with tankers w i l l produce t e c h n i q u e s and b a s e s of m u t u a l confidence so necessary i n the t a n k - i n f a n t r y team.=% The c o n c e r n s of t h e s e b a t t a l i o n commanders ar9 r e f l e c t e d i n t h e O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f o f Army F i e l d Force;. (OCAFF) r e p o r t s o n t h e s t a t e o f - t r a i n i n g o f u n i t s i n comhet d u r i n g t h e K o r e a n war.

A l l t h e t r a i n i n g b u l l e t i n s which d e s c r i b e t h e
t r a i n i n g d e f i c i e n c i e s o f c o m b a t t r o o p s i n K o r e a c a l l f o r a;: i n c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s i n c o m b i n e d arms t r a i n i n g . A l t h o u g h nzn?

o f t h e i n i t i a l f a i l u r e s o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team c o u l d b e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e l a c k o f t a n k s i n t h e f a r a a s t 224 t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e u n i t s committed, Later r e p o r t s s t i l l i d e n t i f y problems i n t h e area a f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g . I n o n e t r a i n i n g b i l l l e t i n th:. f o l l o w i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s were m a d e : T h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t a n k - i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g must be implementad a t e v e r y opportunity d u r i n g t h e t r a i n i n g cycle. T h i s t r x i n i n g s h o u l d commence when r a n k crews a r e c o m p e t e n t t o h a n d l e t k e i r v e h i c l e s and weapons. Small u n i t f i e l d p r o b l e m s ; a t t h e p l a t o o n a n d company l e v e l are e x c e l l e n t f o r teaching tar. k- i n f 311 t r y t eamwo P k . 5 *
-106-

B a t t a l i o n commanders a l s o recommended t h a t a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g begir. d u r i n g b a s i c t r a i n i n g i n

3 : .
9

e f f o r t t o overcome t h e i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f o p e r a t i n g t a n k - i n f a n t r y team i n c o m b a t . 6 0

From a c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e m e t h o d s of c o n x a n d i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team,

IS

w a l l as s numksr

o f d e t a i l e d b a t t l e r e p o r t s , a p i c t u r e of t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e

American Army t o i m p l e m e n t t h e s t a t e d a r m o r - i n f s n t r y d o c t r i n e b e g i n s t o emerge. W i t h o u t t h e a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t i v e l y c o m n a n i c a t e ~t l o w e r l e v e l s , i n f a n t r y and a r m o r c o u l d n o t make r a p i d o p e r a t i o n a l changes.

fhi

T h i s was a s e v e r e h a n d i c a p f o r a tzs:r.

whose h a l l m a r k . s h o u l d h a v e b e e n f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e f a c e o f changing t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s .

The c o l l o c a t i o n of t h e a r m r

and i n f a n t r y l e a d e r s on t a c t i c a l v e h i c l e s h e l p e d c 3 s 6 t k i s p r o b l e s somewhat, b u t a l s o t i e d t h e i n f a n t r y l e a j a r t c . :k.: t a n k ' s r a d i o when h e s h o u l d h a v e been l e a d i n g h i s s o l ? i r r . c . Commanders a t a l l l e v e l s r e l i e d cn t h e t x k ' s

:.?.,?ii.

?I'

communicate w h i c h d i s s i p a t e d combat power n e e d e d i z ~ c l o i e combat. The power and f l e x i b i l i t y cf t k e t a n k . 2 c ~ c ! ! : ' r n d ? tar.ks i n v a l u a b l e t o t h e exchange o f v i t a : information. conbzt i:;ter:.e::.r-

T h i s i n t u r n allowed then t o b>Uii.liiy

t o gain t a c t i c a l advantage.

-107-

V i s u a l s i g n a l s became a n a r t f o r m t o c o m p e n s a t e fo:.
t h e weakness of t a c t i c a l r a d i o s .

The

u s e o f narlcer p a n e l s

and t r a c e r ammunition t o p r o v i d e t h e accompanying t a x i t s i n f o r m a t i o n o f w h e r e f i r e was r e q u i r e d i n c r e a s e d combat efficiency.

In t h i s c a s e t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e t a c t i c a l

r a d i o s e n h a n c e d combat p e r f o r m a n c e by f o r c i n g t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team t o c l o s e l y c o o r d i n a t e s i g n a l s and actions prior t o contact. The v a r i e t y o f v i s u a l s i g n a l s and t h e ad hoc c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m s w e r e c o o r d i n a t e d and c o n s t r u c t e d p r i o r t o each a c t i o n . H a b i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n and i t s a b i l i t y

t o c r e a t e c o h e s i o n , , m u t u a l c o n f i d e n c e , and a s t a c d i n g operating procedure, d i d not occur.

The r e a s o n f o r t h i s c z r

b e d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n s u f f i c i e n t number of t s n k r a v a i l a b l e , p o o r a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g , zn3 t h e f a i 1 ~ 1 1 ' e' ~ f s e n i o r l e a d e r s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e combat m u l t i p l i e r whi8:P. b e d e r i v e d f r o m u n i t - w h i c h t r a i n a n d fight tog;e:hor.

' 2 3 ~

-108-

CHAPTER 5

DOCTRINAL GARDENS
L o o k i n g a b o u t t h e Army t o d a y , ona s e e s
b a t t a l i o n s o f s t a f f o f f i c e r s whose d u t y r e q u i r e s them t o t e n d v a r i o u s d o c t r i n a l gardens. 1 Dr. Roger S p i l l e r T h i s t h e s i s r e s o l v e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a b i l i t y cP t h ? U n i t e d S t a t e s Army t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e l e s s o n s o f h i s t o r y i n t h e development of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e . N e c e s s a r y t o t h i s o b j e c t i v e was a
C?E.BP

c!?finit.i.r.r. :I?

d o c t r i n e and t h o s e f a c t o r s w h i c h make d o c t r i n e m e s n i z g f . : l .

I n seeking t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , s e v e r a l enduring ;roblems

s u r f a c e d t h a t s l a g u e b o t h t h e a r m o r - i n f a z t r y :earn Korean Wsr and t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team f a c i n g +.k,? implementation of A i r l a n d B a t t l e . T h e r e a p p e a r t o b e many d i f f e r e n t i n t o i - ~ r e t a t i . ~ n ,:Fc t h e m e a n i n g and p u r p o s e o f d o c t r i n e .
r h 3 r 3c t e r i z a t i o n c o L' t en f a i 1 t.o

.;f

!he

These
ai!i? r L r.E;
8+81'.3$

XI equ B t e I y
A ripcrous

-..i ':a l
:f

concepts i n t r i n z i c t o doctrine.

m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e p r o d u c e d e n d l e s s a2h:ris-z

akic?.
?i:

d e z c r i b e t i l e c b a r s ~ t e r i s t i c so f , : o c t r i n i ,

but

n c t ,dcfi?-:

- 109-

it.

The S c h o o l f o r Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s l i s t s no l e c s

t h a n e i g h t e e n d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n e of d o c t r i n e i z t h e i r

1989 g l o s s a r y of t h e o r e t i c a l t e r m s .

Included i n t h i s list

i s a d e s c r i p t i o n f o u n d i n t h e 1986, FN 100-5, Qoerati.. , . .-

.-

An armys f u n d a m e n t a l d o c t r i n e is t h e . condensed e x p r e s s i o n of its approach t c f i g h t i n g campaigns, m a j o r o p e r a t i o n s ,

b a t t l e s , and e n g a g e m e n t s . T a c t i c s , techniques, procedures, organizations, s u p p o r t s t r u c t u r e , e q u i p m e n t , and t r a i n i n g must a l l d e r i v e f r o m i t . I+, must be rooted i n timetested theories and p r i n c i p l e s , y e t f o r w a r d l o o k i n g and a d a p t a b l e t o changing t e c h n o l o s i e s , t h r e a t s , and m i s s i o n s . I t m u s t b e d e f i n i t i v e enough t o g u i d e o p e r a t i o n s , y e t v e r s a t i l e e n o u g h t o accommodate 3 w i d e v a r i e t y of w o r l d s i t u a t i s n s . F i n a l l y , t o b e u s e f u l , d o c t r l n e m u s t be uniformly understood.3 F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s t u d y , t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n ,zr^ d c c t r i n e s e r v e d t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g ~f b :~:-. g e n e r a l d o c t r i n e and a z m o r - i n f a n t r y d 0 c t r i r . s .
E-i*r. z ? ; : .

c o n p l e x and r o b u s t d e f i r . i t i o n f a i l s i n s e v e r a l i z ;: r : x : a s p e c t s and shows how d o c t r i n e r ~ s i ~ 2te s finTtion The d e s c r i p t i o n of t a c t i c s , tei!!?r.iqw?E, 2 r f i c d : r e z

I

o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s u p p o r t s t r u c t u r e s , equipment, a n 3 t ~ z : z - z & ,
3s

. .

d e r i v a t i c n s of doctrine is inaccurate.

O o c t r i n e h3z

alsc: e v o l v e d as a r e s u l t o f S e c h n c l o g i c a l s d v z r . c e s .:x! tt;. a n a l y s i s o f m i t p e r f o r m a n c e s a t t h e N a t i o n a l Trcini:-,g Center. -110-

T e c h n o l o g y h a s i n f l u e n c e d d o c t r i n e by g i v i z g .*ea>.znc s y s t e m s e x t s n d e d r a n g e and l e t h a i i t y . For example, t h e

i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e t h e r m a l i m a g i n g f i r e c o n t r o l s y c t a n ; ir. t h e M 1 t a n k has d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e d t h e a b i l i t y o f tack c r e w s t o a q u i r e and d e s t r o y t a r g e t s d u r i n g l i m i t e d visibility. T e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s c r e a t e two e f f e c t s w h i p ! ?

d i r e c t l y impact d o c t r i n e .

In t h e f i r s t e f f e c t method- '2f

employment m u s t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o d o c t r i n e t ? c c z n t - r tj:e t e c h n o l o g i c a l advance. The s e c o n d e f f e c t i s t h e d u v = l o p m s r t

of m e t h o d s o f employment t o c a p i t a l i z e o n t h e advantage:: t h a t technology h a s given m i l i t a r y organizations. c a s e s technology has forced changes i n d o c t r i n e . S i n c e t r a i n i n g o p e r a t i o n s began a t t h e N a t i c r . a l T r a i n i n g C e n t e r u n i t s have s e a r c h e d f o r methods t o d a f e s t I:. k , o t h

0PFC)R u n i t s .

E a r l y a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e d t?,at

:!!+

OPFO9's u s e o f r e o o n n a i s a n c e was one o f t h e x s j o r .

c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o : d e f e a t thei:, apacnenta. R e c o g n i z i n g t h i s , subsequent s z i t s ~ L d c e . . ! " . - . . . - .. .,L .
~

e m p h a s i s o n c c u n t e r - r e c o n n a i s a n c e a 2 t i o r . s t~ d e n y tl;i OPF7P v i t a l Information.

T ., h i s new e m p h a s i s c r e s t a d fiaw - ' - , * + * . : - A : . ' :

a n d ~ r g a n i z a t i o n st o d e a l w i t h t h e t h r e a t . ! ' n i t

z!:.:r,:?:-,:

and w e a k n e s s e s d i s c o v e r e d d u r i n g t h i s s a a o i a l i::ii:-.<:.,; a c t i v i t y , have d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e d d z c t r i n e .

-111-

F o r c e n o d e r n i z a t i o n a l s o impacte on t h e e v o l u t i a r . of doctrine. The l o n g l e a d - t i m e r e q u i r e d t o p r o c u r e and fi;l.:

s y s t e m s o f t e n r e s u l t s i n an ariny u n z b l e t c irnplsment , d o c t r i n a l c o n c e p t s because t h e equipment r e q s i r e d t m z nske them work a r e n o t i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e s o l d i e r . F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , f a c t o r s w h i c h a r e d e s c r i b e d as d e r i v a t i o n s of d o c t r i n e a r e i n f a c t i n t r i n s i c t c i t . d o c t r i n e is t h e k e y s t o n e upon w h i c h s y s t e m s o f war

928

Whil?

b u i l t , t h e s y s t a m s p o s s e s s a f e e d b a c k l o o p w h i c h can u l t i m a t e l y c a u s e t h e e v o l u t i o n o f o r e v e n c r e a t e nex doctrine. A n o t h e r weakr.esa o f t h e d a f i n i t i o n is t k a t i t =c:izIic-r.s d o c t r i n e as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n t h e d e v e l o p n e n t o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t a c t i c s and e q u i p m e n t . p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l r e a l i t i e s . This focus ig?.~res

Acc*atin," t h e s e r e z i i t i c . :

o p e n s d o c t r i n e t o t h e i n f l u e n c e o f e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s wh;ch
a r e o f t e n n o t under t h e d i r e c t c o n t r o l of t h e m i l i t z r y .

T h i s can c r e s t e s i g n i f i c s n t dilemmas which

r n I J s t

bs r e : . ~ l ~ ? <

p r i o r t o t h e commitment o f t r o J p s t o c o m b a t .
The most s i g n i f i c a n t o f thes;e e x t e r n a l f a : t z r z

i; t ? . ~

military budget.

Sudgets a r e determined by

lczg

~YC!,LC,~,Z

p o l i t i c a l process.

F o l i t i c a ? and n a t i s n a ? s s c u - i t y

c s m p r o m i s e s h a v e h i s t o r i c a l l y r e s u l t e d i n a c r e m i s z i : . n s :k?.c resources.

T h e end r e s u l t o f t h i s r e s u u r c e and

mzey

-112-

m i s m a t c h is an a t t e m p t by t h e m i l i t a r y t o f i n d some mann:'r t o d e c r e a s e t h e c o s t of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s t a n d i n g Arey. T h r e e f a c t o r s compete f o r c o n s t r a i n e d r e s c u r c e s . T.C.ese

f a c t o r s a r e p e r s o n n e l , e x i s t i n g f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and e q u i p m e n t , and t h e r e s e a r c h and d e v e l o p m e n t o f f u t u r e f o r c e

s t r u c t u r e s and e q u i p m e n t .

When t h e b u d g e t is a u s t e r e , a : ?

t h r e e f a c t o r s have f a c e d c u t - b a c k s . When f a c i n g t h e s p e c t r e o f r e d u c e d b u d g e t s t h e m i s t i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a n y c h a n g e t o t h e Army p e r s c z n e l s t r e n g t h , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , u r programmed m o d e r n i z a t i o n muz: t h e i m p a c t t h a t t h e s e c h a n g e s h a v e on d o c t r i n e .

55
:.

* a :.l u r e 2

c o n s i d e r t h e s e f a c t o r s unhinge planned a c t i o n s cn t k e b a t t l e f i e l d and c r e a t e s a h o l l o w army u n a b l e t o implement d o c t r i n e when c a l l e d u p u n t o d o so. D o c t r i n e a l s o i n c l u d e s t h e p e r s o n n e l rsglsoemerit s y s t e m which g i v e s l i f e b l o o d t o t h e f i g h t i n g f c r c e s . d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e s t h e complex i n t e r s c t i o c Setweer; x:r.:.r i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s , an i n t e r a c t i o n w h i c h is
?.?&':

. " r

xr::!

5::::

. :

m u t u a l t r u s t and c o n f i d e n c e , t h e n c a p r i c i o u s r?aesigr!ae-: withcgt regard t o t h e s e f a c t o r s i n v i t e s pcor ccnbnt p e r f o r m a n c s and i n c r e a s e d c a s u a l t i e s . D c c t r i n s is n u t j u s t a f i g h t i n g c o n c e p t .

'gi:!;~:?

o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e f i e l d t o iinplement t h s i l o c t r i r , r

.^

-113-

s u p p o r t s y s t e m s a l s o d e s i g n e d t o s u s t a i n i t , d o c t r i n e is n o t o n l y u s e l e s s , i t is dangerous. The l a s t s e n t e n c e of t h e 1936 d e f i n i t i o n o f d o c t r i - e

i n FM 100-5, Oaeratiuns, r e a d s , " F i n a l l y , t o b e u s e f u l ,

d o c t r i n e must be uniformly understood." This sentence

i d e n t i f i e s one of t h e major p r c b l e m s i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n

o f any d o c t r i n e . 4
The d e f i n i t i o n and a r t i c u l a t i o n of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e t h r o u g h o u t t h e Army h a s b e e n g e n e r a l l y u n i f o r m .

I n s p i t e of t h i s r e l a t i v e l y uniform a p p l i c a t i o n , a l e a d e r . ; .
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d o c t r i n e d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y f r o m t h a t which
is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e Army s c h o o l s .

T h i s dichotsmy breeds Twu

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and a d d s n e e d l e s s f r i c t i o n t o war..

b a t t a l i o n commanders who f o u g h t i n K o r e a e x e m p l i f y t h i s d i c h o t o m y when t h e y d e s c r i b e d t h e i r combat e x g e r i e n s e z i n

t h i s manner:

The b a t t a l i o n i n a l l c a s e s f o l l ~ w r ;:.lie f i e l d manuals. W e operate these t a n k - i n f a n t r y t e a m s e x a c t l y as t a u g h t a t t h e Armor S c h o o l . Lieutenant Colonel Charles Turner T a n k - i n f a n t r y teamwork i n K o r e a i s v e r y , d i f f i c u l t t o d * f i n e , a s i t does n o t f o l l o w t h e d e f i n i t i o n s fcund i n t h e t a x t CJP e i t h e r t h e Armored o r t h e I n f o n t r y School. 5 L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l J3t:n Woods

-114-

These two combat l e a d e r s f o u g h t i n t h e same w a r , a g a i n s t t h e same enemy, w i t h t h e same s o l d i e r s , and y e t t!.?y

have a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how t h e d o c t r i r s t h e y were t a u g h t , a p p l i e d t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . B o t h men were wrong. Armcr-infantry d o c t r i n e as

a p p l i e d t o t h e Korean b a t t l e f i e l d began a s a h a z y rememberance by World War I1 v e t e r a n s mixed w i t t l e a d e r s f r e s h from d o c t r i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n i n Army s c h o o l s . p e r c e p t i o n s o f how d o c t r i n e a p p l i e d t o t h e i r c o n b s t e x p e r i e n c e s is i m p o r t a n t d u e t o i t s i m p a c t on t h e i r f u t u r e a c t i o n s a s combat l e a d e r s . Their

T h e Army m u s t a v o i d t h e c r e a t i . J n

of n u m b e r l e s s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n a . I d e a l l y , sound d o c t r i n e is b a s e d on p r o v e n m i l i t a r y p u r c h a s e d w i t h l i v e s o f American s o l d i e r s .
C O R C ~ ~ ~ S

D o c t r i n e 2nd
1::

m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y h e l p a v o i d r e l e a r n i n g t h o s e scinr Iss:::~r!i:
some new b a t t l e f i e l d .

F a i l u r e t o u n d e r s t a n d d o c t r i n e at. : : I 1 r e c u r r i c g theme d u r i n g t h e Korean War.

lev+:a

'r:zs 2

Recopci;ins

thi) r:5-,2

t o g e t b a c k t o b a s i c s , G e n e r a l .J. Lawton C o i l i n s , Aray # ? h i + ?

of S t a f f , p u b l i s h e d a raview of t h e ftJndamentsis
'3?

rn:?.11

u n i t s t t n o k ( d o c t r i n e and t h e r e a s 3 n s b e h i n d t k e s e
prin.?ipies.

T h i s a r t i c l e b y t h e s e n i o r s o l d i e r cif t k i ) A?:?:i s n s a d commentary on wki:t

'h? A:-:ny

on small u n i t d o c t r i c a ,

was f o r c e d

t3

r e l e a r n a s a r e s u l t cf t h e Rorear. Wsr."

-115-

R e l e a r n i n g b a s i c a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d was a d d r e s s e d b y a Korean War t a n k b a t t a l i o n commander s a y i n g : L e s s o n s f r o m K o r e a would i n d i c a t e t h a t when we d e p a r t f r o m t h e norms i n o p e r a t i o n s , we t e n d t o d i s c a r d p r o v e n doctrines, t o our d i s c r e d i t . E a t t e r t h a t we r e a l i z e t h a t o u r d o c t r i n e s a r e s o u n d and e f f e c t i v e , a n d t h a t t h e d e g r e e o f o u r s u c c e s s is d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e amount o f e f f o r t we e x p e n d i n t h e l r application in the l e s s favorable c o n d i t i o n s we f i n d i n K o r e a . ' L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Elmer R e s g o r G e n e r a l Hodge, Commander o f t h e Army F i e l d F o r c e 5 d u r i n g t h e K o r e a n War, a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t I i s r e s n W 2 . r f a i l u r e s c o u l d b e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n a b i l i t y of m i t leaders t o c o r r e c t l y apply d o c t r i n e .
lie w r c t s :

Many o f t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s a r e n r ~ t p e c u l i a r t o K o r e a - - t h e y c a n b e Coszif I n h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s f r o n : World W Z Y I a n d Wcrld War I I . W e a r e stlll x i k i n 2 m i s t a k e s t h a t a r e 35 y e s r s c l d . 8 R e c o g n i t i o n of u n n e c c e s s a r y r e l e a r n i n g .:f d c c t r i n e r e s u l t e d i n a n e w a w a r e n e s s of 't..?

Snsic

r e q n i r e r e n t t: !(hi:+
~

l e a r n and p r a c t i c e h a r d - e a r n e d c o m b a t l e s s c n s .

the

, c e n t r a l i s s G e o f what i s

9 3 : 3 .

resent d c f o ~ t r i ~TeS

z c t . or\z.!.:;
X:?

be m s w e r e d . Korea c r e a t e d

c o c c e n s u s t h a t 2,::ctrir.e

:+

c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r s t u c d a t a l l l e v e l s 9f Army l e a d e r s h i : -116-

F u r t h e r , d o c t r i n e m u s t b e p r a c t i c e d t o p r e v e n t a more c o s t l y i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . L e a d e r s a r e t h e m o s t damaging " i n s e c t s " i n t h e d o c t r i n a l garden.

D u r i n g t h e Korean War, l e a d e r s a:

the

r e g i m e n t a l combat team and h i g h e r l e v e l s f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y u n d e r s t a n d o r implement d o c t r i n e . L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Almond i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f T a s k F o r c e G e r h a r d t , and C o l o n e l Crombez i n t h e o r g a n i s a t i . 3 : ;

: I

Task F o r c e Crombez, f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s
and l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m . They c r g ~ r . i z a 2

and l e d f o r m a t i o n s i n an e x p e d i e n t , a d hoc m a n n e r . c r e a t i o n o f u n i t s which r e q u i r e d m u t u a l t x s t aad

The

confidence, often while in contact w i t h the enesy, resulted

i n u n e c c e s s a r y c a s u a l t i e s and p o o r c o n b a t p a r f o r m a n c s .
A s e c . > n d f a i l u r e o f t!:e rjoctrinal "ins$,-ts"
is
t.i-='-

"..___
. ,

f a i l u r e t o c o n s t r u c t s y s t e m s n e c e s s a r y t o -Listair. d:;c:rixF:. An e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e o f t h i s i s t h e inpact

1 : 1 f

the

LR:..Y~#Z.J:.

,.

r e p l a c e m e n t s y s t e m on a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e tdl:r:ng Korean War.

<k+

A r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e , a s pt-evi,.ii~s:y s',ate.rl.
'.h? . % r w r 3 : . ..I

i s b a s e d ton t h e mutiial t r u s t a n d c o n f i d e n c e o f

i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s i n t h e team.

T h i s ccnfiden-e

shn:?l? ! ? ? ~ e

been S a i l t t h r o u g h i n t e g r a t e d t r a i n i n g and s t e r l t + d b y ? t m t : s* experience. I n d i v i d u s l r e p l s c e m e n t s w h i c h a r r i v e , ? i n Ic.o?e~

7,-

o f t e n g a i n e d t h e i r f i r s t e x p e r i e n c e w i t h tank.? j l i c t g r i , : j r

-117-

enemy c o n t a c t .

R e q u i r i n g raw s o l d i e r s t o l e a r n t.he G s c i c

l e s s o n s o f s u r v i v a l i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e complex a c t i o n s sf t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a m , again w h i l e i n c 3 n t s c t w i t h t h e enemy, o f t e n f a i l e d and c e r t a i n l y d e c r e a s e d combat effectiveness.

This p r o b l e m is n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e American
I t a l s o o c c u r r e d i n World War I1 and

experience i n Korea.

again i n Vietnam.
If t h e f i s l d commander u p d e r s t o o d a r m o r - i n f a n t r y
d o c t r i n e and b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e d combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f an a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e s n was s i g n i f i z a n t . t h e n t h e system would h a v e c h a n g e d . I n f a n t r y replacemuztz

could h a v e u n d e r g o n e t r a i n i n g w i t h tanks i n t h e L'n5te.i States. F a i l i n g t h i s , infantrymen could have undergcne s z z e

_.

t y p e o f a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g upon a r r i v e 1 i n t h e ccx.035 zcne. H i g h c a s u a l t y r a t e s and a war t h s t r a g i d l y t ~ r ? . ? : :,I p o s i t i o n a l w a r f a r e , made t h e t r a i n i n 2 of new z o l d i ; . : . ~ I : . s r m n r - i n f a n t r y d s c z r i n i more d i f f i c u l t .

T h e s e p r c t 1s:~;;

a p p a r e n t l y overcame any a t t e m p t t o d a v e l o p a t r a i z i n g Frogram f o r t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team.

I n s p i t e 3f tbhe c o r . f u r i o r . and v a r i e r ? viewpoint::

t h e h i g h e r l e v e l s o f d o c t r i n e , a r m o r - i n f a n t r y ,i~c::ir..:

1 :

oi

-.

more p r a c t i c a l l e v e l r e m a i n s c l e a r sr,d c o n c i s e and peri-:sc.z z o r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e s e r v i n g o Y P i z e r U P tommorrow.

Examining the evolution of armor-infantry d c c t r i n e

from 1 9 4 1 t h r o u g h 1 9 5 0 , r e v e a l s c h a n g e g e n e r a t e d b y c . m b s t experience. infancy. I n 1941, a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e was i n it::

T h i s i m m a t u r i t y c a n b e s e e n i n t h e s e p a r a t i o r ; of

i n f a n t r y and a r m o r o p e r a t i o n s i n t o e c h e l o n s d e s i g n e d t o achieve s p e c i f i c tasks.

I n t h e c r u c i b l e o f war, t h e s e

e c h e l o n s w e r e f o u n d t o b e u s e l e s s i n t h e m a e l s t r o m of combat and a more i n t e g r a t e d a p p r o a c h a p p e a r e d . Ccmbat d u r i n s

World War I1 r e v e a l e d t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y n a t u r e o f t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. Combat r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t

r e g a r d l e s s of t h e t e r r a i n and t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , t h a t l e a d e r s #demanded, b u i l t and s u s t a i n e d a r m o r - i n f a n t r y : e s m : .

T h e s e demands r e s u l t e d i n recommenda=ions t o c h a n g e t h e
o r g a n i z a t i o n s which c c n s t i t u t e d t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y t e a r . I n t r i n s i c t o t h e s e c h a n g e s was t h e p o s t - w a r c r e a t i . : ? , : . f
5

t a r . k company which became o r g a n i c t o t h e i n f a n t r y re$i&s"L..

T h i s company p r o v i d e d a b a s i s

UPGC

which t h e

' -? . ?. f'2 5 : Yy r e g imen t a 1 connand e r c o c I d b u i I d 3 n e f f c c t i v e ?.r mc i

team.

T h i s team a l s o b e n e f i t e d from h a b i t u a l rel:tti:;nz:::;z

..

and i n t e g r a t e d t r a i n i n g which an c.rpsrri8: t a n k #ccmp:.r.y

sl:owed.

These same advnztages

WBCC-

also

raziizt:! 7.t

:he

.r!ivlsion leva!

b y t a k i n g World W e r 11, Gezeral I!+~.drj~~?:t+:.:

t a n k b a t t a l i o n s , and making them o r g a n i c to infar.t:p divisions.

-119-

F o l l o w i n g t h e Korean War, Army o r g a n i z a t i o n s x e n t t h r o u g h numerous c h a n g e s t o keep p a c e w i t h t h e evo1vlr.g t h r e a t and a d v a n c e s i n t e c h n o l o g y . armor-infantry The o r g a n i z a t i o n cf t h e

team h a s a l s o e v o l v e d , and i n some c a s e s h3z

gone f u l l c i r c l e .

The combined arms t a s k f o r c e , o r g i n a l l y

r e j e c t e d as t o o c o s t l y b y t h e G e n e r a l E o a r d o f t h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , i s p r e s e n t l y in u s e b y t h e 1st C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n a t F o r t Hood, T e x a s . The t a n k b a t t a l i o n and i n f a n t r y b a z t s l i c r .

of o n e b r i g a d e a r e o r g a n i z e d i n t o two p e r m a n e n t tssli f o r c e E , e a c h w i t h two o r g a n i c t a n k and i n f a n t r y c o m p a n i e s .

Recent

t e s t s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e was i n - r e a s e d . . u n i t e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s f o s t e r e d by t h e t z a ~ r . i n g
and h a b i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n o f t h e c o m p a n i e s w i t h i n t h e task forces .a
, b -a r e f u l s t a d y s f s r n o r - i n f a n t r y

.:!octrini.; f x c ; 1 7 4 1

t h r o u g h 1352 h a s r e v e a l e d s u b s t a n t i a l chan&'rs i n a r m f i r - i n f a n t r y d o c t r i n e b a s e d on t h e l e s s c ? s ;f history.

r.Lli?:t:y

Imp 1i c a t i on s

-120-

something of a p r o p h e t . p e r i o d i c a l he w r o t e ,

I n an a r t i c l e f o r a m i l l t a r y

The s i t u a t i o n t h a t we f a c e now i n K o r e a we w i l l u n d o u b t e d l y f a c e a g a i n i n g u e r r i l a i n f e s t e d a r e a s , and well may h a v e t o f a c e again i n b a t t l e = g a i n s t an enemy who makes u n s t i n t e d use of g r e a t s u p p l i e s o f manpower.ln
! : ; . L i e u t e n a n t T i l s o n ' s i m p l i c a t i o n s were r c a i i z e d ir. t

q u a g m i r e o f Vietnam and h a s a h i g h p r o b e b i l i t y r>f re:,eatin," themselves i n f u t u r e c o n f l i c t s . Most r e l e v a n t t o f u t u r e c o n f l i c t s i s t h e c o n t e x r i : which t h e Kurean War was f o u g h t and i t s d i r e c t i n a a c t cr. :!:e armor-infantry team.
stit!:

T h e Korean War was f o u g h t i n a backward c o u n t r y

t e r r a i n i n h o s p i t a b l e t o mechanized w a r f a r e .
?artk5r,

t!!?
khe

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of t h e c o u n t r y g e n e r a l i y d i d n c t . s:;~;'>?: movement of a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s o f f t h e inair; c:,ghxzyz. a d d i t i o r . t o t h e pcdr road n e t , n a i c t e n z n z e

:epzir

..

T:;

f a c i l i t i e s f o r m e c h a n i z e d and w h e e l e d v a h i z i a s w e r ? v i r t u a l l y n c ~ n - e x i s t a n t . Tha r e p e r c u s s i o n s
dp.

J?

the-?

f:c::>r:

v e h i c : i e o p e r a t i o n a l r e a d i n e s s is a k v i o c s .

Any ? . I ! ? . . :

e l e m e n t c o m m i t t e d t o S o u t h o r C e n t r a l A m e r i c a , c , r . 4 f ? i . : a . 2s a p a r t sf t h e n r s o r - i n f a r : t r y same s i t u a t i o n . tezm w i l l t s a l j c d i:. :ci:-,h

-?::

L e s s o n s l e a r n e d i n t h e p ? m n i n g >:.?2
rf

movement. and t h e m n i n t e n a n c e o f v e h i c i e c zr.d e,;::i;r~ec!,

-121-

t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team, need n o t be r e l e a r n e d . a l r e a d y e x i s t i n a Korean War p r i m e r .

The 1esssr.s

A s e c o n d a s p e c t o f c o n t e x t i s t h e uni-,ue I c o x b i n s t i c n

o f i n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d s o l d i e r s w h i c h f o r m e d t h e a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team. The i n f a n t r y u n i t s employed i n t h e

a r h a v e d i r e c t c o u n t e r p a r t s i n t h e l i g h t and Korean W
a i r b o r n e d i v i s i c r n s of t o d a y s a r m y . The r e c e n t i n c r e a s e ir.

t h e number of l i g h t i n f a n t r y o r p s n i z a t i o n s i n t h e A:r.y, i n c r e a s e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h o s e f o r c e s w i l l t e e!nplo;T+? i n g e o g r a p h i c a r e a s w h i c h h a v e a l r e a d y been d e s c r i b e d . H i s t o r y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e commitment of American i n f a n t r y combat w i l l r e s u l t i n s n a c c o m p a n i m e n t by n r n o r and artiIlery units.
5:-

I t is h e r e t h a t t h e Korean War h s s a
F u t u r e employment o f ? i % h t i n f a n t , r y
tki?

special significance.

and a r m o r f o r m a t i o n s csn l o c k t o t h e c o x b a t i e s s o r : z c f armor-infantry

lesscns

team i n K o r e a and a v o i d : e ? ? ~ . r n i ? g x s t : y Specia: czmmand 2nd ccr.tro1 ~r.:,:eI.::.~r. i z K < c r e ~ .:::,!~l:! 5.:

i n zombat.

w h i c h model t h e m s e l v e s a f t e r t h o s e - s a d

c f s p e c i a l v a l u e t o t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y m a n :>f t h e f u t u : c . Means ,2f tx:.$et d e s i g n a t i o n , and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t :?

.;!:!!

s t a n d i n g operating p r o c e d u r e s , s h o ~ l dn o t t e d.-ci~Je.: : c < ! ~ : enemy f i r e and h a v e a l r e s d y S e e n s d d r a s s e c ! Sy Azcrl;:sr. s o l d i e r s d u r i n g t h e Korean War.

- 122-

T e c h n o l o g i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e s i n to-lap'z: f o r c e s may m3!ce t h e m e t h o d s o f t h e Korear. War o b s ; l l e t e ir:

many ways.

When t e c h n o l o g y f a i l s and b e c o x e s i n e f f e i t i v c ,
3 .r. !:I

and c a s u a l t i e s r e n d e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s b a s i c i n s t r i l z t u r e

m i s s i o n , t h e n combat l e s s o n s o f t h e Korean War c o u l d b e c c m e a bedrock of p r a c t i c a l , proven a r m o r - i n f a n t r y d s c t r i n ? .

Cunclusion

The Korean w a r n e v e r e n d e d .

AR a r m i s t i c e wa:

siz:.sj,

b u t American a r m o r e d and i n f a n t r y s o l i i e r s m s i n t s i r . t h e l z
v i g i l i n t h e l a n d o f t h e Morning C a l m .

A u t h c r s ?..ave

c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e s t r u g g l e t h e r e as "The F o r g o t t e n Ysr". 5 ~ : t h a t is n o t t r u e . Whaf o c c u r r e d t h e r e is remembere:!

tC.::::,$.C.
':

t h e e v o l u t i o n o f a r n a r - i n f a n t r y d u c t r i ~ e3r.d .:.r'e c f f i - . . r - 1
5j.l;sdy.

-123-

CFAFTER 0 Y E EYDNOTEC

1. The p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a r m o r - i n f a n t r y c a e r z t i c n s d i s c u s s e d h e r e w e r e p a r t o f an i n t e r v i e w w i t : ? CSM J o e O f f u t t on 8 F e b u a r y 1 9 8 9 . CSM O P f u t t

d e p l o y e d w i t h A Company, 7 3 r d Tank E s t t a l i c r : frc:?, F o r t B e n n i n g , G e o r g i a , t o K o r e a i n August o f 1950. CSM O f f u t t s e r v e d in a l l c r e w p . ; l z i t i o r . c I r , s c p p o r t c f i n f a n t r y , o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e s s s i g r e c i tc X C o r p s . ge t o o k ? a r t i n t h e d e f e n s e ;sP t h e P u s a n P e r i m e t e r , t h o landing a t I n c h c n , t h ? e v a c u a t i o r . a t Hungnam, and s e v e r a l c t > , e z ?.cti::-.z. S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Army Gordon G r a y , Gray on t h e R e c o r d , & U L red C a , J a l r v ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1 9 5 0 ) : 13.
I*

*I

zecret3i"y
T g 1 - u
i E 3

3.
4.

Clay B l a i r , G r a y : 13. Ibid.

+P

(1397):

50.

5.
6.

B l a i r : 59

7 . Gray: 13.

".
0

Paul H. s e r b e r t , & h L a
rmal
pf
DM

W
100 - 5 . Ooe

F . 3epuv

, m4

3-c

t,;

+ ITe , ?_ 7C C.. . _ .,

'-2 I T

.-r:,.

?.I:&:-.-

( 1 9 8 4 ) : 33.

9.

U.S. Army,
3 r 7 .

L U
i l '

P s m o h l e t zn-?gc,
> .

TS
6 ! 7 !

-I+

12.

C h a z l a s A. b l i l l o t y , U&..eurtr ,

i n #*.- ( I ? : : : :

yr<_ +:-4 f ( ;:255 :, ; 1 ,

1.

2.

R o b e r t A . D o u g h t y , Toe Evo-. OP T - ~,t; D o c t r i n e . 1946-1976 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 2; U n i t e d S t a t e s . War D e p a r t m e n t , " R e p o r t o f tk-s War E q u i p m e n t B o a r d " ( 1 3 4 6 ) : 1 0 ; @mar E!:adle;. L e t t e r s t o t h e e d i t o r , Militsrv "P'LFZEL (May 1 9 4 9 ) : 3 - 6 .

4.

J. Lawton C o l l i n s , hlsr
nc: n f

i" p

t . m e : TL,@ w (1989): 37.

5.

U n i t e d S t a t e s . War D e p a r t m e n t . " C o n m i t t e e R e p o r t on O f f i c e r - E n l i s t e d Man R e l a t i o n s h i a s " ( 1 9 4 6 ) : 7-30. The r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of t h e D o o l i t t l e Board had p r o f o u n d i m p a c t s on t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n e n ? i s f e d zrc! commissioned o f f i c e r s . S e p a r a t e mezsec, l a t r i n e s , and p a y i n e q u a l i t i e s w e r e a b o l i s - h d . The most s i g n i f i c a n t recommendation was t:: a b o l i s h t h e A r t i c l e s o f War and r e p l a c e t h s E w i t h t h e Manual f o r C o u r t s M a r t i a l . m . h i s ina.-.uzl is t h e b a s i s of t o d a y ' s m i l i t a r y j u s t i c e s y s t e r . .

6
7.

T . R . F e h r e n b a c h , 2 h i s J j d c f #ar: A (1963): 39.

Maurice H a t l o f f , e d i t o r , t!istorv ( 1 3 6 9 ) : 540.
,.7

C , t \ . k

. .

+ow,

3 3
10.
11.

R . E . 9 e p u y and T . N . Depuy, U c y : l c r ? d i s t o r v (1377): 1 2 R 5 .

M a t l o f f : 542; Alexander Bevin, t . & W s p !qe L o c t ( 1 3 3 6 ) : -12, Pehrenbaoh: 13.

U . 5 . Army, E L 4 10"-5
I

' h 1 7 : 52

, .

Fip1-l

yE.r"i,*e

-.&:

--L - -d -,

t:7

(194:):

I-IV.

12. 13.
1.1 .

I b i c l . : 5-6

I b i d . : 7-5.

TSi?.: 1 4 .
I b i i . : 25?.
Ibic!.
:

15.

16.

2?8-28@

18.
13,

V.S. Army, EII 100- 5 . F i e l d S e r v i c e Ooerations (1944): 8-11.

I b i d . : 307. I b i d . : 310. I b i d . : 313-315.

-&=

20.
21.

22.

Army, P M 17-35. a m ~ ; l l o v ~ g lf t T & p i t h Infsntrv ( 1 3 4 4 ) : I. The p r o p o n e E c y f - r t h i s manual r e s t e d w i t h t h e A r n o r S c h o o l . T!;e d i s s e m i n a t i o n of t h e i n f o r n s t i o n i n t h i s mw.c?.l t o o f f i c e r s a t t e n d i r . g t r a i n i n g a t P o r t Een3in.z i r : n o t documented. For t h i s r e a s o n Arnor c f f i c e r s appeared t o have a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a r m o r - i n f a n t r y team d o c t r i n e t h a n t h e i r i n f s n t r y counterparts.
U.S.

23. 24
2:.
26.

U.S. Army,
pf

-L

4.1 L .

Tank,c. w1t.h

InPantrv

F M 1 7 -36 q J & = + (1944): 3 7 - 6 5 .

U.S. Army, P M 1 0 0- 5. F i n l d S c r v i c p R -r 2 ODersticns (1949): 6 - 7 .

I b i d . : 256-265. I b i d . : 260.
. ++-::--, .,.I?.. A r n y , FH 7 - ? 0 . T _- c ? .r r :. L gq ~ \ _ . _ I . . 113. T h i s manual .Is0 c s n t s i n s e:<t.e:-.?ivc information f o r u n i t s conducting a n ~ i - i i L h ~ s operations.

27.

U.5.

25.

I b i d . : 113.
Ibid.: :Y-llE.

29.
30

I b i d . : 232. ILJid.
:

31.

15s.
r
c L

32.

C.S. Army.
149-1 5 4 .

D, +

::, .

I
~

LJ,C

L - C . 7 , .

I..

-126-

33.

I b i d . : 292 CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

1.

Roy E . Appleman, S o u t h t o t h e (1961): 4 5 4 . U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. " T y ~ e z o f D i v i s i o n s , P o s t War Army, S t u d y Number 1 7 " ( 1 9 4 6 ) : 1. H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as CARL 13032.17-3. I b i d . : 1. I b i d . : 1. Ibid.: 4 . Ibid.: 8. United S t a t e s . Department of t b e Army. " O r g a n i z a t i o n , E q u i p m e n t , and T a c t . i c a 1 Employment o f t h e I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , S t u d y Number 15" (1346): 7 . H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t z as CARL 1 3 0 3 2 . ~ 5 - 2 . Ibid.
:

2.

3. 4.

5.
6.
7.

3.
9.

7.

Ibid.: 6.
r L . .

10. U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t ~ r t 'k e A r z y . " C c n f e r e n c r C c n c ? a a i o n s fcr t,he A:.::,:r #?-,:. F o . - - . r . Agends" ( 1 3 4 6 ) : 3-21, H e r e a f t e r r e f e r d :,I. zLCARL 1 3 5 4 5 . T b i s r e p o r t is v e r y i n t e r e e t i n : j : : +
~

t o t h e s c o p e of t h e s u b j a c t s nddreasc.l L L c o n f e r e n c e . Tke f o c u s is or; e q 3 i p . n r r . t s z ? '3nc! c f t h e r o o t s o f z u r f a s c i n s t i c n w i t ] : f e c t n i c s l s o l u k i o n z t c m i l i t a r y ;r;bLc.zs.

11.
<-' ..>-I ._. J o n a t h a n M . House, -we: A SL>,-ve" o f qg+,t, r e , + u - v T-,-.L;- - ,L ? <,-,.4 ' . !-Ju,.t"ire. au .-I @ - . s m ' , , . 1.;1.
I_

::.3y

>:i.

CAF.L 1 3 0 3 2 . 1 5 - 2 : 2 ;
CASL ? 3 0 3 2 . 1 7 - 3 : 2 1 .

U C Q Z ~ :147

-127-

14.
1 5 ..

I b i d . : 26. T e r r a n c e J . Gough, 1 c m i s t i e s in tl-.e K r 2r e s n W C l a y S l a i r , T h e Forgolt

(1957) : 2 5 .

16.

17.
18. 19.
20.

J . Lawton C o l l i n s ,
ttiStorv o f

h r

in K o r e a (1369): 7 9 .

. (1337): 4F P e a c e a*: T i &

B l a i r : 23.
Interview w i t h C S M Joe Offutt. Interview with C S M B i l l y Gray.

21.

Blair: 50.
A l e x s n d e r B e v i n , U e a : T 5 G F i U 653x L 9 s t . (1936): 4 6 . John
W t
+

22.
23.

X. Mahon, e d i t o r , I: R U ( 1 %
5.

I :

c-?+

':ix:p,c:

24.

David Bergamini, * a n ' . .

. ,

c .:r

-.

(1971): 1368.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Blair: 49.
I b i d . : 50.
Ibid.:

50.

U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t n e r . t a f t h e A r m y . ''F?;,: r: cf t h e C f f i c e o f t h e C k i e f a f Army Fie:.? F:::?=z:. O b s e r v e r Team t o t h e F a r E a s t !2i:mnam'' C 12'" > : 1-23. t i e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s CARL 1"05?..?. The O b e e r v e r m i e s m ' s v i s i t was v e r y 2 h s j - t x d ti':+ S s s i s upon w h i c h t h e y made t h e i r ,c!e?isior.z is I;::: i n c l u d e d i n tt:? r e p o r t . From t h a i r t r i ; i t i n e r a r y i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e y v i z i + ~ 2 d ? :: . n e a r t h e f r o n t l i n e s and may have r c l i e c ! c . 2 c::."f b r i a f i r . g s t o g a t h e r t h e i r ii,f,>rxztiL:-.. I n t e r v i e w with C S M OPEutt

23.

30.

B l a i r : 2:3.

-128-

31.
32.

I b i d . : 50 U n i t e d S t a t e s . Mar D e p a r t n e n t . " R e p o r t .;f t h e War C e p a r t m e n t Equipment B o a r d " ( 1 9 4 6 ) : 1. H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o 3s CARL ?2!3G0. 1. I b i d . : 47; Ibid.:

33. 34.

13.

CARL 13545: E-4.

I b i d . : 14.

35.
36.
37.

CARL 129EC. 1: l e - 1 . 9 .
CARL 1 3 5 4 5 : E-6; I S i d . : E - 2 1 ; I b i d . : E-37.

38.

Gough: 2 E .
B e v i n : 51; Agpleman: E9.

39.
40. 41. 42. 43.

B l a i r : 50.
I b i d : 50. Appleman: 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 .

Blair: 113.
CHAPTER FO'JE EY3X3TE3

1.

Roy E . Appleman, S o u t h t D ? h e hl L I i . . L ..,- ri . ic t h s (19613: 65.1. Ibid. : YO. I b i d . : 90. IbiJ. I b i d . : 91

og Clap ?.lair, " 2 F ~ 'L -' + e T . .
L.l

? J - ,. . -+L

L .

3.

4.
5.
F. 7.

< %U la \. .,L "?. ,

, .

_ _ _ I .

.*?

Simun Ducstun, W r of t h e 1 9 5 0 - W (1352): 5 .

!=

-129-

S.
9.
10.

Ibid. I n t e r v i e w w i t h CSX O f f u t t ' J n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t Cf t h e Army. " S p e c i a l P r o b l e m s i n t h e Korear. C o n f l i c t " ( 1 9 5 2 ) : 5 6 . H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s CARL 17055.74-2.

11.
12.
13.

E l s i r : 439.
B l a i r : 696.

B l a i r : 693.

14.
15.

Blair: 730.
LTC G e o r g e P i c k e t : , " T a s k P s r . - e C r ~ n b e z.?': C h i p y o n g - n i , " i n Brmpr ( J c l y - A u g u s t lC52): 3 5 ; B l a i r : 700; R u s s e l A . G u g e l a r , e d l t a r , " , 7 in (1979): 1 2 3 .

16. P i c l t e t t : 35; G u e g l e r : 1 2 5 . CFT Earti:. Blumenson a c t u a l l y c c n d c c t e d t h e i n t e r v i e w s

17. :3. Ibid. e l s i r : 706; Gubeler: ? 2 c , E 1 3 i r . ' 5 . 5^ -_ . -.. --, _... ..I- . .. . a c t i s n s cf t h e 5t!i C a v a l r y i- k . zzd : . I ! : i z . r e s e a r c h o f t h e 1st C a v a l r y 3ivisL:r. ? f C l : i = . l a c c o u n t s (of t h e a c t i o 3 . '.'a als.2 c s d e e x t ~ r ~ i ~ . . - i ( . .. u s e o f l e t t e r s and i n t e r v i e w * s o n c l 9 ~ c t e i vit:: _ .. C . E a r r e t t who conmanded L Co:opar.y, 2 r J c = & &-.' : -.. . 5 t h C a v a l r y d c r i z g t'.e .-tt.ac.ic.
-1:

L'-:

B l a i r : 70E.

?.lair: 7 0 7 .
Gugeler: l 2 C .
Gugeler: 129; ? l a i r : 7 r 7 .
Gcg*Ler:

I??,

G u g e l e r : 13C.
Crugeler: 139; E 1 3 i ~7 0 7 .

- 130 -

26. 27.
28.

Cugeler: 130.

B l a i r : 708.
F i c k e t t : 37. G u g a l e r : 127-133,

29.

30,
31.

B l a i r : 708

Blair: 709.
LTC J a m e s F . S c h a b e l , "Ridgway i n K o r e s , e v a (flzy 1 9 6 4 ) : 1 2 .
'I

32.
33. 34.

:-

Appleman: 3 4 7 ; G L g e l a r : 12C; G u g e l e r : 1 2 8 J o s e p h H . Q u i n n , " C a t c h i E g t h e Enemy C f f Gusi-?, i n A.LULC ( J u l y - A u g u s t 1951): 4 3 . B l a i r : 605 U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Ariny. "TzsL: F o r c e G e r h a r d t " ( 1 9 5 2 ) : 1-8. H e r e a f t e r :.sfe:.:.c.-! t o as CARL 1 7 0 5 5 . 6 2 . This r e p o r t o r i g i n a t e d ir. X C o r p s H e a d q u a r t e r s . I t p u r p o r t s t o SLOW s t r o n g , a g g r e s s i v e ' l e a d e r s h i p t o s e i z e sz o p p o r t u n i t y t o take the i n i t i a t i v e a : . ! z 25;r i v e r c r o s s i n g . T h i s theme is alzj t:tk+r, 2 : i:: t h e c h a p t e r 2 n t h e T a s k F o r c e iz 5 c g i . l e r ' s . C o . n S a t ~ i t i a n s i n Korea.. S o w r e a d e r s zec' Almond's a c t i o n s i n s negati*Je l i g h t . A1o;c.l.' , . -517.:; :.,y i p n s r c s o b v i o u s cssrcand a n d cc>l'rrtrc: :r::~ f o r m i c 2 an ad k o c t a s k f c r c e at-..: f::rthe: c o m p l i c a t e s m a t t e r s b y p a r s o c ~ l l y inte:.~*:.l:.z. Y i s command and c o n t y c l sf p:a.toc,n s r l c~i:;r3::y s i z e d e l e m e n t s from a h e l i o o o p t e r w i l l k e s?.~-ii sgain i n actions i n Vistnan.
"

35.
36.

Quil'rrn: 47
U n i t e d S t a t e s . D.$partment C P t h e A r c y . "9:~:; ':ie?d F f i r c e z T r a i n i n g Eclletin'' (:!??I?: '?. H l r e a f t e r r e f a r r e d t.2 3 ; : CARL 1 7 X . T . i .

-131-

39.

LTC Elmer R e a g o r , "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , " i n ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1952): 20. A l l t a n k b a t t a l i o n commanders i n K o r e a w r o t e l e t t e r s on t a n k - i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s , d o c t r i n e , and t r a i n i n g f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s a r t i c l e . Later t h e c o n t r i b u t o r s i n c l u d e d some i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n commanders i n a d d i t i o n t o a L i e u t e n a n t from e a c h t a n k b a t t a l i o n .
Brmpr

40. 41. 42 43 44.

LTC R o b e r t Demers, "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , *' i n Brmnr ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1952): 20.

Brplpr

MAJ Warren Hodges, "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , " i n (November-December 1951): 21. LT R o b e r t Harper, "Sum and S u b s t a n c e " i n BMpr (May-June 1951): 23. LT R o b e r t K e l l e r , "The Tank P l a t o o n L e a d e r " , i n Brmpr ( J u l y - A u g u s t 1951): 13.
United S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. " S u r v e y o f Tank B a t t a l i o n E x p e r i e n c e s i n Korea" (1954): 2. Hereafter r e f e r r e d t o a s CARL 17055.14.

45. 46. 47 48. 49. 50 51. 52.

G u g e l e r : 45.

LTC J o h n Harris, "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , " i n Brmpr ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1952): 21.

T . R . F e h r e n b a c h , T h i s o f War: A S (1963): 105.

CARL 17055.1: 111. LTC E d a i n S a y r e , "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , Bplppp (November-December 1951): 23.
"

in in

LT Thomas B o y d s t o n , "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , Bplppp (May-June 1951): 27.

Q u i n n : 51. Roy E . Appleman, East of 155-156.

Chosln ' ( 1987):

-132-

53.

CPT Robert Drake, "A Small U n i t Action i n Korea," i n &rmpr (September-October 1 9 5 1 ) : 17; Blair: 507-508.
B l a i r : 186. Interview with C S M Offutt. H a r p e r : 22; S a y r e : 22-23.
LTC C a r r o l McFalls, "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , " i n (November-December 1951): 1 6 .

54. 55. 58. 57. 58.

59. 60.

Demers: 20.
CARL 17055.1: 20.

McFalls: 1 8 . CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

1.

Dr. Roger S p i l l e r , "The Tenth I m p e r a t i v e " i n v Rev( A p r i l 1988): 3.

V

2.

. .

of

Terms f o r u s e i n t h e c o u r s e on Theory (Academic Year 1988-1989): 14-17.

3.

U.S. Army, E M 100- 5. - 0

Ibid.

( 1 9 6 6 ) : 6.

4.
5.

LTC C h a r l e s T u r n e r , and LTC John Woods, " S p e c i a l Report on t h e T a n k - I n f a n t r y Team" i n BMpr (March-April 1952): 18-19.

6,
7.

Dennis J . Vetock, Qf U.S.

Lessons: A H i s t o r v ( 1 9 8 8 ) : 121.

LTC Elmer Reagor, "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , " i n W (March-April 1 9 5 2 ) : 2 0 .

Vetock: 121.

8.

-133-

9.

TRADOC T e s t and Experimentation Command. " T e s t Report Number 87-PD-TCAT-0164, Combined Arms Maneuver B a t t a l i o n Evaluation" ( 1 9 8 8 ) : 7 .

10.

LT George T i l s o n , "Sum and S u b s t a n c e , " i n Brmnr (May-June 1 9 5 1 ) : 2 5 .

-134-

U . C . Army.

E M 103-5. ot,e-. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, 1 9 8 6 .

FM
100 - 5.

! q a s h i n g t z n , D':

U.S. Army.

.-

W a s h i n g t o n , DC: D e p a r t m e n t o f t h ?

Army, 1 9 4 9 .
U . S . Army.
1 0 0- 5 . F i e l d S e r v i c e & & l , ODersticrns. Washing,ton, DC: D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e

EM

Army, 1 9 4 4 .
Army.

U.S.

. -

E%L.
1941.
m

100- 5 . F i e l d " Ce r v . Icecns-. W a s h i n g t o n , D C : D e p a r t m e n t cf t h e

Army,
U.S.

The d A C c , W a s h i n g t o n , DC: D e p a r t m e n t o f t h a Army, L 2 5 5 .

Army.

t ?fl-?fln,

4.

BMks.
C3lLe.ge 3 t 9 ' :
- - . - I..L .

Appleman, Rsy E . b c . t n f c. I& Texas A & H P r e s s , 1987.

- 136-

Doubler, Michael
0

D.
e.:

t h e Rocage:
T!7

r
L

u l v . 1 W . L e a v e n w o t h , RS: Combat C t u d i e r I n s t i t u t e , U.S. Ccnnand G e n e r a l S t a f f !331?eze!, :988.

Doughty, R o b e r t A . The E v o l u t i s n o f T ,-. 7 w n e . 1346 -19?8. L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U.S. Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1979.

Du P i c q , A r d a n t .

B a t t l e S t u d i e s : Anc w

R s t t h . C a r l i s l e : U . S . Army ;Jar C o l l + g t : Art of War C o l o q u i m , 1985.

Dunstan, Sinon. S o r *an ,r y . 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 5 , London: Osprey P u b l i s h i n g , 1 3 8 2 Fehrenbach, T . R .

T h i c:

! L i d cf Wa I :

. <+ _ . .L A_ V

.1363.

N e w Y o r k : T h e McMilsn C c n ~ ~ z y .

' i,-I n =. t , .-, I Gabe?, C h r i s t o p h e r R . S s e k . e . d U . S . -over Docin W C ~ WarII.L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Combat S t u d i e c I n s t i t u t e , U . S . Command and G a n e r a l StsPf C o l l e g e , 1985.

--

Gough, T e r r a n c a

J.

U.S.

in the ! . . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army C;nter !!istory, 1 9 8 7 .

.-

r.,..!
L

!!Jsz5i!lgt2cI 5 , : :
f a r Hi:ita?:.
r . g

f;,JuIden, J c s e p h C , k ~ i ; r e s : y>+ ' J 2 t u &. New Yorlc: XcGraw H i l l . 1969.

, : . f

;k.i

L L - ' < .-,:. . CJugeler, R u =-= -e l A , , e d i t o r . W z s h i n g t o r l , DC: Departm+i-,t ,>f t?,+ A::;, H i s t a r i c a l S e r i e s , 19'70.

w.

Herbert, Facl H .

I h - t
7 .

.. uas
. I

G + A & - K . ~ U ~ ~ D E. -D Uf1 0 0 - 2 . gcerztisns .

I

t\a

,eavcnwor'!-.. Cantj2t. S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e . L 7 . S . Ci.mflrin;!

- --

Lo

i,+ E - v 2 : ?a75 . F,<L--a

.- ; >.:
I ,

Jn,.!

G e c e r a ? S t a f f College, l 9 3 .

-137-

o m b .. House, J o n a t h a n M . W a rd C I v of L o t h CentL,,.v T a - c t i c s . Doc C J 4 -r.e. ~.,.L GF.4 ." L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U.S. Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1384.
?

Mahon, John K . , e d i t o r . Fi i , cr,rt I: R U . W a s h i n g t o n , DC: D e p a r t m e n t o f Army C e n t e r f o r Military H i s t o r y , 1972. M a r s h a l l , S . L . A . Um River and t h e N a s h v i l l e : The B a t t e r y P r e s r , 198?.

m,

Matloff, Maurice, e d i t o r . a . Washington, DC: Department of t ! . ? Army C e n t e r f o r M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 136?.

m.

NebRidgway, Matthew B.. - T D o u b l e d a y and Cornsany, I n c . , 1967.

V.-.-'-.
L 4 . k .

Robertson, Glenn. " C o u n t e r a t t a c k on t h e YaI.:tc?.g, l . S ! l . L e a v e n w o r t h , KS: Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U . S . Command and G e n e r a l S t a r ' ? C o l l e g e , 1985. S m i t h , Dale 0 .

U.S. U t a r v o D m. N s w York: S l o a n and ? e a r c s , 1955.

0
~

. .

r q t l.., l ~ r l , 4 y Taylor, A . J . P . U C a p r i c o r n Books, 1971,.

___

s.

ysp,

' { . J " ! . .

.:..

-138-

5.

=.

U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. TAADOC T e z t and E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n Command. " T e s t R e p o r t N!imber 87-FD-?CAT-0164, Combined Arms Maneuver R a t t s l i c n 1939. Evaluation,
"

U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. The Gs::ersl Board, U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r c e s European T h e a t e r . ."Answers by M a j o r G e n e r a l s , B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l s and C o l o n e l s t o Q u e s t i o n s on T y p e s o f D i v i s i o n s . " October 1945.
I

U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. Army F i r 1 2 "Army Field Forces Observations c r Forces. Combat i n K o r e a . " 1 6 ! l a r c h 1 3 5 1 . CAPL 17055.15. U n i t e d S t a t e s . DepartmeRt. o f t h e A r n y . Army ?'isli! Forces. "Army F i e l d F o r c e s T r a i n i n g Bulletin." 11 A p r i l 1951. CARL 1 7 0 5 5 . 1 . U n i t e d S t a t e r . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. Army F i ? ?-?.: Forces. "Army F i e l d F o r c e s T r a i n i n g 3 u Z l e t i n . 15 O c t o b e r 1 9 5 1 . CARL 1 7 0 5 5 . 1 .
"

U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t O P t h e Army. Army F i z l . 2 Forces. "Army F i e l d F o r c e s Trai:-:ing 2 u l : + . - L i n . 16 November 195;. CASL 1 7 S 5 5 . 1 .

"

I J n i t e d S t a t e s . O e p a r t m e n t 3 f t h e A r m y . 4rr.y F i t - ? Forces. "Army F i e l d F o r c e s T r a i n i n g F:l:+?i::." 2 9 Nljvember 1851. CARL ?71?.55.1.

-. L!xited S t a t e s . 9 e p s r t m e r . t i.P thC Amy. A:::.? ::.-,.. . . Farces. "Army F i e l d F o r c e s T r a i c i r . 2 ! I J L : ? ~ ~ : , . " 29 November 1951. CARL 1 7 C 5 5 . 1 .
1

. :

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U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. Th? A r : n G r S c h G o l . " c o n f e r e n c e C o n c l n e i u n s f o r $ h e Aracr C o n f e r e n c e A g e n d a . " 2 2 May 1 9 4 6 . CARL 11545. U n i t e d S t a t e s . g e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A m y . Etg!-:tk U n i t e d S t a t e s Army. "Combat I n f o r a a t i o B u l l e t i n . " u n d a t e d . CARL 1 7 2 9 7 . 1 . U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. The A r n c r S c h o o l . "Employment o f Armor i n K o r e a : V ~ 1 - z . s ~ I and 11." May 1 9 5 2 . CARL 2 1 4 5 . 1 1 9 . U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. 2r.d e.rc.2:. Division. "Employment of Armor i n K o r e a . " 1 A u g u s t 1 9 5 1 . CARL 17055.51. U n i t e d S t a t s c . . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. T t e C e n t r a l B o a r d , U n i t e d S t a t e r ; F o r c e s E u r o p e a n T!-,+.ater. " O r g a n i z a t i o n , E q u i p m e n t , anti T a c t i c a l Eni I c y z ~ ~ , ? o f The I n f a n t r y D i v i s i l j n , S t u d y Number 1 5 . " 1?4f. CARL 1 3 0 3 2 . 1 5 - 2 . United S t a t e s . Department of t h e A r m y . Army F i e l d F o r c e s . " R e p o r t o f t h e O f f i c e of t h s C h i e f Army F i e l d F o r c e s , O b s e r v e r Team t o t h e Far Zazt Command." 1 6 A u g u s t 1 9 5 0 . CARL 1 7 0 5 5 . Z . U n i t e d S t a t e s . !Jar D e p a r t m e n t . " R . ~ p o r : ; I ? t!-.-. Tdzr D e p a r t m e n t E q u i B o e n t B ~ s r - 2 . 1 3 2 a " c a - y I?;,?. CARL 1 2 9 6 0 .
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Sr. C h r i s t o p h e r Salsa? Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e U . S . A m y Command and G,r.er?.l St?.?? F o r t L r a v e c w o r t h , K a n s a s EGO27

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