The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

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After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

Patrick A. Heelan* Philosophy Department Georgetown University Washington, D.20057 heelan@guvax.georgetown.edu Section: Science, Logic, Mathematics, Well Formulated Theories, Empirical Research Copyright: based on forthcoming article in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (Cambridge)
ABSTRACT
Hermeneutics or interpretation is concerned with the generation, transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld and was the original method of the human sciences stemming from F. chleiermacher and !. "ilthey. Hermeneutic philosophy refers mostly to #. Heidegger$s. %his paper addresses natural science from the perspecti&e of Heidegger$s analysis of meaning and interpretation. 'ts purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are a(sent from the traditional analysis of theory and e)planation, to re*orient the current discussion a(out scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and to esta(lish some relationship (etween the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. %he paper has particular rele&ance to the history and social studies of science and technology.
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Patric, A. Heelan is the !illiam A. -aston Professor of Philosophy at -eorgetown .ni&ersity. He was formerly a research physicist in high energy physics and seismology.
Introduction
%he title of Heisen(erg$s momentous paper of 19/0 that presented 1uantum mechanics to the world was $A(out the 1uantum theoretical re*interpretation of ,inematical and mechanical relationships$ 2Heisen(erg 19/03. %he title reflected Heisen(erg$s &iew that 1uantum mechanics was not a new solution within the old mechanics, (ut a new mechanics that was sensiti&e to the intrinsic dependence of 1uantum o(4ects on measurement interactions and where measuring instruments, unli,e the 1uantum o(4ects they measure, followed $classical physics$ rather than the new 1uantum physics. %his, he said, was a re-interpretation inspired (y the way 5instein in 1960 sol&ed the 7orent8 and Fit8gerald pro(lem of apparent length contraction and apparent time dilation (y the apparently simple e)pedient of re*interpreting the character of space and time, ta,ing the apparent lengths and inter&als to (e the real lengths and inter&als.213 ' am not going to defend Heisen(erg$s or 5instein$s notion of interpretation, (ut to e)plore at a philosophical le&el the sense in which interpretation is at wor, in all of physics and other e)perimental science, and to contri(ute to opening up a new philosophical**and metaphysical** perspecti&e on physics that was possi(ly foreshadowed (y 5instein and Heisen(erg in their attempt to ma,e sense of their disco&eries.2/3 Interpretation-- alternati&ely, hermeneutics-- (elongs to the method and thin,ing of those other sciences, the human sciences, among which are to (e counted history, classics, philology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, sociology,
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(i(lical theology, 4urisprudence, and philosophy. #ost of these sciences ha&e di&ersified o&er time, (ut ' mean them insofar as they ha&e retained their original focus on cultural meaning and its transmission, rather than on physics$ e)planation, prediction, and control. 'n 5urope the human sciences ha&e always (een as re&ered as the natural sciences and were included in any listing of the sciences9 in -erman, they were 'Geisteswissenschaften,$ in French, 'les sciences humaines.$ %his descri(es a tradition of scholarship oriented towards the $space$ of shared and transmitted meanings within the conte)t of the social historical lifeworld, its characteristic method (eing that of the 2so*called3 hermeneutical circle 2or spiral3 with multiple foci, 1. on the disco&ery, articulation, and fulfillment of meaning in the lifeworld, /. on the historical transmission of meaning, and :. on the transformation of meaning under the historical conditions of its transmission.2:3 ' aim to loo, at the natural sciences from the philosophical way of thin,ing originally de&eloped to support the human sciences. %he hermeneutic orientation is contrasted with the explanatory tradition which in the 5nglish*spea,ing world is simply called $science.$ 5)planatory method aims at the construction of a mathematical model comprising measura(le 2theoretical3 &aria(les, to (e accepted or re4ected (y reason of its a(ility under la(oratory circumstances to predict and control the causal outcomes of assigned initial conditions. uch is in general the methodological profile of the natural sciences. ;ot that the human sciences ha&e to (e e)clusi&ely interpretati&e, nor the natural sciences e)clusi&ely e)planatory. 'n fact, during the past fifty years, the human sciences ha&e ta,en a strong turn towards the e)planatory orientation under the name of $empirical$ or $cliometric$ social sciences, though with disappointing accomplishment on the whole in relation to predicti&e power. As for the natural sciences, the search for an inherent cultural meaning has come predominantly 2(ut not e)clusi&ely3 from outside the sciences, in particular from religious interests loo,ing for traces of di&ine action in the world, large and small. 'n recent years, howe&er, scholars ha&e (egun to use (oth hermeneutic and empirical social science methods to study the actual and historical profiles of acti&ity of communities of scientific researchers. <ne outcome was the strong claim that the march of science was not continuous (ut rather characteri8ed (y a(rupt theoretical discontinuities or 2what %. . =uhn called3 $scientific re&olutions.$ imilar discontinuities were shown to e)ist e&en among co*e)isting e)planatory theories.2>3 <ther studies ha&e con&incingly unco&ered a di&ersity of internal and e)ternal cultural goals to scientific research.203 %he outcome of this research has (rought philosophers of science to a moment of reflection a(out the identity and goals of e)planatory science. %his perple)ity has affected the status of the natural sciences in a special way since, (ecause of their success, they were assumed to pro&ide a pri&ileged route to ,nowledge, a route that (ecame e)emplary for all the other sciences, and e&en for the philosophy of science itself. %he recei&ed tradition of the philosophy of science is a philosophy of modern origin with roots in the classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Among its distinguished modern for(ears were "escartes, ?acon, Hume, 7ei(ni8, and =ant. 'n this century it (ecame a speciali8ed (ranch of philosophy under the influence of @ussell, the 7ogical Positi&ists and 7ogical 5mpiricists of the Aienna and ?erlin Circles, and today it is represented (y a gala)y of honored names among whom it would (e in&idious to ma,e a selection.2B3 %his is the tradition that is presently now deeply di&ided o&er how to respond to the picture of scientific culture newly
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laid out (y the (est scholarship in the empirical social and historical sciences.273 %he story they tell a(out the natural sciences can hardly (e reconciled with the no(le ideals of ,nowledge and reality stemming from the philosophical tradition 4ust mentioned. !hence comes an em(arrassing dilemmaC either natural science is not worth the name of 'knowledge' and deserves no more than to be called 'useful opinion,' or the philosophical analysis of knowledge and reality needs to be revisited and reviewed. ' suppose that most philosophers of science thin, they will e&entually find a way out of this dilemma that preser&es for the natural and other theoreticDempirical sciences a pri&ileged epistemological and ontological status. #uch of the enormous cultural prestige of natural science in modern societies has come from its Faustian powers, (ut e&en more deri&es from the no(le** perhaps, mythic** (elief that science helps us to see ;ature, perhaps as -od sees it, in a way unmi)ed with human error, construction, or superstition. 'f the dilemma can (e resol&ed, it surely will (e done with the (rilliance of the talent a&aila(le. #y goal, howe&er, in this paper is to re&isit and re&iew the natural sciences from the perspecti&e of hermeneutic philosophy in order to get a clearer or at least a different assessment of the status of theoretical e)planatory ,nowledge and its relation to the lifeworld, and possi(ly also to get some sense of how the current logical empiricist and the hermeneutic traditions relate to one another with respect to the short term e)planatory goals of science and the long term goals of ,nowledge. Eust as the philosophy of science has its own fundamental literary corpus, so interpretati&e or hermeneutical philosophy has its own (asic corpus. %his comprises wor,s (y F. chleiermacher, 5. Husserl, #. Heidegger, !. "ilthey, #. #erleau*Ponty, H.*-. -adamer, P. @icoeur, and only in part, their structuralist, post*structuralist, and critical theoretic successors who remain strongly tied to the empiricDtheoretical tradition.2F3 %he principal author used in this essay is Heidegger. ' include a wor,ing (i(liography here (ecause Heidegger is not often found cited in the philosophy of science.293 %hough these writers may (e relati&ely unfamiliar to philosophers of physics, their approach and concerns ha&e long (een the (usiness of the human sciences. %hey ha&e, howe&er, recently (ecome rele&ant to the philosophy of science (ecause of the dilemma mentioned a(o&e. cientific ,nowledge, li,e all e)pert ,nowledge, is a domain of common meaning that finds fulfillment in the e)perience of local communities of researchers sharing a common scientific culture. =nowledge such as this is transmitted synchronically from local community to local community and also diachronically in the historical chain of transmission and reception. !hat is transmitted is not** to use E. "ewey$s term** a museum piece, (ut the product of human understanding in action, re*creating and re*constructing meanings from the sources of meaning that are transmitted. %his process is called $interpretation,$ and out of it, a certain di&ersity of understanding is ine&ita(le among different local e)pert communities and, of course, among different generations of researchers. %urning in particular to historical transmission, what is handed on (y past researchers to their successors is not always what is recei&ed (y these successors, for changes occur (oth in the transmission of common meanings and in the cultural matri) in which the recei&ed meanings find fulfillment. !e
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scientists are today -alileans in a way in which -alileo himself was not a -alilean. ' am not referring to episodic 2say, =uhnian3 paradigm shifts, (ut to the general conditions under which any tradition of ,nowledge is historically transmitted.2163 ;ot only do such changes occur, (ut they must occur in any chain of ,nowledge transmission, let alone in any progressi&e research program. %he interpretati&e character of science shows itself then historically in two waysC 213 in the way the meaning-field of the lifeworld is continually (eing refined, replaced, or transformed (y scientific theori8ing **an enterprise that is easily misconstrued if the role of interpretation is misunderstood9 and 2/3 in the way meaningfulfillment in the lifeworld changes as the lifeworld is transformed (y a succession of new technological pra)es 2among them, a&aila(le instrumentation3 em(odying new or re&ised scientific theories. <f these, 213 focuses on meaning disco&ery, de&elopment, and transmission9 and 2/3 on meaning-fulfillment in e)perience, culture, and perception. %he continual historical dialectic (etween these two transcends all monisms, and all older dualisms.2113 %he following discussion will (e shaped (y some specifically philosophical topics and connected theses. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to get a feel for what they mean, for while the hermeneutical literature is large, the part that e)plicitly refers to natural science is small and needs de&elopment.
I. Lifeworld
%he lifeworld is the philosophical $field$ 2$space$ or $domain$3 of and for human understanding, characteri8ed (y the action of em(odied human in1uirers in communication with one another and with their en&ironment against a (ac,ground of acti&e cultural networ,s.21/3 Human in1uirers (y a species of philosophical reflection disco&er themsel&es to (e contingently $located$ at some place and at some time in human history not (y their choice (ut, as it were, as $ha&ing*(een*thrown$ into the lifeworld conscious of ha&ing no more than a finite lifespan 2Heidegger, 199B, B:*11>, /:B*/B:3. 5ach indi&idual inherits a language, a culture, a community, a set of cares** perhaps, more than one of each** that gi&e meaning structure and purpose to the lifeworld he or she shares, and although the lifeworld is not of the indi&idual$s own creation or choice, it ne&ertheless permeates at conscious and unconscious le&els the indi&idual$s life e)perience. %he philosophical notion of the lifeworld is deri&ed (y a special ,ind of reflection from the e&eryday world of purposeful intelligent social acti&ity in which people con&erse with mutual understanding, conduct their (usiness with intelligence and forsight, resol&e pro(lems with theoretical and practical s,ills, etc., all with more or less success. 't would (e wrong to thin, of the lifeworld as perhaps e)planatory of the e&eryday world, for it is neither a model of nor a theory a(out the e&eryday world9 nor is it merely descripti&e of the e&eryday world for its does not reduce to a categorial list of contents (y a(stract ,inds. %he lifeworld is rather an attempt to show human understanding or ?eing at wor, historically within the practical reality of the e&eryday world (y directing our reflecti&e attention to the pre*theoretical, pre*predicati&e, pre*conceptual acti&ity that is prior in our thin,ing 2not temporally (ut as a grounding condition3 to all categories of things and institutions, and all theories of mind. !hat is thus shown is ?eing as the ontological dimension of human e)perience, ?eing as the lifeworld outside of which nothing e)ists, and each human as (eing there*in*?eing** or Da-sein as Heidegger spo,e.21:3
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II. Interpretation and meaning
Human understanding functions (y interpretation and its product is meaning. #eaning is nothing physical9 it is not a te)t, a (eha&ior, a neural networ,, a computation, not e&en a sign or a medium, nor any relationship among things, though all of these may (e generated (y and producti&e of meaning. ;or is it a pri&ate $domain$ accessi(le only (y some ,ind of introspection. @ather meaning is a pu(lic $domain$ where people share the products of human understanding first (y common ha(its of action 2in which di&erse networ,s are recogni8ed3 and then through the use of language and language*li,e media. #eaning is the $domain$ in which people understand one another, argue with one another, gi&e reasons, esta(lish goals, set up norms, define ,inds, etc.** more or less effecti&ely according to the purpose, intelligence, language s,ills, and education of the parties in&ol&ed. #eaning is historical (ecause language is constituti&e of history9 it is also deeply affected (y human temporality21>3 and historical forgetfulness (ecause the communityDlifeworld milieu in which it is transmitted has gains and losses o&er time9 it is local and social, (ecause it is the product of acti&e local interests and social communities and constituti&e of their interests9 it is then neither once*and*for*all fi)ed, nor e&er perfect and unchanging. Finally, though su(4ect to change under transmission, it is not on this account de&oid of truth, rather is meaning the instrument through which truthfulness ma,es its appearance in the lifeworld.
III. Scientific traditions or the historical transmission of scientific meanings
#eaning, howe&er, is articulated and transmitted only through the medium of language, actions, and other pu(lic e)pressi&e signs. %hese ser&e as the $conduit$ for meaning, (ut do not constitute meaning, for meaning is not a transporta(le su(stance li,e (ric,s or water. #eanimg has to (e re*created from its transmitted sources (y readers of the recei&ing community and there is no guarantee that the meaning deri&ed from these sources (y readers from one community will (e the same as the meaning deri&ed from the same resources (y readers from a different community separated from the first (y history and cultural en&ironment. As historians of science well ,now, this is as true for natural science as it is for literature and politics. #eanings are adopted from traditions of interpretation, or constructed or re*constructed in ,eeping with the responsi(ilities, constraints, and presumptions of rational hermeneutical method 2see (elow3.2103 <ne of these responsi(ilities is that each legitimate meaning (e appropriately fulfilled in a reader$s e)perience or imagination. <ne of the constraints is the relati&e richness or po&erty of the linguistic and cultural resources a&aila(le to the reader.21B3 <ne of the presumptions is that there is no single legitimate meaning rele&ant to all readers of, say, a te)t 2and suchli,e material3, for meanings depend on use.2173 <ne ,ind of use that a te)t or sentence ser&es is its a(ility to (e asserted as true in a chosen conte)t (y a user. Conte)ts and uses are multiple. A te)t then is li,e any piece of e1uipment,21F3 say, a hammer 2to use Heidegger$s e)ample3, it can usually (e used successfully for se&eral meaningful cultural purposes. %he uses are not ar(itrary, for nothing (ut nonsense would (e gained (y ar(itrary use, (ut this does not imply that there is fore&er 4ust a single legitimate meaningful use. ?ut, as in the case of the hammer, for each useful purpose there are lifeworld criteria as to how well a te)t performs for this purpose. Again as in the case of the hammer, there may (e a con&entional priority of uses with $ownership$ set (y cultural tradition**hammers are to (e used for construction, scientific results are
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to (e used for scientific research communities** (ut no one use or $ownership$ need go unchallenged either (y logic or (y e)perience nor should any one use (ecome the sole property of 4ust one interested group.2193 Howe&er, it is not the case that anything goes. @ational hermeneutic in1uiry ac,nowledges the e)istence of traditions of interpretation that gi&e today$s readers and in1uirers a culturally pri&ileged &ersion of past sources, shaped always to the goals of the linguistic and cultural en&ironment of the community with special $ownership$ rights in the su(4ect matter.2/63 !ithin the sciences such traditions of interpretation appro)imate to what =uhn called $paradigms.$ 'n addition to meanings construed on the (asis of a common tradition of interpretation 2with its presumption of historical continuity3, legitimacy can (e gained (y other meanings independently of any presumption that there e)ists a historical continuity of meaning with the source through a common tradition of life, action, and interpretation. uch discontinuities of meaning within the sciences are at the heart of what =uhn called $re&olutions$ in which old $paradigms$ are replaced (y new ones.2/13 'n the wor, of hermeneutics, howe&er, a radically new meaning need not e)pel the old, (ecause each, though different, may (e a &alid historical and cultural perspecti&e. 'ndeed, despite some sense of discomfort, we often find in the sciences the old flourishing side (y side with the radically new, 1uantum mechanics with ;ewtonian mechanics, statistical thermodynamics with phenomenological thermodynamics** though with respect to their formal models they are mutually incompati(le** and so on. 5ach acting within its own hori8on of research purposes is in dialogue with rele&ant data through its own empirical processes of testing and measurement. %he appropriate philosophical approach to the method or process of interpretation is the $hermeneutical circle 2or spiral3.$ ?riefly, following Heidegger 2Heidegger 199B, 106*1013, any in1uiry is initiated (y the (rea,down of a tas, and (egins (y calling on the deep structure of pre*theoretical pre*categorial understanding2//3 of ?eing which is found in the lifeworld 2 orhabe3. Heidegger$s name for the human in1uirer is $Da-sein$9 Da-sein is $e)istence,$ the em(odied understanding of ?eing, a $there*ness$ 2Da3 in the domain of ?eing 2!ein3.2/:3 'n1uiry is awa,ened when Da-sein poses a directed 1uestion 2 orsicht3 which, li,e all directed 1uestions, already implicitly contains an outline of a search and disco&ery strategy aiming at unco&ering a solution. %he 1uestion so construed in this case is not yet in an articulated form9 only later will it achie&e an ade1uate e)pression in 2what philosophers of science call3 an $e)planation.$ %here follows an acti&e dialogue (etween orsicht and orhabe, accompanied (y actions see,ing practical fulfillment in the awareness that the sought*for understanding 2die !ache selbst3 has presented itself and made itself manifest to the in1uirer 2 orgriff3. 'f on first trial the sought*for understanding is a(sent, something ne&ertheless has (een learnt, and the search resumes, dipping again into the a&aila(le resources of orhabe, orsicht and orgriff. %his hermeneutical circle of in1uiry is repeated until a solution presents itself within a new cultural pra)is in the lifeworld. <nly at that time is it in order to e)press the solution linguistically in the form of an e)planation. In summary, hermeneutic method is a process**and difficult wor, it can (e**done (y a current in1uirer who, say, is challenged to construct a contemporary meaning for a source e&ent, such as, for e)ample, -alileo$s o(ser&ations on the phases of Aenus, originating in a different linguistic and cultural en&ironment and
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possi(ly elsewhere at an earlier time. %his is the method of the hermeneutical circle "or spiral#. 'nterpretati&e wor, of this ,ind is clearly historical, cultural, and anthropological, multidisciplinary in character and in need of a philosophical foundation which hermeneutical philosophy tries to pro&ide. 'n this wor, lies the significance and power of hermeneutic method and hermeneutic philosophy for the history and philosophy of science. And not 4ust for these, (ut also for understanding how 1uantitati&e empirical methods gi&e meaning to empirical contents, how theory*laden data depend on the pu(lic self*presentation of the measured entity as a pu(lic cultural entity and, in particular, how measurement e1uipment plays a dou(le role creating and refining (oth theoretical and cultural meanings. %hese are topics that will (e addressed (elow.
IV. The furniture of the lifeworld
%he lifeworld has a furniture that comprises those physical and em(odied cultural o(4ects, (oth $natural,$ li,e trees, and $cultural,$ li,e institutions or technologies, which ha&e names or descriptions in the language9 among them are perceptual o(4ects. All of these are 2to use Heidegger$s term3 ontic beings.
V. Hermeneutics of theory-ladenness: theoretical understanding as explanation
ince in the age*old tradition going (ac, to Aristotle the characteristic goal of all scientific or scholarly in1uiry is theoretical understanding, it is important to understand what theory does in modern science. A theory e)plains why some e&ent occurs 2or does not occur3 (y pro&iding a model of the causes or conditions that control its occurrence 2or non*occurrence39 its goal is e)perimental prediction and control. Alternati&ely, a theory may e)plain a lawful regularity among empirical e&ents (y pro&iding a model of the causes or conditions that, if fulfilled, necessitate the lawful regularity among these e&ents. %o pro(e what is implied (y this meaning of theory, ' follow Heidegger 2199B, :07*:B>3. He (egins with a (ro,en hammer and a construction pro4ect. A hammer is a tool used in a construction pro4ect9 a wor,er generally does not as, what a hammer is until (y (ad luc, he has to find a replacement for it or a su(stitute. <nly then he as,sC what are the specifications of a hammer 2so that the pro4ect engaged in can (e finished3G %he answer will (e a theory 2a(out hammers3 that e)plains its a(ility to do a hammer$s 4o( in carpentry or the (uilding trades. 'n Carnap$s termsC the explicandum is $the a(ility to do a hammer$s 4o(,$ the appropriate explicans is a theory 2of the hammer3 which will gi&e physical specifications for a hammer. Consider now the 1uestionC !hat meaning should a spea,er attach to a hammerG !ithout a specification of conte)t, the 1uestion is indeterminate, (ut in the line of our in1uiry we can distinguish two 1uestions and two answers. 'n the conte)t of a construction pro4ect, a hammer is a cultural entity possessed of a cultural meaning related to the practical needs of carpentry and the (uilding trades. 'n the conte)t of the e)planatory pro4ect of science, the hammer is a physical entity specified (y a theory that lays out the conditions under which it can (ecome the host of the cultural meaning of a hammer. %he first meaning is a cultural praxis-laden meaning, and the second is a theory-laden meaning,2/>3 and they are not independent for the theory-laden meaning ma,es sense only if the hammer*referent is in point of local contingent fact praxis-laden within the (uilding pro4ect either (y reason of actual use or (y social designation.
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"espite the fact then that 2hammer*3 theory $e)plains$ 2hammering*3 pra)is, the language of theory and the language of pra)is (elong to different though coordinated perspecti&es. Coordination does not imply, howe&er, isomorphism (etween the two perspecti&es,2/03 for the hammer could alternati&ely (e designated to ser&e as a nutcrac,er, and the wor,er on the construction pro4ect could, perhaps, (e ser&ed on this occasion (y an old (oot or means other than the use of a theoretically specified hammer. %heory, as we ,now, is underdetermined (y practice and &ice &ersa.2/B3 ince theory and pra)is are merely coordinated (ut not isomorphic, they can (e ta,en as a)es for a ,ind of cultural phase space within which re&olutionary changes can occur stemming either from theory or from pra)is. 5)amples of such re&olutions a(ound. ;ew theoretical insights can generate new cultural practices as, for instance, when theory*(ased (acteria research transforms a host of cultural practices dealing with food handling, personal hygiene, sewage and water systems, the ur(an en&ironment, and the treatment of (acterial diseases. ;ew cultural practices can also generate new theories as, for instance, when the steam engine inaugurated re&olutionary changes in calorific theory leading to the de&elopment of thermodynamics. A creati&e historical tension then arises in the lifeworld (etween theory ma,ing and cultural practices, and this can** and does** result in changes in the lifeworld with concomitant changes in the conditions for meaning*fulfillment within the lifeworld. ;oting such changes, one also notes something a(out the historicity of hermeneutic truth. @eturning to an earlier point, $this hammer is theory*laden$ always implies an implicit cultural hypothetical, $pro&ided this hammer has (een socially designated for a hammering role in construction.$ ;ote that the theory*ladenness of the hammer as such omits to include e)plicit reference to this local and contingent condition, (ut the reference is, ne&ertheless, implicitly assumed (y the logic of theory as e)planation. 7et us consider what the case would (e if this local and contingent condition were a(sent. %hen, $this$ would not (e a hammer, $this$ would not (e theory*laden, $this$ would (ecome 2in Heidegger$s words3 $a mere possi(le resource,$ and $this$ would ha&e no more title to (eing listed in the hammer category among the furniture of the then*lifeworld than old (oots.2/73 !hat ,ind of entity then is a hammer as a socially dedicated resourceG 't can only (e said that it is a pu(lic cultural reality, a physical reality constituted (y a socio* cultural meaning.2/F3 ;ow, to the e)tent that no indi&idual thing**or almost none** in our e)perience is without a human purpose, e&erything in our e)perience, including scientific entities, (ears some resem(lance to a hammer, or other tool or e1uipment. %here are then 2at least3 two perspecti&es on 2almost3 any indi&idual thing in the lifeworldC a pra)is*laden cultural perspecti&e and 2gi&en a successful theoretical e)planation3 a theory*laden perspecti&e. <ne may argue that Carnap$s e)planatory schema does more than specify physical means to cultural ends, and aims (eyond this to specify the culture* independent reality underlying and controlling cultural life. !hether or not e)planation can go (eyond culture and history is a separate assumption the (asis of which is in metaphysics, not e)planatory science. Clearly the search for e)planatory theory in the modern sense is not the same as a search for realistic theory in the metaphysical sense despite the ancient classical assumption that possessing theoretical ,nowledge is ,nowing the real. %he de(ate a(out realism
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and anti-realism is often confused a(out what is percei&ed to (e at sta,e in theoretical scientific research.
VI. Measurement and data
%hese conclusions ha&e important conse1uences for understanding measurement, since they illuminate the (inary &alence of empirical $facts,$ something not gi&en (y the usual empiricist accounts.2/93 %he process of measurement in science fulfills two different (ut coordinated functions. 't presents the ob$ectas-measurable, this is the pra)is*laden cultural function. And it ta,es the data from the presented o(4ect, this is the theory*laden data-taking function.2:63 %hese are the (inary &alences of scientific data. %he data*ta,ing is usually called $o(ser&ation$9 (ut there is no o(ser&ation without the prior preparation and presentation of the o(4ect*as*measura(le.2:13 A well*defined measuring process does (oth 4o(s, presenting the o(4ect and recording the data. %hese in&ol&e two different epistemological perspecti&es, a pra)is*laden cultural one 2which (elongs to the strategy of e)perimental culture in la(oratory en&ironments3 and a theory*laden 2or e)planatory3 one. %hese two perspecti&es can and should (e logically, semantically, and pragmatically distinguished 2see Heidegger, 199B, :0F*:093. 7et us consider what these two perspecti&es re&eal a(out the measuring process, scientific entities, and data. Consider the theory*laden perspecti&e.2:/3 ince it is the function of theory to o&ersee the e)perimental designC what will do the 4o( of presenting the o(4ect* as*measura(leG %he ontic referent of theory as such is the measuring process &iewed from the construction or engineering or technical point of &iew. %hin, of the theory of the hammer in relation to the cultural pra)is of hammeringH !ithin the life of science, theory refers directly to the internal structure of the 2particularly measurement*presenting3 processes (y means of which $theoretical entities$ enter the pu(lic cultural domain of science where they then pro&ide data to o(ser&ers. %his leads to a first conclusion& what is formally theory-laden is experimental design. 'n the pra)is*laden cultural perspecti&e, the presentation of the o(4ect* as*measura(le is a pu(lic cultural e&ent pra)is*laden in the scientific culture of the la(oratory, deri&ing meaning not from the o(ser&ation e&ent itself (ut from a research program. %he o(4ect*as*measura(le is recogni8a(le as such (ecause it comes $dressed$ in sensi(le $clothes$ pro&ided (y the e)perimental strategies used. !hether such $clothes$ render the scientific entities percepti(le will (e discussed (elow. %his leads to a second conclusion& observation events should not be called semantically 'theory-laden'-- this appellation should be reserved for experimental design2::3-- but rather semantically praxis-laden like all dedicated or designated cultural ob$ects of the lifeworld presented as fulfilling experience. %he meaning of data is also (i&alent and, li,e the meaning of a hammer, su(4ect to am(iguity. "ata (elong hypothetically to the theoretical perspecti&e of measurement (ut affirmatively to the cultural perspecti&e of the lifeworld forum of scientific research strategy9 the research $narrati&es$ that @ouse2:>3 spea,s a(out would (elong here. %his is the special en&ironment of the e)pert researcher and, though pu(lic, is usually closed to the understanding and e)perience of the ordinary citi8en. o*called $theoretical entities,$ such as, for e)ample, electrons and electron-data, are theory*laden (ut, for the reasons gi&en a(o&e, they cannot (e said to e)ist as such unless locata(le in a pu(lic forum, the primary pu(lic forum (eing that of an e)perimental scientific research program where as pu(lic
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cultural entities they are e)plicitly pra)is*laden with respect to some standard configuration2s3 of la(oratory e1uipment. %hough the theory of electrons may change, it is ne&er the case that what we call $an electron$ fails to ha&e an in principle relationship to contingent local practical cultural milieus.
VII. Theoretical entities as cultural entities
'n addition to the pu(lic forum of scientific research, there are other pu(lic fora within which indi&idual $theoretical entities$ and the data a(out them can (ecome cultural entities.2:03 %hese are, for e)ample, pu(lic fora featuring technology, finance, political power, religion, art, media, and so on. All of these** li,e the scientific research forum itself** are local fora in which a scientific entity, usually in some technological conte)t, can play the role of a dedicated cultural resource 2for the life of finance, politics, religion, art, media, etc3 and (y this means (ecome part of the local furniture of the lifeworld. For e)ample, choosing tele&ision as one such local technological forum, then, electrons** or, at least, electron*(eams** can (e designated e&en to children and others unlettered in physics as cultural entities in that forum (ecause of their role in $painting$ the %A picture. 'n all such local fora, the scientific entity and its data are meaningfully (i&alent and emulate the relationship (etween theory and pra)is in the study of a hammer. @emo&ed from all such local fora the putati&e $data$ are not data at all2:B3 since they do not ma,e manifest in the lifeworld the presence of anything (ut $themsel&es$** (ut of $themsel&es,$ ha&ing no determinate lifeworld meaning, they are 4ust noise. !hen new theory*(ased technologies are added to the lifeworld, theoretical scientific terms can (e introduced into e&eryday descripti&e language with new non*theoretical cultural meanings. For instance, temperature as a cultural entity is endowed with non*theoretical, practical lifeworld meanings which can (e used to create, designate, employ, and control new classes of e1uipment, for e)ample, thermostats, in the lifeworld. !ith the help of these new resources, the old cultural en&ironment can (e changed, perhaps, in re&olutionary ways. Pu(lic space, for e)ample, was re&olutioni8ed in renaissance 'taly in the 'uattrocento prior to the Copernican re&olution and the de&elopment of modern science when it came to (e su(4ected to uni&ersal measurement, and to analysis according to the principles of the newly disco&ered mathematical perspecti&e. 't was transformed (y this process, from a manifold with di&erse local geometries into one with a single measurement*(ased 5uclidean geometry. For those who loo,ed for a unified cosmology, the way was prepared for -alileo and the Copernican re&olution.2:73 %he second e)ample is from medicine and illustrates how the (i&alence of scientific descriptions can create new moral perple)ities in the lifeworld. "udon2:F3 as,s, is the term $foetus,$ merely a scientific redescription of the lifeworld entity, a (a(yG <r is it the replacement of one lifeworld entity, a (a(y, (y a new scientific entity, a foetusG %he terms are, of course, correlati&e 2each in its own conte)t re&eals something a(out what the other term refers to3 (ut they are not isomorphic 2there is no uni1ue mapping from one to the other3. ?ut a foetus is something that the medical profession alone can discern and control with its sonographical and other techni1ues apart from the mother9 a (a(y is what the mother ,nows (y feeling it within her, defining it in terms of her own familial response to it. "udon then as,s, should ethics and legislation, say, concerning pregnancies, (e written e)clusi&ely in terms of the foetus, as one finds
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increasingly in the current practice in the !estG <r should the difference (etween the two perspecti&es (e recogni8ed and an accomodation found that defers to the special cultural role of the mother in decision*ma,ing a(out the (a(yG ?eyond the life of science then $theoretical entities$ are recogni8ed as pu(lic cultural entities through the technologies that em(ody them and through the pu(lic data that monitor their part in the way these technologies wor,. %heoretical entities then are not e)tra*cultural e)tra*historical entities, (ut to the contrary their theory*ladenness implicitly (inds them, not 4ust to the arcane culture of scientific research, (ut also to the (roader cultural historical lifeworld where&er their presence is recogni8ed in pu(lic e)perience. @emo&ed 2in principle3 from the lifeworld, they are simply non*entities.
VIII. Truth and meaning
%ruth in the classical sense grasped the o(4ect$s inner intelligi(ility lea&ing (ehind what was material, irregular, and unintelligi(le9 it was the immaterial 2mental, spiritual, intentional3 possession of a material o(4ect lea&ing it, howe&er, unchanged. %he mental representation so formed conformed to the o(4ect represented, it $mirrored$ ;ature in #ind. 7anguage and life did not enter into the shaping of what is so presented as truth. Powerful and historically significant as was the classical notion of truth, there came a time, howe&er, when the function of language e&entually could not (e ignored. %ars,i, for instance, proposed to define truth as a property of statements. %hus, let $p$ 2$ now is white$3 (e a statement, thenC $p$ 2$ now is white$3 is true if and only if p 2snow is white3. From the hermeneutic perspecti&e such an account turns out either to (eg the 1uestion or to (e &acuous. For considerC how is the meaning of the sentence $p$ 2$ now is white$3 arri&ed atG !ords to (e meaningful need a conte)t of use and a users$ community, (ut there are an infinite &ariety of conte)ts of use and of users$ communities for the sentence $p$ 2$ now is white$3 gi&ing different meanings, yet none is specified in %ars,i$s definition. %urning to the other half of the definition, how is it determined that p 2snow is white3G ?y e)perience, of courseH ?ut either e)perience presupposes an a(ility to use language correctly which (egs the 1uestion or is indeterminate and so cannot function as a criterion. %ars,i$s logical definition, howe&er, was proposed within a philosophical framewor, different from the one used in this paper and within that framewor, was un1uestioned until recently. 'n the hermeneutical perspecti&e, truth is the product of a human understanding that wor,s through interpretation. 'nterpretation, howe&er, functions through the construction of meaning (y common action, theory, and language. %heoretical meanings contri(ute an a(stract component and common action contri(utes a cultural or practical component. Heidegger em(odied this duality of meaning in his choice of the -ree, term, alethia 2literally $unco&ering$3 for truth 2Heidegger, 199B, /1:*>3. 't signalled a change in the notion of truth from the classical model of full transparency to human understanding, towards one of only partial, historical, local, practical, or conte)tual transparency 2see, for e)ample, Heidegger, 199B, :>*:93.2:93 As in the case of the hammer, the theoretical set of parameters addresses 4ust one aspect of the indi&idual e)emplars, that chosen for e)planation 2the explicandum3. <ther aspects of the e)emplars than those chosen for e)planation are outside of the per&iew of the in1uiry.
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#oreo&er, in the search to e)plain the explicandum, the theori8ing process soon disco&ers the e)tent to which the cultural function of the explicandum can (e transferred to different artifacts from the indi&idual e)emplars originally studied. An old (oot can on occasion do the wor, of a hammerH %his leads to the following 2surprisingG3 conclusionC what makes this or any individual hammer to be a hammer--or what makes this or any individual thing in human experience to be what it is perceived to be-- is not a defining permanent essence but a set of contextual properties any one of which can be found in, or retro-fitted for, a variety of different physical hosts. %he truth a(out things in the lifeworld then is not a classical conformity (etween a mental representation and the o(4ect represented (ut a property of comple) meanings with local and historical uses.2>63 %he meanings we entertain a(out things are disclosed (y pra)es that are implicitly theory*laden. %hese meanings are not permanent (ut historical, local, and changing. %hey are local, (ecause e)pert communities of use are e)clusi&e. %hey are changing (ecause, it happens that, when the particular theory*ladenness of the pra)es (ecomes e)plicit, new, (etter or, at least, different, pra)es can often (e engineered with a conse1uent transformation of cultural meaning. 't can happen, say, that some old (oots function as hammers, or that hammers e&entually disappear entirely in a world of plastics and high tech. uch a spiral of meaning change turns endlessly within the historicality of ?eing 2see Heidegger, 199B, 93 as such tri&ial e)amples show. uch a process of theory*dri&en cultural change (rings new historical perspecti&es into play and through forgetfulness ine&ita(ly puts old ones out of play. %he (ig mista,e of modernity was to commit itself to a classical static conformity notion of truth that could only (e retained (y supposing that scientific theory could (e separated logically or ontologically from temporality and culture. %his is what hermeneutic reflection shows to (e contrary to e)perience.2>13
IX. Scientific technologies
Heidegger feared that, to the e)tent that scientific in1uiry is successful in the construction of e)planatory theories, it would turn the focus of philosophical in1uiry away from $meditati&e thin,ing$ a(out the lifeworld as the cultural arena for human life fulfillment, that is, away from meaning and meaning change, and toward 2what Aristotle called3 $calculati&e thin,ing$ ordained toward management and control9 in the latter, things are treated as means to ends within Gestell, the assumed $o(4ecti&e$ frame of $o(4ecti&e reality$ 2Heidegger, 19BF, pp. :*:09 19BB, p. >B3. ;o minimi8ing is intended, howe&er, of the great (enefits that can and do flow from the $calculati&e thin,ing$ of scientific in1uiry. ;e&ertheless, Heidegger foresaw that such (enefits could ha&e a human cost, for they affect the way cultural life teaches people to (e human and communicates to them the sense of the wholeness, integrity, and goodness of the world, the self, and human communities. %his is "udon$s point 2in the e)ample cited a(o&e3 in 1uestioning the implication of using the scientific term $foetus$ e)clusi&ely in place of the older maternally related &oca(ulary. Changing the traditional &ehicles for the transmission of these core meanings ine&ita(ly changes how people regard themsel&es, their personal destinies, their neigh(ors, and the world around, with conse1uent ris,s of cultural insta(ility in all these areas.2>/3
X. 'Theoretical entities' as perceptual entities
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't was argued a(o&e that $theoretical scientific entities$ are pu(lic cultural entities. Among the latter are perceptual entities. 's it possi(le that some $theoretical entities$ are also perceptual entitiesG #uch depends on what perceptual o(4ects are ta,en to (e. 'n the empiricist tradition perceptual o(4ects are e)plained as organi8ations of sensations, and from this position it can (e argued that sensations recei&ed from a measuring instrument can only (e ingredients of the scientist$s perception of the state change of the instrument, and not of the $theoretical entity$ that caused that change. 'n a more de&eloped &ersion of empiricism, an argument is sometimes made for the partial o(ser&a(ility of the $theoretical entity$.2>:3 %his whole line of thin,ing deri&es from a theory or model of perception** one incidentally that has little supporting e&idence** and when applied to the perceptual o(4ect itself as a cultural phenomenon, it ma,es no sense at all. %he perceptual o(4ect is the explicandum and should not (e confused with the empiricist explicans.2>>3 ;e&ertheless, the empiricist theory of perception e)ercises an influence far (eyond its weight in discussions a(out the ontological status of $theoretical entities.$ !hat then are perceptual o(4ects as phenomena in the lifeworldG A (rief s,etch of an answer would go something li,e thisC they are su(stanti&e indi&idually locali8ed cultural o(4ects in the lifeworld, presented to local human percei&ers in sensory e)perience, and understood (y the character, multiplicity, and systematicity of their sensory presentations or profiles.2>03 -i&en that 2on the (asis of the argment already made3 a scientific $theoretical entity,$ say, an electron, is a su(stanti&e cultural entity in the lifeworld, we as,C can it ha&e the appearance of a perceptual o(4ectG %he answer ' ga&e in an earlier wor, is IesH and this answer still holds.2>B3 7et me re&isit the 1uestion (riefly. 'n section A'', ' referred to the historical influence in the 'uattrocento of two technologies, distance measurement and mathematical perspecti&e, on pu(lic space transforming it from a di&ersity of local and mostly non*5uclidean pu(lic spaces to one uni&ersal 5uclidean pu(lic space. uch technologies as those mentioned a(o&e ' called $reada(le technologies,$ (ecause they made it possi(le to ma,e and mar, en&ironmental cues that ena(led the learning of 5uclidean &ision. 'n general, reada(le technologies are technologies capa(le of transforming perception.2>73 ome la(oratory measurement de&ices when standardi8ed ha&e the capacity of presenting a cultural entity, such as, for e)ample, an electron or a molecule, as locali8ed in the lifeworld and as $clothed$ with systematic sensory profiles that can (e ta,en in conte)t as an electron$s recogni8a(le signature. uch technologies are readable technologies and confer percepta(ility on the scientific entity in 1uestion.
XI. Contextual Logic and Bivalent and Multivalent meanings
%ools, such as, for e)ample, hammers, and practically e&erything else in the lifeworld including $theoretical entities$ ha&e multi&alent meanings. ?y $multi&ant meanings,$ ' mean, a minimum of two synchronic meanings in different, coordinated (ut not isomorphic, perspecti&es that are descripti&e of a pu(lic cultural entity. uch perspecti&al multi&alence raises the further 1uestionC Are there articulate logically reasona(le conditions 2within the pur&iew of hermeneutical philosophy3 that would gi&e coherence to such perspecti&esG %he answer ' ga&e in an earlier wor, is still fundamentally the one ' would gi&e
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today though with some correcti&e glosses.2>F3 %he core of the solution is that the two complementary perspecti&al languages** theory*laden and pra)is*laden** must (e partially ordered (y statement inclusion within a complemented non*distri(uti&e lattice 2or context logic3.2>93
XII.The scope of hermeneutical philosophy for the philosophy of science
%he hermeneutic turn in the philosophy of science is necessary to study aspects of science for which the traditional philosophy of science is not well e1uipped. %hese are the dynamic, narrati&e, historical, and lifeworld aspects of science. 'n this light the traditional philosophy of science appears to (e a &ersion aimed at fulfilling the cultural goal of supporting theoretical research with a strong interest in management and control, and as a philosophy it is cropped of much of its (ac,ground in human life and history that is rele&ant for (roader and longer term issues.2063 From what has (een said, the following are among the pro4ects and themes that hermeneutic philosophy of natural science can fruitfully address and in some cases has already (egun to address. 1. !cientific discovery, or how traditions begin, needs to (e studied in indi&idual e)emplary cases, such as -alileo$s telescopic o(ser&ations of Aenus or Heisen(erg$s 1uantum mechanical e)planation of the hydrogen atom. %he appropriate philosophical approach and method is that of the $hermeneutical circle$ as s,etched a(o&e /. (eaning persistence or change needs to (e studied in the process of transmission of a scientific tradition under ordinary and e)traordinary conditions of di&erse and changing cultural and theoretical interests.2013 :. %he role of metaphor20/3 needs to (e studied9 metaphor is as fundamental for the hermeneutical perspecti&e as literality is for traditional philosophies of science. ince theory is mathematical and the lifeworld is empirical, it ma,es no sense to predicate a(stract and mathematical theoretical properties literally of the lifeworld9 at (est, the two come together in some unam(iguous way in a &ariety of authoritati&e conte)ts each comprised of e)perts, guided (y 2what Aristotle called3 $phronesis,$ and conscious that they are see,ing a consensus a(out a set of rele&ant solu(le issues. Among these authoritati&e conte)ts the scientific discipline has a certain pri&ilege of $ownership$9 it might (e called the $producer ownership,$ others in contrast (eing $user ownership,$ though the notions of $intellectual ownership$ and $use$ as they relate to science is a matter that is not to (e resol&ed here. <ne last important commentC underlying the literalist &iew are a series of cropped understandings 2misunderstandingsG3 of the nature and role of mathematical models, for instance, of how theories relate to the empirical world, of the nature of truth, and particularly, of ,nowledge as only a short term causal o(4ecti&e snapshot in contrast with ,nowledge as long term dynamic, historical, and social assessments that function of necessity in a cultural milieu that, (eing pra)is*laden, does not need or support unlimited uni&ocity, precision, or causality.20:3 >. %he role of metaphor in the history of science is re&ealed as a powerful source for shaping theory and needs to (e studied. 'mages of perfectly smooth (alls, perfect elastic (ands, impondera(le aethers, frictionless mechanical de&ices, $molecular$ (ench models, ideal computer simulations, sine*wa&e oscillators,
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ten*dimensional spaces, and -od$s #ind$s 5ye on ;ature ha&e all helped to shape scientific theories. ;or is it possi(le to come to understand, say, modern physics or (iology, without passing through stages of metaphor in the learning process. As in the search for theory, so in its application, theoretical instruments apply to real situations in socially negotiated ways, using metaphors. 0. )ow scientific traditions end needs to (e studied from the hermeneutic perspecti&e. =uhn and others argue that the a(andonment of a tradition is not simply a function of ha&ing failed the challenge of anomalies, (ut of a decision of those who principally $own$ the tradition to ma,e the tradition &ulnera(le to challenges. @esistance to such a mo&e is strong, (ecause what ,eeps a tradition ali&e is usually some transcendental good it offers or some hope (eyond the particular useful solutions it has generated. %hat good could (e mythic or aesthetic. A mythic good is religious in nature, connected with the notion of theory as a sharing in di&ine or transcendental ,nowledge20>39 this is the spiritual good that -alileo, ;ewton, and 5instein sought in their science. Alternati&ely, it could (e an aesthetic good li,e the styles of art, music, and cuisine that is connected with the fulfillment of human em(odied acti&ity in the world9 this is a good associated more with la(oratory &irtuosity than with disem(odied spirituality20039 one thin,s of some great e)perimenters, a Pasteur or a Fermi, in this connection. B. )ow myth as a grand narrative, understood as normative, metaphorical, and metaphysical,20B3 operates in the transmission of scientific traditions needs to (e studied in particular cases. For e)ample, the historical -alileo and today$s physicists share something associated with the term $-alilean,$ (ut today$s physicists are $-alilean$ more in a mythic than a historical sense. 7. !hile we do not as, of a philosophy that it contri(ute to the successful practice of science, science ne&ertheless continually throws up philosophical 1uestions that di&ide the scientific community and constrain or limit its energies in a world of finite resources. A sur&ey of recent literature2073 suggests that many currently frustrating and contentious topics should (e loo,ed at through the optic of hermeneutical philosophy. ome of these are epistemological or metaphysical framewor, topics, such as, for e)ample, realism, relativism, constructivism, truth, ob$ectivity, causality, purpose, and history, and some are issues that call for liaison with the lifeworld, such as, for e)ample, space, locali*ation, time, measurement, data, explanation, macroscopic and microscopic, elementary particles, multivalence of scientific claims, indeterminacy, and the paradoxes of 'uantum physics.20F3 F. ince theory*(ased technologies can change the lifeworld and the range of possi(le meanings a&aila(le to human life and action, hermeneutical philosophy should as,C in what way does a changing lifeworld change the playing field for science, old or new+ 9. cience also throws up epistemological 1uestions regarding interdisciplinary studies of science9 communities of historians, philosophers, sociologists, cultural anthropologists, etc. are deeply trou(led (y their ina(ility to communicate well among themsel&es.2093 A common platform in a hermeneutic philosophy of science might ease this situation (y disclosing the different agendas and different fundamental resources 2in te)ts, technologies, cultural ha(its, etc.3 that define these disciplines in relation to the differing perspecti&es they engage in a
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postmodern lifeworld. 16. An important focus of interest for hermeneutical philosophy is the empirical social, cogniti&e, psychological, neuro(iological, and medical sciences, where a profusion of theoretical models &ie with each other and conflict with the way people understand themsel&es in their own cultural practices.2B63 11. <n the ethical front, 1uestions li,e, $how does scientific theory, say, in medical science, relate to the lifeworld of cultural e)perience, say, a woman$s pregnancyG$ need to (e treated hermeneutically. 't is often assumed that scientific theory should replace the $fol, wisdom$ of human culture2B13C (ut that is (y no means e&ident. 1/. <n the religious and political front where hermeneutic methods are strongest, there is need for a more hermeneutical account of science$s pu(lic role as the principal agency of theoretical ,nowledge within a culture that is in great need of such ,nowledge, has such great respect for it, (ut is rac,ed (y deep uneasiness a(out its often implicit cultural agenda.2B/3 1:. Finally, returning to Heisen(erg$s description of 1uantum mechanics as a re*interpretation of classical mechanics, the writer has confidence that a hermeneutical analysis in the spirit of this paper would go far to throw light on the (asic $mysteries$ of the 1uantum theory.2B:3
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Feleppa, @. 219F13 KHermeneutic interpretation and scientific truth,K -hil. !oc. !ci., 11 , 0:*B:. Feyera(end, P. 219F73 9arewell to 4eason 27ondonC Aerso3. Fiumara, -. C. 219903 %he (etaphoric -rocess& /onnections between 5anguage and 5ife 27ondon and ;ew Ior,C @outledge3. F4elland, @. 219913 K%he %heory*ladenness of <(ser&ations, the @ole of cientific 'nstruments, and the =antian 1 -riori,K Internat. !tud. in the -hilosophy of !cience, 5 , /B9*/F6. Flec,, 7. 219:0D19793 %he Genesis and Development of a !cientific 9act, %rans. F. ?radley and %. %renn 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. Follesdal, ". 219793. KHermeneutics and the hypothetico*deducti&e method,K Dialectica, 33 , :19*::B. Fraassen, ?. &an. 219F63 %he !cientific Image 2<)fordC <)ford .ni&ersity Press3. -adamer, H*-. 219703 %ruth and (ethod, %rans. -. ?arden and E. Cumming 2;ew Ior,C JJJJJJJJ 219F/3 4eason in the 1ge of !cience 2Cam(ridge, #ass.C #'% Press3. JJJJJJJJ, pecht, 5.=., and tegmuller, !. 219FF3 )ermeneutics vs !cience+ %hree German iews trans. (y E. #. Connolly and %. =eutner 2;otre "ame, ';C ;otre "ame .ni&ersity Press3. -eert8, C. 2197:3 %he Interpretation of /ulture 2;ew Ior,C ?asic ?oo,s3. JJJJJJJJ 219F:3 5ocal 3nowledge 2;ew Ior,C ?asic ?oo,s3. -i(son, E. E. 219793 %he 2cological 1pproach to isual -erception 2?ostonC Houghton #ifflin3. ea(ury Press3.
-rondin, E. 2199>3 Introduction to -hilosophical )ermeneutics 2;ew Ha&enC Iale .ni&ersity Press3. JJJJJJ 219903 !ources of )ermeneutics 2Al(anyC .;I Press3.
-ross, P. @. and 7e&itt, ;. 2199>3 )igher !uperstitions& %he 1cademic 5eft and its 0uarrels with !cience 2?altimoreC Eohns Hop,ins .ni&ersity Press3. -uignon, C. ?. 219F:3 )eidegger and the -roblem of 3nowledge 2'ndianapolis, ';C Hac,ett3. -urwitsch, A. 219BB3 !tudies in -henomenology and -sychology 25&anstonC ;orthwestern .ni&ersity Press3. -utting, -. 2ed3. 219F63 -aradigms and 4evolutions 2;otre*"ameC .ni&ersity of ;otre*"ame Press3. Hac,ing, '. 219F:3 4epresenting and Intervening 2Cam(ridgeC Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. Hahlweg, =. and Hoo,er, C. 2eds3 219F93 Issues in 2volutionary 2pistemology 2Al(any, ;IC .;I Press3.
Hanson, ;. @. 219B13 -atterns of Discovery 2Cam(ridge and ;ew Ior,C Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. Heelan, P. A. 219B03 0uantum (echanics and .b$ectivity& %h -hysical -hilosophy of 7erner )eisenberg 2%he HagueC ;i4hoff3. JJJJJJJJ 219763 KLuantum 7ogic and Classical 7ogicC %heir @especti&e @oles,K !ynthese, 22 , :*::. JJJJJJJJ 21970a3 KHeisen(erg and @adical %heoretic Change,K :eit. f. allgemeine 7issenschaftstheorie, vi, 11:*1:F. JJJJJJJJ 21970(3 KHermeneutics of e)perimental science in the conte)t of the 7ife !orld,K in ". 'hde and @. Maner 2eds3, Interdisciplinary -henomenology 2%he HagueC ;i4hoff3, pp. 7*06. JJJJJJJJ 219F:aD19FF3 !pace--erception and the -hilosophy of !cience 2?er,eley and 7os AngelesC .ni&ersity of California Press. Paper(ac, 19FF3. JJJJJJJJ 219F:(3 K;atural science as a hermeneutic of instrumentation,K %he -hilosophy of !cience, 50 , 1F1*/6>. JJJJJJJJ 219F:c3 KPerception as a hermeneutical act,K in H. il&erman and ". 'hde 2eds3, )ermeneutics and Deconstruction 2Al(any, ;IC .;I Press3, pp. >:*0>. JJJJJJJJ 219F03 K#achine Perception,K in C. #itcham 2ed3, -hilosophy and %echnology II& Information %echnology and /omputers in %heory and -ractice 2"ordrecht and ?ostonC =luwer3, pp. 1:1*10B. JJJJJJJJ 219FB3 K'nterpretation and the tructure of pace in cientific %heory and in Perception,K in 4esearch in -henomenology ; I , ed. (y E. allis 2Atlantic Heights, ;EC Humanities Press3 pp. 1F7*199. JJJJJJJJ 219F7a3 KHusserl, Hil(ert, and the Criti1ue of -alilean cience,K in @. o,olows,i 2ed3, 2dmund )usserl and the -henomenological %radition 2!ashington, ".C.C %he Catholic .ni&ersity Press3, pp. 107*17:. JJJJJJJJ 219F7(3 KHusserl$s 7ater Philosophy of cience,K -hilosophy of !cience, 54 , :BF*:96. JJJJJJJJ 219F9a3 KAfter 5)perimentC @esearch and @eality,K 1mer.-hilos. 0rtly., 26 , /97*:6F. JJJJJJJJ 219F9(3 KIesH %here is a Hermeneutics of ;atural cienceC @e4oinder to #ar,us,K !cience in /ontext, 3 , >77*>FF. JJJJJJJJ 219913 KHermeneutical Phenomenology and the History of cience,K in ". "ahlstrom 2ed3, ,ature and !cientific (ethod& 7illiam 1. 7allace 9estschrift 2!ashington, ".C.C Catholic .ni&ersity of America Press3, pp. /:*:B. JJJJJJJJ 2199/3 K5)periment as Fulfillment of %heory.K in ".P. Chattopadhyaha and E.;. #ohanty 2eds3, -henomenology and Indian -hilosophy 2;ew "elhiC Council for Philosophical @esearch3, pp. 1B9*1F>.
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JJJJJJJJ 2199>3 K-alileo, 7uther, and the Hermeneutics of ;atural cience,K in %. tapleton 2ed3, %he 0uestion of )ermeneutics& 9estschrift for <oseph 3ockelmans 2"ordrechtD?ostonC =luwer3, pp. :B:*:70. JJJJJJJJ 219903 KAn Anti*epistemological or <ntological 'nterpretation of the Luantum %heory and %heories 7i,e it,K in ?. ?a(ich, ". ?ergoffen, and . -lynn 2eds3, /ontinental and -ostmodern -erspectives in the -hilosophy of !cience 2AldershotD?roo,field, A%C A&e(ury Press3, pp. 00*BF. JJJJJJJJ 21997a forthcoming3. K)erm=neuti'ue de la !cience 2xp=rimentale& 5a (=cani'ue 0uanti'ue et les !ciences !ociales,K in F. @astier, E*#. alans,is, and @. cheps 2eds3, )erm=neuti'ue& sciences et textes 2ParisC -resses 8niversitaires de 9rance3. JJJJJJJJ 21997( forthcoming3. K!hy a hermeneutical philosophy of natural sciencesGK, (an and 7orld, 30 . Heidegger, #. 2199B3 6eing and %ime, trans. (y Eoan tam(augh 2Al(any, ;IC .;I Press3. @eferences in the te)t are to page num(ers in the -erman edition found in the margins of this and other translations. JJJJJJJJ 219BB3 Discourse on %hinking& %ranslation of Gelassenheit, trans. (y Eohn Anderson and 5. Hans Freund 2;ew Ior,C Harper and @ow3. JJJJJJJJ 219B73 7hat Is a %hing+, trans. (y !.?. ?arton, Er. and A. "eutsch 2ChicagoC @egnery3. JJJJJJJJ 219BF3 7hat is /alled %hinkingG, trans. (y E.-. -ray 2;ew Ior,C Harper and @ow3. JJJJJJJJ 219773 %he 0uestion /oncerning %echnology and .ther 2ssays, trans. (y !. 7o&itt 2;ew Ior,C Harper Colophon3. Heisen(erg, !. 219/03 K8eber 'uantentheoretischer 8mdeutung kinematischer u. mechanischer 6e*iehungen,K :eit. f. -hysik, xxx, F79*F9:. JJJJJJJJ 219773 %he 8ncertainty -rinciple and 9oundation of 0uantum (echanics& 1 9ifty >ear !urvey, 27ondon, ;ew Ior,C !iley3. Hesse, #. and Ar(i(, #. 219FB3 %he /onstruction of 4eality 2Cam(ridgeC Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. Horgan, E. 2199B3 %he 2nd of !cience 2@eading, #AC Addison*!esley3. Hoyningen*Huene, P. 2199:3 4econstructing !cientific 4evolutions& %homas !. 3uhn's -hilosophy of !cience 2ChicagoC Chicago .ni&ersity Press3. HN(ner, =. 219F:3 /riti'ue of !cientific 4eason, trans. (y Paul @. "i)on and Hollis #. "i)on 2ChicagoC Chicago .ni&ersity Press3. Husserl, 5. 219763 %he /risis of 2uropean !cience and %ranscendental -hilosophy, trans. (y ". Carr 25&anstonC ;orthwestern .ni&ersity Press3. JJJJJJJJ 219>FD197:3 2xperience and <udgment, ed. (y 7udwig 7andgre(e, trans.(y E. . Churchill and =. Ameri,s 25&anston, '7C ;orthwestern .ni&ersity Press3. Eaco(, #. 2197B3 %he ,ewtonians and the 2nglish 4evolution ?@AB-?CDE 2'thaca, ;IC Cornell .ni&ersity Press3. Eohnson, #. 219F73 %he 6ody in the (ind 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. =isiel, %. 2199:3 %he Genesis of )eidegger's Being and Time 2?er,eleyC .ni&ersity of California Press3. =oc,elmans, E. E. 2199:3 Idea for a )ermeneutic of the ,atural !ciences 2"ordrechtD?ostonC =luwer3. JJJJJJJJ 219F03 )eidegger and !cience 2!ashington, ".C.C CA@P and .ni&ersity Press of America3. JJJJJJJJ and =isiel, %. 219763 -henomenology and the ,atural !ciences& 2ssays and %ranslations 25&anston, '7C ;orthwestern .ni&ersity Press3. =uhn, %. . 219763 %he !tructure of !cientific 4evolutions, /nd ed. 2ChicagoC Chicago .ni&ersity Press3. JJJJJJJJ 219773 %he 2ssential %ension 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. 7a,atos, '. and #usgra&e, A. 2eds3 219763 /riticism and the Growth of 3nowledge 27ondonC Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. 7a,off, -. and Eohnson, #. 219F63 (etaphors 7e 5ive 6y 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. 7atour, ?. 219F73 !cience in 1ction 2Cam(ridge, #AC Har&ard .ni&ersity Press3. JJJJJJJJ and !oolgar, . 219793 5aboratory 5ife 27ondon and ?e&erly HillsC age Pu(l.3.
#argolis, E. 219F73 !cience 7ithout 8nity& 4econciling the )uman and the ,atural !ciences 2<)ford and ;ew Ior,C ?lac,well3. JJJJJJJJ 2199B3 5ife 7ithout -rinciples& 4econciling %heory and -ractice 2Cam(ridge, #AC ?lac,well3. #ar,us, -. 219F73 K!hy is %here ;o Hermeneutics of ;atural cienceG 0*01. ome Preliminary %heses,K !cience in /ontext, 1 ,
#erleau*Ponty, #. 219B/3 %he -henomenology of -erception 27ondonC @outledge and =egan Paul3. #ueller*Aollmer, =. 2ed.3. 2199>3 %he )ermeneutics 4eader 2;ew Ior,C Continuum3. ;eedham, P. 2199B3 K#acroscopic <(4ectsC An 5)ercise in "uhemian <ntology,K -hilosophy of !cience, 63 , /60*//>.
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;el,in, ". 2199B3 K!hat are the science wars all a(outGK /hronicle of )igher 2ducation, Euly /B, p. A0/, and ept. B, pp. ?B*7. ;ic,les, %. 219903 KPhilosophy of !cience, 1:9*1B:. cience and History of cience,K .siris, 10 , /onstructing 3nowledge in the )istory of
<,rent, #. 219FF3 )eidegger's -ragmatism 2'thacaC Cornell .ni&ersity Press3. Pic,ering, A. 219903 %he (angle of %ruth& %ime, 1gency, and !cience 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. POggeler, <. 219F73 (artin )eidegger's -ath of %hinking, 2Atlantic Highlands, ;EC Humanities Press3. Polanyi, #. 2190F3 -ersonal 3nowledge& %oward a -ost-/ritical -hilosophy, 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. Putnam, H. 219F:3 4ealism and 4eason. /ollected -apers, ol. F . 2Cam(ridgeC Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. @adder, H. 2199B3 In and 1bout the 7orld 2Al(any, ;IC .;I Press3.
@ichardson, !. E. 219B:3 )eidegger& %hrough -henomenology to %hought 2%he HagueC ;i4hoff3. @icoeur, P. 2197F3 %he -hilosophy of -aul 4icoeur& 1n 1nthology of )is 7ork 2?oston, #AC ?eacon3. JJJJJJJJ 219F13 )ermeneutics and the )uman !ciences& 2ssays on 5anguage, 1ction and Interpretation, ed. and trans. (y E. ?. %hompson 2Cam(ridgeC Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. @ouse, E. 219F73 3nowledge and -ower& %oward a -olitical -hilosophy of !cience 2'thaca, ;IC Cornell .ni&ersity Press 19F73. JJJJJJJJ 2199B3 2ngaging !cience 2'thaca and 7ondonC Cornell .ni&ersity Press3. charff, @. 219903 /omte 1fter -ositivism 2Cam(ridgeC Cam(ridge .ni&ersity Press3. hapin, . 2199B3 !cientific 4evolution 2ChicagoC Chicago .ni&ersity Press3. JJJJJJJJ 2199>3 !ocial )istory of %ruth 2ChicagoC Chicago .ni&ersity Press3. JJJJJJJJ and chaffer, . 219F03 5eviathan and the 1ir -ump& )obbes, 6oyle, and the 2xperimental 5ife 2PrincetonC Princeton .ni&ersity Press3. chut8, A. 2197:3 %he -roblem of !ocial 4eality, ol. ? of /ollected -apers 2%he HagueC #artinus ;i4hoff3. ellars, !. 219B:3 !cience, -erception, and 4eality 27ondonC @outledge3. %oulmin, . 2199/3 /osmopolis& %he )idden 1genda of (odernity 2ChicagoC .ni&ersity of Chicago Press3. Aattimo, -. 2199/3 %he %ransparent !ociety 2?altimoreC Eohns Hop,ins .ni&ersity Press3. !achterhauser, ?. @. 2ed3 2199>3 )ermeneutics and %ruth 25&anston, '7C ;orthwestern .ni&ersity Press3.
NOTES
1. ee Heisen(erg 219/0, 197739 cf also Heelan 219B0, 1970a3. /.%he polarity (etween the methods of the human and natural sciences, that is, (etween hermeneutic 2 erstehen3 and e)planatory 2 erklGren3 method, has (een the su(4ect of many studies, from "ilthey to -adamer. %o mention a fewC "ilthey 219F93, Follesdal 219793, -adamer 21970, 19FF3, #argolis 219F7, 199B3. %he concern of this essay, namely, to address the e)planatory method of the natural sciences from the philosophical perspecti&e of hermeneutic philosophy, is shared with, among others, ?a(ich 2199>3, ?u(ner 219703, Crease 219903, 5ger 2199:3, Feleppa 219F13, F4elland 219913, -adamer 219F/3, HN(ner 219F:3, =oc,elmans 219F0, 199:3, #ar,us 219F73, @icoeur 2197F, 19F13, @ouse 219F73, charff 219903, and the present writer, e.g. Heelan 219B0, 1970(, 19F:aD19FF, 19F7a, 19F7(3. #any important writers, including -adamer, Apel, and Ha(ermas, are too im(ued with the classical &iew of natural science as uni1uely e)planatory that for historical** and perhaps, also practical** reasons characteri8es the culture of empirical research to (e open e)ponents of a hermeneutic philosophy of natural science. %his essay then will draw mostly from Heidegger and his commentators. :.Cf. "ilthey 219F939 and among other wor,s, ?leicher 219F6, 19F/3, Heelan 21991, 199>3. >. ee =uhn 21976, 19773, Flec, 219:0D19793, Crom(ie 2199>3, and others.
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0. ee, for e)ample, the wor, of ?. ?arnes, ". ?loor, H. Collins, #. Eaco(, ?. 7atour, A. Pic,ering, and . hapin, as well as the monumental wor, of Crom(ie 2199>3. B.Among the scholars in this field to whom ' implicitly refer in this paper are ;. Cartwright, '. Hac,ing, #. Hesse, =. Popper, H. Putnam, !. Luine, !. ellars, &an Fraassen, and E. Miman. 7. ee, for e)ample, how Cartwright 219F:3 and 5arman 2199/3 address some of these 1uestions. F.For an o&er&iew of the tradition see, for e)ample, ?leicher 219F6, 19F/3, Heelan 219F:aD19FF3, =oc,elmans 2199:3. %he -erman tradition is co&ered #ueller*Aollmer 2199>3 which contains (rief (i(liographies. ome of the (asic wor,s of the authors mentioned are listed among the references. 9.Among the many e)cellent commentaries on Heidegger and the hermeneutic tradition are ?ernasconi 2199:3, ?uc,ley 2199/3, "reyfus 219913, -rondin 2199>, 19903, -uignon 219F:3, -urwitsch 219BB3, =isiel 2199:3, =oc,elmans 219F0, 199:3, #ueller*Aollmer 2199>3, <,rent 219FF3, POggeller 219F73, and @ichardson 219B:3. 16.Crom(ie$s and hapin$s wor, illustrate this approach.
11.@ecognition should (e gi&en to P. Feyera(end for drawing attention to 4eason's difficulty** 4eason (eing theoretical science and the philosophy of science** in attempting to ma,e sense of the richly &aried real life historical circumstances in which scientific theory grows and from which it has sought to e)ercise hegemony o&er thought. ee, for e)ample, Feyera(end 219F73. #uch of this material needs to (e re*assessed in a different philosophical setting, a more hermeneutical one, from the one he was familiar with. 1/.%he notion of lifeworld was used (y Heidegger 2199B3, Husserl 219763, #erleau*Ponty 219B/3, chut8 2197:3, Heelan 219F:aD19FF3 and others9 it plays an important role in the tradition of hermeneutic philosophy. 1:.Cf also Heidegger 2199B3, :0>*:B>. 1>.Also influenced (y human temporality are, for e)ample, C. Hoo,er, @. ;e&ille, A. himony, #. !artofs,y, and others wor,ing in an e&olutionary naturalistic perspecti&e9 see Hahlweg and Hoo,er 219F93. As in the tradition of pragmatic philosophy of which this is an e)tension, the energy of disco&ery comes from action which, li,e hermeneutics, presupposes a certain priority for the -ood. 10.Cf for e)ample, Heidegger 2199B3, 106*101 2on the $hermeneutical circle$3, "ilthey 219F93, -adamer 219703, and, say, as e)emplified in %oulmin 2199/3. 1B.For e)ample, our current resources may (e poorer than the past to understand, say, the term, $magic,$ while for the term $disease,$ our current resources may (e richer**or, at least, different. 17. ee Heelan 21991, 199>3 for the dependency of meaning on an assumed fundamental corpus of literary resources, as e)emplified, say, (y a shelf of (oo,s in the li(rary.
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1F. ee Heidegger 2199B3,:07*:B>. 19.%here is a &i(rant and copious cross*disciplinary literature a(out historical, religious, ethical, political, and other cultural meanings of topics ranging from ?ig ?ang Cosmology to ethical aspects of science. Among the scientist contri(utors to these discussions are tephen Haw,ing, te&en !ein(erg, Paul "a&ies, and @ichard "aw,ins. %he non*scientists include, for e)ample, ethicians, historians, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists of science, and feminists. /6. uch traditions of interpretation tend to possess from the short term perspecti&e a static 1uality that from the long term perspecti&e shows up as an inauthenticity to (e o&ercome for the sa,e of growth of ,nowledge9 cf. Heidegger 2199B3, 9. /1.For the study of scientific re&olutions, see =uhn 219763, and the e)tensi&e literature that followed the pu(lication of this wor,9 in particular, 7a,atosD#usgra&e 219763, -utting 219F63, Hoyningen*Huene 2199:3. Paradigm re&olutions are also associated with the temporality of the human ,nower and communities of ,nowers, cf. Heidegger 2199B3, :7/*:7:. //.@eaders may find some difficulty with the meaning of this language. 't attempts to direct thin,ing to the foundations of e&ery articulation of human e)perience in the li&ed understanding of the lifeworld, antecedent 2in principle3 to the formation of perceptual ,inds 2of things, e&ents, etc.3 and their representations in language or language*li,e signs. ' ha&e translated orhabe as lifeworld background, orsicht as proposed theory, and orgriff as looked-for fulfillment in experience or experiment. /:.%his may (e e)pressed in a hermeneutical principleC the ?eing of understanding is the understanding of ?eing. %he o(4ect of understanding** Kdie !ache selbstK **necessarily (elongs to ?eing. %his may (e loo,ed upon as the hermeneutical 4oining of an upward mo&ement which is the search for understanding 2 orhabe9 see (elow3 and a downward mo&ement resulting in the self*manifestation of that 2die !ache selbst3 which is articulated (y theory 2 orsicht3 and gi&en in e)perience 2 orgriff3. />.%he term, $theory*laden$ was first used (y ;.@. Hanson against the empiricist &iew of scientific o(ser&ation9 he argued that scientific o(ser&ations were theory* laden9 see Hanson 219B13** there is more a(out this (elow. /0.?y isomorphism is meant a one*to*one translata(ility of any statement in one language into a uni1ue statement in the other language. %he two conte)t* dependent languages refer to the same things (ut from different, often interacting and mutually interfering, perspecti&es. ' ha&e argued that these languages are related among themsel&es within a lattice structure which includes a least upper (ound 2lu(3 and a greatest lower (ound 2gl(3 as well as complements. %his thesis is presented in Heelan 219F:aD19FF3, chaps. 16 and /B.%his is the "uhem or Luine*"uhem %hesis, arri&ed at (y another route9 cf. "uhem 2191>D190>3. /7.$%his$ former hammer could now possi(ly (e a museum*piece, (ut more li,ely it is 4un,.
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/F.%he socio*cultural meaning then is not something that can (e dropped, li,e slag from ore when a metal is refined, (ut essential to the intelligi(ility of the meaning. For an understanding of cultural meaning, see -eert8 2197:, 19F:3. /9.5mpiricist accounts of measurement are legion9 many of them ha&e purposes that are not strictly philosophical (ut methodological. Philosophers of science ha&e also written on measurement (ut mostly from the &iewpoint that empirical measures are grounded in ideal, o(4ecti&e, in the short term uni1ue, and realistic &alues. For a hermeneutic &iew on measurement and data, see Heelan 219F9a3. For its (ac,ground in Heidegger, see 2199B3, :07*:B>. :6.'n physics, these are sometimes called $preparation$ or $measurement of the first ,ind$ and $o(ser&ation$ or $measurement of the second ,ind$ respecti&ely. ee Heelan 219F:aD19FF3, chap. 11. and Heelan 219F:(, 19F9a, 199/3. :1.%his is a point also made (y Hac,ing 219F:3 (ut from a different perspecti&e. :/.!hat follows comes from a further e)ploration and correction of Hanson$s Ktheory*ladenness,K and is also in part a criti1ue of F4elland 219913. ::.How this analysis applies to a $closed$ system, that is, one that is not interacting with its en&ironment, needs further study. %he study of $closed$ and $open$ systems within this conte)t in&ol&es also a study of the spaceDtime notions of $(ody,$ e.g., a (ody$s $spatial (oundaries,$ its $si8e,$ $mass,$ $1uantity,$ etc. and how the notions of $macroscopic$ and $microscopic$ apply. ome of these ha&e (een partially addressed in recent literature, e.g., see ;eedham 2199B3 and the references he gi&es, (ut these studies are against a philosophical (ac,ground that is o(4ect* and concept*oriented. ;one of these analyses addresses satisfactorily how the meaning of these terms relate to a (ody$s lifeworld engagement, say, in measurement. :>.@ouse 2199B3, p. /7 and in chap. 9. :0.For the notion of culture, cf. -eert8 2197:, 19F:3. :B.<f course, there is always an alternati&e strategy, the researcher may re*e&aluate the interpretati&e conte)t of the e)periment and pursue another goal. For a more detailed study of data, see Heelan 219F9a, 199/3, also 219F:aD19FF3. :7. ee Heelan 219F:aD19FF3, chap. 11. :F.%he e)ample that follows was ta,en from "udon 2199:3. :9.Polanyi seems to say the same in different termsC the focal meaning conceals a tacit meaning9 see Polanyi 219B>3. >6.@adder 2199B3 who comes to a similar conclusion. >1.%hese conclusions prepare the ground for ?a(ich$s reading of ;iet8sche$s philosophy of science 2?a(ich 199>3 in which she e)plores with elegance ;iet8sche$s perspecti&alism or musical KconcinnityK in relation to truth, morality, and the criti1ue of science. >/.Contrast the &iews of ?ly 2199B3 and Aattimo 2199/3 a(out the post*modern effects of the dismantling of 5nlightenment culture. As "a&id ?romwich wrote in a
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re&iew of the former in %he ,ew 4epublic, eptem(er 9 P /:, 199B, $... progress for QAmericansR means almost e)clusi&ely technological impro&ement ... ?ut all the new tools a people master cannot assure their generous use. %echnology tra&els a different road from political sta(ility, moral well*(eing or aesthetic achie&ement...$ 2p. :>3. ee also, "udon 2199:3, for a feminist perspecti&e. Also Heelan 219F:aDFF3, chap. 10. >:. uch as, for e)ample, made (y Fraassen 219F63. >>.%his confusion can arise from the common (ut mista,en conception that the &alue of a theoretical &aria(le is to (e identified with the ideal or limiting &alue o(tained (y e&er more precise measurements. uch a conception does not wor,, as =ant indicated, for any singular theoretical &alue must (e postulated a priori. ;either can it (e uni1uely deri&ed inducti&ely from an empirical series. #oreo&er, as the argument a(o&e shows, empirical data (elong to the domain of the culturally manifested o(4ect 2the explicandum3 while the theoretical &alues (elong to the mathematical model of the measurement process 2the explicans3. >0.For a more technical account, influenced (y -i(son 219793 and Husserl 219>FD197:, 19763, of what constitutes a phenomenological perceptual entity, see Heelan 219F:aD19FF, 19F0, 19FB, 19F7(3. >B.Heelan 219F:aD19FF, 19FB, 1997(3. >7.For the transformation of pu(lic space in renaissance 'taly, see Heelan 219F:aD19FF3, chap. B9 for other rele&ant comments, see chapter 11. Putting the emphasis on the transformation of perception effected (y instruments, this philosophy is $hori8onal realism$9 putting the emphasis on the hermeneutical character of the processes of disco&ery and recognition in physics, this philosophy is $hermeneutical realism.$ ' ha&e used (oth designations. For the hermeneutic aspect of e)perimentation, see Heelan 21970(, 19F:aD19FF, 19F:(, 19F9a, 199/3. >F. ee Heelan 219F:aD19FF3, chaps. 16 and 1:, which is (ased on Heelan 219763. %he glosses would correct the interpretation of the language lattice in the light of the more de&eloped doctrine of this paper. %he author intends to re&isit this topic in another wor,. >9.%he author has used conte)t logic to articulate the sense of complementarity in the 1uantum theory. "ata in the empirical social sciences are also su(4ect to complementarity conditions, which suggests that theories of the 1uantum type and conte)t logic might (e useful in the social science domain. ee Heelan 21990, 1997a3. 06.%his is the su(stance of Feyera(end$s criti1ue of the culture of science in Feyera(end 219F73. 01.%he recent history of science contains a wealth of material a&aila(le for this study. Among recent pu(lications should (e noted the magisterial wor, of Crom(ie 2199>3. <n the historicity of meaning, see Fiumara 219903. 0/.For a profound discussion of metaphor and model, see Fiumara 2199039 also Hesse and Ar(i( 219FB3. From the side of linguistics and discourse analysis, see 7a,off and Eohnson 219F63 and Eohnson 219F73.
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0:. ome (rief reflections on the limits of precisionC the chaos situation in physics is an anti*Cartesian phenomenon that arises when the unlimited precision of a theory in mapping inputs and outputs (rea,s down 2fails in relation to the cultural scientific goal of control3, as when small changes in practice produce large and uncontrolla(le outcomes. Perhaps, a li,e anti*Cartesian phenomenon occurs in dielectical discourse when unlimited clarity is pursued to a point where the o&erall cultural point of the discourse 2(etter understandingG control o&er the discourseG3 is no longer attaina(le. <n the side of the social studies of science 7atour 219F73 seems to (e most aware of this impasse. Cf., for e)ample, Heelan 219B0, 1976, 1970a, 1970(, 19F7(3. 0>.=uhn 219763 hints at this &iew. #yth is an animating force at the le&el of deepest human commitments and its presence in a scientific tradition would confer on it a greater degree of no(ility than would (e accounted for if theory were 4ust e)planatory. 00.%he &iew is defended (y Heelan 219F9a3 and Crease 219903. 0B. ee Fiumara 219903, pp. 0/, B1, 70. 07.How frustrating these topics are can (e read from the literature, for e)ample, 5arman 2199/3, Hesse and Ar(i( 219FB3, Cartwright 219F:3, and the feminist writers in criti1ue of science. 0F. ee, for e)ample, ?ell 219F73, Cartwright 219F:3. 09. ee ;ic,les 219903. B6. ome of the ,ey areas are in the theoretical modelling of intelligence, perception, and decision*ma,ing. %here is a large literature that addresses these 1uestions from a &ariety of philosophical perspecti&es, (ut only a small proportion (ases itself on hermenetuic philosophy. For a hermeneutic study of perception, see Heelan 219F:aD19FF, 19F:c, 19F0, 19FB3. B1. ee "udon 2199:3. B/.!itness the current $science wars$ and the lamenta(le misunderstandings on all sides. From the science side, see Horgan 2199B3, -ross and 7e&itt 2199>39 from the science studies side, see !ocial %ext, pringD ummer 199B and 5ingua 9ranca, #ayDEune and EulyDAugust 199B. For one account of the underlying tensions, see ". ;el,in 2199B3 and see also the responses it generated. B:.Among these are the 8ncertainty -rinciple, and pro(lems a(out locali*ation, causality, the observer's role in measurement, and the paradoxes of macroscopic 'uantum phenomena as illustrated, say, (y !chrHdinger's /at, the 2-4 -aradox, and 6ell's Ine'uality. QAfter Post*#odernism Conference. Copyright 1997.R
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The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

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Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

II. Interpretation and meaning

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

Heelan (background) - After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneu...

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