Serigne Fall 11/28/2013 HIST 231: Historical Research and Methods Dr. Daniel J. Clasby, P.h.

D The Boer Wars: Causation & Responsibilities The struggle of emergence into the Republic of South Africa has been completely overshadowed by the historical writings that surrounded by the two world wars that occurred within that historical time frame. This Uitlander conflict, in its entirety, is the nucleus for what caused the Boer Wars. The Uitlanders were almost entirely British; they entered the Boer state of Witwatersrand, in hopes of gaining fortune from their recently discovered gold mines. When these Uitlanders (outsiders in Boer vernacular) arrived to the goldfields, they brought their skills, money, and mining knowledge. However, the Boers along with their President began to change the terms by which the Uitlanders could gain their citizenship, this created much animosity between the two dueling frenemies.1 And while most historians agree on the reality of Uitlander grievances as a contributing factor for the Anglo-Boer wars, the causation and responsibilities are still up for debate. Most of the historians surrounding this topic have evidently bestowed great insight into the consequences -which is the Boer wars. In respects to capturing the essence of the effect, most early-historians on the Boer Wars have inconsistently filled in what they might have thought, with minimal reason, to be the cause of the war. For Britain, during the last 5 years of the nineteenth century, there was the braggart years which subsequently lead to the development of the imperialist mentality- of which was Ladysmith History Online accessed December 9th, 2013, http://www.ladysmithhistory.com/the-town/
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merely an accepted standard of British imperial morality. The goal of this paper is to present as many thoroughly articulated causations as my research could present. Im doing this in hopes of the reader being able to get a better picture of this House of History.

The clash of the Marxist/Anti-imperialist and the Pro-British/Conservative: As a result of this major conflict, mostly, liberals increased their opposition to the radical imperialist efforts of the British Empire. Mr. John Hobson, one of the first historians to investigate the causations of the Boer Wars conflict stated in 1902, The economic root of imperialism is the desire of strong organized industrial and financial interests to secure and develop at the publics expense and by the publics forced private markets for their surplus good and surplus capital.2 For Mr. Hobson, an influencer of the twentieth century Marxist history, the bourgeoisie controlled the distribution of the national product, and as a result, a surplus was given to the bourgeoisie. This analysis of imperialism, in the context of an Englishman, taking Marxist stance on this loose expansionist efforts in South Africa was not taken lightly by the intellectual community of Great Britain. So, as imperialism became the tabooed policy, the self-fashioned demagoguery was subsequently given a closer investigation. In this paper I will attempt to capture the evolution of both causes and responsibilities that lie in this war. By doing this I will present a myriad of related yet contradicting claims, while analyzing the primary resources as they are discovered, and interpreted throughout the history of this study. Thomas Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (The United Kingdom: Cosimo, 1902) pg. 52-54A classic early twentieth century indictment of imperialism.
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As time passed each major viewpoint of the Boer Wars found its championing among historians. Like many of the 20th century historians, J. A. Hobsons, The War in South Africa, Its Causes and Effects -an economist who spent years in South Africa, leans on the relationship of moneyed interest in the part they played in engineering the war for financial gain. Structuralism is what will later define the task of Hobson as he pushes home the argument that a this war was none other than the cause of trumped up grievances which, in the end, drew the British government and its public to their rescue. This argument was presented in the dawn of the 20th century around 1904. This was another classic propaganda piece, aimed to reform the radical expansionist efforts of the British Empire. Hobson claims that this was for the sake of increased profit: The mining capitalist stood to gain and immediately3, the public accepted this coterie-conspiracy ridden argument as gospel. One historian, John Strachey, the author of The End of Empire said, in ultimate agreement with Hobson says, But who can really doubt that that the simple issue on which the war was fought was whether or not independent Boer sovereignty was to be cleared out of the way of the British entrepreneurs and investors who wanted to make their fortunes out of mining the diamonds of gold which, it has been discovered underlay the fields which the Boers were tilling?4 Historical writings later began to support such claims.

J.A Hobson, The War in South Africa, Its Causes and Efects, 2nd ed. (London: James Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1900), pp. 52-61, (accessed pdf October 16, 2013)
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John Stratchey, The End of Empire, (Random House; First Edition: 1960)

On the contrary Professor Keppel-Jones, from the University of Witwatersrand, argues that he sees no conspiracy and this includes the capitalist interests or British officials. Instead, Dr. Jones states in a chapter entry entitled A Test Case for Protection by the Mother Country5, that the Boer War started as a conflict that was caused by a rival group in the Transvaal, and he suggests that if the British government had not intervened, this might have cost Britain the loyalty of thousands of her own people. In both the accounts of Dr. Keppel Jones and Mr. Hobson, they both are contradictory, yet have one thing in common. In their analysis of the war- it was limited to visiting South Africa and simply seeing different accounts and creating what they may have believed to be true. This was the reality of history before the 1930s. A New Revealing Source Changes the Course of the Interpretation of Boer Wars: Shortly afterwards, a brand-new revealing source had now forever changed the study of Boer Wars and the availability of primary sources. Since 1945, the new source materials, chiefly, the papers of Joseph Chamberlain6 and Cecil Rhodes, and records in the Public Records Office in London have created a greater and intensified study of which caused the Boer Wars this has lead to many revisions and interpretations. So, far Ive only touched on two interpretations that have only emphasized the more narrow idea

Arthur Keppel-Jones, South Africa: A Short Story, 3rd revised edition (London, 1961), pp. 116-133. 6 Joseph Chamberlain, University of Birmingham Information Services, Special Collection Department, (ref. GB-150-JC: 1819-Early Twentieth Cent.): http://archiveshub.ac.uk/data/gb150-jc

that the Boer Wars were brought on by the interest of a particular group, but these newly found writings tell a larger story. With the aim of telling the larger story these newly discovered sources also completely dismissed R.C.K Ensors argument published Chamberlain Did Not Foreknow the Raid7- referring to the infamous Jameson Raid, while arguing this point he cites the account of the raid and parallels it with the inquiry of the select committee to interrogate Chamberlain. In great hopes, I can imagine, Ensor wanted to appease the political climate. In the year 1937, when he wrote this piece, Chamberlains son was acting Prime Minister- and the loyalties in intellectual thought would rather comply with keeping the Chamberlain name in its innocence, and this also was avoiding the blot of the Jameson Raid which would forever stain the history of 19-century Britain. To accept the past was to hold someone accountable; Britain wasnt ready to do that. But, what Secretary Chamberlain was saying to the investigative committee of the House of Commons and what his correspondence show are two completely different things. Dr. Jean Van der Poels presents a powerful study of British conspiracy to overthrow the Transvaal Republic and she points out that not only did Chamberlain lie to the British Public- but also the members of the House of Commons were more than happy to assist him in such a deceitful political maneuver8. While these reasons for complying with the PMs office were for mostly patriotic bias not all of the members of the House complied that easily with Chamberlains answer of not having involvement

R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of The Oxford History of England, ed. G. N. Clark (Oxford, 1936), pp. 226-236
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Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press: Jean van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, (Cape Town, 1951), pp. 259-262.
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with the Jameson raid. According to Dr. Van der Poel, the Radical/Liberal members of the House of Commons request for yet another inquiry into the productions of all relevant papers- including letters of Chamberlain and was subsequently met with a defeated motion 286 to 152 votes by members of the House. The great cloud of complicity filled the halls of the government, and at the conclusion of Chamberlains son reign as Prime Minister, the controversial documents were released. But had the Boers retaliated in War against Great Britain because of an attempt coup dtat, and then this answer to the cause of the Boer Wars has significant loose ends to it. Mainly, because the burden of proof had not fully exist on the part of Chamberlain if he admitted to complicity on the part of the Jameson raid then that would have forced Chamberlain to resign in 1896. People still speculated, not Dr. van der Poel that had Chamberlain confessed to complicity in the raid Great Britain and Germany would have had war. However, this prediction even if sincerely made, had absolutely no foundation. Apart from just looking at the Jameson conflict as a point for reference Mr. Arthur Keppel-Jones points out three distinct reasons that solely were the reason for the Boer/British conflict, these were: geography, the railroad system, and natural resource. Mr. Keppler Jones states, with Rhodes being a hardy/domineering force in the Diamond market, and by controlling the diamond markets of the world, he single handedly used his company De Beers to promote the British South African Company. The British South African Company received an imperial charter and became the means of colonizing and conquering Rhodesia. Although, that story lies outside the scope of this historiography, it has major repercussions on the established colonies in South Africa. Out of this wealth in the British South African Company, Mr. Rhodes raised The Pioneer Column - a military

erected by Rhodes in order to secure resources in Mashonaland in 1890. In addition, for the first time Kruger had a good card to play- the Boer people were much elated that they too received concession to Mashonaland. Until they met the British on the territory and received papers that the British received the rights to Mashonaland before them, therefore the Boers had to pay a custom tariff. This tariff was far too heavy so the Volksraad- (Boer Parliament) didnt approve, and the Boers were completely cut off from the Sea. Here, the British were placing themselves in a position of strong bargaining power in respects to their interest in exporting resources in the Transvaal. Rhodes, who Mr. Keppel-Jones credits as the engineer of such audacious attempts, was principal in aligning new Boer relations as quid pro quo. Some could say that the British were making efforts to create the microcosm of the world. But this was unfair due to the already position of balance that the British Empire had brought in respects to finances and amalgamation. One the other side of the coin was the Boers- who had a more agrarian economy of bartering. Mr. Keppel-Jones holds the Germany, who also wanted a stake in the Transvaal mining sector, too was landlocked from any South African port- apart from the Portuguese, whose distance was too far for any rational business man to pursue. The next hit at the Boer people was the established railroad by the Cape government, which provided a cheaper railroad system than the Boer Government. This railroad system faced an immense amount of debt and needed to repay its loan, according to an investigation conducted in 1959 by Mr. Keppel-Jones. Afterwards, the Cape-British began to offer cheaper access for entrepreneurs to travel from the Cape to the Rand-(Boer territory), so Kruger blocked access to the British- because entrepreneurs were finding quixotic ways

to avoid these financial penalties. But the British took a firm stand and rallied Boers, Americans, and English against this Kruger maneuver. Mr. Keppel Jones looks at this exchange between Rhodes and Kruger as almost a game, the power-plays throughout history begins to shape this emerging conflict as what most historians credit as the Uitlander conflict. Its still agreed amongst historians as the most valid of causes presented in the school of structuralism.9 Another Theory? The Boer Conspiracy: Event though the Boers have taken their place in history as the defeated ones, they too conspired against the British. Mr. E.T Cook explains the motives behind Transvaal supremacy in A Far Ranging Boer Conspiracy. In a summary of his book, Mr. Cook explains the difference in the Boer approach to expanding its Borders in South Africa. Mr. Cook states, Its (referring to Boers) ambition was to become and absolutely independent and sovereign State, constantly enlarging its borders and throwing off daughter Republics.10 One could infer that when the time comes for a United States of Africa aimed at the Afrikaner bond, the paramount power would be that of the Boer Republics not Great Britain. Mr. Cook references the annual revenues that the Boer raised and how they surpassed any costs that they had. The Boers also focused on employing those revenues to benefit the unrepresented Englishman to whom the prosperity of the state was mostly due. But the Boers also employed revenues in accumulating a massive armament which its intended use was for England. When Cook examined the policy and political climates Arthur Keppel-Jones, South Africa: A Short Story, 3rd revised edition (London, 1961), pp. 119 10 E. T. Cook, Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War, new and revised edition (London: Edward Arnold, 1902) pp. 276-279
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of the legislature that was in the British Colonies he realized the both Boers and British served on it- to their dismay, British had no place in the unicameral Boer legislature. So, ever since 1881, the Boers aggressively pursued a hostile policy towards the British.

But, in this 1902 publication, Mr. Cook examines the Convention of 1884; here the Boers limited their ambitions to achieve supremacy over Britain in two ways. Mr. Cook states, It placed the republic in a position of semi-interdependence on Great Britain; and it strictly shut it off from the encroachment beyond its borders. This convention to create a sovereign and international (The South African Republic), however in Article IV which treaties negotiated by Her Majesty The Queen of Great Britain remained reserved for her approval. This was a convention of which historians like Hobbs and Keppel-Jones gave strange misinterpretations. The Quarterly Review gives a very lucid account of the Boer/Britain negations in respects to the convention. Apart from the amount of historians crediting Great Britain, as the leading causation for the wars, the Quarterly review paints an entirely different picture. In fact, in a policy of conciliation, Great Britain surrendered Swaziland to the Boers, and offered President Kruger a seaport. The of course came with conditions, as was everything, the conditions were, that the South African Republic should not, without approval of Her Majestys government, part with the harbor, or enter into any treaty regarding it; and if any dispute is to arise, then negotiations should be carried by Her Majestys government. However, Kruger rejected the conditions, and the result of that was a rejection for the seaport. What were his motives? Kruger tried threats; the concessions obtained for him on the seacoast might be transferred to some foreign power.

Claims were put forward in the negotiations of 1883; this showed the ultimate ambitions of the Boer people. The English in habitants of their country were disenfranchised; they were unrepresented, but they were taxed, and the money was used to convert the Republic into a powerful military State, and at the same time to provide for a large expenditure in Secret Service, both in Europe and in Africa. This combination of powerful Boer military artillery and ammunition would be pursued in such an attempt to invade British colonies. These were the same colonies that come from the British Empire who offered, upon the Boers signings the fairly reasonable agreement in the harbor pact, offered to give a complete guarantee against any attack upon the independence of the South African Republic, either from within any part of the British dominions, or from the territory of any foreign state. E. T. Cook states, It is idle to suppose that the great armament of the Transvaal were procured as a protections against the native Africans. Or another Jameson raid. The remarks of an ex-Cape minister said, The Transvaal is armed almost like a European power, while six field-pieces would be adequate to protect them from the native Africans. Then, what then could it want with fifty, sixty, or eighty modern Krapp guns of the best type? 11 Does this signal to you as a sign of a set up perpetrated by the British government. This causation is very plausible. As ruthless as President Kruger was beginning to become, it doesnt surprise historians that the Boers resisted the most practical forms of trade in order to ascend into deliberately planned and strenuously manipulated attempt to take over British Colonies. In this emerging argument, the British
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E. T. Cook, Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War, new and revised edition (London: Edward Arnold, 1902) pp. 281-282

who put their hand out had it bitten, and they had to retaliate in a matter that would both retain their reputation as the imperial leader of the world. A Closer Look At The Personality (Chamberlain and Milner): Another way of analyzing the Boer Wars were analyzed through a to a great extent was an analysis of the One of them being Chamberlin, the other, Milner. Chamberlain was fortunate to have J. L. Garvin as his biographer; he intricately delved into the mindset of the Boer War- Chamberlain, of which many historians have attempted to capture through his role in the critical summer leading up to the Wars in 189912. The government appointed Sir Alfred Milner the posts of High Commissioner and GovernorGeneral of the Cape in August 1897 to pursue the issue more decisively. Within a year, Milner concluded that war with the Transvaal was inevitable, and he worked with Chamberlain to publicize the cause of the Uitlanders to the British people13. A meeting between President Kruger and Milner, at Bloemfontein in May 1899 failed to resolve the Uitlander problem. Milner considered Krugers concessions inadequate by Milner, and the Boers left the conference convinced that the British were determined to settle the future of South Africa by force. By now, British public opinion was supportive of a war and in support of the Uitlanders, allowing Chamberlain to ask successfully for further troop reinforcements.

A Look at The Black South African:

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Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, III (London, 1934), pp. 424 The Milner Papers, Vol. I, South Africa, 1897- 1899 (London, 1931)

After the post-modernist movement, historians began to look into the many segment of society that was affected by the Boer Wars. By doing this they attempted to draw attention away from the Boers and Anglos and focus on the plight that affected the minority segments of populations. In the 1999 Military History Journal, Nosipho Nkuna, takes a look how the both British looked at black Africans and Boers in South Africa. He states The South African War of 1899-1902 was essentially a 'White mans' war, fought to determine which white authority had real power in South Africa but other populations groups like the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazis and Basotho and Sothos were also involved in the war. Although there was an unwritten agreement between the Boers and the British that Blacks would not be armed in the war, neither side adhered to this agreement.14 It was estimated that about 100, 000 Blacks were employed by the British army and more than 10 000 received arms. The British army used Black workers for carrying dispatches and messages, to take care of their horses and assist in the veterinary department. They also were used to do sanitary work and construct forts. Armed Black sentries guarded blockhouses and were used to raid Boer farms for cattle. Therefore, the black took minor roles in aiding the British. And whats interesting about this is the political consciousness that blacks held; they believed that the defeat of the Boers would mean more political, educational and commercial opportunities would be afforded to them. On the Boer side, Republican law forbade the carrying of arms by Blacks, but because many Boers were pressed into service, they allowed their servants to carry arms. Nosipho Nkuna. Black Involvement in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 Military History Journal Vol. 11, (October 1999) http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol113nn.html (accessed October 16, 2013 )
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Black cooperation in the war enabled a larger number of whites to serve actively in war operations on both sides. Refusal on the part of the Blacks to serve could see them punished with a fine of 5 pounds, imprisonment or 25 lashes. Although there is no accurate figure, some sources say that at least 10,000 Black men accompanied the Boer Commandos and, as a rule, labor conscripted by the Boers received no pay. In contrast, the British recruited on the basis of a three-month contract with a monthly wages of 40 to 50 shillings. A major consolation to Blacks entering the British army was the fact that rations were usually included. The fact that the black Africans were in fact a part of this war, there is no compelling evidence that suggest it was their intention to take up arms against the British or Boers. There is evidence that early on, in the settlement years of the British, black South Africans with emphasis on the Zulu, were adamant on removing the Boers from their land. In addition to that evidence, there is also the oral contracts that the both the British and Boers received whence the annexation of Mashonaland caused such conflict with both parties. The goal of this paper is to present as many thoroughly articulated causations as my research could present. Im doing this in hopes of the reader being able to get a better picture of this House of History in the Boer Wars. As each of these strong arguments continue to build and contribute better answers as to why reason and judgment lead to such a bloody conflict. I hope to obtain possession of the Chamberlain papers, because I actually have my own educated guesses as to why this conflict occurred, and its along the lines of the Boers actually pressuring the British government to respond to their expansionism.

Bibliography Primary: The Milner Papers, Vol. I, South Africa, 1897-1899. ed.Cecil Headlam (London, 1931). pp. 229-223. Reprinted by permission of New College, Oxford. Chamberlain, Joseph. University of Birmingham Information Services, Special Collection Department, (ref. GB-150-JC: 1819-Early Twentieth Cent.): http://archiveshub.ac.uk/data/gb150-jc (accessed November 16, 2013) Tertiary: Ladysmith History Online, The Town accessed December 9th, 2013, http://www.ladysmithhistory.com/the-town/ Secondary Sources: Hobson, J.A. Imperialism; a Study, London: Allen & Unwin, 1938, pp. 54- 106. Hobson, J.A. The War on South Africa: Its Causes and Effects, 2nd ed. London: James Nisbet and Co. Ltd., pp. 52-61 Stratchey, John. The End of Empire. Random House; First Edition. Keppel-Jones, Arthur. South Africa: A Short Story, 3rd Revised Edition. (London, 1961), pp. 116-133. Garvin, J.L. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, III. (London, 1934) pp. 424. Reprinted by permission of Mamillan & Co., Ltd. Cook, E.T. Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War, new and revised edition(London: Edward Arnold, 1902) pp. 281-282, 276-279. Jean, van der Poel, The Jameson Raid (Capetown, 1951), pp. 259-262. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press Drus, Ethel. The Question of Imperial Complicity in the Jameson Raid. LXVIII (1953) pp. 582-587. Nosipho, Nkuna. Black Involvement in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 Military History Journal Vol. 11, (October 1999) http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol113nn.html (accessed October 16, 2013 )