ARTICLE IN PRESS

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Fire and explosion risk assessment for large-scale oil export terminal
Yu.N. Shebeko, I.A. Bolodian, V.P. Molchanov, Yu.I. Deshevih, D.M. Gordienko, I.M. Smolin, D.S. Kirillov
All Russian Scientic Research Institute for Fire Protection, VNIIPO 12, Balashiha-3, Moscow Region, 143903, Russia Received 18 November 2006; received in revised form 7 April 2007; accepted 7 April 2007

Abstract Now in Russian Federation and other countries large-scale oil terminals (volume of one tank exceeds 100 000 m3, total volume of tanks exceeds 300 000 m3) are designed and constructed. Therefore re safety of such objects becomes a very important task, solution of which is hardly possible without detail re risk assessment. This study is aimed to a solution of this problem. Potential, individual and social risks were calculated. The potential risk was dened as a frequency of occurrence of hazardous factors of res and explosions in a given point of space (the so-called risk contours). The individual risk was dened as a frequency of injuring a given person by hazardous factors of res and explosions. Time of presence of this person in hazardous zones (near the hazardous installation) is taken into account during calculations of the individual risk. Social risk was dened as a dependence of frequency of injuring a given number of people by hazardous factors of res and explosions on this number. In practice the social risk is usually determined on injuring not less than 10 people. The oil terminal under consideration includes the following main parts: crude oil storage consisting of three tanks of volume 100 000 m3 each, input crude oil pipeline of diameter 0.6 m, crude oil pumps, output crude oil pipeline of diameter 0.8 m, auxiliary buildings and facilities. The following main scenarios of tank res have been considered: rim seal re, pool re on a surface of a oating roof, pool re on a total cross-section surface of the tank, pool re in a dyke, explosions in closed or semiclosed volumes. Fires and explosions in other parts of the terminal are also taken into account. Effects of escalation of accidents are considered. Risk contours have been calculated both for the territory of the terminal and for the neighbouring space. The potential risk for the storage zone is near 104105 year1, and at a distance 500 m from the terminal the potential risk values do not exceed 106 year1. The values of the individual risk for various categories of workers are in the range of 105106 year1. Because of low number of the workers on the terminal and large distances to towns and villages the social risk value is negligible. These risk values are consistent with practice of the best oil companies, and re hazard level of the terminal can be accepted as tolerable. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Risk; Oil terminal; Explosion; Fire

1. Introduction Because of design and construction of large-scale oil terminals (with a volume of a tank over 100 000 m3 and a total volume of the tanks over 300 000 m3) the task of re safety ensuring of such objects becomes very important (Bezrodny, Giletich, Merkulov, Molchanov, & Shvirkov, 1996; LASTFIRE, 1997; Persson & Lonnermark, 2003; Sharovarnikov, Molchanov, & Voevoda, 2002). Fires on
Corresponding author. Tel.: +7 495 5298466; fax: +7 495 5298036.

E-mail address: YN_SHEBEKO@MAIL.RU (Yu.N. Shebeko). 0950-4230/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2007.04.008

such large oil storages can have catastrophic consequences both for neighbouring objects and environment. At the same time an experience of re safety ensuring of such large-scale terminals is not sufcient (particularly taking into account their location in areas with a severe climate). Therefore a detailed analysis of re risk is needed, and on its basis adequate re safety measures can be determined. The importance of the re risk analysis is stipulated also by the following fact that pool res on a total cross-section surface of a large-scale tank can hardly be extinguished by existing re ghting equipment. The maximum diameter of a tank, re on a total cross-section surface of which was

ARTICLE IN PRESS
652 Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658

ever extinguished by the existing re ghting equipment, had a diameter of nearly 35 m (Persson & Lonnermark, 2003). This study is aimed to an assessment of potential, individual and social re risk for the large-scale onshore oil terminal with a storage of a total volume 300 000 m3 and the capacity of each tank 100 000 m3. The obtained results are compared with criteria stated both by Standard GOST R 12.3.047-98 (1998) and standards of leading oil companies (a detailed analysis of acceptable risk values is presented in Ale, 1991; Shebeko et al., 2004; Vorobjev, Kopulov, Shebeko, & Chernoplekov, 2004). 2. Brief description of the terminal Crude oil is supplied on the terminal by a pipeline of internal diameter 600 mm with a mean ow rate near 300 000 m3/day and stored in the tanks. Loading of tankers is produced from the tanks by three parallel pumps and a loading pipeline of internal diameter 750 mm with a ow rate 80 000 m3/h. Crude oil volume loading into the tankers is measured by three measuring lines with turbine detectors. Crude oil quality is controlled on a special facility with taking of oil samples and their analysis in a laboratory building. Besides the main technological facilities the following buildings and structures are present on the terminal:

      

drainage tanks; pipelines for oil recirculation; facility for scraper introduction; foam storage; analyzer building; electrical substation; building for storaging of oil samples.

on an industrial site and their distribution across the territory and is determined by technological equipment and process peculiarities only. The potential risk is usually used as a criterion of tolerability of re hazard from the industrial object to population living near it, and also for calculations of the individual risk. The individual risk is dened as annual frequency of injuring a given person by hazardous factors of re. The individual risk is usually used as a criterion of tolerability of re hazard from the industrial object for workers of that or those profession. This concept takes into account the time of presence of the worker in hazardous zones with high level of the potential risk. The social risk is a dependence of a frequency of occurrence of events with injuring people by hazardous factors of a re on number of injured people. The social risk characterises a scale of a re hazard of an object. Usually the social risk is evaluated on injuring not less than 10 people. As it has been shown in Shebeko et al. (2004), methods for quantitative risk assessment described in literature can be divided into two main parts: methods based on an analysis of event trees (Elokhin, 2000; Safonov, Odishariya, & Shviryaev, 1996), and methods based on imitative modeling of accidents (like the Monte Karlo method) (Clay et al., 1988; Morris, Milos, & Cooper, 1991). In this study the method based in the event trees was used (as it is required by the Standard GOST R 12.3.047-98 (1998), see Fig. 1). The important question is a correct choice of methods for evaluation of impact parameters of accidents with res and explosions at various scenarios (for example, pool re in a dyke, rim seal re, jet re, boilover, etc.). The following main scenarios for oating roof tanks can be mentioned (LASTFIRE, 1997): 1. Rim seal re, which can occur at a rupture of material in some part of the rim seal and ignition of oil vapours. 2. Pool re at a surface of a oating roof. This type of a re can realize at the following conditions: J rupture of some part of the oating roof, formation of a liquid pool on its surface and its ignition; J partially sinking of the oating roof with the following ignition of oil over it; J ignition of oil vapours penetrating from ttings of the oating roof. 3. Fire on a total cross-section surface of the tank. This re can take place at a total or partial sinking of the oating roof. 4. Fire inside a dyke. This re can take place at a rupture of oil pipelines. 5. Explosion inside a pontoon or any other closed space. Explosion can occur at penetrating of oil vapours into compartments of the pontoon and their ignition, and also transition of the oating roof into the lowest position (on the support) and penetrating of air into the space under the roof.

The tankers during their loading are located on a rather large distance (over 500 m) from the terminal, therefore an inuence of a re of the tanker on the terminal is not taken into consideration. The inuence of re taking place on the terminal on the submarine part of the loading pipeline is also not considered. It was accepted that no towns and villages are present in area of radius 3 km from the terminal. 3. Method of analysis and input data As it was mentioned above the potential, individual and social risks were calculated in this study. Determinations of these risk values given in various documents sometimes differ from one another (see, for example, Standard GOST R 12.3.047-98 (1998) and Safety Rule RD 03-418-01 (2001)). Therefore the determinations of these concepts are given below. The potential re risk is dened as annual frequency of occurrence of hazardous factors in a given point of area. The potential risk does not depend on quantity of workers

ARTICLE IN PRESS
Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 653

A.1.1.1.1 A.1.1 Instantaneous ignition of discharging product with the following torch fire and pool fire A.1.1.1 Thermal action of a fire on a technological equipment Closing of a fitting

Safe burning of oil

Elimination of the accident B.1.1.1 B.1.1.1.1 Extinguishing of a fire Elimination of the accident

B.1.1 Fire in buildings and constructions

Destruction of buildings and constructions

On the stage B.1 A.1 Rupture of a pipeline

B.1

B.1.1.2 Extinguishing of a fire Elimination of the accident

Rupture of a technological equipment with a subsequent ignition of oil

B.1.2 Rupture of oil tanks A.1.2.1.1

B.1.2.1 Action of a fire on equipment, buildings and constructions On the stage B.1.1

A.1.2 Spilling of oil on the ground

A.1.2.1 Formation and propagation of a vapor cloud

Dispersion of a vapor cloud without ignition

Elimination of the accident

A.1.2.1.2 Ignition of a vapor cloud

A.1.2.1.2.1 Flash-fire, pool fire, torch fire On the stage A.1.1.1

Fig. 1. Typical event tree for the terminal.

The accidents with instantaneous catastrophic damage of tanks, formation of hydrodynamical wave and its overow over the dyke do not usually be taken into account at a risk assessment for tank farms (dynamics of such accidents in considered in Greenspan & Young, 1987; Shebeko, Shevchuk, & Smolin, 1994). The validation of this approach is a low probability of such cases. But a scale of these accidents is very large, therefore it is necessary to evaluate their contribution to a risk value. For this reason the case with the catastrophic damage of the tanks is not excluded from our analysis. One of the key questions at a risk analysis is a correct determination of frequencies of initiating events, which determines signicantly the accuracy and reliability of results of a risk analysis. The following main technological equipment will be located on the terminal: tanks with oating roofs for oil storage, oil pumps, technological pipelines, ttings, etc. The frequencies of a failure of this equipment are presented in Tables 1 and 2 (on the basis of data CPR 18 E (1999) Purple book, Grossthwhite, Fitzpatrik, & Hurst, 1988). The hazardous factors typical for accidents with res and explosions on oil storages are the following:

high temperature of air, smoke and toxic combustion products, low oxygen concentration (for res in rooms and buildings).

The methods of evaluation of impact parameters of accidents with res and explosions at various scenarios were selected mainly from the Standard GOST R 12.3.04798 (1998). If necessary, the methods Bolodian et al. (2001) and CPR 14 E (1997) Yellow Book were used also. Oil overow over the dyke at catastrophic damage of the tanks was modeled on the basis of Greenspan and Young (1987) and Shebeko et al. (1994). 4. Results and discussion The typical results of evaluation of sizes of impact zones are shown in Tables 35. It can be seen that the largest sizes of the impact zones are realized in the case of a ash re. This conclusion is not unexpected, because a hightemperature cloud of combustion products has a radius more than two times exceeding a size of a liquid pool. Thermal radiation intensity from a pool re is decreased rather rapidly with a distance from the pool, and therefore a size of an impact zone for the pool re is lower than that for ash re. The size of the impact zone for a torch re is much lower. Here and after we assume that the little, middle and large leakages are the leakages from holes of the sizes 5, 25 and 50 mm, respectively. It can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 that a dependence of pool areas and mass of vapours in a vapour cloud on type

  

thermal radiation at pool res and torch res; thermal action of high-temperature products of combustion of vapour clouds at a ash-re; overpressure at combustion of vapour clouds inside the compartments (rooms, buildings etc.);

ARTICLE IN PRESS
654 Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 Table 1 Frequencies of initiating events for some technological equipment Type of equipment Initiating event Diameter of discharge (mm) 12.5 25 50 100 12.5 25 12.5 25 50 100 12.5 25 50 100 Qualitative characteristics of the initiating event Quasi-instantaneous release of oil Long-lime release of oil and its evaporation from a pool Frequency (year1) 1.0 105 5.8 105 2.3 105 5.8 106 2.9 106 9.3 104 4.6 103 1.0 104 3.1 107 7.8 108 5.1 106 2.2 106 7.0 107 1.9 107 5.1 106 2.2 106 7.0 107 1.9 107 2.7 108

Tank with a oating roof

Damage of an envelope of a tank Discharge through the hole in the tanks wall

Sinking of a roof Ignition of oil vapours with burning of liquid in a rim seal Pumps Formation of a hole Catastrophic damage Vessels operating at overpressure and containing vapour and liquid phase Low hole above a liquid level Large hole above a liquid level Hole under a liquid level

Evaporation of oil with a possibility of vapour ignition Fire across a perimeter of a tank Long-time oil discharge Instantaneous oil release Long-time gas discharge Long-time discharge of gas or twophase medium Long-time discharge of a liquid

Catastrophic damage

Instantaneous release of liquid and gas

Table 2 Frequencies of a failure of technological pipelines Diameter of a pipeline (mm) Frequency of failure (m1 year1) for

Low hole 5.7 105 2.8 106 1.9 106 1.1 106 4.7 107 3.1 107 2.4 107

Middle hole 2.4 106 1.2 106 7.9 107 4.7 107 2.0 107 1.3 107 9.8 108

Large hole 9.4 107 4.7 107 3.1 107 1.9 107 7.9 108 5.2 108 3.9 108

Total rupture 4.7 107 2.4 107 1.6 107 9.4 108 3.9 108 2.6 108 2.0 108

50 100 150 250 600 900 1200

of leakage is rather slow. Such situation is caused by the fact that according to GOST R 12.3.047-98 we took into account a mass of oil and condensate released through a hole during 300 s (time required for closing of accidental part of a pipeline according to the Russian Standard GOST R 12.3.047-98 (1998)), and also a mass containing in the accidental part of the pipeline. For the terminal one of the most important questions is an evaluation of a thermal action of a burning tank on a neighbouring one at various wind velocities. Let us consider the results of such evaluation for the most hazardous case, when wind direction is from the burning tank to the neighbouring one. Diameter of each tank was accepted to be equal to 33 m, and a distance between walls of the tanks was also 33 m. Specic mass burning rate of oil

was accepted to be 0.06 kg/(m2 s), and a thermal radiation intensity from a ame surface was 25 kW/m2 (GOST R 12.3.047-98). The thermal radiation intensity from a ame was calculated on the basis of inclined cylinder model of CPR 14 E (1997) Yellow Book. Results of calculations are presented below in Table 6. It is interesting to compare the calculated values of thermal radiation intensity with tolerable values. In CPR 16 E (1989) the value 25 kW/m2 is recommended as the critical one for metal structures. In Martinsen, Johnson, and Millsap (1989) the critical temperature of a dry metal wall of a tank was accepted to be equal to 427 1C, and at the same time the thermal radiation intensity on the dry walls should not exceed 15.5 kW/m2 without wind and 22 kW/m2 at a wind velocity 10 m/s. In Shebeko et al. (1997) it is proposed to take the critical thermal radiation intensity to be 20 kW/m2. As it can be seen from Table 6, the calculated values are rather close to the critical one. Therefore a potential possibility of a re propagation from a burning tank to a non-burning one exists. Some additional protective measures (for example, water deluge systems) should be done. In Fig. 2 the results of the calculations of risk contours with values 108 and 106 year1 are presented on a plot plan of the terminal. Sizes of the risk contours with the value 108 year1 are stipulated by impact zones for accidents with a ash re at a total rupture of the loading pipeline with oil outside the dyke. Sizes of the risk contours with the value 106 year1are stipulated by impact zones for accidents with a ash re at a release of oil inside the dyke. The risk contours with the value 108 year1 is

ARTICLE IN PRESS
Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 Table 3 Typical sizes of impact zones for various accident scenarios with a pool re Type of accident Type of leakage Pool area (m2) Impact zone sizes (m) for probability of a human death (m) 100% Rupture of a pipeline supplying oil to the terminal Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Little Middle Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Total destruction 10 600 11 500 14 100 26 700 680 1060 1660 500 880 3400 3600 4200 20 000 17 200 17 400 18 000 34 800 4800 5800 9000 104 200 59 61 67 93 15 18 23 13 17 33 34 37 80 74 75 76 104 39 44 54 182 10% 69 72 81 121 17 20 24 16 20 34 36 39 101 92 93 95 139 43 48 62 261 1% 82 85 96 138 21 22 28 20 24 41 42 47 117 106 107 110 158 51 58 74 288 655

Rupture of a pipeline of a drainage system

Rupture of a condensate pipeline Rupture of a mixer of oil and condensate

Rupture of a pipeline of supplying oil into tanks

Rupture of a pipeline of supplying oil on a control device

Table 4 Typical sizes of impact zones for various accident scenarios with a ash-re Type of accident Type of leakage Mass of vapours in a vapour cloud after evaporation from a pool during 1 h (kg) 40 300 43 500 53 300 101 400 2600 4000 6300 12 800 13 500 15 800 75 200 64 600 65 300 67 600 127 000 18 100 21 900 33 900 391 900 Size of the impact zone at conditional probability of a human death equal to 1 (m) 850 870 930 1150 340 400 460 580 590 630 1050 990 1000 1010 1240 650 700 800 1810

Rupture of a pipeline supplying oil to the terminal

Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Total destruction

Rupture of a pipeline of a drainage system Rupture of a mixer of condensate and oil

Rupture of a pipeline of oil supplying into tanks

Rupture of a pipeline of oil supplying on a control device

ARTICLE IN PRESS
656 Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 Table 5 Typical sizes of impact zones for various accident scenarios with a jet re Type of accident Type of leakage Mass ow rate of a product (kg/s) 0.7 16.3 65.4 305.8 0.3 7.3 18.4 0.4 6.0 0.8 20.0 80.1 1871 Size of the impact zone at conditional probability of a human death equal 0.17 (m) 9 33 58 107 7 24 35 7 22 10 36 62 220

Rupture of a pipeline of oil supplying to the terminal

Little Middle Large Total destruction Little Middle Large Little Middle Little Middle Large Total destruction

Rupture of a pipeline of a drainage system

Rupture of a pipeline with condensate Rupture of a pipeline of oil supplying on a control device

Table 6 Typical values of a thermal radiation intensity from a burning tank to a neighbouring one Wind velocity (m/s) Thermal radiation intensity (kW/m2) Case 1 Case 2 5 9.3 10.9 10 12.0 15.7 15 13.9 18.6 20 15.4 20.4

Note: Case 1data were calculated without taking into account an increase of a horizontal size of a ame base. Case 2data were calculated with taking into account the mentioned above effect.

presented without taking into account the scenario with oil ow over the dyke at the total tank rupture. If we will consider this scenario, this risk contours will have a circular form with a radius of 6.8 km and a centre at the accidental tank. The risk contours with the value 106 year1 will not change in this case because of a low frequency of such scenario, in which the following consequence of events should take place: catastrophic destruction of a tank oil ow over a dykeweather without a windoil ignition. A comparison of the calculated risk contours with a distribution of population near the terminal was made. A conclusion was made that the individual and the social risks for population do not exceed the critical values stated in the Standard GOST R 12.3.047-98 (1998). Results of calculations of the potential risk for various parts of the terminal are shown in Table 7, and the values of the individual risk for various categories of the personnel are presented in Table 8. The total number of the personnel of the terminal does not exceed six. According to the given determination of the social risk (this risk is evaluated on injuring not less than 10 people) this kind of risk is accepted to be tolerable. Now the tolerable value of the individual risk for personnel of industrial objects is not regulated by Russian standards and norms. Therefore a comparison of the calculated values was made with the tolerable risk values proposed by leading oil production companies. Analysis of these

propositions was made in Vorobjev et al. (2004), Shebeko et al. (2004), and the following conclusions have been made. If the individual risk exceeds 104 year1, this risk is considered as intolerable, and substantial measures for a risk reduction are needed. If the individual risk is lower than 104 year1, but higher than 106 year1, this is a zone of a strict risk control. The risk is accepted as tolerable only in that case, when all reasonable measures for the risk reduction are undertaken. The following conditions should be executed. People in places with a high potential risk level should stay there only a little time, and the total amount of these people should be strongly restricted. These people should be taught on actions in emergencies. The industrial object should have a good system for emergency warning. If the individual risk is lower than 106 year1, this risk is accepted to be unconditionally tolerable, and no additional protective measures are required. As it can be seen for Table 8, the individual risk for the personnel is in the range 1.1 1062.2 105 year1 (that is the individual risk is in the zone of the strict risk control). Usually the presented above conditions for this risk zone are executed, and therefore a conclusion can be made that the re risk is tolerable both for the population living near the terminal and for the personnel of the object.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 657

Fig. 2. Risk contours with values 108 and 106 year1.

Table 7 Results of calculations of the potential risk for various parts of the terminal Part of the terminal Potential risk (year1) 1.5 105 2.0 105 2.2 105 2.2 105 1.9 105 3.7 105 3.3 105

Section of oil receiving Section of electrical substation and local control building Building for oil pumps Section of measuring of oil ow Building for re ghting foam pumps Section of drainage system Oil tanks

social risks have been determined. It was shown that the values of the individual and the social risks for population living near the terminal do not exceed the values stated by Russian standards and norms. Because the individual risk for personnel is not regulated by the Russian standards and norms, the calculated individual risk values (which are in the range 1.1 1062.2 105 year1) were compared with the propositions of the leading oil production companies. It was shown that the calculated risk values are inside the zone of the strict risk control (range 106104 year1) and at some conditions can be accepted as tolerable.

Table 8 Results of calculations of the individual risk for various categories of the personnel Categories of the personnel Head of the terminal Manager of production control Operator Fitter Individual risk (year1) 3.3 106 1.1 106 2.2 105 7.7 106

References
Ale, B. J. M. (1991). Risk analysis and risk policy in the Netherlands and the EEC. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 4(1), 5864. Bezrodny, I. P., Giletich, A. N., Merkulov, V. A., Molchanov, V. P., & Shvirkov, A. N. (1996). Extinguishing of res of oil and oil products. Moscow: VNIIPO (in Russian). Bolodian, I. A., Molchanov, V. P., Deshevikh, Yu. I., et al. (2001). Fire and explosion safety of LNG storages. Estimation of impact parameters at accidents on LNG tank. Fire Safety, 1, 5966 (in Russian). Clay, G. A., Fitzpatrik, R. D., Hurst, N. W., et al. (1988). Risk assessment for installation where liqueed petroleum gas (LPG) is stored in bulk vessels above ground. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 20(13), 357374. CPR 14 E (1997). Methods for the calculation of physical effects (Yellow Book). Den Haag: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters. CPR 16 E (1989). Methods for the determination of possible damage. Den Haag: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters. CPR 18 E (1999). Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment (Purple book). Den Haag: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters.

5. Conclusions In this study the investigations of a re risk for the large scale oil export terminal have been carried out. Calculation was executed on the basis of Russian standards and norms taking into account the best international methods for evaluation of impact parameters for accidents with res and explosions. The values of potential, individual and

ARTICLE IN PRESS
658 Yu.N. Shebeko et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 651658 Safonov, V. S., Odishariya, G. E., & Shviryaev, A. A. (1996). Theory and practice of risk analysis in gas industry. Moscow: VNIIGAS (in Russian). Sharovarnikov, A. F., Molchanov, V. P., Voevoda, S. S., & Sharovarnikov, S. A. (2002). Extinguishing of res of oil and oil products. Moscow: Kalan (in Russian). Shebeko, Yu. N., Bolodian, I. A., Molchanov, V. P., et al. (2004). Fire risk assessment for oil production offshore facilities. In Fire and explosion hazards. Proceedings of the fourth international seminar (pp. 515522). Belfast: University of Ulster. Shebeko, Yu. N., Malkin, V. L., Smolin, I. M., et al. (1997). Methods of evaluation of impact parameters for large accidents with res and explosions on external installation. In Fire and explosion hazard of substances and venting of deagrations (pp. 565581). Moscow: VNIIPO (in Russian). Shebeko, Yu. N., Shevchuk, A. P., & Smolin, I. M. (1994). Assessment of an inuence of a dyke on a combustible liquid spread at a tank rupture. Chemical Industry, 4, 230233 (in Russian). Standard GOST R 12.3.047-98 (1998). Fire safety of technological processes. General requirements. Methods of control (in Russian). Vorobjev, Yu. L., Kopulov, N. P., Shebeko, Yu. N., & Chernoplekov, A. N. (2004). Standardization of risks of technogenic emergencies. Fire Safety, 3, 3744 (in Russian). Elokhin, A. N. (2000). Analysis and control of risk: theory and practice. Moscow: Insurance Company LUKOIL (in Russian). Greenspan, N. P., & Young, R. E. (1987). Flow over a containment dyke. Journal of Fluid Mechanics, 87(1), 179192. Grossthwhite, P. J., Fitzpatrik, R. D., & Hurst, N. W. (1988). Risk assessment for the siting of developments near liqueed petroleum gas installations. Institution of Chemical Engineers Symposium Series, 110. LASTFIRE (1997). Large atmospheric storage tank res. A Joint Oil Industry Project to review the re related risks of large, open-top oating roof storage tanks. London. Martinsen, W. E., Johnson, D. W., & Millsap, S. B. (1989). Determining spacing by radiant heat limits. Plant Operations Progress, 8(1), 2528. Morris, M., Milos, A., & Cooper, J. (1991). Quantication of escalation effects in offshore quantitative risk assessment. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 4(1), 5864. Persson, H., & Lonnermark, A. (2003). Tank res. Review of res incidents 19512003. SP Svedish National Testing and Research Institute. Brand forsk project 513521. Safety Rule RD 03-418-01 (2001). Methodological instructions on risk analysis for hazardous industrial objects (in Russian).