1979 US Army Vietnam War Physical Security 516p

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*FM 19-30
Field Manual Headquarters

No. 19-30 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 1 March 1979
*This publication supersedes FM 19-30, 3 November 1971, including all changes.
i
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You, the user of this manual, are the most important element in keeping this
publication current and viable. You are encouraged to submit any comments or
recommendations pertinent to this field manual. Comments should be keyed to
the specific page and line of the text in which you feel an improverment is
needed. You should provide reasons for each comment made to insure complete
understanding and evaluation Make your comments on DA Form 2028
(Recommended Changes to Publications) and forward to the Commandant,
USAMPS/TC, ATTN: ATZN-TDP-C, Fort McClellan, AL 36205. Every comment
will be considered.
The word “he” in this publication is intended to include both the

masculine and feminine genders and exception to this will be noted.
ii
FM 19-30
1 MARCH 1979
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
J. C. PENNINGTON
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, USAR and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A,
Requirements for Physical Security (Qty rqr block no. 142).
Additional copies can be requisitioned from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center,
2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1994 - 153-846

iii
Chapter 1
T he commander must insure that

appropriate physical security measures
are taken to minimize the loss of sup-
plies, equipment, and materiel through
threats, natural or human. He normally
exercises this charge through the provost
marshal and/or physical security officer.
1
Formulating Section I
1-1 System Design Note: Selection and use of means

beyond minimum requirements:
You should formulate and imple- ■ Established by command directives.
ment your basic physical security design
■ Coordination and cooperation be-
from a total system approach. It should be
tween physical security officers and
organized in depth and contain mutually
facilities engineers is a necessity.
supporting elements and be coordinated to ■ Wherever threat indicates need for
prevent gap or overlap in responsibilities and increased security.
performance.
a. Total system approach is based on: 1-2 Design Considerations

(1) Thoughtful and continuing analysis of
existing protective measures. a. Available resources must be used
in the most efficient manner to achieve
(2) Determination of the possibility of adequate protection for an entire installation.
interference with the operational capabili-
ties of the installation or facility from any b. Emphasis goes to the operational
or all sources. requirements of the installation in
(3) Careful evaluation of the measures determining the type and extent of physical
necessary and practicable that maintain protection. The physical security manager
security at a desired level. should consider the following pertinent
factors in the indicated sequence.
(4) Tailored to the needs and local condi-
tions of each installation or activity.
(1) Mission assignment— importance of
the installation or unit to the mission of the
b. Mutually supporting elements in- Army.
clude:
(2) The area to be protected, including the
(1) Physical perimeter barrier(s). nature and arrangement of the activity;
classification of information, data, activi-
(2) Clear zones. ties; the number of personnel involved;
(3) Protective lighting. monetary and/or strategic value of mate-
riel located therein; or other important
(4) Entry control facilities. features inherent to the problem, such as
(5) Detection, including the use of sensors existing threats, either natural or human.
and assessment systems. (3) Criticality and vulnerability of
(6) Warning systems. information, materiel and personnel.
(7) Perimeter defensive positions, if ap- (4) Integration of operating, mainte-
propriate. nance, and other requirements.
2
(5) Environment, such as political and 1-3 Assessment
economical aspects, legal considerations, Of Security Posture
terrain, weather, climate, etc.
(6) Feasibility, effectiveness, and desira- The degree of protection desired on
bility of various possible methods of any installation is predicated upon an analy-
providing adequate protection. sis of two factors-criticality and vulnerabil-
ity.
(7) Costs of materiel and equipment to be
installed as well as availability of finds to
provide at least minimum protection for all
critical areas and activities This mini- a. Resource Criticality
mum may be less than the desirable degree
of physical protection; therefore, the pro- (1) Determination
gram must be flexible so that refinements
can be added as additional resources (a) Importance to the national defense
structure.
become available.
(b) Effect of its partial or complete loss.
(8) Possible changes in operation,
(2) Evaluation
such as expansion, relocation and re-
trenchment. Coordination must be main- (a) Installation. High criticality-great
tained with appropriate staff offices so effect on national defense structure.
that changes may be projected as far in (b) Command/activity. High critical-
advance as possible, and necessary supple- ity—partial or complete loss—
mental personnel and/or funds can be immediate and serious impact to per-
requested. form its mission for a considerable
period of time.
c. Changes in mission and activities of

an installation or activity may also require
adjustments in security. Physical security b. Resource Vulnerability
planning and programing must be a
continuing process if security managers (1) Determination
are to provide the best protection possible. (a) Susceptibility to threats that result
in damage, loss, destruction or disrup-
tion.
d. All security measures should be
(b) Type Of installation or activity
employed so that they complement and involved, industrial or other processes
supplement each other. Lack of integration of
performed, physical layout and con-
security measures may result in a waste of struction.
money, equipment, and manpower. But more
important, the security of an installation may (2) Evaluation
be placed in jeopardy. By the considerations
(a) High vulnerability—one or more
outlined, a sound physical security program
threats easily causing sufficient loss,
should evolve.
damage, or destruction to affect the
mission of the whole installation or its
subordinate commands/activities.
e. The formulating procedure is sound (b) Decreased vulnerability—existing
whether it is applied to changes on existing threats not likely to cause interference
installation or the construction of a new with the mission.
facility. (c) It should be noted that cost of
3
protective measures in terms of equip criminal act or will be detected and appre-
ment and manpower may not allow for hended before he can successfully complete
optimum security for the entire installa- the criminal act. Accumulated delay time
tion. Also, determination of security for the intruder must be built into a
priority based on criticality and vulnera- system for protection in depth. This
bility is essential to proper allocation of protection results from the security in-depth
resources. ring (see figure 1).
c. Security in depth (guards, physical d. Physical security is only part of the

barriers, and systems) is always the goal of overall defense plan of an installation. It does
those individuals responsible for the security not include dispersion of facilities, continuity
of an installation or activity. No object is so of operations, civil defense structures, con-
well protected that it cannot be stolen, struction specifications, or plans formulated
damaged, destroyed, or compromised. There- to cope with natural or human threats that
fore, access must be made so difficult that an happen. The formulating process must allow
intruder will be deterred from committing a for the integration of all these measures.
Figure 1—Security in-depth ring.
4
Security Threats Section II
Security threats are acts or conditions that (3) Physical layout and construction.
may result in the compromise of information;
(4) Geographical location.
loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction of
property; or disruption of the mission of the (5) Stability of the situation.
installation or facility. Before the physical
(6) Existing state of law and order.
security manager can develop an effective
security program, he must determine the (7) Protection measures in effect.
possibility of interference with the opera-
tional capabilities of the installation or
facility from any and all sources. Recognition 1-5 Categories
of all risks is mandatory if he is to make
recommendations for physical security mea- Security threats are classified as
sures to control or eliminate them. The sever- either natural or human.
it y of security threats depends on such varia-
bles as the type of installation or facility a. Natural Threats
involved, mission or processes performed,
physical layout, and construction. The geo- (1) Usually the consequence of natural
graphical location, the enemy situation, and phenomena.
the existing state of law and order are most (2) Normally not preventable by physical
important factors. security measures.
(3) May greatly affect security operations
1-4 Definition in one or more of these ways.
(a) Require an increase in protective
a. Security threats are acts or condi- measures.
tions, which include human threats, that may (b) May reduce the effectiveness of
result in: existing security measures by such
(1) Disruption of the installation or facil- occurrences as:
ity. ● Collapsed perimeter fences.
(2) Damage, loss or destruction of proper- ● Inoperable protective lighting.
ty. ● Damaged patrol vehicles.
● Poor visibility.
(3) Personal injury or loss of life.
(4) Compromise of defense information. Examples of natural threats are:
Floods— flooding of the installation with
b. Threat severity depends on such vari- resulting property damage, destruction of
ables as: perimeter barriers and short circuiting of
intrusion detection systems. Heavy rains or
(1) Type of installation or facility. snowfalls, even though they do not result in
(2) Mission or processes performed. floods, may cause some of the same damages.
5
Storms— high winds or rain causing nui- 1-6 Risk Analysis
sance alarms and short circuiting in IDS, and
limiting visibility of security personnel. This process is invaluable to the
security manager in establishing priorities of
Earthquakes— causing nuisance alarms,
possible fires from broken gas mains, build- protection of assets. Basically, it consists of
ings weakening and falling down.
a. Identifying items and functions in
Winds— disrupting power lines, setting off terms of:
nuisance alarms, causing safety hazards
with flying debris. (1) Total replacement
Snow and Ice— blocking patrol roads, (2) Temporary replacement

increasing response time to alarms, and (3) Unrecoverable costs
freezing of locks and alarm mechanisms.
(4) Allied and related costs.
Fires— damage/destruction of perimeter
barriers or buildings. b. Conducting a hazards and vulnerability
Fog— causing reduced visibility for security study of personnel, facilities, items, and
functions.
forces and increased response time to alarms
and may require additional security person-
c. Conducting a probability of occurrence
nel.
assessment through indicators, such as:
(1) Documented records
(2) Insurance claims or adjustments
b. Human Threats (3) Weather, etc.
These threats are the result of a state of
d. Establishing a range of losses based on
mind, attitude, weakness, or character trait
experience involving specific items (mini-
on the part of one or more persons. They
mum to maximum in terms of dollar value),
include acts of commission or omission—
and assessing the losses over a 3-5 year
overt and covert—which could disrupt or
period.
destroy the operation or mission of an
installation or facility.
e. Correlating the degree of loss experi-
enced with the ranges of losses or functions.
Examples of human threats are:
f. Comparing the low against high ele-
❑ Pilferage (appendix A). ments of ranges for all items and functions;
❑ Sabotage (appendix B). then averaging weight against risk value in
❑ Espionage (appendix C). terms of criticality (Defense Industrial Secu-
❑ Bombing (appendix D). rity Institute, DSA).
❑ Pilferage in Consumer Outlets (appendix
A).
❑ Attacks on Key Persons (chapter 14).
1-7 Evaluation of Risks
❑ Carelessness and accidents in perfor-
mance of official duties. The actual degree of risk involved
❑ Disaffection and disloyalty of employees.
depends on two factors:
❑ Safety hazards from equipment malfunc-
tion. ■ Probability of adverse effects occurring as
❑ Human Intelligence Threat (HUMINT). a direct result of the threat(s).
6
■ Extent to which the installation or activity ❑ All determinable threats.
will be affected by the threat(s). ❑ Continuing activity beginning in peace-
time and expanding to meet the particulari-
Security threats significantly impact on a ties of formal hostilities.
physical security program by requiring the ❑ Coordination and integration with other
incorporation of the following considera- protective programs, such as crime preven-
tions: tion and safety.
7
Chapter 2
Planning, Programing, and

Budgeting
T o insure that the security responsi-

bility of an installation or activity receives
maximum emphasis, the security manager
must be totally aware and involved in the
installation planning, programing, and
budgeting process. This involvement in-
cludes preparation of manpower reports and
appropriate submissions.
8
Planning Section I
Planning for the security defense of an c. Probability of the most serious incident.
installation must remain constant, practical, d. Implementation in the interest of conti-
flexible to the mission and certainly respon- nuity of all security operations.
sive to the needs of the commander. Only
through adequate planning can we provide
an effective counter response to security
threats-as outlined in chapter 1. 2-3 Pre-operational Phase
(Estimate)
2-1 Planning Basis
a. Sound prior estimates of the
security operational situation will reap big
a. Implementation of Department
dividends when planning is ongoing. As a
of the Army (DA) policy, AR 190-13, and those
minimum, the preoperational estimate
supplemental directives by installation and
should be concerned with the latest
higher commanders is imperative to having a
sound security, program.
(1) Security Analysis and Vulnerability
b. The following must be considered when Estimate (SAVE)
planning security measures for an installa-
tion:
(2) Security Vulnerability Assessment
(1) Mission. (SVA)
(2) Vulnerability.
(3) Impact on operations. (3) Operational Security (OPSEC).
(4) Budget limitations.
(5) Personnel and equipment limitations. b. The estimate must involve determina-
tion of all available resources and acts as the
basis for developing a sound security plan.
2-2 Objectives
c. The estimate should entail maximum
To be effective, planning must in- use of existing organizational structures,
volve a phased approach, be flexible in supervisors, materiel and equipment, and
incorporating changes, and have clearly available technical skills.
defined courses of actions. It must be con-
cerned with realistic protection in depth and (1) Identification of unknown factors and
be based on: limitations.
a. Relative standards. (2) Identification of the necessary aug-
b. Personnel, materiel and equipment mentation of personnel and equipment to
available. support the operational phase.
9
2-4 Operational Phase procedures will identify plan deficiencies and
allow for necessary corrections and adjust-
Planning for the operational phase ments.
must be all inclusive. It involves training
programs concerning duties and responsibili-
b. Evaluation of the plan will actually
ties prior to, during, and after the operational
acquaint personnel with their duties and
phase. As a minimum, this phase should
responsibilities as well as the mechanics of
cover:
the plan.
a. Employment of assigned and attached

personnel. c. The methods of evaluation should in-
clude:
b. Serviceable equipment.
(1) Testing techniques in which all por-
tions of the plan are exercised individually
and collectively.
2-5 Awareness Phase
(2) Testing conditions which are as close
To insure that the operational phase as possible to real world conditions and
is sound and that the plan is workable and which simulate security threats as appro-
practical, all personnel must be aware of their priate.
duties and responsibilities. Contents of the
plan must dictate requirements and courses (3) Quality control through selecting eval-
of action to include the interface of security uators who can provide a complete critique
personnel. of the workability and appropriateness of
Extracts of the plan must be provided to key the plan. Evaluators should be instructed
personnel and supervisors to insure areas of to place special emphasis on personnel
responsibility are executed. Also, supervisors actions, both individually and collectively
must brief their personnel on appropriate as a team, when weaknesses in training
duties and responsibilities, and monitor their
are evident. The evaluator should make
actions to insure a successful plan exists. note. An essential element of the evalua-
tion is the feedback by evaulators. This
feedback acts as a procedure for revising
2-6 Development and modifying the plan. Revision should
be immediate and all personnel must be
Developing a sound security plan made aware of the changes.
must involve an integrated approach as to
who, what, when, where and how. Specifi- (4) Evaluation Frequency:
cally, the development should be in accor-
(a) The plan must be evaluated at
dance with appendix F of this manual.
irregular intervals based on published
directives and as deemed necessary by .
the responsible commander.
2-7 Evaluation (b) Mechanics involving development
of a security plan should consider the
a. This is an important element of processes outlined in figure 2 and
any plan to insure the plan’s overall appropri- incorporate the data set forth in appen-
ateness and workability. Sound evaluation dix F.
10
Figure 2—Process steps in effective planning.
Programing and Budgeting Section II
As the Army continues to mature in terms for advanced security equipment, more and
of complexity and sophistication of weapons better trained security personnel, both civil-
and equipment, the management of Army ian and military. Therefore, the security
resources becomes an increasing responsibil- manager must be knowledgeable in resource
ity. Inherent to this responsibility is the need management.
11
It is essential, in the management of b. This document provides higher head-
installation security measures and require- quarter’s approval for use of all assigned
ments, that the security manager knows the resources for a specific period. The document
working relationships and necessary require- is an extract from the Army portion of the
ments involving budget formulation and FYDP of those resources that have been
execution of the following: contemplated for allocation and contains
❑ Command Budget and Manpower Guid- goals and workloads that such resources are
ance (BMG). designed to support.
❑ Program Budget Advisory Committee
(PBAC).
❑ Command Operating Budget Estimate 2-10 Concepts
(COBE).
❑ Major Activity Directors (MAD). a. Major command/agency 5-year
❑ Budget Requests. programs, written in terms of appropriations,
❑ Manpower Procedures. budget programs, and elements of expense,
❑ Justification for Additional Security Per- are detailed statements of the planned
sonnel and Equipment. application of the resources (based on DA
guidance) to accomplish assigned missions,
goals, and workloads of the command for 5
years.
2-8 Budget and Manpower b. DA’s budget and manpower guidance

Guidance (BMG) for major commands and agencies does not
constitute authority to obligate finds.
a. Budget and manpower guidance Rather, it is guidance to which recipients
is generated at Headquarters, DA, to insure respond with their budget estimates and,
that Army responsibilities spelled out in the finally their command operating budget
FYDP are passed down to major commands estimates (COBE). This guidance document
and agencies. from Headquarters, DA, is formally updated
three times a year.
b. Through this guidance DA spells out for
each major command and agency precisely c. Each successive headquarters trans-
what will be required and what limitations lates the guidance it receives from above into
are to be imposed. Based on this guidance, expanded guidance for its subordinate com-
major commands and agencies update their mands. This action carries guidance from
5-year programs and generate budget esti- Headquarters, DA, down to the operating
mates for the budget year. The document each levels where, in response, the COBE is gener-
command or agency develops is its budget ated.
and manpower guidance (BMG).
2-11 Command Operatin

Budget Estimate (COBE)
a. The command operating budget
2-9 BMG Objectives estimate (COBE) is the field commander’s
estimate of resource requirements for the
a. The BMG is the basis for plan- approaching fiscal year and an estimate of
ning, programing and budgeting for all the following fiscal year based on advanced
assigned missions, objectives and workloads. budget plans. Headquarters, DA, will advise
12
field commands of their approved operating 2-12 Purpose of COBE
budgets through four interrelated actions.
a. To record in one place the activi-
(1) June update of program and budget ties to be conducted for a given year and the
guidance. resources for their support. These are the
activities necessary to achieve objectives
(2) DA issuance of the resources guidance. assigned by higher authority based on
guidance extracted from the Army portion of
(3) Issuance of approved operating bud- the FYDP.
get.
(4) Command operating budget markup. (1) Identify that portion of the budget to
be accomplished by each subordinate ele-
ment in terms of objectives, policies, priori-
ties, and resources available.
b. Missions are assigned and resources are (2) Establish a basis against which ac-
allocated to the installation commander in complishments and resource utilization
the command operating program of higher can be measured.
headquarters. The allocation is expressed in
terms of the Army management structure, b. Each command, agency, and installa-
tion in the Army establishment prepares an
AR 37-100 (basic fiscal code), and AR 37-100-
annual COBE covering operations for which
XX (FY fiscal code). Within this broad frame-
it receives funds. These COBEs are prepared
work the installation commander develops a
in sufficient detail to identify
more detailed description of activities to be
performed during the year. When approved, (1) What has to be done.
the COBE becomes the plan of action for ex- (2) When it must be done.
ecutors of the program.
(3) What resources are available.
c. The COBE is a command, agency or c. The COBE is prepared by each com-

installation plan of action for a specific fiscal mand and developed in response to program
and budget guidance received from higher
year covering the activities for which it was headquarters.
responsible.
Installation Management Section Ill
We have already noted that the resource much higher portion of the DOD budget will
management system requires installation be reflected annually in Army installation
commanders to identify the costs of their budgets.
military personnel. In the future, therefore, a
13
2-13 Budget Formulation prepares the draft installation BMG.
At the installation level, you will be e. To facilitate and coordinate preparation

concerned with a budget cycle divided into of program/budgets, the staff forms a pro-
two phases—formulation and execution. gram budget advisory committee (PBAC) to
serve as atop management advisory group to
a. The budget cycle for operation and the commander. The Chief of Staff is nor-
maintenance, Army, appropriation which mally chairman. Other members are the
finances most of the day-to-day operating principal staff officers responsible for the
costs of the Army, actually starts 18 months functional areas of personnel, operations,
ahead of the target budget year (BY). Most and logistics, and other representatives as
installations do not become formally in- desired by the commander.
volved in the actual budget until 6 to 8 months
before the beginning of the target BY. As soon f. The committee considers all aspects of
as the annual Army budget estimate has been the internal management of the command.
finalized [following joint DOD/Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) hearings on g. Each member insures that his area of
the Army budget estimate], DA revises its staff responsibility is accorded full considera-
guidance by sending to all of its major tion by the committee.
commands revised budget and manpower
guidance (BMG) in January (about 6 months h. The use of financial data (that is,
before the target BY). Based on this revised expressions of resource requirements in
guidance, each subordinate command makes dollar terms) permits comparison of total
necessary changes in its local plans and input, using a common unit of measure.
programs.
i. The goals and requirements of individ-
ual areas are coordinated and molded into
b. On receipt of the guidance document at overall goals and requirements for the com-
the installation in October—six months prior mand.
to the BY—it is sent to the Directorate of
Resource Management (DRM), who is the j. Recommendations of the PBAC repre-
primary staff officer charged with financial sent the consensus of the top management
management responsibility. After briefing officials of the command.
the installation commander and adding the
commander’s desires, the DRM breaks down
k. The comptroller presents the draft BMG
the guidance into terms and segments that
to the PBAC along with any unresolved
are meaningful at the installation level. He
differences that could not be settled by staff
then distributes guidance with a minimum of
coordination.
delay to the major activity directors (MADs).
2-14 PBAC Functions
c. The DRM develops a time-phased sched-
ule of actions necessary for completion of the a. Interpretation of BMG from
installation budget. This is similar to a higher authority and integration of the local
suspense-date calendar. commander’s guidance.
b. Development of a plan for preparation

d. Aided by his staff, the DRM establishes of a proposed program/budget that will
objectives and resource limitations, using effectively and efficiently accomplish the
local historical data and experience. He then command’s mission.
14
Figure 3-Installation budget cycle.
15
c. Application of judgment and experience Also, the Guard and Reserve forces program
to specific program areas. would belong to the director of plans and
training. Physical security equipment (pro-
d. Achievement of reasonable balance and vost marshal’s office) belongs to the director
coordination between proposed missions, of personnel and community activities
activities, and resources assigned to subordi- (DPCA).
nate commands and agencies.
a. At the installation level, organization
e. Presentation of a staff-coordinated pro- more clearly reflects the functional manage-
posed command operating budget estimate ment requirements, but does not clearly ad-
(COBE) to the commander. dress the program as a whole. The installa-
tions have subdivided their programs by
f. Review of the reports of program/budget functional area responsibilities. The name
execution and preparation of recommended coined for the subdivisions is “key accounts.”
revisions to the operating program/budget
based on the results of operations. b. One rule that must be followed in this
subdivision is that the data collected for the
g. Principal members of the PBAC are accounts must be identifiable to insure that
assisted by their subordinates who function when this data is combined with data
as a junior or working PBAC. Representation concerning other key elements in the pro-
in this junior group is expanded to include at gram, it does not lose its identity with the
least one representative of each category major programs that it supports.
within each functional area. For example, the
DPCA represents the provost marshal (secu- c. Guidance is analyzed by the major
rity officer). The program/budget officer from activity directors and passed down to the
the comptroller’s office also participates as a activity chiefs who report to them. The
working member. Much of the detailed work activity chiefs analyze their guidance and
for the senior PBAC is done by the junior pass appropriate guidance down to subactiv-
PBAC prior to the senior PBAC’s being ity chiefs who report to them. For example,
convened. The junior PBAC works up de- the DPCA is the MAD for G-641. Under him
tailed alternative courses of action for consid- there are normally activity chiefs and subac-
eration of the senior PBAC. tivity chiefs (physical security managers).
h. Action agencies receiving the BMG are d. When the guidance finally gets down to
the major activity directors (MADs). They are the activity/subactivity chief, it is translated
also frequently called program directors. into budget requirements. This is the turna-
Specific determinations of what is a major around point. Detailed budget segments are
activity and of the designation of the MAD prepared by subactivity chiefs; reviewed, and
depend on the installation and its mission. consolidated by activity chiefs; again re-
However, primary staff officers are normally viewed and consolidated by major activity
designated MADs for activities falling in chiefs; until the draft installation COBE is
their areas of primary staff responsibility. consolidated by the DRM. Requirements are
Major activities usually follow the break- justified by use of performance factors (PF)
down of the Army management structure. listed for budget codes in the Army manage-
ment structure.
2-15 Major Activity Directors
e. The basic program/budget document
For example, the director of indus- prepared at the installation is the activity
trial operations (DIO), is responsible for the budget schedule, reflecting, within cost guid-
central supply and maintenance program. ance, dollar requirements for resources by
16
Figure 4-Typical organization for programing and budgeting (OM
17
type (element of expense), manpower by man- action for a specific fiscal year and has a
years and type, and work output in terms of threefold purpose:
PF. Data is projected for each quarter of the ● Record activities to be conducted and
fiscal year. The same three types of data are resources needed for the installation’s sup-
provided for unfinanced requirements; that
port.
is, the workload considered essential for ● Identify action to be accomplished by each
mission accomplishment and its associated
subordinate element.
resource requirements that cannot be per- ● Establish basis to measure accomplish-
formed within the cost guidance received. The ment and resource consumption.
activity budget schedule establishes a stan-
dard cost per unit of output, composed of la-
j. Of special interest in the COBE is section
bor, supply equipment, and other costs at the
I, Commander’s Narrative Analysis. In this
programed level of output.
section, the commander is provided the
opportunity to defend his views on the
f. The activity budget schedule is normally adequacy or inadequacy of his COBE which
supported by schedules of temporary duty has been developed in response to guidance
travel, supply requirements, contracts, and received from parent headquarters.
unfinanced requirements and a narrative
statement by the activity manager. When k. After review and approval, the COBE is
automatic reimbursements are expected to be submitted to the major command which
earned by the activity, a list of sources and reviews all COBEs submitted to determine
anticipated amounts is also prepared.
consistency with guidance, magnitude, and
type of resources requested and also the
g. Activity budget schedules are reviewed urgency of unfinanced requirements.
by functional category managers. Particular
attention is paid to the balance of unfinanced
l. Major command COBEs are reviewed,
requirements of activities having similar
adjusted, and consolidated at Headquarters,
priorities. When balance has been achieved DA, and form the basis of the Army’s annual
among activities of the same functional
apportionment request, which is submitted
category, functional category managers, through DOD to OMB.
acting now as the working PBAC, propose
adjustments in activity cost ceilings to
achieve balance installation wide among all
functional categories and activities. 2-16 Budget Execution
h. The PBAC will review and make neces- a. The installation budget execu-
sary modifications to the draft COBE before tion phase begins 1 October with receipt of the
submitting it to the commander with its approved operating budget (AOB) or marked
recommendations. Those items that the up COBE indicating the action taken in
installation feels are necessary for the accom- response to the DA-approved COBE. The
plishment of its mission, but cannot afford markup of the installation COBE at this
within the dollar guidance received from point reflects all changes to the installation’s
higher headquarters, are included in the COBE resulting from budget reviews at all
COBE as unfinanced requirements. Unfi- levels of DOD, OMB, and Congress. As such,
nanced requirements are listed in order of it represents the approved installation plan of
priority with justification and impact state- execution for the BY.
ments supporting the installation’s request
for additional funds. b. An approved budget establishes annual
limitations and/or objectives to include the
i. The installation COBE is a plan of amount of expense or obligations that maybe
.
18
incurred for a specific program (or other 2-17 First-half-year Data
classification) for the BY.
a. Actual data (experience) on ex-
penses incurred and performance (workload)
c. The installation marked up COBE and accomplished for the first 3 months (that is 1
the AOB for the first quarter of the fiscal year October through 31 December).
are sent to the DRM for action. The DRM
reviews and analyzes these documents,
determines adjustments required, and in- b. Cumulative projected data for the first 6
forms major activity directors concerned of months that include the first 3 months of
pertinent adjustments. actual data plus 3 months (1 October through
31 March) of projections of the expense to be
incurred and the performance (workload) to
d. Through the coordinated efforts of the be accomplished.
DRM and the working PBA, the installation
program is updated. The DRM sends the
original of the AOB to the finance and c. Cumulative projected data for the entire
accounting office. Authority to obligate the fiscal year. The last half estimated data are
Government comes to the installation in the included in the cumulative projections or
form of a Funds Authorization Document expenses to be incurred and performance to
(FAD). This authority is provided on a be accomplished for the entire fiscal year.
quarterly basis.
d. Segments of the BER are submitted

e. If the magnitude of changes warrants, similar to sections of the COBE; they are
the PBAC meets to review the revised reviewed, analyzed, and consolidated by
installation program for balance in re- activity chiefs and the major activity direc-
sources, levels and workloads. When satisfied tors, and finally, the draft installation COBE
with the plan of operation, the PBAC recom- is composed of five sections.
mends that the plan be approved by the
installation commander. The commander
either approves the recommended program or e. Section I, Commander’s Narrative An-
directs that changes be made. After final alysis, is the one in which the installation
approval, the program is returned to the commander informs higher headquarters of
installation DRM. The DRM finalizes, pub- major problems involved in performing
lishes, and distributes the approved installa- assigned missions, programs, and workloads
tion operating program which serves as the within existing resources. It is the highlight
overall plan of operations for the fiscal year. feature of the BER on which all reviews are
finally focused for decision and action. It is
developed under the management-by-
f. The budget execution review (BER) is the exception concept and oriented to facilitate
midyear review report and provides the basis budget execution, management, review, and
for funding adjustments by higher headquar- analysis processes at each succeeding level of
ters during the latter half of the current fiscal command. See section IV, chapter 2, AR 1-1,
year. In preparing the BER, program and for a more detailed explanation of the Army
activity directors should carefully review all budgeting system.
resource requirements to insure that esti-
mates are accurate, and that the unfinanced
requirements are completely justified to J-SIIDS issue is based on request made to
insure that no mission-essential activities are the National Inventory Control Point
hampered by the lack of resources. (NICP). Other equipment may be obtained,
19
153-846 0 - 94 - 2
as a result of an annual unprogrammed and un- mander on installation vulnerability, equip
financed request, by providing the necessary ment criticality, and need. This will also
justification for input to the command op- assist the commander in preparing section I
erating budget estimate (COBE). of the commander’s narrative analysis.
d. Coordinate with necessary installation

primary staff elements and solicit docu-
2-18 Security Equipment mented support.
Procurement Procedure
e. Prepare the installation budget forms
a. Security manager conducts an and a security equipment decrement list to be
inspection to determine the need. submitted to the comptroller. (The decrement
list is a priority list for items to be removed
b. Determine requirement authority from the program if resource guidance is
(DOD/DA letter, AR, directive, etc.). reduced. As such, the document list goes from
lowest priority to highest priority in terms of
c. Brief provost marshal/installation com- the critical needs of the installation.)
Sample Budget Request Section IV
Budget requests provide for police services, The samples included in the next 15 pages are
maintenance of order, traffic control, crim- physical security oriented (6 pages for COBE
inal investigations, correctional facility, and and 9 for SPE funding).
physical security services, equipment,
and inspections. The physical security man- If the DPCA receives cuts in its request, the
ager must review the design of Military Con- budget request may be returned to the
struction Army (MCA) projects and provide installation in initial FY 80 budget guidance
recommendations. because of cuts in the DPCA request. If, for
The cost estimate must be submitted with instance, the security manager’s request for a
the appropriate transmittal document, ac- radio network was not funded, he must
cording to local policy. DA Pamphlet 140- submit a second request for special equip-
series explains this subject in great detail. ment finding to the installation DRM.
20
Sample COBE (1 of 6 pages).
21
COBE summary (2 of 6 pages).
22
COBE summary continued (3 of 6 pa
23
Sample COBE continued (4 of 6 pages)-Travel and transpo
24
Sample COBE continued (5 of 6 pages)-Contrac
25
Sample COBE continued (6 of 6 pages)-Supplies and ma
26
Sample SPE funding request (1 of 9 pages).
27
Sample SPE funding request continued (2 of 9 pages).
28
Sample SPE request continued (3 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 7.
29
Sample SPE request (4 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 2.
30
Sample SPE request (5 of 9 pages)–Enclosure 3.
31
Sample SPE request (6 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 3 continued.
32
Sample SPE request (7 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 4.
33
34
35
Manpower Procedures Section V
Review and revision of tables of organiza- b. The final product of this system is a
tion and equipment (TOEs) is accomplished unit’s authorization documents (MTOE/
on a recurring basis, coinciding with HQDA TDA), which provide for subsequent person-
planning requirements and the Army imple- nel and equipment transactions. The MTOE
mentation of the Five-Year Defense Program provides the commander with the means to
(FYDP) as discussed earlier. modify or adjust the DA approved TOE to
meet specific operational requirements. The
The TOE Documentation Program is con- TDA, on the other hand, establishes its own
trolled by the TOE program letter and organizational structure to meet the needs of
schedule. This letter specifies the TOE to be each specified unit. A flow chart showing the
developed or revised during the fiscal year, processing of a TAADS authorization docu-
and is published in July and updated in ment is at figure 5. Authorizations to support
January. Security managers are not involved this document are as follows:
in the revision and development of TOEs. • MTOE
This action depends on the TOE proponent • TDA
agency within the TRADOC school system. It
• Augmentation TDA
is based upon and in concert with, DA
• Mobilization TDA.
approved doctrine and concepts, etc. (See AR
310-31.)
c. TDA security units organized to support
the Army’s peacetime posture may not be
sufficient in terms of personnel strength and
2-19 Security Manager’s equipment. The requirements column of the
Interface TDA must be based on requirements recog-
nized in an approved manpower survey.
a. Security managers, at various Adjustments by the survey authority maybe
times, must be involved with revision of made when changes in mission, function, or
modification tables of organization and
workload occur between manpower surveys.
equipment (MTOEs) and tables of distribu- Requirements for a new TDA unit must be
tion and allowances (TDAs)-mainly the
based on the mission, projected workload,
latter. This involvement usually requires an
and applicable staffing guides.
interface with the supporting force develop-
ment officer or the next higher headquarters
d. The manpower authorizations column
operation section (S3) to prepare documents
of the TDA must be based on allocations of
in accordance with the Army Authorization
resources, and normally will be equal to or
Documents System (TAADS) which is a less than the manpower reflected in the
system used for:
requirements column. When authorizations
❑ Developing organizational structures are less than requirements, reduced capabili-
❑ Requirements ties must be reflected in the appropriate
❑ Personnel authorizations and equipment. paragraphs of section I of the TDA.
36
* Security manager involvement
Figure 5—Flow chart for TAADS data.
37
e. Grades of DA civilian personnel posi-
tions in the TDA must be established by
2-21 Establishing Manpower
-
application of civil service and DA civilian

Requirements
personnel policies, regulations, and proce- a. The security manager must ob-
dures. tain the following documents to prepare his
requirement:
f. Organizational structures of TDA units
must adhere to applicable DA regulations (1) TOE manpower authorization criteria
governing organization of specific units; or in (2) DA staffing criteria
the absence of such regulations, they must
adhere as closely to the appropriate DA (3) DA staffing guides
staffing guide as local conditions permit. (4) Manpower surveys
g. Military and civilian manpower utiliza- (5) Various work measurements
tion policies in AR 570-4 must be followed (6) The physical security plan.
when organizing and staffing TDA units to
perform security missions.
b. The civilian personnel officer will ac-
tively participate in TDA development in-
volving civilian security positions. Civilian
2-20 Manpower Management position structures in the TDA will be in
accordance with regulations of:
The objective is to achieve optimum
(1) The office of management and budget
use of manpower in accomplishing the
security mission. (2) Civil Service Commission (CSC)
(3) HQDA.
a. The security manager must realize that
the two primary constraints on manpower
are:
(1) Man-years generated during a fiscal
year. 2-22 Grade and Position
(2) Strength at the end of a fiscal year. Change
b. The total strength of an activity at any a. To change security grade level

given time in the year is important because it or position at the local level, unless instructed
is the basis for computing man-years. otherwise, must be done IAW the following:
(1) Civilian Personnel Regulation 501.
c. As security strengths change during a
fiscal year, adjustments must be made to: (2) Job reengineering.
(1) Total man-years and, if appropriate, (3) Civil Service Commission Research &
Development Engineering Grade Evalua-
(2) End-year strengths. tion Guide.
Manpower planning and allocation docu- (4) Civil service classification guidance.
ments, as discussed previously, are as an-
nounced in Chapter IV of the Program and b. Grade levels and position structure of
Budget Guidance (PBG) provided to major positions in grade GS-15 and below, and in
activity directors (MADs). wage board pay categories may be submitted
38
as proponent-approved, unless HQDA in- tional elements for greater security mission
structs otherwise. efficiency.
c. Evaluation of civilian personnel officer b. Proponent-initiated changes must com-

positions are subject to the provisions of ply with organizational policies, as set forth
Civilian Personnel Regulation (CPR) 501. in chapter 2, AR 310-49.
d. Application of job evaluation decisions c. Changes in the organization and man-

of the CS or HQDA is mandatory. Action on ning of units and activities must conform to
such mandatory decisions must be taken in the manpower management policies in AR
accordance with civilian personnel regula- 310-49, and to information on position catego-
tions and instructions, even though applica- ries, classifications, and grading.
tion results in grade levels that exceed the
current approved TDA. d. Requests for additional security person-
nel spaces required because of increased
e. Prior approval requirements. The secu- workload or similar factors must be made in
rity manager must realize that successive accordance with AR 570-4.
echelons of command are not authorized to
establish prior approval requirements be-
yond the provisions of CPR 501, unless
determined to be necessary to improve 2-24 Justification
position management and the civilian posi- For Personnel Changes
tion structure. The HQDA policy of decentral-
izing authority for civilian personnel man- a. Justification is an explanation of
agement and for position classification to the the situation and circumstances which re-
lowest practicable level must. be observed quire personnel changes to cope with the
both in principle and in practice. security mission.
f. Civilian grades listed in DA-approved (1) Your justification is the major basis on
TDA. Civilian grades listed in DA-approved which the Army staff forms its judgment
TDAs are not authorized until finalized by regarding the request.
the security element’s supporting civilian (2) Explanations must be sufficiently
personnel office in accordance with the above clear, well-organized, concise, and com-
paragraphs. DA review normally will be plete to allow an analyst who is unfamiliar
accomplished on a post audit basis. Com- with the unit and local conditions to
ments addressing civilian positions in ap- understand the rationale for the proposed
proved TDAs, if any, will be furnished action.
separately by DAPE-CPP.
b. Organization charts and diagrams help
to clarify the reasons for a justification
proposal.
2-23 Proponent-Initiated
Changes c. A citation of Army directives, previously
obtained approval of actions, and approved
a. The organization structure of manpower survey reports frequently are
security units and activities may be changed adequate justification.
at the initiative of commanders. Changes
may be necessary to respond to changes in d. Section VI shows conditions that influ-
mission or to realine resources and organiza- ence personnel spaces and the actions re-
39
quired by proponents to justify specific supplement the TDA, you will be required to
changes. justify the increase IAW DA Pamphlet 570-4,
The Manpower Procedures Handbook. Act-
e. When new security organizational ele- ing as a check and balance to strength levels,
ments are formed, an explanation of the manpower surveys by specialized teams are
mission or functions of the newly formed conducted on a programed basis; therefore, as
organization and an estimated workload will a security representative of the commander,
often suffice to justify positions, grades, and the burden of proof that additional manpower
MOSs of members. is needed to accomplish the security mission
(1) Job descriptions provided must be fully rests with assessment of individual capabili-
explained to assist in the justification. ties and documentation of normal workloads.
(2) To further substantiate the require- d. In accomplishing this documentation,
ment for a position, the grade and MOS or there are several survey documents that
civilian series code, workload data, and an present data about the operation of the
indication why the work is performed, security office in terms of:
must be included in the justification.
(1) Organization
f. Guidance for preparation and sub (2) Manpower utilization
mission of justification for security personnel
changes in TAADS is reflected in AR 310-49. (3) Workloads
(4) Estimated manpower requirements in
relation to existing guides.
2-25 Justification for Security
Personnel and Equipment
e. The security manager, when preparing
a. The security manager must docu- for manpower surveys, must take a two-prong
ment necessary justification in accordance approach—(1) strong justification must be
with: documented to prevent loss of existing
manpower, and (2) strong detailed justifica-
(1) AR 570-2
tion must be documented to obtain additional
(2) AR 611-1 manpower spaces. Survey documentation
involves the following forms:
(3) AR 611-101
(1) DA Form 140-1 (Remarks)
(4) AR 310-34
(2) DA Form 140-2 (Schedule A - Man-
(5) AR 310-49 power Inventory)
(6) AR 750-43. (3) DA Form 140-3 (Schedule T-Identifica-
tion of Manpower)
b. As a security manager, you realize that
TDA units rely primarily on manpower to (4) DA Form 140-4 (Schedule X - Man-
establish manpower requirements. There- power and Workload Data)
fore, between surveys, manpower survey (5) DA Form 140-5 (Schedule A - Man-
forms must be used and documented to assist power Inventory Continuation Sheet).
in developing changes in requirements
caused by changes in the activity’s security
mission and/or workloads. f. Initial entries on the forms must be made
by the security manager, and the applicable
c. To increase the personnel strength level portions must be completed during the on-site
of the local security office in an effort to visit by the manpower teams.
40
2-26 Staffing Guides (Again, this number must be based on
actual and programed training, includ-
Appropriate staffing guides must ing time for SQTs, SQT preparation,
be used in preparing TDAs. It is essential that actual job training, and mandatory unit
the security manager use the correct yard- training such as RR/EO, etc., per man.)
stick for manpower appraisals and require- (e) Total nonavailable time = 1,392
ments to accomplish the following: hours.
(1) Indicate the total number of positions (2) Determine available time (AT):
required to perform a security function.
AT= BMY - NAT 2,920 - 1,392 = 1,538
(2) Consider:
(3) Determine yardstick (YS):
(a) Annual leave
(b) Sick leave YS = BMY divided by AT
2,920 divided by 1,528 = 1.9 men
(c) Training
per required position.
(d) Orientation
(e) Other activities not contributing (a) For a 24-hour-7-day-week position,
directly to the performance of the desig- multiply the basic yardstick by 3 (5.7).
nated function. (b) For a 16-hour-day-7-day-week posi-
tion, multiply the basic yardstick by 2
(3.8).
(c) For less than a 7-day position,
2-27 Yardstick Examples multiply the proper yardstick by the
number of days required and divided by
a. The following yardstick determi- 7 (such as, 24-hour day, 6 days per week =
nation for 8-hour-day/7- and 5-day-week 1 . 9 x 3 x 6 = 4.9).
positions involve basic man-years (BMY) and 7
nonavailable time (NAT) computations for c. Eight-Hour-Day-5-Day-Week Position
security positions. The computations are a
modified version of those outlined in DA (1) It is necessary to determine basic man-
PAM 570-4; however, they have been accepted years.
by various manpower survey teams as unique (2) Determine nonavailable time without
to a security unit or depot. considering days off, since it is a 5-day
week position:
b. Eight-Hour-Day-Week Position (a) Leave (30 days per year) = 30 x 8 = 240
hours.
(1) Determine nonavailable time (NAT): (b) Sick (1/3 day per month) = 1/3 x 8 x
12 = 32 hours (determined the same as
(a) Days off (2 days per week)=2 x 8 x 52 for 7-day week position).
= 832 hours.
(b) Leave (30 days per year)=30 x 8 = 240 (c) Training (3 days per month)= 3 x 8 x
hours. 12 = 288 hours (determined the same as
for 7-day week position).
(c) Sick (1/3 day per month) = 1/3 x 8 x
12 = 32 hours. (d) Total nonavailable time= 560.
(This should be based on historical
records taken from sick slips but in lieu (3) Determine available time:
of accurate data, 1/3 day per month is 2,920-560 = 2,360
acceptable average per man.)
(d) Training (3 days per month) = 3 x 8 x (4) Determine yardstick:
12 = 288 hours. 2,920 divided by 2,360= 12.
41
Chapter 3
Education
A ny security program or system

designed to combat the security threats
discussed in chapter 1, appendixes A, B, C,
and D will prove ineffective unless it is
supported by an effective security education
program. Security personnel cannot effec-
tively accomplish their mission without the
active interest and support of everyone on the
installation. Such interest and support can be
secured only through an effective security
education program.
42
e. The essential interrelationship of both
3-1 Program Considerations types of security, plus the need for close
coordination between Military Police and
a. It is obvious from a review of Army Counterintelligence personnel in the
the security threats as presented, that a formulation and operation of a security
security education program must approach education program were considered in pre-
security from a total package, paring this chapter.
comprehensive-360-degree viewpoint. It must
be concerned not only with physical security
measures designed to prevent such purely 3-2 Program Formulation
criminal acts as pilferage; but just as impor-
tant, with counterintelligence measures de- To insure integration of security
signed to provide security of classified intelli- education, your plan must be developed at the
gence information and materials. The close installation level, which will require actions
relationship of the two types of security is by the major commands. Based upon vulnera-
made evident from a review of the Coun- bility and criticality, statistical data of
terintelligence Survey Checklist in FM 30-17, incidents and criminal information formula-
Counterintelligence Operations. The relation must complement both crime prevention
tionship and importance of physical security and military intelligence educational efforts.
to all other security is also well documented in
DA Pam 380-1. Both of these documents are 3-3 Program Objectives
highly recommended reading for the physical
security manager. a. The objectives of a security edu-
cation program are to acquaint all personnel
b. It is also essential that the security with the reasons for security measures and to
education program include all pertinent insure their cooperation. The assumption by
aspects of the crime prevention program (ARs installation personnel (military and civilian)
190-31, 190-33, 195-10, and FM 19-20). Many that they are not concerned with security
aspects of this program have a direct per- unless they work with classified matter or in a
sonal application to all installation person- restricted area must be overcome. It must be
nel. impressed upon them and be continually
reiterated that a locked gate or file cabinet
c. The individual and collective concern of does not constitute an end in itself, but is
every soldier and Department of the Army merely an element in the overall security
(DA) civilian is involved in protection efforts. plan.
Security education must be designed to
supplement mission accomplishment and be b. A continuous program should be pre-
considered essential to the successful imple- sented to selected audiences (primarily super-
mentation of a physical security program. visors and other key personnel) on timely and
applicable topics to develop and foster a high
d. Your educational program should en- degree of security consciousness.
courage prompt reporting of security
breaches and attempt to:
■ Reduce security infractions and violations.
Act as a communications feedback for 3-4 Educational Requirements
improved protective measures.
■ Reduce vulnerabilities. Security consciousness is not an
■ Instill security consciousness, which will inherent state of mind—it must be acquired.
solicit potential-threat information. Many people are naive and trusting, and are
43
153-846 O - 94 - 3
inclined to accept things at face value, tion programs within his command and
Desirable as these characteristics are, they insure the following:
are not conducive to vigilance or security
consciousness. Structural and mechanical a. Each individual is indoctrinated and
aids to security are valueless without the kept proficient in the particular security
active support of all personnel. All installa- procedures which apply to him in the per-
tion personnel must be made aware of the formance of his duties.
constant threat of breaches of security and of
their individual responsibilities to detect and b. All personnel are aware of their security
thwart such threats. A continuous and responsibilities.
forceful education program provides the
constant awareness that successful security c. All newly assigned personnel must be
demands. given security indoctrinations. The reading
of printed security regulations is not suffi-
cient to insure complete understanding.
3-5 Personal Presentations Indoctrination should consist of a general
orientation on the need for and dangers to
Very effective at commander’s call. security, and the individual’s responsibility
Requires formal instruction at the unit and in preventing infractions. It should include a
activity level. discussion of those hazards common to all
Technical advice may be presented by the personnel, with emphasis on the dangers of
provost marshal or security manager. loose talk and operational carelessness. It
Security content is presented in accordance should define general security measures in
with the 190-series Army regulations.
effect, such as the pass system, private
vehicle control, and package inspection. The
security indoctrination is an introduction to
3-6 Graphic Media Aids the subject as applied to the particular
installation. Further instruction should be
Posters –are effective since they applicable to the individual’s duty assign-
may be large in size, brief and to the point, ment.
and impact their message at a glance. Posters
should be displayed in locations where the d. Further orientation, on an initial and
majority of people pass and/or congregate. annual basis, is prescribed by AR 381-12,
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against
Placards –used where attention is neces- the US Army and Deliberate Security Viola-
sary and people are expected to loiter and tions.
have time to read, such as bulletin boards,
telephone booths, vending machines and e. AR 360-81, The Command Information
recreation areas. Program, discusses news media that can be
Leaflets –are economical and are usually used in security education programs, includ-
pocket size for easy carrying. Distribution of ing those prescribed by AR 381-12.
leaflets is determined by the commander or
activity chief. 3-8 Crime Prevention
All security education programs
3-7 Indoctrination should include materials on the crime preven-
tion programs (AR 190-31, AR 195-10, FM 19-
AR 380-5 requires the commander to 10, and FM 19-20) which are designed to
establish security indoctrination and educa- reduce crime. This is done by eliminating or
44
neutralizing factors that cause individuals to uting materials from its own areas of re-
commit criminal acts and that remove or sponsibility, knowledge, and interest. Each
minimize opportunities for committing such can also assist by presenting security brief-
acts. ings within those areas.
FM 19-20 provides detailed guidance on Staff judge advocate

conducting a crime prevention program. Chaplain
Such a program includes both the conduct of Special services officer
crime prevention surveys for the purposes Safety director
mentioned in above paragraph, and an Information officer
education program to emphasize security Post surgeon
consciousness on the part of all personnel, CID representative
and to educate them in the importance of Character guidance council representative
securing and protecting both military and Major organizational command represent-
personal property. atives
Local police and allied agencies
A security education program, therefore,
provides an excellent means of disseminating d. The program should be based on an
crime prevention information, and of encour- evaluation of the total security posture of the
aging the active participation of all personnel installation. It should begin with an explana-
in observing and reporting security deficien- tion of the program, its aims and objectives—
cies, violations, or hazards of any nature. the WHY.
e. It should then develop the necessary

tools to reach those aims and objectives—the
WHAT.
3-9 Program of Instruction
f. It should proceed to delineate methods of
a. The security manager is responsi- education by which the program will be
ble for planning an effective program of conducted-through individual and group
instruction. Profitable use of the limited time conferences, meetings, speeches, use of news
normally available for such instruction media, posters, placards, leaflets, etc.—the
demands the techniques of a competent HOW.
instructor. The security manager should give
the more important portions of the instruc- g. Each program must provide for initial
tion. Other competent instructors may be and refresher training. It will also provide for
used for less important phases or for phases debriefing of appropriate personnel upon
which concern their areas of responsibility, their reassignment, retirement, departure on
training, and experience. leave, and at other appropriate times.
b. FM 30-17 provides an excellent discus- h. The program must, above all, stress the
sion of the planning and implementation of a absolute requirement for the support of every
security education program. While the pro- individual, regardless of any security clear-
gram outlined is directed primarily to intelli- ance he mayor may not have, and regardless
gence security, a review will indicate many of his work assignment.
points at which physical security and crime
prevention education can be integrated. i. As a minimum, each program should
include materials on any recent incidents of
c. Each of the offices listed here can assist security deficiency or violation, and any
in the formulation of the program by contrib- areas of laxity or trends that have become
45
apparent in the security posture of the instal- the audience is seldom well received. Short
lation. periods of instruction to selected groups are
easier to schedule without disrupting the
operation.
3-10 Scheduling and Testing In any form of instruction, testing serves

the dual purpose of keeping the audience alert
Frequent short periods of instruction and indicating the efficiency of the presenta-
are more effective than less frequent long tion and the total program. Tests do not
periods. The ideas contained in four well- necessarily involve written answers. In fact,
planned weekly 15-minute classes are more skits and hypothetical situations tend to
readily absorbed than those contained in a 1- enliven the instruction. Audience participa-
hour lecture once a month-regardless of how tion in giving consequences or solutions to
well the latter is planned and delivered. situations presented will accomplish the
Instruction that infringes on the free time of same results.
46
Chapter 4
erimeter barriers, intrusion detec-

tion devices and protective lighting provide
physical security safeguards; however, they
alone are not enough. A positive personnel
movement control system must be estab-
lished and maintained to preclude unauthor-
ized entry, and to facilitate authorized entry
at personnel control points. Access lists,
personal recognition, security identification
47
cards and badges, badge exchange proce- ing efficient operations. Properly organized
dures, and personnel escorts contribute to the and administered, a personnel and move-
effectiveness of movement control systems. ment control system provides a means not
The best control is provided when systems
only of positively identifying those who have
incorporate all these elements. Simple, under-
standable, and workable identification and the right and need to enter or leave an area,
movement control procedures should be used but also of detecting unauthorized personnel
to achieve security objectives without imped- who attempt to gain entry.
Identification of Personnel Section I
4-1 Purpose of Movement (6) Using identification codes.

Control and Identification (7) Using duress codes
a. Prevent introduction of harmful

devices, materiel, or components. 4-2 Employee Screening
b. Prevent misappropriation, pilferage, or a. Screening job applicants and
compromise of materiel or recorded informa- employees to eliminate potential espionage
tion by means of: and sabotage agents and other security risks
is important in peacetime and is extremely
● Package
important in time of a national defense
● Materiel
emergency. For such screening to be most
● Property Movement Control.
effective, it should be incorporated into
standard personnel policies for peacetime as
c. This prevention is accomplished well as for times of emergency.
through:
(1) Initially determining who has a valid b. Personnel Security Survey Ques-
requirement to be in an area. tionnaire. The use of a personnel security
questionnaire is essential in the investigation
(2) Limiting access to those persons who of both applicants and employees. The
have that valid requirement. security questionnaire should be screened for
(3) Establishing procedures for positive completeness and, in the case of applicants,
identification of persons within, and of obvious undesirables eliminated from further
persons authorized access into, areas. consideration. A careful investigation should
be conducted to assure that the applicant’s or
(4) Issuing special identification cards or employee’s character, associations, and suit-
badges to personnel authorized access into ability for employment are satisfactory.
restricted areas.
(5) Using access lists. c. Sources of Data. The following
48
sources may be helpful in securing employ- The identification card or badge should be
ment investigative data: designed as simply as possible and still
(1) State and local police, to include provide for adequate control of the movement
national and local police in overseas areas. of personnel.
(2) Former employers. d. Provisions for identification by card or
(3) References (including those not fur- badge control at an installation or facility
nished by applicant or employee. These are should be included as part of the physical
known as throw-offs, and their names are security plan.
obtained during interviews of references
furnished by applicants or employees). 4-4 Use of Identification Media
(4) Public records. a. Designation of the various areas
(5) Credit agencies. where media are required.
(6) Schools (all levels). b. Description of the various types in use
(7) Others as appropriate. (These may plus authorizations and limitations placed
include the FBI, the US Army Criminal upon the holder.
Records Repository, etc.). In requesting
investigative data from any of the above c. Required presentation at times of enter-
sources, enough information should be ing and leaving each area, including nonop-
furnished to properly identify the appli- erational hours.
cant or employee and avoid error in
identity. d. Details, of where, when, and how worn,
displayed, or carried.
4-3 Identification System
e. Procedures to be followed in case of loss
a. An identification (ID) system or damage.
should be established at each installation or
facility to provide a means of identifying all f. Disposition on termination of employ-
military personnel, civilian employees, and ment or as a result of investigations and
visitors. The system should provide for the personnel actions.
use of security identification cards or badges
to aid in control and movement of personnel g. Prerequisites for reissue.
into, within, and out of specified areas or
activities. 4-5 Types of Systems
b. The standard identification media, DD
Form 2A (Military) or DA Form 1602 (Civil-
ian Employee), may be prescribed for person-
nel by installation or facility commanders as
valid identification for access to areas that
are basically administrative in nature, con-
tain no security interest, and are not in the
restricted area category.
c. Personnel requiring access to restricted

areas should be issued a security identifica-
tion card or badge as prescribed in AR 606-5.
49
4-6 Card and Badge System 4-8 Card or Badge Exchange
a. A security identification card or a. In this system, two items contain
badge system should be established to admit identical photographs but different back-
and control the movement of all persons ground colors, or one item has an overprint.
admitted to restricted areas employing 30 or One is presented at the entrance to a specific
more persons per shift. However, the com- area and exchanged for the other, which is
mander may at his discretion authorize a carried or worn while in that area. Individual
card or badge system in restricted areas possession upon issuance is only in the area,
where less than 30 persons per shift are to decrease the possibility of forgery or
employed. alteration.
b. This method provides extra security by

b. Of the several identification systems having both photographs identical. In this
used in access control, three of the most type of system, the second badge or card is
commonly used are the single card or kept in the security area and never leaves the
badge system, the card or badge ex- area.
change system, and the multiple card or
badge system. These ID systems may be
used either for cards carried on the person or
for cards or badges worn on outer clothing.
4-9 Multiple Card or Badge
c. A system may be established (in an a. Instead of having specific mark-
appropriate situation) for issuance of identifi- ings on the ID card or badge denoting permis-
cation cards or badges at the main entrance sion to enter various restricted areas, the mul-
to an installation. Such a system can be used tiple card or badge system makes an ex-
for visitors and similar personnel. change at the entrance to each security area
within the installation. Exchange cards or
badges are kept at each area for only those in-
dividuals who have the appropriate card or
badge. By virtue of the localized and con-
trolled exchange requirements, this is the
4-7 Single Card or Badge most secure and effective system.
a. With this system, permission to

enter specific areas is shown by letters, b. Card and badge data are identical and
numerals, or colors. It has a major must be so to allow comparisons.
limitation-loose control. The opportunity for
alteration or duplication is high.
b. This system gives comparatively loose 4-10 Card and Badge

control and is not recommended for security Specifications
areas. Permission to enter does not always go
with the need to know, and the fact that ID a. Security ID cards and badges
cards and badges frequently remain in the should be of a type of design and construction
bearer’s possession during off duty or off post which will make them, for all practical
hours gives the opportunity for alteration or purposes, tamperproof, and which will meet
duplication. the requirements of AR 606-5.
50
control is exercised by the supplier. This
is especially important when engraving
or special paper is concerned.
4-11 Enforcement Measures
The most vulnerable link in any

identification system is its enforcement.
Perfunctory performance of duty by the
security forces in comparing the bearer with
the card or badge may weaken or destroy the
effects of the most elaborate system. Positive
enforcement measures should be prescribed
b. Security ID card and badge inserts to insure effective operation of the personnel
should be prenumbered to avoid any possibil- and identification system. These should
ity of reissuing any number. Acquisition, include, but not be limited to the following:
storage, and control of card and badge a. Security personnel designated for
components and all engraved plates must be duty at entrance control points should be
accomplisher as prescribed in AR 606-5. chosen for their alertness, quick perception,
tact, and good judgment.
c. Issuance and Accountability:
(1) Identification card or badge issuance, b. Formalized, standard procedures
accuntability, and control should be for conducting assemblies, posting, and relief
accomplished at a central office, preferably of personnel, and frequent inspection of
the office of the provost marshal or personnel on post at irregular times are
physical security office, so a minimum of effective means to preclude posting of unqual-
time me elapses between change in the status ified personnel and perfunctory performance
of a card or badge and noti fication of the of duty.
security forces.
c. A uniform method of handling or
(2) A duplicate of each issued card or wearing security ID cards or badges
badge and a file on each hearer should be should be prescribed. If carried on the person,
kept including, in addition to the data the card must be removed from the wallet or
entered on the card or badge, the bearer’s other container and handed to security
residential address and telephone number. personnel. A badge should be worn in a
(3) Why such strict control? con spicuous position to expedite inspection
and recognition from a distance.
(a) Because any ID card or badge may
be altered or reproduced by a person d. Entrances and exits of restricted
having the time and sufficient skill in areas should be arranged so that arriving and
printing. engraving and photocopying, departing personnel arc forced to pass in a
the makeup, issuance, and accountabil- single file in front of security personnel. In
ity of cards and badges must be fully some instances, the use of turnstiles may be
controlled. advisable to assist in maintaining positive
(b) Because control commences with the control of entrance and exit.
manufacturer or supplier.
(c) When inserts or complete cards or e. Artificial lighting at the control
badges are secured commerically, verifi- points should be arranged so that it illumi-
cation should be made that adequate nates the arriving and departing personnel
51
and should be of sufficient intensity to enable trol points of current lists of lost or
security personnel to compare and identify invalidated cards and badges.
the bearer with the ID card or badge.
(6) Establishment of controls within re
stricted areas to enable security personnel
f. Enforcement of access control sys- on duty to determine promptly and accu-
tems rests primarily on the installation rately the number of persons within the
security forces. However, it is essential that area at any time.
they have the full cooperation of the employ-
(7) Establishment of a two-man rule when
ees, who should be educated and encouraged
required.
to assume this security responsibility. Em-
ployees should be instructed to consider each (8) Establishment of procedures to control
unidentified or improperly identified individ- movement of visitors to security areas. A
ual as a trespasser. In restricted areas where visitor control record should be maintained
access is limited to particular zones, employ- and located where positive controls can be
ees should report movement of individuals to exercised.
unauthorized zones.
g. Identification card and badge racks

or containers used at control points for an
exchange system should be positioned so they 4-12 Visitor Identification
are accessible only to guard personnel. And Control
h. A responsible custodian should be a. Physical security precaution
appointed by competent authority to accom- against pilferage, espionage, and sabotage
plish control procedures required by AR 606-5 requires screening, identification, and con-
for issue, turn in, recovery, or expiration of trol of visitors. Visitors are generally in the
security ID cards and badages, The degree of following categories:
compromise tolerable in the identification (1) Persons with whom every installation
system is in direct proportion to the degree of or facility must have dealings in connec-
security required or indicated. The following tion with the conduct of its business, such
control procedures are recommended for as representatives of suppliers, customers,
preserving the integrity of a card and badge licensers or licensee, insurance inspectors
system: or adjusters, government inspectors (na-
tional, state, and local), service industry
representatives, contractors, employees,
(1) Maintenance of an accurate written etc.
record or log listing, by serial number, all
(2) Individuals or groups who desire to
cards and badges, showing those on hand,
visit an installation or facility for a
to whom issued, and disposition (lost,
purpose not essential to, or necessarily in
mutilated, or destroyed).
furtherance of, the operations of the
(2) Authentication of records and logs by installation or facility concerned. Such
the custodian. visits may be desired, for example, by
business, educational, technical, or scien-
(3) Periodic inventory of records by a
tific organizations and individuals or
commissioned officer.
groups desiring to further their particular
(4) Prompt invalidation of lost cards and interests.
badges.
(3) Individuals or groups specifically
(5) Conspicuous posting at security con- sponsored by government agency organi-
52
zations such as foreign nationals visiting (5) Procedures which will insure support-
under technical cooperation programs and ing personal identification in addition to
similar visits by US nationals. Requests check of visitor cards or badges at re-
for visits by foreign nationals should be stricted area entrances.
processed in accordance with AR 380-25.
(6) Procedures for escorting visitors hav-
(4) Individuals and groups who the gov- ing limitations relative to access through
ernment generally encourages but does not areas where an uncontrolled visitor, even
specifically sponsor, because of the contri- though conspicuously identified, could
bution they make to economic and techni- acquire information for which he is not
cal progress or to defense production in the authorized. Foreign national visitors
United States and/or in friendly nations. should be escorted at all times.
(5) Guided tour visits to selected portions (7) Controls which will recover visitor ID
of installations in the interest of public cards or badges on expiration, or when no
relations. longer required.
(6) Further information concerning re- (8) Twenty-four hour advance approval
quirements and procedures for visits will when possible. Where appropriate, the
be found in AR 381-130 and AR 550-50. installation should prepare an agenda for
the visit and designate an escort officer.
b. Arrangements for identification and
control of visitors may include the following:
(1) Positive methods of establishing the
authority for admission of visitors, as well
as any limitations relative to access. 4-13 Sign/Countersign
(2) Positive ID of visitors by means of And Codeword
personal recognition, visitor permit, or
other identifying credentials. The em- This additional measure to verify
ployee, supervisor or officer in charge identity is primarily used in tactical maneu-
should be contacted to ascertain the vers and during Army Training and Evalua-
validity of the visit. tion Programs (ARTEP). The sign/counter-
sign or codeword procedure should be checked
(3) Availability and use of visitor registra- and tested to insure immediate change if.
tion forms and records that will provide a compromised.
record of identity of the visitor, time and
duration of his visit, and other pertinent
control data.
(4) Availability and use of visitor ID cards
or badges. Such identification media
should be numbered serially and indicate
4-14 Duress Code
the following:
This is a simple word or phrase used
(a) Bearer’s name. during normal conversation. It alerts other
(b) Area or areas to which access is security personnel that an authorized person
authorized. has been forced to vouch for an unauthorized
(c) Escort requirements, if any. individual. A viable duress code requires
(d) Time limit for which issued. preplanning to insure appropriate response.
(e) Signature (or facsimile). And it is changed frequently to minimize
(f) Photograph, if desired and available. compromise.
53
Methods of Control Section II
Equipment And/Or Manpower
This system assists in the control of entry b. Escort personnel should be other than
and departure of personnel to and from these military police or civilian guards.
areas and provides a strict control and identi-
fication system within the area. c. Whether or not the escort remains with
such visitor during the time he is within the
restricted area is determined by local regula-
tions. Personnel listed on the access list may
4-15 Use of Escorts be admitted to restricted areas without escort,
depending upon local policy.
Escorts must be chosen because of
their ability to accomplish tasks properly and
effective y and their knowledge of areas to be 4-16 Entry Roster
visited, to include all security requirement.
Admission of unit or installation
a. Each should be a representative of the personnel to restricted areas should be
person or activity visited. granted only to those positively identified
54
and whose names appear on a properly (1) When uncontrolled access to vital
authenticated roster of all persons authorized machinery, equipment, or materiel might
by competent authority to enter. provide opportunity for intentional or
unintentional damage which could affect
a. Each time a permanent addition or the mission or operation of the installation
deletion is made, this correction can initially or facility.
be accomplished by pen and ink.
(2) Where uncontrolled access to funds
b. Changes may be published in the same
could provide opportunity for diversion by
manner as the original roster.
falsification of accounts.
c. Rosters should be maintained at access
control points to facilitate positive control (3) When uncontrolled delivery or receipt
and be kept current, verified, authenticated, for materials could provide opportunity for
and accounted for by an individual desig- pilferage through “short” deliveries and
nated by the commander. Admission of false receipts.
persons other than those on the authorized
roster should be subject to specific approval (4) When uncontrolled access to an arms
or ammunition storage room could provide
by the installation or facility commander, or
an opportunity for theft. Keys should be
his designated representative. Such persons
issued so as to require the presence of at
will be escorted or supervised.
least two men to unlock the three locks
required under provisions of AR 190-11.
4-17 Two-man Rule (This is analogous to the safe deposit box
system, which requires two keys in the
a. At least two authorized persons, possession of two different persons.)
each capable of detecting incorrect or unau- d. The foregoing are only a few examples
thorized procedures with respect to the task the listing is virtually limitless. The impor-
being performed and who are familiar with tant point to be stressed is that the provost
applicable safety and security requirements, marshal and the physical security manager
will be present during any operation that should explore every possible aspect of
affords access to sensitive weapons. physical security operations in which the
two-man rule would provide additional secu-
b. The rule is designed to prohibit access to rity and assurance, and include all appropri-
sensitive weapons by a lone individual. Two ate recommendations and provisions in the
authorized persons will be considered to be overall physical security plan.
present when they are in a physical position
from which they can positively detect incor-
rect or unauthorized procedures with respect
to the task and/or operation being performed. 4-18 Additional Procedures
When application of the two-man rule is For Specific Groups
required, it will be enforced constantly by the
persons who constitute the team while they a. Visitors— Entrance prerequi-
are accomplishing the task or operation sites:
assigned and until they leave the area in
(1) Verify identity.
which it is required.
(2) Contact person or activity to be visited
c. The two-man rule should not, however, to insure identity and validity of visit.
be considered applicable only in the cited
(3) Record visitor information.
situations. It can, and should, be applied in
many other aspects of physical security (a) Issue visitor badges.
operations, such as the following: (b) Use registration forms.
55
b. VIPs and foreign nationals, special 4-19 Security Personnel
consideration— Coordination with protocol At Entry and Exit Points
office:
(1) Twenty-four hour advance notice desir- The security manager responsible
able. for these individuals must insure that the
personnel:
(2) Agenda for visit and designation of
escort officer, if appropriate. a. Are alert, very perceptive, tactful, and
capable of exercising sound judgment in
executing their duties and responsibilities.
c. Civilians working on jobs under b. Conduct frequent, irregular checks of
government contract— The security their assigned areas during periods of inac-
manager should: tivity (holidays, weekends, after-duty hours,
• Coordinate with procurement office to etc.). (Also, see chapter 5.)
determine applicable provisions of con-
tract.
• Identify procedures to control the move-
ment of those employees.
• Insure that protection of the construc-
tion site is accomplished with available 4-20 Mechanized/Automated
resources. Systems
Identification and access control
d. Supervisors using cleaning teams systems base their identification judgment
should seek technical advice from the physi- factor on a remote capability through a
cal security office on internal controls for routine discriminating device for positive ID,
each specific building. as opposed to the manual system’s using a
guard force member to conduct identification
based on access rosters and personal recogni-
e. Public utility and commercial ser- tion.
vice representatives:
a. In a mechanized identification
(1) Entrance prerequisites same as for system, the following actions occur within
visitors. the machine:
(2) Designated activity personnel check (1) Receives physical ID data from an
on authority to remove equipment for individual.
maintenance.
(2) Encodes this data for use.
(3) Compares this data to stored data.
f. DOD employees in work areas after
normal operational hours: (4) Makes ago or no go decision based on
the comparison.
El Supervisors establish internal controls,
based on coordination with the security (5) Translates the results into readable
manager. form.
El Notify security personnel of workers’ b. Several mechanical devices add to the

presence and expected duration of work. security posture and are expanding in popu-
56
larity and use. Such devices use the following (2) The voiceprint technique is being
techniques: widely used as an identification means and
features rapid processing with accuracy.
(1) Magnetic coding.
(2) Embossing.
(3) Optical characters. d. An all-inclusive automated ID and
access control system reinforces the security
(4) Dielectric coding. indepth ring through its easy and rapid
change capability. The computer is able to do
c. Specialized mechanical systems are this through its memory, stored on magnetic
ideal for highly sensitive situations because tape or disc. Changes can be made by remote
these systems use a controlled process in a use of specific code numbers. The big advan-
controlled environment to establish the tage for this system is that changes do not
required data base and accuracy.
require wiring or media alterations.
(1) One innovative technique with appli-
cation to identification and admittance e. The commercial security market has a
procedures involves dimension compari- wide range of mechanized and automated
sons. The dimension of a person’s full hand hardware-software systems interfacing for
is compared to previously stored data to the enhancement of any security posture.
determine entry authorization. Another Assessment of security needs and use of the
specialized machine reader can scan a planning, programing and budgeting proce-
single fingerprint and provide positive dures outlined in chapter 2 will greatly assist
identification of anyone attempting entry. a security manager in improving the overall
(Good for semiremote environment.) security posture.
57
Designation of Restricted Areas Section Ill
these documents that the security protection

4-21 Restricted Areas afforded by a restricted area pertains particu-
larly to subversive activities control, that is,
The term “restricted area” as used protection against espionage, sabotage, or
here, is defined (AR 380-20) as “Any area, any such actions adversely affecting the
access to which is subject to special restric- national defense of the United States. Within
tions or controls for reasons of security or this context, the designation “restricted
safeguarding of property or material.” area, ” as defined, is not applicable to an area
solely for protection against common pilfer-
a. Designation and establishment of re- age or misappropriation of property or
stricted areas is the responsibility of the material which is not classified or not
military commander of the installation or essential to the national defense. For exam-
facility. His authority is derived from Depart- ple, an area devoted to the storage or use of
ment of Defense Directive No. 5200.8, dated classified documents, equipment or materials
20 August 1954, which was issued pursuant to should be so designated to safeguard against
the provisions of section 21, Internal y y espionage. An installation communications
Act of 1950. Within the Army, the DOD center should also be so designated, to
Directive was implemented by AR 380-20. safeguard against sabotage. On the other
hand, a cashier’s cage or an ordinary me-
b. AR 380-20 states, “these regulations chanic’s toolroom should not be so desig-
apply only to Army installations or activities nated, although the commander may impose
within the continental United States. Over- controls on access thereto. This may be as
sea commanders may utilize these regula- simple a matter as posting a sign, “Off Limits
tions for guidance in establishing local proce- to Unauthorized Personnel,” or it may require
dures.” the erection of fences, railings, etc. The
responsibility for designation is, of course,
c. The terms, “restricted area,” “controlled the commanders. However, in furnishing
area, “ “limited area,” and “exclusion area,” advice to him, the provost marshal or
are described by AR 50-5 as standard termi- physical security manager should consider
nology. The regulation states that these carefully the foregoing guidance; evaluate
terms “will be employed wherever United the purpose of any proposed or necessary
States Army nuclear weapon material is designation of a restricted area; coordinate
involved.” Such employment outside the with the intelligence officer and staff judge
continental United States would, however, advocate; and formulate his recommenda-
require publication of an appropriate com- tions accordingly.
mand directive, since AR 380-20 would not
apply. e. To comply with the requirements of the
Internal Security Act of 1950 and the provi-
d. It is clearly the meaning and intent of sions of implementing directives, and to
58
provide for proper procedures in cases of (3) Conditions for compartmentalization

violation, a restricted area must be desig- of classified information or critical equip-
nated in writing as such by the military ment or materials, with minimum impact
commander and must he posted with warning on operations.
signs or notices of the type described in AR
380-20. 0-20. b. Different areas involve different degrees
of security interest, depending upon their
f. The establishment of restricted areas purpose and nature of work, information,
improves security by providing defense in and/or materials concerned. For similar
depth (see also paragraph 1- 3c) and increases reasons, different areas within an installa-
efficiency by providing degrees of security tion may have varying degrees of impor-
compatible with operational requirements. tance. In some cases, the entire area of an
These specially designated areas may also installation may have a uniform degree of
provide for economy of operation by reducing importance, requiring only one level of
the need for stringent control measures for restriction and control. In others, differences
the installation or facility as a whole. in degrees of importance will require further
segregation or compartmentalization of ac-
tivities.
4-22 Types of Restricted Areas c. To meet these different levels of sensitiv-

ity and to provide for an effective and
a. The degree of security and con- efficient basis for applying the varying
trols required depends upon the nature, degrees of restriction of access, control of
sensitivity. or importance of the security movement, and type of protection required,
interest or other matter involved. Restricted restricted areas or portions thereof may be
areas may be established to provide the further administratively designated as “ex-
following: clusion, ” “limited,” or “controlled” areas. It
must be understood that the term “restricted
(1) Effective application of necessary area” is in effect a legal designation (Internal
security measures and exclusion of unau - Security Act of 1950), whereas the terms,
thorized personnel. “exclusion” and “limited” are administrative
(2) Intensified controls over those areas only (AR 380-20). The term “controlled area, ”
requiring special protection. is not mentioned in either the Security Act or
59
AR 380-20, and is used only as a matter of The degree of control of movement within
convenience. this area will, therefore, be as prescribed by
the appropriate commander.
d. The primary criteria for administrative
designation of exclusion, limited, and con- e. You can see from the foregoing that an
trolled areas is the degree of restriction or installation may have varying degrees of
controls required to prevent compromise of security designation, or none at all. It maybe
the security interest or other matter therein. designated in its entirety as a restricted area,
Characteristics of these areas are: with no further degree of restrictions or
controls. It may, however, provided that it is
(1) Exclusion area— A restricted area first designated as a restricted area, to bring
containing one of the following: it under the provisions of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, be further administra-
(a) A security interest or other matter of tively classified, in whole or in portions, as an
such nature that access to the area exclusion area, limited area, or controlled
constitutes, for all practical purposes, area with specific clear zones (figures 6,7,8,9
access to such security interest or mat- and 10).
ter.
(b) A security interest or other matter of
such vital importance that proximity 4-23 Other Considerations
resulting from access to the area is
treated as equivalent to (a) above. a. There are other important consid-
erations which should be kept in mind
(2) Limited area— A restricted area con- concerning restricted areas and their com-
taining a security interest or other matter partmentalization. Some of these are:
and in which uncontrolled movement will
(1) Immediate and anticipated needs
permit access to such security interest or
can be determined by survey and analysis
matter, but within which access may be
of the installation or facility, its missions,
prevented by escort and other internal
and the security interests or other matters
restrictions and controls. Individuals who
on hand which require protection. Antic-
have a legitimate reason for entering a
ipated needs can be determined from future
limited area may do so if internal restric-
plans.
tions and controls are provided to prevent
access to the security interest or other (2) The nature of the security interest
matter. These measures usually consist of or other matter to be protected. Classified
escorts and other physical safeguards. documents and small items may be pro-
tected by securing them in safes or locked
(3) Controlled area— An area, usually containers, whereas large items may have
adjacent to or encompassing limited or to be placed within guarded enclosures.
exclusion areas. Access to a controlled area
(3) Some security interests are more
is restricted to those with a need for access.
sensitive to compromise than others.
However, movement of authorized person- Brief observation or a simple act by an
nel within this area is not necessarily untrained person may constitute a compro-
controlled, since mere access to the area mise in some cases. In others, detailed
does not provide access to the security study and planned action by an expert may
interest or other matter within the exclu- be required.
sion or limited areas. The controlled area is
provided for administrative control, (4) All security interests should be evalu-
safety, and/or as a buffer zone for depth in ated according to their relative im-
security for the exclusion or limited areas. portance. This may be indicated by a
60
security classification such as TOP SE- tions. However, without security there
CRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL, or by may be no operations. The use of security
their criticality. That is, the effect their loss areas makes it possible to have security
or compromise would have on national compatible with operational requirements.
defense or the mission of the installation or Instead of establishing stringent control
facility. measures for the installation as a whole
b. Parking areas for privately owned varying degrees of security can be provided
vehicles must be established outside restrict- as required and as conditions warrant. In
ed areas, if at all possible. This is due to the this way, interference with overall
fact that large amounts of articles can be operations is reduced to a minimum and
readily concealed in vehicles, and would then operational efficiency can be maintained at a
be harder to detect than if they were on a relatively high level.
person. Also, entrances should be kept at a d. Where required, adequate physical safe-
minimum necessary for safe and efficient guards such as fences, gates, and window
operation and control. bars must be installed to deny entry of
unauthorized persons into restricted areas.
c. Establishment of restricted areas within Except where such action would tend to
an installation improves overall security by advertise an otherwise concealed area, warn-
providing security in depth. Limited and ing signs or notices must be posted in
exclusion areas serve as inner rings of conspicuous and appropriate places, such as
security; the controlled area serves as a buffer ordinary entrances or approaches to these
zone. As a general rule, an increase in areas, and on perimeter fences or boundaries
security results in some slowdown in opera- of each area.
Figure 6—Sample layout of temporary tactical restricted areas.
61
Figure 7—Sample layout for temporary tactical exclusion area.
62
Depot Complex
(Restricted Area—Base Defense)
Figure 8—Diagram of depot complex example.
63
Figure 9—Schematic diagram of simplified restricted area and degrees of security.
Package, Materiel, and Property Control Section IV
4-24 Package Control include control of anything that could be

a. A good package control system used to secret property or materiel of any
helps prevent or minimize pilferage, sabo- type.
tage and espionage. Only packages with pro- b. Persons should not be routinely
per authorization should be permitted into re- searched except in unusual situations. When
stricted areas without inspection. they are, it should be only in accordance with
b. A positive system should be estab- published command directives.
lished to control movement of packages,
materiel, and property into and out of
the installation. 4-26 Vehicle Control
c. A package checking system, using In-
a. All privately owned/visitor-
dividual Property Pass, DA Form 1818, or a
operated motor vehicles on the installation
similar form, may be used at the entrance
should be registered with the provost mar-
gate for the convenience of employees and
shal or the installation physical security of-
visitors. When practicable, inspect all out-
fice. Requirement to display a tag or decal
going packages except those properly au-
should be IAW AR 190-5 and AR 210-10.
thorized for removal. When 100 percent in-
b. Vehicles belonging to visitors should be
spection is impracticable, conduct frequent identified by a temporary decal or identifi-
unannounced spot checks.
cation media different from permanent regis-
tration to permit ready recognition by secu-
4-25 Property Controls rity personnel.
a. Property controls must not be c. When authorized vehicles enter or exit a
limited to packages carried openly; but must restricted area, each must undergo a sys-
64
Figure 10—Drawing of standard physical security layout.
tematic search, including, but not limited railroad engines to insure proper identifica-
to, the following areas: tion and registration of those entering and
• Interior of vehicle leaving the area. Such cards or badges
• Engine compartment should permit access only to specific loading
• External air breathers and unloading areas.
• Top of vehicle d. All conveyances entering or leaving a
• Battery box protected area should be required to pass
• Cargo compartment through a service gate manned by security
• Undercarriage. forces. Drivers, helpers, passengers, and ve
hicle contents should be carefully examined.
4-27 Truck and Railroad The security check should include
= Appropriate entries in security log, date,
Car Control operator’s name, description of load, time
a. Movement of trucks and railroad entered and departed.
cars into and out of installations or facilities 9 License check of operator.
should be supervised and each inspected to 9 Verify seal number with shipping docu-
prevent the entry or removal of unauthorized ment and examine seal for tampering.
persons or materiel. Inspectors should be es- e. Incoming trucks and railroad cars
pecially watchful for explosives or incendiar- must be assigned escorts before they are
ies. permitted to enter designated limited or
b. Truck and railroad entrances should be exclusion areas. Commanders should es-
controlled by locked gates when not in tablish published procedures to control the
use, and should be under security supervision movement of trucks and railroad cars that
when unlocked or opened for passage. enter designated restricted areas to dis-
c. Identification cards or badges charge or pick up cargo. Escorts should be
should be issued to operators of trucks and provided when necessary.
65
Chapter 5
Protective Barriers
P rotective barriers are used to define

the physical limits of an installation, activity
or area and are used to restrict, channel or
impede access.
Protective barriers are divided into two
major categories —structural and natural.
Natural protective barriers may be moun-
deserts, or other terrain difficult to traverse.
Structural protective barriers involve man-
made devices such as fences, walls, floors,
roofs, grills, bars, roadblocks or other con-
struction to make penetration difficult.
66
5-1 Benefits 5-3 Positive Barriers
The use of barriers offers two impor- Positive barriers should be designed
tant benefits to a physical security posture. in view of the threat, to deter access to the
First, they create a psychological considera- maximum extent.
tion for anyone thinking of unauthorized en-
try. Second, barriers have a direct impact on a. Positive barriers are required for the
the number of security posts needed and on entire perimeter of controlled, limited, or
the frequency of use for each post. exclusion areas (see chapter 5). Specific types
of barriers cannot be predesignated for all
5-2 Considerations situations; however, they should incorporate
the following elements:
Protective physical barriers should (1) Structural perimeter barriers, such as
be used in the protection of the entire fences, walls, etc.
installation or facility and in establishing
restricted areas. The following guidance may (2) Provisions at points of entrance and
exit for identification checks by either pass
be used for protective structural barriers and
and badge exchange or badge examination
the types of areas they serve:
(chapter 4).
a. The size of an area, which in some cases
may embrace extensive tracts of land, will (3) Opaque barriers to preclude visual
compromise by unauthorized personnel
depend upon the nature of the security may be necessary in certain instances.
considerations. These considerations will
have a bearing on the essentiality and cost
b. When the greatest degree of security is
effectiveness of establishing structural barri-
essential, additional structural barriers may
ers on the outer perimeter. You can define the
be required. Two lines of structural barriers
outer perimeter of a restricted area by:
should be installed on the perimeter; such
(1) Structural barriers at control points lines of barriers should be separated by not
and other points of possible entrance and less than 15 feet and not more than 150 feet
exit. for optimum enforcement, protection, and
control.
(2) Natural or structural barriers between
control points that are sufficiently obstruc-
c. If the nature of a secure area dictates a
tive and difficult to traverse—to control
requirement for a limited or exclusion area on
and to preclude accidental intrusion.
a temporary or infrequent basis, you may not
be able to use the types of physical structural
b. The size of a restricted area will depend
perimeter barriers described in paragraph 5-
on the degree of compartmentalization re-
3a. In such cases, a temporary limited area or
quired and the complexity of the area. As a
exclusion area may be established in which
rule, size should be kept to a minimum
consistent with operational efficiency. Posi- the lack of proper physical barriers is com-
tive barriers should be established for: pensated for by additional security posts,
patrols, and other security measures during
(1) Controlling vehicular and pedestrian the period of restriction (chapter 4).
traffic flow.
(2) Checking identification of personnel 5-4 Fence Design Criteria
entering or departing.
(3) Defining a buffer zone for more highly Four types of fencing authorized for
classified areas. use in protecting restricted areas are chain-
67
153-846 O - 94 - 4 (Fold-in No. 1)
Figure 11—OCE drawing 40-16-10 of chain link fence construction.
link, barbed wire, concertina, a n d controlled areas), excluding top guard. Fence cations in Office, Chief of Engineers (OCE)
barbed tape. Choice of type depends primar- heights for conventional arms/ammo securi- drawing 40-16-10 (figure 11). For added resist-
ily upon the degree of permanence of the ty must be 6 feet for standard chain link, wire- ance to climbing, optional top rail or taut wire
installation, availability of materials, and mesh fencing. Chain-link fences must be of 9- may be omitted. Fencing may be painted
time available for construction. Generally, gauge (.1508 inches or 3.77 mm) or heavier with a nonreflective substance to reduce the
chain-link fencing will be used for protection wire galvanized with mesh openings not glare to security forces (TM 5-830-3). Weak-
of permanent limited and exclusion areas. All larger than 2 inches (approximately 5.1 cm) nesses in the chain link fence occur as a re-
four types of fencing maybe used to augment per side, and a twisted and barbed selvage at sult of weather (rusting) and failure to keep
or increase the security of existing fences that top and bottom. It must be taut and securely fencing fastened to the post which affects the
protect restricted areas. Examples would be fastened to rigid metal or reinforced concrete desired tightness.
to create an additional barrier line, increase posts set in concrete. It must reach within 2
existing fence height, or provide other meth- inches (5.1 cm) of hard ground or paving. On
ods that add effectively to physical security. soft ground it must reach below the surface b. Barbed Wire. Standard barbed wire is
deeply enough to compensate for shifting soil twisted, double-strand, 12-gauge wire, with
a. Chain-link (Federal Spec. RR-F-191/1, or sand (OCE Guide Specification 02711). Se- four-point barbs spaced an equal distance
Type I). Chain-link fence, including gates, curity commensurate with FE-6 fence con- apart. Barbed wire fencing, including gates,
must be constructed of 7-foot (approximately struction standards will be provided. Con- intended to prevent human trespassing
2.13 m) material (6 foot or 1.83 m for struction must be in accordance with specifi- should not be less than 7 feet (2.13 m) high,
68
Figure 12—Example of properly constructed barbed wire fence.
excluding the top guard, and must be firmly between poles with one roll on top of another
affixed to posts not more than 6 feet (1.82 m) or in a pyramid arrangement (minimum of
apart. The distance between strands will not three rolls). The ends must be staggered or
exceed 6 inches (approximately 15.3 cm) and fastened together and the base wire picketed
at least one wire will be interlaced vertically to the ground.
and midway between posts (figure 12).
Figure 13—OCE drawing 40-16-10, barbed tape details.
d. Barbed Tape (Mil Fed Spec. MIL-B-
c. Concertina. Standard concertina
52775A) (figure 13).
barbed wire is a commercially manufactured
wire coil of high-strength-steel barbed wire, (1) The barbed tape system is composed of
clipped together at intervals to form a three items—barbed tape, barbed tape
cylinder. Opened, it is 50 feet long and 3 feet in dispenser, and concertina tape. These
diameter. When used as the perimeter barrier items were type classified “standard A
for a restricted area, concertina must be laid type,” 16 December 1965.
69
153-846 O - 94- 5 (Fold-in No. 2)

Figure 14—Supporting arms on top guard point outward.
(2) Barbed tape is fabricated from a steel retracted into a closed coil.
strip (0.020 inches thick nominal) with a
(4) The handling of barbed tape requires
minimum breaking strength of 500
the use of heavy barbed tape gauntlets
pounds. The overall width is 3/4 of an inch.
(FSN 8415-926-1674) instead of standard
The tape has 7/16-inch barbs spaced at 1/2
barbed wire gauntlets.
inch intervals along each side. Fifty meters
of tape are wound on a plastic reel 8 3/4
e. Top Guard. A top guard must be
inches in diameter and 1 inch thick. The
constructed on all perimeter fences and may
finish is electro-galvanized 0.0001-inches
be added on interior enclosures for additional
thick on each side.
protection. A top guard is an overhang of
(3) Barbed tape concertina consists of a barbed wire or barbed tape along the top of a
single strand of spring steel wire and a fence, facing outward and upward at approxi-
single strand of barbed tape. The sections mately a 45-degree angle (figure 14). Top
between barbs of the barbed tape are guard supporting arms will be permanently
securely clinched around the wire. Each affixed to the top of fence posts to increase the
coil is approximately 37 1/2 inches in overall height of the fence at least 1 foot
diameter and consists of 55 spiral turns (approximately 30.5 cm). Three strands of
connected by steel clips to form a cylindri- barbed wire, spaced 6 inches (15.2 cm) apart,
cal diamond pattern when extended to a must be installed on the supporting arms. The
coil length of 50 feet. One end turn is fitted number of strands of wire or tape may be
with four bundling wires for securing the increased when required. The top guard of
coil when closed and each end turn is fitted fencing adjoining gates may range from a
with two steel carrying loops. The concer- vertical height of 18 inches (45.7 cm) to the
tina extends to 50 feet without permanent normal 45-degree outward protection, but
distortion and when released, can be only for sufficient distance along the fence to
70
Figure 15—A type of field perimeter fence (cattle fence).
open the gate(s) adequately. Top fence rails and has been found to be most effective
should not be specified where protection is of (figure 15).
utmost importance. Top rails will assist a
climber. A bottom and top wire reinforcement h. Tanglefoot Wire. Barbed wire or tape
should be used as a substitute (OCE-02711). may be used in appropriate situations to
construct a tanglefoot obstruction either
f. Gates and Entrances. The number of outside a single perimeter fence or in the area
gates and perimeter entrances must be the between double fences, to provide an addi-
minimum required for safe and efficient tional deterrent to intruders. The wire or tape
operation. Active perimeter entrances must should be supported on short metal or wood
be designed so that the guard force maintains pickets spaced at irregular intervals of 3 to 10
full control. Semiactive entrances, such as feet, and at heights between 6 and 12 inches.
infrequently used vehicular gates, must be The wire or tape should be crisscrossed to
locked on the inside when not in use. Gates provide a more effective obstacle. Depth of
and entrances, when closed, must provide a the field is governed by the space and
barrier structurally comparable to their materials available.
associated barrier(s). Top guards, which may
be vertical, are required for all gates.
5-5 Utility Openings
g. Type Field Perimeter Fence. A
combination of concertina fencing, developed Sewers, air and water intakes and
in Vietnam, uses a double-barbed wire fence exhausts, and other utility openings of 10
(the cattle fence described in FMs 5-15 and inches (25.4 cm) or more in diameter that pass
100-50), with five rolls of concertina between through perimeter barriers must have secu-
the fences. This fence has, in many situa- rity equivalent to that of these barriers (TM 5-
tions, been used in place of chain link fence, 820-4).
71
a. Interior manhole covers 10 inches (25.4 5-6 Other Perimeter Barriers
cm) or more in diameter must be secured to
prevent unauthorized opening. a. Building walls and roofs, when
serving as perimeter barriers, must be con-
b. Unavoidable drainage ditches, culverts, structed and arranged to provide uniform
vents, ducts, and other openings having a protection equivalent to that provided by
cross-sectional area greater than 96 square chain-link fencing. If a building less than two
inches (624 sq cm) and a smallest dimension stories high forms part of the perimeter, a top
greater than 6 inches (16.3 cm) will be guard must be used along the outside coping
protected by securely fastened welded bar to deny access to the roof (figure 17).
grills (TM 5-280-4). As an alternative, drain-
age structures may be constructed of multiple
pipes, each pipe having a diameter of 10 b. Masonry walls, when used as perimeter
inches (25.4 cm) or less. Multiple pipes of this barriers, must have a minimum height of 7
diameter also may be placed and secured in feet (approximately 2.13 m) and must have a
the inflow end of a drainage culvert to prevent barbed wire top guard, sloped outward at a 45-
intrusion into the area. (See examples in degree angle, carrying at least three strands
figure 16.) of barbed wire and increasing the vertical
Figure 16—Examples of secured utility openings.
72
height of the barrier by at least 1 foot
(approximately 30.5 cm); or they must have a
minimum height of 8 feet (2.4 m) and have
broken glass, set on edge and cemented to the
top surface.
c. Windows, active doors, and other desig-

nated openings must be protected by securely
fastened bars, grills, or chain-link screens.
Window barriers must be fastened from the
inside If hinged, the hinges and locks must
be on the inside. If an instrusion detection
system is used, consideration should be given
to using the security screen detailed in OCE
drawing DEF 40-26-01.
d. Construction Procedures. D e t a i l e d
guidance on construction procedures, mate-
rial and manpower requirements for field
construction of barriers by small troops units
is in FM 5-15.
Figure 17 - Sample of top guard on roof.
73
5-7 Security Tower Design ties that use towers must have a support force
available for emergencies, and tower person-
Reliance on towers as the only nel should be rotated at frequent intervals.
means for observation of a perimeter is
usually considered unsatisfactory. However, b. Psychologically, the mere elevation of
all towers should be located to provide the observer has an unnerving effect on a
maximum observation and be constructed for potential intruder. However, as mentioned
protection from small arms fire. above, the isolation of the tower tends to
reduce the alertness of its occupants.
a. Mobile towers are useful in some
temporary situations, such as a large open c. The height of a tower increases the
storage area where there is activity in range of observation during daylight hours
receiving and storing equipment. All facili- and at night with artificial illumination.
However, during inclement weather and
during blackout, towers lose this advantage
and must be supplemented by on-the-ground
observation.
5-8 Tower Use

In planning the use of towers,
consideration must be given to the following:
a. A possible necessity for hardening the
tower (by use of sandbags, salvage armor-
plating, etc.) to protect the occupant. This
may require strengthening of the support,
which should be performed only under the
supervision of an engineer.
Figure 18—Details of tower design.
74
b. Communications and alarm systems, 5-9 Installation/Activity
both audible and visual (primary and alter- Entrances
nate).
a. The number of installation/ac-
c. The possibility of using appropriate tivity gates and perimeter entrances inactive
STANO equipment with the tower and use should be limited to the minimum
perimeter barriers being surveilled. Some of required for safe and efficient operation of the
the infrared items may be especially valu- installation. Protective lighting must be IAW
able. chapter 6 of this manual. When necessary,
crash beams should be installed in front of
d. Protective lighting (chapter 6, AR 50-5). vehicle gates according to the design specifi-
cations in figure 19.
e. Protection of the route to the tower.
f. Height of the tower according to the area b. Entrance plans (primary and alternate)
of observation. for an installation or activity to control
vehicle traffic using guard personnel is
g. Mutually supporting in terms of small outlined in figures 20 and 21 on page 76. The
arms fire. type guard post used to support the entrance
plans is detailed in figure 22.
h. Allows for egress and ingress of support-
ing alert forces, as appropriate.
i. Backed up by a fortified defensive c. Active perimeter entrances should be

fighting position, as appropriate. designated so security forces maintain full
control without unnecessary delay in traffic.
j. Located within the exclusion area. (See This is largely a matter of having sufficient
figure 18 for tower design details.) entrances to accommodate the peak flow of
Figure 19—OCE drawing 40-16-10 crash beam details.
75
Figure 20—Primary entrance plan.
Figure 27—Alternate entrance plan.
76
5-10 Entry Control Stations
Entry control stations normally
should be provided at main perimeter en-
trances where such entrances are manned by
security personnel on a full-or part-time basis.
Considerations for construction and use
should be based, in part, on the information
outlined in paragraphs 5-8 and 5-9.
a. Entry control stations should be located

as near as practicable to the perimeter
entrance to permit personnel inside the
station to maintain constant surveillance
over the entrance and its approaches.
b. Entry control stations that are manned

Figure 22—Guard post support plan. 24 hours each day should have interior and
exterior lighting, interior heating (where
appropriate) and sufficient glassed area to
pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and ade-
afford adequate observation for personnel
quate lighting for rapid and efficient inspec-
inside. Where appropriate, entry control
tion. When gates are not manned during
stations should be designed for optimum
nonduty hours, they should be securely
personnel identification and movement con-
locked, illuminated during hours of darkness,
trol (chapter 4).
and periodically inspected by a roving patrol.
This also applies to doors and windows that
c. Equipment in a station should include:
form a part of the perimeter.
(1) Telephone or radio.
d. Semiactive entrances, such as extra (2) Badge racks.
gates for use during peak traffic flow and (3) Electronic boards for checking lights.
railroad siding gates, should be locked at all
times when not guarded. Keys to such d. Procedures for hardening against- at-
entrances should be in the custody of the tack.
provost marshal (security manager) or the
chief of the security force, and should be (1) Reinforced concrete.
strictly controlled (chapter 8). (2) Steelplating and bullet-proof glass.
e. Inactive entrances (those used only (3) Sandbags two layers in depth.
occasionally) should be kept locked and be
subject to the same key control and inspection
as semiactive entrances. 5-11 Signs and Notices
Signs should be plainly displayed
f. Sidewalk elevators and any other utility and be legible from any approach to the
openings that provide access to areas within perimeter from a reasonable distance. The
the perimeter barrier should be locked, size and coloring of such signs, lettering
guarded, or otherwise provided security thereon, and the interval of posting must be
equivalent to that of the perimeter barrier. appropriate to each situation.
77
a. Control Signs. Signs should be erected that may be prescribed by the installation
where necessary to assist in control of commander (AR 210-10).
authorized entry, to deter unauthorized entry, (2) Signs or notices legibly setting forth
and to preclude accidental entry. the designation of restricted areas and
b. Warning Signs. provisions of entry thereto should be
plainly posted at all entrances and at other
(1) A system must be provided to warn points along the perimeter line as neces-
intruders that the arena is restricted and sary. The wording of such signs or notices
that trespassing may cause the use of is prescribed in AR 380-20, and chapter 4;
deadly force. The system must include section III of this manual.
warning signs and a method of challeng-
ing intruders. 5-12 Installation/Activity
(2) Warning signs must be installed along Perimeter Roads
the limited area physical barriers and at And Clear Zones
each entry point so they can be seen readily
and understood by anyone approaching When the perimeter barrier encloses
the perimeter. In areas where English is a large area, an interior all-weather perimeter
but one of two or more languages com- road should be provided for security patrol
monly spoken, warning signs must con- vehicles. Clear zones should be maintained
tain the local language(s), in addition to on both sides of the perimeter barrier to
English; and the wording on the signs will provide an unobstructed view of the barrier
denote warning of a restricted area. Warn- and the ground adjacent to it.
ning signs must be positioned on or outside
the limited area physical barrier and a. Roads should meet these requirements:
should be at intervals of no more than 100 (1) Be within the clear zone and as close to
feet (30.5 m). the perimeter barrier as possible, but not
(3) Signs must not be mounted on fences close enough to cause soil erosion.
equipped with IDA equipment because
(2) Constructed to allow for effective road
nuisance alarms could be caused by
barriers to deter motor movement of
environmental movement of the signs.
unauthorized personnel during mobiliza-
Additionally, the restricted area warning
tion periods.
signs prescribed in AR 380-20 must be
posted at all entrances to limited and
b. Clear Zones.
exclusion areas.
(1) Clear zones should be kept clear of
c. Other Signs. weeds, rubbish, or other material capable
of offering concealment or assistance to an
(1) Signs setting forth the conditions of intruder attempting to breach the barrier.
entry to an installation or area should be
plainly posted at all principal entrances (2) A clear zone of 20 feet or more should
and should be legible under normal condi- exist between the perimeter barrier and
tions at a distance not less than 50 feet exterior structures, parking areas, and
from the point of entry. Such signs should natural or manmade features. When possi-
inform the entrant of the provisions of ble, a clear zone of 50 feet or more should
search of the person, vehicle, packages, exist between the perimeter barrier and
etc., or prohibitions (such as against structures within the protected area, except
cameras, matches, lighters, entry for when a building wall constitutes part of the
reasons other than official business, etc.) perimeter barrier.
78
(3) When it is impossible to have adequate b. An alternate to erecting new or replac-
clear zones because of property lines or ing old chain-link fence involving an entire
natural or manmade features, an increase installation, perimeter is to relocate/isolate
in the height of the perimeter barrier, the sensitive area or item by:
increased security patrol coverage, more (1) Relocating the item within a safe
protective lighting, or an intrusion detec- perimeter.
tion device along that portion of the
perimeter barrier may be necessary. (2) Consolidating the item with other
items.
(3) Erecting a chain-link fence (regulation
permitting).
5-13 Protection In Depth
a. On a very large installation such 5-14 Nuclear Weapons
as a proving ground, it is obviously impracti- Construction Design
cable to construct an expensive perimeter
fence and to keep it under constant observa-
Criteria
tion. Such an installation is usually estab For design and construction crite-
lished in a sparsely inhabited area. Its ria, see DOD Directive 5210.41M and AR 50-5.
comparative isolation and the depth of the
installation itself give reasonable perimeter The interest of security must be kept in
protection. Under these circumstances the mind when walls, ceilings, floors, and roofs
posting of warning signs or notices, reducing are constructed. Facilities that house arms
access roads to a minimum, and periodic and ammunition should be constructed as
patrols in the area between the outer perime- security barriers in the interest of deterring
ter and the conventionally protected vital penetration. Protection should be equivalent
area of the installation may be sufficient. to that provided by chain-link fencing.
Arms Facility Structural Standards Section II
horizontal joints reinforced at every course.

5-15 Wall Construction As a minimum alternative, use 8 inches of
Standards brick interlocked between inner and outer
courses. These options are stated in order of
a. Walls should consist of 8 inches most to least secure.
of concrete reinforced with No. 4 bars on 9-
inch centers in each direction and staggered b. Selection must depend on local threat
on each face to form a grid approximately 4 ½ and vulnerability.
inches square. An alternative 8-inch concrete
block with No. 4 bars threaded through block c. See AR 190-11 for information concern-
cavities at 8-inch centers, with the cavities ing USAR consolidated arms storage facili-
then filled with mortar or concrete and with ties.
79
5-16 Ceiling Construction secure door (usually the inner door) must be a
Standards high security padlock and hasp (MILP-
43607). The other door must have a secondary
a. The ceiling of the arms storage padlock (MILP-17802B) or an equivalent
facility must be reinforced concrete, structur- mortise cylinder lock approved by the Intelli-
ally designed for the spans between support- gence Material Development Officer, Ft.
ing walls. The resulting slab should offer Holabird, Maryland.
security comparable to that provided by the
walls. d. One of the doors in the double-door
concept may be a rod and bar grid door; and
b. If the ceiling is of concrete pan joist the other may be either solid wood with metal
construction, the pans must be reduced in plate or hollow metal. Grid doors must be
depth over the vault area so the thinnest constructed of 1 1/4-inch x 3/8-inch flat steel
portion is not less than 6 inches and the clear bars horizontal at 8 inches maximum on
space between joists does not exceed 20 center, and l/2-inch diameter rods vertical at
inches. The reinforcing grid requirement for 4 inches maximum on center welded to, or
flat slab construction also applies. passing through, the 1 l/4-inch surface of the
flat bars, resulting in a grid with openings of
c. Reinforcing bar spacing should form a 32 square inches or less.
grid in which the area of any opening does not
exceed 96 square inches, using No. 4 bars or e. The grid door is more suitable for
larger. accommodating the high security hasp (MIL
P-43607D) and should be used as the inner
door. Door hinges must be fixed-pin security
5-17 Floor Construction type, safety-stud hinges, or must have hinge
Standards pins spot-welded to prevent removal. Hinge
mounting screws will not be exposed to the
Floor slab thickness, if on grade, outside of the arms room.
should be a minimum of 6 inches reinforced
with 6x6—W4xW4 mesh or equivalent bars. If f. Frames must be compatible with adja-
the floor forms the ceiling of an underlying cent doors and walls and must be securely
room or area, the ceiling standards apply. anchored.
g. Class 5 steel vault door (Fed. Spec. AA-

5-18 Windows and Entrances D-600B) with a built-in three-position, dial-
type, changeable combination lock may be
a. Entrances and issue windows
used in lieu of the two doors described above.
should have two doors. A vault door day-gate does not provide
adequate penetration resistance for an unat-
b. Doors should be 1 3/4 inch-thick, solid tended vault, and, if used, should be intended
wood doors with 12-gauge metal plate se- only to prevent inadvertent entry when the
curely attached to the outside face; or stand- vault is open and occupied.
ard 1 3/4-inch-thick, hollow metal, industrial (1) Anchor rings in arms and ammunition
type doors (minimum thickness of skin plate vault construction should be placed every 6
14-gauge) internally reinforced vertically feet along the length of each wall.
with continuous steel stiffeners spaced 6
inches maximum on center. (2) Review Engineer Technical Letter,
1110-3-229, 11 Apr 75, and definitive
drawing, DEF 33-33-18, Consolidated Stor-
c. The locking device used on the most age Building.
80
h. Openings such as windows should be
limited to meet the essential minimum, or be
eliminated entirely by removal and sealing of NOTE: It is next to impossible to build
the resultant openings with material compar- a protective barrier that cannot be
able to that forming the adjacent walls. Any penetrated by a human or heavy armor.
required windows or openings greater than 96 Therefore, as opposed to protecting an
square inches (the smallest dimension is installation or facility using only one
greater than 6 inches) must be protected by a barrier, a combination of barriers will
rod-and-bar grid as described in AR 190-11. provide security as discussed in chapter
Grid ends should be imbedded in the structure 2.
or welded to a frame that is securely attached
to the structure from the inside.
81
Chapter 6
Protective Lighting
P rotective lighting provides ameans

of continuing, during hours of darkness, a
degree of protection approaching that main-
tained during daylight hours. This safeguard
also has considerable value as a deterrent to
thieves and vandals and may makethe job of
the saboteur more difficult. It is an essential
element of an integrated physical security
program.
82
6-1 Requirements determined intruder. security forces thus
relieved may be used to better advantage
a. Protective or security lighting elsewhere.
needs at installations and facilities depend
upon each situation and the areas to be Protective lighting usually requires less
protected. Each situation requires careful intensity than working light, except for
study to provide the best visibility practicable identification and inspection at authorized
for such security duties as identification of portals and in emergencies. Each area of an
badges and people at gates (chapters 4 and 5), installation or facility presents its particular
inspection of vehicles, prevention of illegal problem based on physical layout, terrain,
entry, detection of intruders outside and atmospheric and climatic conditions, and the
inside buildings and other structures, and protective requirements. Data are available
inspection of unusual or suspicious circum- from the manufacturers of lighting equip
stances. ment and from the Army Corps of Engineers,
which will assist in designing a lighting
b. When such lighting provisions are system. Included in these data are:
impractical, additional security posts, pa-
trols, sentry dog patrols, or other security Descriptions, characteristics, and specifi-
means will be necessary. cation of various incandescent, arc, and
gaseous discharge lamps.
c. Protective lighting should not be used as Lighting patterns of the various luminar-
a psychological deterrent only. It should be ies.
used on a perimeter fence line only where the Typical layouts showing the most efficient
fence is under continuous or periodic observa- height and spacing of equipment.
tion. Protective lighting may be unnecessary = Minimum protective lighting intensities
where the perimeter fence is protected by a required for various applications.
central alarm system.
d. Protective lighting maybe desirable for

those sensitive areas or structures within the 6-3 Commander’s
perimeter, which are under specific observa- Responsibility
tion. Such areas or structures include pier and
a. Each commander must deter-
dock areas, vital buildings, storage areas,
mine perimeter lighting needs dependent
and vulnerable control points in communica-
upon the threat, perimeter extremities, sur-
tions, power, and water distribution systems.
veillance capabilities, and the available
In interior areas where night operations are
guard forces.
conducted, adequate lighting of the area
facilitates detection of unauthorized persons
b. He must insure that protective lighting
approaching or attempting malicious acts
is designed and employed to discourage
within the area.
unauthorized entry and to facilitate detection
of intruders approaching or attempting to
gain entry into protected areas.
6-2 Characteristics
c. The commander must insure that protec-
fighting is inexpensive to maintain tive lighting operates continuously during
and, when properly employed, may reduce the periods of reduced visibility, and that
need for security forces. It may also provide standby lighting is maintained and periodi-
personal protection for forces by reducing the cally tested for use during times of emergency
advantages of concealment and surprise for a and mobilization alerts.
83
6-4 Planning Considerations (b) Avoid silhouetting or highlighting
the guards.
In planning a protective lighting (2) Lighting in these areas must be under
system, the physical security manager must the control of the security force.
give specific consideration to the following
areas: (3) The perimeter band of lighting must
provide a minimum intensity of 0.2 foot
a. Cleaning and replacement of lamps candles, measured horizontally 6 inches
and luminaries, particularly with respect to (15.2 cm) above ground level, at least 30 feet
costs and means (such as ladders, mechani- (9.1 m) outside the exclusion area barrier.
cal buckets, etc.) required and available. Lighting inside exclusion areas or on
structures containing nuclear weapons
b. Advisability of including mercury and must be of sufficient intensity to enable
photoelectric controls. These may be detection of persons in the area or at
desirable in a peacetime situation, but unde- structure entrance(s). fighting at entrance
sirable when blackout is a possibility. control points must be of sufficient inten-
sity to enable guards to compare and
c. The effects of local weather condi- identify bearers and badges.
tions on various types of lamps and lumina- (4) Protective lighting systems will be
ries. operated continuously during hours of
darkness.
d. Fluctuating or erratic voltages in the
primary power source. (5) Protective lights should be employed so
that the failure of one or more lights will
e. Requirement for grounding of fix- not affect the operation of remaining
tures and the use of a common ground on an lights.
entire line to provide a stable ground poten-
tial. h. Interior and exterior arms storage
lighting. Interior and exterior security
f. Establishment of a ledger to maintain a lighting must be provided as follows for all
burning-time (80 percent) record based arms storage facilities, buildings in which
on the life expectancy of the lamp. The ledger arms storage rooms are located, arms storage
should contain as a minimum the following: rooms, motor pools, hangars, and outdoor
parking areas for vehicles or aircraft that
Type and wattage of lamp. have weapons stored on board:
Area, facility, or utility pole used.
Date of insertion. (1) During hours of darkness, exterior
Programed date (based on life expectancy) entrances of arms buildings and motor
for extraction and where used (admin area). pool bays and hangars where vehicles or
aircraft are parked with weapons aboard
must be illuminated to an intensity of not
g. Limited and exclusion areas. less than 1.0 foot candle at any point to a
height of 8 feet on their vertical surfaces
(1) All limited and exclusion areas must and to a horizontal distance of 8 feet from
have protective lighting on a permanent the entrance.
basis at perimeter and access control (2) Interior entrances of arms rooms must
points. The lighting must be positioned to: be illuminated a minimum of 0.10 foot
(a) Prevent glare that may temporarily candle at any point within a 20-foot radius
blind the guards. of the entrance.
84
(3) Vehicles and aircraft parked outside (17) Troop working areas.
with weapons aboard must be illuminated
0.10 foot candle at any point within a 30-
foot radius of the vehicle or aircraft.
(4) Switches for exterior lights must be 6-5 Principles
installed so they are not accessible to Of Protective Lighting
unauthorized individuals. Exterior lights
must be covered with wire mesh screen or Protective lighting should enable
other material that will prevent their being guard force personnel to observe activities
broken by thrown objects. around or inside an installation without
(5) New construction lighting require- disclosing their presence. Adequate lighting
ments must conform to ammunition and for all approaches to an installation not only
explosive safety requirements of appendix discourages attempted unauthorized entry,
C, TM 9-1300-206. but also reveals persons within the area.
However, lighting should not be used alone. It
(6) Lighting requirements on existing should be used with other measures such as
facilities should be programed for and fixed security posts or patrols, fences, and
upgraded as needed. alarms. Other principles of protective light-
ing are listed next.
i. Other Suitable Employment Loca-

tions: a. Good protective lighting is achieved by
adequate, even light upon bordering areas,
(1) Warehouses glaring lights in the eyes of the intruder, and
relatively little light on security patrol routes.
(2) Motorpools/parks In addition to seeing long distances, security
(3) Commissaries forces must be able to see low contrasts, such
as indistinct outlines of silhouettes, and must
(4) Post exchanges/annexes be able to spot an intruder who may be
(5) Clubs (EM, NCO, Officer, Country) exposed to view for only a few seconds. All of
these abilities are improved by higher levels
(6) Bank/finance and accounting office of brightness.
(7) Medical/dental facilities
(8) Salvage yards b. In planning protective lighting, high
brightness contrast between intruder and
(9) Helipads and hangars
background should be the first consideration.
(10) Museums With predominantly dark dirty surfaces or
camouflage type painted surfaces, more light
(11) Gasoline dispensing areas
is needed to produce the same brightness
(12) Recreational areas (isolated/admin- around installations and buildings than
istrative areas) when clean concrete, light brick, and grass
predominate. When the same amount of light
(13) Troop billet areas
falls on an object and its background, the
(14) Individual troop movement areas observer must depend on contrasts in the
amount of light reflected. The ability of the
(15) Housing areas
observer to distinguish poor contrasts is
(16) Perimeter entrances/exits (isolated/ significantly improved by increasing the
used) level of illumination.
85
c. When the intruder is darker than his lighting are glare projection and controlled
background, the observer sees primarily the lighting:
outline or silhouette. Intruders who depend (1) The glare projection lighting
on dark clothing and even darkened face and method is useful where the glare of lights
hands may be foiled by using light finishes on directed across surrounding territory will
the lower parts of buildings and structures. not be annoying nor interfere with adja-
Stripes on walls have also been used effec- cent operations. It is a strong deterrent to a
tively, as they provide recognizable breaks in potential intruder because it makes it
outlines or silhouettes. Good observation difficult for him to see the inside of the
conditions can also be created by providing area. It also protects the guard by keeping
broad lighted areas around and within the him in comparative darkness and enabling
installation, against which intruders can be him to observe intruders at considerable
seen. distance beyond the perimeter. (See figure
23 for installation details.)
d. Two basic systems, or a combination of (a) Glare projection or other protective
both may be used to provide practical and perimeter lighting may not be appropri-
effective protective lighting. The first method ate in some instances. In combat,
is to light the boundaries and approaches. tactical perimeter security considera-
The second is to light the area and structures tions are given first priority over secu-
within the general boundaries of the proper- rity against pilferage. Generally, the
ty. tightening of tactical perimeter security
strengthens other physical security
e. To be effective, protective lighting efforts. A blending of tactical and
should: physical security principles is
required—especially true with regards to
(1) Discourage or deter attempts at entry perimeter lighting.
by intruders. Proper illumination may lead (b) Glare projection is not appropriate
a potential intruder to believe detection is where security troop emplacements may
inevitable. be silhouetted or illuminated for the
(2) Make detection likely if entry is at- enemy to see from the enemy’s approach
tempted. to the secured site. Where glare projec-
tion is desired, security troops placed in
front of the perimeter fence should be
6-6 Types of Lighting moved, but still be able to take up
effective fields of fire for defense of the
The type of lighting system to be perimeter. If such blending of protective
used depends on the overall security require- lighting and tactical security cannot be
ments of the installation concerned. Lighting accomplished, perimeter lighting should
units of four general types are used for not be used. Floodlights that provide a
protective lighting systems-continuous, band of light with great horizontal
standby, movable, and emergency. angular dispersal and which directs the
glare at a possible intruder while re-
a. Continuous lighting (stationary stricting the downward beam, is pre-
luminary). This is the most common protec- ferred in this application.
tive lighting system. It consists of a series of
fixed luminaries arranged to flood a given (2) Controlled lighting is best when it’s
area continuously during the hours of dark- necessary to limit the width of the lighted
ness with overlapping cones of light. Two strip outside the perimeter because of
primary methods of employing continuous adjoining property or nearby highways,
86
Figure 23—Typical perimeter security lighting details.
87
Figure 24—Example of boundary lighting near adjoining property

(controlled lighting).
railroads, navigable waters, or airports. In darkness or lighted only as needed. The
controlled lighting, the width of the lighted system normally is used to supplement
strip can be controlled and adjusted to fit continuous or standby lighting. (The 18-inch
the particular need, such as illumination of 2.2 KW Xeon searchlight, using a 106 Recoil-
a wide strip inside a fence and a narrow less Rifle mount on a 1/4-ton truck is excellent
strip outside; or floodlighting a wall or for this purpose).
roof. This method of lighting often illumi-
d. Emergency lighting. This system
nates or silhouettes security personnel as
may duplicate any or all of the above systems.
they patrol their routes (figure 24 shows
Its use is limited to times of power failure or
controlled lighting).
other emergencies which render the normal
b. Standby lighting (stationary lumi- system inoperative. It depends on an alterna-
nary). The layout of this system is similar to ative power source, such as installed or
continuous lighting. However, the luminaries portable generators, or batteries.
are not continuously lighted, but are either
automatically or manually turned on only
when suspicious activity is detected or 6-7 Other Lighting
suspected by the security force or alarm
systems. a. Fenced perimeters.
c. Movable lighting (stationary or
portable). This type of system consists of (1) Isolated fenced perimeters are
manually operated movable searchlights fence lines around areas where the fence is
which may be either lighted during hours of 100 feet or more from buildings or operat-
88
ing areas, plus the approach area is clear of tion to enable guards to see better, increase
obstruction for 100 or more feet outside the their night vision adaptability and avoid
fence and is not used by other personnel. making them targets.
Both glare projection and controlled illumi-
nation are acceptable for these perimeters. d. Areas and structures within the
Patrol roads and paths should be kept installation property line consist of yards,
unlighted. storage spaces, large open working areas,
piers, docks, and other sensitive areas and
(2) Semi-isolated fenced perimeters structures.
are fence lines where approach areas are
clear of obstruction for 60 to 100 feet (1) Open yards (defined as unoccupied
outside the fence and the general public or land only) and outdoor storage spaces
installation personnel seldom have reason
(defined as material storage areas, railroad
to be in the area. Patrol roads and paths sidings, motor pools, and parking areas)
should be kept in relative darkness. should be illuminated as follows:
(3) Nonisolated fence perimeters are
(a) An open yard adjacent to a perimeter
fence lines immediately adjacent to operat-
(between guards and fences) should be
ing areas within the installation, other
illuminated in accordance with the
installations or to public thoroughfares, illumination requirements of the perime-
where outsiders or installation personnel
ter. Where lighting is deemed necessary
may move about freely in the approach
in other open yards, illumination should
area. The width of the lighted strip in this
not be less than 0.2 foot candle at any
case depends on the relative clear zone
point.
inside and outside the fence. It may not be
(b) Lighting units should be placed in
practicable to keep the patrol area dark. outdoor storage spaces to provide an
b. Building face perimeters consist of adequate distribution of light in aisles,
faces of buildings on or within 20 feet of the passageways, and recesses to eliminate
property line or area line to be protected, and shadowed areas where unauthorized
where the public may approach the buildings. persons may conceal themselves.
Guards may be stationed inside or outside of (2) Piers and docks located on an installa-
the buildings. Doorways or other insets in the tion should be safeguarded by illuminating
building’s face should receive special atten- both water approaches and the pier area.
tion for lighting to eliminate shadows. Decks on open piers should be illuminated
to at least 1.0 foot candles and the water
c. Active entrances for pedestrians and approaches (extending to a distance of 100
vehicles should have two or more lighting feet from the pier) to at least 0.5 foot candle.
units with adequate illumination for recogni- The area beneath the pier floor should be
tion of persons and examination of creden- lighted with small wattage floodlights
tials. All vehicle entrances should have two arranged to the best advantage with
lighting units located to facilitate complete respect to piling. Movable lighting capable
inspection of passenger cars, trucks, and of being directed as required by the guards
freight cars as well as their contents and is recommended as a part of the protective
passengers. Semiactive and inactive en- lighting system for piers and docks. The
trances should have the same degree of lighting must not in any way violate
continuous lighting as the remainder of the marine rules and regulations (must not be
perimeter, with standby lighting of sufficient glaring to pilots). The US Coast Guard
illumination to be used when the entrance should be consulted for approval of pro-
becomes active. Gate houses at entrances posed protective lighting adjacent to
should have a low level of interior illumina- navigable waters.
89
(3) Critical structures and areas should be repair worn parts, tighten connections, and
the first consideration in designing protec- check insulation. Luminaries should be kept
tive fencing and lighting. Power, heat, clean and properly aimed.
water, communications, explosive materi-
als, critical materials, delicate machinery, b. Replacement lamps can be used in less
areas where highly classified material is sensitive locations. The actuating relays on
stored or produced, and valuable finished emergency lines, which remain open when
products need special attention. Critical the system is operating from the primary
structures or areas classified as vulnerable source, need to be cleaned frequently since
from a distance should be kept dark dust and lint collect on their contact points
(standby lighting available), and those and can prevent their operation when closed.
that can be damaged close at hand should
be well lighted. The surroundings should c. The intensity of illumination and speci-
be well lighted to force an intruder to cross fication for protective lighting for fences or
a lighted area, and any walls should be other antipersonnel barriers should meet the
lighted to a height of 8 feet to facilitate minimum requirements (next page).
silhouette vision.
6-10 Power Sources
6-8 Wiring Systems Power sources should meet the
following criteria:
Both multiple and series circuits
may be used to advantage in protective a. Primary— usually a local public utility.
lighting systems, depending on the type of
luminary used and other design features of b. Alternate— the following should be
the system. The circuit should be arranged so provided:
that failure of any one lamp will not leave a
large portion of the perimeter line or a major (1) Standby batteries or gasoline-driven
segment of a critical or vulnerable position in generators may be used.
darkness. Connections should be such that (a) If cost effective, a system should
normal interruptions caused by overloads, start automatically upon failure of
industrial accidents, and building or brush outside power.
fires will not interrupt the protective system. (b) Must insure continuous lighting.
In addition, feeder lines should be located (c) May be inadequate for sustained
underground (or sufficiently inside the pe- operations, therefore, additional secu-
rimeter in the case of overhead wiring) to rity y precautions must be considered.
minimize the possibility of sabotage or van- (d) Tested to insure efficiency and
dalism from outside the perimeter. The effectiveness. The frequency and dura-
design should provide for simplicity and tion of tests depend on:
economy in system maintenance and should
D Mission and operational factors.
require a minimum of shutdowns for routine
repairs, cleaning, and lamp replacement. It is Location, type and condition of equip
necessary in some instances to install a ment.
duplicate wiring system. Weather (temperature affects batter-
ies very strongly).
(2) Located within a controlled area for
6-9 Maintenance additional security.
a. Periodic inspections should be (3) Generator or battery-powered portable
made of all electrical circuits to replace or and/or stationary lights.
90
Lighting Specification Table
(a) For use in a complete power failure (2) Security emphasis goes to sources in
(b) Includes alternate power supply terms of mission essential/vulnerable
(c) Available at designated control activity, IAW AR 190-13.
points for security personnel.
(3) Continual physical security inspec-
c. Security— a must.
tions of power sources is required to
..
determine security measures and replace-
(1) Starts at the points where power feeder ment of equipment (transformers, lines,
lines enter the installation or activity.
etc.).
91
Chapter 7
Intrusion Detection
System
T he basic electronic security system

consists of an interior sensor (integrated by
data transmission and links) into a moni-
tored annunciator console backed by a
security response force.
Intrusion detection systems are an in her-

ent element of the Army’s security in depth
ring and play a vital part in the overall
92
protection of military installations, activi- Individuals responsible for physical security
ties, equipment and materiel assets. These planning must be aware of the advantages
systems detect through sound, vibration, and limitations of these systems so they can
motion, electrostatic and/or light beams. be incorporated effectively into the security
Basically, for an item to be secure, the system plan.
must focus upon detecting unauthorized
individuals at the entry point (gate, door, There are a variety of commercially manu-
fence, etc.), area (building, etc.), and at a factured and militarily procured systems
specific object (vault, file, safe, etc.). designed to detect approach or intrusion.
Certain systems are suitable only for outdoor
protection, while others are suitable only for
The basic electronic security consists of an indoor uses. All have weak points by which
interior sensor (integrated by data trans- their functioning can be minimized or com-
mission links) into a monitored annunciator pletely interrupted.
console backed by a security response force.
It is important for security managers to
These systems can be applied to both remember that any detection system is
tactical and nontactical situations. The useless unless it is supported by prompt
systems are designed to detect entry of security force action when the system is
unauthorized persons into the protected area. activated.
The Basics Section I
7-1 Definitions 7-2 Technical Review

And Approval
The definitions in appendix S are
Plans and specifications for installa-
provided for common understanding of tion of intrusion detection systems estimated
intrusion detection systems and their compo- to cost more than $5,000.00 must be for-
nent parts. The definitions apply to commer- warded through command channels to: Chief
cially produced and militarily procured of Engineers (ATTN: DAEN-MCE-D) for
final technical review and approval (AR 190-
systems. You will discover that the terms 13).
defined may overlap/impinge on other defini-
tions provided or commonly used in the 7-3 Purposes
security/intrusion detection field. Some are
frequently used in fields other than security, Intrusion detection alarm systems
and may have added or different definitions are used to accomplish one or more of the
following:
in use. You should review appendix S prior to
reading this chapter. a. Economize — permit more economical
93
and efficient use of manpower by requiring d. Accessibility to intruders.
smaller mobile responding guard forces
instead of larger numbers of personnel for e. Location of installation or facility
patrols and fixed guard posts. (geographical) and locations of areas to be
protected inside the installation.
b. Substitute— use in place of other physi-
cal security measures which cannot be used f. Construction of building.
because of safety regulations, operational
requirements, appearance, layout, cost, or g. Hours of operation.
other reasons.
h. Availability of other forms of pro-
c. Supplement— provide additional con- tection.
trols at critical points or areas.
i. Initial and recurring cost of the
7-4 Principles of Operation system as compared to cost, in money or
security, of possible loss of materials or
a. The following are some basic information.
principles upon which intrusion detection
systems operate: j. Design and salvage value of the
system.
(1) Breaking an electrical circuit.
k. Response time by the security force.
(2) Interrupting a light beam.
l. Saving in manpower and money over a
(3) Detecting sound.
period of time.
(4) Detecting vibration.
m. Intruder time requirement.
(5) Detecting motion.
(6) Detecting a change in capacitance due
to penetration of an electrostatic field. 7-6 Selection
b. Each principle is discussed separately Each type of intrusion detection
in paragraphs 7-7 through 7-12, including system is intended to meet a specific type of
advantages and disadvantages. problem.
7-5 Necessity and Feasibility a. Factors to be considered in selecting the

appropriate components/system include but
are not limited to the following:
The following are factors that need
to be considered to determine the necessity
(1) Location and response time capability
and feasibility of installing an intrusion
detection system. of security personnel.
(2) Value of facility, material, or the
a. Mission of the installation or facility. sensitivity of classified defense material to
be protected.
b. Criticality of the installation or facil-
(3) Area environment, to include building
ity.
construction, sound levels inside and
outside, climate, etc.
c. Vulnerability of the installation or
facility. (4) Radio and electrical interference.
94
(5) Operational hours of the installation or b. A consideration of these factors readily
facility. indicates the advisability of obtaining techni-
cal data to assist in making a wise selection.
(6) Specific target to be protected. Often more than one type of sensor, or even
system is necessary to give adequate protec-
(7) Availability of security personnel. tion for an area or structure.
Types of Systems Section II
7-7 Breaking (c) Has little salvage value–not re-

An Electrical Circuit coverable.
(d) Will not detect “stay-behinds.”
a. Possible points of entry into 7-8 Interrupting a Light Beam

buildings or enclosures can be wired by using
electrically sensitized strips of metallic foil or a. The photoelectric (electric eye)
wire. Any action that breaks the foil or wire type of intrusion detection derives its name
breaks the electrical circuit and activates an from the use of a light-sensitive cell and a
alarm. Metallic foil is frequently used on projected-light source.
glass surfaces. Doors and windows may be
equipped with magnetic contact switches (1) A light beam is transmitted at a
which sound an alarm when the door or frequency of several thousand vibrations
window is opened. Metallic wire running per second. An infrared filter over the light
through concealed wooden dowels or between source makes the beam invisible to intrud-
panels or walls, doors, and ceilings may be ers.
used.
(2) Alight beam with a different frequency
b. Characteristics: (such as a flashlight) cannot be substituted
for this beam. The beam is projected from a
(1) Advantages. Consistently provides hidden source and maybe crisscrossed in a
the most trouble-free service; causes few, if protected area by means of hidden mirrors
any, nuisance alarms. Adequate in low- until it contacts a light-sensitive cell.
risk applications. (3) This device is connected by wires to a
(2) Disadvantages: control station. When an intruder crosses
the beam, he breaks contact with the
(a) Costly to install where there are photoelectric cell, which activates an
many entry points to the protected area. alarm.
(b) Easily compromised when improp-
erly applied; unprotected soft walls or (4) A projected beam of invisible light can
ceilings may be penetrated without be effective for approximately 500 feet
disturbing the alarm system; it may also indoors and will cover an area up to 1,000
be defeated by bridging the circuits. feet outdoors. The effectiveness of the
95
Figure 25—Sample of photoelectric intrusion detection device.
beam decreases from 10 to 30 percent for equipment is recoverable.

each mirror used. Figure 25 shows a typical (e) May be used to actuate other security
light beam setup. devices, such as cameras.
(f) May detect fires through smoke
b. Characteristics. interruption of the beam.
(1) Advantages. (2) Disadvantages

(a) When properly employed, affords (a) Employment is limited to those
effective, reliable notice of intrusion. locations where it is not possible to
(b) Useful in open portals or driveways bypass the beam by crawling under or
where obstructions cannot be used. climbing over it.
(c) Detects “stay-behinds.” (b) Requires some type of permanent
(d) Has a high salvage value; almost all installation.
96
(c) Fog, smoke, dust, and rain in suffi- (c) Microphone speakers may be used in
cient density will cause interruption of more expensive sensors to monitor
the light beam. sounds coming from the protected area.
(d) Requires frequent inspections of (2) Disadvantages. Can be used only in
light producing components to detect
enclosed areas where a minimum of
deterioration.
extraneous sound exists; not satisfactory
(e) Requires keeping the ground be-
where high noise levels are encountered,
neath the light beam free of tall grass,
especially in proximity to aircraft and
weeds, drifting snow, and sand.
railroad traffic. Cannot be used effectively
outdoors. Should not be used in areas
7-9 Detecting Sound where sensitive classified discussions
occur unless the system is designed to
a. This type of intrusion detection prevent its use as a clandestine listening
system can be effectively used to safeguard device.
enclosed areas, vaults, warehouses, and
similar enclosures. Supersensitive micro- 7-10 Detecting Vibration
phone speaker sensors are installed on walls,
ceilings, and floors of the protected area. Any This type of intrusion detection
sound caused by attempted forced entry is system can be effectively used to safeguard
detected by the sensor. Sensitivity can be enclosed areas in sound detection systems.
adjusted.
a. Vibration-sensitive sensors are at-
b. Characteristics. tached to walls, ceilings, and floors of the
(1) Advantages. protected area. Any vibration caused by
attempted forced entry is detected by the
(a) Economical and easily installed. sensors. Sensitivity can be adjusted. (See
(b) High salvage value. figure 26 for a sample setup).
97
b. Characteristics: motion occurs within the area.
(1) Advantages. b. Ultrasonic systems consist of trans-

ceivers (single unit containing a transmitter
(a) Economical and easily installed. and receiver or separate transmitters and
(b) High salvage value. receivers), and electronic unit (amplifier) and
(c) Flexible application. a control unit.
(2) Disadvantages. Can be used only in
areas where a minimum of vibration (1) The transmitter generates a pattern of
exists; not satisfactory where high vibra- acoustic energy which fills the enclosed
tions are encountered, especially in prox- area.
imity to heavy construction, railroad, or (2) The receiver, connected to the elec-
automotive/truck traffic. Cannot be used tronic unit, picks up the standing sound
effectively outdoors. patterns.
(3) If they are of the same frequency as the
7-11 Detecting Motion waves emitted by the transmitter, the
system will not alarm.
a. Intrusion detection systems us-
ing ultrasonic or microwave motion sensors (4) Any motion within the protected area
can be very effective for the protection of sends back a reflected wave differing in
interior areas. Such systems flood the pro- frequency from the original transmission.
tected area with acoustic or microwave The change in frequency is detected,
energy and detect the Doppler shift in amplified, and the alarm signal activated
transmitted and received frequencies when (illustrated example in figure 27).
Figure 27—How an ultrasonic motion sensor works.
98
(5) Multiple transceivers or a transmitter (b) Fluorescent light bulbs will activate
and multiple receivers may be operated the sensor.
from the same control unit for more
effective coverage of large or broken areas.
This system can only be used indoors. 7-12 Detecting
(6) Advantages. Capacitance Change
In An Electrostatic Field
(a) Provide effective security protection
against intruders concealed within the a. The capacitance or electrostatic
premises. intrusion detection system can be installed on
(b) High salvage value. a safe, wall, and/or openings therein in an
(c) Protective field is not visible, there- effort to establish an electrostatic field
fore, it is difficult to detect the presence around the object to be protected. This field is
of, or to compromise the system. tuned by a balance between the electric
(7) Disadvantages. capacitance and the electric inductance. The
body capacitance of any intruder who enters
(a) May require reduced sensitivity to the field unbalances the electrostatic energy
overcome possible disturbance factors in of the field. This unbalancing activates the
the enclosed area (such as telephones, alarm system. (See figure 28, next page.)
machines, clocks, etc.).
(b) Can be set off by loud external
sounds. b. Characteristics:
c. Microwave systems closely parallel (1) Advantages.

the operation of ultrasonic systems. A pattern
(a) Extremely flexible type of system; it
of radio waves is transmitted and partially
may be used to protect safes, file cabi-
reflected back to an antenna. If all objects nets, windows, doors, partitions; in fact
within the range of the radio waves are any unguarded metallic object within
stationary, the reflected waves return at the maximum tuning range may be pro-
same frequency. If they strike a moving tected.
object, they return at a different frequency. (b) Simple to install and operate.
The difference in the transmitted and re-
(c) Provides an invisible protective
ceived frequency is detected, thus initiating field, making it difficult for an intruder
an alarm signal. to determine when system has been set
off.
(1) Advantages.
(d) High salvage value-may be easily
(a) Good coverage is provided if anten- dismantled and reinstalled.
nas are properly placed. (e) Compact equipment size.
(b) Not affected by air currents, noise, or (f) High grade of protection.
sound.
(2) Disadvantages.
(c) High salvage value.
(a) Can be applied only to ungrounded
(2) Disadvantages.
equipment.
(a) Coverage is not easily confined to (b) Housekeeping of protected area on
desired security area. Penetrates thin object must be carefully watched.
wooden partitions and windows and (c) Accidental alarms can occur if pro-
therefore may be accidentally activated tected area or object is carelessly ap-
by persons or vehicles outside the proached, such as by porters or cleaners
protected area. at night.
99
Figure 28—Example of capacitance proximity sensor setup.
7-13 Penetration Sensors be covered with a grid wire sensor, or the room
equipped with a passive ultrasonic sensor
Modern penetration alarm sensors (see figure 31, page 102). Sound detection
can be used at any installation or activity for systems (par. 7-9) and vibration detection
additional security protection. Their versatil- systems (par. 7-10) may also be used to detect
ity lends to use on windows, interior or penetration through such areas.
exterior doors, ceilings, walls and other
potential entry areas. d. Open walls and ceilings. Wire cage
walls and ceilings present distinct problems.
a. Exterior doors. To guard against To protect this type of construction, certain
unauthorized entry, the door can be equipped modifications are necessary. The wall and
with one or more balanced magnetic switches ceiling may be enclosed with building mate-
as shown in figure 29. The surface of an rial on the outside of the cage. This permits
interior door or wall can be covered with a use of passive ultrasonic or grid wire sensors.
grid wire sensor (figure 30) or any type system
using the principle of breaking an electrical e. Windows. Wherever possible, windows
circuit, as discussed in paragraph 7-7 of this should be eliminated. Where windows are
chapter. necessary, consider the use of interior metal
shutters which can be closed and locked. This
b. Interior doors. These sensors are allows use of passive ultrasonic sensors. If
subject to the same considerations that the character of the room does not allow the
govern the choice of systems for exterior use of a passive ultrasonic sensor, the
doors. vibration sensor (par. 7-10) or capacitance
proximity sensor (par. 7-12) can be used
c. Solid walls, floors and ceilings. To instead. Any system using the principle of
monitor attempts to penetrate solid walls, breaking an electrical circuit can also be
floors, and ceilings, the interior surface may considered.
100
Figure 29—Balanced magnetic switches placed on inside of exterior doors.
Figure 30—Grid wire sensors used on interior surfaces.
101
Figure 31—Examples of passive ultrasonic sensor effectiveness.
f. Ventilation openings. These are any struction. The openings can be covered with a
openings in the ceiling, walls, or doors to grid wire sensor installed on plywood. Where
allow the free passage of air. They are the opening is required to stay open, a
generally covered with steel bars, mesh, or capacitance proximity sensor can be used on
louvered barriers. For maximum protection, the inside of the opening.
you should consider eliminating ventilators.
Where it is not possible to seal ventilators, h. Air conditioners. To monitor for
consider the use of locked metal shutters. intrusion through an air conditioner aper-
Intrusion through the ventilators then can be ture, the capacitance proximity sensor can be
detected with the passive ultrasonic sensor or used on a metal grill extending into the room
the vibration sensor. Where the ventilators in front of the unit.
are required to be open all the time, a metal
grill can be placed over the inside of the
ventilator opening and the capacitance 7-14 Motion Sensor
proximity sensor can be used.
To detect the motion of an intruder
g. Construction openings. These are inside a protected area, an ultrasonic motion
unsecured openings from incomplete con- sensor (par. 7-11) can be used, provided there
102
Figure 32—Examples of fixed duress sensor placement.
7-15 Duress Sensor

is a minimal flow of air from heating units, Considerations
air conditioned, cracks in the protected area,
or any other possible source of air turbulence, Fixed. This sensor is used to call for
as this may reduce the effectiveness of the assistance of other personnel. It consists of a
sensor or cause nuisance alarms. A micro- foot- or hand-operated switch located in a
wave system (par. 7-11) may also be used to position most likely to be occupied by person-
nel working in the protected area (figure 32).
protect an enclosed area.
103
Figure 33—Examp/e of portable duress sensor use.
Portable. An alternate to the fixed duress b. Weapons. To detect removal of weap-

sensor, the portable duress sensor is a UHF ons from a standard weapons rack, a mag-
transmitter which can send an alarm to a netic weapon sensor (figure 34) can be used.
receiver located at the control unit. The (Also see Section IV, The Systems, for
effective range will be restricted depending security of arms and ammunition.)
upon inside or outside use (figure 33).
7-16 Point Sensor 7-17 Control Unit

Considerations
a. Storage cabinets and safes. One control unit (figure 35) is re-
To detect movement near to or contact with quired in each secure area to receive signals
any part of a storage cabinet or safe, the from the sensors and to transmit signals to
capacitance proximity sensor can be used. the monitor unit and local audible alarm.
104
Figure 34—Magnetic weapons sensor used on weapons rack.
Figure 35—Sample details of control unit.
105
153-846 O - 94 - 7
Figure 36—Monitor unit examples.

7-18 Monitor Unit where there are no response personnel. A
local audible alarm should not be used
Each control unit must report to a without a remote monitor unit.
separate monitor unit status indicator mod-
ule (see figure 36). Each monitor unit must 7-20 Telephone Dialer
contain one signal and power status indica -
tor module. A telephone dialer (figure 38) maybe
employed where it is not possible to install a
monitor unit. This device telephones an
7-19 Local Audible Alarm alarm to a number of preselected phones.
Telephone dialers are recommended only for
A local audible alarm (see figure 37) low-security application. Telephone dialer
may be installed outside the protected area. lines may be tied up by calling the number
This alarm serves two purposes. Initially, it which receives the alarm notification
may scare the intruder away. Secondly, it message. They are subject to other tampering
alerts local guard and police forces in the and interruption and do not alarm when they
area. This alarm has limited value for areas are out of order, cut, or grounded.
106
Figure 37—Example of local audible alarm.
Figure 38—Telephone dialer example.
107
Figure 39—Example of data transmission system.
7-21 Data Transmission System a. Local alarm system. In a local alarm

(Type I system the protective circuits or devices
actuate a visual or audible signal in the
The data transmission system (fig- immediate vicinity of the object of protection.
ure 39) is used wherever there are segments of Response is by the local security force or other
the signal transmission line accessible to personnel within sight or hearing. The light
tampering, or wherever the signal is trans- or sound device should be displayed on the
mitted over commercial conductors. One data exterior of the building, and should be fully
transmission system is required for each protected against weather or willful tamper-
security zone covered by a control unit ing. It should be connected to the control
connected to such a line. element by a tamperproof cable, and should
be visible or audible for a distance of at least
400 feet. This system can also be used in
7-22 Intrusion Detection conjunction with a proprietary system, as
Alarm Report described in paragraph 7-22d.
Alarm and communications detec- b. Auxiliary system. An auxiliary

tion systems are closely allied in any compre- system is one in which the installation-owned
hensive protection system. Telephone and system is a direct extension of the civil police
radio communications are so common in and/or fire alarm systems. This is the least
everyday usage that their adaptation to a effective system and because of dual responsi-
protective system poses few new problems. bility for maintenance is not favorably
An alarm detection system is simply a considered by many protective organiza-
manual or automatic means of communicat- tions.
ing a warning of potential or present danger.
Types of alarm detection systems include the c. Central station system. A commer-
following: cial agency may contract to provide electric
108
protective services to its clients by use of a necessary equipment to adjust the resistance
central station system. The agency designs, in the signal transmission lines.
installs, maintains, and operates
underwriter-approved systems to safeguard b. Signal transmission lines maybe super-
against fire, theft, and intrusion; and moni- vised in a variety of ways, according to
tors industrial processes. Alarms are trans- location of the lines and the security required.
mitted to a central station outside the
installation from which appropriate action is
taken such as notifying local police or fire (1) The simplest means of line supervision
departments. is to monitor whether an electrical circuit
has been broken, grounded, or shorted.
Note. Direct connected systems or (2) The most common means is to monitor
central station systems may be appro- whether a predetermined variation to an
priate for armories/buildings used by electrical current has occurred. For exam-
the Army National Guard, Army Re- ple, an alarm light might be created if a 30-
serve, and/or Army ROTC. The main milliamp current has been increased or
consideration is lack of an organic or decreased five percent.
supporting response force. (3) A more sophisticated means is to
monitor two or more features of a complex
signal, such as current and frequency. If
d. Proprietary System. A proprietary the signal is changed on a random basis,
system is similar to the central station system the likelihood of the signal being recorded
except that it is owned by, and located on, the and replayed successfully is very remote.
installation. Control and receiving equip
ment is located in the installation security or (4) Another approach is to monitor a
fire department headquarters. Response to an digital- or tone-type signal transmitted
alarm is by the installation’s own security or through a telephone system. An investiga-
firefighting personnel. In addition, this type tion and reply scheme is ordinarily em-
of system may be connected with the civil ployed. Since an electrical current is not
police and fire departments, and with a being monitored in this case, the distance
commercial central station. limitation (a few miles) of the other types
does not apply.
c. The need for constant electronic or other

7-23 Signal Transmission Lines type surveillance of signal transmission lines
must be emphasized to insure awareness of
An intrusion detection system is no security personnel that this is normally the
better than the security of the conductors that weakest link in the system. Emphasis must
transmit the alarm signal to the monitor unit. also be placed on the necessity to maintain
These conductors must be sensitive enough to records of both nuisance alarms and sched-
cause an alarm in the event of tampering. uled/unscheduled maintenance to insure
proper operation of the system at all times.
a. An intrusion detection system may be
defeated regardless of the effectiveness of its d. Signal transmission lines can be se-
sensor if the signal transmission line is not cured by locating them on high overhead
functioning properly. Conductors may be poles, burying them, leading into buildings as
made ineffective by an intruder who has high as possible, locking terminal cabinets,
sufficient knowledge of electricity and the and comparable measures.
109
Communication Systems Section Ill
Protective communication systems vary in d. Telegraph and teletype facilities for

size and type with the importance, vulnerabil- either commercial service or private line
ity, size, location, radio receptivity, and other operation.
factors affecting a specific installation, and
must be largely subject to local determina- e. Hand-carried portable radios and\or
tion. receivers, with transmitters stationed strate-
gically throughout the installation.
7-24 Primary f. A security supervisory system consists

Communication Systems of key-operated electric call boxes located
strategically throughout an installation. By
inserting the key in the call box, security
In many situations, the regular personnel can make routine tour reports or
communication system of an installation is summon emergency assistance. Tampering
not adequate for protective security purposes. with the transmitting key or the call box
It is desirable for security forces to have their automatically locks the latter, causing a
own communication system with direct lines failure of the signal. This signal failure would
outside and an auxiliary power supply. prevent future routine/scheduled calls, a
Although principal dependence is on the cause sufficient for immediate investigation.
telephone and the teletype, interior and
exterior radio communications play an im-
portant part in the protective net of large
installations. 7-25 Alternate
Communication Systems
One or more of the following means of
communication should be included in the Alternate communication systems
protective system. must be provided for use in emergencies. The
flood of inquiries that follow emergency
a. Facilities for local exchange and com- conditions added to the normal flow of
mercial telephone service. messages may, overload the existing system
at the very time that sure and rapid communi-
b. Intraplant, interplant, and interoffice cation is vital. The most efficient emergency
teIephone systems using either Government- reporting system consists of direct connec-
owned or rented circuits and equipment; but tion to the security or communications center
not interconnected with facilities for commer- from telephones strategically placed through-
cial exchange or toll telephone service. out the installation. The use of these tele-
phones should be restricted to emergencies
c. Radiotelephone and\or radiotelegraph and security force reporting only. The wires of
facilities for either point-to-point or mobile alternate communication systems should be
service. separated from other communication lines,
110
Figure 40—TV monitoring of cargo movement.
and should be in underground conduits. For 7-27 Closed Circuit Television

emergency communication with agencies
outside the installation, leased wires or a Closed circuit television (CCTV),
radio adjustable to civil police and fire while not an intrusion detection system in
department frequencies should be available. itself, is very useful in physical security
operations and is frequently used to comple-
ment such a system.
7-26 Wiring, Inspection,
And Testing a. This may be accomplished by placing
cameras at critical locations to provide direct
a. Whenever practicable the signal visual monitoring from a vantage point.
transmission lines of communications sys- Closed circuit television may be used on gates
tems should be on separate poles or in or other security areas not manned continu-
separate conduits from the installation com - ously. This system normally consists of a
munication and lighting system. television camera, monitor, and electrical
circuitry. The camera may be remotely
b. Tamper resistant. wire and cable. with
controlled by monitoring security personnel.
she ath of foil that transmits a signal when
penetrated or cut, provides added protection.
b. Normal use of TV on entry points
c. All communication circuits should be includes the use of a two-way communication
tested at least, onto during each tour of duty, system between the monitor panel and the
preferably when the new shift assumes duty. gate, and an electrically operated gate lock.
At small installations that do not employ With this device, the person at the monitor
security forces, a test should be made immedi- panel can be alerted on the speaker system by
ately before closing for the night. Some a person desiring to enter, converse with the
commerically manufactured systems have person, observe him on the monitor to
self-testing features which should be checked determine his authority to enter, and then
periodically by the security patrol or operat- release the gate lock. An adaptation may be
ing force. All equipment must be inspected added to this equipment to enable the monitor
periodically by the technical maintenance personnel to make a side-by-side comparison
personnel who will repair or replace worn or of a person’s face with the picture of his
failing parts. identification badge.
111
c. CCTV can also be used for surveillance tion. However, such observation is usually
of security cages, high value goods in ware- limited to that performed by periodic patrols.
houses, fence lines, movement of cargo (figure Intrusion detection systems (IDS) may be
40) and parking lots. valuable additional security aids if the
perimeter requires continuous surveillance.
d. TV controls should be enclosed in metal
housing and properly secured to preclude a. The decision to use IDS depends upon:
attempted adjustment by unauthorized per- ■ Vulnerability and sensitivity of the
sonnel. Delay caused by camera warmup and protected area.
adjustment may be eliminated by keeping the ■ Degree of protection necessary.
camera in contiguous operation. ■ Security aids currently in use.
■ Availability of manpower.
e. Normally, surveillance TV is of the low ■ Cost effectiveness.
light level type (LLLTV) and can operate
under marginal light conditions. A key
consideration is maintenance of the TV b. Usually, gates are protected by locks
system and supportive artificial lighting and intermittent patrol checks, or with
system. security personnel on continuous duty. Intru-
sion detection systems at gates are not
normally justified. However, if the gate is
7-28 Perimeter used only intermittently, or if additional
Intrusion Detection protection is desired for the gate portion of the
perimeter fence line, some system, such as a
The primary means of perimeter photoelectric system, may be used for this
protection continues to be personal observa- purpose.
The Systems Section IV
7-29 Joint Service a. J-SIIDS has been certified for use in

Interior Intrusion the following areas:
Detection System
(1) Finance offices
The Joint Service Interior Intrusion
Detection System (J-SIIDS) is a standardized (2) Post exchanges
set of intrusion detection system. components
(3) Class VI stores
developed to provide physical security for
interior areas. Protection of arms rooms was (4) Narcotics storage areas
a prime concern in interior areas. Protection
(5) Accountable property storage areas
of arms rooms was also a prime concern in the
development of J-SIIDS. (6) High value item storage areas
112
(7) CID evidence rooms
(8) Conventional weapons storage areas
(9) Billets and offices
(10) Aircraft hangars
(11) Nonconventional weapons and
chemical weapons storage areas.
b. J-SIIDS is not certified for use in the

following areas:
(1) Sensitive weapons storage areas (RED-

EYE, DRAGON, LAW, and STINGER)
(2) Nuclear fuel storage areas
(3) Nuclear reactor facilities
(4) Computer centers
(5) Classified storage areas
(6) Areas where cryptographic devices are
stored, used or maintained
(7) Ammunition and explosives storage
and manufacturing areas
Figure 41—Control unit process.
(8) Radioactive isotope storage areas
(9) Communication centers e. The control unit for J-SIIDS is inside the
protected area. It has tamper switches and
dedicated telephone lines to carry a coded
c. This system consists of a family of transmission to the monitor station. Any
sensors that can be used singly or in combina- attempt to tamper with the telephone lines
tion to provide detection of intrusion. Sensors will cause an alarm.
are grouped into four categories-
penetration, point, motion and duress. Sig-
nals from sensors are reported to the control 7-30 J-SIIDS
unit (see figure 41), processed and transmit- Component Categories
ted to the monitor unit or audible alarm some
distance from the protected area. a. Sensors.
(1) Penetration sensors:

d. A J-SIIDS can be adapted for use in any
arms room configuration by proper selection (a) Balanced magnetic switch
and installation to provide detection of (b) Capacitance proximity sensor
unauthorized attempts to enter the protected (c) Grid wire sensor
area. A representative arms room installa- (d) Vibration sensor
tion is shown in figure 42 (next page). (e) Passive ultrasonic sensor
113
Figure 42—Example of arms room application of J-SIIDS.

(2) Motion sensor: Ultrasonic motion of various systems, and the overall security
sensor. program of the particular command or activ-
(3) Point sensors: ity.
(a) Magnetic weapons sensor

7-31 Addable
(b) capacitance proximity sensor
J-SIIDS Components
(4) Duress sensors:
(a) Fixed duress sensor
(b) Portable duress sensor. a. Additional J-SIIDS components
have materialized to provide more capabili-
b. Control unit. ties for protection of arms rooms and improve
protection flexibility for areas other than
c. Monitor unit. arms rooms. In short, the components fill
security voids in a basic J-SIIDS setup.
d. Local audible alarm. Addable J-SIIDS components include:
e. Telephone dialer. Commercial Alarm Monitor Interface

(CAMI)
f. Data transmission system (Type I). Alarm Line Security Attachment
(ALSA)
g. The selection of components to make up Special Application Alarm Monitor
each intrusion detection system depends on System (SAAMS)
the physical characteristics of the specific Data Transmission System Resynchro-
area to be protected, operating characteristics nization Kit (DTSRK).
114
Figure 43—Commercial / J-SllDS Alarm Monitor Interface (CAMI).
b. Commerical/J-SIIDS Alarm Monitor

Interface (CAMI) (figure 43) will receive
alarm-secure-access signals from an internal
mounted J-SIIDS data receiver and electri-
cally convert these signals to a format that
will activate standard commercial alarm
monitors. Many existing commercial alarm
monitor stations are modular, allowing new
modules to be plugged into a spare location in
the monitor panel when additional protected
areas are added to the system. For these
areas, J-SIIDS can be monitored on the
already available commercial type alarm
monitor panel through the use of the CAMI
rather than installing a J-SIIDS monitor
unit.
c. Alarm Line Security Attachment

(ALSA) (figure 44) consists of a printed circuit
card mounted in the production J-SIIDS
control unit and a complex terminating
impedance mounted in each sensor signal
processor enclosure. Circuitry on the card
continuously monitors both the phase and
amplitude of an a.c. signal on the alarm lines Figure 44—J-SIIDS Alarm Line Security
between the sensor signal processor and the
control unit. If an attempt is made to inhibit a Attachment (ALSA).
sensor alarm output by bridging across or
115
Figure 45—J-SIIDS Special Application AIarm Monitor System (SAAMS).

opening the sensor alarm lines, the ALSA (DPAR) and a modified status monitor
will detect phase and amplitude changes in module which interface with the monitor
the a.c. signal and output a tamper alarm to cabinet, and a telephone circuit which allows
the control unit alarm circuitry. voice communication between the hazard-
ous area and the monitor site. The only
d. Special Application Alarm Monitor voltages present in the SAAMS at the
System (SAAMS) (figure 45) is an alarm hazardous location are low level (less than 3
monitor system designed to be intrinsically volts) a.c. signals placed on the transmission
safe for use in Class I, Division I hazardous lines by the DPAR to monitor alarm and
locations. The system uses nonpowered access/secure status of the hazardous loca-
sensors, such as the J-SIIDS balanced mag- tion.
netic switch and gridwire sensors, and
interfaces with the J-SIIDS monitor cabinet. e. Data Transmission System Resynchro-
SAAMS consists of an access/secure enclo- nization Kit (DTSRK) (figure 46) is an
sure (mounted inside the hazardous area), electronic device designed to allow resynchro-
barrier enclosuere (mounted outside the haz- nization of the J-SIIDS data transmission
ardous area), a dual P annunciator receiver system from the monitor cabinet. This device
116
Figure 46—J-SIIDS Data Transmission System Resynchronization Kit (DTSRK).
117
will function over transmission lines up to 10 system to detect intrusions into, theft and
miles in length. The device consists of a tone pilferage from, or espionage/sabotage activi-
generator module which interfaces with the ties against all types of facilities worldwide.
monitor cabinet and a tone recognition A valid requirement for FIDS exists because
module which interfaces with the control unit J-SIIDS did not meet the physical security
and data transmitter. requirement of the areas mentioned previ-
ously. FIDS is being developed for areas that
presently are not protected by a standardized
IDS.
7-32 Facility Intrusion a. Purposes:

Detection System (FIDS)
(1) Developed for worldwide application
FIDS (figure 47) is a joint service containing improved communications,
project, intended to provide DOD with a control, and display functions.
Figure 47—FIDS control unit examples.
118
(2) Provides an advanced additional de- (3) For the motion/presence sensor, its
tection and response capability that is not basic role concerns ultrasonic and large
all inclusive with the J-SIIDS. area motion. Advanced stages of the
sensor concerns employment in a passive
motion or a combination of ultrasonic/
b. Additional capabilities: microwave and ultrasonic/ infrared.
● Worldwide operation
● Higher defeat resistance components (4) Duress sensors' basic characteristic
● Additional sensing capabilities involves fixed duress situations and port-
● Command capability able hand activated. It contains a physio-
● Centralized processing and display ca- logical application in the advance stages.
pability
● Improved control unit and monitor unit
d. FIDS' control, communications, and
● Contraband sensors
display system involves items, basic, and
● Entry control advanced uses as shown in fig. 48, page 120.
● Improved duress sensors
● Response/deterrent system.
e. FIDS ancillary equipment has four

c. FIDS sensors come in four basic types, characteristics—local alarm, entry control
each with advanced characteristics. The four system, response force, and surveillance
types are: equipment.
■ Point
■ Penetration (1) The local alarm in basic application
■ Motion/Presence involves an audible capability, while it
■ Duress. displays a visual (flashing light) alarm
signal in the advanced stage.
(1) Basic characteristics for the point

sensor involves capacitance proximity and (2) In the basic stage, the entry control
magnetic weapon while the advanced system uses keys, control card or pushbut-
characteristic concerns point contact ton for entry application. In advanced
strain only. application, the system uses:
■ Fingerprint identification
■ Voice analysis
(2) Characteristics of the penetration ■ Handwriting analysis.
sensor device in the basic configuration
involves employment of:
(3) The equipment’s response device in the
● Vibration settings basic phase employs light activation, and
● Grid wire is used in the advanced stage with:
● Passive ultrasonic role ● Electronic activated gates
● Balanced magnetic switch(s). ● Recordings (warning, deterrent, etc.).
The advanced stages of the penetration
sensor involve point contact strain ther-
mal and gamma effects. (4) FIDS ancillary equipment concerning
119
Figure 48.
surveillance capability identifies by audio 7-33 Fixed Installation
in the basic stage, and identifies intruders Exterior Perimeter
through visual (CCTV) in the advanced Sensor System (FIEPSS)
stages.
FIEPSS is a standardized security
f. FIDS is certified for use in the
system to detect/prevent intrusion, forcible
following areas (not for J-SIIDS applica-
entry and/or unauthorized access into instal-
tion, par. 7-29b):
lations or facilities. This system consists of a
family of sensors and a monitor unit. The
(1) Sensitive weapons storage areas (RED-
sensors are classified as perimeter, barrier
EYE, DRAGON, LAW, and STINGER) penetration, imaging, point, limited access,
(2) Nuclear fuel storage areas contraband, and duress. The system must be
monitored from a central control.
(3) Nuclear reactor facilities
(4) Computer centers a. Operational concept.
(5) Classified storage areas (1) The system must be deployed to detect
(6) Areas where cryptographic devices are the intrusion or attempted intrusion across
stored, used, or maintained installation perimeters, and boundaries of
areas inside or outside the installation
(7) Ammunition and explosives storage perimeter.
and manufacturing areas
(2) It must also detect the unauthorized
(8) Radioactive isotope storage areas
presence of personnel within the areas
(9) Communication centers mentioned in the preceding paragraph and
the unauthorized entry or removal of
(10) Nonconventional weapons storage protected items within the area boundary.
areas and chemical weapons storage
areas. (3) Security personnel in duress situations
120
Figure 49-Example of FIDS component interfac
121
must be able, using this system, to activate the perimeter. It reduces losses due to pilfer-
a duress sensor to indicate a need for age, sabotage, espionage, organized ground
assistance. attack, or other physical intrusion. The
system includes following essential charac-
(4) Each sensor component must be ca- teristics:
pable of announcing evidence of intrusion
or unauthorized presence through a con- (1) Service and storage life of 10 years.
trol unit to monitoring and display equip- (2) Capable of operating continuously.
ment located at the control center.
(3) Capable of being stored and operated
(5) The FIEPSS must provide the user in climatic categories 1-8, AR 70-38. The
flexibility and modularity in tailoring the requirements of which can be met by
system to the particular requirements of means of a cold weather kit.
the installation and must be operated by
installation security personnel. (4) Provide operation from primary and
backup power sources. Backup power
(6) .Unmanned sensors will be employed sources (batteries) must provide 24-hour
along perimeters and/or around key facili- minimum operation.
ties.
(5) Design consistent with electronic
(7) A member of the security force must magnetic impulse (EMI) requirements of
monitor the system in total and dispatch
intended operational environments.
security forces to investigate alarms when
activated. (6) Employed so that individuals cannot
gain information by electromagnetic ex-
ploitation or other means that will enable
b. Organizational concept. This system them to defeat the system without an
must be employed on an installation-by- alarm being activated.
installation basis in CONUS and OCONUS. (7) Incorporate a self-test capability at the
monitor unit to check functioning of the
(1) Size and configuration of the system to
be employed will be determined by the system.
installation security manager. (8) Capable of protecting several zones
simultaneously.
(2) Some installations could employ a
FIEPSS to completely cover its installa- (9) Consist of appropriate mixes of the
tion perimeters, while other installations following sensors:
might employ the system to cover an area
(a) Perimeter sensors–Detect intrusion
within its perimeter, such as an ammuni-
across or under a land boundary line to a
tion storage area or a warehouse complex.
minimum height or depth of five meters,
(3) Using units could vary from a total or across or under a line on the surface of
installation to selected units with special a body of water, which defines the
security requirements; such as ASA de- perimeter of the area to be protected.
tachments. It is possible to have more than
one FIEPSS on an installation. (b) Barrier penetration sensors-Sense
intrusion or attempted intrusion
through a physical barrier; such as a
c. Characteristics. The system will in- chain link fence, which is part of the
crease the mission reliability of personnel perimeter of the area to be protected.
securing and protecting installation perime-
ters and areas of interest within and without (c) Imaging sensor–Detect intrusion or
122
confirm the presence of an intruder of skilled and semi-skilled intruders and
announced by another type sensor. organized forces.
(d) Point sensors—Detect someone ap- (15) Data transmission system providing
proaching and/or touching a protected hard wire and/or RF data transmission
item; such as aircraft, vehicles, etc. capability between monitor and control
unit. This system must provide for security
(e) Limited access/contraband of both hard wire and RF transmission, to
sensors—Detect movement of persons or include protection hardening of wire and
items into or out of the protected area. encrypting of radio frequency (RF) trans-
mission, if and when required. The system
(f) Duress sensors—Permit the station- must provide the capability for initiating
ary or roving guard force to signal for reactions, such as deterrent systems,
help in case of emergency. lighting, imaging and listening devices,
and responding to a systems test.
(10) Have a control unit to provide pri- (16) Response unit to provide a command
mary power to sensors. The unit shall relay capability for illuminating an area and
status of the sensor monitored area to the initiating deterrents, ranging from broad-
monitor unit. The system shall individu- cast voice warning to application of force.
ally identify alarms from each sensor. (17) Capability to identify and reject
Control unit shall monitor security of nuisance stimuli (false alarms) initiated by
surveillance area by providing supervision natural or manmade environments, either
of sensors, indication of change of power at the sensor or control unit, with a high
source and tampering or change of line degree of probability.
integrity status. Unit shall automatically
(18) Designed to have a specified mean-
switch to self-contained emergency power
time-between-failure (MTBF) of 720 hours,
should primary power supply fail. It shall
assuming a system comprised of no more
provide the capability of simultaneous than 12 components. A failure of any of the
zone alarm in a guard tower as well as in
12 components is considered a system
the control center.
failure.
(19) Mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) for each
(11 ) Monitor unit displays the status and subsystem shall not exceed 30 minutes for
location of sensors by zone and/or sensor. organizational maintenance and 60 min-
Unit shall provide both audible and visual utes for DS and GS maintenance. Sched-
alarms, hard copy of all alarms and status uled maintenance shall not exceed 2 hours
changes and an output for a map display. for every 1000 hours of operation.
(12) Map display capability to indicate (20) Must to the maximum extent, be
sensor locations with numbered light designed to modular replacement of re-
system keyed to a standard map or chart. parir parts.
(13) Central console shall be capable of (21) Not susceptible to electromagnetic
integrating data, providing display com- deception/countermeasures.
patibility with the facility intrusion detec-
tion system and the remotely monitored (22) Fail in the alarm mode for all faults.
battlefield area sensor system and com-
mercial intrusion detection system and (23) Safe to use at nuclear weapons
will include a map display capability. storage installations.
(14) High probability (95-99%) of detection (24) Designed to overcome these three
123
possible TEMPEST (compromising ema- (2) The complete system contains addi-
nations) hazards: tional features such as:
(a) Flooding phenomena (as defined in (a) Central console equipment.
NACSI 4000.3).
(b) A sensor for detecting penetration
(b) Fortuitous conduction of compro- over or under water boundaries.
mising emanations from the facility
being protected.
(c) A sensor for detecting human mo-
(c) Electromagnetic radiation of com- tion.
promising emanations from the facility
being protected. (d) Limited access/contraband sensors.
(e) Duress sensors.

(25) Designed for installation in accor-
dance with Military Standardization (f) Response unit.
Handbook (MIL HDBK) 232 whenever the
facility being protected processes classi-
fied information electrically.
7-34 Base and Installation
Security System (BISS)
d. Data transmission system. Data
transmission and display equipment being BISS is a product of the US Air Force
developed for J-SIIDS and Base and Installa- and is a standard for DOD. It has the
tion security System (BISS) can be adapted to capability of interfacing with other intrusion
meet requirements of the basic system. detection and sensor systems.
(1) The basic system consists of the a. Functional role of BISS:

following components:
(a) Control unit at installation perime- (1) Electronic surveillance
ter to collect alarms from sensors and (2) Electronic detection
supply primary power to sensors. (3) Identification of intruders.
(b) Hard wire/RF data transmission b. System description. The system being
system from control unit to monitor unit. developed under this program consists of a
wide variety of equipment and system seg-
ments, which when selected, configured and
(c) Monitor unit with status display integrated for specific security situations will
modules. comprise electronic systems (such as, BISS)
for particular situations.
(d) Status display map to be used with
monitor unit when required. (1) A single system configuration for all
applications will not be the eventual
(e) A buried line sensor for protecting product; but will be various types of
land perimeters. equipment developed against a standard
system specification. The important factor
(f) A sensor for protecting perimeter is that equipment can be integrated in
fences. various configurations and function
124
together as a system that will accept d. Intelligence. BISS is charged with
interior facility sensors (such as J-SIIDS developing enhanced intelligence capabili-
and others). ties for the security forces, enabling them to
provide for physical security of DOD bases
(2) Such a system when employed pro- and installations.
vides a completely integrated electronic
security system comprised of internal and (1) BISS will have application literally to
external elements functioning under cen- every conceivable geographical location,
tral command and control. operational environment, and external
(3) The situations in which the BISS threat intensity. The common threat in
capability is applicable to worldwide are defining the BISS threat model is, there-
many and varied. These have been fore, to be found in the operational con-
grouped into three categories (or modes of cepts of its users. The shared threat for
deployment) for system engineering- BISS is any individual, or group of individ-
permanent installations, semipermanent uals, who penetrate or attempt to penetrate
installations (transportable mode) and a boundary, or who enter into an area of
mobile (quick reaction mode). Considera- denied access. BISS provides detection,
tions in employing systems in these three surveillance, and warning of such an
distinctly different situations are varied, intrusion, and, when possible, aids in
and are factors in engineering the BISS. response to an alarm stimulus.
However, they are factors which directly (2) The operational response evoked from
influence equipment and system segment local security forces by the detection of
engineering, and only indirectly the total intrusion must reflect the level of threat
system. represented by the ingress depth of the
intrusion. This reflected threat level de-
c. Application. Viewed from an opera- pends on the existing external threat
tional application or functional standpoint, (hostile vs. nonhostile), ingress extent of
the initial system will consist of equipment in the intrusion (area, boundary, or point),
the following two subsystems. and the intrinsic value of the protected
resource.
(1) Detection is the basic subsystem for
any system, and is comprised of sensors, (3) In selecting the components of BISS,
and a sensor data transmission and as well as in planning a specific BISS
display segment. Sensors that employ configuration, consideration must be given
various techniques to detect the presence or to both the nature of the threat and to the
movement of people and vehicles are being reflected level of the threat. (These are
developed. Data transmission must be by discussed more filly in following para-
hard wire with line security, and radio graphs.) When a user defines his BISS
frequency (R/F). Either or both can be installation requirements, he must define
employed, depending on the situation. his general threat level, including all
possible escalations from that level. The
(2) Surveillance uses various techniques
user depends on his own intelligence
to present on a remote monitor visual
channels to assist in his defining and
presentation of an area or location under
maintaining the specific threat definitions
surveillance. Surveillance may be for
associated with each of his specific config-
observing activity within a wide area, or
urations.
assessing causes for sensor activations.
(When a motion detection feature is incor- (a) Nature of threat. In general, BISS
porated, visual equipment can also be must function against both external and
used as a sensor to signal movement.) internal threats.
125
(b) Internal threats. Personnel who expected to attempt entry without de-
work in, or have intimate knowledge of tailed planning or highly sophisticated
the area and the security system are the equipment. They may evaluate the
source of internal threat. This threat is security posture by considering appro-
generally considered to be a human priate time factors, location vulnerabili-
reliability problem. Susceptibility of this ty, and personnel/guard presence. They
threat can be reduced by incorporating may attempt to bypass or otherwise de-
certain security measures and proce- feat an intrusion detection system by co-
dures into hard wire design, system vert means.
installation and system operation. For
example, boxes, sensor covers, and ■ Organized force. Well organized units
cables can be designed to make them less can be expected to use overt force and
vulnerable to tampering; and communi- diversionary actions to gain entry.
cation networks can be provided with Efficiency, depth of planning, execution,
tamper detection capability through line and size of acting force may vary
supervision. greatly. Altering intelligence will be
(c) External threat. The external necessary to upgrade the defense or
security posture required to effectively
threat can generally be divided into five
categories—skilled, well-equipped, counter this threat.
semi-skilled, organized force, and casual ■ Casual intruders(s). These intruders
intruders. would attempt penetration with little or
■ Skilled and well-equipped intruder(s). no advance planning and without ap-
These intruders would attempt penetra- parent rational purpose. They include
tions to conduct military operations, thrill seekers and individuals who are
espionage, sabotage and theft of sensi- mentally deranged or intoxicated. While
tive or very high value items. They could they represent no military threat in the
be expected to plan their entry thor- usual sense, it is possible they might
oughly and to carefully select the time inadvertently or with malicious intent
and method of entry. Highly skilled cause considerable damage. An intru-
intruders using professional, advanced sion detection system should detect
techniques would probably attempt to these intruders with very high confi-
covertly defeat or circumvent your dence.
intrusion detection and other physical (d) Levels of threat. For convenience,
protective measures. An intrusion detec- the general levels of threat have been
tion system, however, can deter intru- designated low, medium and high. The
sion and can increase the difficulty of essential point is that each BISS config-
such an intrusion, resulting in a higher uration must take into account this
probability of detection. general threat level and its possible
escalations. BISS must contain a suffi-
■ Semi-skilled intruders. These intrud- cient variety of modules to permit
ers would attempt penetration to con- tailoring each configuration to meet its
duct terrorist or paramilitary activities, existing threat and yet provide the
theft for profit, and/or vandalism. In required interface capability to upgrade
addition, highly motivated and capable with minimum difficulty and expense in
dissident groups or individuals may try the event that the level of threat esca-
to reduce confidence in the military lates. An analysis of threat levels is
establishment, embarrass the govern- presented in figure 50. This figure also
ment, or create a dramatic incident to indicates appropriate levels of response
attract public attention. They would be by local security forces. Note that as the
126
Figure 50-Threat analysis guidelines.
127
threat level escalates, requirements for tages to the particular tactical operation.
probability of detection, reliability and Methods of emplacement are hand, air,
degree of security required, as well as the and ballistic. Sensors may be employed
speed and intensity of the local security underground, on top of the ground, or in
response forces, also escalates. trees. Permanently or semipermanently
emplaced line sensors to be used primarily
for base defense are not considered part of
7-35 Integration of Systems REMBASS. However, base defense sen-
sors which may be developed under other
When electronic protective systems programs should be compatible with
are integrated there is great improvement in REMBASS readout elements.
the overall security posture of an installation
or activity. (4) Disposition. Ballistically emplaced
sensors must be expendable. Hand and air
A simple example of how DOD sensors emplaced sensors must be retrievable
would be integrated on an Army installation during training and expendable during
is shown in figure 51. tactical operations.
(5) Emplacement accuracy. Emplace-
ment accuracy is not a REMBASS require-
ment, but is the responsibility of the
7-36 Remotely Monitored delivery platform or individual performing
Battlefield Sensor the emplacement. For target acquisition,
System (REMBASS) this accuracy is critical; however, for
general surveillance and early warning
REMBASS, as an element of the roles, less accuracy is required. Regardless,
sensor family, is used primarily in tactical employment accuracies must be sufficient
situations in remote areas and acts as a squad to accomplish the three REMBASS target
or platoon early warning system. classification roles. For surveillance and
early warning, the emplacement accuracy
a. REMBASS sensors. of the individual or delivery platform is
considered sufficient. Target acquisition
(1) Target detection. Sensors must be sensors must have an emplacement accu-
able to detect personnel, vehicles, and racy sufficient to accomplish a 50-meter
aircraft (rotary wing only) using as few circular error probable for target location.
different technologies as possible. (6) Detection range. In general, sensors
(2) Target classification. Sensors must should have adjustable detection ranges.
be able to classify the following: Maximum sensor detection ranges should
not exceed:
Wheels Tracks Personnel (a) 100 m for personnel (single)X
(b) 1,000 m for vehicles
Heavy Heavy Armed (c) 500 m for aircraft.
Light Light
(7) Transmission range. All sensors
(no bikes)
must have an RF output capable of
transmitting to an intended receiver (radio
relay or readout unit) at a line-of-sight
range of:
(3) Sensor emplacement. Sensors must
be emplaced by several different means, (a) 15 km ground-to-ground
each offering its own operational advan- (b) 100 km ground-to-air.
128
Figure 51—Simplifed example of an installation integrated protective system.
(8) Commendable features. A require munitions for the anticipated delivery

ment exists for a commendable imaging means.
sensor. Desired features are: on, off, trans-
(11) Mission life and reliability. All
mit, and change viewing direction.
sensors must be capable of operating for 7
(9) Features required in all sensors: to 30 days. Strings of three or more sensors
(a) Selective mission duration (7, 15, or will have a 0.97 probability of successfully
30 days). completing a 7-day mission.
(b) Selective classification (if cost and (12) False alarm rate. Sensors will be
operationally effective). designed so the system will experience an
(c) Selective detection range sensitivity. average false alarm rate per sensor of not
(d) Frequency and ID code that can be more than 3 percent of alarms, or not more
easily changed prior to mission. than one false alarm per 24-hour opera-
(e) self-disable circuit to automatically tional period.
activate upon end of programed life, (13) Channel and ID selection. The
malfunction, and/or tampering.
capability to select frequency channel, and
ID code by emplacement personnel in the
(10) Weight and size, including batter-
field is required. Although such occur-
ies. Hand emplaced sensors should be
rences are expected to be relatively infre-
easily man-transportable. They should be
quent, the procedure and/or techniques to
less than 3 pounds and 100 cubic inches in
accomplish selection must be simplified.
size. Air emplaced sensors must be less
than 20 pounds and 800 cubic inches. (14) Realtime/nonrealtime outputs.
Ballistically emplaced sensors must be Realtime outputs are desired for all sen-
compatible in size and weight to the sors. Digital sensor alarms should be
129
realtime with an inhibit (update) time of 10 must have a line-of-sight range of 100 km.
seconds. Since analog outputs from special (5) Storing and time tagging. Each
acoustic and image sensors require much relay, with the addition of an attached
wider bandwidths, analog-to-digital con- module, must be capable of storing and
version with delayed transmission times is time tagging activity and providing this
acceptable, if the delay is not greater than 1 data upon command.
minute.
(6) Self-disable features. These fea-
(15) Power supply. Each sensor requires tures, which must automatically activate
an internal power supply that will function upon end of programed life, malfunction,
for the required mission duration in hot tampering, and/or end of battery life,
and cold environments. Hand emplaced should be included in all relays.
sensors should have the capability to
connect to an external alternating current (7) Size and weight. Hand and air
(AC) or direct current (DC) power supply to emplaced relays should not exceed 1.5
extend mission life as much as 24 months. cubic feet and 30 pounds. Ballistically
emplaced relays must conform in size and
b. Radio relays. weight to the munitions for the anticipated
delivery means.
(1) Types. The depth of sensor emplace-
ments in the division area of interest (8) Mission life and reliability. All
requires a variety of emplacement tech- relays must be capable of operating for a 1
niques for relays (hand, air, and ballistic). percent duty cycle for up to 30 days on
If size and cost constraints permit, each internal power sources. The reliability of
relay should be capable of transmitting the three relays in a series must equal 0.87 for a
digital sensor and command signals as 7-day mission.
well as the signals from imaging or
acoustic sensors. Hand emplaced relays (9) Power supply. All air and ballisti-
must be capable of operating from the cally emplaced relays require internal
ground, from a vehicle, or in an aircraft battery supplies. Hand emplaced relays
(without requiring a dedicated vehicle or should have provisions for external power
aircraft). supplies. Airborne relays require provi-
sions for using aircraft power.
(2) Channel selection. Selections of
desired channels or desired frequency
bands for relays may be required in the (10) Storage capability. To retransmit
field by emplacement teams. If narrow near realtime audio or image information,
band frequency shift keying (FSK) is used a store and forward feature may be re-
for a data transmission system, each type quired.
of relay will require a dual channel cap-
ability . c. Basic readout unit.
(3) Disposition. All relays must be ex-
pendable during armed conflict. In peace- (1) The readout unit must be the basic
time, relays must be recovered and used to sensor monitoring device in the
the maximum extent. REMBASS. The readout unit must consist
of a receiver, hard copy printer or chart
(4) Transmission range. All relays must record, and a backup visual display.
have an RF output capable of extending
each transmission link by 15 km. That is, (2) Input/output features. Readout in-
the relay must be able to transmit to an put will be RF from the sensors or relays.
intended receiver at a line-of-sight range of The primary output from the readout
15 km ground-to-ground. Airborne relays should be hard copy. A visual light display
130
backup is also necessary. Output should transmitter must be capable of transmit-
provide the following information: ting over a line-of-sight path of 30 km to
either a relay or sensor.
(a) Sensor identification
(b) Type target (classification) (4) Command outputs. A command
(c) Timing information. transmitter must be capable of addressing
commendable sensors and relays on ap-
Auxiliary outputs must be provided for
image and acoustic processing devices. propriate frequencies and with appropriate
ID codes. (In-band command is preferred.)
(3) Frequency selection. Manual selec-
(5) Weight and size. The command
tions of frequency channels will be neces-
transmitter should be man-portable, weigh
sary. There is a requirement for a dual
no more than 4 pounds, and not exceed 0.4
channel receiver in the basic readout unit
cubic feet in volume.
for limited electronic warfare (EW) protec-
tion and for monitoring flexibility. (6) Reliability. The command transmit-
ter must have a 0.80 probability of success-
(4) Power requirements. Readout de- fully completing a 7-day mission.
vices require an internal battery and
external AC/DC power capability. The
readout must function continuously for 15 e. Special processing unit.
hours without requiring battery change.
(1) The special processing unit must
(5) Computing requirements. When provide a processing and computing termi-
fewer than three readouts are collocated, nation for three or more basic readout
limited computing capability is required. units. This is a nonessential device used to
This may involve a simple nomogram or a expand and facilitate operator functions
small electronic calculator. The sole pur- when readout units are stacked within the
pose of the nomogram or calculator is to monitoring site. Sensor activation infor-
assist the operator in determining mation from the readouts would be pro-
REMBASS functions. cessed so that the printout from the special
(6) Weight and size. The readout should processing unit will provide:
be man-portable, weigh less than 8 pounds, (a) Sensor activation by ID and time.
and be no more than 0.5 cubic feet in (b) Target classification.
volume. (c) Target location in universal trans-
(7) Reliability. Readout reliability must verse mercator grid coordinates.
equal 0.94. (d) Direction of movement.
(e) Speed.
d. Command transmitter. (2) Inputs. The processing unit must

provide with minimal human interface the
(1) The command transmitter must pro- same computational capability required of
vide signals to the commendable relay. It the nomogram or calculator used with a
must be separate from the readout unit so single readout unit. The processing unit
each can be employed independently. must receive inputs from one to six readout
units. These units should be either plugged
(2) Power requirements. The command or cabled to the processing unit.
transmitter should have an internal bat-
tery and an external AC/DC power capa- (3) Outputs. The primary output for
bility. It must function. for a 7-day mission sensor information would be page print.
without requiring battery change. There may be a need for a paper tape or
ADP link which can conveniently inter-
(3) Transmission range. A command face with the integrated battlefield control
131
Figure 52—Example of REMBASS tactical employment.
system (IBCS) or tactical operations should weigh no more than 30 pounds and
svstem. This need cannot be established should not exceed 1.0 cubic feet in volume.
until the IBCS concept is defined explicitly. (6) Reliability. The special processing
Auxiliary imaging and audio display/ unit must have a 0.948 probability y of
monitors can be attached to the processing successfully completing a 7-day mission.
unit for special applications.
(4) Power requirement. The special
processing unit should not require internal 7-37 Intrusion Detection
battery power. An external AC/DC power System for Nuclear
capability must be provided. The special Storage (AR 50-5)
processing unit should be capable of
operating from aircraft and vehicular a. The basic electronic security
sources, tactical generators, and external system must consist of an interior sensor
commercial AC sources. integrated by data transmission links into
(5) Weight and size. The processing unit the annunciator console.
132
(1) All nuclear weapons storage structures safeguarded to preclude tampering. If the
at permanent sites must be protected by transmission lines must leave the secured
primary intrusion detection systems. Al- area, they must be inspected frequently by
ternate backup systems, operated on a guards. A line supervision system should
different principle of detection, and remote be installed to monitor lines connecting the
annunciator panels are desirable. intrusion detection devices to the monitor
(2) Systems must provide both audible panel. Supervision may be accomplished
and visual alarm indications and must be by monitoring various modes/deviations/
dependable, easy to maintain in their random line signals (such as digital, tone,
operational environment, and adequately frequency encoding, and others) and must
protected against tampering. They must at least equal the following acceptable
give an alarm in case of failure, have low mode and supervisory criteria, activating
nuisance-alarm rates, and be equipped an alarm signal when any of these criteria
with a protected, prompt, online alternate are exceeded:
source of power or an emergency battery (a) As much as 5-percent change in
power source. normal line signal, if it consists of direct
(3) Systems must be installed and de- current from 0.5 milliampere through 30
signed so that all portions of the system, milliamperes.
including data transmission lines, are (b) As much as 10-percent change in
protected against tampering. normal line signal, if it consists of direct
current from 10 microampere to 0.5
(4) At sites supporting Allied units, some milliampere.
additional monitor equipment may be (c) As much as 5-percent change in any
required to facilitate US and user-nation component of the normal line signal, if it
coordination. consists of an alternating current of a
(5) If the telephone communications frequency from 1 through 100 Hz and 0.5
system is owned by the Government and milliampere through 30 milliamperes.
maintained and operated by military or (d) As much as 15-percent change in
civilian employees who have suitable any component of the normal line
security clearances, wires in the cables signal, if it consists of an alternating
may be used for intrusion detection cir- current of a frequency of higher than 100
cuits. Otherwise, detection circuits must Hz superimposed on a direct current that
not be earned in cables that also contain has any value from 0.5 milliampere
telephone or other electrical circuitry. through 30 milliamperes.
b. Interior sensor equipment. As a (2) Alarm circuits with a remote test

minimum, protection must be provided to capability must be tested at least once
detect entry into a storage structure or during each guard relief. When a remote
maintenance facility used for overnight stor- test is not possible, circuit tests must be
age. conducted at least once every 24 hours by
activating detection devices. Inspections
c. Control/data transmission (com- must be made at least semiannually by
munications). maintenance personnel qualified to repair
or replace worn or failing components and
(1) Hard wire data transmission links to detect evidence or indications of tamper-
must be used for interior sensor compo- ing with any portion of the system.
nents. All transmission lines for alarm (3) Prior to maintenance or repair, the
circuit should be completely contained in a system must be tested, as in (2) above, and
secured area and must be adequately a record made of each sensor/alarm
133
operating status. The monitoring operator an intrusion detection system or be under
must deactivate only that portion of the surveillance by a guard, closed circuit televi-
system to be repaired and continue to sion, or onduty personnel. The IDS used must
monitor the balance of the system. Immedi- contain a duress signaling component.
ately after completion of repair or mainte- Alarms must be annunciated at a location
nance, the entire system must be tested from which a designated response force can
again, as in (2) above. In addition, those be immediately dispatched. Alarm signaling
circuits on which repair or maintenance with only a local audible alarm is unauthor-
was performed must be tested by physi- ized.
cally activating the detection devices.
b. As a minimum, IDS installed for protec-
tion of arms rooms must consist of two types
d. Records. Commanders must insure of sensors with different methods of activa-
that personnel monitoring primary annun- tion (such as a balanced magnetic switch on
ciator panels maintain records of the data the doors and ultrasonic motion sensors
listed in (1) through (9) below. These records, inside the arms room). Additional levels of
retained for 1 year, will be used for evaluating protection, where practical, are encouraged.
intrusion detection system effectiveness In selecting the mode of operation desired for
(including reliability, sensitivity, required each arms room, it should be emphasized that
adjustments or maintenance, and other an interior IDS is designed to detect, not
information intended to maintain or increase prevent, an intrusion. Therefore, a compre-
security): hensive physical security plan must contain
(1) Date, time, and prevailing weather appropriate physical security measures and
conditions when an alarm signal is re- procedures for an effective reaction force. To
ceived. insure this, IDS must be installed so that
alarm signals can only be cleared by entering
(2) Identity of the guard recording the the protected area. Remote clearing of alarms
alarm. prior to entering and checking the alarm is
(3) Identity of the area from which the not authorized.
alarm was activated.
c. The Joint Services Interior Intrusion
(4) Cause of the alarm. Detection System (J-SIIDS) will be used as
(5) Action taken in response to the alarm. the initial IDS or as replacement for installed
commercial systems at onpost facilities.
(6) Total elapsed time required by respond- Installation of J-SIIDS at offpost facilities is
ing personnel to reach the scene. optional depending upon cost effectiveness,
(7) Tests of detection circuits. ease of maintenance, and monitoring. Com-
mercial IDS are authorized for installation in
(8) Malfunctions. facilities off post where J-SIIDS is not em-
(9) Servicing and/or maintenance of the ployed.
systems .
d. Installers and maintainers of the
J-SIIDS must have as a minimum, a favor-
7-38 Intrusion Detection able national agency check or foreign country
System for Arms Rooms equivalent prior to having access to J-SIIDS.
(AR 190-11) This includes military personnel, DAC,
foreign national employees, civilian contrac-
a. All structures designated for tors or contract foreign nationals. A current
permanent storage of firearms except as list of cleared installer/maintenance person-
specified in AR 190-11, must be protected with nel must be maintained by the facility
134
engineer. The key to access test/retest a minimum, a 24-hour backup power source
switch must be maintained and only those most be provided for each control unit and
persons on the arms room key roster will be monitor panel.
authorized access to these keys on a need to
have basis. Keys to the control unit door and h. Commercial IDS equipment is autho-
monitor must be secured separately from the rized when J-SIIDS is not available or consid-
access test/retest keys, and only authorized ered impractical. When government type-
maintenance men, whose identity has been classified systems are to be employed, the
verified at the direction of the unit/activity applicable installation manual must be used.
commander, will be authorized access to Plans and specifications for installation of
these keys. Commanders must insure unit commercial IDS equipment must be for-
personnel will not have access to the interior warded through command channels to the
of the control unit or monitor. All keys to Chief of Engineers, HQDA (DAEN-MCE-D),
J-SIIDS or commercial equipment must be WASH, DC 20314 for final technical review
under control of the commander whose and approval.
storage area is being protected. Keys must be
secured in containers as required for arms i. Periodic systems operational checks
room keys; however, they must not be must be made and logged by unit security
retained together with arms room keys. personnel, to include visual inspection of
Wiring diagrams or other instructions devel- components and conduit for evidence of
oped by the installer to assist maintenance tampering, operational checks of sonsors to
personnel must be stored inside the control insure stimuli activate the sensor.
unit door in the space provided. Such docu-
ments must be marked FOR OFFICIAL USE j. Installation physical security inspectors
ONLY (FOUO). should include a check of each IDS during
any announced security inspections. Checks
e. When intrusion detection systems are should include visual inspection of compo-
used at arms storage rooms in civilian nents and conduit for evidence of tampering,
communities, arrangements must be made to operational checks of the system in accor-
connect alarms to local civilian police dance with procedures outlined in section V,
agencies, campus police headquarters, or chapter 5, TM 5-6350-262-14/14 under abbrev-
private security companies. There must be a iated system check test. This same test can be
designated response force that can be modified and applied to any commercial
immediately directed to respond in case of an system. Checks should also be made of unit
alarm from the protected area. log entries and records regarding operation
and inspection of IDS.
f. A daily log must be maintained by
monitor stations of all alarms received from 7-39 Maintenance of IDS
arms/ammo storage facilities. The log must
indicate, as a minimum: time, date, and a. Intrusion detection systems
location of alarm; identity of individual should remain in continuous operation
receiving alarm; nature of cause of the alarm; during nonoperational hours of the protected
and action taken in response to the alarm. activity if they are to be effective security
The logs must be maintained for 3 months. aids. In some situations it may be necessary
Problem areas identified must be brought to to have continuous 24-hour operation. There-
the attention of the troop support command. fore, preventive and corrective maintenance
should be performed properly. Each system
g. Transmission lines from control units to should be capable of operating from a stand-
monitor panels that are open or accessible to by power source to compensate for the
tampering must be electrically supervised. As vulnerability of power sources outside the
135
installation. The time requirement for such classified and protected accordingly.
capability must be evaluated in each case
dependent upon such factors as alternate e. The alarm receiving area should be
power supplies, maintenance support, hours designed to give adequate protection to
of active operation, and so forth. monitor personnel, as this will be a prime
target for intruders. Provision for emergency
b. Maintenance is not a difficult problem assistance to this area should be established.
if proper care is routinely exercised. Most Appropriate measures should be employed to
malfunctions, if the system has been properly insure that monitor personnel maintain the
selected, installed, and adjusted, result from system’s integrity. Admittance to this area
improper maintenance. To prevent malfunc- should be restricted to supervisory and
tions, all component parts must be regularly maintenance personnel.
inspected and tested by qualified personnel
as often as recommended by manufacturers. f. Personnel on duty at monitor units at
Spare parts, such as fuses, condensers, installations or facilities using intrusion
relays, and other parts as recommended by detection systems should maintain a daily
the manufacturer, should be stocked locally. record of all systems including the number of
alarms and any malfunctions experienced.
c. Normally, the manufacturer will train Operational records should reflect the follow-
and advise personnel on maintenance of their ing:
equipment. To insure proper operation of
detection systems, the following should be
observed. (1) Date, time, and prevailing weather
conditions.
(1) Designated unit personnel should be
(2) Identity of person recording alarm
available and capable of effecting immedi-
signal.
ate minor repairs, to include replacement
of burned out bulbs, replacement of fuses, (3) Identity of area from which alarm
maintenance and replacement of the signal is received.
auxiliary power unit, and correction of
(4) Action taken in response to alarm
obvious causes of malfunctions and in-
signal received.
valid alarms. All other forms of replace-
ment parts and repairs should be provided (5) Total time required by responding
by support maintenance personnel. personnel to arrive at the scene of an
alarm.
(2) If an installation cannot furnish sup-
port maintenance personnel, a service (6) Cause for alarm signal to be activated.
contract should be negotiated with the (7) Tests of alarms.
manufacturer. In either case, maintenance
service must be available on a 24-hour (8) Malfunctions, including nuisance
basis. Maintenance response time to criti- alarms.
cal areas should be no more than 3 hours.
(9) Servicing/maintenance of detection
systems.
d. Operating and maintenance personnel
should be cleared for access to classified
information to the degree necessary for g. Maintenance for the J-SIIDS, J-SIIDS
access to the area concerned. Plans and addable components, FIEPSS, FIDS, and
diagrams showing location and technical BISS must be in accordance with the techni-
data of installed systems, signal trans- cal manuals published in support of the
mission lines, and monitor units should be equipment.
136
Chapter 8
Lock and Key Systems
T he lock is the most accepted and

widely used security device of the basic
safeguards in protecting installations and
activities, personnel, classified material, and
government and personal property. All con-
tainers, rooms, buildings, and facilities
containing vulnerable or sensitive items
should be locked when not in actual use.
However, regardless of their quality or cost,
locks should be considered delay devices
only, and not positive bars to entry. Many
137
153-846 O - 94 - 8
ingenious locks have been devised, but determining the security value of a key-
equally ingenious means have been develop- type lock.
ed to open them surreptitiously. Some types of (2) Conventional combination locks.
locks require considerable time and expert This type lock may be opened by a skillful
manipulation for covert opening, but all will manipulator, who may be able to deter-
succumb to force and the proper tools. mine the settings of the tumblers and
Therefore, the locking system must be backed construction of a common three-position
up with other security measures. dial-type combination lock through his
sense of touch and hearing. Although the
manipulation of some combination locks
8-1 Installation may require several hours, a skillful
And Maintenance manipulator can open an average con ven-
tional combination lock in a few minutes.
a. The Army Corps of Engineers is
responsible for installation and maintenance (3) Manipulation-resistant combina-
tion locks. A manipulation-proof lock is
of locks, latches, padlocks, or other locking
designed so that the opening lever does not
devices on doors, cabinets, vaults, and
come in contact with the tumblers until the
similar built-in items that are an integral part
combination has been set. Such a lock
of a building or structure. Locks and locking
furnishes a high degree of protection for
devices are listed by manufacturer and
highly-classified or important material.
catalog number in TM 5-805-8. Conversely,
locking devices for safes, lockers, cabinets, (4) Other combination locks. Combi-
desks, and similar items that are not an nation locks with four or more tumblers
integral part of a building are not the may be desirable for containers of highly
responsibility of the Army Corps of important items.
Engineers (AR 420-70).
(5) Relocking devices. A relocking de-
b. Certain Army regulations (such as 190- vice on a safe or vault door furnishes an
11, 50-5, 50-6) prescribe specific types of locks added degree of security against forcible
for specific types of installations or facilities, entry. Such a device appreciably increases
and provide the National Stock Number the difficulty of opening a combination
(NSN) in each case. AR 380-5 prescribes lock container by punching, drilling, or
standard facilities for storage of classified blocking the lock or its parts, and is
material. recommended for heavy safes and vaults.
(6) Interchangeable cores. The inter-
changeable core system uses a lock with a
8-2 Types of Locking Devices core that can be removed and replaced by
another core using a different key. Its main
The degree of protection afforded by features include:
any well-constructed vault, safe, or filing (a) Cores may be quickly replaced,
cabinet may be measured in terms of the instantly changing the matching of
resistance of the locking mechanism to locks and keys if their security is com-
picking, manipulation, or drilling. Types of promised.
locking devices include: (b) All locks can be keyed into an overall
(1) Key locks. Most key locks can be complete locking system.
picked by an expert in a few minutes. The (c) Economical due to reduction in
possibility of the loss and compromise of a maintenance costs and new lock ex-
key and the possibility of an impression pense.
being made should also be considered in (d) System is flexible and can be
138
engineered to the installation’s needs.
(e) Simplifies recordkeeping.
(7) Cypher locks. A cypher lock is a digi-

tal (pushbuttons numbered from 1 through
9) combination door locking device used to
deny area access to any individual not au-
thorized or cleared for a specific area.
8-3 Understanding
Lock Security
a. Combination locks— This pop-

ular type of lock is incorporated in padlocks,
vaults, and doorlocks. The operation princi-
ple of most combination locks is a simple one.
The operator uses numbers (or other symbols)
as reference points to enable him to aline Figure 53—How a three-tumbler
tumblers so that the locking parts of the lock
can move to an unlocked position. combination lock works.
(1) Figure 53 represents a three-tumbler

combination lock mechanism. (A combina- to move into the space made by the gates,
tion lock has the same number tumblers as the lock will operate. First, the dial is
there are numbers in the combination.
rotated in one direction several times. The
Therefore, a lock having three numbers in
driver follows the dial and within a 360-
the combination has three tumblers; four
degree turn, the drive pin “F” on the driver
numbers, four tumblers, etc.) In figure 53
comes into contact with the drive pin on
“A” represents the dial, which is firmly
rider “C” causing “C” to rotate in the same
fixed to the shaft “E”. Any movement of
direction. As the dial continues to turn in
the dial is directly imparted to the shaft.
the same direction, the drive pin on “C”
Letters “B,” “C,” and “D,” identify the
contacts the drive pin on “B” and then all
tumblers.
the tumblers are nested (that is, all tum-
Each tumbler resembles a disc with a blers are going in the same direction).
notch cut into its circumference. This notch
The operator then stops the dial when the
is called a gate. “D” represents the driver
first number of the combination comes into
tumbler. It, like the dial, is firmly fixed to alinement with the index mark on the front
the shaft so that when the dial is moved,
of the lock. This will aline the gate on
the driver tumbler also moves. “B” and “C”
tumbler “B” with the fence. He then
are called rider tumblers. They merely reverses direction and rotates the dial one
rotate around the shaft. Therefore, move-
less turn to the next number of the
ment of the dial may not immediately
combination. This allows “B” to remain in
impart corresponding movement to the
alinement while “C” comes into alinement.
rider tumblers.
Changing direction and turning the dial
To operate the lock, one must aline the one less turn again brings “D” into
gates with the fence; when the fence is free alinement and the lock will now open.
139
Figure 54—Example of combination lock Figure 55—Example of combination

gates alined and fence in open position. lock with gates not alined.
(Figure 54 shows gates and fence in open book for some Master brand combination
position.) padlocks can be purchased for very little
cost from one major supplier. With inex-
(2) Figure 55 portrays improper alinement pensive locks there is a certain amount of
of gates and fence, caused by applying the
tolerance between the widths of the gates
wrong combination, preventing operation
and the width of the fence. This tolerance
of the lock.
allows for some leeway with respect to the
(3) To determine the number of possible combination numbers. In other words,
combinations on a lock, you raise the total with these locks, applying the exact
number of reference points on the dial to combination is not critical. If the exact
the power equal to the number of tumblers. combination were 1-3-8, for example, the
Example: A lock has 40 numbers on the lock might also open on 2-4-7 or 1-4-9.
dial and a three-number combination. The Therefore, manipulation would require the
three-number combination indicates that intruder to try every other combination
there are three tumblers in the lock. instead of every single one. This cuts the
Therefore, the number of combinations intruder’s time considerably.
possible is 403 or 64,000. How can someone (5) There are still other ways to neutralize
find one combination out of 64,000 in less
small combination padlocks. The bolt (that
than an hour? part engaging the shackle) is spring-
(4) On inexpensive combination padlocks loaded in most models. Therefore, a sharp
there is usually a serial number stamped blow on part of the lock will cause the bolt
on the back. These serial numbers can be to jump toward the blow. If this is done
checked in a code book (available from properly, the bolt will disengage from the
locksmith supply houses) and the combina- shackle and the lock will open. This
tion of any such lock can be obtained. This operation is known as rapping. The
is one way an intruder can neutralize the combination padlock with the spring-
combination lock. Incidentally, a code operated bolt can also be opened by
140
Figure 56—Examples of interior wards and matching ward cuts in keys.
shimming with a small piece of thin metal most wards in any warded lock. These are
known as a sneaker. This is an amazingly known as skeleton-keys. However, a skeleton
quiet, simple, and fast operation. key is not absolutely necessary to bypass a
warded lock. A piece of wire bent to the right
(6) Manipulation can be done on safe locks
shape will bypass the wards yet still make
as well as on simple locks. However, it is
contact with the bolt of the lock.
not as easy as it appears on TV and in the
movies. Most big combination locks em- (1) Warded padlocks are frequently seen in
ploy very close tolerances between gates barracks and on storage sheds. These locks
and fences, balanced tumblers, and false actually offer very little security. Most are
gates to foil surreptitious burglary at- of laminated type construction and to the
tempts. unaware seem quite secure. They can be
identified by a free-turning keyway. An
object, such as a nail file, inserted into the
b. Warded locks— While combination free-turning keyway will turn the keyway
locks are popular, key-operated locks are even
but will not operate the lock because the
more popular. One type of key-operated lock is keyway is simply a guide for the key, not a
called the warded lock. Wards are defined as
functional part of the lock. However, if this
obstructions in the keyway (keyhole) and/or
object is inserted too far into the lock, it will
inside the lock to prevent all but the properly-
not turn at all.
cut key from entering or working the lock
(figure 56). The key must have the proper (2) Figure 57 depicts a warded padlock. On
ward cuts to bypass the wards in the keyway this type of lock, the shackle is secured not
or in the lock. There are keys made to bypass by a bolt, but by a flat spring, the leaves of
141
Figure 57— Warded padlocks with

spring secured shackle. Figure 58— Wafer lock operations.
which press together on the sides of the thorized keys; however, these locks have
shackle, engaging a notch on each side of other security features besides the wards.
the shackle. To open this lock, all that is c. Wafer or disc tumbler locks— This is
needed is to spread the leaves of the spring. another type of key-operated lock. Generally,
This can be done with the proper key, by a these devices are more secure than warded
specially designed key, or by an ingenious- locks. Wafer locks are used on most automo-
ly bent paper clip. biles, desks, cabinets, and in some padlocks.
(3) Any lock that relies entirely upon The operation principle of the wafer or disc
wards for its delay factor is not a good lock tumbler lock is as follows: several wafers are
for security purposes. Most modern locks located in the core or plug of the lock (the part
employ wards to curtail insertion of unau- that turns). The wafers are under spring
142
Figure 59—Example of pin tumbler lock operation.
tension and protrude outside the diameter of

the plug into a shell formed by the body of the
lock (see figure 58, locked), thus keeping the
plug from turning and keeping the lock
locked. Insertion of the proper key causes the
wafers to be pulled out of the shell into the
diameter of the plug, allowing the plug to be
turned (figure 58, unlocked). If the wafer lock
is in a door or a desk and has a spring-
operated bolt, it can be shimmed open. If it’s
in a padlock and has a spring-operated bolt, it
can also be rapped open. If it is in a vehicle or
if it employs a deadbolt (a bolt which operates
only when the key plug is turned) the lock can
be picked open.
d. Pin tumbler locks— These are used
extensively in commercial, military, and
residential security. The pin tumbler lock,
generally, is more secure than the warded or
wafer tumbler lock. In this lock, pins are
moved by a key so that a shear line can be Figure 60—Secondary deadlocking
obtained thus allowing the key to turn the
plug and operate the lock (see figure 59). Iatchbolt.
(1) Pin tumbler locks may be incorporated (2) As in wafer locks, a dead bolt maybe
into padlocks, door locks, switches, ma- incorporated into a pin tumbler lock to
chinery, etc. The padlocks, if the bolts are prevent rapping or shimming. The plug of
spring-operated, may be rapped or the lock must turn to operate the dead bolt.
shimmed open. In other devices such as In this case the lock must be picked. In
door locks, if the pin tumbler lock operates residential type locks a feature known as a
a spring-operated bolt, the bolt may be secondary deadlocking latchbolt is often
shimmed open. Specifically, shimming a used (figure 60). If properly adjusted so that
door open is known as loiding, after the when the door is closed the bolt is fully
word “celluloid,” a material commonly extended into the strike (recess for the bolt
used in this technique. in the doorframe) and the secondary bolt is
143
Figure 61—Example of master split

in pin tumbler lock.
fully depressed, the secondary deadlocking
latchbolt will prevent loiding or shimming.
This type of lock should be used on
residences—it is cheap security. Figure 62—Example of mushroom
(3) The principal operation of pin tumbler tumbler action during picking.
locks makes possible the technique of
mastering. Mastering allows the use of
several differently cut keys to operate the
same lock. In mastering (with the excep-
tion of one or two particular makes of pin
tumbler locks), the pins are segmented by
splits which allow several possible pin
alinements at the lock’s shear line (see
figure 61). Because of this, mastering
makes picking easier.
(4) To counter this susceptibility to pick-
ing, a mushroom or spool tumbler or pin
should be used in the lock. This type of pin
makes picking considerably more difficult
because picking tools tend to cant the
tumbler sideways and bind it at the shear Figure 63—Example of lever lock
line (figure 62). figure 62). The mushroom type pin can mechanism.
also be used effectively in nonmastered
locks.
(prison type doors) and padlocks. Large lever
e. Lever locks— Some locks use a system locks can be made quite pick-resistant since
of levers under spring tension to provide the springs can be made to exert considerable
security. The properly cut key will move the pressure to resist picks. However, lever locks
levers so the gates will be properly alined with can be picked. If the lever lock has a spring-
the fence, thus allowing movement of the bolt operated bolt, it can be shimmed or rapped
(see figure 63). Levers are used on some doors open.
144
Figure 64—Professional lock picking kit.
8-4 Picking properly with the shear line, the lock opens.
b. Picking takes practice, skill, and a little
Since locks are manmade, men can luck. However, it seems that most intruders
defeat them. For this reason it is foolish to use other methods to bypass locks. They may
state that a lock is pick-proof. A lock can be cut them, pull them apart, blast them, or rip
called only pick resistant and that is a them off the door. In some doors, the intruder
relative term. In reality, picking is normally simply spreads the door frame away from the
quite simple. Picks can be purchased from door to release the bolt from the strike. This
locksmith supply houses, made at home, or can be combatted by using locks with long
fashioned out, of spoons in confinement bolts (up to 1 inch) and by using grouting a-
facilities. round the door frame (this holds the frame
rigidly).
a. A professional picking kit is shown in c. At times, intruders saw the bolts of locks
figure 64. Basic picking tools are the tension by putting a saw blade in the space between
wren ch and the pick. Both are necessary. the door and the frame. Some bolts have
Without going into detail, the tension wrench floating hardened bearings in the middle of
imparts a rotary motion to the key plug of the the bolts themselves—this foils the saw
lock and aids in finding the bindings or attack because the saw cannot get a bite.
locking tumblers of the lock. The pick is used Hasps are often defeated because they are
to move the binding tumblers, one at a time, to installed improperly and the screws holding
the shear line. When all tumblers are alined them on the door can be removed.
145
Figure 65—Examples of dead bolt (deadlock) latches.
8-5 Dead Bolt Latches figure 65. The dead bolt latch is recommended
for use in military housing as an effective
a. The dead bolt latch may be used security measure in the installation crime
on almost any door, is easy to install and prevention program.
inexpensive, and increases the security
posture of the facility. For most effective b. Chain latches are not recommended as
application, the bolt of the latch should be effective security measures. Because of their
applied so the bolt slides into the door casing usual installation onto door facings, as
frame or into a keeper firmly attached to the opposed to door frames, little effort is needed
frame (not the door facing). Look at the to force entry with a chain latch in the “safe”
examples of best dead bolt installation in position (see figure 66).
146
Figure 66—Most chain latches require little effort to neutralize.
147
8-6 Issue and Control compromise. Fixed combination locks
Locks and Keys (General) should never be used for the protection of
classified material.
Of primary importance in safe- (6) Records containing combinations
guarding property or classified material is a should be placed in the same security
good lock and key issue and control system. classification as the highest classification
Such a system includes control of the combi- of the material authorized for storage in
nations of locks. the container which the lock secures.
a. For effective control, accurate records (7) Use of keys must be based on the same
should be maintained and periodic physical general concept as applied to safe combina-
inspections and inventories made. The main tions. Issue of keys must be kept to a
principles of this system include: minimum and retained under constant key
control supervision. Generally, the instal-
(1) Combinations or keys should be ac- lation key system should be under control
cessible only to those persons whose of the installation provost marshal or
official duties require access to them. physical security manager. However,
(2) Combinations to safe locks and pad- where this is not feasible, the provost mar-
locks securing containers for classified shal should have staff supervision over the
information will be changed at least once system. The following measures are recom-
during each 12-month period (AR 380-5), mended for control of keys to magazines,
and at such other times as deemed appro- trailers, warehouses, and other structures
priate, and at the earliest practical time containing classified matter or highly
following: pilferable materials:
(a) Loss or possible compromise of the (a) Keys should be stored in a locked,
combination or key. fireproof container when not in use.
(b) Discharge, suspension, or reassign- (b) Access lists for persons authorized to
ment of any person having knowledge of draw keys to classified storage facilities
the combination. should be maintained in the key storage
(c) Receipt of a container with built-in container.
combination lock. (c) Keys should not be issued for per-
sonal retention, or removal from the
(3) More frequent rotation of key padlocks installation.
may be required in certain instances. This (d) Key containers should be checked at
is a recommended practice in all situations. the end of each shift and all keys must be
(4) In selecting combination numbers, accounted for.
multiples and simple ascending or de-
scending arithmetical series should be b. Key control records should be main-
avoided. tained on all key systems. Accountability can
be maintained by records, key cards, and key
(5) When padlocks with fixed combina- control registers. Each record must include at
tions are used with bar locks as supplemen- least the following information:
tal locking devices, an adequate supply
should be maintained to permit frequent (1) Total number of keys and blanks in the
interchange of locks among users. This system.
type of lock is not considered to provide (2) Total number of keys by each keyway
adequate security unless it is used in large code.
numbers over extensive areas, which
permits a successful interchange without (3) Number of keys issued.
148
(4) Number of keys on hand. times on those locks being used to secure
more sensitive materiel.
(5) Number of blanks on hand for each
keyway code. (4) All locks (lock cylinders when appro-
(6) Persons to whom keys have been is- priate) and keys in a masterkeyed system
sued. should be numbered with unrelated num-
ber system. The words—US govern-
c. Inventories of key systems should be ment—DO NOT REPRODUCE—should
conducted at least annually. Requests for be imprinted on all master and higher
issuance of new, duplicate, or replacement level control keys.
keys should be approved or monitored by the
official responsible for key control.
8-7 Key Control Officer
d. A key depository should be provided at
a. A key control officer should be
installations where keys are secured during appointed by the commander. He maybe the
nonoperational hours. Supervisors should be provost marshal, his physical security
required to sign a register for the keys at the manager, or other designated individual.
beginning of each working day and to turn in This officer should be concerned with the
keys at the end of the working day. Security supply of locks and how they are stored;
personnel should check the key board and handling of keys; records maintenance;
register to insure accountability for all keys. investigation of loss of keys; inventories and
inspections; custody of master keys and
e. Key control systems will normally be control keys if applicable; regulations con-
engineered to provide the degree of security cerning locks and keys on the installation
required with a minimum impairment of the and facility; maintenance and operation of
operational mission. Basic requirements for the installation’s key depository; and the
all key control systems are as follows: overall supervision of the key program at the
(1) High security pin tumbler cylinder installation.
locks will normally be specified for use. b. The key control officer should maintain
a permanent record of the following:
(2) Key control systems will be developed
(1) Locks by number, showing–
to insure against usable keys being left in
possession of contractor or other unauthor- (a) Location of each lock;
ized personnel. Such assurance is normally (b) Key combination, i.e., pin lengths
achieved by using locks with restricted and positions;
keyways and issuing new keys on key (c) Date of last key change.
blank stock that is not readily available to (2) Keys by number, showing–
commercial keymakers.
(a) Location of each key;
(3) Masterkeying is prohibited except in (b) Type and key combination of each
rare minimum security cases. When pin key.
tumbler systems are masterkeyed, the use (c) Record of all keys not accounted for.
of several shorter pins to facilitate two or
more acceptable pin positioning reduces c. The key control officer should also be
the security afforded by use of a maximum responsible for the procurement of locks and
number of pins in a nonmasterkeyed lock. keys. Based on determined requirements, he
One or more mushroom-typed pins or a should coordinate procurement with the
variation of this type pin will be used in installation or facility engineer, and keep
each such lock. Also, individual pins abreast and know the availability of im-
should not be segmented more than two proved locks and keys.
149
8-8 Mechanics locking devices used on the most secure door
Of Implementation must be high security padlock and hasp. The
secondary padlock, mortise locks, or rim dead
Since each installation or facility locks must be used to secure the other door or
will have conditions and requirements pecu- the double door requirement. Mortise locks
liar to its activity, key control systems will and rim dead locks must meet the following
vary. Before establishing a system, a survey specifications:
should be conducted to determine actual (1) Be a key-operated mortised or rim-
requirements and to identify all warehouses, mounted dead bolt lock.
shops, storage areas, safes, filing cabinets,
etc., that require the additional protection (2) Have a dead bolt throw of 1 inch.
afforded by locking devices and security of (3) Be of double cylinder design.
keys. When this determination has been
made, an annex to the physical security plan (4) Cylinders are to have five-pin tum-
can be prepared to show the following: blers, two of which are to be of mushroom
or spool type drive pin design.
a. Location of key depositories.
(5) Have 10,000 key changes.
b. Keys (by building, area, or cabinet (6) No master keying of lock to be permit-
number) to be turned in to each depository. ted.
c. Method of marking or tagging keys for (7) If bolt is visible when locked, it should
ready identification. contain hardened saw resistant inserts or
be made of steel.
d. Method of control for issue and receipt of
keys to include maintenance of register and b. At least one lock must secure each door
identification of personnel authorized posses- in the triple barrier system. Vehicles and
sion of keys. storage facilities in which items are stored
must be secured by approved secondary
e. Action required if keys are lost, stolen, or padlocks. Aircraft must be secured with
misplaced. locking devices specified in modification
work orders; devices must not be designed
f. Frequency and method of lock rotation. and produced locally without approval from
the US Army Aviation Systems Command.
g. Assignment of responsibilities by job or Doors that cannot be secured from the inside
position title. with locking bars or deadbolts will be secured
on the inside with secondary padlocks.
h. Emergency type keys, which would be
readily available to the security supervisor. c. Keys to arms storage buildings, rooms,
racks, and containers must be maintained
i. Other controls as deemed necessary. separately from other keys and must be
accessible only to individuals whose official
duties require access to them. A current roster
8-9 Keys and Locks of these individuals must be kept within the
For Ammunition Storage unit, agency, or organization and must be
(AR 190-11) protected from public view. The number of
keys will be held to the minimum. If an
a. All doors used for access to arms alternate set of keys is maintained, they must
storage rooms must be locked with approved be secured at the next higher headquarters
locking devices. On storage facilities, the and inventoried monthly. When the next
150
higher headquarters is not on the same mentioned in paragraph c above, records
installation as the unit, the alternate set of that identify:
keys must be secured by the unit separate
from the operational set of keys. Custody of (1) Total number of locks and keys in the
keys will be transferred between authorized lock system used by the organization or
individuals after both parties have conducted agency, including replacement or reserve
locks.
a visual inventory of weapons, including a
total count of weapons on hand. The change (2) Total number of keys for each lock.
of custody and physical inventory must be
recorded as prescribed. After duty hours, keys (3) Number of keys issued.
will be secured in a locked container con- (4) Number of keys on hand.
structed of at least 20-gauge steel or material
(5) Number of keys and locks retained in
of an equivalent strength away from the
reserve.
storage area or in the custody of responsible
duty officer, NCO, or individuals authorized (6) Persons to whom keys have been is-
unaccompanied access. At no time will keys sued.
be left unattended or unsecured. Key contain-
ers when not in use must be placed in a secure f. Padlocks must be locked to the staple or
location. Keys to arms storage buildings, hasp when the area or container is open to
rooms, racks, and/or containers must not be preclude theft, loss, or substitution of the lock.
removed from the installation. The use of
master key system is prohibited. In the event
of lost, misplaced, or stolen keys, affected g. Inventories of keys and locks must be
locks or cores to locks must be replaced conducted semiannually. Inventory records
immediately. Replacement or reserve locks, must include the information contained in
cores, and keys must be sufficiently secured to paragraph e, above, and be retained in unit
preclude them from being readily accessible files according to regulations.
to unauthorized individuals.
h. Combinations to locks on vault doors or
class V containers will be changed semian-
d. A key and lock custodian must be nually and the combinations safeguarded in
appointed and his or her duties will include accordance with AR 380-5. Padlocks used to
insuring the proper custody and handling of secure entrances to arms storage facilities
keys and locks. A key control register must be must be rotated at least semiannually, and a
maintained at all times to insure administra- record maintained reflecting the date of
tive accountability for keys. Key control rotation. All other locks used to secure
registers must contain the signature of each weapons will be rotated at least annually.
individual receiving the key, date and hour of Rotation of locks will be such that none of the
issuance, serial number of key, initials of locks formerly used to secure the doors, racks,
person issuing the key, date and hour key was or containers securing weapons will be used,
returned, and signature of the individual after rotation for a period of 3 years, within
receiving the returned key. Key control the same arms storage facility. Rotation will
registers must be retained in unit files for one include exchange of locks among units or
year and then destroyed. from another geographical area. Each arms
room will maintain on hand a back-up set of
e. Organizations or agencies maintaining locks amounting to 15 percent of the number
keys to arms storage buildings, arms storage of locks in use. Keys to locks to be used must
rooms, and arms racks must establish a key be inventoried at the time of rotation. The loss
control accountability system which will of or inability to account for any key to a lock
include, in addition to the key control register makes that lock unauthorized for the purpose
151
of securing arms or ammunition. Lock every month and must be given routine
combinations will be changed— maintenance at that time. The number of
installed padlocks should be supported with a
(1) When placed in use after procurement. 5 percent backup of serviceable padlocks.
(2) At least semiannually.

c. Active entrances to all permanent stor-
(3) On transfer, reassignment, resigna- age structures must be equipped with dual
tion, or relief of any person having the high-security locking systems or one high-
combination. security locking system equipped with an
anti-tamper device. All other exterior storage
(4) When the combination has been com-
structure doors must be secured by a substan-
promised or the lock has been found
tial dead-bolt device from inside the struc-
unlocked and unattended.
ture.
d. No one individual may have access to or

possession of the keys to both locks of a
8-10 Lock and Key Control structure containing nuclear weapons. Keys
For Nuclear Storage to nuclear weapon storage structures must be
(AR 50-5) controlled as classified material at least equal
to the classification of the material being
protected.
a. Each nuclear weapons storage
structure entrance in a permanent exclusion e. Key padlocks must be changed, have
area must be locked with at least two key- their cylinders replaced, or be rotated ran-
operated high-security padlocks with domly between structures or sites at least
shrouded shackles which meet military annually. They must be replaced upon loss or
specification MIL-P-43607 (GL) and with compromise of their operable keys. Rotation
appropriate style high-security hasps, as of padlocks is not required when either of the
described in amendment 1 to this military following exists—
specification.
(1) Two padlocks are installed on each
b. A custodian must be designated by the structure and a system established for
commander to control, issue, and maintain separating these locks into A- and B-series
adequate records of all keys and locks to locks. Personnel must be identified and
buildings or areas containing nuclear mate- authorized to have in their possession the
rial. Keys must be made available only to keys to either the A-series locks or the B-
designated personnel whose official duties series locks, but not both.
require access to them. Key registers, to (2) The locking mechanism is protected by
indentify keys for each lock, their current an anti-tamper bar that will activate an
locations, and custody, will be maintained. alarm when it is moved.
Repositories must be provided in areas where
keys are secured during nonworking hours. f. Master keys are prohibited.
Key repositories, racks, boxes, rings, and
boards will be secured when not in use. All g. Keys to currently installed locks must
keys must be jointly inventoried with each not be removed from the site.
change of key custodians. Keys stored in
two-man control containers need only h. Keys and spare locks must be protected
be inventoried when containers are in a secure container when they are not
opened. Keys and locks must be inventoried needed for authorized operational purposes.
152
8-11 Inspection Procedures for key into key recess. Jamming will cause
Defective Locks severe damage to locking levers and may
preclude removal of test key.
b. Defective locks. Locks found defec-
a. A periodic inspection should be tive during test inspections must be reported
instituted upon all locks to determine the to Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC)
locking mechanism’s effectiveness, detect on SF 368, Quality Deficiency Report. Defec-
tampering, and to make replacements. This tive locks will be retained until disposition
may be accomplished by inserting a test key instructions have been received.
(any comparable key other than the assigned
key) no more than one-quarter inch into c. Periodic maintenance. In addition to
keyway. Turn test key by hand using the the above, periodic preventive maintenance
normal amount of force required to open lock. of locks should be performed to insure
If the lock opens during inspection, it should adequate lubrication, employment of rust
be replaced immediately. Care must be taken preventive on outer surfaces and clearing of
during inspection to prevent jamming of test dust and moisture from keyways.
153
Chapter 9
Security Forces
T he security force of an installation

or facility provides the enforcement medium
in the physical security program. This force
consists of persons specifically organized,
trained, and equipped to protect the physical
security interests of the command. It is a
commander’s most effective and useful tool in
a comprehensive integrated physical security
program.
154
Selecting Members Section I
9-1 Types of Security Forces such personnel should be assigned the

least sensitive posts or patrols.
a. Military. (b) The military police unit may be
augmented either by over-staffing if
(1) On an installation or facility, military qualified personnel are available, or by
security forces may be military police or activation of a provisional unit(s) under
they may be from other branches. the provisions of AR 220-5. Such a unit
may be of any size (such as platoon or
company).
(2) The interior guard type of security This type of action must be approved by
duties are performed by installation or
the senior commander from whose re
facility unit troops on a roster basis.
sources the personnel will be drawn.
Military police normally perform security This method has the advantage of
duties that require higher degrees of
providing a more stable force than de-
training and experience, such as: scribed in paragraph 9-1a(3)(a) above and
Security of restricted areas. an organizational framework in which
Security of specific sensitive gate(s). training and operations can be more
Supervisory or coordinated role with realistically blended.
other military or DOD Civil Service Secu- The disadvantages of this type unit are
rity Guards. that it is considered only a temporary
measure, and the personnel are obtained
(3) Depending on the mission, area, facili- only on a temporary duty or detail basis
ties and/or functions to be secured; enemy from their parent units. It is intended for
situation; and similar factors, a military use only in unforeseen circumstances and
police unit may perform the entire physical for temporary periods. Should a continuing
security function. When it cannot assume need be anticipated, action should be
responsibilities for all of the physical initiated for activation or assignment of
security requirements in the command, additional military police TOE/TD units
other physical security forces must be or other security guard type units.
required.
(4) Another source of physical security
(a) These additional forces may consist forces is the combat arms branches,
of personnel furnished by other units of especially the infantry. Units of such
the command on a daily, weekly, or other branches may be attached to military
periodic basis. While this method has police units, and as such, may be desig-
the single advantage of providing addi- nated as security guards and assist in all
tional manpower, it has the disadvan- required and appropriate operations.
tages of rapid turnover and lack of
training of such personnel in security (5) A final source of military forces maybe
requirements and procedures. If used, the host country in an oversea area.
155
Military or paramilitary units of the host (3) It maybe necessary to train certain of
country may also be attached to, or operate the regular force in supervisory positions
in coordination with, military police. They so a nucleus of supervisory personnel is
may also be supplemented with national available to staff the auxiliary force in case
police of their own country. the need for their service arises.
(4) Auxiliary forces should be adequately
b. Civil Service. These security person-
nel are uniformed civilian employees of an trained and equipped to be able to function
agency of the government. They are custom- effectively. A uniform, or at least a distinc-
arily trained and organized along semimili- tive arm band, should be provided. Arms
tary lines. The organization may be com- and other necessary equipment can be
issued as needed from regular supply
pletely civil service or may be composed of
civil service personnel under military super- channels. An intensive training program
vision. In either case, it is under operational should be set up whereby each auxiliary
receives at least the basic training of a
control of the provost marshal or security
member of the security force and periodic
officer.
refresher training.
c. Labor Service Personnel. In addi- (5) If auxiliaries are employees, this train-
tion to military and civil service forces, labor ing should be accomplished during normal
service type units composed of local civilian working hours so as to interfere with their
personnel have been organized and used normal working schedule as little as possi-
successfully in a theater of operations. These ble.
types of units were organized after World War
(6) Such use of nonmilitary personnel
II and since that time have established
must be closely coordinated with the
enviable records in the physical security field.
personnel officer and the G1, as to employ-
These personnel, men of many nationalities,
ment aspects; and with the staff judge
are distinctively uniformed, organized, and
advocate as to legal aspects (such as
equipped. They have set and maintained the
liabilities, responsibilities, etc.).
highest security standards, resulting in a
very minimum loss of property. While not
military organizations as such, these units
have successfully developed a high sense of
duty and esprit de corps, which has been 9-2 Authority and Jurisdiction
reflected in their outstanding contributions to
the physical security of installations in It is most important that the provost
oversea commands. marshal or security officer determine (and
instruct his security force in) the extent and
d. Auxiliary Force. It maybe advisable limitations of the commander’s jurisdiction
to have an auxiliary force to supplement the in the field of law enforcement and investiga-
regular force and to relieve the regular force tions.
for additional duties which may be required
a. Jurisdiction of Place.
during a disaster or national emergency.
Auxiliary force personnel should be drawn (1) Military installations and facili-
from installation or facility personnel. ties. Whether state or Federal law or both
are applicable on a particular portion of a
(1) Retired military personnel may be used military installation or facility depends
if they are physically capable. largely on the nature of jurisdiction over
(2) The auxiliary force should be orga- the land involved. The amount of Federal
nized in the same manner as the regular jurisdiction will vary between different
security force. areas of the same installation or facility.
156
The legal formalities of acquiring jurisdic- regulations, and state law where appli-
tion over land under the control of the cable.
Secretary of the Army are accomplished at (b) Security force personnel may be
Department of the Army level and in given the same authority as MPs over all
accordance with the provisions of AR 405- personnel subject to military jurisdic-
20. Information and advice relating to tion, including apprehension, detention,
jurisdictional questions should be obtained search, and interrogation.
through the office of the local staff judge (c) Security force personnel have no
advocate. If the required information is not specific grant of authority over civilians
available in that office, it will be furnished other than the right of citizen’s arrest,
to the staff judge advocate by Lands which every citizen enjoys.
Division, Office of the Judge Advocate They maybe deputized in accordance
General. with state authority where applicable,
but only upon prior permission from DA
(2) Areas outside military installa-
and must serve in that capacity without
tions. Areas outside military installations
are generally subject to state and local law. extra compensation. (See Federal Per-
However, there are exceptions. Informa- sonnel Manual § 734.101.)
tion and advice in this regard should be Department of Justice policy is
obtained through the local staff judge against deputizing such personnel as
advocate. US Marshals. (See Op JAGN 1952/82, 2
Dig Ops Posts, § 23.1.)
(3) Oversea areas. In oversea areas, (4) The commander is the source of juris-
jurisdiction of place varies according to the diction and authority for all other person-
military situation, and existing interna- nel assigned to security force duties.
tional treaties, contracts, and agreements.
Guidance should be obtained in each
instance and area from the commander
and the staff judge advocate, and set forth
in appropriate command directives. 9-3 Personnel Selection
Regardless of the use of structural,

b. Jurisdiction of Persons. mechanical, electronic, and other supple-
ments, the human element in security opera-
(1) Jurisdiction of persons follows, in tions makes the difference between success
general, the limitations- of jurisdiction of and failure. Commanders and supervisors
place. have a definite responsibility, under the
(2) Military police have jurisdiction and provisions of AR 604-5, to insure that security
authority over persons as described in FM personnel who control access to restricted
areas and classified activities are screened,
19-5 and related publications.
selected, cleared, retained, or disqualified,
(3) The source of authority for Federal based on criteria contained in that regula-
civilian employees assigned to security, tion.
police and guard duties is derived from the
commanding officer of the installation. a. Desirable Qualities of Security
These personnel can have no more author- Force Personnel. Most of the qualities
ity than he possesses and are subject to any desired in security personnel are developed
limitations imposed thereon. through training and become instinctive
(a) Security force personnel may en- through experience. Every person assigned to
force all offenses under the UCMJ, security duties must recognize the part he
military regulations, Federal law and plays in this development; he must have an
157
awareness of his need to acquire this instinc- communications equipment and protec-
tiveness and a willingness to learn principles tive alarm systems enhance the effec-
of self-improvement. Many qualities are tiveness of security forces; but nothing
desirable for security personnel; however, can be substituted for the alertness of
only those considered essential for key security force personnel. Alertness
performance of security duty are outlined makes the difference between effective
below: security and a lack of security.
(1) Alertness. This quality, more than (2) Judgment. Sound judgment is more
any other, will determine the effectiveness than the application of common sense—it
of a person assigned to security force is the power of arriving at a wise decision.
duties. It must be cultivated by all security The process involves mental comparison of
force personnel. Even though hundreds of an unfamiliar situation with a similar
contacts are made with individuals who situation of known values and relation-
show proof of the right and need to enter a ships. With careful discrimination during
restricted area, for example, one contact the process of elimination, the formulated
could be with a person who should not decision will be sound. It follows that
enter. To be able to detect this one excep- knowledge precedes judgment, and experi-
tion, the security guard must be constantly ence provides knowledge. Both are neces-
alert. sary. Security instructions cannot cover
(a) He must watch for deviations from each situation. They can provide only
the normal, such as a strange car near fundamental guidelines, because each
his post, a person approaching from an situation is unique and requires individual
area which is not normally used, or consideration. Each guard must develop
nervousness in an approaching individ- the ability to observe, compare, and dis-
ual. criminate similarities and differences.
(b) Little things that seem to have no However, a word of caution is in order:
significance may add up to something security personnel should be trained
important. Alertness can be achieved to call security headquarters for in-
only by keen watchfulness and by structions when in doubt as to a
diligent application to the requirements situation or experience.
of the patrol or post.
(c) Technological advancements in (3) Confidence. This quality is not
158
inborn-it is learned. Confidence is a state b. Other Requirements.
of feeling sure, a state of mind free from
doubt or misgivings. Confidence includes (1) In selecting personnel for security force
faith in oneself and in one’s abilities, and assignment and in their continuing per-
nothing can bring out self-confidence like formance, each man’s general mental atti-
job knowledge. Each man must have tude toward life and his job is most
confidence in himself, his weapons, his important. Uncompromising interest and
leaders and other members of the security loyalty to the job are particularly appli-
team. Confidence is thus best achieved cable to security personnel. Supervisors
through thorough and proper training and must be alert for any change in this
competent supervision. attitude that might adversely affect the
performance of security personnel.
(4) Physical fitness. Security duty is
difficult and demanding. The security of (2) Only personnel of known responsibil-
an installation or facility-and even the ity and trustworthiness should be assigned
life of the person assigned to security to security duties. Security clearance
duties-may depend upon his physical criteria for security positions must be
fitness. Training in the techniques of based principally on the security classifi-
unarmed defense and in physical condi- cations of the information to which access
tioning is essential for developing this will be granted. Security positions are
quality. normally designated as sensitive, and
require a security clearance of SECRET.
(5) Tactfulness. The ability to deal with Army Regulations 381-130 and 604-5 de-
others without giving offense is a quality scribe criteria and procedures governing
desired in security personnel. It is difficult security clearances for military personnel
to assume the authority and responsibili- and affiliated civilians. Appropriate civil-
ties of security duty without consciously or ian personnel regulations should also be
subconsciously displaying a sense of consulted where civilians are involved.
superiority and an overbearing manner. (3) Requests for security clearance must be
Security personnel must be able to give processed in accordance with the above
instructions clearly and concisely, firmly, cited regulations.
and authoritatively, but without arro-
gance. (4) Positive evaluation of the reliability of
all personnel must be made before they are
(6) Self-control. Security duty presents entrusted with access to classified or
situations which require not only sound sensitive information and followup action
judgment and tact, but also self-control. must be made on all personnel who are
When an individual is offensive, the granted security clearance to insure that
security guard must be impersonal in his their actions are above reproach. Those
response, or he will likely lose control of his personnel not meeting or adhering to the
temper and of the situation. The security prescribed standards must have their
guard, after he has given his instructions, security clearances revoked, and thereby
should keep his conversation to a mini- lose their access to areas containing
mum. A person who is trying to beat the classified information or material (AR 604-
system will attempt to make the security 5).
guard angry. A person on the defensive
does not have the situation under control.
This situation will occur most frequently in c. Women. Security positions maybe effi-
making apprehensions, issuing traffic ciently filled by women. Women are required
citations, and during civil disturbances. where search of females is necessary.
159
Organization and Use Section II
9-4 Organization and

Employment of Forces performed. A method for computing require-
ments is shown in the following example (see
also ARs 310-31, 570-2, and 570-4):
The discussion in this section is (1) Function: physical security.
directed primarily toward physical security
in a static situation, such as a CONUS (2) Work activity: fixed security post.
installation or facility. Some of the factors (3) Work unit: fixed security post. Post is
discussed are applicable in other situations, operated on a continuing basis, 24 hours a
such as in an active theater of operations; day, 365 days a year, with 2 men on duty at
others are not. the post at all times.
a. Organization. The organization of a
security force will vary depending on circum- (4) Performance standard: 52.8 man-
stances and forces available. Forces may be hours per fixed post per day.
organized by: (5) Productive hours per man per
(1) Fixed post deployment. year: 2,753 man-hours. Based on 12-hour
shifts, 4,380 man-hours are available per
(2) Patrol deployment. man per year. Of this total, 1,627 man-
hours are nonproductive by reason of
(3) Reserves.
preparation for duty, maintenance of
(4) Any combination of these three. equipment, briefing, travel to and from
posts, and similar requirements.
b. Manpower Requirements. These re-
quirements for a security force will vary (6) Formula for determining authori-
according to the types of operations being zation criteria (also see chapter 2):
Man-hours required Number of

per post per day
Productive man-hours
x Operational days
per post per year
direct workers
required to man
one post
per man per year
160
(7) Computation: are applicable at all posts and patrols.
They must cover such items as wearing of
52.8 X 365 7 direct workers per post the uniform, reporting for duty, report
2,753 writing, etc.
(2) Special Orders pertain to the conduct
(8) Authorization criteria: Seven di- of a permanent post or patrol. Each
rect workers for each two-man post. permanent post or patrol should have
Special Orders issued concerning the
c. Shifts. Security forces are normally location, duties, hours manned, arms,
organized into three or four shifts, usually on ammunition and other equipment re-
duty for eight-hour periods. Normally, one quired, and instructions on the use of force
individual is placed in charge of each shift of in enforcement and apprehension activi-
the force. Clear and definite understanding ties.
should exist as to seniority and who is in (3) Temporary Orders are issued for a
charge of the shift. Changes of shifts should short period covering a special or tempo-
occur before peak periods of activity in the rary situation and having no permanency
normal operation of the installation or at the time issued. If it can be predeter-
facility. The minimum requirement of secu- mined, such orders should indicate the pe-
rity personnel for each shift should be riod of time for which they are valid.
established by dividing the total number of
man-hours needed by hours in the shift. To b. A security force manual or handbook
this number must be added sufficient man- covering standing operating procedures, and
power to provide relief, which is usually based setting forth policies, organization, author-
on one-half hour per man needed for each ity, functions, and other required operating
shift. If there is a post or patrol requiring less information, should be prepared and distri-
than 8 hours duty occurring during a shift, buted to each member of the security force for
this security may be provided by drawing a required reading. Each man should be held
man or men from a less essential mission, or responsible for full knowledge and under-
by adding personnel to the shift and using standing of its contents. Each installation
their services in some other post on patrol, or provost marshal, physical security officer, or
as relief during extra time. chief of guard force, should conduct periodic
inspections and examinations to determine
each individual’s degree of understanding of
9-5 Security Force and compliance with all security force in-
structions.
a. Instructions to the security force

should be issued in writing. These instruc- 9-6 Headquarters
tions are normally in the form of General, And Shelters
Special, or Temporary Orders, and should be
carefully and clearly worded to include all
a. Location of the security force
necessary phases of each assignment. They
headquarters will depend on the size and
should be reviewed at least monthly to be layout of the installation or activity. The
certain they are current. Categories of in- objective is efficient control of the security
structions and the scope of each are as
force, and adequate security of vital activi-
follows:
ties. On a small installation there is fre-
(1) General Orders are those which quently only one full-time entrance, which
concern the security force as a whole and may be supplemented by several part-time
161
Figure 67—Location of security forces and headquarters.
Figure 68—Floor plan for security force headquarters.
162
entrances. At such an installation the logical security hazards and assist in identifying
location of the headquarters would be at or violators and intruders.
near the main entrance. On the other hand, at
an installation of large acreage it might be c. Written reports should be required for
much better located near the center of the all security activities. These should be pre-
main group of buildings. pared by each man and turned in to the
supervisor for necessary action.
b. The security force headquarters should
be the control point for all matters pertaining d. Personnel who are assigned to fixed
to physical security of the installation and posts should have some designated method
the terminal or monitoring point for protec- of securing relief when necessary. Where
tive alarm and communication system (see fixed posts do not permit the person to move
figures 67 and 68, page 162). at all, such as posts on watch towers,
arrangements should be made so they may
c. A list of key telephone numbers should leave their posts at least every two hours.
also be available for use in emergency
e. A simple but effective plan of opera-
operations. It is frequently the office of record
tion should be worked out for the security
on security matters, and usually houses the
force to meet every foreseeable emergency.
pass and badge office with its identification
Practice alarms should be conducted fre-
and visitor control files. It should have a
reliable and independent means of contact quently to test the effectiveness of this plan
and the understanding of it by the security
with nearby civil authorities.
force. Such plans should be designed to
prevent a diversion at one point in the
d. Personnel shelters should be designed to installation, drawing off the guards and
provide occasional temporary protection distracting their attention from another
from severe weather. The design should section of the installation where unauthor-
include space for one person only; facilities ized entry may be made.
such as heat, ventilation, storage space for
essential accessories, and lighting that will f. Routes for security patrols should be
not expose the occupant; and good visibility varied at frequent intervals to preclude
in all directions (see figure 68). (For towers, establishing a routine which maybe observed
fence, and protective lighting, see chapters 5 by potential intruders and used to gain
and 6.) entrance.
g. Records of tours and reports to

headquarters should be carefully checked.
9-7 Execution Failure to record a visit at a designated
Of Security Activities station, to report to headquarters as required,
or any other deviation from established
a. Security personnel should defi- reporting procedures should be investigated
nitely and clearly understand their rela- immediately. (1) Security personnel should
tionship to employees. They have certain have no firefighting or other similar duties
duties to carry out in respect to employees, regularly assigned. Such emergencies offer
but bad employee relationships can result if an excellent diversion to cover the entrance of
security personnel become impertinent and a saboteur or pilferer. Consequently, during
assume powers not rightfully theirs. such times security personnel should be
exceptionally alert in the performance of
b. Security personnel must understand the their duties. (2) It must be strongly empha-
methods and techniques that will detect sized that security personnel will be used for
163
security duties and should not be given other training in other areas such as firefighting,
routine functions except as directed by the so they maybe used when required and when
commander or his representative. (3) They circumstances permit (such as when off duty).
may and should, however, be given cross-
Training Section III
9-8 Training Requirements appropriate to his skill level. Past experience,

training, acquired skills, and duty assign-
ments should be evaluated for each person as
The extent and type of training an aid in planning an effective training
required for security forces will vary accord- program.
ing to the importance, vulnerability, size, and c. A good training program has benefits
other factors affecting a particular installa- for both the installation and the security
tion or facility. The objective of the training force. Some of the benefits are:
program is to insure that all personnel are
able to perform routine duties competently (1) For supervisors. The task of super-
and to meet emergencies quickly and effi- vising the security force is made easier.
ciently. There is much less wasted time. Fewer
mistakes are made. The resulting econo-
9-9 Benefits mies of motion or action are of benefit to
Of Proper Training the installation. There is also less fiction
with other agencies. A good program also
a. Efficient and continuing training helps to instill confidence, which is most
is the most effective means of obtaining and valuable to a security force.
maintaining maximum proficiency of secu-
rity force personnel. Regardless of how (2) For security personnel. Training
carefully a supervisor selects personnel for benefits personnel because their skills are
his force, seldom do they initially have all the increased; it provides increased opportuni-
qualifications and experience necessary to do ties for promotion; and it provides for
the job well. In addition, new and revised job better understanding of their relationships
requirements frequently mean that personnel to the command or management.
must be retrained for different jobs and skills.
The gulf between ability and job requirement (3) For the security organization.
can be bridged by training. Good training helps to provide for more
b. It is also well for supervisors to remem- flexibility and better physical protection,
ber that all people do not have the same fewer required personnel, and less time
training needs. It is a waste of valuable time required to learn duties and requirements.
to train an individual in subject matter which Training also helps to establish systematic
he has already mastered, and it is a source of and uniform work habits. An effective
dissatisfaction to the man when he is sub- program helps to create better attitudes
jected to instruction that he knows is not and morale.
164
9-10 Basic Training apprehension, search and seizure, and the

use of force.
a. Military police personnel as- (3) Location and use of first aid and fire
signed to physical security assignments, as a control equipment and electrical
minimum, have completed basic training and switches.
advanced individual training. Dependent on
their experience, they may need special (4) Duties in event of emergencies, such
training in physical security or only such as alerts, fire, explosion, civil disturbance,
additional training as required by the pecu- etc.
liarities of the installation. (5) Common forms of sabotage and
b. As a minimum, personnel (including espionage activity.
civil service security personnel) who have not (6) Location of hazardous and vulner-
had security police training should receive able equipment and materiel.
training at their assigned units or agencies in
their security duties, to include:
c. Army Training and Evaluation Pro-
gram (ARTEP 19-97).
(1) Care and use of weapons. No man
should be placed on security duty unless he
has completed at least familiarization d. Special training to fit individual
firing within the past 12 months with the situations may be required at installations
weapon with which he is armed. Weapons where security duties are unusually varied or
training must also include thorough indoc- complex. Key personnel should be chosen to
trination and understanding of the provi- attend specialized security courses available
sions of AR 190-28, concerning the use of at the US Army Military Police School/
force by law enforcement and security Training Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama;
personnel. or specialized oversea command courses.
Extension courses covering physical security
(2) Area of responsibility and author- subject matter are also available for
it y of security personnel, particularly on all personnel on a self-study basis from
165
ACCP, US Army Training Support Center, (3) Present a consolidated picture of the
Newport News, VA 23628. security force training status.
(4) Helps certify guard personnel.
9-11 In-service Training
9-13 Security Force Duties—
a. When a new individual is as- MOS 95B10
signed, he must be given instruction in
conditions peculiar to his post. Whenever Duties vary with the requirements of
possible, his first assignment should be with an installation, facility, or activity. Security
an experienced man. Additional in-service forces achieve their purpose by a combina-
training and periodic retraining to review tion of actions consisting principally of those
basic material and such other subjects as outlined here:
may be applicable to the specific installation (1) Performs security foot, static, and
is a continuous requirement for training motorized patrol.
supervisors.
(2) Detects violations of laws, regulations,
b. Scheduling classes for nonmilitary-type and orders.
security forces is often difficult. It is often
impossible to assemble an entire security (3) Applies crime prevention measures.
force or even a complete shift at any one time (4) Searches suspects.
to participate. As a result, the supervisor of
training must take care to provide an opportu- (5) Employs unarmed self-defense mea-
nity for each man to receive the training he sures.
needs. (6) Prepares military police security re-
ports.
9-12 Evaluation of Training (7) Provides security for designated indi-
viduals, installation, and equipment.
a. Using tests or examinations (FM (8) Employs intrusion detection sensors
21-6) to evaluate performance is a necessary and devices.
step in the training program. These tests,
which may be oral, written, or a type of (9) Controls entry and exits to facilities
performance test, should be given at least and vital areas.
once a year to determine that high standards (10) Deters pilferage, damage, and loss of
of proficiency are achieved and maintained supplies and equipment.
by the entire force. A testing program also
aids in improving training by: (11) Performs as a security guard during
air movement operations and ground con-
(1) Discovering gaps in learning. voys .
(2) Emphasizing main points. (12) Participates in civil disturbance oper-
(3) Evaluating instructional methods. ations as a member of
(a) Crowd control formation
b. Security training received by personnel (b) Patrol of disturbed area
at their units should be entered in unit (c) Special reaction team(s).
training charts or records. This record helps
to: (13) Employs civil disturbance munitions
(1) Indicate individual degrees of skill. and equipment.
(2) Establish priorities of instruction. (14) Collects security police intelligence.
166
(15) Administers first aid. nage, sabotage, or other criminal acts).
(16) Employs individual and crew-served (29) Generally safeguards information,
weapons. materials, or equipment against espio-
nage, sabotage, unauthorized access, loss,
(17) Operates radio equipment.
theft, and damage.
(18) Operates wheeled and tracked vehi-
(30) Operates and enforces regulatory
cles.
traffic controls and procedures to aid in the
(19) Conducts rear area security opera- smooth flow of traffic and to prevent or
tions and activities, as appropriate. reduce the number of accidents.
(20) Operates and enforces the system of (31) Performs such other security duties
personnel identification and movement outside the installation or facility as may
control. be required, such as port and harbor
security, loading/unloading operations
(21) Observes and patrols designated
perimeters, areas, structures, and activi- aboard ships, security escort on lines of
ties of security interest. communication, ambush/counterambush
operations, and other duties required by
(22) Observes and patrols areas outside the local situation.
the perimeter, to include operation of
(32) Reports periodically, as a matter of
listening posts, as necessary to provide
prescribed routine under normal condi-
security in depth against enemy attacks or
tions, and as necessary in unusual or
terrorist/guerrilla acts
emergency circumstances.
(23) Apprehends persons attempting or
gaining unauthorized access to any por-
tion of the installation or facility. 9-14 Security Force Duties—
(24) Checks depositories, rooms, or build- MOS 95B20
ings of security interest during other than
normal working hours to determine that a. Leads security troops involving:
they are properly locked and are otherwise
in order. (1) Military police security patrol.
(25) Performs escort duties for materiel or (2) Squad activities.
designated persons when required.
(3) Small security detachment/section
(26) Enforces the established system of operations and actions, plus rear area
control over removal of property and security operations and activities.
documents or material of security interest
from the installation or facility. It maybe b. Assists in coordinating security activi-
necessary for security force personnel to ties with civil police organizations.
establish the system and monitor its opera-
c. Assists in supervising the following:
tion.
(1) The crime prevention program.
(27) Responds to protective alarm signals
or other indications of suspicious activi- (2) Security training.
ties.
(3) Participation in unit employment.
(28) Acts as necessary in situations affect-
(4) Riot and crowd control operations on
ing the security of the installation or
security installations.
facility (including fires, accidents, internal
disorders, and attempts to commit espio- d. Supervises military and civilian guards.
167
e. Helps conduct physical security sur- 9-16 Security Force Duties—
veys. MOS 95B40
f. Inspects and posts military police secu- a. Leads military police security
rity static post guards and motorized patrols. detachment or section of 40 or more positions
or supervises and directs a platoon of 40 or
more positions, and processes security opera-
g. Prepares reports, forms, and records on
tions and intelligence information.
MP security operations and activities.
b. Collects offensive and defensive secu-
rity intelligence information for development
of military police security operations.
9-15 Security Force Duties— c. Supervises and trains personnel in

MOS 95B30 military police security operations and intelli-
gence activities.
Leads military police security sec-
tion or large squad and supervises a platoon d. Monitors the unit’s crime prevention
with less than 40 positions. program.
a. Assists in: e. Assists in coordination and implemen-

tation of military police.
(1) Planning
Security operations
(2) Organizing Training programs
(3) Directing Administrative matters, and
Communication activities.
(4) Supervising
(5) Training f. Assists in production and administra-
tion of
(6) Coordinating
• Security staff journals
(7) Reporting activities of subordinate • Files, records, and security reports.
elements.
g. Assists in planning rear area security
operations, as appropriate.
b. Supervises and directs receipt, storage,
and distribution of:
(1) Weapons
(2) Ammunition
9-17 Security Force Duties—
(3) Supplies MOS 95B50
(4) Equipment, and
a. Supervises physical security du-
(5) Food to subordinate elements. ties of 95B50 security personnel.
b. Serves as principal noncommissioned

c. Directs execution of the unit’s crime officer in a military police physical security
prevention program. company.
168
c. Supervises the progress of security (7) Performs other logistical, administra-
operations and intelligence information at tive, maintenance, and training duties as
battalion or higher level. assigned.
d. Interprets, supervises, and monitors

execution of company administrative, logisti- b. Law Enforcement Officer (Security
cal, maintenance, training, limited rear area Unit Commander) duties:
security, and tactical policy and SOP.
(1) Commands, directs, controls, and mon-
itors unit military police physical security
e. Monitors and inspects duties performed operations and functions.
by subordinate enlisted personnel.
(2) Directly insures that a safe and secure
physical security environment is provided
f. Prepares security charts, reports, and for sensitive and critical equipment, facili-
related documents and material. ties, items, lines of communication, and
government officials.
g. Plans the unit’s crime prevention pro- (3) Plans and monitors implementation of
gram. physical security surveys and inspections
involving the unit’s mission.
(4) Coordinates with supporting investi-
gative units concerning illegal activities.
9-18 Security Duties—Officer (5) Coordinates with local, US, and allied
law enforcement agencies, as appropriate,
a. Law Enforcement Officer to insure a total integrated security effort
(Security Platoon Leader) duties:
during routine and emergency operations.
(1) Leads, supervises, directs, and moni-
(6) Coordinates with the local provost
tors enlisted military police security marshal to insure that local military police
guards and supervisors in the execution of law enforcement support is performed in
assigned security duties. nonrestricted depot and installation areas.
(2) Helps insure that adequate security is (7) Insures that a unit crime prevention
provided to critical equipment, facilities, program is designed and implemented.
items, lines of communication, and govern-
ment officials. (8) Assists the security officer, when
applicable, in preparation of security
(3) Assists in planning and coordinating
plans, policies, and SOPs, and performs
physical security surveys and inspections
the necessary security inspection of
involving the unit’s physical security
guards, equipment, alert procedures, and
mission.
sensitive areas and facilities.
(4) Assists in planning and implementing
(9) Insures all unit personnel are properly
the unit’s physical security operations and
trained for daily security operations and
activities.
physical security inspections and techni-
(5) Helps develop the unit’s crime preven- cal security inspections by higher head-
tion program. quarters.
(6) Performs the duties of convoy security (10) Insures the unit is prepared to partici-
officer and participates in limited rear area pate in limited rear area security opera-
security operations. tions as appropriate.
169
153-846 O - 94 - 9
mentation and supervision of:
Recommended Qualifications (a) Depot access control.
For Law Enforcement Officer (b) Material/vehicle control.
(c) ID/badge systems.
Completion of the Military Police (d) Vehicle registration.
Officer Advanced Course, or (e) Security clearance initiation on all
Appropriate subcourse of the Army depot employees.
Correspondence Course Program Mili- (f) Security information programs.
tary Police Officer Advanced Course, or (g) Accident/incident investigations.
Completion of resident physical secu- (h) Traffic control–routine and spe-
rity training at the US Army Military cial.
Police School/Training Center, or (i) Law enforcement and related func-
Equivalent training or experience. tions.
(j) Conduct of physical security inspec-
tions.
(k) Security patrolling.
c. Physical Security Officer (Manager)
(l) Conduct of a depot security aware-
duties. If a depot/installation or activity is so
ness program.
configured by TDA that a separate security
(m) Operational security.
officer is assigned in addition to a security
(n) Computer security.
unit commander, the security officer per-
(o) Security guard/supervisor train-
forms the following duties:
ing.
(1) Responsible for continual review and (p) Security guard/supervisor weapons
update of the physical security plan. security.
(2) Conducts inspections of on-duty guard (q) Guard communications equipment
personnel, IDS equipment, SOPs, alert security.
procedures, safety equipment, and sensi- (r) Security of vital areas.
tive areas and facilities. (s) Screening employment applica-
tions.
(3) Coordinates continually with: (t) Contingency plans.
FBI
CID (3) Directly responsible for logistical,
Local PM maintenance and administrative support,
MI operational education and training of:
DAFE Three 50-man guard force branches
Local police Intelligence/investigation branches.
State/county police.
d. Depot Security Officer duties: 9-19 Security Force

Instructions
(1) Performs liaison with:
a. Will be in writing and made
•CID available to each guard.
•MI
•Local police
b. They are normally in one of the follow-
•Local PM ing forms:
•FBI
•State/county police General instructions
Special instructions
(2) Responsible for development, imple- Temporary instructions.
170
c. Reviewed at least monthly. •Organization
•Authority
d. Security force manual must be made •Functions.
available for required reading by each mem-
e. Periodic inspection and examination of
ber and cover the following:
each individual’s degree of security, skill and
•Operating procedures knowledge must be exercised by each appro-
•Policy establishment priate supervisor.
Supervision and Management Section IV
9-20 Supervision ratio may be higher than at very large

installation.
a. A security supervisor has the (1) There must be sufficient supervision to
task of overseeing and directing the work and enable the inspection of each post and
behavior of other members of the security patrol twice per shift, plus sufficient
force. Effective supervision requires a com- backup supervisory personnel to provide
plete understanding of the principles of for sick and annual leave.
leadership and how to apply them so as to
obtain maximum performance from members (2) It is also essential that supervisors be
of his force. in contact with security headquarters to
control emergencies that may arise.
b. The supervisor is called upon to think
and act in terms of many different jobs. He is (3) Specific duties of a supervisor include
often responsible for the selection, induction, the inspection and briefing of the relief
training, productivity, safety, morale, and shift prior to its going on duty, and the
advancement of the members of the force. He inspection of posts, vehicles, and equip-
must understand these and all other employment during visits to posts and patrols.
ment aspects of his force.
9-21 Responsibilities
c. To maintain an alert, presentable, and To Management
efficient security force, there must be con-
stant and constructive supervision. Supervi- a. The physical security supervisor
sors must be in evidence, and they must is responsible to management for the develop-
conduct themselves as models of neatness, ment of a security-minded organization. This
fair play, efficiency, and loyalty. The morale program is greatly enhanced by a well-
and efficiency of a security force is a direct organized security education program.
reflection of the quality of its supervision.
b. The role of the physical security supervi-
d. The ratio of supervisory personnel to sor puts him in a position of advising on the
security personnel should be determined by formulation of policies for the physical
the individual characteristics of each instal- security of an installation. His goals should
lation. In small compact installations, the be the accomplishment of the assigned
171
mission at the lowest possible cost consistent have knowledge of his job and the principles
with the commander’s policy. It is well for all involved, and the ability to teach these
physical security planners to remember that principles to his subordinates. All of these
anyone can provide adequate security with qualities help greatly in building confidence
unlimited funds; however, this is not a among his personnel and securing their
realistic approach. There must be a constant cooperation. Specific techniques for securing
endeavor to effect justifiable economy wher- cooperation include the following:
ever possible without jeopardizing the physi- (1) Each person should be made to feel his
cal security program. job is an important one.
(2) Each person should be given an oppor-
tunity to express his thoughts, likes, and
9-22 Supervisor’s Relationship interests to the supervisor.
To The Security Force
(3) Supervision should be based on indi-
Supervisors should strive to create vidual needs.
and maintain a loyal force with high morale.
(4) Supervisors should recognize achieve-
Following are some of the means by which ment. For example, a security man of the
this may be accomplished: month program may be implemented, with
a. Proper training and supervision. appropriate reward for outstanding effort
or achievement.
b. Direction of the security force in an
(5) Personnel may be recommended for
objective business-like manner while exercis-
advancement for outstanding effort or
ing consideration for the personal welfare of
achievement.
security force members.
(6) The supervisor should maintain an
c. Application of basic principles of human attitude of impartiality in dealing with his
relations. The effective supervisor must know subordinates.
that there will be individual differences
among members of his security force. He f. An effective supervisor develops good
should be guided by the principle that discipline by establishing rules that are just,
subordinates are motivated indifferent ways; complete, easy to administer, and easy to
ambition can be stirred or pride hurt by his understand. If a supervisor needs to take
regard, or lack of it, for their welfare and corrective action involving his security force,
feelings. A good supervisor must understand it may only call for “setting a man straight,”
the needs and desires of each member of his which is a recommended technique for
force. He is their representative and they supervisors to consider. Types of situations in
should be made to feel that he is the one with which verbal corrective action should be
whom they can talk and discuss their considered are:
problems, on a personal basis. (1) When the deficiency is due to lack of
knowledge or training. (This must be
d. A good supervisor develops depth in his
followed by appropriate training.)
security force so that continuity of operations
is assured. He can develop depth by rotation (2) When the error is trivial.
of assignments, cross-training in varied
(3) When the action is a first offense.
duties, etc.
(4) When it is due to old habits. (These
e. A good supervisor has the reputation of must be corrected.)
being honest, considerate, and willing to
listen to both sides of a grievance. He must g. Under some circumstances the supervi-
172
Profile of an Effective Supervisor
sor may need to take constructive discipli- (2) In cases of flagrant or willful violation
nary action. Occasions for this might be: of installation or security rules.
(1) When verbal corrective action has (3) When loss, damage, or hazard is
failed. caused through negligence.
173
h. Disciplinary action should be handled sonal supervision, or to supplant personal
calmly, in private surroundings, and the supervision at installations with small secu-
supervisor should have full knowledge of the rity forces. These systems provide in-
facts. If punitive action is called for, the stantaneous supervision, plus a means of
UCMJ, or pertinent civilian personnel regula- detecting interferences with normal security
tions covering probation and discharge, activities and initiating an investigation or
should be consulted. It is well to remember other appropriate action.
that these are serious actions and should be c. All personnel on security duty should be
taken only when all other measures have required to report periodically to headquar-
failed. The supervisor should bear in mind the ters by the usual means of communication.
requirements for documented proof of events The frequency of such reports will vary,
and actions leading to the necessity for depending on a number of factors, including
disciplinary action. When the decision has the importance of the installation. Regularity
been reached as to the propriety of probation should be avoided, to preclude setting a
or reprimand, further action should be pattern by which an intruder can gauge an
pursued vigorously and without fear of appropriate time for entrance.
reprisal or seemingly excessive administra-
tive burden. (For further discussion on
military leadership principles, see FM 22- 9-24 Security Force Problems
100.)
a. Assignment to a unit with physi-
cal security functions is not always looked
9-23 Supplements upon with favor by military police, many of
To Personal Supervision whom prefer serving with a unit having
broad general MP functions or requirements.
Various means and devices may be b. The nature of security force operations
successfully used as supplements to personal poses some morale problems that do not
supervision or, in the case of small installa- normally confront other personnel. The
tions or remote areas, to supplant personal security force is required to be effective at all
supervision as a means of assuring that times, regardless of the weather, day, and
necessary areas are patrolled and other hour. This necessitates duty hours on week-
functions performed. These include the fol- ends, holidays, and night—hours usually
lowing: considered nonduty time. These circum-
stances produce problems in living for both
a. Recorded tour systems, under which the individual and his family, problems that
personnel record their patrols or presence at tend to lessen enthusiasm for the job. There is
strategic points throughout an installation a direct relation between quality of perfor-
by use of portable watch clocks, central watch mance and morale that forces consideration
clock stations, or other similar devices. These of these problems. The problem can be mini-
are effective means of insuring that such mized by implementation of the following
points are regularly covered, and have steps:
application at most installations and facili-
ties. This system provides an after-the-fact (1) Maintain high standards of discipline.
type of supervision. (2) Promote an aggressive security educa-
b. Supervisory tour systems by which a tion program to insure that each man
signal is transmitted to a manned central clearly understands the importance of his
headquarters at the time the tour station is job. Each man must be made to understand
visited. These have application at a limited the consequence of any breach of protec-
number of installations to supplement per- tive barriers. Each man should understand
174
that the human element in security opera- c. If both military and civilian security
tions makes the difference between success forces are used at an installation or activity,
and failure. the provost marshal or physical security
manager should insure equality of treatment
(3) Arrange shifts so that personnel peri- for members of the entire force. Any instruc-
odically have a 48-hour period free from tions or corrective action should be passed to
shift requirements.
appropriate supervisors for dissemination to
(4) Consider shift rotation as one solution the security force.
to boredom. However, there are advan-
tages and disadvantages to be considered d. At installations or facilities where
on the question of rotation of individuals security force personnel are posted at exits/
from shift to shift. An advantage of entrances or at other internal posts to control
permanent shift assignment is that each the movement of traffic, they do not merely
shift presents its own problems in security, stand guard. Such personnel check transpor-
and if the man is permanently assigned he tation movement documentation against
is able to learn these peculiarities and is actual loads on trucks. They check for hidden
able to cope with them more efficiently. contraband, pilfered property or goods, au-
Another advantage of regular assignment thorization for access onto or within the
to the same shift is that the physical facility/installation, and safety violations.
welfare of the man requires that he work They conduct searches and seizures when
regular hours and establish regular habits authorized, and enforce regulations and
of eating and sleeping. The major disad- assist visitors, as appropriate. People en-
vantage of being permanently assigned to gaged in the performance of worthwhile
one shift is that some shifts are considered duties do not become bored. When personnel
very undesirable from the standpoint of are required to either stand or walk post
hours of work, and if assignments are merely as guards, especially in an oversea
made permanent, the same personnel will environment, they must be checked fre-
be working the same undesirable hours. quently for alertness.This requires aggres-
sive and imaginative supervision, vulnerabil-
(5) The transfer of a man from one shift to ity tests, greater frequency in change of
another could be considered a reward, shifts, and even the rotation of personnel
since the working hours of some shifts are from one post to another within shifts to
more desirable than others. For better combat boredom created by unchallenging
operation, the integrity of the shift should duties.
be maintained as a unit. In this way, each
man learns the abilities and limitations of e. Continuous endeavors should be made
the others, and is able to function much by physical security supervisors to provide
more efficiently as a member of a coordi- the best conditions possible and to maintain
nated team. an aggressive program to develop a high
(6) Establish good recreational facilities state of morale and esprit de corps among
at appropriate locations along with an security force members.
organized athletic program, as this helps
considerably in the development of loyalty,
pride, and enthusiasm for the unit or
installation.
9-25 Uniforms
(7) When practicable, hot food should be
provided to men going on post and those a. All security force personnel
coming off, as this is a definite morale should be required to wear the complete
factor. prescribed uniform as outlined in AR 670-10
175
(for civilian personnel), AR 670-5, and FM 19- course of official duty (and then only when
5 for military police and other security authorized by proper authority). When not in
personnel. Deviations from the prescribed use, weapons must be secured in arms racks
uniform requirements should not be made or storage rooms as prescribed by AR 190-11.
except for such additional items of wear as
are necessary to protect the health, comfort, b. Control of weapons used by security
and safety of the individual. force personnel on duty must comply with AR
190-11. Procedures should be established for
b. The duty uniform should be worn during the control and accountability of weapons at
all tours of duty. Normally, it may be worn all times.
during off-duty hours only between the place
of residence and place of duty. c. Inspection of weapons should be
conducted at the beginning and end of each
c. Each member of the security force tour of duty, and at such other times as
should maintain high standards of personal necessary to insure proper maintenance and
and uniform appearance, and should wear a to determine if the weapon has been dis-
neat, clean, and well-pressed uniform. charged. A written report should be prepared
and filed on the discharge of any weapon
except for authorized and supervised train-
ing. Such report should be prepared by the
individual to whom the weapon was issued at
9-26 Vehicles the time it was discharged. Appropriate
action should be taken in those instances
The security force should be fur- when it is determined that the discharge of a
nished with sufficient vehicles to maintain weapon was not in the performance of
patrol standards established by the installa- assigned duties, or when it was the result of
tion commander. Vehicles assigned to the negligence.
force should be equipped with two-way radios
to obtain the greatest possible use of all d. Weapons for emergency use. In
personnel and vehicles. Vehicles should be addition to the use of individual weapons,
marked as prescribed in AR 746-1. security force personnel should be furnished
weapons as needed to sustain the security
force in the event of an emergency, riot, or
other disturbance. Weapons in this category
9-27 Firearms should be properly secured as indicated
above, maintained at strategic points, and
a. Weapons. Security force person- kept in readiness for issue when appropriate.
nel should be appropriately armed at all times
while on duty. Normally, the weapon of issue e. Ammunition supplies for security
to civilians will be either the revolver, cal. 38, force use must be maintained in secured
or pistol, cal. 45. However, the commander storage containers, as outlined for weapons,
may prescribe other weapons for the security to prevent unauthorized access. Ammunition
force, based on need and requirements. must be issued only under proper supervision
Weapons normally are loaded with live for authorized purposes. Ammunition issued
ammunition, except where prohibited for to members of the security force for any
safety reasons. The use of privately owned purpose must be accounted for by individual
weapons while on duty should not be author- members immediately upon completion of the
ized. Weapons and ammunition issued to period or purpose for which issued. Any
security force personnel should not be re- ammunition unaccounted for will be the
moved from the installation except in the subject of a report of its disposition by the
176
individual in the same manner as for weap- tion. The types of deception which may be
ons (a, preceding page). used are almost unlimited.
b. Test Objectives:
9-28 Signal Items (1) A vulnerability test provides the com-
mander an estimate of the vulnerability of
The security force should be his installation or facility; tests the effec-
equipped with radio transmitters/receivers, tiveness of the security force and other
both vehicle-mounted and portable, and personnel; alerts personnel to the tech-
telephones for expeditious transmission of niques that could be used by an intruder;
reports and instructions between security and provides material for corrective in-
headquarters, posts, and patrols. This equip struction.
ment is considered essential for the efficient
operation of the security force and the (2) Specifically the test should examine:
accomplishment of its assigned mission. (a) Improper enforcement of identifica-
Proper use and care by security personnel will tion and control procedures by security
enhance equipment usefulness and capabil- personnel, such as failure to:
ity.
● Determine authority for entry.
● Scrutinize identification media. The
9-29 Miscellaneous Equipment ways of using fake credentials to deceive
security forces are numerous. The only
way to detect such trickery is to know the
Security managers or supervisors details of each type of access credentials
should obtain such other equipment as may
and to examine them thoroughly. Secu-
be necessary to implement their security
rity tests and inspections have indicated
program. Items in this category may include,
that unauthorized persons have been
but are not limited to, warning lights, sirens,
granted access to restricted areas by
and spotlights for vehicles, portable lights,
altering or forging passes, by faking
flashlights, first aid kits; traffic control
identification by telephone, and by
devices; and items of wear for the health,
playing upon the sympathy of security
comfort, or safety of security personnel.
personnel with excuses.
● Ascertain identity.
● Detain unauthorized persons.
9-30 Vulnerability Tests
● Conduct immediate preliminary
search of suspects.
a. Because of the routine, repeti- ● Enforce security procedures.
tious nature and solitude of many security ● Report security violations.
requirements, personnel must make special
efforts to overcome a tendency to relax in (b) Susceptibility or gullibility of secu-
their performance of duties. To check on this rity personnel to plausible stories by
weakness and keep personnel aware of their intruders or members of the security
responsibilities, and as a means of pointing force and other personnel of the installa-
out other weaknesses in the security system, tion. This inclination to believe, on
vulnerability tests may be used. These tests slight evidence, an individual who may
are normally designed by the provost mar- be attempting to gain unauthorized
shal or the physical security manager, and access to a restricted area is the product
consists of attempts to breach security in one of two factors: monotony, and a desire to
way or another, such as entering or attempt- save time. In the busy activity of
ing to enter a restricted area through decep- individuals who are authorized access to
177
a restricted area, it is easy for security (e) The cover story should originate
personnel to be deceived by slight with the provost marshal or physical
evidence. The monotony of verifying security manager. A well-contrived
hundreds of access credentials which cover story is necessary. It should sound
are valid can dull the sensitivity to convincing to provide an adequate test
detect one which is invalid. Many of the security force.
attempts to deceive security personnel (4) Obtain appropriate material for test-
involve false credentials, assumed rank, ing. This may include:
or falsely marked vehicles.
(a) Clothing appropriate to assumed
(c) Unauthorized disclosure of informa-
identity.
tion by members of the security force
(b) Props necessary to support cover
and other personnel of the installation.
story.
c. Test Planning and Preparation. De- (c) Tools appropriate to assumed
tailed planning and preparation is a require- identity, such as repairman or plumber.
ment for effective testing of security. Plan- (d) Transportation.
ning should include the following: (e) False or altered credentials.
(f) Simulated sabotage devices (explo-
(1) Plan in secrecy to avoid alerting sives, incendiaries, abrasives, corrosive
installation personnel. Prior knowledge by acids, etc.) to provide realism. These
the security forces or other people produces should meet the following criteria:
invalid test results and thus defeats the
purpose of the test. ● The device should be suitable for the
target.
(2) Establish a priority of targets that ● Device should be the same size and
seem more vulnerable than others. Do not weight as the genuine article.
test the same target on a continous basis. ● The device should be properly labeled
Attempt to test all eligible targets over a as the device which it is simulating.
time. This will keep all personnel alert, ● Simulated time of detonation should
rather than those of only one area. be indicated on the device to simulate
(3) Select qualified people to conduct realism. There is always the possibility y
vulnerability tests. Criteria for personnel that the device will be discovered before
should include: the simulated time of detonation.
● Planting of the device should be
(a) Appropriate security clearances for related to the type of device used. It
all members of the team at the same or should be placed to simulate the greatest
higher classification level of the area or amount of destruction or to achieve the
installation that might be entered. Such desired results.
clearances preclude any compromise of
security interests if a safe is found open d. Test Instructions.
or an area containing classified matter (1) The officer in charge of the test should
is entered. select the method or techniques to be used
(b) Members of the test team should be based on the ability of testing personnel
unknown to members of the security and supporting materials available.
force or other personnel of the installa- (2) This officer should provide for flexibil-
tion or facility. ity in selection of targets. His orientation to
(c) Team members should be capable of team members should include the follow-
quick thinking to adapt to their cover ing instruction:
stories.
(d) Members should be able to bluff in a ■ Exploit any security weakness that
convincing manner. becomes evident during the test.
178
■ Change tactics or take evasive action as bility tests should consider the following
necessary. techniques for infiltration of security areas:
■ Strike targets of opportunity.
(1) Entry through unguarded gates or
(3) Personnel assigned to conduct vulnera- open areas not under observation by
bility tests should be given only such security forces or other personnel.
information concerning the installation or (2) Use of false or altered passes or badges
facility that an outsider would normally
through active gates manned by security
have or could obtain through reasonable
personnel who give only a cursory glance
efforts.
at these credentials.
e. Test Safety. Instructions to test team (3) Entry through areas without presenta-
members should also include safety precaution of identification media.
tions. Test personnel should not: (a) One method is to bypass security
forces by mingling with a work group
(1) Scale barriers of any kind, because the
entering the area.
guards may have instructions to fire.
(b) Another method is to obtain permis-
(2) Forcibly resist apprehension, because sion to enter the area, claiming loss of
of the danger involved. By resisting identification media and using a plausi-
apprehension, personnel will nullify bene- ble story.
fits to be achieved. (c) A third method involves deception
by false representation, whereby a
(3) Use dangerous materials that might member of the vulnerability test team
cause harm to any person involved directly poses as a high-ranking officer or
or indirectly.
civilian dignitary, or as a repairman,
(4) Use any action that might influence installer of equipment, inspector, etc.,
normal operations or safety or equipment who would have legitimate business in
of the installation. the area.
f. Techniques for Infiltration of Secu- g. Neutralization of Escorts. After

rity Areas. Personnel conducting vulnera- making successful entrance to a security
179
area, testers must in many cases, neutralize (3) Test results should be given appropri-
an assigned escort to accomplish the test ate security classification (should be the
mission. Procedures for this include the same as or higher than the security
following: classification of the area). Dissemination
of test results should be rigidly controlled
(1) When operating as a team, use ruses to and limited to those who have the required
divert the escort’s attention. security clearance and a need to know.
(2) Request use of latrine and leave if not
accompanied by escorts.
(3) Devise any other means as opportuni-
ties present themselves. However, no force
should be used to overpower the escort. 9-31 Sentry Dogs
h. Planting Simulated Sabotage De- The requirements for physical pro-
vices. Procedures to follow for planting tection of installations or facilities within the
simulated devices include the following: United States and oversea theaters of opera-
(1) The device should be planted as ap- tions continue to increase, yet the manpower
propriate if access can be gained, in the available for this purpose has always been,
location where it would do the most dam- and probably will continue to be, limited. The
age. sentry dog, properly trained and properly
used, can be a great asset to the physical
(2) Place on any vehicle entering the area. security program of some installations or
(3) The device can be given to authorized facilities and should be considered in develop-
personnel entering the area by using ing an effective crime prevention program.
bribery or coercion, or by secreting it in Use of the dog and posting of conspicuous
their clothing or accessories such as purses signs has been found to be a strong psycho-
or briefcases. logical deterrent to attempted intrusion.
(4) Mail the device to a person or activity a. Mission of the sentry dog is to detect
in the security area. Estimated time of intruders; alert his handler; and when neces-
delivery can be obtained by surveillance of sary, pursue, attack, and hold any intruder
delivery personnel. who tries to escape. Normally, the dog has
done his job when he detects the intruder and
i. Review and Analysis of Vulnerabil- alerts his handler. The handler is then
ity Tests. responsible for taking appropriate action.
(1) Upon completion of vulnerability tests,
b. The sentry dog and handler work as a
results should be reported, preferably in team. Since the outstanding qualifications of
writing. The report should be carefully the sentry dog for security type duties are his
reviewed and analyzed by the provost keen sense of hearing and smell, he is used to
marshal, physical security manager, and most advantage in darkness or poor visibility
others responsible for physical security
when human vision is restricted. Because of
planning. The review and analysis should
the added perception of the handler-dog
provide an evaluation of the physical
patrol, patrol routes can often be lengthened
security program and serve as a basis or
without sacrificing coverage. (FM 19-35
guide for effecting necessary changes.
presents detailed discussion on types of dogs;
(2) Review and analysis of the method and their desirable characteristics; traits and care
procedures used for vulnerability tests of military dogs; basic training; and special-
provide guidance for future tests. ized training.)
180
c. For this manual, only the sentry dog will pipelines, and open storage areas. The dog
be considered. There are, however, situations also tends to keep the man on post more alert,
in which the use of sentry dogs is undesirable give him added self-assurance, and to relieve
or impractical due to their limitations (para- the ever-present monotony and loneliness of
graph i, below). In such situations the use of security duty.
other types of dogs (FM 19-35) should be
g. In addition to a man and dog walking
considered.
post, which is the most common and desired
d. The sentry dog is used on exterior or method, there are other methods of employ-
interior security duty as a watchdog. This ment of dogs. Some of these are:
type of dog is trained to give warning to his (1) Sentry dogs may be used as warehouse
handler by growling or barking, or by silent dogs. Dogs may be placed in warehouses at
alert. He is always worked on a leash. The the close of the day, remain throughout the
handler can depend on the dog to alert him to night, and then be taken out of the
the approach or presence of strangers in or warehouse the next morning. This elimi-
about the area being protected. When the dog nates the necessity of having a guard stay
alerts, the handler must be prepared to cope with the dog all through the night, only
with the situation as circumstances dictate. requiring a roving patrol to check on the
That is, he must challenge, investigate, presence of the dog. The dog will alert the
remain concealed, or make an apprehension. security force by barking at any attempt by
The dog, being kept on leash and close to the intruders to enter his patrol area.
handler, also helps as a psychological factor
in such circumstances. He will attack upon (2) These dogs also may be used on cables
being released from the leash. which may be extended between two
buildings or areas. The dog is hooked to
e. Sentry dog posts and patrols can be this cable and permitted to run its length.
broken down into three types for reference
(3) Sentry dogs also may be used between
and use. These are:
double fenced areas used primarily around
(1) Perimeter. This type patrol is along exclusion areas. In this situation the dog is
a portion of, or the entire fence line, inside allowed to run between a double fenced
or outside, which may enclose security area that is blocked off every 400 to 500
areas such as tactical aircraft parking yards. The sentry dog will alert his handler
areas, POL storage areas, POL pipeline. if anyone comes near the fence, inside or
and pumping stations, remote transmitter outside.
sites, guided missile sites, radar sites, (4) Such dogs also may be posted in front
special weapons and ammunition storage of entrances to a security area and will
areas, and depot storage areas.
bark when anyone comes close.
(2) Area. This type post is located around
(5) Sentry dogs also may be used in
a group of buildings, or at such places as
vehicles. While this method has not been
launching pads that may be considered
used to any great extent, it has possibilities
critical, but do not justify perimeter posts.
for security force applications.
These posts are used for security in depth.
(3) Specific. Buildings such as ware- h. Proper use of the sentry dog depends
houses or offices which contain valuable or upon the existing situation and results
highly classified materials. desired; but normally the handler/dog
patrol is the most effective method of employ-
f. The sentry dog patrol is especially ment. Regardless of how the sentry dog is
effective in areas of little activity such as used, the mere knowledge by potential intrud-
isolated perimeters, remote storage areas, ers that dogs are on duty in the area has a
181
great psychological effect and often is a (4) Kennels and training areas must be
deterrent in itself. A vicious dog is often more isolated and kept off limits to unauthorized
feared by intruders than an armed guard. persons. Signs should be posted warning of
i. The sentry dog is a very versatile animal; the presence of sentry dogs. In oversea
however, he does have some limitations with areas, these signs should be bilingual.
respect to type of assignment. The odor of
(5) Care and maintenance of sentry dogs
petroleum products decreases the effective-
must be considered in manpower require-
ness of his sense of smell. Noise is a definite
ments. To maintain the physical fitness
limitation, as it decreases his sense of
required of sentry dogs, periodic services of
hearing. Activity near a sentry dog post is
a veterinarian are necessary. This often
also another limitation, as it tends to distract
poses a problem at small or isolated
the dog. installations or facilities. Special facilities
j. Advantages of Sentry Dogs: are required for care and training of sentry
dogs, which adds to the initial expense of
(1) Presence of sentry dogs provide a very
adding dogs to the security program.
strong psychological deterrent to intrud-
ers. (6) The selection and training of handler
personnel must be carefully accomplished.
(2) Use of dogs is beneficial where security The qualities of a handler dictate, to a great
forces have been reduced.
extent, the effectiveness of the sentry dog.
(3) The dog’s keen sense of smell and Volunteers and persons who like and
hearing enable him to detect the presence understand dogs are not always available
of danger and to alert his handler. as handlers. There will be some morale
problem among the handlers as most of the
(4) Safety is a consideration. There is less
work is at night and, in addition to security
chance of a fatality through the release of a
duty, they are normally required to care for
dog than through firing a weapon at an
intruder. and train their assigned dogs.
(7) Public relations must be considered
(5) The dog’s ability to detect/apprehend
when planning for the use of dogs. There is
intruders during hours of darkness is a
strong feeling on the part of many persons
definite advantage.
that using dogs for security or police
(6) A dog is more effective than a man purposes is uncivilized.
during inclement weather. This type of
(8) Although these problem areas must be
weather offers ideal conditions for illegal
considered, care should be exercised that
entry.
the value of the sentry dog, especially in a
theater of operations, is not underesti-
k. Disadvantages of Sentry Dogs:
mated. Any method of reinforcing avail-
able manpower, whether it be weapon,
(1) Attrition and turnover of personnel
machine, or animal should be carefully
trained as handlers reduces the efficiency
appraised. Certainly the capabilities of a
of the dog program.
man will increase in scope when aug-
(2) A break-in period is necessary to mented by a properly trained sentry dog.
facilitate man and dog working as a team. The sentry dog, used with other physical
This results in many nonproductive hours. safeguards, can be invaluable to the
commander’s physical security program.
(3) The type of dog best suited for security
work is naturally dangerous. Care must be (9) AR 190-12 provides additional detailed
taken that innocent persons are not hurt by guidance on all aspects of the sentry dog
the dogs. program.
182
Chapter 10
Port and Harbor Terminal

Security
T heft and pilferage of cargo are

extremely serious problems in terminal
operations. A seemingly insignificant bit of
laxness insecurity operations and procedures
may provide a clever thief an opening to steal
as much as a loaded container.
Physical protection requirements are the
same in terminal areas as in warehouse and
open storage areas. The need for personnel
identification and control is, if anything,
183
greater. Many of the problems encountered or vulnerable because of extensive distance and
physical security procedures and techniques exposed beach or pier areas.
used in storage and intransit security (ARs
190-11, 50-5) are equally applicable in termi- Terminal areas may include modem piers
nals. and warehouses, or may be an unimproved
beach on which logistics-over-the-short
There are, however, some different and (LOTS) or roll-on/roll-off (RORO) operations
frequently more demanding aspects of physi- are conducted. The water-side may be any-
cal security due to the very nature of a thing from a broad and deep harbor to a
terminal. The exposure to pilferage and narrow and shallow river, either of which
sabotage is intensified and broadened be- may be under constant or intermittent enemy
cause ports and harbors are prime targets for attack, either open or covert. All of these
enemy and criminal activities, plus the elements contribute to problems especially
perimeter areas of these activities are more attendant to physical security of terminals.
Frequently Overlooked Functions Section I
10-1 Military Police that must be considered in this determina-

Participation tion include characteristics of the:
■ Ship.
a. There are three important func- ■ Ship’s cargo.
tions in terminal operations in which the ■ Capabilities of the terminal.
physical security aspects are frequently ■ Capabilities of the land transportation
overlooked and military police participation system.
is not always sought. Provost marshals and
military police commanders should be partic- (a) Military police interest includes
ularly aware of these functions, and should advance determination and planning
seek out all opportunities to participate in for the provision of MP support required
them. They are ship destination meetings, during unloading/debarkation opera-
boarding parties, and reconnaissance and tions while the ship is in port.
site selection in LOTS operations. (b) A most important item for determi-
nation at this time is the nature of the
cargo-whether it is dangerous or haz-
(1) Ship destination meetings. Ships, ardous, sensitive, or highly susceptible
especially those en route to a theater of to pilferage. This information should be
operations, usually sail from their ports of used to determine the amount and types
origin with only a tentative destination, of MP support required, and for briefing
since it is not always possible to determine all persons assigned.
the most desirable point of discharge until
the ship arrives in the theater. The final (2) Boarding parties. When the ship’s
destination is determined at a ship’s manifest and cargo disposition instruc-
destination meeting conducted by the tions have been received, plans are made
appropriate commander. Many factors for unloading. Before any movement or
184
unloading begins, a boarding party goes should be included in these meetings
aboard to inspect the cargo and its manner and functions to determine the support
of stowage, and to check on troop units or need for:
individuals to be debarked. This boarding
party is normally led by the terminal ● Traffic control operations
operations officer. A military police repre- ● Security of the pier and dock
sentative should be included, to obtain ● Beach security
information necessary for planning for MP ● Convoy escorts and route selection
support (such as hatch and/or deck ● Other MP activities.
guards, patrol boat escorts for lighters,
etc.) and to observe, or receive reports on, b. Another activity in which the military
any indications of pilferage or sabotage of police should be represented is the daily
cargo en route. review of ships in port and en route. (This
review may be conducted as a part of the
(3) Reconnaissance and site selection ship’s destination meeting, or it may be
in LOTS operations. Logistics-over-the- separate.)
shore (LOTS) operations require selection
of suitable sites, based initially on a study (1) Progress in unloading/loading of each
ship is reviewed so that an estimate can be
of maps and hydrographic charts and
made of clearance of a ship from the port
analysis of aerial reconnaissance reports
and its replacement by another.
by the terminal group or brigade com-
mander. (2) Reviews may also be made of any
factors that would affect plans previously
(a) Final determination is based on made at ship’s destination meetings, such
detailed ground and water reconnais- as the necessity to reschedule a ship due to
sance by representatives of the engineer, the nature of its cargo, delay en route, or
signal, amphibious and landing craft similar factors. All such reviews will
units, and others as required. provide information essential to the provi-
(b) Military police representation sion of adequate military police support.
Responsibilities and Functions Section ll
10-2 Who’s Responsible terminal to departure, either inbound or

outbound.
a. The entire responsibility for a US
Army terminal is that of the transportation b. The provost marshal, military po-
lice commander, or military police physi-
terminal commander. He is responsible
for: cal security staff officer, assigned or
attached to the terminal advises, recom-
■ Safety and security of the entire terminal. mends, and assists in preparation of physical
■ Personnel assigned to, passing through, or security plans and implementing directives.
working within the terminal. He also either commands or supervises
■ Security of all cargo from time of arrival in security guard forces assigned to the terminal
185
(military and civilian), and participates in badges, observe longshoremen, keep on the
the coordination of all security and defense alert for evidence of pilferage or tampering,
activities of the terminal (tactical and nontac- and assist or relieve other guards. Pier guards
tical). watch for small boats approaching the
wharves. They check for proper identification
of persons on board who desire to enter the
10-3 Terminal Areas Defined pier or to board any vessel docked at the pier.
These guards should have ready access to
A terminal is composed of a number firefighting equipment and should maintain
of distinct, although correlated, areas, such constant vigilance for fires under piers and
as storage areas (covered and open), piers heavy accumulations of oil next to pilings.
(land and water sides), beach or shore areas, They should not, however, fight fires at the
entrances/exits, anchorage areas, and ships expense of their security duties, but take only
tied up at piers. It may also include POL emergency measures while awaiting fire-
discharge points, pipelines, and POL storage fighting crews. Fires are sometimes started to
areas. distract security personnel.
e. Offshore guards, on stationary or walk-

10-4 Water Terminal ing posts, cover the harbor or stream end of
wharves. They watch for trespassers in boats.
Guard Force They notify the officer of the day or the
The guard force is the key to success- sergeant of the guard of the approach or a
ful security. cargo vessel so that gangplank and ship
guards will be on hand when the vessel docks.
a. Guard posts are motorized, stationary,
or walking, depending on the type of supplies
and cargo on the wharves, types of ships, and f. Gangplank guards control longshore-
men, terminal personnel, crew, and ship
location and nature of the posts.
handlers boarding and leaving a vessel.
b. Gate guards check passes and badges of
all individuals entering or leaving the termi-
g. Hatch guards are posted as required in
nal facilities; issue and check badges of cargo hatches where longshoremen load or
authorized persons entering or leaving re- unload cargo. Requirement is based on the
stricted areas in the terminal, such as piers, nature, value, or sensitivity of the cargo.
wharf sheds, vessels, and ammunition areas;
search bundles and packages being taken (1) Hatch guards stay on the same level as
from the area; examine trip tickets and workmen, when possible, and report on
documentation of cargo vehicles; control damaged cargo and evidence of pilferage
vehicle, railroad, and pedestrian traffic; and
and sabotage. They must be alert for any
direct persons without proper passes to the attempts to divert, or “frustrate” cargo by
identification section.
changing destination markings. Damaged
cargo must beset aside and guarded until it
c. Pier and beach guards may be assigned can be delivered to the terminal recooper-
to stationary posts to guard certain cargo
age section for repair.
areas, or they may be assigned to walking
posts. (2) Hatch guards must also coordinate
with guards on deck to prevent dropping of
d. Pier guards check passes and/or cargo over the side of the ship.
186
10-5 Pier Security (1) Patrol boats should be sufficiently
narrow of beam to enable passage between
The landward side of a pier can be the pilings when inspecting the underside
protected by fencing and pass control; but the of piers.
part of the pier that protrudes over the water
cannot be protected in this manner. Not only (2) Patrols walking along the end of the
is this part of the pier accessible from the pier may be used separately or with boat
sides and end, but also from the underside. patrols.
Methods for securing the pier along its water (3) All patrols should observe all debris
boundaries are as follows: floating on the water, as floating mines are
sometimes delivered in this manner.
■ Patrols
■ Protective lighting b. Protective lighting in the working
■ Booms area of piers should be adapted to construc-
■ Nets. tion and work needs. Slips and underpier
areas should be lighted sufficiently to give
night protection. Lights under a pier can
a. Patrols in small boats should be used in usually be affixed to pilings close to the pier
pier areas to prevent unauthorized small craft flooring. Wiring and fixtures in this area
from operating in adjacent waters and to should be waterproof to insure safety in case
recover jettisoned cargo (figure 69). of unusually high tides (chapter 6).
Figure 69—Pier security patrol boats should be able to move between pilings.
187
Figure 70—Example of boom and cable net protection.
c. Booms. Under certain circumstances it b. Category I civilians are subject to US

may be advisable to close off the waterside of military police authority.
a pier area by the use of booms (figure 70). A
floating boom will prevent entry of small c. US military police exercise apprehen-
boats. To deny underwater access, a cable net sion and detention authority over Category I
must be suspended from the boom. An civilians. Military police exercise this author-
adaptation of the barrier described in chapter ity on a US Government installation or on
5 may be used. US-controlled property or in combat areas
and facilities under US control for offenses
committed thereon or for protection of human
life or property.
10-6 US Merchant Seamen
And MP Authority d. US-operated ports are considered facili-
ties under US control. This includes vessels
a. US civilians manning ships di- moored or anchored.
rectly operated by a US agency, or any US
civilian employed by a private business firm e. US military police are authorized to
(foreign or US) under contract to one of the board a US Flag vessel to protect American
military department to support military citizens, US property or the US Flag vessel
operations in an oversea area are usually itself, whenever requested to do so by the
classified as Category I civilians. master and in such other emergencies when
188
deemed necessary by appropriate lawful met), he must hold the vehicle and report
military authority. This police authority the circumstances immediately so that an
extends to US Flag ships at anchor, moored, investigation can be made and discrepan-
moored by buoys, or at piers within pre cies corrected. He should know and be able
scribed distance (usually the three mile to verify by a signature on the TCMD, the
territorial limits) of the host nation. person(s) authorized to release the cargo.
Signature cards or coded templates maybe
used for this purpose.
10-7 Cargo Documentation c. Another instance of military police
concern with the TCMD is a report from a
a. Cargo moving through terminals consignee that he did not receive a shipment,
is documented in accordance with DOD or that there was a difference between the
Regulation 4500.32-R. The basic document cargo as described on the TCMD and that
used is the Transportation Control and actually received. Either case will probably
Movement Document (TCMD), DD Form require a military police investigation, using
1384. (See appendix T for details.) This form the TCMD as a starting point.
is a seven-part, pre-numbered document
which is initiated by the shipper for each d. Two physical aspects of the cargo
shipment, for example, a truckload. checking activity may be worthy of consider-
ation:
(1) The form shows the cargo (type,
number of packages, etc.), the consignee to (1) When the cargo vehicle gates are also
whom it is being delivered, names of the used by other traffic, a turnout may be
cargo checker and truck driver, and the provided into which cargo vehicles can be
time the cargo left the shipping point. directed for checking. This turnout, of a
size appropriate to the volume of traffic,
(2) Its purpose is to insure accurate and will eliminate congestion at the gate.
quick delivery of the cargo, reducing the
risk of loss, theft, or pilferage. (2) To facilitate checking of cargo, a
wooden platform may be built at the
b. The MP or physical security guard is checking area. The platform should be as
concerned with the TCMD, since he must long as the vehicles being used (e.g.,
check this document against the load on a tractor-trailer) and provide a deck at, or
truck leaving the terminal, unless the load is slightly higher than, the level of the truck
sealed and wired or locked, such as a van or bed. Such a platform provides for easier
CONEX container. Otherwise, he must check and quicker checking since it permits
the itemized TCMD, verify the types and
better observation of the cargo.
number of packages, and check the security of
the load in accordance with local require- e. Military police assigned to terminal
ments. cargo checking duties should be thoroughly
(1) If all is in order, he writes his name and familiar with the procedures for use of the
organization on the TCMD, and stamps it TCMD and allied documents (see appendix
with a date/time stamp, all in the spaces T).
provided. He also records the date, time,
and TCMD number in the gate log, and 10-8 Container Operations
returns the TCMD to the driver.
(2) If he does not find all in order (for Cargoes intransit are vulnerable to
example, less packages than listed on the overt hazards (such as pilferage, and enemy
TCMD or load security requirements not or guerrilla attack or ambush) and covert
189
Figure 71—Vulnerable stages for theft / pilferage of cargo.

hazards (such as sabotage). As one measure d. Some basic measures for beefing up
to provide additional security for supplies security are discussed next:
and equipment, the use of containers during
(1) Marshaling yard entrance/exit.
shipment is widely used.
Control of vehicular and pedestrian traffic
a. Containers must receive close security entering and leaving the area is a must:
emphasis during: Establish a single control point for each.
Filling Man both points with US military
Sealing personnel assisted, as required, by foreign
Storage (shipper/receiver) national police and/or interpreters.
Shipment (onloading and offloading), (2) At the vehicular control point:
b. Areas where security measures for Prevent entry of unauthorized vehicles

containers must be stringent are (figure 71): (only transporter and materials handling
equipment, maintenance, and essential
On board ship administrative vehicles may enter).
Shoreline transitions Inspect inbound and outbound contain-
Container marshaling area. ers for:
• Evidence of damage or unserviceability.
c. Knowledge is the keynote to security
• Presence and condition of container seal
during container operations. It is important
and/or lock.
that security personnel be aware of the • Evidence of illegal entry into container
following to detect pilferage and theft: (such as tampering with or removal of door
Packaging, labeling and placarding re- hinges).
quirements. • Stolen items, particularly with outbound
Cargo compatibility characteristics and containers (look on top and under con-
segregation requirements. tainer, and inspect transporter cab).
Container and cargo handling and safety
Verify documentation for correctness,
measures.
completeness, and legibility (check that
Actions to be initiated in case of suspected
the transporter number, container number,
pilferage/theft operations.
and container seal number match those
Speical storage, identification and move-
shown on the TCMD).
ment requirements.
Pertinent regulations and publications. No container (inbound or outbound)
190
passes through the control point (2) Concertina wire (chapter 5).
without a valid TCMD.
(3) Flood lighting (chapter 6).
(3) At the pedestrian control point:
(4) When feasible, use of sensors and IDS
● Permit only authorized personnel to systems (chapter 7).
enter container marshaling area.
(5) In a LOTS operation, mine strips on
● Establish, maintain, control, and safe-
the land side.
guard a pass system for persons authorized
to be in the area: (6) Use of motor patrols, dog patrols, and
physical security posts, which, upon re-
● A photo-bearing, serially numbered,
quest, can be made available by the
plastic-enclosed pass can be prepared for military police physical security company
each individual authorized to be in the (TOE 19-97).
yard. The individual picks up the pass
when entering through the gate and
g. Security cargo. Though it may not be
returns it to the security guard upon possible to fence the entire yard, the security
leaving.
cargo (that is, sensitive, classified, and high-
● Further refinement of the pass system
dollar-value cargo) area should, as a mini-
may be made by color-coding to indicate mum, be fenced with its own military
the specific area of the yard in which the
guarded gate and MP patrol. An added
bearer is authorized. Color-coding can be security measure is the stacking of contain-
made even more visible by requiring hard ers door-to-door, or with the door against a
hats that reflect the same color as the pass. wall (also applicable to other types of cargo).
e. A physical security officer (military (See figure 72 for example.) The break-bulk
police) is authorized in the security, plans, point and damaged cargo storage area are
and operations section of the transportation
terminal battalion. He is responsible to the
battalion S3 for developing, putting into
effect, and monitoring the marshaling area
security plans, procedures, and actions. His
responsibilities also include determination
and supervision of the force (for example,
military police units) required for terminal
security.
f. Perimeter security of the marshaling

yard backs up gate security in keeping
unauthorized people out of the area. Unau-
thorized people may engage in sabotage
(particularly in an ammunition marshaling
area) or petty theft. Or, to promote large-scale
theft operations, they may establish inside
contacts with people working in the yard.
Perimeter security measures may include one
or more of the following:
(1) Chain type fencing topped by strands
of barbed wire. Inspect fence daily to
assure there are no holes or breaks (chapter Figure 72—Details of stacked
5). containers for maximum security
191
also potential high loss areas and require ■ Seals should be applied—
close supervision and/or adequate perimeter ● As soon as container has been stuffed.
barriers and lighting. Additionally, when- ● A S soon as a stuffed but unsealed or
ever possible, security cargo should be un- improperly sealed container is detected.
loaded from the ship during daylight hours. ■ An inventory of contents may be required
Observation of unloading operations by MP if sufficient evidence exists that cargo has
security personnel is highly desirable. been pilfered. In an y case appropriate entries
must be made on the TCMD to indentify any
h. Safeguarding and controlling change in seals.
TCMDs. Normally TCMDs are not account- ■ Application of seals should be supervised.
able documents. If desired, TCMDs may be Failure to supervise, or allowing a yard
serially numbered locally to aid in control hostler to move an unsealed container to the
and to discourage pilferage of the form for stacking area, offers opportunity to—
illegal use. Regardless of other measures,
blank TCMDs should be secured, with one ● Pilfer
cargo prior to applying the seal.
individual responsible for their safeguarding ● Applya bogus seal, break the seal later,
and issue. Completed TCMDs should be kept remove cargo, and then apply the legiti-
in a vault file to prevent unauthorized mate seal.
alterations or destruction to remove evidence
of cargo diversions/pilferage.
10-9 Anchorage Security
i. Safeguarding and controlling con-
tainer seals. A container seal is a device When a port lacks sufficient pier
applied to the container door fastening to space to accommodate traffic, ships may be
indicate whether the door has been opened or required to anchor, or even to load and
the fastening tampered with and, if so, at unload, offshore. Positions of ships in anchor-
what point in the movement system it age are assigned by local port authorities.
happened. Seals are serially numbered to Cargo is loaded or unloaded by lighters (large
help indentify the person who applied the seal barges) which also transport stevedores to
and to provide control. Unless seals are the ship being worked. This type of operation
strictly accounted for from receipt to applica- has advantages and disadvantages with
tion, their purpose (to pinpoint unauthorized respect to security of the ships. The trips to
entry into the container) is defeated. Con- and from anchored ships give added time for
tainer seal control and accountability is inspection or surveillance of the laborers; but
promoted by the following procedures: it is difficult to control movements of small
■ Maintain a record by serial number of boats that bring provisions to the ships. Such
seals— craft may be used in pilfering, smuggling, or
sabotage activities. Military police water
❑ Received by the port operations officer. patrols and alert supervision of stevedoring
❑ Issued to authorized persons for applica- offer the most effective protection.
tion to containers.
■ Store seals under lock. a. Shipboard Guards.
■ Designate one person to be responsible for
safekeeping, issue, and recordkeeping of (1) In addition to hatch guards, guards
seals applied at the port. must be assigned, where appropriate, to
■ Designate specific persons on each shift to the decks of ships at anchor.
apply seals (keep number of persons to a
minimum). (2) Deck guards may be assigned to either
■ Enter serial number of seal on TCMD. stationary or walking patrols. In addition
■ Conduct periodic inventory of seals. to cooperating with hatch guards, the
192
following duties may be included: b. Anchor Chain Collar.
(a) Security of’ cargo stowed on deck.
(b) Security of cargo being unloaded (1) Swimmer sappers use the anchor
onto lighters. chains of ships to their advantage. They tie
(c) Observation of small craft in the one end of a line to them and on the other
vicinity of the ships at anchor. end attach their mines. When the current
(d) Observation of surrounding waters changes, the mine moves alongside the
to detect any attempted approach by ship and explodes. To prevent sappers
swimmer sappers. from accomplishing this goal through this
(e) Assistance in operating the anchor technique, anchor chains must be checked
chain collars. frequently. This can be done from aboard
ship.
(3) Deck guards must be able to communi-
(2) A simple device has been discovered to
cate, preferably by radio, with harbor
help personnel aboard ship check the
patrol boats either directly or through their
anchor chain. This device is the anchor
operations center.
chain collar (figure 73). It is built with two
(4) Deck guards must have appropriate padeyes—one at the top of the collar and
foul weather clothing; binoculars are one at the bottom. The padeye at the top is
essential for proper observation of sur- used to connect the rope used to haul the
rounding waters and small craft. collar up, dragging any attached sapper
Figure 73—Anchor chain collar details.
193
line out of the water. The lower padeye is size since it can be used also on smaller
used to connect an out-haul line which is sizes. The collar should be, generally, twice
threaded through the link in the anchor the length of the anchor chain link; the
chain at the anchor ring. The collar can width should be sufficient to leave 3 to 4
thus be raised by hauling the collar up, and inches of free space on each side of the link,
lowered by pulling in the out-haul line. to allow for accumulations of seaweed or
Raising and lowering the collar should be debris.
done every 15 to 20 minutes on an irregular
basis. A detail of the collar (ring) is
(4) A port commander should have one of
depicted at figure 74.
these collar devices available for each ship
(3) No specific dimensions are set for the that anchors in his area of responsibility.
collar since one standard collar will not fit Collars could be issued to each vessel as it
all sizes of anchor chains. Collars should arrives and returned to port authorities
be fabricated (by engineer, ordnance, or just prior to the ship’s departure. Ships’
naval units) in sizes appropriate to the captains should also be encouraged to
sizes of anchor chains most commonly in fabricate their own collars for use while in
use in each area—preferably the largest hostile waters, thus insuring they will
Figure 74—Details of anchor chain collar design.
194
always have a collar available while they (a) Any of the missions in paragraph (1)
are at anchor. above.
(b) Support beach or shore parties in
(5) Personnel operating and checking regulation, control, and direction of
these collars must be instructed that: watercraft near the beach or shore.
(a) Lines must be kept taut while the (c) Guide troop or cargo carrying small
collar is in place. Any slack observed in craft between larger craft and beach or
the line must be considered as possible shore points.
tampering with the line (cut by an (d) Guide, escort, and guard small craft
underwater swimmer) and must be engaged in high priority movements of
promptly investigated. wounded personnel, emergency sup-
(b) If the line cannot be hauled in, an plies, command and staff groups and
investigation must be made to determine designated persons.
the reason. It may have been cut by an (e) Guard craft transporting, loading, or
underwater swimmer and tied to the unloading prisoners of war, and guard
anchor chain to prevent hauling in the offshore areas at prisoner-of-war assem-
collar. bly points.
(6) When mines are suspected or dis- (3) At military installations. Patrol
covered, EOD personnel should be con- activity on waterways that form the
tacted immediately through the port com- boundaries of or pass through a military
mander so that mines can be detached and installation may include any of the
made harmless. missions in paragraphs (1) and (2) above
applicable to the installation, and:
10-10 River and Harbor Patrols (a) Guard waterways to prevent their
use for unauthorized entry or exit.
a. Port and harbor security requires
(b) Provide security for facilities and
the use of patrol boats, not only for the open
equipment, power and communications
harbor area but for the water sides of piers,
line, etc., located on or adjacent to
dock areas, and patrol of inland waterways waterways.
and beach areas used in LOTS operations.
(c) Enforce hunting, fishing, swim-
ming, boating, camping, fire prevention,
b. Missions assigned to military police and forestry conservation regulations
water patrols may include the following: on and adjacent to waterways.
(1) In port areas: (d) Enforce off limits regulations per-
taining to firing ranges, impact areas,
(a) Enforce port regulations. demolition areas, restricted areas, and
(b) Suppress criminal activity. similar areas on or adjacent to water-
(c) Provide offshore security for quays, ways.
piers, moorages, and anchorages.
(d) Provide offshore security for commu- c. The MP company assigned the mission
nication facilities, port security devices, of river and harbor patroling is the “Military
and aids to navigation. Police Company River/Harbor Security,”
(e) Provide security for incoming and TOE 19-287. Review this TOE for personnel
outgoing craft, moored or anchored strength and unit operational capabilities
craft, and lighter operations. and limitations.
(f) Assist in circulation and control of
individuals. d. Water Patrol Operations. River and
(2) In beach or river shore areas. harbor security operations require continu-
195
ous coordination and liaison with land-based police plus the possibility of encounters
MP organizations and with indigenous with dangerous waterfront criminals or
military or civil police operating in the same enemy/insurgent forces and of accidents
area of responsibility. on the water. A thorough and continuous
consideration of safety, communications,
(1) Extent and nature of coordination support, and reserve factors is a must in
necessary for effective use of this support water patrol operations.
varies with the activity supported. But the
company commander and his physical e. Planning. Water patrol routes and
security officer must also maintain close missions are assigned in accordance with the
operational liaison with the headquarters need for MP service. The need is determined
staff element responsible for such physical by:
security planning in order to implement
operating instructions.
(1) A survey of actual and probable
(2) Waterborne patrols provide the only criminal or enemy activity that can be
practical means available to effectively suppressed or prevented by water patrols.
protect arterial and smaller waterways
and pier facilities (to include such sensitive (2) An estimate of the number, type, and
installations as tank farms and pumping location of water patrols required.
stations) against waterborne threat. In
carrying out their security activities,
personnel of this functional support unit
f. Prevention of waterfront criminal or
assist the terminal commander in the
discharge of his responsibility for the enemy activity is based upon adequate
physical security measures to provide protec-
security of military cargo in terminal
tion for Government supplies and equipment.
facilities and support the area commander
Physical security measures may be supple-
in security of in transit supplies through
mented by water patrols that perform the
his area of responsibility.
following:
(3) Two additional platoons and support-
ing maintenance elements may be at- (1) Observe activities of watercraft and
tached to this organization, depending on persons aboard watercraft.
range of waterway areas to be covered.
(2) Observe activities of persons on the
Conversely, platoons and their organic
waterfront and shoreline.
patrol craft sections may be detached
where required for support of separate (3) Suppress trafficking in controlled and
facilities. pilfered items between the shore and
watercraft, and between watercraft.
(4) Water patrol operations should be
conducted as an extension of and a (4) Investigate and report any suspicious
supplement to shore-based MP operations. actions on the part of persons or water-
Operational procedures and techniques craft.
prescribed in military police training
(5) Enforce off limits regulations pertain-
publications (FM 19-series) should be fol- ing to, and provide offshore security for,
lowed. communications facilities, port security
(5) Water patrol activity includes all the devices, aids to navigation, dock facilities,
dangers normally encountered by military moorages, and anchorages.
196
Chapter 11
Computer Security
Expensive equipment and sensitive

information is usually concentrated in a
military computer complex. The importance
of the Army computer complex has increased
correspondingly with the use of automatic
data processing (ADP) in a variety of military
activities. Protective security measures
should be established for the equipment,
information, operational programs main-
tained in the complex, and for the facility that
houses the processing, main storage units,
and remote components.
197
Computer complexes are susceptible to the measures should be reevaluated as part of the
security hazards discussed in appendixes B planning process for future modification,
and C. Additionally, magnetism poses a expansion, or renovation. Considerations in
possible threat to the computer complex. A the selection of a location for the computer
magnet, depending upon its size and location, complex should include whether it will be:
can scramble recorded data. Also, strong
(1) Housed in one or multiple buildings.
radar signals can interfere with the operation
of data processing equipment. (2) Positioned on one or more floors of the
buildings.
An integrated staff effort is recommended (3) Other activities located around it.
for formulating and executing a security
program for a military computer complex. (4) Exposed to hazards described in ap-
The user is responsible for classification of pendixes B and C.
informational elements contained in the
input, data base, and output. At the local data Note: Ideally, a DPI should be located
processing installation (DPI) level, the sys- in a separate building. This increases
tems security officer has staff responsibility the feasibility of applying appropriate
for security of the facility in which the physical protection. Alternatively, it
machines are located, to include remote should be located on the second floor of a
terminals. Local military intelligence has multi-story structure. This reduces un-
staff responsibility for security of the data necessary pedestrian traffic around the
contained within the machines. DPI and thus reduces the possibility of
unauthorized persons gaining access to
The physical security expertise available in or observation of DPI operations.
the provost marshal’s office should be used to
the maximum extent, and should be comple-
mented by the technical knowledge in other b. Protective Measures. Computer com-
staff areas, such as management information plexes may require differing degrees and
systems, communications and electronics, types of protection depending on the physical
security office (G2/S2), facilities engineer, characteristics of each location, surrounding
fire and safety. Computer expertise, not environment, and vulnerability to security
organic to the installation, may also be hazards (see figure 75).
considered as a source for additional informa- (1) Physical security measures may
tion and advice. include:
(a) Protective barriers consisting of
fences, gates, and doors (chapter 5).
(b) Locking systems (chapter 8).
11-1 Physical Protection (c) Protective lighting (chapter 6).
(d) Security force personnel (chapter 9).
Primary considerations should be In some cases well trained receptionists
the building design and the corresponding can perform the same duties as security
applicability of protective measures. personnel during normal working hours.
(e) Personnel movement control (chap-
a. Building Design. This includes both
ter 4).
existing structures and those being planned
(f) Intrusion detection systems (chapter
and under construction. Selection of protec-
7).
tive measures may be influenced by the
construction materials used to meet building (2) Electric power. Without electrical
specifications. Existing physical security power a computer complex cannot operate.
198
Figure 75—Computer hazards.

All power sources to the computer complex (a) Certain military installations may
must be continually protected. Three maintain their own power source and
specific problems dealing with electrical also use commercial power. Dual feed
power are: would incorporate both on post and
(a) Transients are temporary oscilla- commercial power sources into the
tions that occur in a circuit due to a computer complex. There should be
sudden change in voltage or load. This emergency cutoff switches for all electri-
sudden change can cause errors in cal utilities at every exit from the DPI.
passage of data within the computer. Such switches will break every electrical
(b) A brownout is a short period of circuit when thrown and will minimize
curtailment in electrical power; how- damage from electrical fires.
ever, it lasts longer than a transient. (b) There are many different generators
(c) A blackout is the same as a brown- that can provide an alternate power
out but for an extended period. source to the computer complex. Costs of
alternate power sources are high but
may be necessary to insure continuous
(3) Emergency power. This energy operation of the computer complex.
source should be available to insure contin- (c) Loss of power may be caused by
uous operation of the computer complex. natural or manmade reasons. Physical
There are at least two types of emergency security planning should include mea-
power available—dual feeds and genera sures to prevent or minimize the effects
tor. of power losses.
199
Figure 76—Fire dangers for computer equipment.

(4) Fire prevention. To insure against trained, and efficient personnel can
destruction of the computer complex by properly use existing fire control de-
fire, comprehensive fire prevention mea- vices. They should be-trained to fight a
sures should be undertaken (figure 76). fire in the computer room with minimal
Considerations should include the type of damage to computer equipment.
construction of the building that houses (d) Protective covering. The use of
the computer complex, location and gen- equipment protective coverings can
eral cleanliness of the area, and the degree reduce fire and water damage in case of a
of housekeeping within the computer fire.
center (ARs 18-1 and 18-2). (e) Emergency utility procedures.
(a) Alarms and detectors. The loca- Water and electrical utility cutoff proce-
tions, sizes, and functions of alarms and dures should be specified in case of fire or
detectors are important in considering other disaster.
fire prevention. (5) Air conditioning is required for most
(b) Fire extinguishers. There are a computer complexes. A computer complex
variety of fire extinguishing agents should have its own air conditioning
available for use in a computer complex. system. It should not be dependent upon
These extinguishers must be chosen the system that is used for the entire
carefully to insure they do the least building. The fresh air intakes should be so
damage to computers and still extin- located as to prevent smoke, dirt, or dust
guish a fire. from entering the computer complex. They
(c) Firefighting teams. Any fire should contain filters. Periodically the
control plan must insure that qualified, intakes should be inspected to insure
200
proper operation. Air conditioning systems sump pumps, and protective equipment
for a computer complex should have coverings may minimize water damage
performance monitors. The placement of to the computer room.
these monitors is important. Improper
placement may cause the system to operate
incorrectly. Emergency power sources 11-2 System Integrity
must also be capable of handling air
conditioning systems within the computer a. Hardware is the physical equip-
room because most computers cannot ment or devices forming a computer and its
operate without air conditioning. peripheral equipment.
(6) Housekeeping. The enforcement of (1) Alternate data storage refers to equip-
good housekeeping practices increases ment/files available as auxiliary or
overall security for computer operations backup to the primary computer system.
(AR 18-2). Alternate storage should not be located in
the same computer room with the primary
(a) Smoking and eating in the computer system. Physical security of the alternate
room should not be allowed. A cup of
should be similar to that of the primary
coffee accidentally or purposefully
system.
spilled on a computer mainframe or tape
drive unit could cause extensive dam- (2) Computer maintenance on hardware
age. is a continuing process. It may involve an
(b) Trash containers within the compu- unscheduled stoppage or normal preven-
ter room should be made of fireproof tive maintenance. Knowledge and
material and have properly fitting lids. supervision of maintenance personnel are
(c) Fire extinguishers should be stored important. Security requirements differ
so they are readily available when depending upon whether maintenance is
needed. performed by internal or external services.
(d) Proper disposal of input and output Physical security standards must be
media is important. In the hands of strictly enforced during maintenance
unauthorized persons, this information operations.
could be compromised and could lead to
(3) Key punch equipment and locations
breaches of national security. should have physical security equivalent
to the material being prepared or punched.
(7) Water damage. The following two
areas of concern are important in prevent- (4) Computer terminals require physical
ing water damage to the computer room: security procedures based on their per-
formance requirements. Location of the
(a) Natural flooding. Surface water system user must always be considered
within the computer room is possible if
when setting up a system with various
the room is located on the ground floor or
station locations. A given user may have
basement of an area subject to flooding.
full authoritative access to certain infor-
Storms may cause damage to the compu-
mation, but certain locations may not have
ter room if it is located on the outer wall
access to that information because of
of a building containing large glass
unauthorized persons in the area. Security
windows.
technical protective measures should be
(b) Manmade fixtures. Plumbing
directed toward these areas:
should not be allowed to run over, under,
nor alongside the computer room be (a) Data controls
cause extensive damage could occur if (b) Access controls
such pipes should burst. Floor drains, (c) Password controls.
201
153-846 O - 94 - 10
(5) Secure handling of sensitive and clas- computer complex. The areas of interest are
sified information should be emphasized to diverse, as the following example shows:
everyone in the computer complex.
a. Separation of Duties. In most compu-
b. Software refers to the program and ter complexes, personnel are divided into
routines used to extend the capabilities of the several functional groupings—programers,
computer. operators, librarians, data preparers, and
data controllers. These are in addition to
(1) Necessary security precautions should internal audit personnel and the security
be implemented to insure knowledge of force, which are usually independent of data
who writes the program, where they are processing operations. It is not always
written, where they are tested and filed and necessary or possible for these groupings to
what is the security classification of the be separate and distinct; but in a large
program. computer operation they should be so
grouped. The security classification of
(2) Data file systems contain information these personnel must be commensurate
that can be processed or produced by the with the level of classification of the
computer. These files must be provided a data or program that they are process-
degree of security commensurate with the ing or developing. This factor is highly
importance of the files. A typical data file significant in the staffing and use of person-
system allows for the creation of a unique nel.
file with the establishment of a password
when the file is created. The system must b. Rotation of duties is sound personnel
respond to the privacy of the password management and an essential control.
itself, and must prevent printouts or
readouts or system reviews that would c. Production schedules should contain
reveal the password. In addition to pass- run authorizations, time estimates, data file
words, some files are further protected by a and program library release memoranda,
permissive system. The names of valid data preparation instructions, output routing
users should be explicitly stated as having and input and output checking guides. All
certain very specific access to the file, such production work should be run according to
as read or write. In this manner a file can the schedule and all program development
be put to its maximum use by allowing should be controlled separately.
differing and restricted use simultaneously
to various users at various levels of author-
ity.
(3) Documentation provides the historical 11-4 Protection
reference record of data file systems and Of Crime Scenes
programs. The same degree of physical
security should apply to documentation as a. A breach of physical security is,
in paragraphs 11-2a(2) and (3). in most instances, a crime; and the scene of
the breach must be treated as such. The first
c. For further guidance in this area, see AR principle is to refrain from disturbing it.
18-2.
b. Protection may then be afforded to the
scene through the use of other security forces
11-3 Procedures and Control on fixed posts, roving foot patrols, motorized
patrols, or by roping or blocking off the area
Procedures and controls encompass with available materials such as ropes, boxes,
the entire area of operation concerning the or boards (see TC 19-23).
202
c. Complete protection is essential to personnel pertinent to the situation. Such
insure that no evidence is moved until the information may include observations as to
investigators can record its exact location vulnerability of the area, which permitted the
and condition by the use of notes, sketches, breach of security to occur reports of previous
photographs, or other means. Protection also incidents of the same or similar type, when
preserves the integrity of the evidence for and where they occurred, and their effect on
proper identification and evaluation, and routine operations of the installation; and
enables investigators to correlate the evi- information concerning the security classifi-
dence with the crime and crime scene. cation of the area, if any, and the pass or
badge system or other personnel circulation
control measures (chapter 4).
11-5 Personnel at the Scene
c. Security force personnel can also pro-
a. Persons at or near the crime scene vide facilities for the questioning of persons;
must be considered as part of the scene and can insure that personnel are available for
must be identified. Where appropriate, and questioning; and if apprehension is neces-
where jurisdiction of place and persons is sary, provide information as to where the
clear, they should be detained at the scene subject can be located and what assistance
and released to investigators. can be rendered by the command to facilitate
apprehension.
b. Any questioning of such personnel must
meet the requirements for warning of rights d. The security force may also assist
under the Manual for Courts Martial, and the investigators, at their request and under their
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution must be direction, in searching for, locating, and
strictly observed, since they may later be preserving any physical evidence pertaining
considered as suspects, and any improper to the breach of security. In such activities,
questioning could prejudice any disciplinary caution must be exercised to avoid any action
or legal action against them. Careful and that would contaminate or impair the integ-
complete notes should be made of any rit y of the evidence. Evidence must be
spontaneous or voluntary information they handled—if at all—strictly in accordance
offer, or any remarks they make. with the directions of investigators, who are
ultimately responsible for it.
11-6 Assistance
To Investigators e. Security force personnel should be
familiar with the provisions of FMs 19-10 and
Security force personnel can assist 19-20 with respect to handling and preserva-
investigators in numerous ways, both at the tion of evidence, and adhere strictly to those
scene and during later phases of the investi- provisions.
gation. Protection and control of the scene is,
of course, the first consideration. Nothing f. Run Control Log. This log should
should be disturbed or removed until it is contain detailed records of all runs, errors,
released by the investigators. interruptions, and restarts. For sensitive
operations, a console printer, recording all of
a. All information obtained should be the operations listed above, may be located
turned over to investigators immediately remotely or in a secured part of the computer
upon their arrival. complex.
b. Provide investigators with any informa- g. Operations Review. Sound manage-

tion they request relative to the installation, ment of a computer complex requires that
scene of the breach of security, activities and actual performance be compared to scheduled
203
performance and any variations be noted, o. Hardware Monitoring Prevention.
investigated, and explained. Production An independent survey by technically quali-
schedules and run control logs are essential fied persons should be conducted at all
inputs to this process. computer facilities to determine external
hardware emissions and methods available
to reduce or eliminate emissions capable of
h. Input and Output Control. Quality being recorded by undesirable sources.
control and checks of all input and output
should be maintained by a separate data
control group. Special efforts should be made
to insure that data accepted by data control is 11-7 Evacuation And
not altered prior to processing. This is Contingency Planning
required not just for control, but is essential
for detecting and correcting errors.
a. Evacuation planning should be
initiated to insure that immediate and effec-
i. Program Change Control. Changes
to production programs should occur only tive action is taken in case of required
upon authorization. Verification of any evacuation of the computer complex due to
change should be made by the internal audit fire, flood, bomb threat or enemy action.
These plans should include:
group prior to replacing the audit copy in the
library. (1) Procedures for securing and priority
evacuation of certain data files.
j. Master File Control. Master file
changes should also be made only by authori- (2) Criteria for destruction of hardware,
zation, and should be subject to an internal software, and data files prior to evacua-
system of checks and balances. tion.
k. Rigid Control of Passwords. In a b. Contingency or emergency planning is

teleprocessing environment, passwords important in case the everyday operation of
should not be assignable from the console, the computer complex is disrupted or com-
pletely destroyed. Contingency planning
nor transmitted to users by telephone. Wher-
should afford the ability to continue opera-
ever possible, terminal identification and
tions using auxiliary power sources and
password match should be required.
alternate equipment.
l. Auditing Support. Skilled and experi-
enced audit personnel on the installation may c. Further guidance in this area is found in
AR 18-2.
increase computer security by participating
in the development and maintenance of
standards and procedures for systems design,
programing, and operations.
m. File Protection Devices. Maximum 11-8 Computer

use of file protection devices and techniques Security Program
will assist in preventing accidental or willful
destruction of data files. Computer security is the sum of
man y parts. A total security program should
n. Manual Operations. Systems design include a blend of procedural safeguards, an
should include provisions for short-term interface of physical protection, personnel
manual operation whenever possible in the selection, and audit controls. There should be
event normal operations are disrupted. an integration of all interdependent features.
204
Figure 77—Five steps to computer security.
Where possible, each of these individual system at the start. An effective program is a
controls should be built into the computer continuing one.
205
Chapter 12
Transportation Security
T ransportation security has evolved

to encompass all security measures taken to
protect shipments from criminal/terrorist
activity. The types of shipments include:
Classified Protected
Hazards Pilferable
General cargo Sensitive
Combination of these Controlled
206
There are no universal or one-time solu- 12-2 Physical Security
tions to the problems of cargo security, Cargo Plan
because each mode of transportation and
type of shipment in each shipping/receiving To insure that adequate security is
terminal, and each transfer point is unique. assessed, it is imperative that a security cargo
However, certain basic principles of cargo plan be developed to cover all forseeable
security can be adapted to accommodate any contingencies and be flexible to meet ship
mode of transportation or any facility—large ment/storage needs.
or small.
12-1 Considerations
12-3 Pilferage
a. The following general considera-
tions should be adhered to when shipping The following characteristics apply
cargo:
to pilferage in the transportation environ-
(1) Exercise management obligation di- ment:
rectly or through a security manager re-
sponsible for the shipment (appendix I). a. Difficult to detect because pilferers
usually operate alone.
(2) The threat, sensitivity of cargo, vulner-
ability, and mode of transportation dictate
b. Evidence is hard to obtain because of the
the degree of security required during
complexity in the shipment and storage
storage and in transit (chapter 1).
system.
b. The degree or type of security needed is c. A primary concern of the security
determined by: program involving transportation and stor-
● Facility size and location. age of items.
● Complexity of storage or shipment.
d. Unsystematic in nature.
● Volume/value of items.
e. Commonly occurs in a terminal while
● Economic and geographical situa-
cargo is awaiting movement from one vehicle
tion.
or mode of transportation to another (figure
Available crime statistics. 78).
● Security/law enforcement available.
f. Most often committed by employees of
● Transit shipments. the carrier service.
These factors may change as the cargo is
moved from one area to another.
c. Development of an effective cargo secu-

rity system should be based on: 12-4 Pilferage
— Prevention
Experiences of personnel responsible for
shipments and storage of cargo. To prevent transportation pilferage,
❑ Loss potential based on a risk analysis as apply these steps:
outlined in chapter 2.
❑ Established security standards and policy. a. Analyze existing conditions (chapter 1).
207
Figure 78—Transshipment areas are most vulnerable to pilferage.
b. Control presonnel movement (chapter h. Develop respect between security per-

4). sonnel and employees.
c. Use a parcel check system (chapter 4). i. Incorporate active security measures in
a security in depth configuration.
d. Exclude privately owned vehicles from
parcel checkpoint (s).
e. Stress the moral wrong of pilferage

(chapter 3). 12-5 Theft During
Shipment/Storage
f. Apply stringent accountability proce-
dures (chapter 4). a. Theft prevention is manage-
ment’s first responsibility (see appendix I).
g. Insure high employee morale (chapter
3). b. A systematic and planned theft or other
208
crime is frequently committed with accom- i. Obtain feedback to determine whether
plices and usually involves: promulgated cargo theft countermeasures
have, in fact, been implemented and are being
An available market. properly followed by operating personnel.
■ Goods that are profitable and easily
disposed of.
12-8 Special Security

12-6 Areas And Functions Considerations
Vulnerable Because the following items are part
To Manipulation of military life and easy to pilfer, and because
there is a demand for them on the black
The following are considered areas market, special security considerations are
and functions with high theft potential: necessary:
• Terminal operation areas • Weapons
• Truck drivers • Ammunition
• Facility personnel • Electronic items
• False invoice shipments and receipts. • Photographic equipment
• Class VI items.
(See appendix U, p. 494 for classes of supply.)
12-7 Management Controls
12-9 Shipper Awareness
To minimize exposure to individuals
who display a motive to steal, the security Shippers, to reduce theft of cargo,
manager should: should be familiar with:
a. Illustrate and use countermeasures. Packing requirements and procedures.
Receipt procedures at destinations.
b. Screen prospective personnel. Provide advance notice of shipments to
receiver.
c. Eliminate in-facility gambling among Arrival and departure times of all cargo
employees. shipments.
❑ Specific routes of travel.
d. Eliminate the get-even attitude among
employees.
e. Reduce exposure of cargo to theft and 12-10 Intangible Losses

pilferage.
Cargo theft and pilferage losses in
f. Insure close coordination between pack- today’s multimodal transportation system
aging, shipping, and receiving personnel. are ever present through the less visible
impact of:
g. Increase the probability of detection
when thefts do occur. Insurance claims.
Administration of cargo theft claims.
h. Discipline those persons apprehended Delayed or lost sales for post exchanges,
for theft and pilferage. commissaries, class VI stores, etc.
209
Lost business by carriers. a. Exclusive useof vehicles (see paragraph
Embargoes and interference with the flow 226, MTMR):
of commerce. Reduces breaking of seals (appendix c,
Diversion of cargo.
MTMTS PAM 55-4)
Higher prices/freight rates increase loss of Total vehicle security.
government revenue.
Reduced operational readiness of person- b. Constant surveillance service (required
nel, equipment, and supplies. by parpagraph 22660 2d, MTMR).
Overall shipments involving vehicles and

12-11 Carrier
Protective Services commericaial carrier personnel.
Operation/procedures.
Protective services availabIe from a
carrier are specifically described in the c. Bill of lading annotations.
contract, tender, or tariff. The following
protective services should be considered: d. Signature security service (SSS).
Figure 79—Steps in transportation process and corresponding audit trailpoints.
210
Provides individual fixed responsibility 12-13 Armed Guard
for shipments. Surveillance
Provides tally record (DD Form 1907) and a. This service provides armed
audit trail (figure 79). guards to maintain constant and specific
surveillance of shipments for which the
e. Include dual driver protective service service is requested.
where constant vehicle attendance by two
persons is provided. b. A guard in this case is considered armed
when he has a firearm and appropriate
f. Rail surveillance service provides hourly ammunition readily available for immediate
security checks of the rail car when it’s not use.
moving.
12-12 Protective
Security Service (PSS) 12-14 Unarmed Escort
PSS is a transportation security Escort personnel must be cleared

function of the Government involving con- to the degree of classification required for the
tract shipments. shipment. They must possess valid identifica-
tion cards and must maintain constant
a. In addition to SSS (par. 12-11d), the PSS surveillance over the shipment.
must insure that the transporting earner is a
cleared carrier as defined in paragraph
— - .
22600, MTMR.
b. Shipment must be under constant sur-

veillance of designated employees who are 12-15 Routing
appropriately cleared.
Security Shipments
c. DD Form 1907. Managers and security personnel

should consider the following prior to select-
(1) Provided to the carrier by the shipper. ing a route for shipment:
(2) Required for each person responsible
• Threat by hostile elements or lone person-
for proper handling of the shipment (only nel.
one set of forms used/passed along with • Value of shipment and required degree of
the shipment). security (by regulations).
(3) Must accompany shipments requiring • Identity of commodity.
SSS. • Strength of basic unit package.
• Total weight and number of pieces.
(4) Required from air carrier personnel but • Security capabilities of consignee and
not from flight crews or attendants. Com- intermediate transshippers.
mercial airlines use Form AC-10 in lieu of • Primary and alternate routes.
DD Form 1907, therefore, coordination to
• Strength of transport container.
insure accuracy of records is a must.
• Quality of service or claims record of the
(5) Carriers providing SSS must be able to carrier.
trace a shipment in less than 24 hours. • Cost of movement.
211
12-16 Sensitivity of Cargo • Small arms and ammunition.
• Other materials requiring strict control.
As indicated in paragraph 12-15,
there is no simple solution to every routing
problem. After considering all alternatives,
sometimes imagination is still needed. For 12-18 Packing Marking,
example, containers on a flatcar, over some And Addressing
rail routes, can be particularly vulnerable to
pilferage. On the other hand, movement by From a security point of view, a
motor is more costly and, even with protective packing list should be considered when
measures, it too may require extra security. packing, marking, and addressing merchan-
(See mode selection guide, appendix U, p. dise for shipment. Preparation of a packing
493.) The solution usually is the use of special list is necessary on all shipments to assist the
guards. However, where consignor and con- transportation officer in determining short-
signee have heavy lift capability, this more ages. Extremely close attention should
expensive solution (special guards) can be be provided to packing list preparation
avoided by using rail and by loading contain- when several shipments and pieces are
ers in gondola cars. This arrangement consolidated.
permits substantial blocking of side doors
and back doors. When butting to another
container is not possible, additional protec- 12-19 Alarm Devices
tive measures such as intrusion detection During Shipment
devices and barbed wire might be required.
a. Alarm devices have the basic
function of providing a warning when a
shipment has been moved from its proper
12-17 Protective location; or when the security being provided
Security Measures by the container or vehicle holding the
shipment has been breached (such as opening
a. Protective measures for ship- container doors, or tampering with the ship-
ments must be compatible with the threat. ment).
b. Three types of protective measures are: b. The devices used should:

(1) Physical (containers, storage ware- (1) Augment other security measures.
houses).
(2) Provide protection under unusual cir-
(2) Personnel (consignee, guards, etc.). cumstances.
(3) Procedural (accounting, shipping, re- (3) Conserve manpower security re-
ceiving, etc.). sources.
c. Three degrees of cargo control are:
c. Technically speaking, an alarm device
(1) Minimum-provided all cargo: is only that part of an intrusion detection
(2) Medium-provided: system that sounds the alarm. Actually there
are three basic parts:
• High-value cargo with a ready resale.
(1) Sensor to detect noise, presence, or
• Others as designated.
movement.
(3) Maximum-provided: (2) Wire or transmitter to send the sensor
• Classified material. signal to a receiver/annunciator.
212
Figure 80—Packing lists offer opportunities for pilferage—when not used and
when altered or improperly prepared.
(3) Receiver/annunciator to display or is picked up by a receiver, which notifies a

emit a notification (as a light, sound, or guard.
switch to trigger another device), indicat- A tarpaulin, constructed of heavy water-
ing the situation detected by the sensor. proof fabric with built-in motion sensors,
operates on the same principle. Any move-
d. Most intrusion detection systems are ment of materials from under its cover causes
designed for fixed installations and do not transmission of a radio signal.
lend themselves to shipments. A few have the Application of devices. The security
primary purpose of detecting anyone moving officer must be consulted in applying any
a shipment or entering a transport container device.
or vehicle. Alarm devices suitable for ship
ment use and available from commercial
sources include: 12-20 Use of Seals
Entry alarms. Similar to the common The following guidelines must be

house burglar alarm, these are built to met in using seals in transportation security:
operate on a small battery and emit a mind-
wrenching sound, which can be.felt as well as Show if the integrity of a shipment has
heard. been compromised.
Movement alarms. These operate on the Maybe used as a seal-lock or cable seal. (A
principle of a radio; that is a transmitter and lock is not necessarily a seal, and a seal is not
a receiver. necessarily a lock.) (See figure 81.)
Small motion sensors easily attached to Unless funds and time are unlimited, there
a container or vehicle door transmit a coded is no particular seal, lock, or combination
radio frequency signal when the door is suitable for every situation. For example, a
opened or the container is moved. The signal high-grade lock on a weak container hasp is a
213
Figure 81—A seal is not a lock and a

lock is not a seal.
waste of money and a high grade seal is of no d. Individually identifiable. Identifica-

value on an easily removed door. tion must be accomplished by embossing
Strict seal accountability is a must, and serial numbers and owner identification on
accountability should be constant. each seal.
Accountability starts with the manufac-
turer and ends with seal destruction.
Seals, to be effective, must meet two basic 1 2 - 2 2 Seal Accountability
requirements —construction specifications
and accountability. Each seal should be strictly ac-
counted for from manufacture to the time of
12-21 Seal Construction application. Seal custodians, users, users’
Specifications subordinates authorized to apply seals, and
seal removers must be appointed in writing.
a. Durability. A seal must be These appointments should be kept to a
strong enough to prevent accidental break- minimum. Procedures listed below must be
age during normal use. followed:
b. Design. The design must be sufficiently All seals must be ordered or purchased
complex to make unauthorized manufacture from manufacturer by the same office of an
of a replacement seal difficult. organization and must be recorded serially in
a log by the seal custodian.
c. Tamperproof. The seal should provide
readily visible evidence of tampering and Until issued to users, all seals must be
preclude reconstruction after the seal is safeguarded in a suitable locked metal
closed; that is, a seal should be constructed so container, limiting access, under supervision
as to make simulated locking difficult. of the custodian, in a manner that will
214
prevent unauthorized substitution or illegal along with the trailer and tractor number,
use of seals. on his gate log.
(2) Persons receiving sealed shipments or

12-23 Issuing Seals to Users equipment must examine the seal and
record the number on the receipt.
a. Custodians must issue seals to
users, obtain a receipt, and record issuance by
number. (3) Whenever a seal is removed, broken, or
suspected of having been compromised,
b. Each seal user must maintain a log the following actions must be accom-
showing numbers of all seals and the date plished:
received.
(a) Record pertinent information:
c. Each user and his employees authorized • Date and time seal was removed,
to apply seals in a terminal must sign or broken, or discovered broken, etc.
initial for the seals, by number, and after • By whom, organization, name.
applying seals in a terminal, prepare a seal •Circumstances/justification for
application log, showing date and trailer breaking the seal.
number to which applied. • New seal number, if applied (new seal
must be same type).
• Person resealing.
• Witness.
12-24 Seal Application
And Verification (b) Make proper disposition of broken
seals.
a. Record of application—seal
numbers must be entered in the designated Retained until it is determined
place on pertinent transportation documents; whether the shipment contained dis-
such as bills of lading, manifests, gate passes, crepancies.
and in users’ seal application logs.
If there were none, the seal should be
destroyed.
b. Time of application— trailers must be
sealed as soon as the load is closed out
If any discrepancy is found, the
(complete). Roll-up type doors must be sealed
by the checker at the dock. Swing out doors broken seal must be sent to the security
must be sealed by the person pulling the unit manager.
away from the dock as soon as the unit is far If shipment contains classified infor-
enough away for the doors to be closed. mation, material, or equipment, the
following actions, as a minimum, must
c. Verification— seals must be examined be immediately initiated:
and verified at every stop; such as terminal
exits and entrances, docks, transfer points, • Secure the area.
and road stops for truck and driver services. • Position security guards.
• Notify the commander.
(1) The gate guard must check the seal • Contact local support MI office.
number against the gate pass and ship- • Conduct immediate inventory by
ping documents and note seal numbers, authorized personnel.
215
12-25 Breaking Seals withheld, reconsigned, or diverted at any
And The Law intermediate point.
Title 18, US Code, Section 2117, (1) While this is a right afforded the
states: “Whoever breaks the seal or lock of shipper under law, the services rendered by
any railway car, vessel, aircraft, motor truck, the carrier in connection therewith are
wagon or other vehicle…containing inter- supplementary services which the carrier
state or foreign shipments of freight or is obligated to provide and may collect for.
express, or other property, or enters any such (2) These services and charges, as well as
vehicle... with intent in either case to commit the terms and conditions under which the
larceny therein, shall be fined not more than shipper’s right to be exercised, are, in
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, effect, a contractual matter to be estab-
or both…” lished and governed by the carrier’s tariff
or tender.
c. Such supplementary services are or-

12-26 Legal Considerations dered by the shipper or someone authorized to
For Guards/Escorts act in his behalf. Insofar as the shipment of
Government property by commercial carriers
a. The duty of a common carrier of is concerned, the Government, as a shipper,
property is to provide all reasonable and acts through duly appointed transportation
necessary facilities for safe and efficient officers or their authorized representatives.
transportation of such goods as it holds itself Presently, only a transportation officer or his
out to the public as engaged in carrying. authorized representative may exercise such
responsibilities. The assigned duties and
(1) This includes the duty to carry such responsibilities of armed military escorts are
goods safely and to exercise the care limited to maintenance of security over the
required to protect. them from loss or injury property being transported and do not in any
during transportation. way extend to the ordering of transportation
services, or changes thereto, that might be
(2) These duties are imposed by the com- required in any emergency.
mon law and statute. For this reason, horn
the time goods are turned over to a carrier d. While the right of the shipper to have his
for transportation until final delivery has consignment interrupted, diverted, or re-
been made, a carrier’s liability is that of an routed is based on law, the carrying of escorts
insurer, with certain exceptions (act of or guards provided by shippers to accompany
God, act of the public enemy, act of the shipments is permissive on the part of the
shipper, etc.). earner, and, where authorized, is a matter of
(3) In keeping with the duties and liabili- contract to be spelled out in the carrier’s tariff
ties imposed by law, a carrier, as a bailee of or tender. In this connection, the inclusion of
goods, will necessarily exercise full control annotations on bills of lading setting forth a
and custody over the lading. Accordingly, requirement for escorts and stating their
while the goods are in transit, the carrier, responsibilities would be ineffective unless
not the shipper, is responsible for proper provisions are first spelled out in the carrier’s
care of the goods. tariff or tender.
b. At the same time, the shipper retains the e. A carrier used by a shipper for transpor-
legal right during the time the goods are in tation of special cargo requiring an escort
transit to have his consignment interrupted, may be a contract carrier or a common carrier
216
providing services under a commercial tariff e. Duties of each escort during movement,
or a Section 22 tender. Common carriers stops en route, and during loading and
providing transportation services for the unloading operations.
Government generally provide such services
under Section 22 tenders. The Section 22 f. Emergency and communication proce-
tender, as a commercial tariff, sets forth dures.
services the carrier will perform, applicable
charges, and conditions of shipment. In 12-28 Escort Functions
effect, it is the governing contract. It usually
contains the following provisions relative to Escorts assigned for the protection
armed security guards: of shipments must adhere to the following
guidelines:
When requested by the shipper, an
armed security guard (furnished by the a. Conduct themselves in such a manner
military accompanying the shipment) that the security of matter entrusted to them
will be permitted to ride in the carrier’s will not be prejudiced through carelessness,
vehicle. This guard will be responsible inadvertence, or lack of vigilence. Intoxicants
for the security of the shipment from or drugs that may impair their judgment may
origin to final destination but will not be not be used by escorts while assigned to a
responsible in any way for the operation security shipment.
of the vehicle or the route to be followed.
b. Possess identification cards and carry
f. Authority to direct or otherwise control them at all times while having custody of
movement of the cargo in question will be security shipments. These cards must be
granted to an escort, provided appropriate safeguarded, and the loss of a card must be
provisions are included in the carrier’s tariff reported immediately to the security supervi-
or tender, and the escort is duly appointed to sor.
act as the transportation officer’s representa-
tive for the desired purposes. c. Carry packages on his person, or in
hand-earned containers, until delivered to
consignee whenever practicable.
12-27 Guards/Escort
Instructions d. Provide continuous observation of the
shipment, vehicle, or container and be in a
Instructions and operating proce-
physical position to exercise direct security
dures. Specific written instructions and
controls over the material.
operating procedures must be furnished
escort/guards and will include, but not
e. Maintain liaison, as required, with train
necessarily be limited to, the following:
crews, airport and other transportation
a. General unclassified outline of the personnel, special police, and law enforce-
mission. ment agencies, as appropriate.
b. Name and address of person(s), includ- f. Maintain continuous vigilance when

ing alternate(s), to whom classified matter is escorting security shipments for the presence
to be delivered. of conditions or situations that might
threaten the security of the cargo; take action
c. Receipting procedures. as circumstances might require to avoid
interference with continuous safe passage of
d. Means of transportation and route to be the vehicle; and check seals and locks at each
used. stop where time permits.
217
g. When escorting shipment by aircraft, a. Senior members of the guard must
the escort will not enplane until the cargo report to the officer in charge of cargo
area is secured. The escort should preferably operations for any special instructions. In
be the first person to deplane in order to general, responsibilities of the cargo security
observe the opening of the cargo area. officer (may be the senior guard member)
Advance arrangements with the airline are begin upon arrival at the loading terminal
required. and terminate when relieved by appropriate
authority at the port of debarkation. While
h. Notify the consignor by the fastest the shipment is in the terminal, and provided
means available if there is an unforeseen adequate facilities exist to safeguard the
delay en route, an alternate route is used, or if cargo, temporary custody of shipment maybe
an emergency occurs. If appropriate and if taken by the terminal.
the security of the shipment is involved,
notify the nearest office of the Federal Bureau b. A joint inspection of the condition of the
of Investigation (FBI). following items must be made by the senior
member of the classified cargo guards and a
representative of the terminal commander
12-29 Use of Firearms before and after each operation:
(See AR 190-28) (1) Quarters provided aboard ship or other
carrier as to the cleanliness and adequacy
The responsible commander may for personal occupancy.
require the use of armed guards for protection
of materiel under his jurisdiction. Military (2) Railroad escort car, etc., prior to its
and civil service personnel are authorized to being vacated by the guard(s).
be armed as deemed necessary without
regard to state laws concerning weapons, as c. If possible, a conference is held with the
long as the individual remains within the master of the vessel or his representative,
scope of his orders on bearing and using senior guard member, and loading terminal
arms. Such personnel will comply with the personnel prior to loading classified cargo, to
provisions of federal law when applicable. insure complete understanding of all respon-
Commercial carrier and contractor personnel sibilities involved.
bearing arms in the accomplishment of a
shipment do so under the authority and d. Appropriate receipts covering cargo
control of both state and Federal laws that and/or understanding of instruction or relief
apply. The commercial earner or contractor is of responsibilities must be executed or se-
responsible for arranging any necessary cured by the loading terminal from the senior
permits in this regard. guard member.
Ordinarily, classified shipments do not e. While aboard ship, cargo guards must:
require the arming of escorts. (1) Conduct inspections upon relief of each
guard and during tours of duty of cargo
spaces containing classified cargo, for
12-30 Guards
condition of materiel (if visible), signs of
For Oversea tampering, or pilferage.
Shipments
(2) Maintain an inspection log, noting
When cargo guards arrive at a results of each inspection.
terminal or port to begin escorting a ship
ment, the following general instructions (3) Be immediately responsible to the
apply: master of the vessel. Coordinate duties and
218
inspections with a ship’s officer in a mander of the discharge terminal with
manner that will not interfere with opera- permission of the master of the vessel.
tion of the vessel. Responsibilities aboard
the vessel must be confined to safeguard- 12-31 Sensitive Shipments
ing the classified cargo.
Shipments involving weapons, am-
f. If damage to cargo or other irregularities munition, explosives, and special weapons
are noted, immediately report the facts and and chemicals require special security
circumstances to the master of the vessel, and measures in addition to those discussed
confirm the irregularity in writing. Copies of in this chapter. These additional require-
such reports will be attached to the narrative ments are explained in the following Army
voyage report furnished to the commander of regulations:
the outloading terminal and the oversea (1) ARs 190-11 and 190-49 for weapons,
discharge terminal.
ammunition, and explosives.
g. Photos of damaged or pilfered contain- (2) ARs 50-5, 50-6, and 55-228 for special
ers, if required, will be taken by the com- weapons and chemicals.
219
Chapter 13
Hospital Security
ospital security requires and inte-

grated systems approach for maximum
effectiveness. Therefore, hospital security
requirements must be considered, planned
and implemented in coordination with law
enforcement and police service activities.
And, all of these must consider the daily
internal and extended operations of the
hospital and its many related activities.
220
Responsibilities Section I
13-1 Security Coverage gram. The responsibilities of these positions

include the following:
a. Effective hospital security en-
compasses all of the following Develops policy and standards for crime
prevention and hospital security.
Installation hospitals Performs onsite inspections.
Medical centers (MEDCENS) Guides related law enforcement and police
Medical department activities (MEDDAC service activities within the health care
clinics and dispensaries) system.
Special mission activities. Advises on use of military police.
Maintains crime trend statistical data.
Performs liaison with law enforcement
b. Each MEDCEN or MEDDAC is usually and security elements of higher, lateral, and
composed of several fictional activities subordinate headquarters, and with civil and
which must be considered when establishing other Federal law enforcement personnel.
security measures to prevent pilferage and to
protect sensitive items, equipment, struc-
tures, and key personnel. These activities b. To insure proper security, it is essential
include: that the provost marshal/security officer be
included as a member of construction review
• Dental activities. boards and therapeutic agent boards.
• Veterinary activities.
• Community mental health activities.
• Health and environment activities.
•Pharmacy or any controlled medical c. He provides direct input to contingency
substances storage facilities. planning for
• Medical supply facilities.
• Hospital treatment and care facility. • Field operations and disasters.
• Medical warehouse storage facilities. • Bomb threat/natural disasters, etc.
• Physical security on what, when, where,
and how to best provide it.
• Measures (what the individual should do).
• Techniques (how devices are setup, placed,
13-2 Provost Marshal/Security etc.).
Officer • Devices (what to look for).
a. The Health Services Command

(HSC) director of security and subordinate d. The provost marshal/security officer is
MEDCEN/MEDDAC provost marshals/sec- also responsible for circulation control of
urity officers must direct the command'sd’s vehicles and individuals and for police
crime prevention and hospital security pro- service support as required.
221
Security Considerations Section II
13-3 Circulation Control d. Chapter 4 has more information on

personnel movement control.
Controlling the movement of vehi-
cles and people is a continuous considera-
tion in hospital security. Effective circula- 13-4 Security Lighting
tion control includes the following:
a. Routine use.
a. Routing controls. (1) Within medical treatment facility.
(1) Establish vehicle traffic patterns. (2) Adjacent to medical treatment facility.
(2) Designate pedestrian movement pat- (3) Along all well-traveled foot paths
terns. where possible.
(3) Insure proper use of information signs
and services. b. Special use.
(4) Direct procedures for enforcement.
(1) Prevent/reduce crimes.
(5) Establish visitor parking areas.
(2) Prevent/reduce vehicular and pedes-
trian accidents.
(3) Assist in emergency activities.
(4) Accommodate nighttime circulation
pattern, or vice versa.
b. Special controls.
(5) Entrances to critical areas, sensitive
(1) Patient parking areas. areas, or other access points.
(2) Hospital staff parking areas.
(3) Handicapped person(s) parking areas.
c. Chapter 6, Protective Lighting, contains
(4) Emergency vehicle entrance/exits (en-
more specifics.
forced by MPs).
(5) Emergency vehicle parking areas.
(6) Equipment/supplies offloading.
(7) Taxi/bus pickup points.
(8) Fire department vehicle parking near 13-5 Use of Dogs
water plugs (enforced by MPs).
(9) Law enforcement vehicle parking. a. Patrol and marihuana dogs.
c. Reporting procedures for suspicious (1) Use only with specific permission of
or unidentified persons and activities. medical commander.
222
(2) Detect and prevent unauthorized drugs 13-6 Key and Lock Control
from entering facility.
(3) Emphasis on dog use should be di- AR 190-50, Section II, sets policy for
rected toward entrances to neuropsychiat- key and lock control. Briefly, hospital require-
ric and detoxification wards. ments in this area are:
a. Continual emphasis.
b. Sentry dogs. b. Establishment and implementation of

an aggressive plan.
• Used only outside the medical treatment
facility. c. Use of safeguards for
• In high risk areas.
• Near areas for storage of supplies and Controlled substances (see the Security
equipment. Inspection Checklist below).
223
High cost medical equipment. 13-8 Personnel Screening
Highly pilferable supplies.
Mission essential areas. Because of the vulnerability to
Vulnerable areas. criminal activity of medical property and
Medical supply storage areas. that of patients, military personnel and
civilian employees must be adequately
d. Chapter 8, Locking Systems, has more screened for hospital duty. This also applies
details on lock and key control. to other categories of facilit y workers, such as
contractor employees.
13-7 Intrusion Detection Minimum screening must include a local

Systems (IDS) military and civilian police records check and
an NCIC check.
a. Regular installation and special
hi-weekly testing of IDS/duress alarms Reclassification and discharge proceed-
should be accomplished for medical treat- ings are processed on persons involved in
ment facilities and for medical supply storage criminal activity. This also applies to high
activities. risk military and civilian employees.
b. Alarm annunciation at the military

police station is a necessity, to provide 13-9 Material Control
continuous monitoring capability and an
armed police force response. a. Management and control of med-
ical material is necessary regardless of the
c. See chapter 7, Intrusion Detection Sys- number of times it is exchanged. The follow-
tems for IDS details, and AR 190-50, Section ing items require special security and ac-
II for DA policy. countability:
Figure 82— The IDS must alert the MP station.
224
Controlled substances 13-10 Controlled Substance and
Stored hospital linens Medically Sensitive Items
Expensive medical equipment
Money and valuables a. Require special security and
Other sensitive items. handling to prevent loss and public injury
(par. 2-5, AR 190-50). This includes:
b. Store sensitive and accountable items
away from the mainstream of heavy foot Drugs
traffic to assist in detecting removal. Precious metals
Radioactive medical materiel
c. Equipment and medical substance dis- Needles and syringes.
posal must meet these guidelines:
(1) Equipment will be disposed of IAW b. Consumption of drugs must be by
established regulations and directives. authorized prescription.
(2) Medical substance IAW ARs 40-2, 40- c. See checklist for narcotics and con-
61, and TB Med 291. trolled drugs on page 223.
(3) Disposal must be supervised by ap-
propriate custodial personnel.
(4) Including foodstuffs.
1 3 - 1 1 Intransit Security
Of Controlled -
Medical Substances
And Other Sensitive Items
These items must be protected from

unauthorized possession, use, and theft. The
guiding regulation is AR 40-61.
13-12 Protection of Individuals
a. Special consideration must go to

patients, prisoners, visitors, and the hospital
staff.
b. Patient categories that must be consid-

ered:
(1) VIP—military and civilian.
(2) Active duty personnel.
(3) Dependents (check ID cards with
Figure 83—Unlocked medicine hospital cards).
cabinets invite theft / pilferage. (4) Retirees of all services.
225
13-13 Patients’ Personal and Government property (weapons, ammu-
Property and Valuables nition, etc.).
Security problems are compounded by the

• Retainable money for comfort and con- disruptive effects of
venience items.
• The secured patients’ trust fund. Friends and relatives
Other patients (able/disabled)
• Valuables left on the ward as gifts, etc. Children
• Military pay. Investigating police
News media
• Other personal items (radios, tapes, cloth- Chain of command personnel.
ing, etc.).
These areas should be sealed off to all
except selected medical staff personnel. The
areas may be controlled by military police
13-14 Medical Treatment under special circumstances. Information
points should be designated and identified by
signs.
Records of patient treatment must
not be available to the visiting public. Nor
will the information contained therein be
released during telephone conversations.
These restrictions are covered by the Right To
Privacy Act, DA guidelines, and HSC direc- 13-16 Security Checks
tives on the subject. Personnel awareness
briefings should be held concerning critical- a. Military police, security police or
ity of records to the total individual. interior guards must conduct periodic checks
each shift of isolated structures containing
Records will be released under signature medical items and equipment. HSC security
only. Those involving official investigations staff duty officers, medical, and unit person-
must be released IAW published directives. nel may inspect facilities within hospitals,
When MPs desire private medical informa-
RDT&E complexes and structures, and other
tion on individuals for official use, they must
request it on DA Form 4254-R. Other Federal medical facilities.
law enforcement personnel must make their
requests according to paragraph 4(b), AR 40- b. These checks should be conducted at
42. irregular intervals. Increase frequency dur-
ing hours of darkness or periods of limited
visibility, and on weekends and holidays.
Suspected loss, illegal entry, theft, open or
unlocked facilities or containers, or suspi-
13-15 Emergency Treatment cious incidents must be immediately reported
Facilities
to the nearest military police.
Because the medical treatment staff
is extremely occupied with emergency pa- c. Security for bulk storage facilities,
tients, emergency rooms and triage areas pharmacy storage, medical treatment facili-
pose special security problems regarding ties, TDT&E laboratory facilities must be
patients’ personal property and valuables secured IAW AR 190-50.
226
Security Standards
and Structural Applicability Section Ill
13-17 See AR 190-50 For

Security Standards And
Structural Applicability
Of Controlled
Medical Items
Emergency Utilities System Section IV
13-18 Separate Protection 13-19 Utility Services

Protection of utilities is a vital effort Protection of the following vital
of security police and must be separated from areas must be coordinated and integrated
hospital materials protection. Utilities in- into the installation provost marshal con-
clude the primary power source and the tingency plans:
alternate power source. As a minimum, the
utilities have an impact on the following Water
areas designated as limited access areas: Natural gas
Fuel oil
Emergency treatment facilities Electricity/backup generators
Operating room(s) Telephone
Intensive or special care wards Heating
Pharmacies Air conditioning
Food preparation Air filtration units.
Emergency operation center (EOC)
Communications and control centers
227
Chapter 14
Personal Security of
Designated Individuals
W ith increased incidents of terror-

ism, hostage taking, and kidnapping, the
security of designated individuals is of
extreme importance. Security of designated
individuals is separate and distinct from
protective service missions.
Personnel assigned a physical security

mission in support of the US Secret Service in
accordance with AR 1-4 are subject to
operational control of the Director, US Secret
Service, or his authorized representative for
the duration of their assignment.
228
Since the problems of personal security tion, etc., the preparation of a comprehensive
vary so greatly with each individual case in SOP is virtually impossible. There are,
terms of potential hazards and threats, however, basic factors that must be consid-
political and sociological considerations, ered which can be applied to all situations
geography, environment, mode of transporta- regarding personal security.
Authority and Mission Section I
14-1 Authority military police investigators in the security of

persons under Army control.
The authority to secure designated
individuals is outlined in the following Army e. AR 210-10 states that the security of an
regulations: installation is the responsibility of its com-
• AR 1-4 mander.
• AR 10-23
• AR 190-10
• AR 190-30 14-2 Mission Accomplishment—
• AR 210-10 Delegating Responsibility
a. AR 1-4 prescribes support to the US The installation commander must
Secret Service and specifies that the director designate a physical security officer IAW AR
of this agency or his authorized representa- 190-13. This duty position will normally be in
tive will have operational control over Army the provost marshal security office.
personnel selected for this support.
a. Personal security of designated individ-
b. AR 10-23 pertains to the US Army uals is within the scope of physical security
Criminal Investigation Command. The responsibilities. The skills and other knowl-
principles, procedures, and organizational edge of military police/security personnel
concepts of personal security are provided for give them the background, most easily
law enforcement/security personnel of instal- adaptable to personal security tasks.
lations/activities.
b. The following organizational concepts
c. AR 190-10 refers to the protection of are essential to this mission:
dignitaries not listed in AR 1-4 or 10-23.
(1) Operational personal security teams.
d. AR 190-30 pertains to the employment of (2) Designation of an officer in charge.
229
Protection Procedures Section II
The purpose of a security protection plan is be given full responsibility for all phases of
to minimize the chances of success of any the security mission, such as coordination:
contemplated attack.
(1) Close coordination must be established
with all local military and civilian authori-
ties. On an installation, for example,
coordination must be accomplished with
14-3 Security Principles the headquarters commandant, transpor-
tation officer, intelligence officer, and
a. Every phase of security must be others as applicable. Civilian authorities
carefully considered in advance, to include will include police and other interested
the importance of the protected person, city, county, state, or comparable officials.
political attitude of the population, obstacles
(2) The agencies responsible for each
involved, means of transportation, and
phase of the security plan must be clearly
duration of the security mission.
defined. Arrangements should be made for
local civil police to control local inhabit-
b. Physical protection should consist of a
ants. All available intelligence channels
series of protective cordons, each complete in
should be used to obtain information of
itself. These protective cordons may be
potential danger areas, persons, or groups.
composed of security personnel or physical
barriers, or a combination of both. An (3) Much of this coordination can best be
example of this type of security is the accomplished by an advance party after
protection established around a house desig the official itinerary is received.
nated as a residence for the dignitary. A
protective cordon may include these steps: d. Personnel selected for the security detail
should be mature, experienced, and outstand-
(1) A number of walking patrols around ing in physical appearance and bearing.
the grounds to establish a protective cor- Personnel assigned to a security detail
don. involving regular or frequent contact with the
President, or access to Presidential facilities,
(2) A series of fixed posts at entrances
would provide another form of cordon. are selected in accordance with special
procedures prescribed in AR 614-3.
(3) Security personnel stationed within
the house form the third echelon of protec- e. Technical assistance. In many of the
tion (security in depth). activities and procedures discussed in this
chapter, the assistance of qualified technical
c. Central direction and unity of effort are personnel will be required. For example,
of special importance because of the nature of inspections of buildings will require Engineer
this assignment. The officer in charge should assistance; vehicles, aircraft, and boats
230
should be inspected by trained mechanics. Last-minute changes in the schedule of
Other technical assistance should be ob- events occur routinely. The security plan
tained as necessary. must be sufficiently fluid to cover these and
man y more eventualities, all of which present
f. Continuing personal security opera- hazards.
tions. Certain MP and CID personnel/ a. An excellent format for preparation of a
units have continuing personal security protective plan is the standard operation
assignments to designated persons and order in FM 101-5.
continuing responsibility for their security.
For these personnel/units, all of the responsi- Requirements of the order are:
bilities and tasks described in terms of visits
and tasks in this chapter are continuing Mission
responsibilities and tasks. Ordinarily, these Concept of operation
personnel/units have no other MP or CID Coordination and liaison
responsibilities, and concentrate their total Itinerary areas-of interest
effort on their personal security operations. Personnel and equipment requirements
For the CID protective service responsibili- Cooperation
ties, see USACIDC Pam 195-1. Communication
Logistical support
g. Routes and means of transportation to Public relations
be used by the protected person should not be Emergency information.
publicized. In many instances this is not Command and control.
possible. The itinerary, more often than not, b. The order should be in writing and
receives wide publication. It may be neces- produced in sufficient copies to be staffed
sary that he address public audiences, accept with those officers with whom coordination
invitations to local civilian functions and is necessary. Length of the order will depend
receive delegations at railway stations and upon the size of the mission performed.
airports. Careful scrutiny of the normal
itinerary will reveal many details that need c. Only key personnel need a complete
not be made public. Routes to and from copy, but all protective personnel are given
announced appointments usually need not be an orientation on the contents of the order
revealed. If a series of appointments is and should be familiar with the whole opera-
scheduled for a particular location, routes tion. Each participant commits the require-
should be varied. No publicity should be ments of his specific mission to memory. For
given concerning the mission except that this reason the order contains detailed in-
released by the information officer. Maintain- structions for each post and mission. These
ing secrecy on the movements of the digni- instructions must be simple to understand
tary is one of the most effective means of and easy to execute.
minimizing the opportunity for attack.
d. The itinerary and other information
pertaining to the travel of a person, which is
often attached as an annex may, under
14-4 Contingency Planning certain conditions, be classified in accor-
dance with AR 380-5. Sufficient time must be
Security planning should be flexible. allowed for dissemination of travel informa-
Weather conditions and mechanical failures tion to permit suitable security measures to be
(including failure of lighting systems) are two taken. The key to successful accomplishment
ever-present potential hazards. The unex- of a security mission is detailed continuous
pected arrival of large numbers of visitors is planning and careful selection, training, and
another situation frequently encountered. use of personnel.
231
e. In his planning, as well as in the of each individual in the party of a
execution of his mission the officer in charge protected official.
should use the guidance furnished in other (b) The attitude of the protected person
portions of this manual and other publica- must be estimated by the military police
tions, adapted to his requirement. officer. In some instances the presence of
security personnel is unpleasant to a
f. FMs 19-15 and 19-25 provide valuable dignitary. This is understandable in
guidance in the areas of crowd control and view of the lack of privacy inherent in
traffic control, respectively. TC 19-17, Defen- personal security missions.
sive Driving for Military Police, provides (c) Security personnel must be aware of
information on the proper techniques of this natural reaction, actually antic-
operating a sedan at speeds higher than ipate it, and adhere to strict policies of
normal. All of these publications should be nonirritating conduct. In the initial
studied and used by the officer in charge. planning stages, all potential embar-
rassment should be avoided. It is nor-
mally good policy to avoid direct contact
14-5 Mission Orientation with the dignitary on details of arrange-
ments. The officer in charge should
An orientation should be conducted coordinate with a member of the official
by the officer in charge of the protection plan, party who is designated for this purpose.
during which he explains filly the content of (2) When the protected person ignores
the plan. Examples of topics to be emphasized measures taken for his protection, mili-
are: tary police continue to perform their duties
as directed. When appropriate, the officer
a. Conduct and Demeanor of Security in charge offers suggestions tactfully.
Personnel.
(1) Military police assigned to these duties (a) Enforcement power over the security
are selected on the basis of their of the protected person is exercised by
appearance, alertness, and intelligence, as the chief of the escort only, and then only
well as their ability to act quickly and with caution and diplomacy.
correctly in unforeseen circumstances (b) Any violation of security measures
(chapter 9). They are informed that no by any member of the party of the
risks are taken with the safety and well- protected person is brought to the
attention of the chief of the escort or
being of important persons. Protective
guard. The military police officer insures
personnel, to perform their mission
that guards comply with every detail of
efficiently, must understand the
their instructions.
terminology peculiar to an assignment of
this type. For example, a personal security (3) Restrictions on the circulation of
guard mission may require a single individuals should be strictly enforced.
bodyguard, a security guard unit or an Before any person is allowed to approach
escort unit. the dignitary or his effects, the person is
checked carefully for identification and the
(a) The mission may incIude direct or authority for his presence is established.
indirect protection or escort duty. Direct
Protective personnel should quickly learn
protection is open and obvious; indirect
to recognize all employees and regular
is generally a surveillance measure. The
visitors calling on the dignitary.
security guard unit may operate as an
interior guard and may consist of one or (a) Advance lists should be obtained
more men stationed at fixed posts. when a group of visitors is expected.
Military police should know the identity Arrangements should be made with a
232
Figure 84—Sample MP placement and observation zones for convoy route security.
Air cover with radio communications is recommended when appropriate.
member of the official party to identify areas, or dangerous places. They also flank
and vouch for any unrecognized visitor. and follow him.
(b) Visitors should be admitted only at
(5) Bodyguards must exercise constant
specified entrances and control should vigilance over the protected person; remain
be maintained to insure that they at all times a very short distance from him;
proceed directly to their approved desti-
and afford him constant protection. Body-
nations. Members of the security detail guards should always be armed, be experts
must be especially tactful and diplo- in the use of weapons, first aid measures,
matic in performing this function to know the fundamentals of judo, be well
avoid offending some unrecognized briefed as to the itinerary of the person
dignitary. being protected, and well rehearsed in
responding to emergencies.
(4) Military police are stationed so that
they can observe everyone and everything (6) The security detail should not enter
in the immediate vicinity of the protected into conversation between the protected
person. For example, if the dignitary is in person and other individuals. Information
an automobile convoy and military police should be given only when solicited. All
are lining sections of the route, a few MPs dealings with the protected person and his
will be designated to face in the direction of associates should be on a formal basis.
the dignitary, but the majority will face the Security detail personnel should never
crowd so they can observe any suspicious become involved with providing personal
movement (figure 84). They investigate services for dignitaries or members of their
unusual or suspicious actions tactfully and parties. Attempts to ingratiate themselves
promptly. MPs place themselves between only serve to degrade the security mission
the protected person and any individual and result in an undesirable relationship.
acting suspiciously. They precede the If the protected person or members of his
protected person into buildings, crowded party are friendly in their approach to the
233
153-846 O - 94 - 11
security detail, security personnel should control. They should not show prejudice or
react accordingly. However, the intimacy sympathy, or become involved in any griev-
of the relationship should be established ances expressed by the crowd.
by the MP officer in charge. In the absence
of guidance from him, an impersonal, (1) When force is necessary, protective
business-like approach to personal contact forces should move with speed and sur-
should be the rule. prise. At the first sign of disorder, all
leaders should be apprehended by person-
b. Use of Weapons. There is always the nel specifically assigned such duties. The
danger of accidental discharge and injury of
real troublemakers are usually to the rear
innocent persons when weapons are carried. of the crowd.
All protective personnel must be qualified to
fire the weapons with which they are armed. (2) Protective forces should not be fooled
The numbers and types of weapons earned or deterred by mob leaders who arouse and
should be appropriate to the situation and use women and children in front ranks to
any indicated threat based on intelligence shield themselves from aggressive action
reports on the situation and the mission. In a by protective personnel. The crowd’s re-
security mission, the weapons should be treat should never be hindered; it should be
ready for use. moved in the direction where there is space
to disperse.
(1) MPs in close contact with the protected
person should carry a holstered sidearm of
d. Conduct and demeanor, use of weapons,
at least .38 caliber. Automatic pistols
and crowd control are just a few of the many
should contain a fully loaded magazine
topics which might be included in the
with a round in the chamber and the safety
orientation or training of personnel prepar-
on. ing for a security mission. The complete list of
(2) In areas where attackers may fire from subjects depends on the experience of the
a distance, the rifle is valuable. When protective force and the specific mission it is
attacks are made in force by armed mobs, to perform. Necessary training should be
the machinegun can be used. The machine conducted using, as applicable, FM 19-10,
gun is also used when attacks are made Military Police Operations, FM 19-15, Civil
from vehicles, and when attackers are Disturbance Operations; FM 19-25, Military
behind shields or barricades. Police Traffic Control; FM 19-20, Law En-
forcement Investigations; and USACID Pam
(3) Riot or shotguns should be available
195-1, Protective Services.
when the attack is made in a congested
area where there is danger of injuring
innocent persons if long-range weapons
were used. They are also effective against 14-6 Special Requirements
mobs using suicidal attacks.
As in other phases of law enforce-
(4) Use of police nightsticks and riot ment, investigative functions, physical secu-
control agents will break up and confuse a rit y, and security of designated individuals,
crowd, making their movement by the special requirements must be adhered to. As a
protective force easier. The provisions of minimum, the following should be considered
AR 190-28 must be thoroughly understood applicable:
by all protective personnel. They must use
only that degree of force reasonably a. Advance Party Duties. Normally, the
necessary. advance party is composed of at least two
c. Crowd control. Protective personnel accredited military police criminal investiga-
should understand the principles of crowd tors. They should be given written authority
234
defining their mission, which is to coordinate tives from his office. It is important that
and elicit cooperation from various agencies. the advance party keep in regular contact
They should make a conscious effort to avoid with the officer in charge for changes in
giving the impression that they are usurping schedule and transmission of special
local authority or prerogatives. Their specific information. The advance party briefs the
duties start upon receipt of the dignitary’s officer in charge on the local situation upon
itinerary. The officer in charge of the detail his arrival, and then moves to the next area
will indicate the advance party’s responsibili- on the itinerary.
ties. Usually the areas involved will be b. Area and Building Surveys. All
located at distances too far removed for the areas to be occupied or visited by the
officer in charge to make personal reconnais- protected person should be surveyed in
sance. It is essential that advance party advance. The procedure to be described for
members be fully briefed in all phases of the building inspections is complete and thor-
planned activities. ough. In many instances the dignitary is a
(1) Specific information that they will house guest of the commanding general on a
require include: military installation, on, other occasions he
• Complete list of the official party and may be the house guest of a high-ranking
staff. governmental official. At times he may stay
• Duration of the visit, including arrival in a hotel occupied by numerous other guests.
and departure times. Certainly, all of the inspections listed in this
• Name of officials to be contacted. section are not feasible.
• List of buildings, billets, and areas to be (1) The officer in charge and his advance
visited by the dignitary. party must use common sense and sound
(2) In each area, their activities follow a judgment in establishing the best security
similar pattern. They coordinate with the possible under existing circumstances. In
local provost marshal, military intelli- some instances the advance party can
gence, local police, FBI, and other agencies facilitate security measures by arranging
such as the office of special investigations, for a separate house or separate floor or
and office of Naval intelligence, to define wing of a hotel as a billet for the official
security responsibilities. In each case, one party. Normally, billeting arrangements
of the agencies involved should have the are included in the itinerary prior to the
authority and primary responsibility for start of the security detail.
coordinating the protective efforts of all
personnel involved in the operations. This (2) Proper building inspection entails a
agency, once designated by the senior thorough examination from roof to base-
commander in the area, or by the senior ment. Blueprints of the building should be
civilian law enforcement agency chief, will obtained. Rooms and hallways are mea-
establish a working liaison with other sured visually and compared with the
agencies involved. The advance party dimensions indicated on the building plan
contacts all local intelligence channels for to locate possible hidden passageways or
pertinent information. Necessary maps alcoves. Each room is examined systemati-
and diagrams are obtained. They survey cally. Walls, ceilings, and floors are men-
all areas to be occupied by the dignitary for tally divided into three foot squares and
layout, potential hazard, and amount and each square minutely examined for cracks,
types of protective forces needed. They evidence of recent repairs and any unnatu-
conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the ral appearance.
dignitary’s mute of travel. When a provost (3) Suspicious areas should be explained
marshal is located in the area, these satisfactorily by reliable operating or
surveys are conducted with representa- maintenance personnel. All furniture is
235
carefully examined; all doors opened and (2) The security vehicle should follow the
drawers removed as a check for concealed protected vehicle as closely as possible
compartments. All wires leading into or consistent with driving safety. An advance
leaving the various rooms are traced, and car should precede the convoy by approxi-
all devices connected with them identified. mately one half mile to observe hazards
Heating radiators, plumbing pipes, and and report on any unusual conditions.
similar equipment is carefully examined
(3) A reserve vehicle should follow the
for dummy installations. All locks and
convoy a short distance in the rear for use
locking mechanisms are inspected. After
in emergencies. The escort, follow-up, and
the inspection is completed, the room or
all security vehicles should maintain radio
building is secured until used.
contact. Whenever possible, a member of
the security detail is placed in the protected
14-7 Techniques of Protection person’s vehicle. Under extreme condi-
tions, when greater security is necessary,
a. Protection demands teamwork. one or two dummy vehicles, carrying
individuals similar in appearance to the
Success depends upon the cooperation and
assistance of others. The failure of one protected official, may be included in the
individual may nullify the efforts of the entire convoy.
organization. All personnel should be trained (4) Fixed posts at bridges, underpasses,
for the ideal system and attempt to approach and railroad crossings may be established
that system as closely as circumstances when deemed necessary. An alternate
permit. Protective personnel must be re- route should be arranged for emergency
hearsed so well that in an emergency, despite requirements. Unless indicated otherwise
excitement and emotion, they will instinc- by competent authority, the convoy will
tively act correctly. Protective personnel conform with local traffic regulations and
must be familiar with the characteristics of will maintain a rate of speed consistent
all phases of a protective mission to include with road conditions.
the special techniques for protecting the
dignitary when he is traveling by motor (5) Each situation is evaluated to deter-
vehicle, train, air, small boat, while walking, mine the degree of security that is practical
and at public assemblies. and necessary. For example, on a military
installation it is normal procedure for
ranking officers to ride in the vehicle
b. Protection While Riding in Vehi-
cles. The selection of the type vehicle to be immediately behind the escorted official’s
used should be given thought. Whereas the vehicle. The security vehicle may drop
behind and follow at a discreet distance
closed car provides greater concealment and
when hazards are minimal. Good judg-
therefore better protection for a protected
ment on the part of the officer in charge
person, the open vehicle, such as the army 1/4
will be necessary in solving the various
ton truck, provides much better maneuvera-
bility and observation. situations that arise. Figure 85 shows a
typical motorcade arrangement.
(1) All automotive equipment should be in c. Travel by Train. Generally, the great-
excellent mechanical condition and should est potential security hazards exist at the
be regularly inspected for signs of tamper- points where the protected person boards or
ing. Drivers should be well-trained and leaves the train. Usually, this is a congested
reliable. Vehicles must be secured at all area with numerous individuals carrying all
times during the security mission. An sorts of bags, packages, and containers. In
escort vehicle should precede the protected the study of assassination techniques, the
vehicle. large number of attempts in this type of
236
Figure 85—Motorcade arrangement.

location is noteworthy. When possible, the as in train movements, are boarding and
area should be closed to the general public or departure times.
the protected person should board at an
isolated siding. (1) All structures offering observation of
When a private car is assigned the party, it the boarding area should be adequately
should be attached to the rear of the train. The secured either by closing off when not used
security detail should be in control of all or by strategic placement of a security
entrances of the car. When the train is detail. When a large crowd is expected for
stopped they assume positions covering all take-off ceremonies, barricades and large
avenues of approach to the car. forces of uniformed military and/or civil-
If the protected person leaves the train for a ian police should be included in the plan-
temporary period, constant security should ning. The plane designated for the protect-
be maintained on the train until the protected ed person should be kept under constant
person returns and the train departs. Prior guard when not operational. All unauthor-
coordination should be made with railway ized persons should be kept away from
officials for exact scheduling of stops en contact with the plane.
route. Railroad police and local police at
(2) When the destination is another base,
scheduled stops can be contacted for standby advance arrangements should be made
assistance. with the local provost marshal for addi-
When deemed necessary, advance and rear tional security and transportation require-
guard trains may be scheduled to precede and ments as needed. Sufficient transportation
follow the official train at safe distances,
is normally scheduled for the protected
Under certain circumstances, additional
person and his party. It should not be
security personnel may be placed in other
forgotten, however, that arrangements
cars of the train, seated among passengers, as must be made for accompanying security
an additional safeguard.
personnel.
d. Travel by Air. Normally, a special
plane is assigned for transporting the digni- e. Travel by Small Watercraft. When
tary and his official party. Technical safety planning for a cruise, the boats selected
factors such as clearance of operating person- should be of a type and size capable of
nel and control in flight are responsibilities of withstanding weather and surf conditions
the operating agency when performed by the that may be encountered. A thorough inspec
military forces. The most dangerous periods, tion of the boat designated for the protected
237
person should be made with responsible ship the staff and frequent visitors. Food suppliers
personnel. The inspection is primarily for should be checked and food selection and
unauthorized persons stowing away and for handling should be controlled. Mail and
any suspicious objects or packages. An packages should be fluoroscope. Periodic
additional check should be made for adequate inspections should be made of premises for
lifesaving and emergency facilities. Security safety hazards, lethal devices, and suffi-
personnel should be alert for other craft ciency of security equipment. Adequate
approaching the protected person’s boat. communications should be maintained. All
Arrangements should be made for boats to possible emergency situations should be
precede and follow the protected boat. considered. Persons providing personal or
domestic services for the dignitary and his
f. Protection While Walking. One of the party should be screened in advance and
best protective measures is varying the should receive a security briefing prior to the
selection of walking times and routes. The dignitary’s arrival. Accomplishing this task
security detail accompanying the protected is the responsibility of the advanced party.
person should be positioned to cover all
avenues of access. Additional security per- 14-8 Critique
sonnel should be available in the area. A And After Action Report
security vehicle should cruise in the immedia-
ate vicinity. Local police agencies can be of a. The critique is the final stage of
special value in adding background security the security mission. It is conducted so that
in these instances.
all participants will have a clear, orderly idea
of what was done properly and what was
g. Protection at Public Assemblies. A done improperly. To improve operations,
careful search and inspection of the area intelligent, tactful, and constructive criticism
should be made at the time protection is is necessary. The critique can be most
established. A physical defense zone should effective if held as soon as practicable after
be set up immediately around the protected the mission is completed.
person and additional concentric defense
areas should be added to the greatest possible (1) The critique is so important that it
extent. Protection in the defense zone is must be considered a phase of the security
provided by protective personnel, permanent mission itself. The effectiveness of this
or temporary type barricades, and a combina- phase depends upon the flexibility with
tion of the above two resources. Screening which the officer in charge employs it. In
points should be established to admit passage conducting the critique, the officer in
of authorized persons and materials. Obser- charge must not be sarcastic; he must
vant and inconspicuous security personnel make criticism or comments in a straight-
should patrol among the crowd. Maximum forward, impersonal manner. He should
use should be made of security aids such as criticize individuals in private; praise
flood and spotlights, communications, them in public. Participants should leave
emergency equipment, special weapons, the critique with a favorable attitude
locks, barricaded areas, and bulletproof toward the security mission and a desire to
equipment and materials. improve the next one. Examples of per-
sonal initiative or ingenuity, type of errors,
h. Protection While in a Residence. and ways for correcting them should be
The protective detail should occupy at least covered specifically. Protective personnel
one protective ring. At least two additional should be encouraged to participate in the
areas should be established on the outer controlled discussion. They feel then that
perimeter. There must be a pass system for the critique is a period for learning rather
238
than a time set aside for criticism of their brings out the weaker points and makes
performance. suggestions for improvement. He must
be careful not to talk down to the group.
(2) Steps in conducting the critique. All remarks must be specific and imper-
The critique cannot be planned as thor-
sonal. Personnel will not profit from
oughly as other phases of the mission,
generalities.
because the points to be covered are
(d) Control the group in
influenced directly by the performance of
discussion— The officer in charge will
protective personnel. Advance planning
discuss the points he has mentioned and
can include the time and place of the
suggest other points for discussion.
critique, and the general outline to be
(e) Summarize— The critique is con-
followed. During other stages the officer in
cluded with a brief but comprehensive
charge and supervisors can take notes to
summation of the points brought out.
guide the critique, but detailed planning is
The officer in charge can suggest study
not practical. However, the officer in and practice to overcome deficiencies.
charge can insure complete coverage of the The critique is business-like. It must not
important elements by following this
degenerate into a lecture.
general procedure:
(a) Restate objective of the b. The after-action report is a resume—
mission— This will enable participants highlights of the security mission, written in
to start on a common ground. This is narrative style. It is written as soon after
necessary because the participants who completion of the mission as practicable.
were concerned with a particular aspect
of the subject may have forgotten the (1) Notes taken by supervisory personnel
overall objective. during the operations will serve as a basis
(b) Review procedures and tech- for compiling this report. Emphasis is
niques employed— In this step briefly placed upon the difficulties encountered
summarize the methods used to attain and the procedures necessary to eliminate
the objective. them.
(c) Evaluate performance—This is (2) Recommendations for improvement,
the most important part of the critique. especially in planning, coordination, per-
Using notes taken during the mission, sonnel and equipment, are written in
the officer in charge points out and detail. A file copy is retained for use in
discusses the strong points. Then he improving future operations.
239
Chapter 15
Nuclear Reactor Facilities
his chapter outlines minimum

security-in-depth measures for the safeguard-
ing of Department of the Army nuclear
reactor facilities. It is designed to assist Army
commands, installations, and activities that
have design control and operate active
nuclear reactor facilities. However, it is
recognized that because of physical plant
differences, not all requirements will apply.
240
• Closed circuit television surveillance sys-
15-1 Security Engineering tems (appendix M).
• Computerized microwave system hard-
Security engineering begins with the ware and software.
selection of a site. It entails a security
assessment of the construction blueprints
and considers the following:
Site isolation 15-4 Prevention and Protection

Access routes
Security force location and response time a. Protect nuclear reactor facilities
Landscape from all forms of sabotage, espionage, and
Terrain characteristics overt attacks.
Climate.
b. Prevent theft or diversion of special
nuclear material.
c. Prevent unauthorized access and dam-
15-2 Responsibilities age to nuclear reactor facilities.
a. Security standards and mea-

sures for US Army reactor facilities are
provided by the Deputy Chief of Staff for 15-5 Essential Requirements
Personnel. Supervision, guidance, and sup-
port for the protection of Army nuclear a. Restricted areas criteria.
reactor facilities is provided by the responsi-
ble command and installation staffs. AR 385- AR 380-20, Restricted Areas, establishes
80 outlines other Army staff agency responsi- that exclusion/vital areas must be sur-
bilities in protection of US Army nuclear rounded by structural barriers and have
reactor facilities. appropriate signs posted. (See chapter 4,
also).
b. The reactor commander must comply
with all applicable physical security stan- Areas contain:
dards, measures, and procedures (ARs, DNA, • Special nuclear material (SNM).
DOD, NRC, etc.). He must develop and • Nuclear reactor(s).
maintain a comprehensive security plan • Control consoles.
(chapter 3, AR 50-5).
Contained within a limited area also
surrounded by at least an additional struc-
tural barrier (see chapter 5, Protective Barri-
ers).
b. Special nuclear material storage

15-3 Security Components areas.
For a Reactor Facility
(1) If not installed in the reactor assembly,
• Guard forces (chapter 9).
construction of walls, roof, and floor will be
• Access controls (chapter 4).
of one of the following
• Explosive and metal detectors (appendix
D). • Steel at least 1½-inches thick.
• Identification systems (chapter 4). • Nonreinforced concrete at least 12
• Intrusion detection devices (chapter 7). inches thick.
241
Figure 86—Palm print readers help

control access.
(2) Access doors must meet these guide- (1) Access control procedures and equip-
lines: ment are different from host installation
badges (section XI, AR 606-5, and chapter 4
Kept to a minimum. of this manual).
Constructed of steel at least 1 inch thick. (2) Formal entry control rosters must be
Exclusive of the locking mechanism. maintained.
Secured with at least 2 locking devices. (3) A visitor control system must be
Locks must consist of a three-position, established. The system should be periodi-
manipulation-resistant, dial-type, built-in cally reviewed to determine who visits the
combination and any one high-security facility most and when.
padlock with high-security hasps.
(4) Package, material and vehicle control
must include:
c. Entry control must be formalized and • A positive system.
maintained. It must insure positive identifi- •Prevention of unauthorized removal of
cation prior to admission and restrict access SNM—a necessity.
to limited and exclusion areas. • Any sealed package requires a signed
242
Figure 87—Electric card reader. Figure 88—Example of digital code

access control equipment.
DA Form 1818, Individual Property Pass. ❑ Digital code access control.

Authority to sign DA Form 1818 must
be designated in writing. Reactor com- 15-6 Intrusion Detection
manders may designate other items to be Systems
controlled by DA Form 1818.
● Other packages and material must be
These systems were discussed at
examined for unauthorized items. length in chapter 7. At this point we’ll list
(5) Vehicle entry to restricted area must be their special application at nuclear facilities.
limited to mission-essential vehicles only.
■ Used in unoccupied nuclear reactor facility
(6) Types of equipment suitable for access exclusion/vital areas.
control to a nuclear reactor facility. ■ All alarms must sound in at least one
❑ Palm print readers (figure 88) continuously manned station.
❑ Signature identification devices ■ Station does not need to be located onsite.
❑ Electric card readers (figure 87) ■ Alarm sounding must indicate where the
❑ Fingerprint readers alarm was caused and vital areas identified
❑ Voiceprint identification accordingly.
243
Figure 89—Sample IDS application at a nuclear facility.
Alarms must be: Date and time of activation

Self-checking king. Details of response by security guards.
Tamper-indicating.
Functionally tested for operability and
required performance at the beginning and
end of each interval during which they are 15-7 Lock and Control Key
used. Control
Tested not less frequently than once
every 24 hours. a. Each SNM storage structure
entrance must be secured with at least two
Alarm annunciator panel (monitor) loca- locking devices.
tion must be identified and secured.
Record must be maintained of each alarm b. Other entrance doors or gates to the
(nuisance alarm, alarm check/test, tamper facility must be secured with a locking device
indication). The record must show the follow- that provides protection equal to MILSPEC
ing information: 17802.
Identify type of alarm
Alarm location c. Custodian of keys and locks to buildings
Alarm circuit or ar33eas containing SNM must be designated
244
by the reactor commander, in writing. Keys ❑ Inventories must reflect the following:
must be available only to authorized individ- ● Serial numbers
uals. ● Quantity
● Weight
d. Key registers must be maintained. ● Be recorded and authenticated.
e. During nonworking hours depositories
must be available where keys are secured.
Keys must not be removed from the facility
and no one individual will have access to
both keys and/or combinations of a structure
containing SNM.
f. At the end of each operational shift or 15-9 SNM Hazard/

period, inventories must be made concerning Inaccessibility
key registers, key boards, and key deposito-
ries. Inventories must remain on file at least
60 days. In case of incidents involving ● If radioactive and it presents a
investigations, they must be maintained on health hazard, SNM item must be inaccessi-
file until the investigation is terminated. ble.
● A joint inventory must be conducted by
g. Six-month requirements: custodian and a disinterested person.
● Railway type seal (or equivalent) must be
■ Key padlock rotation. used and affixed through the high-security
■ Combinations on combination locks must hasp.
be changed immediately upon compromise, ● All seal serial numbers must be recorded.
transfer, or loss of individual with knowledge ● Excess seals must have the same degree of
of combination. security as keys and high security locks and
■ Records of the 6-month requirements must hasps.
remain on file for 1 year. ● Seals must be inspected daily by custodian
or alternate.
● Seal inspection results remain on file for at
least 60 days, or longer, in case of an investi-
gation.
15-8 Custodian and Inventories

❑ A primary and alternate custo- 15-10 Communications
dian must be designated in writing, concern-
ing responsibility and accountability. a. Each individual controlling ac-
❑ The primary custodian or his alternate cess into limited, exclusion or vital areas
must conduct weekly inventories. must maintain positive communications
❑ Irregularity must be immediately reported with an individual at a continuously manned
to the proper authority. location. The individual at the continuously
❑ A joint monthly inventory must be con- manned location will call for assistance from
ducted by the custodian and a disinterested other guards or the response force, if neces-
person. sary.
245
b. As a minimum, one two-way voice radio b. Commanders must develop emergency
communication link will be established in procedures to cope with any unauthorized
addition to conventional telephone service presence and/or activity in the limited exclu-
between security posts and supporting secu- sion/vital areas. As a minimum, a 15-man re-
rity agencies. sponse force must be able to reach a security
problem within 5 minutes of verified discov-
c. All communications equipment must be ery. In the case of an unverified problem, the
capable of remaining operable from inde- 5 minutes begin when two or three members
pendent power sources in the event of loss of of the force verify the problem and call for the
primary power. Such independent power remainder of the force. Security and response
sources may be provided through standby force personnel will use the force necessary to
generators or batteries. prevent any unauthorized attempts to re-
move special nuclear material from the facili-
d. Communications equipment will be ty. Commanders must make provisions for
tested for operability y and performance not any additional response forces that may be
less than once at the beginning of each required during times of emergency. These
workshift. contingency provisions must be included as
an annex to the physical security plan. Plans
e. Positive procedures must be developed should be kept current and, as a minimum,
to provide notice when a limited or exclusion tested semiannually.
area is in a state of duress.
c. Security and response forces should be
armed with a mix of weapons suitable to the
environment in which they will be employed.
15-11 Protective Lighting

Security lighting must be provided
to discourage unauthorized entry and to 15-13 Survey and Plan
facilitate detection of intruders approaching
or attempting to gain entry into the facilities. A physical security survey should be
Perimeter and access control point lighting conducted by qualified physical security
will be positioned to prevent blinding of specialists of each facility. DA Form 2806,
sentries from glare and to avoid silhouetting Physical Security Survey, should be used and
or highlighting of sentries. Such lighting copies of the survey, including reports of
must be controlled by the securit y force. (See corrective action if required, forwarded
chapter 6 for specifics on protective lighting.) through command channels to HQDA
(DAPE-HRE), WASH DC 20310 (AR 190-13).
A physical security plan should be pre-

pared for each nuclear reactor facility and be
15-12 Security Force integrated with the plans of host military
installations. Guidance and format for the
a. Commanders will plan for an physical security plan are contained in
armed force of sufficient strength and compo- appendix F. Detailed specifications, photo-
sition to insure enforcement of established graphs, drawings, guard orders, and sketch
security measures and to detect unauthorized maps, as appropriate, should be included as
presence or activity of persons within the annexes. Plans should be reviewed and
limited or exclusion area on a 24-hour basis. approved at major command level.
246
15-14 Shipment Security d. Security is governed by:
a. Intra-installation transportation ● AR 55-355, and Department of Transporta-

security is a command responsibility, and tion, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations
procedures should be developed accordingly. (CFR) when commercial camera are used.
● Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
b. All transfers of special nuclear material Title 10, Part 73, CFR, when SNM is trans-
between security areas should be escorted by ported in coordination with the NRC or when
at least two people, one of whom is armed. Department of Energy courier service is used.
Escorts should have radio communications
capability, as appropriate.
c. Personnel must be trained in civil 15-15 Definitions

disturbance formations and small unit tac-
tics (FM 19-15 and TC 7-1). See appendix S.
247
Chapter 16
Military and Civil

Works Projects
T his chapter establishes security

doctrine for civil works facilities and for
Corps of Engineers hydroelectric power
plants, dams, flood control structures, navi-
gational locks and dams, floating and land
plants, resident/project engineer offices,
compounds, warehouses, auxiliary facilities,
projects, and construction sites.
248
Planning Considerations Section I
Physical security planning for Corps of 16-3 Security Aspects

Engineers projects should be based on a total
integrated systems approach and should a. In providing security to projects,
include, as a minimum, the following factors: district engineers should use well designed,
■ Environmental and human aspects of the quality perimeter fencing (OCE Drawing 40-
16-08) which, where feasible, is lighted during
project to include criminal, political, and
hours of darkness to deny or discourage
economic considerations, accessibility, and
access to critical facilities or areas. Perimeter
locality.
■ Importance of the projector activity to the security fencing must be standard Corps of
Engineers design or an aesthetic design
national defense, OCE using agency, and
equally secure and be set back sufficiently
environment.
from the facility to prevent damage from
■ Vulnerability of the project to loss, theft,
explosives or flammable material thrown
pilferage, or willful damage of equipment or
into the area. Where not practical to erect
supplies.
barrier fencing, ground level windows should
■ Operational requirements to include aes-
be covered by heavy gauge security screen or
thetics and access to the public.
equivalent aesthetic designed security mate-
rial.
b. Also necessary are systems for vehicle

and personnel control, adequate communica-
16-1 Applicability tions (secure inhouse telephone systems),
effective liaison with responsible law enforce-
Guidance contained in this chapter ment agencies, and a security awareness
applies to all Corps of Engineers divisions, program for all Corps personnel.
districts, and field operating agencies.
c. Permanent hire personnel deemed by

the district engineer as being in a noncritical/
sensitive position, should undergo limited
and/or extended NACI checks.
16-2 Basic Philosophy
The basic philosophy of the Corps of d. All personnel should be trained thor-
Engineers encourages maximum use of oughly prior to assumption of duties and
projects for educational and recreational responsibilities. Training should be designed
purposes. However, access to project facilities to accommodate formalized training (class-
considered vulnerable/critical as defined in room), informal training (on-the-job), and on-
this chapter should be restricted or denied. going training. Passing criteria, evaluation
249
Figure 91—Typical protective fence for dam with highway.
and efficiency ratings should be used to the to the location of civil works projects, it may
maximum. Where contract guards are em- be necessary to develop special security
ployed, specific levels of proficiency expected requirements for certain projects. For exam-
should be identified in the contract specifica- ple, a dam that has a state or Federal
tion (appendix G). highway across the top, transformers, and/or
switch yards, may be protected by fencing as
shown in figure 91. The primary objective
e. Discussion and/or communications should be to maintain a controlled security
concerning project security measures should posture. Generally, this posture can be
be safeguarded. Written communication attained by imposing reasonable restrictions
should be designated “FOR OFFICIAL USE of free access to critical areas of a project.
ONLY,” and discussion restricted to persons When establishing the degree of protection
with a need to know. Appropriate secure necessary, security requirements should be
communications procedures should be used coordinated with the district security officer,
in all transmissions. who, in turn, should coordinate with local law
enforcement agencies in establishing a threat
f. Because of varying conditions relating analysis.
250
Hydroelectric Power Plants Section II
Hydroelectric power plants are generally Corps personnel. During high visitation
the primary feature of a multipurpose pro- periods, trained temporary hire guides may
ject. They are designed, constructed and be used to greet the public and conduct
operated by the US Army Corps of Engineers supervised tours. Controlled visitation
with civil funding appropriated by Congress should prevail at all times.
and are located throughout the United
States. These facilities are used for:
b. Packages, briefcases, camera and gad-
❑ Flood control get bags, suitcases, etc., must not be per-
❑ Electric power production mitted in any area of the powerhouse.
❑ Public recreation
❑ Fishing
❑ Boating
❑ Land conservation c. Explosive material should not be al-
❑ Forestry. lowed within or near the powerhouse or
switch yards. Firearms should also be prohib-
ited except when carried by authorized Corps
personnel or persons in the law enforcement
community. During the winter season, on
16-4 Critical/Sensitive weekends, holidays, and at other times when
Functional Areas public visitor activities cannot be monitored,
powerhouse entrances and parking area
The following areas demand secu- gates should be kept locked.
rity attention:
❑ Powerhouses
❑ Switchyards 16-6 Security Measures
❑ Intake/outlet structures
❑ Transformers ● Fence/barriers (chapter 5).
❑ Generators. ● Protective lighting (chapter 6).
● Intrusion detectors and sensors (chapter 7).
● Metal and explosive detectors (appendix
D).
● Access control and identification systems
16-5 Public Access (chapter 4).
● Closed circuit television surveillance (ap-
a. The general public should be pendix M).
given access to only the visitor’s lobby, ● Lock and key control (chapter 8).
display areas, overlook facilities, and rest- ● Security force (chapter 9).
rooms associated therewith, unless on a ● Contingency forces (chapter 9).
conducted tour under the direct supervision of ● Contractor personnel (appendix G).
251
Figure 92—Sample security setup for dam, including CCTV.
252
16-7 Intrusion Detection greatly improve security and public safety,
Devices especially for remote facilities such as the
following (see appendix M):
These devices are especially ideal for
remote facilities or land areas adjacent to ❑ Switchyards
dam structures. Detailed explanation is ❑ Transformers
contained in specific Corps of Engineers ❑ Head and tail water
regulations and chapter 7 of this manual. ❑ Powerhouse compounds.
16-9 Guard Forces
16-8 Closed Circuit Television During maximum security condi-

tion, security officers should identify areas
In an effort to monitor personnel for guard forces, to include static, mobile, and
activity, the use of CCTV (figure 92) will response force protection.
Dams Section Ill
16-10 Control Structures
Flood control dams provide flood

control as well as water supply, public
recreation, fishing, boating, land and
forestry conservation.
a. The control structure, generally a

concrete tower-type building at the dam site,
houses the inlet and outlet control gates and
is the critical facility at such projects (figure
93). Project visitation is encouraged;
however, p u b l i c a c c e s s t o c o n t r o l
mechanisms should be denied or restrained.
Increased physical security measures should
be taken to safeguard all facilities housing
Figure 93-Detail of control structure. control mechanisms.
253
b. Since intake valves are critical to the 16-11 Protective Lighting
operation of the entire dam structures, the
following special security measures should be Protective lighting should be used to
considered: illuminate critical control structures and be of
(1) Use of personnel surveillance/CCTV sufficient brightness for observation of criti-
to detect floating or drifting high explo- cal areas such as intake and outlet structures.
sives into the dam’s intake valves. Transformer decks, generators, switchyards,
exterior powerhouse doors/gates should be
(2) Use of buoy lines or log booms strategi-
cally placed in front of intake valves to considered in developing any protective
prevent access. lighting plan.
Navigational Locks and Dams Section IV
Navigational locks and dams (figure 94) briefcases, or suitcases will be permitted in
are the primary features of US inland critical areas.
navigational systems located throughout the
United States and its possessions. These
facilities provide an economical means of
water transportation which is critical to the 16-13 Security Safety
national economy.
Access to the lock wall should be
secured by fencing (Corps of Engineers
Standard Drawing 40-16-08, Type FE-6).
Also, at least a 20-foot clear zone should be
16-12 Public Access established.
a. Public visitation and use are
encouraged; however, visitor facilities should
be developed only where warranted.
16-14 Protective Lighting
b. The public should not be allowed access
to lock walls, lock and tainter gates, control The following guidelines apply to
rooms, operating machinery, or the power the use of protective lighting at lock and dam
supply unless under supervision of Corps facilities:
personnel.
Inside and outside chambers.
c. All entrance doors to control houses and ■ Upper and lower gate and controls.
control shelters for all locks should be kept ■ Dam gate spillway component security.
securely locked at all times. ■ Restricted access to system controls.
■ Walkways and gate hoists.
d. During supevised tours, no packages, ■ Restricted access to hydraulic structures.
254
Figure 94—Typical navigational lock and dam.
255
16-15 Inside/Outside Chambers ● Periodic inspection of upper and lower gate
structures for high explosive charges and for
● Periodic inspection of walls. objects that, if pinned in the gates, would
● Identify and protect or restrict access to cause severe damage to gate structures and
structural areas that could conceal high supporting hydraulic pumps.
explosive charges. ● Consider use of CCTV for visual surveil-
● Barriers should be erected to eliminate foot lance of the entire project from control build-
traffic by public and access to tunnels and ing.
pumps.
Floating and Land Plants Section V
Land and floating plants (figure 95) sup- during operation, rest breaks, and after
port intercostal river navigational systems termination of workday.
and ocean ports throughout the United
States and its possessions.
c. Vessel damage/larceny prevention
measures:
(1) Brief personnel on the need for secu-
rity.
16-16 Floating Plants (2) Establish port watch for off-duty peri-
ods.
a. Corps of Engineers floating
(3) Use transom locks to secure boat mo-
plants include:
tors.
(1) Dredges. (4) Sleep on board vessels when appropri-
(2) Barges. ate.
(3) Tug, tow, snag, derrick and survey (5) Remove small boats from the water
boats. whenever feasible and place in secure
areas. Use of rented marina facilities is
(4) Work and patrol boats.
encouraged.
b. Floating plant security measures:
d. Security considerations should include
(1) Establish a physical security plan for the following:
boat operations, drydock or waterborne
(1) Sea cocks and valves should be secured
service.
to prevent sinking of vessel.
(2) Notify civil authorities/Coast Guard
(2) Electric power source, to include con-
in case of emergencies.
trols, should have security measures ap-
(3) Continual surveillance of area– plied to restrict access and/or tampering.
256
Figure 95—A dredge is one example of a floating plant.
(3) Ground fuel storage tanks and tanks hardened steel chain with case hardened
located on vessels should have locking padlocks.
caps and protective lighting.
c. Protective lighting— see chapter 6.
d. Building lock and key control sys-

tems.
16-17 Land Plants (1) All exterior doors and high value
storage areas should be secured with series
a. Corps of Engineers land plants 1000 (86), mortise, dead bolt Iockset with a
include: 1-inch throw or a case hardened steel hasp
❑ Ports.
and padlock and be rotated annually.
❑ Shipyards and machine shops. (2) See chapter 8.
❑ Harbors.
❑ Marine terminals.
(3) All exposed bolts should be protected
by a baffle plate (strip of metal overlapping
❑ Docks and piers.
bolt area) to prevent tampering with the
❑ Lighthouses.
bolt.
❑ Maintenance yards, construction yards,
and warehouses. (4) Exterior doors should have steel
frames.
b. Land plant security measures.
Standard Corps of Engineers compound (5) Hingepins should contain security set
screws or pins to prevent removal.
perimeter security fences and gates (Stand-
ard Drawing 40-16-08, Type FE-6) with clear (6) Peened or welded hingepins should be
zones, be secured with a 3-foot-8-inch case the standard, not the exception.
257
e. Windows and other openings. (e) Remove all extraneous and un-
(1) Ventilation openings should be se- mounted property from vehicle (such as
cured by security screens or bars. radios, equipment, instruments, tools,
etc.).
(2) All ground level windows on equip- (f) Lock all doors, windows, compart-
ment storage buildings, toolrooms, supply ments, hatches, trunks and gas tanks.
rooms, and other high value storage areas
should have security screening of 6-gauge (2) Where possible, all vehicles should
steel mesh with 2-inch diamond grids or have lockable gas caps and be parked in a
steel bars not more than 4 inches apart fenced, well-lighted area. Vehicles may be
with horizontal bars welded to vertical parked in secured engineer equipment
bars so that openings do not exceed 32 storage yards, post motor pools, and other
square inches. secured US Government agency motor
pools or commercial parking areas that
(3) Use of IDS/CCTV should be consid- have on-duty attendants, provided an
ered for critical and sensitive areas/struc- agreement is made with the supporting
tures. (See chapter 7 and appendix M.) activities.
(3) Privately owned vehicles should not be
f. POL security. parked in Engineer motor pools/mainte-
(1) Filler caps to bulk fuel and oil storage nance areas/equipment storage yards.
tanks should be secured with case hard- (4) Vehicle keys and US Government
ened steel security type padlocks or equiva- credit cards must be secured at all times in
lent devices. separate heavy metal locked cabi-
(2) The electrical power switch to all nets/safes when vehicles are not on
electric-operated gas pumps are generally dispatch. Credit cards must be secured by
left unmarked and are located inside a the operator at all times while vehicle is on
secured area. Switches are normally dispatch and will not be left in vehicle
turned off during nonduty hours. when unattended. All credit cards must be
inventoried quarterly by serial number by
(3) Nozzles to gas pumps should be locked a disinterested person; and a written re-
with case hardened steel locks/padlocks
cord must be retained for 2 years. Any
when not in use.
loss/discrepancy must be reported imme-
(4) All POL items (gas, diesel and oil) diately to the security officer.
should be locked during nonduty hours.
16-18 Offices, Warehouses, Etc.
g. Vehicle security.
Corps of Engineers resident/pro-
(1) Vehicles should be secured at the close ject engineer offices, warehouses, com-
of business daily, on weekends and holi- pounds and auxiliary facilities are oper-
days, or when vehicles are to be left ated throughout the world to provide
unattended/unoccupied. Minimal vehicu- administrative, technical, and logistical
lar security should include the following: support for the various Corps of Engineers
(a) Apply emergency brake. projects cited previously. They provide points
(b) Place transmission in “Park” posi- of contact for assistance to public users of
tion. Corps facilities and recreation areas, and
(c) Lock steering column/transmission provide ranger support for recreational areas
and remove key from vehicle. with responsibility for liaison with civil law
(d) Raise all windows to their maximum enforcement and federal investigative agen-
upward positions. cies.
258
a. The general public should be made to conducted by key installation personnel,
feel welcome; however, their access should be the district security officer, and contractor
limited to controlled areas. Direct assistance personnel.
may be provided under emergency conditions
(2) Follow-up inspections conducted as
when they occur if security aspects are not
required.
compromised. Indirect assistance, such as
telephonic guidance/direction, etc., will be (3) Schedule and inventory arrival of
provided when security aspects are unclear or equipment and materials in construction
unknown. priority.
(4) Secure storage areas and facilities
b. Security measures for these facilities
(such as semitrailers).
are the same as defined for land plant
facilities in paragraph 16-17. (5) Protective lighting/fencing.
(6) Security forces and auxiliary equip
c. Warehouses/storerooms where nice-to-
ment and liaison with local law enforce-
have/high-value Government property
ment agencies.
is stored, should require as a minimum, the
following additional security requirements: (7) Contractor and subcontractor em-
ployee identification.
(1) Exterior doors equipped with security
type mortise locksets, series 1000 (86) with (8) Separate employee and project vehicle
1-inch throw or case hardened steel hasps parking/registration procedures.
and case hardened steel security padlocks.
(9) Post-construction inventory of materi-
Locks rotated semi-annually and recorded
als by a Corps of Engineers representative.
on the key control register.
(2) All small high-value items secured in c. Tool and equipment security:
locked containers/cages/room within the
warehouse. (1) Gang boxes secured with case hard-
ened hasps and locks.
(3) Access restricted to responsible per-
(2) Color code/marking of all tools/equip-
sons.
ment.
(4) Windows covered by security mesh or
(3) Frequent inventories/inspections by
equivalent aesthetic material.
supervisory personnel.
d. For buildings, vehicles and equip-

16-19 Construction Projects ment security, see land plant security consid-
erations, paragraph 16-17.
a. Corps of Engineers military and .
civil works construction projects are designed e. Security of explosives:
and supervised by Corps personnel for
execution by civilian contractors throughout (1) Military projects secured IAW AR 190-
the world. During construction, the con- 11.
tractor has worksite security responsi-
(2) Civil works projects secured IAW Title
bility, including Government furnished
XI, Regulations of Explosives (P.L.91-452)
materials on-site, until accepted by the using
and part 181, Title 26, Code of Federal
agency.
Regulations. Corps of Engineers on-site
representative should immediately notify
b. Site security considerations:
the district security officer when explo-
(1) Presite security conference will be sives are to be stored on-site. The physical
259
security officer then should conduct a storage usually requires adding additional
physical security inspection, preferably requirements to contract specifications for
with representatives assigned to the Bu- daily issue/turn-in/accountability proce-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms dures, security fencing, lighting and
(ATF). watchman services. Failure to comply
could result in explosives being stored
(3) The CFR prescribes minimum legal off-site by the contractor at his storage
standards of explosive security. On-site area.
Other Considerations Section VI
16-20 Control, Warning, d. Sign criteria.

And Prohibition Signs (1) AR 190-13.
Proper and strategic selection of (2) AR 380-20.
sign locations will assist greatly in external (3) Internal Security Act 1950.
security measures.
(4) Appropriate engineer regulations.
a. Control signs.
(1) Used to regulate foot and motor vehicle

traffic at entrances and exits to parking
and sightseeing areas near project opera-
16-21 Support Agreements
tional areas.
(2) To regulate visitors to recreational and a. Written agreements should be
wildlife management areas. prepared, coordinated, and maintained by
b. Warning/prohibition signs. the project manager with appropriate state
police, and local police authorities when
special support requirements are necessary.
(1) Displayed in accordance with estab-
lished policy.
b. Agreement considerations:
(2) Displayed in areas noticeable to the
public and erected according to the degree (1) Authority-local authorities jurisdic-
of security desired or criticality of project tion.
operation.
(2) Response during routine and emer-
C.Water release horn at dams will be gency situations.
specified on signs conspicuously located to
warn the public of rush waters (figure 96). (3) Communication checks.
260
Figure 96—Correctly placed release horn warning signs below a dam.
(4) IDS interface. b. Periodically inspected for strange ob-.

(5) Emergency Equipment. jects or stay-behind persons.
c. Located to prevent access to critical
16-22 Visitor Registers facilities.
d. Pamphlets or project cut-away charts, if

Visitation room sign-in/sign-out displayed, should not depict access routes or
registers should be reviewed every 6 months
critical functioning areas of the plant, dam
by security personnel. These can serve as an
structure or facility.
excellent source for determining visitation
patterns involving the same people.
16-24 Impress/Recreation
16-23 Visitation Room Fee Funds
a. Impress/recreation fee funds
a. Should be controlled through IDS should be secured in GSA specified safes or
and CCTV. vaults.
261
b. Safes or vaults should be secured to a b. Public warning in case of actual or
permanent structural fixture. possible dam rupture.
c. Response force:
c. Money should not exceed amounts
outlined in appropriate regulations (AR 190- (1) Airmobile
13, AR 37-103, AR 37-103-1, ASPR 3-607.2(c)), (2) Motor vehicle
and appendix L of this manual.
(3) Foot.
d. Isolation of public during hazard condi-
tions (extended rains, etc.).
16-25 Contingency Plans e. Investigating/reporting of crimes
against persons and property, fraud and
The following points should be conflict of interest.
covered in all contingency planning: f. Pursuit operations.
a. Plant and facility evacuation. g. Bomb threats.
262
Chapter 17
Security Analysis and

Evaluation
T his chapter outlines the procedures

to be used for conducting physical security
inspections, surveys, and vulnerability tests.
They are guidelines to help you determine the
adequacy of security for a particular facility
or installation. The items discussed are not
all-inclusive. Reference to applicable Army
regulations and other directives is an abso-
lute necessity to insure an activity has a
comprehensive security program.
263
Inspections Section I
17-1 Basic Guidelines b. Inspectors, to be effective, should know

the mission and history of each activity they
Physical security inspections are are going to inspect.
only conducted at Department of Army in-
c. Previous inspection reports will be
stallations, activities, and facilities. The
types of inspections most often conducted are reviewed and assessed to guide inspectors
initial annual, biennial, and supplemental. through a follow-up inspection prior to the
regular inspection (of arms rooms, for exam-
Inspection personnel should be trained in
ple).
accordance with AR 190-13. Inspections are
most often required on a biennial basis. d. A file of all appropriate SOP, Army reg-
Missions of some activities on an installa- ulations and training and doctrinal manuals
tion may be exempt from inspection and be will be maintained and be accessible to in-
inspected under guidance of regulations and spectors. Security libraries should contain
directives unique to those activities. the latest data on items of security interest,
e.g., color copiers, which can be used to dupli-
cate government bonds similar to originals,
etc.
17-2 Coordination
17-4 Entrance Interviews
a. Liaison and coordination should
be established with other agencies on the a. Entrance interviews are usually
installation prior to inspection. required prior to conducting the actual in-
spections.
b. The director of facility engineers can
provide information to benefit the overall b. The conduct of the inspection will act as
security program. a service to the commander or supervisor.
c. All members of the inspection team will

c. Other agencies, such as MI (threat be introduced and the purpose and objectives
analysis) and ASA have input essential to of the inspection outlined.
the security program.
d. Assistance and cooperation by the
17-3 Security Library commander, supervisor, and inspecting party
will be stressed.
a. A security library is necessary to
aid people in preparing for and conducting e. Avoidance of unusual terminology is a
inspections. must.
264
f. A review of waivers, work orders, and 17-6 Exit Interviews
exceptions is a must prior to conducting the
inspection. a. Exit interviews should be con-
ducted as soon as possible after the inspec-
g. Anticipating changes to the unit’s tion, and the inspection’s goal and objectives
mission should be considered by inspectors should be restated.
and the details worked out by all personnel
concerned. b. The commander should be informed of
all deficiencies and compliments noted in an
effort to establish a good relationship.
17-5 Conducting Inspections c. A rating on the results of the inspection

should be provided during the exit interview.
The established inspection plan d. Recommendations should always be

should start with the inspection being con- realistic and positive.
ducted from the outside to the inside of the
facility, activity, or area. e. When considering recommendations,
the mission, budget limitation, threat, re-
● Observation of the unit will be conducted source availability and urgency must be
during all hours of unit operation. considered.
● Interviews of managerial and operational
personnel will be performed. f. Written reports should be forwarded
● Security forces should be inspected so as through channels within 30 days and follow-
not to disrupt the mission. up corrective action initiated within the
● A class assessment should be made of prescribed time frames.
security force training, especially if security
knowledge is inadequate. 17-7 Report (DA Form 2806)
● Inspection of entry and movement control
should not hinder operations. Physical Security Survey, DA Form
● All communications (alternate or primary, 2806, is used for survey and inspection
base or handheld) should be thoroughly reports. AR 190-13 governs use of the form.
inspected. Details on completion of the form can be
● Each inspector should take detailed notes found in FM 19-10, and in appendix T, pp. 428
and have a checklist ready as a reference. and 429 of this manual.
Surveys and Evaluations Section II
17-8 Surveys formal assessment of an installation activity.

Each survey includes a complete reconnais-
A physical security survey differs sance, study and analysis of installation
from an inspection in that a survey covers a property and its operations.
265
153-846 O - 94 - 12
17-9 Survey Report c. Security personnel who check identifi-
cation must detain unauthorized persons;
The survey report on DA Form 2806 conduct preliminary searches on suspects;
is completed in the same manner as an in- enforce security procedures; and report any
spection report. security violations.
Exhibits to the survey report will be d. Unauthorized disclosures of informa-

handled IAW AR 190-13. tion by members of the security forces should
be detected and immediately reported.
June 30 is the deadline for submission of
one copy of the installation’s physical secu- e. Detailed planning should be conducted
rity survey. prior to implementing a vulnerability test
and priority of targets be established accord-
ingly.
17-10 Evaluations f. Personnel selected to conduct vulnerabil-

ity tests should meet all the criteria required
An evaluation of an installation’s for the test and have appropriate material
security posture will be based on this manual. and equipment to conduct the tests.
A security list should be prepared, assigning
priorities for allocation of security resources. g. Each test team should be briefed on all
instructions pertaining to execution of the
test.
h. A means for neutralizing escorts should

17-11 Vulnerability Tests be devised in the interest of security.
a. It is essential that vulnerability i. Procedures should be used to simulate

tests be conducted to assess operational planting of sabotage devices to add realism to
security alertness and posture. tests.
b. When conducting a vulnerability test, j. A written report will be provided on the

specific objectives should be stated and results of each vulnerability test and will be
complied with (safety, etc.). given the proper rating.
266
Appendix A
Pilferage
T he protection of property, including

the prevention of pilferage of government
supplies and equipment, is one of the primary
functions of military police and civil service
security forces. This function may include
protection of supplies and equipment in
storage areas, during the issue process, and
while they are in transit.
267
The Basics Section I
A-1 Pilferage tactical units could result in unnecessary loss

of life and danger to national defense. In
a. Pilferage is probably the most some areas, losses could assume such propor-
common and annoying hazard with which tions as to jeopardize the mission of the
security personnel are concerned. It can installation. All installations and facilities
become such a financial menace and detri- can anticipate loss from pilferage. Actual
ment to operations that a large portion of the losses will depend on such variable factors as
security guard force efforts may have to be type and amount of materials, equipment,
devoted to its control. Pilferage, particularly and supplies produced, processed, and stored
petty pilferage, is frequently difficult to at the facility; numbers of persons employed;
detect, hard to prove, and dangerous to social and economic conditions in surround-
ignore. ing communities; command attitudes (this is
a most important consideration); and physi-
cal security measures employed. Because
Note: The words, “pilfer,” “pilferer,” these factors differ greatly in various types of
and “pilferage” are used throughout this installations and in different geographical
manual in the senses in which they have locations, each must be considered sepa-
come to be accepted by physical security rately.
personnel rather than in the dictionary
sense. Thus, they include the meanings d. To determine the severity of this hazard
of “steal,” “thief,” “theft,” “larceny,” at any given installation or facility, there is a
and similar terms. They embrace not need to determine the amount of loss which
only petty theft, but theft of any quan- may be occurring. Unfortunately, this is not
tity or monetary value. (For a discussion always an easy task. Accounting methods
of pilferage in consumer outlets and may not be designed to pinpoint thefts;
associated storage facilities, see section consequently, such losses remain undis-
III of this appendix.) closed or they are lumped together with other
shrinkages, thus effectively camouflaging
b. It is imperative that all military person- them.
nel, to include the management, understand
the potential losses to the military on a daily e. One of the most common inventory
basis. methods is to conduct periodic inventories of
property and assume that unaccounted-for
c. Yearly, military installation property inventory loss is due to theft. This is, a
loss throughout the world would increase convenient but deceptive and dangerous
millions of dollars each year if subjected to device because theft is only one of many
uncontrolled pilferage. However, the risks causes of inventory shrinkage.
incurred cannot be measured in terms of
dollars alone. Loss of critical supplies for f. Failure to detect shortages in incoming
268
Figure A-1—When shipping and receiving is mismanaged, entire

loads of supplies, material, and foodstuffs may be taken.
shipments, improper stock usage, poor stock

accounting, poor warehousing, improper (1) This is an undesirable situation and
handling and recording of defective and should be corrected where possible. Recom-
damaged stock, and inaccurate inventories mendations should be made that running
cause inventory losses that may be inaccu- inventories be maintained.
rately labeled as pilferage.
(2) An established estimate of the degree
g. In some cases inventory losses may be of severity of this hazard may have to be
impossible to detect because of the nature and revised because of anticipated changes in
quantities of materials involved. Stock inven- the economic or social conditions in nearby
tory records may not be locally maintained, communities, increases in numbers of
or there may be no method for spot checks or employees, introduction of new materials
running inventories to discover shortages. into the installation, or any of the other
269
Figure A-2—The systematic pilferer steals according to plan.
variable factors on which estimates of These are casual pilferers and systematic
expected losses are based. pilferers.
(3) The degree of risk involved can be a. A casual pilferer is one who steals
determined only by analysis of the relative
primarily because he is unable to resist the
vulnerability of each area or activit y of the
temptation of an unexpected opportunity and
installation to the hazard of pilferage. To
has little fear of detection. There is usually
do this, it is necessary to consider the
little or no planning or premeditation in-
problem of who is likely to steal, and what
volved in casual pilferage and the pilferer
items they are most likely to take (see Risk
normally acts alone. He may take items for
Analysis, paragraph 1-6).
which he has no immediate need or foresee-
able use, or he may take small quantities of
supplies for use of family or friends, or for use
A-2 Profile of Pilferers around his home. The degree of risk
involved in casual pilferage is normally
There are two types of pilferers who slight unless very large numbers of persons
physical security personnel must be prepared are involved.
to counteract—or at least recognize so proper
physical security measures may be taken to (1) Casual pilferage occurs whenever the
afford the best protection against them. individual feels the need or desire for a
270
certain article and the opportunity to patterns. In fact, their modus operandi is
take it is provided by poor security difficult to detect due to their changing
measures. Though it involves unsystem- motivational desires.
atic theft of small articles, casual pilferage
is nevertheless very serious, and it may a. The military or civilian thief may:
have a great cumulative effect if permitted ❑ Not be profit oriented
to become widespread—especially if the ❑ Be any person
stolen items have a high cash or potential ❑ Operate with others
value.
(2) There is always the possibility that b. Usually, the common danger signs that
casual pilferers, encouraged by successful a pilferer is at work are:
theft, may turn to systematic pilferage. ● Dedication and devotion to work
Casual pilferers are normally employ- ● Increase in personal financial spending
ees of the installation and usually are the ● Refusal to accept office, activity or installa-
most difficult to detect and apprehend. tion movement control procedures
b. A systematic pilferer is one who c. A pilferer’s rationalization to dishon-
steals according to preconceived plans, esty is:
and steals any and all types of supplies to
sell for cash or to barter for other valuable (1) Why not, others are doing it
or desirable commodities. (2) It’s morally right to me
(3) “It’s not stealing, only borrowing.”
(1) He may work with another person
or with a well-organized group o f d. Elements that induce dishonesty:
people, some of whom maybe members of a
cleaning team or even be in an advanta- (1) Target of opportunity
geous position to locate or administra- (2) High personal need or desire
tively control desired items, or remove (3) Rationalization of personal actions.
them from storage areas or transit facili-
ties.
(2) The act of pilferage maybe a one-time
occurrence, or such acts may extend over a A-4 Opportunities
period of months or even years. Large For Pilferage
quantities of supplies, with great value,
may be lost to groups of persons engaged in Pilferage may occur anywhere. Even
elaborately planned and carefully exe- supplies that are stationary in permanent or
cuted systematic pilferage activities. semipermanent storage areas or warehouses
(3) Systematic pilferers may or may not are vulnerable to theft if adequate precaution-
be employees of the installation; if ary measures are not taken; and vulnerability
they are not, they frequently operate in increases as supplies become more mobile.
conspiracy with such employees.
a. New and greater opportunities for
pilferage are present when supplies are being
A-3 Motivations of Pilferers transported in trucks, trains, planes, or ships.
The degree of dishonesty may vary b. The greatest vulnerability and the
with the motivation of pilferers. The uses widest variety of opportunities occur at the
pilferers make of pilfered items and/or the various points where supplies are transferred
money from them does not establish any from one means of transportation to another,
271
or from storage to transportation and vice d. Finally, to derive any benefit from his
versa. act, the pilferer must use the item himself
or dispose of it in some way. The casual
c. Remember that anyone maybe a pilfer- pilferage of supplies is intended primarily to
er. Where need or desire exists, and opportu- satisfy the need or desires of the thief. The
nity is presented, theft is almost sure to result. systematic pilferer usually attempts to sell
the material through “fences,” pawnbrokers,
or black market operations.
A-5 Targets for Pilferage

(1) Detection of use or disposal can
Both the casual and systematic help prevent similar pilferage through
pilferer have certain problems to overcome in investigation and discovery of the means
order to accomplish pilferage objectives. used to accomplish the original theft.
Similarly, each of the problems faced
Some of these are:
by would-be pilferers offers opportu-
a. A pilferer’s first requirement is to nities for constructive preventive
locate the item or items to be stolen. For measures. Careful study of the possible
the casual pilferer this may be accomplished opportunities for the pilferer to solve his
through individual search or even accidental problems is essential in security work (see
discovery. In systematic pilferage, more Risk Analysis, paragraph 1-6).
extensive means are generally employed.
(2) The primary concern of a system-
These may consist of surveillance by mem-
atic pilferer in selecting a target is its
bers of the group, or checking of shopping and
monetary value. Since he steals for
storage areas or documents by those who
have access to them. personal profit, the systematic pilferer
looks for items from which he can realize
the greatest financial gain. This means he
b. The second requirement is to deter- must also have or be able to find a ready
mine the manner in which he can gain market for items he maybe able to steal. He
access to and possession of the desired pilfers small items of relatively high value,
items. This may involve something as such as drugs, valuable metals or elec-
simple as breaking open a box. Or it may be as tronic items, including radio and television
complex as surveying security factors such as tubes. However, we cannot discount the
physical safeguards or security procedures possibility that a systematic pilferer may,
for weaknesses, attempting to bribe security if the profit is substantial, select a target of
forces, altering or forging shipping docu- great size and weight. As a rule, bulk
ments or passes, or creating disturbances to storage areas contain most of the material
divert attention of security personnel while that may be selected by systematic pilfer-
the actual theft is taking place. ers.
c. The third requirement is to remove (3) The casual pilferer is likely to take
the stolen items to a place where the thief any item easily accessible to him. Since
may benefit from his act. Articles of clothing he normally will remove the item from the
may be worn to accomplish this. Small items installation by concealing it on his person
may be concealed in any of many possible or in his privately owned automobile, size
places on the body of the thief or in vehicles. is also an important consideration. Mone-
Through falsification of documents, whole tary value and available markets are not of
truckloads of supplies may be removed from any great concern to the casual pilferer,
their proper place without immediate dis- because he usually does not have any idea
covery. of selling the property he steals.
272
(a) He normally uses the item himself. by executing fictitious invoices that appear
Any property not secured or not under to be legitimate when inspected by security
surveillance, and small enough to be personnel.
hidden on the person or otherwise
removed from the installation by com-
monly available means, is subject to (2) One individual must not have
control of all shipping and receiving
casual pilferage.
transactions. Obviously this procedure
(b) Storage areas containing loose items invites manipulation of Government bills
are more likely to tempt casual pilferers
of lading and inaccurate storage and
than bulk storage areas.
movement procedures through failure of
one activity to compare bills and invoices
with another activity. The opportunities
A-6 Methods of Pilferage for monetary kickbacks increase without a
sound system of checks and balances.
There are many ways by which
pilfered items may be removed from military
installations. Because the motives and tar-
gets likely to be selected by systematic and
casual pilferers are very different, the meth-
ods of operation for each are very different.
a. As stated above, the casual pilferer
steals whatever is available to him and
generally removes it from the installation by
concealing it on his person or in his automo-
bile.
b. The methods of the systematic pilferer
are much more varied and complex. The
means he may employ are limited only by his
ingenuity. The following are cited as exam-
ples:
(1) Shipping and receiving operations
are extremely vulnerable to systematic
pilferage. It is here that installation
personnel and truck drivers have direct
contact with each other and readily avail-
able means of conveyance. This offers a
tempting opportunity for collusion. Al-
though most truck drivers and employees
are honest, a few of them may succumb to
temptations such as a receiving clerk who
certifies the receipt of property that the
truck driver actually disposed of prior to
his arrival at the installation. An installa-
tion employee can provide property to a
truck driver and assist in concealing it
aboard the truck for unauthorized removal
from the installation. Employees can Figure A-3—One-person control
assist truck drivers in removing property invites losses.
273
(3) Railway employees assigned to practical and effective method for controlling
switching duties on the installation can casual pilferage is to establish psychological
operate in a similar manner but with more deterrents. This may be accomplished in a
difficulty because a railway car normally number of ways. Some are discussed in the
cannot be directed to a location where following paragraphs.
stolen property can be easily and safely
removed. Additional confederates are a. One of the most common means of
usually required to transfer stolen goods discouraging casual pilferage is to search
from a railway car, at some point or siding individuals and vehicles leaving the in-
outside the installation, into some other stallation at unannounced times and places.
means of transportation for removal. This (1) Spot searches may occasionally detect
increase in the number of persons involved attempts of theft but greater value is
reduces profits and increases the chances realized by bringing to the attention of all
for discovery and apprehension. employees they may be apprehended if
they do attempt to illegally remove proper-
(4) Tanker trucks employed for ship ty.
ment of petroleum products maybe altered
to permit pilferage of the product. (2) Care must be taken to insure that
personnel are not demoralized nor their
(5) Trash disposal and salvage dispo- legal rights violated by oppressive physi-
sal activities offer excellent opportunities
cal controls or unethical security practices.
to the systematic pilferer to gain access to
valuable material. Property may be hidden
b. An aggressive security education
in waste material (Fig A-2) to be recovered
by a confederate who removes trash from program (chapter 3) is an effective means of
convincing employees that they have much
the installation. Serviceable or even new
more to lose than to gain by engaging in acts
items of equipment or material may be
of theft. Case histories may be cited where
classified as salvage by dishonest employ-
employees were discharged or prosecuted for
ees operating in collusion with other pilferage. Care must be taken in discussing
persons working in or having access to these cases to preclude identification of
salvage disposal. individuals, because of possible civil suits for
defamation of character. Also, it is generally
c. Other methods which maybe employed
poor policy to publicize derogatory informa-
by systematic pilferers to remove property
tion pertaining to specific individuals. It is
from military installations include throwing
important for all employees to realize that
items over fences to be retrieved at a later time
pilferage is morally wrong no matter how
by themselves or by confederates; packaging
insignificant the value of the item taken.
property and sending it to outside addresses
through mail channels; collusion with secu-
rity personnel; loose fitting clothing that can c. It is particularly important for supervi-
be worn to conceal small items; and removal sory personnel to set a proper example and
of items on vehicles belonging to outside maintain a desirable moral climate for all
contractors and vendors. employees.
d. All employees must be impressed with

A-7 Control Measures the fact that they have a responsibility to
For Casual Pilferage report any loss to proper authorities.
Specific measures for preventing
pilferage must be based on careful analysis of e. Adequate inventory and control
the conditions at each installation. The most measures should be instituted to account for
274
and other employees of the installation must
be maintained if the facility is to be protected
from other more dangerous forms of human
hazards. Any security measure that infringes
on the human rights or dignity of others will
jeopardize, rather than enhance the overall
protection of the installation.
A-8 Control Measures

For Systematic Pilferage
Unlike the casual pilferer, the sys-
tematic thief is not discouraged by psycholog-
ical controls. Nothing short of active physical
security measures are effective in eliminating
losses from this source. Some of these
measures include:
Figure A-4—Good physical controls a. Establish security surveillance of all

discourage casual pilferage. exits from the installation.
b. Establish an effective package and

material control system.
all materiel, supplies, and equipment. Poor
accountability,if it is commonly known, C. Locate parking areas for private vehi-
provides one of the greatest sources of cles outside the perimeter fencing of the
temptations to the casual pilferer. activity.
f. Identification of all tools and equip- d. Eliminate potential thieves during the
ment by some mark or code (where feasible) hiring procedure by careful screening and
is necessary so that government property can observation.
be identifiable. Installation tools and euqip-
ment have counterparts on the civilian e. Investigate all losses quickly and effi-
economy and cannot otherwise be identified ciently.
as government property. Another control
f. Establish an effective key control
method is to require signing for all tools and
system.
equipment to be used by individuals. The use
of the signature control method reduces the g. Establish adequate security patrols to
temptation to pocket the item. check buildings, grounds, perimeter, and
likely locations for clandestine storage of
g. In establishing any deterrent to casual property removed from its proper location.
pilferage, physical security officers must not
lose sight of the fact that most employees h. Install mechanical and electrical intru-
are honest and disapprove of thievery. sion detection devices where applicable and
Mutual respect between security personnel practical.
275
i. Coordinate with supply personnel to assist in detecting pilferers. The audit should
establish customer identification, to authen- provide a thorough review of all handling and
ticate supply release documents at ware- accountability procedures and control sys-
houses and exit gates. tems. An audit should be conducted even
though an installation or activity has out-
j. Establish appropriate perimeter fencing, standing control measures.
lighting, and parking facilities and effective
pedestrian, railway, and vehicle gate security a. An audit will discourage dishonesty
controls. and:
(1) Uncover manipulations
(2) Detect control irregularities.
A-9 Audit Procedures
b. For an example of an audit concerning
A detailed item/merchandise audit stock withdrawals and warehouse storage,
procedure conducted once yearly will greatly see figure A-5.
Withdrawal and Inventory Procedures
Figure A-5—Sample of audit steps
276
A-10 How To Stop a. An effective stop-employee-thefts policy
Employee Theft must include at least the following:
■ Preemployment screening.
No matter what it’s called—internal ■ Analysis of opportunities for theft.
theft, peculation, embezzlement, pilferage, ■ Analysis of how employees steal.
inventory shrinkage, s t e a l i n g , o r ■ Management-employee communication.
defalcation—thefts committed by employees ■ Prosecution of employees caught stealing.
are behind at least 60 percent of crime-related
losses. So many employees are stealing so
much that employee theft is the most critical b. Each employer must reduce losses as
crime problem facing business today. much as possible. A police state need not be
Although employee theft results in part created. Large monetary expenditures need
from factors beyond control, the extent of not be made.
employee theft in any business is a reflection c. Preemployment Screening. The best
of its management—the more mismanage- way to stop employee theft is simply not hire
ment, the more theft. those employees inclined to steal. The best
Warehouse Redemption Procedures
for accountability of merchandise.
277
way is also impossible. What the employer ❑ Cash, check and credit transactions.
must do is set up a screening process that will ❑ Accounts payable.
weed out obvious security risks. Many ex- ❑ Payroll.
perts believe that personnel screening is the ❑ Facility storage units.
most vital safeguard against internal theft.
Here are some basic guidelines for the
(2) Methods used:
employer (because of the legal implications of
the process, a separate discussion follows on ■ Pilferage (one item at a time).
employee rights and privacy): ■ Cash register theft or alteration of cash
register records.
● Always have applicant fill out a written
■ Issuance of false refunds.
application. Be sure that the written applica-
■ Use of back door and trash containers.
tion does not discriminate and conforms to
■ Taking advantage of undersupervision.
any applicable laws.
● Exercise caution when considering ex-
■ Avoidance of package control.
■ Embezzlement.
convicts for employment. (This is not meant
■ Check forgery.
to be a steadfast rule-individual judgments
■ Stealing credit cards.
must be made as to degree of rehabilitation.)
■ Manipulating computers and stealing
It is illegal to solicit information about arrest
computer time.
records not leading to convictions.
● Solicit references but keep in mind that
■ Night cleaning crews.
■ Duplicating keys, or use of master key
those contacted will give favorable opinions.
Ask primary references for secondary refer- that is not properly controlled.
ences. In contacting the latter, make it clear ■ Collusion with outsiders (inflated claim
that the applicant did not refer you. in insurance, for example).
● Always interview. In interviewing, assess
Too many opportunities exist for employees
the applicant’s maturity and values. Observe
to exploit. Reduce these opportunities and
gestures.
losses will be reduced. Reduce opportunities
● Use psychological deterrents-inform ap-
by control.
plicant that your business routinely runs a
security check on background, or that finger-
prints will be taken. The hope is that the (3) Useful controls:
dishonest applicant won’t be back.
● Obtain credit bureau reports but only after ● Randomly spot check all phases of
following guidelines set forth in the Fair business, in addition to regular, compre-
Credit Reporting Act. hensive audit.
● Check payroll-make sure you’re not
paying a fictitious or dead employee.
d. Opportunities, Methods, and Con- ● Take physical inventory seriously.
trols. Cases of employee theft have been ● Know what you own-be able to identify
documented in almost every conceivable it.
phase of business operations—from theft of ● Do not allow one employee to perform all
petty cash to theft of railroad cars. An infinite functions. Separate receiving, purchasing,
variety of methods have been used. and accounts payable. Separate account-
ants from cash.
● Control payment authorizations.
(1) Areas most vulnerable:
● Keep blank checks locked, don’t presign
❑ Shipping and receiving. or use uncoded, unnumbered checks.
❑ Inventory. ● Reconcile cancelled checks with original
❑ Accounting and recordkeeping. invoice or voucher.
278
● Secure exits—restrict employees to one Explain all security procedures, stressing
exit. Prevent exit from rear of buildings. their importance. Emphasize that any
Establish strict package control. deviations will be thoroughly investigated.
● Inspect cash register receipts daily,
(2) Establish grievance procedures; give
inspect tape, insure that employee is
your employees an outlet for disagreement;
identified on slips, deposit monies daily.
and be receptive to all grievances submit-
● Issue identification badges to decrease
ted. Insure that employees are aware of its
employee presence in unauthorized areas.
existence and that no reprisals are taken.
● Simplify red tape—make it harder for the
employee to disguise theft. (3) Regularly evaluate employee perfor-
● Have employee parking away from mance and encourage employees to evalu-
business establishment. ate management. Unrealistic performance
● Establish usage schedule of supplies to standards can lead either to desperation
isolate irregularities. and anger, resulting in dishonesty; or to
get even attitudes. Regularly review sala-
e. Management—Employee Commu- ries, wages and benefits—don’t force
nication. Leadership must be firm yet employees to steal from you.
reasonable. Most employees pattern their
(4) Delegate responsibility. Unless
values after yours, so a good example must be decision-making exists among lower and
set. If you expect employees to remain honest, mid-levels, there is a tendency for develop-
don’t cart home office supplies or goods.
ment of an it’s-us-against-them attitude.
(1) Train new employees, advising them of Delegate accountability as well; no deci-
the company’s values and the standards sion is valid if it is lost in a buckpassing
by which they will be expected to perform. routine.
Army Property At Local Level Section II
A-11 Accountability zational level involving military property

create vulnerability supported by criminal
Proper accountability by command- activity. Criminal activity includes:
ers and subordinate personnel cannot be ■ Theft
overemphasized. To insure accountability of ■ Fraud
property, commanders must establish, imple- ■ Property diversion
ment, and supervise an installation, activity, ■ Property manipulation.
or organization security program.
A-12 Vulnerability b. Commanders and subordinate person-

nel must conduct a risk analysis and identify
a. Weaknesses in security proce- military property that must, in the interest of
dures at the installation, activity and organi- monetary value and mission accomplish-
279
Recommended Security Measures
Figure A-6—Recommended security measures for Army property.
280
Figure A-7—Typical clamp and chain installation.
ment, design mandatory security measures A-13 Motor Vehicles

for specific property. a. Security of tactical vehicles
should be based on a uniform and cost ef-
c. Security doctrine as outlined in this fective approach. For example, to insure
manual should be used to the maximum proper security of a tactical ¼-ton, 4x4, install
extent in securing Army property vulnerable a clamp, chain, and lock device as illustrated
to theft, destruction, and/or manipulation. in figure A-7. To properly install the security
device while maintaining safety, use Techni-
d. Certain categories of property shown in cal Bulletin (TB) 9-2300-422-20, dated 17
figure A-6 must be assessed for security October 1977.
vulnerability and protective treatment. Secu-
rity protective measures addressing this b. Army motor vehicle security should also
military property should be documented in incorporate at least the use of the following:
the unit/installation physical security plan. ❑ Key/lock security and accountability.
If the security measures recommended in ❑ Protective lighting.
figure A-6 are implemented using established ❑ Fencing.
doctrine, they should eliminate or reduce ❑ Walking patrols, as appropriate.
property vulnerability. This will reduce the ❑ Frequent observation and visits by mobile
incidents of theft, pilferage, and manipula- patrols or unit personnel, such as CQ, SDO,
tion at the unit/installation. SDNC, etc.
281
Consumer Outlets Section Ill
No matter what it’s called—internal theft, employees guilty of criminal acts or

embezzlement, inventory shrinkage, steal- infractions conducive to criminal
ing, or pilferage—thefts committed by em- acts.)
ployees in consumer outlets contribute to (4) Inattentive job attitudes of subordi-
approximately 60 percent of crime-related nate supervisors.
losses at these businesses.
(5) Inadequate personal checks of estab-
lished accounting and inventory proce-
dures.
A-14 Employee Pilferage
a. Creating the Environment. Note: Checks on both a regular and
The lack of initiative at the management/su- unannounced basis tend to control
pervisory level within operational consumer access to official stock records and to
outlets does little to prevent or reduce pilfer- insure careful and organized storage or
age. Such shortcomings are identified as: stocking of merchandise.
(1) Failure to present professional image:
❑ Lack of continuing interest, motivation,
(6) Infrequent observation of employees’
and direction. job performance.
❑ No alertness to internal control of
pilferage. (7) Failure to report misconduct, criminal
or otherwise, to superiors and/or responsi-
(2) Failure to institute and implement ble law enforcement personnel in the
methods of operational effectiveness and activity.
efficiency, such as:
(8) Failure to implement recommenda-
● Clearly defined delegation of responsi-
tions made during physical security in-
bility. spections or crime prevention surveys.
● Insistence on stringent accountability.
● Orientation and training programs for
b. Accomplishing the Act of Pilferage.
subordinate supervisors, current and new The act may be accomplished by individual
employees. employees, more than one employee working
(3) Failure to emphasize and enforce as a team, or by employees and patrons in
established criteria for continual employ- collusion. These actions can be greatly
ment. reduced by tightening supervision and secu-
rity in the following areas:
❑ Rules of conduct.
❑ Standards of job performance. (Offi- (1) Merchandise display or dispensing
cially request appropriate action for areas.
282
● Detect unauthorized price reductions. ■ High degree of consumer desirability.
● prevent or make it difficult to alter price ■ Easily carried in pocketbooks or secreted
tags. on the person.
● Check procedures for declaring mer-
chandise old, shopworn, damaged, or sal- a. Profiles of Shoplifters.
vage.
(1) Amateur adult shoplifters share
● Provide more unpackaged items for
these characteristics:
personal consumption.
● Discourage careless waste of foods and ● Sudden temptation—impulse theft. Suc-
other perishable items. cess in initial thefts, more temptation,
stronger impulses, more thefts.
(2) Cash registers. ● Rarely a genuine need for the item.
Generally has enough money to pay for
(a) Theft of cash is common: item(s).
● Displays symptoms of nervousness and
❑ Direct from an unattended register.
uneasiness.
❑ By rerunning register tapes at lower
figures. (Preventable if reset key is (2) Juvenile shoplifters have the following
maintained by the supervisor.) traits:
❑ By clearing the register at a lower ❑ Act on a dare or “to belong.”
total figure than actual receipts for the ❑ May be coached and/directed by an
operational period. adult.
❑ By falsely reporting over-rings and
refunds. (3) Professional shoplifters share these
characteristics:
(b) Theft of merchandise is common
● May be talkative, usually polite and
to the following: deliberate.
■ Under-rings ● Continually looks for opportunities.
■ Reuse of cash register tapes occurs ● Does not take many chances.
when employees fail to provide patrons ● Very capable of spotting security per-
with tapes or patrons allow employees to sonnel.
retain tapes (for theft or fail to recognize ● Steals for resale.
the crime prevention measure in asking ● Usually has “fences.”
for tapes). The tapes allow employees to ● Often steals “to order.” May have a list
package merchandise and remove it describing the items to be pilfered.
from premises. ● Employs innovative techniques.
(4) Kelptomaniacs:
(3) Removal of items from bags or
containers by carry-out employees. ❑ Take items without regard to value or
use.
❑ Steal compulsively, often openly.
A-15 Patron Pilferage ❑ Nervous and shy.
(Shoplifting)
This type pilferage is usually con-
fined to sales areas and is committed by Note: Genuine cases of kleptomania
casual and systematic pilferers. Items most are rare.
frequently pilfered:
■ Relatively small in size.
283
(5) Narcotic addicts as shoplifters are (3) Allowing an emphasis on small rooms
described as follows: and/or partitioned areas causes conges-
tion, which clusters, isolates, and/or par-
❑ Desperate need for money and fear of tially hides displays.
imprisonment.
❑ Take long chances. c. Accomplishing the Act. This involves
❑ Quickly take merchandise and exit use of one or more of the following means to
premises. obtain items:
❑ Steal usually at lowest physical and/or
psychological ebb. (1) Palming or placing an open hand on a
❑ Dangerous if apprehension is at- small article, squeezing the muscles of the
tempted. hand over the article to grasp it, and lifting
❑ Habitually resists apprehension, often the still open and apparently empty hand.
violently.
❑ Only military police/security per- (2) Use of fitting rooms to put on tight or
sonnel should attempt apprehension, close fitting garments under clothing worn
not employees. into the store.
(6) Alcoholics and vagrants as shoplifters (3) Trying on unpurchased hats, gloves,
share these traits: sweaters, jackets, and like item, then
exiting the store—is a very common prac-
■ Usually steal because of need. tice.
■ Often under the influence of liquor at the
(4) Stepping around counters and remov-
time of theft.
■ Usually, quickly take merchandise and ing items from unlocked showcases.
exit. (5) Handling several items at once and
■ Less likely to repeat regularly at a single replacing all except the item(s) pilfered.
location.
(6) Use of accomplices to create a diver-
b. Environment for Shoplifting. sion of employee attention when secreting
(1) Greatest pilferage occurs when em- items on the person. Such items include:
ployee coverage is low and/or when ● Clothing.
employees are untrained, inexperienced, or ● Pocketbook and handbags.
indifferent to the issue.
● Umbrellas.
(2) Ineffective use of floor space aids ● Various items placed in packages or
shoplifters by creating congestion in the paper sacks containing merchandise paid
patron traffic flow. for at other departments.
284
Appendix B
Sabotage
D isaffection, disloyalty and subver-

sion of employees present grave dangers to all
installations, and may result in acts of
sabotage, pilferage, or espionage. Past inci-
dents of espionage, subversive activity, and
defections by US personnel in possession of
classified information or materiel are of
grave concern to the Army.
In all cases where an individual’s behavior
or characteristics cast reasonable doubt as to
285
his reliability or suitability, aggressive com- of sabotage, and the known existence of
mand action must be promptly taken to certain groups available and willing to
suspend his security clearance and thereby undertake such work, place this hazard high
immediately withdraw access to classified on the list of risks confronting the Army. In
information, materiel, or activities. Com- terms of trained manpower, equipment, and
manders and supervisors must administer risk, a sabotage operation involves only
this program so as to assure continued negligible expenditure by the enemy; but the
alertness for any indication of disqualifying profit may be enormous if the target has been
conduct. strategically selected.
The primary purpose of this appendix is to
expedite identification of persons with beliefs c. The greatest danger of sabotage lies in
or traits of character dangerous to national concerted, simultaneous covert sabotage
security and their denial of appointment to, or attempts against sensitive military installa-
removal from, positions of trust in which they tions or facilities, which, if successful, could
could do significant harm to national inter- seriously jeopardize military operations and
ests. could prevent tactical commanders from
performing combat missions. It is this
threat of sabotage that requires sabo-
tage alert procedures to be an important
B-1 The Sabotage Threat part of physical security plans.
d. Sabotage as a diversion measure:
Sabotage is defined in Federal law
as any act that may injure, interfere with or (1) Sabotage, particularly in the form of
obstruct the United States or any associate fire or minor explosions, may also be used
nation in preparing for or in carrying on war, as a diversion to permit pilferage, by
or any act in willfully making, in a defective drawing attention to the affected area and
manner, war materiel or any tool used in away from the object of the pilferage.
making war materiel. It is the willful and (2) This hazard exists particularly when
malicious disruption of the normal processes security personnel are also responsible for
and functions of the nation with respect to the firefighting and similar control opera-
national defense (chapter 645, Public Law tions.
772, Aug 1948, 18 US Code 2153-2156).
a. Since Title 18 is a punitive law, the scope B-2 Recognizing Sabotage

of sabotage which it defines is somewhat
limited. Security personnel have a broader Recognition of an act of sabotage as
interest in this area, and should expand this such is often difficult, as the ultimate target
definition to include any act which may not be readily apparent and the act itself
maliciously destroys property or dis- frequently destroys evidence of sabotage. To
rupts the operation or mission of an employ effective countermeasures against
installation or facility for any reason the threat of sabotage, it is necessary to
whatever. This includes vandalism, as understand some of the methods and targets
defined in various dictionaries. Whether such of the saboteur.
vandalism could be chargeable as sabotage
under the cited law is a matter for legal
decision, and must be referred to the staff B-3 Characteristics
judge advocate. Of Saboteurs
b. The highly effective results which may a. May be highly trained profes-
be accomplished by the skillful employment sionals or rank amateurs.
286
b. May be computer programmers, labor- e. Agents may work for:
ers, machinists, flight engineers, foremen, or
■ Pay
members of the management.
■ Hatred
■ Revenge
c. May be specially trained enemy agents
■ Sincere beliefs
assigned a specific mission or individual ■ Settling real or imaginary grievances
enemy sympathizers, or disaffected natives
■ Blackmail purposes.
who act for their own personal reasons or
interests. B-5 Sabotage Targets
d. May work alone or in groups. They may In choosing their targets, saboteurs
infiltrate military or industrial groups as
are influenced by two basic considerations
legitimate members, or they may work from
analogous to those found in a tactical
the outside.
situation; namely, the objective, and how best
to attain it. Is the destruction of the target to
e. May or may not have affiliation with be sufficient in itself, or is it but a contribution
foreign or military groups. to a larger plan? The ultimate in sabotage is
complete and permanent destruction of the
f. May be discontented employees.
target. When this cannot be attained there
may be many lesser targets, and enough of
g. Very vulnerable to subversive propa-
these strategically grouped may achieve
ganda.
comparable results.
h. Maybe mentally ill.
B-6 Target Analysis
i. Actions cannot be predicted or antic-
ipated. In analyzing a sabotage target, the
saboteur considers the following factors:
j. Acts on impulse. a. The importance of the installation or
facility from a technical or military stand-
point. Will its complete or partial destruction
B-4 Characteristics hinder or breach the overall defense?
Of Enemy Special Agents
b. When complete destruction is not possi-
a. Directed, trained, supported, and ble, what specific items of technical or
supplied by a sabotage organization. military importance will have the most
crippling effect on the mission of the installa-
b. Coordinate efforts in an overall attempt tion? Examples of such items are:
to impede or disrupt industrial potential.
(1) Rail yards and train equipment.
c. May lie dormant for years awaiting (2) Transformers at power stations.
desired opportunity.
(3) Dies in machine shops.
d. The motivation of an enemy special (4) Pumps at waterworks.
agent or an enemy sympathizer is obvious.
The motivations of disaffected natives are (5) Condensers at steam power plants.
much more complex. Correspondingly such (6) Fuel pipelines.
agents are more difficult to detect, and
individual motives may be as varied as the (7) Weapons and ammunition storage
personality. points.
287
(8) Airfields and airstrips and their facili- c. Industry. Industry presents innumer-
ties. able possibilities for explosive and mechani-
cal sabotage, and is especially vulnerable to
c. The capability of a target for self- acts that will initiate a chain reaction. The
destruction is always attractive to a saboteur. following are examples of means by which
Heavy rotating machinery, such as turboelec- sabotage can be committed in industrial
tric generators, can be ruined by a distur- processes:
bance of the shaft alinement or by placing
abrasives in the lubrication system. Other (1) Drainage of oil or blocking of lubrica-
examples of self-destroying targets include tion pipelines.
ammunition and gasoline dumps, dams, and (2) Introduction of abrasives into machin-
warehouses containing inflammable stocks. ery.
(3) Missetting or damaging process con-
trol instruments.
B-7 Methods of Attack (4) Introduction of small tools or other
pieces of metal into moving gears.
The following specific targets are
vulnerable to one or more methods of sabo- (5) Explosive charges placed to have a
tage: shattering effect when detonated.
a. Natural Resources.
d. Warehouses and Supply Depots.
(1) Mines may be sabotaged by causing Materiel in storage is subject to ordinary
cave-ins or flooding of the shafts or tun- explosive or incendiary sabotage. There is
nels. also an opportunity for delayed sabotage by
the introduction of abrasives, contaminants,
(2) Forests may be destroyed by incendia-
or adulterants into the items stockpiled. This
ries; fruit trees maybe killed by an induced
latter type of sabotage will not normally be
blight.
discovered until the materiel is put into use,
(3) Farm produce is vulnerable to para- and is difficult to detect or trace.
sites and various blights, and on a smaller
scale by the diversion of water used for e. Transportation. The propelling ma-
irrigation. chinery and cargoes of land, sea, and air
transportation are subject to acts of sabotage
b. Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force similar to those mentioned in paragraph c
Installations or Facilities. Any action above. In addition, rail transportation can be
against an armed forces installation or sabotaged by damaging switches, rails,
facility, which disrupts or prevents full roadbeds, and various structural adjuncts,
accomplishment of its mission, constitutes a such as bridges, tunnels, and shop facilities.
potential threat. Sabotage actions intended
to destruct ammunition or fuel supplies, and f. Materials Intransit. Supplies or equip-
to disrupt communications, are common to all ment of any type intransit may be sabotaged,
of the armed services. Other targets are either by sabotaging the, means of transporta-
peculiar to each service, such as drydocks and tion or by directly attacking the materials, or
repair facilities to the Navy, and complex both. A bomb or arson device placed in the
flight and navigation equipment to the Air hold of a ship may damage or destroy both the
Force. Headquarters buildings and billets cargo and the ship. A bomb or arson device
located outside the installation or facility are used against a railroad tank car may destroy
specific targets of terrorists and insurgents, the car, its contents, and a portion of the rail
especially by bombing and arson. line. The same applies to POL pipelines.
288
B-8 Sabotage Methods sistance in such training can be ob-
tained from post engineers and fire
There are many ways to commit departments.
sabotage, and new methods and devices are (c) Incendiary materials include:
constantly being adopted. ● Phosphorous
● Sodium
a. A major sabotage effort may be ● Thermite
undertaken after thorough study of the ● Potassium
physical layout of the facility and its produc-
tion processes by technical personnel fully
qualified to select the most effective method (2) Sabotage by Mechanical Devices.
to strike one or more of the most vulnerable Mechanical delay devices are frequently
parts of the facility. used with dry cell electric batteries.
b. Sabotage may, on the other hand, be (a) The basic idea in these mechanisms
improvised by the saboteur, relying solely can be well represented by the use of an
upon his own knowledge of the facility and ordinary pocket watch. By removing the
the materials available to him. The device or minute hand, setting a small screw in
agent selected for sabotage may range from the crystal to a depth that it will contact
the crude or elementary to the ingenious or the hour hand but not the minute hand,
scientific. and using this screw and the main stem
as contact points to complete the electri-
c. The methods of sabotage may be clas- cal circuit, the watch becomes a timing
sifed as follows: delay mechanism with a 12-hour span
(figure B-1). This same principle is
❑ Fire employed in the majority of mechanical
❑ Explosive devices delay devices.
❑ Mechanical devices
❑ Chemical
❑ Psychological.
(1) Sabotage by Fire. The malicious use

of fire is one of the oldest methods of
sabotage. It is one of the most effective
methods because it can result in destruc-
tion of the evidence as well as complete
destruction of the objective.
(a) By using a timing device, the sabo-

teur can have time to leave the area and
establish an alibi, and it is entirely
possible that the fire itself will leave
minimum identifiable traces of its
causes.
(b) Personnel assigned firefighting du-
ties must be trained to recognize the
various incendiary materials which
may be used, and in the use of the Figure B-1—Simple mechanical device.
appropriate extinguishing agent(s). As-
289
(b) Other, and simpler delay devices can (4) Chemical agents may be easily intro-
be devised, limited only by the ingenuity duced into installations by such means as
of the saboteur. For example, a rubber air vents or heating systems. Likely
band may be used to hold the safety lever targets for chemical agent sabotage are
of a hand grenade in place. The pin is installations employing highly skilled
then pulled out, and the grenade is technicians. Toxic chemical agents and
placed in a gasoline tank. The rubber incapacitating agents are highly effective
band eventually rots, and an explosion and may cause employee productive efforts
and fire result. In a motor pool or to be totally impaired.
refueling area, the widespread results (5) Psychological sabotage is most
can be disastrous: difficult to control or combat because it
deals in intangibles and takes full advan-
(3) Sabotage by Explosives. The use of tage of normal human frailties. In its
explosives achieves instantaneous, at least simplest form it is the implanting of a
partial, destruction of the target, and the doubt or fear in the mind of an individual.
initial damage may be followed by a fire. It depends on natural rumor spreading for
The most probable targets are power and
exaggeration and multiplication.
transportation facilities.
(a) Small quantities of explosives may
trigger a chain reaction or destroy an (a) Psychological sabotage may be
extremely vital portion of an installa- employed effectively on a local scale to
tion. corrupt a unit or an installation. A
(b) One problem to the saboteur in definite distinction must be made, how-
explosive sabotage is the difficulty of ever, between manpower sabotage by
surreptitiously bringing explosives psychological means, such as the in-
to the target. For example, only ap- stigation of strikes, slowdowns, and
proximately three pounds of an explo- the like, and legitimate labor activities.
sive can be concealed on a person. A Manpower sabotage of this nature is
saboteur may use any ingenious method extremely difficult to detect. One dis-
to accomplish his mission. loyal employee engaged in psychologi-
(c) Explosives are readily available, cal sabotage may influence others who
and are used extensively in mining, will thereupon, believing in good faith
agricultural, and some industrial opera- that a labor grievance exists, engage in
tions. Also they are not difficult to strikes and other activities resulting in
produce, and the ingredients are readily loss of production.
procurable. These factors work to the (b) Another form of psychological sabo-
advantage of the saboteur. tage is creation of panic through the
290
spreading of false, exaggerated, or no indication of the explosive used or the
distorted information or rumors. Panic manner of construction. Both of these key
has its basis in fear, and is usually the factors are largely dependent upon the
result of lack of knowledge of the truth or availability of materials and the technical
lack of confidence in leadership. In this skill of the saboteur.
type of sabotage, damaging rumors or
surreptitiously distributed printed mat- a. In view of the infinite varieties possible,
ter may be encountered by security it is obvious that no set procedure can be
forces who should be properly trained in established for their handling. However, the
countermeasures to combat this and primary consideration is the safety of life and
other types of sabotage. property, and there are certain basic rules
which must be followed.
b. Wherever the possibility of a sabotage

B-9 Sabotage Bombs bomb exists, there must be a prearranged
plan for coping with such an emergency
An explosive bomb itself is the unit so that the following steps maybe earned out
of destruction and is not dependent upon quickly and in many cases concurrently:
outside aid as is an incendiary bomb; it is, (1) Clear the area of all personnel, cordon
therefore, normally larger than an incendi- the area, and establish a guard control
ary bomb. However, the same ingenuity of around the danger zone.
disguise is applicable as in the case of an
incendiary bomb. (2) Send for technical help such as the
explosive ordnance disposal unit, engineer
personnel, or civilian police bomb squad.
a. Five sticks of dynamite taped together (3) Immediately notify the security force
and equipped with a blasting cap would headquarters.
make an effective bomb, but upon sight
would incite suspicion and concern. The (4) Shut off power, gas, and fuel lines
leading into the danger area.
same five sticks of dynamite stuffed in a suit-
case with a dry cell battery and a clock-work (5) Notify the fire department, medical
delay device would be just as destructive, but service, MI and Federal Bureau of Investi-
would not attract attention. gation, as appropriate.
(6) Secure mattresses or sandbags for use
b. A lump of plastic explosive coated with a as protective shields and barricades. Sand-
mixture of shellac and coal dust would be bags may also be used in confining and
unnoticed in a load of coal. The possible directing the force of an explosion.
combinations of explosive, activator, delay (7) Remove flammable materials and
device, and outside containers are many. small objects from the surrounding area.
However, anything that might be con-
nected with the bomb or might act as a
trigger mechanism must not be touched.
B-10 Bomb Handling (8) Arrange for the use of portable X-ray
fluoroscopic equipment, which will be used
In any discussion of the handling, by technical personnel only.
disarming, or disposal of sabotage bombs, it
must be realized that the exterior appearance (9) See FM 19-5, chapter 12, and appendix
of a known or suspected bomb gives little or D of this manual.
291
B-11 Countersabotage f. Searches of incoming vehicles (chapter
4).
Countermeasures against sabotage g. Restricted areas (chapters 4 and 5).
include, but are not limited to, the following: h. Safeguarding classified information.
i. Investigation of securit y breaches (chap-
ter 9).
a. Planning (chapter 1). j. Physical security surveys and inspec-
b. Risk analysis and evaluation (chapter tions (chapter 17).
1). k. Of utmost importance is the building
c. Education (chapter 3). and maintaining of employee morale, inform-
d. Protective barriers (chapter 5). ing employees of threatened dangers, how
e. Identification and movement control they may be recognized and what protective
systems (chapter 4). measures are available.
292
Appendix D
Bomb Threats
B omb-threat planning is an impor-

tant facet of any physics] security program,
whether for a single building, a facility, or an
installation. This appendix provides the
security manager or trainer a basic outline
from which he can develop an effective bomb-
threat plan and training program.
The purpose of this appendix is to provide
outline guidance in planning for or respond-
ing to bomb threats. For an indepth discus-
sion, review TC 19-5.
297
153-846 O - 94 - 13
D-1 Definitions D-2 Countermeasures
a. A bomb is a device capable of Measures taken to minimize the

producing damage to material and injury or production and placement of bombs to
death to personnel when detonated or ig- include reducing the disruptive effects are as
nited. Bombs are classified as explosive or outlined:
incendiary. An explosive bomb causes dam- a. Preplanning considerations (figure D-
age by fragmentation, heat, and blast wave. 1).
The heat produced often causes a secondary (1) Preplanning is an essential prerequi-
incendiary effect. An incendiary bomb gener- site for developing a workable bomb threat
ates fire-producing heat without substantial plan. In the preplanning phase, provision
explosion when ignited. must be made for:
Bombing occurs when an explosive bomb ● Communication channels
detonates, or an incendiary bomb ignites. ● Support organizations
● Primary
b. A bomb threat is a message delivered ● Alternate.
by any means and the message mayor may
not: (2) Communication equipment. Do not
■ Specify location of the bomb. operate radio transmitters in the vicinity of
■ Include the time for detonation/ignition. the device. They could detonate it. The
■ Contain an ultimatum related to the following elements should have communi-
detonation/ignitor or concealment of the cations capability:
bomb.
■ Emergency operations center
c. A bomb incident involves any occur- ■ Facility/area inspections
rence concerning the detonation/ignition of a ■ Reporting system
bomb, the discovery of a bomb, or execution of ■ Search teams
a bomb threat. ■ Security teams.
Figure D-1—Effective bomb threat reaction must include communication and support.
298
b. Prepare the bomb threat plan. Any D-3 How To
effective plan must address at least the
following considerations A bomb threat may be received by
any of the following:
Control of the operation.
Evacuation. Telephone message
Search. Suspicious package through the mail
Finding the bomb or suspected bomb. Written message through the mail.
Disposal—EOD.
Detonation and damage control- a. Search Techniques (figure D-2). The
Barricade material around the device to guide choice of search techniques will depend on
device fragments upward. whether the threat is overt or covert. The
Control of publicity. following decisions must be made before the
Erection of barriers. proper techniques can be applied:
Fire and medical service standby.
Disconnection of utilities. Conducted prior, after, or without evacua-
Removal of flammables/expolsives. tion
After action report. Conducted by supervisors, occupants, or a
special team
c. Evaluate the threat. Percent of building to be searched
If a search team is used, it should be
d. Activate the plan. divided as follows:
Figure D-2—Search technique decisions to be made.
299
■ Outside search 25 percent. (3) Predesignated guides.
■ Public areas 25 percent. (4) Other considerations:
■ Detailed building search 50 percent.
❑ Authority to order evacuation.
❑ Decision to permit reentry into building.
b. Equipment ❑ The signal to evacuate.
● Specialized.
❑ Who will be the evacuation team.
● Available. ❑ What are the evacuation procedures.
❑ Destination of evacuation occupants.
c. Evacuation Procedures (threat re- ❑ Responsibilities of the occupants during
ceived and bomb found). evacuation.
(1) Predesignated routes of evacuation. d. Telephone Procedures Bomb Threat

(2) Priorities for people removal. Checklist.
300
Appendix E
Countering Terrorism
I ncidents of terrorism take place

almost daily. Therefore, it is essential that
security personnel know what to expect from
terrorists and something of their beliefs and
goals. This appendix addresses the following
aspects of terrorism:
❑ History of violence
❑ The threat
301
❑ Target selection (2) A well planned campaign. (It still is.)
❑ News media
❑ Weapons (3) The threat that further violence is
❑ Typical operations possible/probable.
❑ Methods
❑ Jurisdiction
❑ Reporting incidents
❑ Installation vulnerability
❑ Countermeasures. E-2 Target Selection Criteria
a. For maximum shock effect.
b. An environment that presents a low risk

E-1 History of Violence to the assault team, such as isolated situa-
tions and sites.
a. Violence dates back thousands of
c. High risk environments to demonstrate
years. Torture was prevalent then and
potential and ability, such as:
persisted into the 18th and 19th centuries.
The 20th century introduced various forms of (1) Communication/operational nerve
chemical and psychological torture. centers.
(2) Heavily populated living areas and/or
b. Terrorism, historically, is most closely establishments.
related and referenced to the reign of terror of
the French Revolution in 1793. This was the d. To gain international attention.
first time an attempt was made to create an
organization outside of a governmental body, e. Assault a target because of the high
whose philosophy was to systematically dollar placed upon it.
murder and set a rule of lawlessness based
upon a political belief. f. For maximum disruption of a facility’s
operation.
c. The terrorist threat has encompassed

all areas of government, business and com-
munity life—international, national, and
local. Terrorists have acted to spread fear for E-3 News Media
the following reasons:
The final result of all terrorist acts is
(1) Retaliation-for a variety of political
that they receive widespread news media
and/or organizational reasons.
exposure. Results of such exposure must be
(2) Destruction of Property-a message considered in view of the following:
warning, or sign of things to come.
a. In hostage situations, the hostage has
(3) Taking of hostages as bargaining tools been known to identify with his captors. This
for various goals. association increases the difficulty of the
situation.
d. The use of terror has always been: b. Increase of publicity of an incident may
(1) A means of coercion. increase sympathy for a particular cause.
302
E-4 Terrorist Weapons ■ Terroristassault and/or negotiation team
has a designated leader.
a. The most common weapons of
terrorists include: ■ Use available rapid transportation.
(1) Handguns ■ Terrorism techniques embrace:
(2) Automatic weapons
Subversion
(3) Explosive devices Penetration
(4) Other sophisticated weapons. Indoctrination
Direct assault
b. Sale and smuggling of guns has forced Skyjacking
increased security and enforcement measures Kidnapping
by Federal agencies. It is estimated that there Sabotage.
are some 40 million handguns in the posses-
sion of citizens in the United States. This does
not include automatic weapons, explosive
devices and rocket firepower.
c. Major concern and priority is to be given E-6 Methods of Operation
to installations with chemical and nuclear
material. These sensitive installations must a. Robbery of needed equipment
receive maximum security. and supplies is an indication of possible
terrorist activity, such as theft of ammuni-
d. The handheld automatic weapon is a tion, weapons, communications equipment,
favorite of terrorist groups because of its large amounts of paper, or copying machines
availability, size, weight, ease of conceal- to produce propaganda.
ment, high rate of fire and psychological
impact on lightly armed security forces or b. Attack selected persons or property
unarmed civilians. to cause confusion, disorder or to force
nations to confront one another.
c. Blackmail is an intelligence or Federal

investigation matter. A DOD member maybe
blackmailed into providing information
about the installation.
E-5 What to Expect
Members of terrorist organizations d. Kidnapping a family member of a high
usually meet these standards: ranking or influential officer of DOD as a
hostage for ransom or other demand (figure
■ Well disciplined for violence. E-1, page 304).
■ Attacks are well planned. e. Arson of government property as a

gesture of their ability.
■ Members are well armed and trained.
f. Bombing of specific or indiscriminate
■ Expertly executed. targets to convey a message and display their
serious intent on an issue.
■ Reconnaissance conducted by persons
other than strike force. g. Shootouts (ambushes) of guards to
303
Figure E-1—Family members are susceptible to kidnapping.
gain access to a restricted area. Critical areas c. Operational, investigative responsibil-

of security demand reaction teams. ity (Department of Justice, FBI).
h. Hijacking of aircraft and trains. d. Military abroad (Department of State).
e. Military forces command and opera-

tional control.
E-7 Jurisdiction
Considerations must include the
following on jurisdiction when planning and E-8 Reporting Incidents
determining counterterrorism reactions:
a. Any terrorist incident must be
a. Whether jurisdiction is concurrent or reported immediately to security supervisors,
exclusive. operational alert centers, jurisdictional agen-
cies, police response forces, and adjacent
b. Proximity to installation borders. installations.
304
b. Security supervisory personnel should ● FBI
be familiar with command relationships ● Next Army operations center, DA,
during counterterrorism operations. Memo- who alerts the next higher command
randums of understanding should be pre- (see figure E-2, next page).
pared and mutually signed concerning when
and how FBI/military authorities interact
during incidents. Also, how Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAS) apply in host countries (d) OCOPOS, installation headquarters
when incidents occur on military installa- operation centers contact the major
tions. As a minimum, memorandums of command (USAREUR, Eighth Army,
understanding should include: etc.). Alert notifications are cited in AR
● Command-relationships and jurisdiction 190-40 (see figure E-3, page 307).
● Sharing of information
● Control of military operations (e) Step-by-step:
● Organization-composition of joint forces
● Negotiating tactics
● Initial on-scene commander with
● Use of equipment military and/or security police person-
● Use of force measures
nel sustains contact with terrorists and
● Liaison with media and public officials. in accordance with doctrine and prees-
tablished procedures, and attempts to
ascertain a precise estimate of the situa-
E-9 Counterterrorism Actions tion.
a. Each terrorist incident is catego- ● Provost marshal, or designated rep-
rized in three phases—initial response, nego- resentative, arrives on scene at nearby
location to establish forward command
tiation, and assault.
post, assuming forward operational
(1) Initial response phase is the period control as commander. The initial, now
during which military and security person- former, commander remains at the
nel become aware of a terrorist committed command post to provide information
act and prepare to counter the act through and assistance.
peaceful persuasion or military force. ● Security and reconnaissance person-
nel of the predesignated reaction force
(a) Terrorists seize buildings and take
arrive on scene and establish physical
hostages. The nearest military police or
security cordon of the area. They deter-
security patrol arrives on the scene to mine best access to and egress from the
estimate the situation. Military police/
terrorist target (building with terrorists/
security patrol report incident to the
hostages).
military police/guard operations desk.
● Tactical elements or predesignated
(b) In CONUS, the following agencies
reaction force moves to assembly area
are alerted:
beyond sight and hearing of terrorists
❑ MP duty officer
and prepares for possible assault opera-
❑ Provost marshal
tions.
❑ Installation headquarters ● Forward command post establishes
❑ Installation operations center
communications with installation
❑ CID
emergency operations center (IEOC).
❑ MI
● Installation commander arrives at
(c) The installation duty officer at the IEOC to command counterterror opera-
operations center notifies installation tions, first obtaining an estimate of the
commander who informs: situation from the provost marshal.
305
Figure E-2—CONUS Terrorist Alert Notification Process. This flowchart outlines

notification channels and depicts interface with all areas of the government.
306
Figure E-3—OCONUS Terrorist Alert Notification Process.
307
● The provost marshal sustains contact options with estimated risk factors.
with terrorists and determines: (d) IEOC analyzes tactical military
❑ The number of hostages, who they options and determines best security
are, and their condition. option, then alerts forward command
❑ Precise interpretation of terrorist post of the option selected.
demands. (e) Forward command post alerts sup-
❑ Number of terrorists, type of terror- port elements (such as medical, trans-
ist group(s), position of terrorists in the portation, etc.) to embark on support
building, and movement patterns of mission.
both terrorists and hostages. (f) Forward command post alerts the
❑ Name(s) of terrorists, especially the leader of the tactical element and pro-
leaders. vides this individual with the military
❑ Terrorist behavior characteristics option plan although permission to
(such as nervousness, tense, easily conduct such a plan is yet to be
excitable, or unemotional). granted.
❑ Terrorist weapons, explosives, (g) The option may be to conduct as-
equipment. saults to free hostages and take prison-
❑ Best access and egress to and from ers.
building (from reports by elements of the (h) Leader of tactical element returns to
reaction force). rear assembly area and briefs element to
❑ Tactical military options for use by conduct the plan. Element obtains
tactical elements. additional equipment, if needed, and
❑ If available resources will support undergoes full preparation, rehearsing
planned tactical military operations. actions repeatedly.
❑ Begins formal negotiations with (i) FBI official and/or installation com-
terrorists (NOTE: Terrorists may reject mander (US, i.e., on command preroga-
the assigned negotiator and request to tive) may move to forward command
negotiate only with installation com- post. However, it should be noted that
mander or other official party.) Report the appearance of additional authority
results of all above to IEOC. may be viewed by terrorists as an
● Senior FBI official arrives at IEOC indication of impending final action.
and receives briefing on situation from (j) AOC/DA forwards to IEOC a deci-
sion on use or nonuse of tactical military
installation commander or provost mar-
option. IEOC reports decision to forward
shal and assumes responsibility along
command post (FCP) commander of the
with the installation commander as
director of operations. tactical element. If a decision is made to
conduct tactical military operation(s),
(2) Negotiation phase.
the third phase is initiated.
(a) Negotiating team, or negotiator, (3) Assault phase.

contacts the terrorists and buys as much (a) Tactical element completes rehears-
time as possible from terrorists for the als, regroups at assembly area, estab-
consideration of their demands. lishes mobile command post, and in-
(b) IEOC forwards clarification of de- forms forward command post when
mands to AOC/DA and awaits guidance ready to embark on military operation.
on how the US Government will react. (b) On order, tactical element moves as
OCONUS reports to OPNS center, covertly as possible from assembly area
major command. to its objective.
(c) Forward command post forwards to
IEOC recommended tactical military b. Control is the essential element during
308
Figure E-4 - Outline of control for hostage
309
any of the three phases. The outcome of a able and under direct control of the
terrorist event depends on counterterrorist installation commander. FBI and local
situational control; therefore, command and authorities are considered supplements to
control links must contain limitations im- the military resources because of response
posed upon them by policy direction. time. Another important aspect is the
number of MPs on duty or available within
(1) Military and security poIice duties and the required response time.
responsibilities must be clearly estab-
lished. (3) Distance from population
(2) Installation and unit contingency centers— miles/time. Experts on terror-
plans/SOP must be developed. ism say that heavily populated urban
(3) Security personnel must be schooled areas usually provide these advantages to
and/or trained to react to a terrorist terrorists:
situation. (a) Concealment of supplies and equip-
ment.
(b) Safe houses are more readily avail-
E-10 Vulnerability able.
(c) More of a tendency for popular sup-
a. To determine the vulnerability of port.
any given installation, ten major factors are (d) More freedom of movement.
considered: On the other hand, low density population
areas have the following characteristics:
(1) Installation characteristics and
sensitivity— personnel/mission. There (e) Strangers are noticed.
are four subfactors. (f) Local law enforcement personnel
(a) Consider personnel as hostage can- tend to be close to day-to-day activities.
didates. General officers and foreign (4) Size of installation— area popula-
personnel assigned to the installation. tion.
(b) Sensitivity of the installation
mission. Maximum consideration to (a) The larger the installation popula-
nuclear or chemical storage sites. tion the larger number of potential
(c) Consider open post versus closed targets created due to increased require-
post. ments for arms, ammunition, banks,
(d) The installation considered a sym- schools, clubs, etc.
bol of national significance. (b) With increased population, the popu-
larity for infiltration and support within
is increased.
(2) L a w e n f o r c e m e n t r e s o u r c e s -
available personnel. Three categories to (5) Routes for access and egress—
consider: method of transportation. There are gener-
ally three major means of approaching and
(a) Military leaving a military installation-aircraft,
(b) Federal vehicle, and boat. Because of the capabili-
(c) Local. ties of a helicopter, all military installa-
tions are considered equally vulnerable.
The law enforcement resource is responsi- The number of roads and their quality
ble for law and order, and should be a should be considered. Only major water-
priority when analyzing for safety and ways or large bodies of water should be
control. The military is immediately avail- viewed as transportation routes.
310
(6) Area social environment— social. than radio because the radio is more
Some geographical areas of the United subject to interruption either by terrorist
States either have a history of, or a act, by accident, or jamming.
tendency for, unrest and dissident ele- (e) Interpersonal communication, your
ments. ability to perform your command of
required security measures which will
(7) Proximity to borders— jurisdiction.
aid the safety of the installation, is a key
This factor of vulnerability takes into factor.
consideration the desirability of preparing
for a terrorist attack in a foreign country b. Included with these ten factors are two
and for escape after the act. aspects which are the results of actions taken
(8) Distance from other US military by the installation commander. These two
installation— support. Major governing factors are area social environment and
factor is response time. If a local agreement law enforcement resources.
for military support exists with a non-US
military installation, the supporting force c. The area social environment can be
must be periodically exercised for an reduced to zero if the installation command
efficient cooperative response. and/or provost marshal is an active partici-
pant, on a regular basis, in meetings or
(9) Terrain. The terrain adjacent to the
councils with other area law enforcement
installation is another condition to be
agencies.
considered in overall installation vulnera-
bility. Some types of terrain are built-up
d. With the restriction imposed on Federal
areas which present advantages to plan- authorities in collection of domestic intelli-
ning and executing a successful terrorist
gence, close contact with state and local
act or incident. (See TC 7-1, chapter 3, authorities provides the most effective means
Cover, Concealment, Camouflage, and for staying current on the social environment
Target Acquisition.)
surrounding the installation.
(10) Communications with next
higher echelon. e. The assessed vulnerability value of the
law enforcement factor can be reduced if
(a) Asignificant influence is if terrorists military law enforcement assets have certain
have knowledge of the effectiveness of capabilities. These can be unique equipment
the installation communication system. or training:
(b) Consider communications and the
influence it may have on the outcome of (1) Equipment, armored car, aircraft,
a terrorist act. special firearms and suppression de-
(c) The more prolonged the act (such as vices.
hostage), the more influence communi- (2) Unique training (such as sniper,
cations can have in providing advice special reaction team, negotiating team)
and assistance in coping with the gives additional capabilities to law
situation. On the other hand, a bombing enforcement personnel.
is a sudden event and the communica-
tions then serve primarily as a means of f. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security
reporting. Program, provides guidance as well as a
(d) Both land and line telephone and formal system for surveys and inspections to
radio must be evaluated. Land line test vulnerability of an installation.
telephone is more secure and reliable
311
Appendix F
Physical Security Plan
I t is essential, in the best interest of

security, that each installation, unit, or
activity maintain and use a detailed physical
security plan. The plan should include at
least special and general guard orders, access
and materiel control, protective barriers/
lighting systems, locks, intrusion detection
systems, etc. This appendix contains a
sample plan.
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
Appendix G
Contract Guards
T his appendix contains a sample

contract with appropriate special and general
orders for security forces (in addition to those
discussed in chapter 9). Contract guards are
an inherent part of overall installation
security forces. When considering the use of
or the actual employment of contract guards,
the area addressed in this appendix should
apply. Contract guards are usually used
when it is more feasible in terms of manpower
resources and criticality y of the mission. A
contract is essential when the Government
provides the property and services to a
contractor or when the Government main-
tains possession of the property and employs
contract personnel to exercise care, mainte-
nance, security and use of the installation
activity, or equipment.
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
153-846 O - 94 - 14
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
Appendix H
Game Warden's Role
T he installation game warden, in his

execution of fish and wildlife law enforce-
ment duties, should be used to supplement the
physical security program in remote areas of
the installation. Game warden personnel
have the ground mobile capability to enhance
the security posture during daylight and
darkness in areas normally inaccessible or
off limits to “white-hat” patrols. This appen-
dix outlines the areas of assistance in which
security can be supplemented by game war-
357
H-1 Signs (liquor stills, drug drops, staging areas for
terrorist activities, etc.).
a. Game warden personnel should
detect and report sign damage and recom- c. Provide assistance in detecting trespass-
mend sign posting at: ing of personnel or individuals loitering in
out-of-the-way places
(1) Installation boundaries
d. Detect unsecured buildings and report
(2) Off limits and restricted areas and supervise the repair of physical barriers.
(3) Routine access areas by public person-
nel e. Assist in security of downed aircraft.
(4) Hunting and recreational areas. f. Periodic spot checks of POVs to prevent
transportation of ammunition from ranges
b. Coordinating sign maintenance is a off post.
continuous process in support of the installa-
tion security posture.
H-4 Detect Pilferage

In the following:
H-2 Natural Disasters Semi-isolated and isolated work areas
Range areas
a. Game wardens can be used in Warehouses
assessing damage from: Open storage construction yards
Fire Rail yards.
Flood
Storm
Wind.
b. The game warden can recommend, due

H-5 Equipment
to damage assessed, where to position secu-
rity forces in support of area facility, and Game wardens assisting in the
security program should have the following
perimeter security to enhance the overall
equipment:
security posture.
a. Ground motor vehicle with off road
capability.
b. Vehicle communications with a re-

H-3 Isolated Areas charge/disconnect capability for extended
remote operations.
Fish and wildlife personnel can also
assist in detecting planned criminal activity c. Proper seasonal protective clothing.
such as:
d. Participate as an observer on rotary-
a. Larceny of government property and wing aircraft to conduct security assessments
equipment. and surveillance.
b. Operation of covert illicit activities e. Armed and badged.
358
H-6 Routine Observation H-7 Security Awareness
• Post boundary Be familiar with the requirements in
Ž Range areas and buildings AR 190-13, FM 19-30, plus command policies
• Pipelines and directives.
Ž Pump station
• Bulk storage areas
• Communication facilities/lines
Ž Lake/river docks H-8 Additional Information
• Government boats
• Recreational areas The special package produced for the
• Physical security plan military police platoon leader’s course, Fort
• All security activities McClellan, Alabama is an in-depth discus-
• Related duties in FM 19-10. sion of wildlife law enforcement.
359
Appendix I
Cargo Security
Management
A s indicated in appendix A, there

are many possible control measures to
prevent cargo pilferage; but none will achieve
full potential unless implemented, coordi-
nated and checked by management person-
nel. This appendix uses a working manage-
ment model to show you how to do it.
360
b. To help assure timely detection of thefts
occurring before goods get into the consig-
I-1 Cardpac nee’s record system, request purchasing
personnel to contact the supplier di-
A good illustration of cargo security
rectly when an order is not filled within
integrated management is the Military Traf-
a reasonable time.
fic Management and Terminal Service
(MTMTS) card packet system. (MTMTS is a
c. To prevent forged purchase orders and
Department of Defense agency that central-
subsequent thefts, prohibit purchasing
izes and coordinates the procurement and
department from receiving ordered
operation of transportation services for the
merchandise from having access to such
movement of military freight and personnel.)
merchandise. Likewise, assure that receiving
The computerized card packet system, Card-
personnel do not perform purchasing duties.
pac, was designed to operate at six high
volume marine terminals, through which
d. Only specified individuals should
about 85 percent of the MTMTS surface
export cargo flows. be authorized to check in merchandise
received. Unless responsibility is fixed,
When a DOD shipper alerts the computer at shortages can be blamed on others.
an MTMTS area command that a shipment
destined for overseas is in the transportation
e. Consignee employees who check
pipeline, this information is relayed by the
incoming goods should reconcile such
area command to the computer at the water
goods with a purchase order and remove
terminal scheduled to receive the shipment
goods to the storage area immediately
for export. The terminal’s computer automati- thereafter. Absence of a purchase order could
cally generates a set of punched cards
mean the merchandise was ordered fraudu-
containing all the data necessary for termi-
lently with the intention of removing it before
nal personnel to process the incoming ship-
it got into the record flow. Prompt transfer of
ment. These cards are the basis for manage-
goods to storage not only gets them into the
ment printouts for controlling the cargo as it
record flow, but also removes them from a
moves through the terminal and are the
traditionally high-theft area.
means by which to update the area command
master file.
f. Consignees should not delay taking
When the shipment is received, one of the
delivery of goods. Anticipate difficulties
prepared cards is used as a receipt document. regarding import license, exchange control,
The checker at the gate records the date of
or other regulations. Those who have taken
receipt and the location within the terminal
advantage of free time in customs and of free
where the cargo is stored.
storage time at earner terminals often find
that the practice is penny-wise but pound-
foolish. For example, an importer of canned
goods took prompt delivery and suffered only
limited pilferage in contrast to the heavy
I-2 Consignee Management losses of his procrastinating competitors.
a. Consignee management should
instruct its receiving department to noti-
fy purchasing when incoming items I-3 Receiving
arrive. This helps prevent fraudulent pur-
chase orders originated by someone outside of a. Receiving personnel should use
purchasing from getting into the flow and prenumbered forms on which to record
forces receiving to make a careful count. delivered merchandise, and copies
361
153-846 O - 94 - 15
should be sent to purchasing and ac- pickup drivers to insure they are the legal
counts payable. This will help deter destruc- representatives of the carrier. Record license
tion of receiving records and theft of mer- numbers, especially on rental vehicles.
chandise. Failure to furnish purchasing with
a record will spur an investigation, and
failure to advise accounts payable will result
in a complaint by the supplier. I-4 Shipping
b. All discrepancies must be immedi- a. Prepare legible bills of lading
ately reported to the terminal manager and other shipping documents, which are
and/or security director for investigation. manufactured from a paper stock that will
hold up under multiple handlings. Try to use
c. Freight received without accompanying classification descriptions instead of trade
documentation should be stored in a secure names, and avoid listing values.
place. Record the number of shipping docu-
ments given to strippers or loaders. When the b. Periodically, rotate drivers among
documents are returned, count them again runs. Otherwise, there is too great a chance
and compare totals. that they might develop contacts for collu-
sion. Beware of drivers who request certain
d. When returned by the local driver, routes despite the lower wages associated
delivery receipts should be compared with those routes.
with terminal control copies and all bills
accounted for. c. Change truck stops frequently.
e. Analyze claims to determine type of d. Develop incentive plans to control

cargo most subject to theft and where it’s losses– payments to employees being based
being lost. on reductions in insurance premiums and/or
actual losses.
f. Each receiving station should assign a
trusted employee to review advance mani- e. On multipiece shipments, shippers
fests or, if none, the documents arriving with should label each package. As the driver
the cargo to identify and segregate for special instruction manual of one carrier reads, “The
attention theft-prone cargo. Such “paper driver must check all shipments to determine
alerts” should also be supplemented by actual that each piece is legibly, durably, and
examination of the cargo. For example, a properly marked. The name and address of
manifest described one shipment as “electri- the shipper must be shown on each piece of
cal equipment,” but the carton identified the freight in any shipment. The marking on
goods as calculators. Relying on the mani- each article should be checked to determine if
fest, a cargo handler treated the shipment as the consignee’s name and address is the same
general cargo; one of the calculators was later as shown on the airbill. Drivers must be
stolen. certain that the marking will not tear off
when the shipment is in transit.”
g. Cargo entering a terminal from shippers
or other stations should be thoroughly f. Exposure to loss often increases with
inspected, accurately counted, properly class- higher turnover of personnel on shipping
ified, and immediately stored. Paperwork and receiving docks.
should reflect all decisions and actions taken.
g. Segregate shipping from receiving
h. Require positive identification from areas, inbound and outbound cargo.
362
h. Any employee withdrawing goods from c. Prelodged delivery or pickup order
storage should be different from the one should be safeguarded from theft or unau-
actually releasing the merchandise (appen- thorized observation. Verify identity of
dix A). carrier and carrier employee before
releasing a prelodged pickup order.
An operator of large terminals notes the
potential advantages of prelodging: “We
encourage truckers to bring their documenta-
tion to the terminal the day before they
1-5 Security Education deliver cargo. We prepare our receiving
documents from the trucker’s papers and
Security education should consider when trucks arrive, give priority in handling
the risk analysis aspects outlined in chapter 1 to the loads for which we were furnished
and be constructed as defined in chapter 2, advanced documentation. Cargo handling is
Security Education. expedited, checking is more precise, and the
documents themselves are more accurate.
a. As practicable, insist on piece counts Our cargo accounting has improved signifi-
when cargo is moved to and from vehicles cantly....”
and in and out of storage areas, vessels, This confirms the observation in a carrier
railcars, aircraft, etc. And insist on clear task force report: “Reforms in paperwork to
identification of those who conduct such eliminate bottlenecks and to raise accuracy
counts-driver, checker, receiving personnel, also may make it less easy to smudge the
terminal cargo handler, or whoever. The two responsibility for cargo and cargo records."
parties involved in a cargo transfer should
not take one another’s word regarding the d. Restrict access to cargo documenta-
count. If they do, accountability becomes tion to a need-to-know basis. Systems assur-
blurred. ing strict accountability for documentation
As a carrier executive advised, employees are as important as those designed for the
who check cargo must be told, “You are cargo itself.
individually responsible. You must know. For example, after several thefts in a
You must count.” Among his instructions to terminal involving stolen documentation as
drivers were these: (1) “If the bill calls for well as its cargo, an internal release order was
‘CS. No. 1234,’ don’t accept a case marked devised. The cargo handler who is to retrieve
‘4567’ for it.” (2) “A driver should never a shipment in the terminal is given the
accept a shipment described as ‘one bundle release order, which describes the cargo and
tires.’ The airbill should indicate how many its location. Source documents remain in the
articles are in the bundle. For example, ‘one order. The clerk retains a copy of the release
bundle (4) tires.’” (3) If a shortage exists in a on which he records time of preparation and
shipment, determine the exact piece short. “If name of the cargo handler. The cargo hand-
it is shoes, the exception should be ‘1 cs. shoes ler takes the shipment to his control supervi-
short.’ A general statement such as ‘1 cs. sor, who verifies the identity of the cargo
short’ is not sufficient....” handler and description and quantity of car-
go to be delivered. The supervisor requests
b. Negotiate with carriers for what one the signature of the trucker after recording
large shipper calls “signature security date and time of release. Finally, the release
service” for certain kinds of shipments. This order is returned to the clerk who prepared it.
means a signature and tally are required from
each person handling the shipment at each
stage of its transit, from point of origin to e. An integral part of terminal security is a
destination. workable, accurate cargo location
363
system. Delays in, or confusion over, remov- i. Advertise your security efforts in high-
ing cargo from storage increases the risk of theft locations.
theft or pilferage. Among other things, a good
locator system does not give cargo handlers
the excuse to wander all over the terminal
when looking for a shipment.
I-6 Security Precautions
f. Devise procedures to minimize termi-
nal congestion and poor housekeeping, a. Know employees on all shifts.
which result in obstructed visibility of cargo,
misplaced cargo, less efficient checking and b. Do not advertise on trucks, such as
handling, and other situations promoting “Smoke Brand X-distributed by....”
theft and pilferage.
States one highly knowledgeable source, c. Run radio and TV spots indicating the
“The real enemy of security is congestion. convenience and other advantages (such as
When goods pile up, you lose control, no service) of buying through regular channels.
matter what procedures are in effect.” Many
carriers try to combat this by discouraging d. Request truck rental companies to post
consignees from delaying pickup or accep- signs warning users that the rental agent is
tance of cargo. cooperating in theft prevention.
g. If strikes hit other modes or carriers, e. Conceal or seal in a pouch the papers
some terminals should have emergency plans covering a load.
by which to handle in an orderly fashion the
anticipated extra flow of cargo (such as f. Provide cargo checks with self-inking
through a pickup and delivery appointment identification stamps. When receipting for
system for shippers and consignees). cargo, in addition to affixing his signature on
the receipt, the checker stamps the document,
h. In areas where the rate of truck hijack- thereby clearly identifying himself.
ings is high, a police official suggests that at
each delivery point drivers note the indicated g. Use color-coded vehicle passes (keyed to
mileage, leaving a record at the dock in their specific areas in the terminal) and time stamp
logs. If the truck is hijacked, the difference them.
between the mileage recorded at the last
delivery and the indicated mileage at the h. Establish advance-notice procedures
point of recovery-combined with other whereby consignee is notified at least 24
driver-supplied information—will assist po- hours prior to arrival of sensitive shipments.
lice in pinpointing the drop or fence. Alert intermediate points as well.
364
Appendix J
Commissary Outlets and

Storage
C ommanders at each echelon are

responsible for the protection of property
under their jurisdiction, custody, and control.
Commissaries, commissary annexes, and
commissary storage receiving facilities must
be continually secured using the security in-
depth ring and the operational considera-
tions dictated.
365
Physical protection of commissary and c. Crawlways beneath the facility should
commissary related facilities encompasses be inspected and secured to add to the overall
measures designed to develop habits and security posture.
attitudes in commissary employees and
supervisors that will emphasize security d. The facility must be constructed so that
through: access through unhardened material is im-
• Foodstuff protection. possible.
Ž Providing a secure environment.
ŽEliminating potential security weaknesses.
J-3 Service/Facilitv
Entrances
J-1 Controlled Areas
a. The service entrance to the com-
a. Establishing controlled areas for missary and other related activities must be
the security of food items will improve the designed so employee supervisory personnel
total security posture of the commissary and can observe entry and departure as neces-
related facilities by providing security in- sary.
depth and insuring that all personnel are
security conscious. b. The entrance should be located far
enough from the cash registers to allow for
b. Although an increase in security mea- observation in detecting pilferage.
sures may cause some slowdown in operation
and may inconvenience some personnel, the c. Guard rails should be established to
use of controlled areas assists in identifying channel personnel entering to purchase items
security requirements with needs as they de- to insure passage through the entry control
velop. point from the facility entrance.
c. Controlled areas are those involving: d. The service entrance to the commissary
● Parking area(s) for incoming shipments of sales outlet must be secured to allow opening
food items (rail, motor transport, air). from the inside only.
● On/off loading area to include the direc-
tion of travel area to specific points within a e. Service doors should remain locked until
warehouse or to sales outlet. the precise operating hours and opened only
● Surveillance by physical or electronic by designated personnel to allow employee
methods. entry.
● Control of visiting personnel.
f. Service entrance doors to warehouse
facilities must remain locked at all times
during loading and unloading operations or
J-2 Facility Construction remain under close observation when not
secured.
a. Doors to the facility must be
adequately constructed from a security stand- g. Exterior door hinge pins must be of the
point. lock-pin variety or welded to prevent their
removal.
b. Openings (exhaust outlets, etc.) in
excess of 96 square inches must be barred, h. Padlock hasps must be installed to
grilled, or covered with chain-link material. prevent their removal.
366
J-4 P a t r o n s b. Incoming shipping documents will be
filed and periodically reviewed and checked.
a. Procedures must be established
to insure positive identification prior to c. Incoming items should have continual
making a purchase. observation during offloading, delivery, ac-
countability, and storage.
b. Admission procedures will be posted in a
conspicuous location to inform patrons of
store requirements.
J-7 Meat Disposal
c. An established policy on verifying
checking credibility must be implemented. a. The property disposal officer or
his designated representative will witness
d. A sign should be posted to inform the destruction of meat supplies considered
patrons of the possible penalties for shoplift- unfit for human consumption. The local offi-
ing. cial veterinarian will inspect and condemn
meat supplies that are unfit for human con-
sumption prior to releasing the items to the
disposal officer.
J-5 Store Configuration b. Reports of surveys must be requested
and initiated when it has been determined
a. The store will be arranged to lend that certain items are unfit for human
itself to maximum observation of attempted consumption through fault or neglect of the
employee pilferage or patron shoplifting. commissary officer and/or employees.
b. There should be circular mirrors at c. Fat trimmings not sold to authorized

strategic points within the shopping area to patrons or issued to organizations subsisted
provide for observation of dead spaces that on field rations, must be reported to the
cannot be viewed by on-duty employees. installation property disposal officer. A
secured and accountable process should be
c. Aisles used for patrons should be specifi- established from departure to delivery of fat
cally designed to provide maximum flow for trimmings to the installation property dispo-
dispersal and reduction of shoplifting. sal officer.
d. Storage bins will be located and de-

signed to provide adequate security for
cardboard boxes which provide monetary
input when contracted by weight. J-8 Cash Register Procedures
a. The amount of cash in the change
fund for each cash register should not exceed
$150.00 (as established by Troop Support
J-6 Incoming Items Agency).
a. An effective tally-in and tally-out b. Each cashier should receipt for either
system will be established for checking items the cash register or the change fund.
and supplies received or shipped against the
available shipping documents. c. Cash register tapes and cash receipts
367
will be reconciled and verified by an autho- designated in writing by the commissary
rized representative of the commissary offi- officer.
cer at the end of each business day.
c. Keys to entrances and exits will be
d. There will be an established amount turned in and placed in a key locker or other
that personal checks can be cashed for secured container at the close of each busi-
greater than the total purchase price of the ness day.
items.
d. Keys will not be removed from the
e. Government payroll checks will not be installation by employees under any circum-
cashed at commissary facilities. stances.
f. The commissary employee entrusted e. Keys, locks, and lock cores will be
with the monies will be escorted to the bank changed periodically in the event of key
deposit vault by on-duty military police duplication.
personnel (appendix K).
f. Locks will be changed immediately upon
g. A periodic records check must be made loss or theft of keys or commissary sales
to verify the transfer of overage funds and items.
receipts to the US Treasury Department.
g. If multiple-use keys exist, access to such
h. Cash register clearing tapes will be keys must be restricted to the commissary of-
properly accounted for, secured, and for- ficer or his assistant and secured when not in
warded to the appropriate troop support use.
agency in DA Form 3292, Summary of Daily
Fund Receipts. h. When combination locks are used, the
manufacturer’s serial number will be obliter-
i. Procedures will be established to secure ated.
and account for the detail cash register
receipts at the end of the business day. i. Locks should be rotated and used at
another facility after the second rotation.
j. There will be a person designated to

secure and account for on-shelf locks that are
targeted to be used for rotation purposes.
J-9 Locks and Keys
k. Safe combinations will be restricted to
a. The commissary officer will con- the minimum number of persons necessary.
trol locks and keys to all buildings and
entrances. 1. There will be a current list developed
that specifies individuals who are knowledge-
b. Keys will be issued to only those people able of each combination.
368
Appendix K
Escorting Public Funds
P roper security during fund escort

procedures is of utmost importance. Military
police must provide the best security and
protection possible when escorting funds.
This includes the safety of the person being
escorted.
369
K-1 Security Measures K-2 Escorts
a. Avoid Patterns. a. Vehicle Escorts (figure K-1).
Avoid escorting at the same time. (1) Two vehicles should be used for secu-
rity during the escort of finds.
Refrain from using the same route.
Vary direction of approach to pickup and (2) One vehicle will contain the courier,
delivery points. funds, and an armed MP escort.
Avoid use of same entrance/exit to build- (3) The security escort vehicle will be an
ing for pickup and delivery. armed MP vehicle.
(4) MP security personnel will be trained
b. Security Sweeps.
in escort procedures to include being
(1) A security sweep must be made of the knowledgeable of the predesignated
area for suspicious personnel, vehicles, or routes.
actions prior to picking up courier.
(5) Vehicle 1 conducts the initial security
(2) Where possible, another MP security sweep of route and receiving point while
vehicle should sweep the area prior to enroute to deposit the payload. Mission
arrival of the security escort vehicle. permitting, vehicle 1 should cruise the area
(3) Check of delivery point by another or establish static surveillance near the
security patrol prior to arrival of the escort deposit facility (bank, etc.) until vehicle 2
vehicle for suspicious personnel, vehicles, has accomplished its mission.
or activities is necessary.
b. Communications.
(4) When it is not feasible to use the second
security vehicle to sweep the destination (1) Security procedures will be established
point, then the escort vehicle should to insure constant communication between
escorted vehicle(s) and the MP station.
conduct a sweep of the area prior to
delivery. (2) Establishment of radio security check-
Figure K-1—Placement of occupants in escort vehicles.
370
points for position identification during Ž Coordinate with the fund facility manager
movement is essential. Escort status to obtain the name, information, and pictures
should be relayed to the MP station upon of courier personnel to assist identification
reaching each checkpoint. and to expedite escort procedures at pickup
points.
(3) Procedures for duress must be estab Ž Request employees working at the pickup
lished while in a mobile posture and while
and delivery points to observe escort arrivals
on foot from patrol vehicle to the deposi-
and departures while maintaining telephonic
tory. As an example of a duress code, the
contact with the MP station.
Julian date on the calendar could be used Ž Brief courier personnel to possible courses
as well as the remaining days of the
of actions in case of a holdup while on foot, or
calendar year.
positioned in vehicle.
(4) All escort personnel must have por- • Positive identification of escort personnel
table radio communications capability to courier must be made prior to arrival and
while separated from the escort vehicle. by courier upon arrival.
Ž Consolidation of fund escort schedules
should be accomplished to the maximum
extent possible.
• In oversea areas, coordinate with local
K-3 Protective Actions national police in reference to nation-to-
nation agreements on escorts, use of firearms,
a. Protective Cover. and carrying of weapons.
(1) Preselected safety positions should be
identified to use if a robbery is attempted. d. Backup Response Forces.
(2) The motor vehicle, if properly posi- (1) Readily available, armed, and
tioned, will provide adequate cover during equipped.
small arms fire.
(2) Trained in small unit tactics.
(3) A member of the escort team will
provide cover of pickup and delivery points
from a nearby safe position. e. Compliance.
(4) Escort team members will not, except ■ AR 190-28.
in emergencies, be in possession of fired Traffic regulations.
containers. Instructions by civil police escorts while off
post, providing there is violation of federal
b. Response Plan. law, or lessening the protection of funds.
■ Emergency equipment procedural use.
The plan must be designed for responding
to holdups, and the military police perform-
f. Training should include the following:
ing fund security must be briefed on the plan.
It should provide procedures for cordoning (1) Threat potential.
potential holdup areas. (2) Use of force.
The response plan should allow for instal-
lation closing in case of holdups. (3) Small unit tactics.
(4) Limited crisis intervention counseling.
c. Coordination.
Ž Coordinating the pickup and delivery time (5) Escort procedures.
of courier personnel will reduce complacency. (6) Weapons firing.
371
(7) limited, low-speed pursuit operations.
Note: Funds of less than $500 should be
(8) Advanced driver training techniques escorted by the responsible fund activ-
(TC 19-17). ity, depending upon the threat posture.
All funds involving post exchange,
(9)) After-action reports of previous hold-
commissaries, clubs, etc., will be es-
ups on military installations in various
corted by an MP armed guard.
geographical locations. .
372
Appendix L
Closed Circuit Television
I n security, closed circuit television

(CCTV) is designed for a limited audience-
the security manager and/or a few guard
force members. It is used in some military
consumer outlets to prevent and detect
pilferage and is used at various guard sites,
warehouses, and docks in the remote mode. A
CCTV system can be installed in any build-
ing or outdoor area in the interest of security
if electricity is available.
373
For the security manager to be effective in view from wide-angle to close up while the
selecting and employing CCTV, it is essential camera is in a stationary position (through
that he become knowledgeable of component automatic changing of the focal length of
parts, camera movement capability, and the lens).
types of shots.
L-4 Operation
L-1 Characteristics
CCTV operation capability should
a. The camera can operate under include the following:
any marginal light conditions and provide
● Operate by remote control by security
adequate security surveillance of the low-
personnel at guard headquarters.
light-level type.
● The camera can provide routine and
continuous monitoring of activity.
b. Provides continuous operation and is
● Preplanned monitor and automatic zoom
advantageous in that it eliminates delay time
of activity at specified time intervals.
required for camera to warm up and be
properly adjusted.
c. Adjustment of the TV is critical, espe-

cially when enclosed in metal facilities to L-5 Control Room
provide essential security.
The control room is located at the
guard headquarters in case of dispatching of
guard force members.
L-2 Component Parts a. Control room monitor equipment is

connected by cable to remote cameras (multi-
The following components make up ple) conducting security surveillance.
a CCTV system:
b. Security personnel will occupy control
■ Television camera room according to established policy.
■ Automatic zoom lens
Manual controls c. The control room must be well secured at
■ Mounting equipment. all times with limited access.
d. The system should have a pushbutton

capability to randomly select different opera-
L-3 Camera Movement tional areas for monitoring, depending upon
shipping, receiving, and potential intrusion
To detect pilferage, theft, or intrud- interests.
ers in all directions (360 degrees), the camera
should be able to:
(1) Pan-turn horizontally, left to right, or L-6 Shot Classification

right to left.
The following types of camera shots
(2) Tilt-aim the camera up or down. should be available for security consideration
(3) Zoom-change the camera’s field of (see figure L-1):
374
Figure L-1—Camera shot classifications (lens lengths).
Ž Extreme closeup (2) Used between the monitor panel and

Ž Closeup the control points.
• Bust shot
Ž Medium closeup (3) Where electrically operated gate locks
• Midshot are used without guards.
• Three-quarter length (4) The system should allow an individual
• Full length at the monitor panel to converse with the
• Long shot person desiring entry.
• Wide angle.
(5) The camera should show a person on
the monitor so that authority to enter can
be determined.
L-7 Employment (6) The gate lock can be remotely released
to allow entry when authorization is veri-
Use of a CCTV system at entry/exit fied.
control points should meet these guidelines:
(7) Allows observation of security cages,
(1) Includes a two-way communication high value goods in warehouses, fence
system. lines, parking lots, banks, ports, ships, etc.
375
Note: Adaptation to CCTV equipment al’s face with the picture on an identifi-
can allow monitor personnel to make cation card. Also, an area can be
side by-side comparison of an individu- observed through zones (figure L-2).
Figure L-2—Example of zone observation by CCTV cameras.
376
Appendix M
Finance and Accounting

Office
s ecurity of finance and accounting

offices must be very detailed concerning:
■ Vaults
Cash, controls
Cashiers
■ Agents, checks, and bonds
■ Locks, keys, and combinations.
377
The following questions concern the opera- a. Is an amount in excess of current
tion of your finance and accounting office disbursing needs promptly deposited to the
and should be answerable in the affirmative. credit of the Treasurer of the United States?
They are guidelines to assist you in determin-
ing adequacy of security. These questions are b. During temporary absence of a clerk(s),
not all-inclusive. Reference to applicable AR is either a drawer with a key lock, or
37-103 and other directives is essential to field/similar safe, provided for safeguarding
insure a comprehensive security program for funds and vouchers?
your finance and accounting office (FAO also
can mean finance and accounting officer). c. If possession of funds is allowed for moral
than one employee, is each individual pro-
vided a separate and secure receptacle for
these monies?
M-1 Overview
d. Is there a procedure for unannounced
a. Are there adequate facilities for verification of cash on hand? Do current
storing and safeguarding public finds and records indicate that these verifications are
documents? being made on a quarterly basis?
(1) Do railings or counters exist to prevent
unauthorized entry to the working areas? e. Has authority to keep a specific amount
of cash on hand been approved by the major
(2) Are windows used for exchange of command?
money constructed to prevent individuals
outside the windows from reaching funds
inside?
(3) Are entry controls to vaults and safes
adequate and stringently enforced? M-3 Cashier(s)
(4) Are the combinations of vaults and
• Is each provided with a separate working
safes changed at least every six months
and upon the departure/transfer of person- space?
• Is there a properly enclosed cage or room
nel with knowledge of the combinations?
with a window for paying and receiving?
Ž Is positive identification of the payee made
b. Are procedures established to provide
two disinterested individuals to witness the prior to each cash payment?
Ž Is each provided a list of AWOL personnel,
opening of either the cashier’s or FAO’s safe
when the FAO or cashier are not present? soldiers reported as receiving several casual
payments, and imposters seeking entitle-
(1) Is there a requirement for disinterested ments to authorized individuals?
persons to sign affidavits as to the contents Ž Is each furnished a current list of lost or
of the safe at the time of opening? stolen personal financial records (PFR)?
(2) When vaults or safes are opened, does (changed in 1971)
• Are receipts taken for all entrusted funds?
the person using the combination protect • Are receipts given for all funds returned or
the dial from observation?
valid vouchers accepted?
• Is a detailed record maintained of daily
settlement with the disbursing officer (or the
M-2 Cash Controls deputy)?
• If a weapon is furnished, is the cashier
These questions cover general con- qualified in its use? (Arming is not manda-
siderations for cash control: tory.)
378
M-4 Class A Agents ered and returned checks and savings
bonds?
● Instructed in writing on their duties and (b) Is there a central point for their
responsibilities? (Required by AR 37-103.) receipt, holding, and final disposition?
• Promptly account for finds? (c) Is responsibility charged to a specific
individual?
M-5 Blank Checks

And Savings Bonds M-6 Locks, Keys,
And Combinations
a. Initial Delivery to FAO.
❑ Are ke ys to the locking devices of the meter
(1) Upon receipt of shipments, are the
and protection unit of check signing ma-
cartons examined and the serial numbers
checked? chines kept in the custody of the FAO (or
deputy) at all times?
(2) Are cartons bearing evidence of tam- ❑ Does the FAO (or deputy) keep a current
pering, opened, and checks counted indi- list published of personnel authorized keys to
vidually? the office?
❑ Is the cashier the only person with keys
b. In Current Use. and combinations to the cashier’s safe and
(1) Prior to use, are they kept under lock cash drawer?
❑ Has the cashier sealed one key to and/or
and key in the safe of the FAO (or the
the combination of the safe in an envelope?
deputy)?
❑ Has he or she suitably marked the enve-
(2) Does the FAO (or deputy) inspect blank lope so that its unauthorized opening maybe
checks and bonds at the start and end of detected?
each day’s business to determine if any ❑ Is the envelope secured in the safe of the
have been extracted? FAO?
❑ IS the combination to the FAO’s vault or
(3) Does the FAO (or the deputy) maintain
a daily record of the number released, safe known only by the FAO?
❑ Has a copy of the combination been sealed
written, and returned for safekeeping?
in an envelope suitably marked to detect
(4) When voided or spoiled, are they unauthorized openings and placed in the
properly marked and reported? Are such possession of the installation com-
items properly safeguarded? mander for use in an emergency? Is the
(5) Are there proper controls for mailing envelope marked to reflect that it will be
and/or delivering checks and savings opened only in emergencies and with specific
consent of the installation commander, his
bonds to prevent loss?
alternate or equivalent of Chief of Staff; and
(a) Are internal office procedures estab- that two disinterested officers will inventory
lished to provide controls on all undeliv- and witness the contents of the vault safe?
379
Appendix N
Mail and Postal Effects
T he US mail must be provided

adequate protection at all times. Security of
mail and protection of postal effects are
responsibilities of commands. Commanders
will institute additional security measures as
required (AR 65-75) to insure this.
380
Unit Mailrooms Section I
The following questions concern the mail- ❑ Protection of openings permitting entry?
room. If you can answer "Yes" to all ques-
Adjoining room doors, trapdoors, etc.,
tions, you can be confident that your security
locked and/or blocked?
is adequate. These questions are not all-
Windows, ventilation, etc., covered with
inclusive. Reference to applicable Army
steel bars or screened with heavy wire
regulations and other directives is essential
mesh?
to insure a comprehensive security program.
Wire mesh anchored to preclude unau-
thorized removal?
Field safe or other suitable container
provided for registered and/or certified
mail?
N-1 Responsibility Affixed to the structure to sigificantly
decrease possibility of removal?
Are personnel appointed by the unit Meet the requirements of AR 380-5 for
commander? overnight storage of official registered
Unit mail supervisor— in writing? and/or certified mail?
■ During periods of temporary absence (such
as leave, pass, TDY, hospitalization, etc.),
alternate unit mail supervisor, in writing?
Mail clerk? Alternate mail clerk, at least
one? N-3 Operation
a. Used exclusively for mail activ-
ities?
b. Exterior posting of provisions of entry

N-2 Design Construction signs?
Separate room? c. Entry list of authorized personnel kept
Reinforcement for walls and ceilings of current and signed by the unit commander or
soft materials? unit mail supervisor.
Protection of door?
Hinges and hasps mounted to decrease d. Items of mail kept out of the reach of
the possibility of removal? Spot-welded or individuals standing outside the mailroom
peened-hinge pins, if hinges on outside of door?
door.
Equipped with one or more secondary e. Transportation of mail to and from the
padlocks? post office is:
381
(1) In a closed-body vehicle equipped with ● ISthere prompt change of combinations
a rear door? and/or keys and locks upon transfer of
(2) If not does the mail clerk ride in the personnel to whom boxes were assigned?
compartment of the vehicle containing the
mail? Is there a prohibition in effect against the
use of master keys and/or “SET” locks for
f. Delivery to only the addressee or agent the mailroom and mail receptacles?
designated in writing by the addressee?
g. Positive identification required of an

individual addressee agent before delivery of
registered, number insured, or certified mail? N-5 Mailboxes
h. Are there written instructions on re- a. Do they provide protection for all
quired actions for known or suspected postal deposited mail from weather and other
offenses, such as willful destruction, loss, natural or human security threats? (see figure
theft, delay, etc., of mail? N-1 for sample.)
b. Construction:
(1) Built into fixed foundation(s)?
N-4 Locks, Keys, (2) Adequate size and depth to protect
And Combinations quantity of mail accumulated over week-
ends/holidays?
Does the mail clerk or alternate have
one set of keys in their possession at all times
to locked mail receptacles, such as mailroom,
mailboxes, safes, individual lockboxes, etc.?
Are all copies of each combination and/or

duplicate keys individually sealed in separate
envelopes?
Do the envelopes indicate the contents?
Have the unit commander or mail supervi-
sor and the mail clerk written their names
across the sealed portion of each envelope?
(This procedure assists in detection of tam-
pering.)
Is there a requirement for the prompt

change of combinations and/or keys and
locks to the mailroom and all mail receptacles
upon the transfer or the AWOL of the
mailclerk(s) and/or unit mail officer?
Use of individual lockboxes:

● Does only one individual have overall
authority and responsibility for issuing and Figure N-1—Example of
changing the combinations and/or keys and
locks? properly secured interior mailbox.
382
Postal Facilities Section II
The following questions concern minimal c. Is the yearly record of unit mailroom
general security requirements. inspections, DA Form 4216-R, properly main-
tained and on file for review?
d. Are mail vehicles properly closed and

sealed before dispatch and properly unsealed
N-6 Security on arrival at destination?
● Does the facility provide security
e. Are there proper controls by the desig-
against unauthorized entry?
nated seal control officer for numbered seals
● Do the doors have proper locks?
employed?
● Are all windows barred or covered with
heavy wire mesh?
● Are walls and ceilings of material suitable
to prevent forcible entry?
● Was particular attention given to the N-8 Emergencies
procurement of safes?
● Is particular attention provided to use of
a. During emergencies (fire, flood,
the safes? burglary, or other forced entry, etc.), are
● What about the attention provided to other
security guards required to be posted?
receptacles?
● Is registered mailroom adequately secured, b. Have arrangements been established
and is log of all entering personnel main- for security personnel to safeguard mail,
tained? postal effects, equipment, and property for as
● Are off-duty postal personnel denied en- long as needed by investigative authorities?
try?
N-7 Accountable Items N-9 Safes

a. Is there adequate security af- Are authorized safes secured to
forded blank money orders, money order prevent removal?
validation plates, postage stamp stock funds,
and fund effects? Are proper security checks of safes con-
ducted during opening and closing proce-
b. When a vault is not available, are dures?
accountable items secured in a cash box and
delivered to the custodian of postal effects Have specific persons been designated to
(COPE) or designated NCO for safekeeping? open the safes?
383
Appendix O
Checklists
T he checklists contained in this

appendix are intended only as guides for
physical security personnel. Their most
important function is to act as reminders to
security personnel as to what to look for in
each situation.
384
These checklists must not be viewed as activities covered by the checklists is housed
complete or all-encompassing. In individual in a single building.
situations, there may be items of physical No specific sources of reference are pro-
security interest and importance which are vided for the individual items on these
not included on any of the checklists. Security checklists. Such specific references rapidly
personnel must be alert for such items, and become outdated as Army regulations, field
not be content merely to check off the items on manuals, and their publications are revised
the checklist. and republished. Also, many such references
For some facilities or installations, none of are supplemented by command publications
the checklists will specifically apply. In such which impose changed or additional require-
cases, security personnel should formulate ments.
their own checklists, using any of the items
on the attached lists as basic guidance and These checklists may also be adapted to the
adding any items peculiar to the facility or style of a locally produced form, with appro-
installation. priate heading, general information spaces,
There also will be situations in which more and columnar headings with boxes for “yes,”
than one of these checklists will be useful. “no,” and/or similar checks. DA Form 2806
This may occur where more than one of the is an example of such a form.
Waiver/Exception
1. Has a waiver/exception been granted for specific require-

ments of AR 190-11? Yes No
2. If the waiver was granted, is it valid? Yes No
3. Are the specific requirements set forth in the granted

waiver/exception being complied with? Yes No
4. Are compensatory measures on which the wa iver/exception

is based in effect and are they appropriate to provide sufficient
security to insure reasonable protection for the property contained
in the storage facility? Yes No
5. Are the required enclosures attached to the granted

waiver/exception as outlined under the provisions of AR 190-11? Yes No
6. What is the issue date of the waiver/exception?
385
Arms Storage Building
1. Is the building used to secure only small arms? Yes No
2. Are the walls constructed of 8 inches of concrete, reinforced

with No. 4 bars at 9 inches on center in each direction and
staggered on each face to form a grid approximately 4½ inches
square? Yes No
3. Are the walls constructed of 8-inch concrete blocks with No. 4

bars threaded through block cavities at 8-inch centers with the
cavities then filled with mortar or concrete and with horizontal
joints reinforced at every course? Yes No
4. Are roof structures and/or ceilings of fire resistant construc-

tion to provide an equal or greater degree of security as the
approved protection of windows and doors? Yes No
5. Are walls constructed of 8 inches of brick interlocked

between inner/outer courses? Yes ❑ No
6. Is the number of doors and windows limited to only the

essential? Yes No
7. Is the building posted as a restricted area? ❑ Yes No
8. Are all windows protected by rod and bar grid/steel bars

horizontal at 8 inches maximum on center, and ½-inch diameter
rods vertical at 4 inches maximum on center welded to, or passing
through, the 1¼-inch surface of the flat bars, resulting in a grid
with openings of 32 square inches or less? Yes No
9. Is each rod and bar grid secured to a steel frame securely

attached to the building with fastenings inaccessible from the
outside? Yes No
386
10. Are the ends of the steel bars securely embedded in the
structure of the building or welded to a steel frame securely
fastened to the building with the fastenings inaccessible from the
outside? Yes No
11. Are all windows locked at the close of the business day? ❑ Y e s No
12. Are all doors constructed of materials that will render

access by force extremely difficult? Yes No
13. Are all doors, except the main entrance, secured on the
inside by locking bars? ❑ Yes No
14. Are door frames fastened to the building so as to prevent

them from being separated from the casing? ❑ Yes No
15. Is the main entrance door secured by at least one high

security padlock? Yes No
16. Are outswinging doors mounted on fixed-pin security-type

hinges, safety stud hinges, or the equivalent? Yes No
17. Is there adequate exterior and interior lighting? ❑ Yes ❑ No
18. Are ceilings constructed of reinforced concrete, structurally

designed for the spans between supporting walls with reinforcing
bar spacing forming a grid in which the area of any opening does
not exceed 96 square inches using No. 4 bars or larger? Yes ❑ No
Note: Active Army and USAR consolidated arms storage fa-

cilities may use woven wire mesh caging with individual locks
on each door in lieu of separate walls between unit arms
rooms.
387
Arms Storage Room
1. Are procedures established and stringently applied to reduce

the opportunity for unobserved access to the arms storage room
within the building? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2. Do internal procedures include prevention of loitering in close

proximity to the arms room, either inside or outside the building? ❑ Y e s No
3. Is the arms room posted as a restricted area? Yes No
4. IS the number of windows limited to the essential minimum? Yes No
5. Are windows protected with rod and bar grids? Yes ❑ No

6. Is each rod and-bar grid secured to a steel frame securely
attached to the building with the fastenings inaccessible from the
outside? ❑ Yes ❑ No
7. Are the ends of the steel bars securely embedded in the
structure of the building or welded to a steel frame securely
fastened to the building with the fastenings inaccessible from the
outside? Yes No
8. Are all windows locked at the close of the business day? Yes No
9. Does the arms room provide triple barrier protection? Yes ❑ No
10. Are the doors constructed of steel bars welded to a grid with
openings of 32 square inches or less, or a solid wooden door
covered on the outside with steel plate(s) of at least 12 gauge? Yes No
11. Are door hinges of the fixed-pin security hinge type or of a

type that provides equivalent security? Yes No
388
12. Unless safety stud hinges are used preexposed hinge pins
spot welded or otherwise secured to prevent removal? Yes No
13. Are all doors used for access to the arms room locked with
approved locking devices? Yes No
14. Is the locking device on the most secure door a high security
padlock and hasp? ❑ Yes No
15. Is there at least one approved locking device on each door

of the triple barrier system? Yes No
16. If the arms room is equipped with a steel vault type door,
does it have a built-in three position, dial-type, changeable
combination lock? Yes No
17. Are doors not used for access to the arms room of equivalent
structural strength as adjacent walls and secured so as to preclude
access to the locking device from the outside? Yes No
18. If a wire-mesh cage is used for the temporary storage of

small arms, is it constructed in conformance with OCE Standard
Drawing 40-01-41 and 40-21-01 and kept under continual
surveillance? Yes No
19. Is a prefabricated cage used to reinforce arms room as an

inner liner to provide additional delay to forced entry? Yes No
20. If so, is it used only when structural standards for the arms
room cannot be met? Yes No
21. In temporary buildings, are the exterior walls of the arms

room of double wooden-wall thickness (standard stud construc-
tion)? Yes No
22. In temporary buildings, are the interior walls, ceiling, and

floor constructed to insure that at least one side of the surface is 1-
inch, double-nail, tongue-and-groove wood sheathing or a material
that will provide a similar degree of security? Yes No
389
Arms Racks
1. Are all arms racks or containers locked with approved locking

devices when not in use? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2. Are the arms racks fastened together and to the wall or floor
with bolts or with approved chains equipped with at least
secondary locking devices? ❑ Yes No
3. Do those racks with hinged locking bars have the hinge pins
welded or otherwise secured to prevent easy removal? Yes No
4. Do locally fabricated arms racks provide, as a minimum,

security equivalent to standard issue racks? Yes No
5. Are all racks constructed so that when locked, a weapon

cannot be removed by partially disassembling it? Yes No
6. Are crew-served and other weapons that will not fit into issue
racks secured in containers constructed of at least 22-gauge steel;
and if locally fabricated or commercially manufactured, are
containers constructed of at least 26-gauge steel? ❑ Yes ❑ No
7. If Class 5 weapons container (map and plan security cabinet)

is used by small isolated units having few weapons, is the
container adequately augmented by other physical security
measures? ❑ Yes No
8. If lockers are being used as a substitute for racks, are they

fastened to the structure? Yes No
9. Are hasps of the lockers installed so they cannot be removed? ❑ Yes No
10. Are lockers equipped with approved locking devices? Yes No
11. Are hinges of the lockers installed so they cannot be

removed? Yes No
390
Admin Control Procedures
1. Are all weapons’ serial numbers entered in unit and/or

station property records and kept current at all times? Yes No
2. Are all weapons not in bulk storage inventoried by serial

number at least once each month? ❑ Yes ❑ No
3. Are written records of weapon inventories accomplished and

maintained? Yes ❑ No
4. Are weapons in bulk storage or in depots properly inventoried

and the inventories made into written records? Yes No
5. In addition to scheduled weapon inventories, are frequent

unscheduled inventories conducted? Yes No
6. When more than one unit uses the same arms room or
weapons storage facility, are weapons separated and identified by
unit? ❑ Yes No
7. When more than one unit uses the same arms room or
weapons storage facility, does each unit maintain individual
accountability for its own weapons? Yes No
8. Are individuals issued weapons cards? Yes No
9. Is the weapons card turned in to the arms room when the

weapon is drawn? Yes No
10. Do individuals sign a weapons receipt register when

weapons are removed from the arms room? Yes No
11. Have written procedures been established for issuing

weapons and ammunition during emergencies or field exercises,
or at other times when operational necessity dictates a need for
this equipment to be issued quickly? ❑ Yes No
391
1 2 . I s t h e a r m s o r ammunition storage facility checked
periodically by a security or guard patrol, or unit personnel? Yes No
13. Are all checks recorded? Yes No
14. Are individuals who are in possession of weapons or

ammunition warned of their responsibilities and the inherent
dangers involved in the loss of weapons and ammunition? Yes No
392
Key and Lock Control
1. Are keys to arms storage buildings, rooms, racks, and

containers maintained separately from other keys and accessible
only to those individuals whose official duties require access to
them? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2. Is a current roster of these individuals kept within the unit? ❑ Y e s ❑ No
3. Is the number of keys held to the essential minimum? ❑ Yes ❑ No
4. Is the custody of keys transferred between authorized

individuals only after both parties have conducted a visual
inventory of weapons to include total count of weapons on hand? ❑ Yes ❑ No
5. Is the change of custody of keys properly recorded? ❑ Yes ❑ No
6. After duty hours, are keys locked in a secure receptacle away

from the storage area or in the custody of the responsible duty
officer/NCO or charge of quarters? ❑ Yes ❑ No
7. Are keys left unattended or unsecured at any time? ❑ Yes ❑ No
8. Is the removal of keys to arms storage buildings, rooms, racks,

and/or containers from the installation permitted? ❑ Yes ❑ No
9. Is the use of master keys permitted? ❑ Yes ❑ No

10. Are locks replaced when keys are lost, misplaced, or stolen? ❑ Yes ❑ No
11. Has a key/lock custodian been appointed on orders? ❑ Yes ❑ No
12. Is a key control register maintained at all times to insure
administrative accountability for keys? ❑ Yes ❑ No
393
153-846 O - 94 - 16
13. Does the key control register contain the signature of the
individual receiving the key, date/hour of issuance, serial number
of key, initials of the person issuing the key, date/hour key was
returned and the signature of the individual receiving the returned
key? ❑ Yes ❑ No
14. Are padlocks locked to the staple or hasp when the area or
container is open? ❑ Yes ❑ No
15. Are inventories of keys and locks conducted quarterly? ❑ Yes ❑ No
16. Are locks and locking devices securing weapons rotated at

least annually? ❑ Yes ❑ No
17. Are tools located in the vicinity of the arms storage area
secured in a locked container? (See chapter 8, FM 19-30.) ❑ Yes ❑ No
394
Safeguarding Ammunition
And Explosives
1. Is ammunition stored in the unit arms room, authorized by

higher headquarters, inventoried daily, and stored and controlled
as stipulated by chapter 3, AR 190-11, and safety regulations? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2. Is ammunition assigned on unit property records inventoried

monthly? ❑ Yes ❑ No
3. Is a written record made of all ammunition inventories? ❑ Yes ❑ No
4. Is the area where ammunition/explosives are stored posted
as a restricted area? ❑ Yes ❑ No
5. When more than one unit uses the same ammunition storage
facility, are the stocks separated and identified by unit? ❑ Yes ❑ No
6. Are there written security procedures established which

designate one unit responsible for the security of the storage
facility? ❑ Yes ❑ No
7. Is ammunition in unit arms room stored in separate locked

containers? ❑ Yes ❑ No
8. Is the container firmly secured to the structure? ❑ Yes ❑ No
9. Is the ammunition storage area secured with a high security
padlock and hasp? ❑ Yes ❑ No
10. Are ventilators, or other openings affording access to
individuals or dangerous objects, equipped with steel mesh or
other material offering equivalent protection? ❑ Yes ❑ No
11. Is the control and accountability of keys to ammunition/ex-

plosive storage proper? ❑ Yes ❑ No
12. Are locks securing ammunition/explosive storage areas

rotated at least annually? ❑ Yes ❑ No
395
13. Is loose ammunition, assigned on the unit property records
and not in banded containers, physically counted? ❑ Yes ❑ No
14. Does the monthly inventory of ammunition include an

inspection and count of crated ammunition to insure that bands
and seals are intact? ❑ Yes ❑ No
15. Does monthly inventory of ammunition in banded contain-

ers include lot number(s)? ❑ Yes ❑ No
16. Have agencies or organizations responsible for securing

large quantities of ammunition (such as bulk storage in depot,
installation ammunition supply points, prestock points) insured
that an accurate system of accounting and inventory, such as cyclic
inventory, is established and maintained? ❑ Yes ❑ No
17. Does the basic load ammunition storage room meet, to the
extent possible, the same requirements as established for small-
arms storage rooms? ❑ Yes ❑ No
18. Are all doors secured with approved locking devices? ❑ Yes ❑ No
19. Are fire-control measures and symbols posted? ❑ Yes ❑ No
396
Privately Owned Weapons
1. Are privately owned weapons and ammunition or authorized

war trophy firearms secured in locked containers, separate from
military weapons and ammunition in the unit arms room? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2. Is the retention and storage of incendiary devices and

explosives permitted? ❑ Yes ❑ No
3. Has a receipt been issued for each privately owned weapon

stored in the unit arms room? ❑ Yes ❑ No
4. Is the receipt retained in the arms room when the weapon is

in the possession of the individual owner? ❑ Yes ❑ No
5. When the weapon is properly stored in the unit arms room, is

the receipt in the possession of the individual owner? ❑ Yes ❑ No
6. Are privately owned weapons withdrawn from the unit arms

room only after written approval of the unit commander or his
authorized representative? ❑ Yes ❑ No
7. Are applicable state and local laws regarding registration and

possession of firearms posted on the unit bulletin board? ❑ Yes ❑ No
8. Are newly arrived personnel briefed on provisions governing

possession and use of privately owned weapons? ❑ Yes ❑ No
9. Does the commander conduct unannounced inspections to

insure proper storage and control of privately owned weapons? ❑ Yes ❑ No
397
Loss, Theft, and Recovery

Of Weapons, Ammunition,
And Explosives
1. How many weapons, if any, have been lost or stolen within

the past 12 months?
2. H o w m a n y l o s t o r stolen weapons, if any, have been

recovered during the past 12 months?
3. How many weapons if any, have been the subject of a report

of survey during the past 12 months?
4. If a loss, theft, or recovery of weapons, demolitions, or

explosives has occurred, was the local provost marshal notified
promptly? ❑ Yes ❑ No
398
Intrusion Detection Systems
1. Are intrusion detection systems installed at permanent small

arms storage areas? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2. If not, have these systems been requested by the command-

er? ❑ Yes ❑ No
3. Has an SOP been published for the operation and mainte-

nance of an intrusion detection system? ❑ Yes ❑ No
4. Does the SOP include:
(a) Instruction for daily testing, activation/deactivation and

response? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(b) Requirement that a log be maintained indicating alarm
activations by date, time, and type of activation (actual or false)? ❑ Y e s ❑ No
5. If the IDS has proven unreliable (excessive false alarms), is

the system at fault or is it the result of faulty installation? ❑ Yes ❑ No
6. According to the user’s evaluation, is the system adequate? ❑ Y e s ❑ No
7. At the time of this inspection, was the system functioning

properly? ❑ Yes ❑ No
8. Is the system suitable for its present location and environ-

ment? If not, explain in remarks. ❑ Yes ❑ No
9. Is the system capable of accomplishing the job that the

responsible using official expects it to accomplish? ❑ Yes ❑ No
10. Does the responsible official user understand that the

protective alarm system is designed to detect, not prevent,
unlawful intrusion into the protected area or beyond a predeter-
mined point of approach to a protected object? ❑ Yes ❑ No
399
11. Is security of the system provided by the use of physical
security measures being built into the system, such a s :
(a) Height of reporting lines on poles? ❑ Yes ❑ No

(b) Depth that reporting lines are buried in ground? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(c) Use of shielded transmission and power lines? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(d) Control of access to system equipment? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(e) Use of seals on controls and exposed adjustment mecha-
nisms? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(f) Placement of transmission and power lines inside walls or
metal conduit? ❑ Yes ❑ No
12. If local annunciator is used and is displayed on exterior of a

building, is it protected from the weather or willful tampering? ❑ Yes ❑ No
13. Is the system underwriter approved? ❑ Yes ❑ No

14. Was the system installed by underwriter-approved service
personnel? ❑ Yes ❑ No
15. Is the system equipped with a two-position lock switch for

on and off operation? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(a) Are there at least two keys available? ❑ Yes ❑ No

(b) Are adequate key controls exercised? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(c) Can the system be turned on and off from outside? ❑ Yes ❑ No
16. In addition to the on and off switch, is the system equipped

with electrical shunt type switches for testing? ❑ Yes ❑ No
17. Is it a multiple purpose system (smoke, water, heat, etc.)? ❑ Y e s ❑ No

18. Is the system equipped with a pilot light or with any other
type of operational readiness indicator? ❑ Yes ❑ No
19. If an AC power supply is used, is the system designed to

operate by automatic switching to DC power when necessary to
provide continuous protection? (Standby battery in place?) ❑ Yes ❑ No
400
20. Is the system designed to make an uninterrupted and silent
protective circuit transfer with only a local visible indicator to signal
when such transfer occurs? ❑ Yes ❑ No
21. Can activating devices be unobtrusively operated? ❑ Yes ❑ No
22. Are properly cleared personnel used to maintain system? ❑ Y e s ❑ No
23. Is the alarm system properly maintained by:
(a) Trained local maintenance personnel? ❑ Yes ❑ No

(b) Readily available trained commercial type maintenance
personnel? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(c) An appropriate service contract? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2 4 . Are records kept of all alarm signals received, to include:
(a) Time? ❑ Yes ❑ No

(b) Date? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(c) Location? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(d) Action taken? ❑ Yes ❑ No
(e) Cause for alarm? ❑ Yes ❑ No
2 5 . Is the system tested prior to activating it for nonoperational

periods? ❑ Yes ❑ No
26. Are frequent tests conducted to determine the adequacy

and promptness of response to alarm signals? ❑ Yes ❑ No
27. Is there any inherent weakness in the system itself? ❑ Yes ❑ No
28. Is it connected to a capable response element? ❑ Yes ❑ No
29. Are activating devices appropriately located and sufficient
in number? ❑ Yes ❑ No
30. Is the equipment visible to public view? ❑ Yes ❑ No
31. When system is activated, is it audible on the premises? ❑ Yes ❑ No
32. Are independent transmission lines used? ❑ Yes ❑ No
401
33. Are adequate spare parts, such as fuses and bulbs, readily
available to user? ❑ Yes ❑ No
34. Are user personnel capable of conducting minor mainte-

nance and installing fuses and bulbs as required? ❑ Yes ❑ No
35. Is a duress capability built into the system when an

authorized person deactivates the system under duress? ❑ Yes ❑ No
402
Appendix P
Organizational
Effectiveness Approach
E ach commander of a physical

security unit or security manager, to include
provost marshal security inspectors, must
possess a professional and personal interest.
This interest should be:
■ Active
■ Continuous
■ Concentrated.
403
The psychologically demanding mission of P-2 Interpersonal
physical security increases the requirement Communications
to implement innovative management tech-
niques to reduce the effects of human emo- a. Listening, not just hearing.
tions on unit and other security personnel in
performance of their duties. The following b. Speaking, not just talking.
psychological factors may impact on human
emotions in these conditions: c. Establish procedures for unit members
to present their creative and constructive
● Isolation— assignment to a geographical
ideas to the unit chain of command through:
area which inherently:
(1) Unit suggestion boxes.
❑ Limits access to large military commu-
nities and facilities. (2) Rap sessions.
❑ Provides extended observations of deso-
late areas of land to detect and prevent (3) Surveys to determine:
unauthorized access. (a) Job satisfaction.
(b) Improvements in security opera-
■ Disappointment— assignment to a secu- tions.
rity unit and, in some cases, to a security (c) Adequacy of existing activities and
position within the provost marshal’s office, facilities.
as opposed to the traditional “white-hat” (d) Covert drug and other illegal opera-
assignment, impacts tremendously upon tions within the unit.
some individuals’ morale.
■ Frustration— evolves due to a lack of (4) The Army’s suggestion program.
prior security educational preparation, of
understanding the criticality and importance d. Physical security and inspection per-
of the protection of sensitive property to the sonnel must believe that they, as individuals,
nation’s defense. are important to their unit and section in the
total support of its mission.
■ Boredom— extended performance of sec-
uring (routine tasks within the same opera- e. Implementation of the Army’s organi-
tional environment and operating on an zational effectiveness process will insure that
individual basis). the accomplishment of the unit and section
mission is done in a methodical systems
approach.
P-1 Command Understanding

Individually and collectively all unit
personnel must be understood by the com-
mand and provost marshal elements to P-3 Mission Accomplishment
determine security force:
■ Capabilities a. The accomplishment of the pri-
■ Limitations mary physical security mission when com-
■ Potential. bined with nonsecurity commitments placed
404
upon the unit and inspector requires the management techniques may be used:
commander and provost marshal to: (1) Management by objectives (MOB).
(1) Critically assess personnel and equip- (2) Time management (TM).
ment resource availability and need.
(3) Decisionmaking.
(2) Assess routine and higher command
inspection dates and previous results. (4) Effective group meetings.
(3) Establish priorities for unit and sec- (5) Performance Evaluation Review Tech-
tion goals and objectives. niques (PERT) (modified).
(4) Establish milestone dates for all goals c. Morale and esprit de corps, on and off
and objectives identified. duty, are achievable goals involving all
security matters. The command effort re-
b. To accomplish the security mission, the quired must emphasize total interpersonal
use of one or a combination of the following communications.
405
Appendix Q
Contingency Plans
C ontingency plans must be devel-

oped to cope with all emergency operations.
To develop an effective plan, the plan must be
appropriately designed and periodically
exercised. To insure that each plan developed
accommodates its intended purpose, the plan
should be developed in the operational format
outlined in FM 101-5.
1. When a plan is implemented in this

format, it can officially become an operation
order. The plan, therefore, should be devel-
oped in the operation order format as shown
in this appendix. All plans and orders should
bear appropriate protective markings or
classifications.
406
2. The plan/operation order format can be 3. Use the following selected references
used for various primary and secondary (not all inclusive) when preparing plans/op-
physical security operations. You should erational orders for physical security opera-
have a plan for each of the following, as a tions:
minimum:
● AR 190-28, Use of Force by Personnel
Engaged in Law Enforcement and
a. Primary Plans/Operation Orders: Security Duties.
● AR 19-10, Security of Government
(1) Counter-Terror Officials.
● AR 50-5, Nuclear Surety.
(2) Hostage Threat
● AR 50-6, Chemical Surety.
(3) Bomb Threat ● AR 500-50, Civil Disturbances.
(4) Confrontation Management ● AR 500-60, Disaster Relief.

● AR 500-70, Military Support of Civil
(5) Natural Disaster Defense.
(6) Nuclear Accident/Incident ● FM 31-50, Combat in a Fortified and
(7) Chemical Accident/Incident Builtup Area.

● FM 31-85, Rear Area protection (RAP)
(8) Security Alert. Operations.
● FM 3-15, Nuclear Incident/Accident
Contaminated Control.
b. Secondary Plans/Operations Orders: ● FM 3-21, Chemical-Biological Con-
tamination and Control.
(1) Air Movement Operations ● FM 19-5, Bomb Threats.
(2) Ground Convoys ● FM 19-15, Civil Disturbance.
● FM 7-10, Rifle Company, Platoon,
(3) Field Storage Movements/Loca-
Squad.
tions ● TC 19-1, Keeping Your Cool in a Civil
(4) Emergency Escorts. Disturbance.
Sample Plan/Order
The sample contingency plan/operational begin my research. Using my Infantry

order in this appendix has proven itself in experience, I developed the plan so that it
actual use. Its originator also developed the could be immediately implemented as needed.
accompanying operational chart to help The plan/order was designed to accommo-
provide a safe and secure environment for date an operational order when implemented
sensitive items. He relates the following and to support the unit’s specific mission.
experience, which demonstrates how you can “Post Engineers furnished a map of the
develop and implement your own plan. installation; and I used this for my master
tactical deployment chart. I covered the map
“One of my first tasks as security manager with acetate and identified the following
was to develop a contingency plan to insure items:
the existence of adequate security of the ❑ Site location and configuration
depot. I went to appendix F of FM 101-5 to ❑ Key terrain features near the site
407
❑ Security force objectives detached from the reserve force platoon to
❑ Likely avenues of enemy approach secure nearby objectives that would be the
❑ General unit deployment areas responsibility of the next reporting platoon. I
❑ Potential primary and alternate deploy- instructed the platoon leaders to comply with
ment routes. the requirements set forth in the op order.
“Probably the best way to show how to use “Within a few minutes the 1st Platoon
the plan/order is to relate my first security leader reported in by radio. The 1st squad and
alert, which came a few weeks later. platoon headquarters had secured objective
“As the battalion operations officer (S3), I A. The 2d squad was in position at objective
received an unclassified message at 1800 B. The 3d squad was set at objective C with
hours that an armed element of five to ten one fire team dispatched to secure objective D.
persons was planning to attack the depot. “He also told me that the M60 machineguns
The attack was scheduled to occur between were in place with assigned final protective
2000 and 0200 hours. In view of previous fires (FPF) for interlocking fire.
threats and our vulnerability, the expected “When I asked about the early warning dog
attack direction was from the northwest of patrols and listening posts, he said they were
exclusion area J (see figure Q-1). in position. Then in code, he gave me their
“Three units were placed on alert status locations. These I noted on my chart with the
and told to organize IAW the battalion alert machinegun placements, which he also gave
plans and orders. The unit commanders in code.
notified were those of the 776th Military “A few minutes later, he contacted me
Police Company, 30th Ordnance Company, again and asked about the status of his unit
and the 809th MP Detachment (Sentry Dog). command post. I told him I was in the process
“I called the security alert team (SAT) to of briefing the commander.
place it in a mobile status with the backup “I had already entered ‘2’ and ‘776th MP
alert force (BAF) standing by for deployment. Co’ on another sleeved op order. After the
For information only, I also alerted the briefing, I gave the order to the commander
supporting agency that would provide the and the CP element deployed to secure
augmentation reserve force (ARF). objective E.
“Then I established the battalion com- “The commander contacted me by radio
mand post (CP) and prepared the tactical after a few minutes to tell me that they had
deployment chart (figure Q-1) to brief re- made contact with the 1st platoon and its
sponding security reserve forces (RF) as they detached squads. All future contact with the
arrived. I pulled copies of the contingency command post would be on the command net.
plan/operational order (figure Q-2), which I logged ‘776th’ on the chart at objective E for
were on file in acetate sleeves. the CP.
“At 1812 hours, the 1st Platoon from the “The 2d Platoon arrived, and I briefed the
776th MP Company reported for deployment. leaders on the situation. I read the op order
I took a sleeved op order and entered ‘1’ in the and gave the platoon leader the sleeved copy
upper right blank and ‘1st’ in the first blank with appropriate entries. I told him to
of item 3.b. As I filled in the platoon’s standby as a ready strike force to reinforce
assigned objectives, (A, B, C, and D), I noted the 1st Platoon in case of attack. I reminded
on my master tactical chart each assigned him that the radio frequency was in the order
objective. and that he should make and maintain
“I quickly read the order to the leaders and communication contact with his unit com-
mand CP once deployed.
gave it to the platoon leader. I asked for
questions; fielded the few there were; and
immediately dispatched the platoon to exclu- “There are several things about the plan/
sion area J. order concept that make it appealing to
“During the briefing, someone recom- commanders and to security managers —it’s
mended that a fire-team-size element be flexible, it’s quick, it’s easy, and . . . it works.”
408
Figure Q-1.
409
Figure Q-2 (first page).
410
Figure Q-2 continued (last page).
411
Appendix R
IDS Application and

Component Charts
T he security manager must be famil-

iar with the various intrusion detection
systems to include their characteristics and
application. This appendix provides informa-
tion on principle of activation, application,
maintenance supervision problems, nuisance
alarms, and credibility rating of each system.
Additionally, this appendix outlines a compo-
nent selection reference.
412
413
414
Computer Security ADP system threat— any danger to ADP

installations, hardware, software, communi-
Access— the ability and means to approach, cation links, inputs/outputs, or data which
communicate with (input to or receive output could adversely affect ADP system perfor-
from) or otherwise make use of any classified mance, accomplishment of the DPI mission,
material or any component of an automated or ADP system security. They are (human
data processing (ADP) system. error, sabotage, and theft), accidental, and
natural disasters; DPI environmental degra-
Access control— operational procedures dation; and ADP equipment failure threats.
and physical security measures designed to
limit the availability of either classified ADP ADP system threat minimization
data in any form, or physical ADP resources, efforts— the sum of hardware and software
to a recipient. features, physical and personnel resources,
and operating and administrative procedures
ADPE— abbreviation for automated data designed to prevent or minimize the probabil-
processing equipment. ity of that occurrence. They include physi-
cal security measures, personnel training,
ADP system damage minimization personnel security procedures, equipment
efforts— efforts and resources whose pur- reliability, data security, and communica-
pose is keeping to a minimum the ADP dollar tions security (COMSEC).
loss, adverse impact on ADP, and supported
agency operations. Damage minimization ADP system security— the hardware/soft-
efforts can be identified as belonging to ware functions, characteristics, and features;
system backup, control and warning sys- operation procedures, accountability proce-
tems, and drills. dures, and both access and entry controls at
415
the central computer facility, remote compu- Data security— protection of data from
ter and terminal facilities; management either accidental or unauthorized modifica-
constraints, physical structures, and devices; tion, destruction, or disclosure; sabotage;
and personnel and communications controls malicious; mischief; theft; or mutilation.
needed to provide an acceptable level of
protection in a computer system. Debug/test program procedures—
methods used to locate and correct any errors
Audit— a system for tracing items of data in a computer program.
from processing step to processing step,
particularly from a machine-produced report Disaster— an occurrence that could com-
or other machine output back to the original pletely prevent a DPI from accomplishing its
source data. normally assigned mission. (This includes
fire, major water damage, extended power
Automatic data processing (ADP)— any failure, sabotage, etc.).
phase of data recording, manipulation, re-
mote terminal operations, and other related DP equipment malfunction— temporary
operations in which data are processed by failure of any equipment to function as
ADPE; systems inclusive of punched card designed when required.
machines (PCM) and terminal operations.
Drills— simulations designed to test the
Backup system— a compatible ADPE con- performance of resources, systems, proce-
figuration at an alternate site which will dures, and personnel against standards
effectively process mission essential ADP established for threat minimization.
applications in case of damage, environmen-
tal disruption, or equipment malfunction. Edit controls— measures designed to
identify rearrangement of data or informa-
Breach— successful defeat of security con- tion. The editing may involve deletion of
trols that could result in penetration of the unwanted data, selection of pertinent data,
system. Examples include, but are not limited and the testing of data for reasonableness
to, operation of user code in control program and proper range.
mode, unauthorized acquisition of ID pass-
word or file access passwords, and not using Entry— the ability and means to approach,
prescribed operating system mechanisms to communicate with (input to or receive output
gain a file. from), or otherwise make use of either
unclassified material or any component of an
Data— information or symbology contained automated data processing system.
in storage, registers, buffers, documents,
cards, tapes, drums, and communications Entry controls— operational procedures
links. and physical security measures designed to
limit availability of either unclassified ADP
Data processing (DP) installation/ ac- data in any form, or physical ADP resources,
tivity (DPI/A)— any facility, room, or build- to a recipient.
ing housing ADPE, storing tapes, cards, or
other media used to perform the ADP support Environmental disruption— improper
mission. It does not include the housing of concentrations of rust, dust, humidity,
auxiliary power sources, or output processing smoke, temperature, foreign matter, etc., in a
areas (unless they are collocated with the room housing ADPE.
DPI/A). A DPA, by nature of its mission and
resources, can function independently within Erase/degauss procedure— a protective
the DPI. It normally has a separate manager measure that involves overwriting or rere-
and a separate ADPE configuration. cording on a magnetic surface so as to
416
completely erase the original data. Penetration— a successful unauthorized
entry and/or access into a system.
ESI— abbreviation for especially sensitive Physical security measures— protective
information. actions against threats to the central compu-
ter facility, its remote computer and terminal
Human error— unintentional act of a hu- facilities, the related tape/disk libraries, and
man that results in the occurrence or probable the supporting areas achieved by locks,
occurrence of a disaster, environmental guards, badges, personnel security clear-
disruption, or equipment malfunction; or the ances and administrative control measures
unintentional addition, deletion, or substitu- outside the computer as well as measures
tion of data in any file, record, or program. required for the protection of the structures
housing the computer. Associated with these
Inputs/outputs (I/O)— physical media pro- measures should be provisions for off-site
cessing information used as an input or storage of data and for backup systems.
output in an ADP system. (Includes docu-
ments, punch cards, magnetic tape, punched
tape, machine printouts, and similar media. Remote terminals— remotely located de-
Excludes the data or information displayed vices used to input data to and receive output
or the information on the media.) data from a central computer system by
communication lines or cables. Generally,
MISM— abbreviation for management infor- these devices are physically located in an
mation system material. area separated from the central site.
Multilevel security mode— a mode of Remotely accessed/entered resource

operation under an operating system (super- sharing computer system— a computer
visor or executive program) which provides a system that includes one or more central
capability permitting various levels and processing units, peripheral devices, remote
categories or compartments of material to be terminals, and communications equipment
concurrently stored and processed in an ADP or interconnection links, which allocates its
system. In a remotely accessed resource- resources to one or more users, and which can
sharing system, the material can be selec- be used from terminals located outside the
tively accessed and manipulated from vari- central computer facility.
ously controlled terminals by personnel
having different security clearances and Resource sharing computer facility— a
access approvals. This mode of operation can computer facility that uses its resources,
accommodate the concurrent processing and including I/O devices, storage, central pro-
storage of two or more levels of classified cessor (arithmetic and logic units), control
data, or one or more levels of classified data units, and software processing capabilities to
with unclassified data depending upon the enable two or more users to manipulate data
constraints placed on the systems. ‘and process coresident programs in an
apparently simultaneous manner. The term
Operating system— an integrated collec- includes systems with one or more of the
tion of service routines for supervising the capabilities commonly referred to as time-
sequencing and processing of programs by a sharing, multiprograming, multiaccessing,
computer. multiprocessing, or concurrent processing.
Passwords— a word or string of characters, Routine, utility— a standard routine used to

uniquely associated with a use, which either assist in the operation of the computer, such
authenticates a user or identifies a defined as a conversion routine, a sort routine, or a
system resource, such as a program. printout routine.
417
Sensitive information— unclassified data closure. In addition, it detects attempts to
which a commander designates for special defeat the switch by substituting a magnetic
handling, including individuals authorized field and may have provisions for internal
to receive it. adjustments and detection of switch tamper-
ing attempts.
SIOP— abbreviation for single integrated
operational plan. Capacitance— the property of two or more
objects which enables them to store electrical
Software lockout— prohibition of access to energy in an electrostatic field between them.
information through programing techniques
rather than hardware lockout or physical Capacitance proximity sensor— records a
means. change in capacitance or electrostatic fields
to detect penetration through windows,
System backup— a computer or peripheral ventilators, and other openings, and can be
equipment normally specifically designated used to detect attempted penetration into
and available to provide computer process- safes or storage cabinets.
ing/services if the primary computer system
or its peripherals are destroyed or otherwise Conductor— material which transmits elec-
unavailable. Backup equipment may be tric current. Wire and cable are conductors.
collocated with the primary system or at Also called signal transmission lines.
another installation.
Contacts— parts of a switch or relay which
Tempest— refer to AR 530-4. by touching or being separated permit electric
current to flow or cease to flow. Frequently
Warning system— any device or procedure and improperly used to designate an entire
designed to alert personnel to a specified magnetic switch or balanced magnetic
event or threat. switch component.
Control unit— the terminal box for all

sensors. It receives alarm and tamper signals
and transmits these signals to the local
Intrusion Detection Systems audible alarm and/or monitor unit. It pro-
(IDS) vides the primary and backup power for all
sensors; activates and deactivates the
Actuator— in commercial security systems, system.
a holdup button, magnetic switch or thermo-
stat that will cause the system to alarm. Data transmission system— Component
consisting of a data transmitter in the control
Annunciator (monitor)— a visual or audible unit and a data receiver in the monitor unit
signaling device that indicates conditions of and is the communication link used to pass
associated circuits. Usually, this is accom- alarm and equipment status signals from the
plished by activation of a signal lamp and control unit to the monitor unit over a wire
audible sound. transmission line or by radio frequency.
Antenna— a conductor or system of conduc- Doppler— the effect of compression of ex-

tors for radiating or receiving electromag- panding sound or radio frequencies reflected
netic waves. from or originating from a moving object.
Balanced magnetic switch— a magneti- Fail-safe— a term applied to a system

cally operated switch designed to detect the designed so that if a component fails to
opening of a secured door, window, or other function properly, the system, will, by a
418
signal or otherwise, indicate its incapacity. assembly used to detect the magnetic field
disturbance caused by the removal of a
False alarm— activation of sensor(s) for weapon from a weapons rack.
which no cause can be determined.
Microwave sensor— a radio/radar fre-
Fixed duress sensor— an emergency notifi- quency (RF) transceiver having a frequency
cation device, switch, or button manually range of GHz (billion cycles per second)
operated by personnel needing assistance. which detects motion through the Doppler
shift effect.
Grid wire sensor— detects forced entry
through walls, floors, ceilings, doors, and Monitor— a device that senses and reports
other barriers by the break-wire method. on the condition of a system, commonly used
interchangeably with the terms, monitor
Intrusion detection system— the combina- unit, monitor panel(s), status indicator mod-
tion of components, including sensors, con- ule, annunciator, and other similar terms.
trol units, transmission lines, and monitor
units integrated to operate in a specified Motion sensor— detects movement inside
manner. the area to be protected.
Intrusion detection sensors— devices that Nuisance alarm— the result of a sensor
initiate alarm signals by sensing the stimu- activation caused by accident, neglect, mal-
lus, change, or condition for which they were function, or natural causes, such as wind,
designed. lightning, or thunder. Often improperly
called false alarm.
Joint-Service Interior Intrusion Detec-
tion System (J-SIIDS)— developed as a Overload— a condition in which an electri-
standard detection system for joint-service cal device draws a current greater than its
application for protection of military arms rated capacity.
rooms and other inside areas.
Passive ultrasonic sensor— detects the
Local audible alarm— an electronic sounds of forced entry through walls, ceilings,
screamer or bell for outdoor or indoor use in and doors.
the vicinity of the protected area.
Penetration sensor— detects entry through
doors, windows, walls, or any other openings
Magnetic contact/simple magnetic into the protected area.
switch— consists of two separate items, a
magnetically actuated switch and a magnet. Photoelectric system— usually supplied as
The switch is usually mounted in a fixed two separate units, a transmitter and re-
position (door frame or safe) opposing the ceiver. A light beam is transmitted to the
magnet, which is fastened to a hinged or receiver. Any interruption of this light causes
sliding door. When the movable barrier is an alarm.
opened, the magnet moves with it and the
switch opens. Magnetic contacts are usually Point sensor— detects removal or attempted
connected so that the switch is closed while removal of an object from its storage con-
the magnet is near. This allows the electric tainer.
current to flow. When the door or window is
open, the magnetic contact opens. This stops Radio— radio frequency (RF) transceiver
the electric current flow, causing an alarm. having a frequency range of 100 MHz (million
cycles per second) to 1 GHz (billion cycles per
Magnetic weapon sensor— a wire loop second).
419
Sonic— having a frequency within the hear- measures exceeding those prescribed, or not
ing distance of the human ear. in the best interest of the US Government.
Supervised line— a conductor which (if cut, Nuclear reactor— a facility in which fis-
broken, shorted, or otherwise tampered with) sionable material is used in a self-supporting
will cause a change in status indicated at a chain reaction (nuclear fission) to produce
monitoring unit. heat and/or radiation for both practical
application and research and development
Telephone dialer— a device, normally in- (AR 310-25). A nuclear reactor system in-
stalled within the protected area, that auto- cludes reactors and their associated compo-
matically dials preselected telephone num- nents, auxiliary systems, and engineered
bers upon sensor activation and provides a safeguards.
prerecorded message notifying of intrusion.
Nuclear reactor facility— a nuclear reactor
Ultrasonic— the frequency range of sound system, the associated buildings, auxiliary
that is above the capabilities of normal equipment, and reactor staff required for its
human hearing. In intrusion detection sys- operation, maintenance, and support. The
tems it usually varies between 21,500 and term includes both power and research
26,000 Hz (cycles per second). nuclear reactor facilities.
Ultrasonic motion sensor— detects by Reactor commander— chief of the organi-

frequency shift (doppler) the motion of an zational unit directly responsible for opera-
intruder inside the protected area. tion of a nuclear reactor facility, including the
reactor staff.
Vibration sensor— detects forced entry
through metal barriers placed over windows Response force— personnel, other than
and ventilators or attempts to drill, saw, or those performing security functions at the
cut through walls, ceilings, floors, or doors. facility, whose mission is to augment the
security force as required.
Responsible commander— the organiza-

tional element commander or director to
whom the reactor commander reports.
Nuclear Reactors
Restricted or vital area— any area, desig-
Access-close physical proximity to special nated by the reactor facility commander, to
nuclear material, control consoles, or the which access is restricted or controlled for
reactor, which provides the opportunity for reasons of security or to safeguard property or
tampering with or damaging the material, material.
consoles, or reactor. Posts must be estab-
lished to control access. Limited area— a restricted area that sur-
rounds one or more exclusion or vital areas.
Exception— permanent exclusion from spe-
cific requirements based on case-by-case Exclusion/vital area— a restricted area
determination that unique circumstances at a which contains special nuclear material, a
given unit, facility, or installation are such nuclear reactor, or control consoles.
that conformance to established standards
and measures is impossible, highly impracti- Security force— personnel performing secu-
cal, exceptionally costly, unnecessary due to rity duties at the nuclear reactor facility.
420
Special nuclear material (SNM)— Waiver— a temporary exemption, for not
plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope more than 1 year, from a specified require
233 or in the isotope 235; any other material ment. (Requests for waivers or exceptions
which the US Nuclear Regulatory Commis- referred previously will include circum-
sion determines to be special nuclear mate stances requiring the action and compensa-
rial; or any material artificially enriched by tory measures taken to achieve a comparable
any of the foregoing. SNM does not include degree of security. Requests will be forwarded
source material. through command channels to HQDA.)
421
Appendix T
Forms
T his appendix contains samples of

completed forms to help you in the daily,
semiannual, and annual operation of your
security office. There are examples of forms to
support preparation of manpower requests
and justification; DA Form 1818, Individual
Property Pass; DD Form 577, Signature Card;
DA Form 2806, Physical Security Survey; SF
1103, US Government Bill of Lading; DD
Form 836, Special Instructions for Vehicle
Drivers; and DD Form 1907, Signature and
Tally Record.
422
DD Form 577, Signature Card, is best used Each card should be prepared in triplicate.
in the physical security environment in The first is for the person authorizing release
support of DA Form 1818. Each activity or of the property. A second copy is filed at the
installation commander should require that local security office. The third copy goes to
signature cards be prepared on persons the security guard at the gate or control point,
authorized to allow property to be removed for immediate reference.
from the activity or installation.
Figure T-1 - Sample signature card.
423
Figure T-2—Sample individual property pass.
One essential element of an installation’s A property pass may be temporary or

overall physical security program is DA permanent with a valid use of 24 hours to 90
Form 1818, individual Property Pass. It acts days, depending on local policy. For best
as a check and balance for authorized accountability and control of the forms and
removal of property from an activity or inspection of installation property, you
installation. should control the forms from one location,
preferably the physical security office.
424
425
426
427
153-846 O - 94 - 18 (Fold-in No. 4)
Figure T-6—Example of completed inspection report (front of DA 2806). Figure T-6 Continued—Inspection report (back of DA 2806).
The results of physical security surveys Form 2806, Physical Security Survey, is used Form 2806 is divided into eight areas of Recommendations blocks on the reverse side.
and inspections must be documented. DA for this purpose. concern in physical security inspections/sur- These two blocks often require attached
veys. The most involved portion of the form is sheets to fully reflect results. These portions
usually the Remarks and Comments and are critical to the security manager or
428
Figure T-6 Continued—lnspection report (attached sheets). Figure T-6 Continued—-lnspection report (attached sheets).
installation commander, because the infor- accomplish the physical security mission.
mation here could be helpful in obtaining The information also may be helpful in
additional equipment and devices to properly budget and manpower requests (chapter 2).
429
153-846 O - 94 - 19 (Fold-in No. 5)
430
Figure T-7 Continued - General remarks by the commander
431
Figure T-7 Continued - Survey team's general remarks (p. 3 of
432
Figure T-7 Continued - Schedule X, manpower, and workload data
433
153-846 O - 94 - 20
Figure T-7 Continued - (p. 5 of 35).
434
Figure T-7 - Continued - (p. 6 of 35).
435
Figure T-7 Continued - Continuation sheet (p. 7 of 35).
436
437
438
439
Figure T-7 Continued (p. 11 of 35).
440
441
442
Figure T-7 Continued - Remarks (p. 14 of 35).
443
Figure T-7 Continued - Workload data No. 2 (p. 15 of 35).
444
445
446
Figure T-7 Continued-(p.18 of 35).
447
Figure T-7 Continued-(p. 19 of 35).
448
449
Figure T-7 Continued- (p. 21 of 35).
450
Figure T-7 Continued- Workload data No. 3 (
451
452
Figure T-7 Continued-(p. 24 of 35
453
Figure T-7 Continued-Workload data No. 4 (p. 25 of 35)
454
Figure T-7 Continued-(p. 26 of 35)
455
456
Figure T-7 Continued-Workload data No. 5 (p
457
458
Figure T-7 Continued- (p. 30 of 35).
459
Figure T-7 Continued- Workload data No. 6 (p. 31 of 3
460
461
Figure T-7 Continued- Continuation sheet (p. 33 of 35
462
Figure T-7 Continued-Remarks (p. 34 of 3
463
464
Appendix U
Convoys, Trains,
And Pipelines
M ilitary police responsibility for

physical security of convoys, trains, and
pipelines can vary greatly in combat and
peacetime. And it can vary greatly in degree
within these two situations. Convoy security
can bean MP unit’s responsibility only while
the convoy passes through the unit’s area; or
it can be the unit’s responsibility from the
point of origin to the point of delivery. During
railroad security, MPs work closely with
transportation railway service personnel.
Pipelines present a very difficult security
task. These highly vulnerable and volatile
arteries are critical to our peacetime and war
effort and must be protected from end to end.
This appendix offers details on how best to
meet the physical security requirements for
each of these tasks.
465
153-846 O - 94 - 21
Convoys Section I
U-1 Definition detailed to provide security and

movement to a specific group of vehicles.
a. A convoy is a march column of MPs may be called onto help numerous kinds
vehicles moving over the same route for a sin- of convoys, to include the following.
gle movement under the centralized control
of a single commander. This column com- • Resupply operations.
mander is designated by the major com- • Special ammunition or sensitive material
mander controlling the movements control movements.
center. He may also be designated by the
commander of the organization initiating the • Escort of designated commanders and
convoy. other VIPs.
• Assistance to combat arms units during
b. Size. A convoy may be one group of difficult movements, such as passage of lines
vehicles, or it may be broken down into subdi- or river crossings.
visions, each under control of a subordinate
commander. A serial is the major subdivi- The area commander (theater Army,
sion; it may be broken further into march corps, division), through HTH, allocates
units. In some recorded instances, the serial MP resources to convoy security missions.
has been eliminated, as in a convoy of 60 ve- A primary consideration is whether or not
hicles organized into four 15-vehicle march the convoy is able to provide its own security.
units. Organization depends on many fac- For example, an infantry battalion has the
tors. Some of these are road conditions, travel organic weapons to provide its own security;
distance, terrain, weather, enemy activity, a light truck transportation battalion may
and the training and experience of all person- not. The specific tactical situation is also a
nel. Normally, a column of 20 or less vehicles concern, particularly when rear area protec-
is not broken down, since they can all be con- tion is a factor. Military convoy operations in
trolled by one commander. If more than 20 CONUS are discussed in detail in TM 55-312.
vehicles are involved, the convoy should be Military convoy operations for stability oper-
broken down because of the difficulty of con- ations are covered in TM 55-311.
trol in terms of column length.
U-3 MP Commitment
U-2 Operation Military police are committed for
Convoy escort and security is an convoys in one of two ways—are-oriented or
operation in which military police are functional-oriented support.
466
a. In area-oriented support, the MP U-5 Function, Intelligence
unit provides MP support within a geo-
graphical area. The unit would escort a con-
Placement, and Command
voy from the time it enters this area until it a. Function. Escort and security
leaves the area. elements accompany a column or convoy,
assist the convoy’s movement, and pro-
b. In functional-oriented support, the tect it from interference from any source.
MP unit performs a specific task. This unit Convoy escort and security elements are
would escort a convoy from start to finish, placed in direct support of the convoy. The
regardless of areas passed through. security elements may consist of military
police, civilian police, or other personnel
assigned to accompany the column through
congested areas or areas of possible traffic
conflict of armed guards, ground troops, or
armed aircraft to protect the movement from
U-4 Controls sabotage, pilferage, guerrilla activity, or en-
emy action; or any combination of the fore-
Convoy movements are usually going. Military police performing as escorts
controlled by two methods—organizational or security elements will normally be
and area control. assigned only to high priority missions.
a. Organizational control is the respon-
sibility of the commander of the organization b. Military intelligence. Prior to the
or unit using the road. In this case, the com- movement of convoys, coordination should
mander is concerned with enforcing obser- be effected with the military intelligence unit
vance by his drivers of the rules of the road. providing counterintelligence coverage
These rules include traffic laws and regula- through the area to be traveled. This coordi-
tions, speeds, vehicle distance, routing, time nation may provide additional security cov-
schedules, discipline en route and at halts erage. It may reveal information on potential
and local security measures. Organizational guerrilla, terrorist, or sabotage activities
control is the rule under peacetime conditions along the intended route.
in CONUS and in secure oversea areas. Mil-
itary police become involved in such func- c. Placement. Convoy escort and secur-
tions for traffic control at critical points, ity elements perform their functions on
escorts through congested areas, and secur- mission-type commitments. They comply
ity of critical or sensitive cargo. with pertinent command directives and the
en route requirements of the convoy com-
b. Area control is the responsibility of mander. The location of these elements
the commander having area jurisdiction. within the convoy is determined by locally
This is the more common type of control exer- established policies and procedures; the
cised in an active theater of operations. It is enemy, weather, and terrain situation; cur-
superimposed on organizational control. It is rent area intelligence; troops available; avail-
employed only to the extent necessary to ability of armored or hardened vehicles; and
assure orderly and effective movement of experience of the convoy commander and
vehicles over the highway system. It is exer- escort and security personnel.
cised by a central office, such as a movements
control center in the transportation com- d. Security Element Control. In some
mand, or a division transportation office (for instances, particularly with small convoys,
a movement entirely within the division area the convoy commander may also be the com-
of responsibility). mander of the escort and security force. In
467
other situations, someone other than the and type of operation will influence the scope
commander may be in control, depending on of each SOP. The following minimum actions
policies established by the responsible com- must be covered:
mander. In large convoys, which may
(1) Approval authority for convoy
include 75 to 150 vehicles, the convoy com-
movements.
mander is usually a Transportation Corps
officer. He exercises control over the escort (2) Duties of convoy commanders and
and security element through the element control personnel.
commander. In either case, the escort and
(3) Convoy organization and communica-
security commander normally plans, coordi-
tion.
nates, and integrates all matters pertaining
to security of the convoy, to include noise and (4) Weapons and ammunition to be
light discipline requirements; front, flank, carried.
and rear security during movement and
(5) “Hardening” of vehicles (adding
halts; air cover; fire support; communica- armorplating).
tions with supporting units and higher head-
quarters; and interrogation of local civilians (6) Protective equipment worn by
along the route to develop current intelli- personnel.
gence information concerning road condi-
tions and possible guerrilla or enemy (7) Preparation of convoy vehicles, such
activities. as detailed instructions regarding tarpau-
lins, tailgates, and windshields.
(8) Counterambush action.
(9) Security measures.
(10) Maintenance and recovery of dis-
U-6 Convoy SOP abled vehicles.
a. Planning. The degree of (11) Refueling and rest halts.
success or failure of military convoys is in
direct proportion to the planning that pre- (12) Safety measures.
cedes its execution. A comprehensive stand-
ing operating procedure (SOP) facilitates c. Training in convoy operations and
planning. It provides guidance in various counteambush measures should conform as
situations in the absence of orders. The SOP closely as possible to the SOP. This will help
must not standardize any procedures into insure that personnel are adequately trained
patterns that would indicate to the enemy the to cope with probable situations.
anticipated or predictable action of convoy
personnel. When routes are established and d. Military police assigned to convoy
alternates do not exist, it is advisable to oper- escort duties must be familiar with the SOP
ate on these routes on an irregular schedule. of the convoy personnel. The MPs must
This decreases the convoy’s vulnerability to insure their own SOP is compatible with that
deliberate ambushes. Departure points, of the escorted unit. Exchange of information
halts, and refueling points should be varied concerning training and matters of mutual
when possible to help keep ambush forces off interest aids successful completion of the
balance. mission.
b. Content. SOPs at company level e. Convoy air support. Consideration

should conform with SOPs prepared by the should be given to the use of air cover for
next higher headquarters. The local situation security of the convoy. It also maybe used as
468
a reaction force if the convoy is ambushed. officers to make necessary adjustments for
The air element of the convoy security force integration of additional vehicles into the
might consist of one aircraft or more. march elements.
b. Local nationals who gather around ve-

hicles in the assembly area or during sche-
U-7 Multi-unit Convoys. duled or unscheduled halts are a potential
a. Convoys frequently are com- source of sabotage and pilferage. Unautho-
posed of vehicles and personnel from more rized personnel should be kept out of the
than one unit. In some circumstances assembly area. They should be kept at a
vehicles are a part of units only remotely safe distance from halted vehicles. Convoy
related to the command responsible for the and escort personnel should be alert for any
convoy organization. This situation may hostile act. They should wear protective
occur when various units must move equipment and keep their weapons in hand.
personnel or equipment over lines of
communications. These units may wish to
take advantage of the security normally
provided a large convoy. Additions of this
type are referred to as add-ons. The arrival
U-8 Vehicle Preparation
of unscheduled units at the assembly area a. Maintenance. Emphasis must
with the intention of joining the convoy may be placed on the importance of preparing ve-
disrupt the organization plan. This can be hicles for a convoy operation. When a truck
prevented by units making advance notice has a mechanical failure in an area infested
of their intentions. The notices should arrive by insurgents, the truck and its cargo may
at the responsible headquarters 24 hours have to be destroyed. Even when repairs can
before convoy departure time. This allows be made on the spot or the truck taken in tow,
Convoy Vehicle Checklist
Air hose couplings Tires

Oil and lubrication levels Brakes
Cooling system Battery.
Supervisory personnel should check for:
Availability of additional fuel, water, and lubricants.

Windshield in prescribed position.
Tarpaulin and end curtains when required.
Condition of sandbags in the driver’s compartment and in cargo bed when required.
Weapons mounted on vehicles must be inspected.
469
some elements of the column will be delayed. e. Hardening vehicles. The floors of
This increases their exposure to ambush, troop-carrying vehicles should be covered
snipers, or terrorist attacks. with at least a double interlocking layer of
sandbags. Cab floors of all vehicles should be
b. Unit commander’s responsibilities. sandbagged with a double layer under the
The commander of the unit furnishing vehi- driver’s seat. As an additional precaution, a
cles for a convoy and for a convoy security heavy rubber or fiber mat is recommended
escort is responsible for their condition. over the sandbags to reduce danger from
Before dispatching vehicles to the convoy fragments such as stones, sand, metal parts
assembly points, each vehicle should be thor- of the vehicle, and shrapnel. The life of sand-
oughly inspected by qualified maintenance bags is prolonged when the sandbags are
personnel. (See checklist on page 469.) covered by a mat. Sandbags also may be
placed on the gas tank, fenders, and hood.
c. Assembly area inspection teams. Armorplating may be installed on general
Trucks scheduled for the convoy normally purpose vehicles when authorized by the
arrive at the assembly area during the night responsible commander. Fuel tanks can be
prior to departure time. To insure all vehicles hardened by inserting steel plates between
are in satisfactory mechanical condition, the the fuel tanks and hanger straps.
convoy commander may appoint a night
maintenance inspection team to inspect vehi- f. Tarpaulins and cab tops.
cles on arrival. Minor deficiencies must be
(1) In some areas the use of tarpaulins,
corrected on the spot. Vehicles with major
canvas truck tops, and cab tops is decided
deficiencies must be returned to the parent
by the responsible area commander. In
unit and replaced with satisfactory ones.
other areas, it may be left to the discretion
Under no circumstances will a mechanically
of the responsible convoy commander.
defective vehicle be allowed to depart with
When the decision is made by the convoy
the convoy. A comparable procedure
commander, he should weigh the disad-
should be followed with military police
vantages against the advantages. (It can
security escort vehicles.
be assumed that when cargo will be dam-
aged by prevailing weather conditions, it
d. Windshields. Unless prescribed by
will be covered.)
higher headquarters, the convoy commander
should consider the following when deciding (2) The principal advantage in covering
whether to have windshields removed, a shipment is that it makes it more difficult
lowered, or left in place. Windshields left in for an ambush force to identify critical
place provide protection against heavy dust cargo such as ammunition and POL
and driving rain. They also serve as a con- products-always a preferred target.
necting point for chicken wire that may be
(3) The main disadvantage of using
secured to each window to protect against
truck top or tarpaulins is that they have to
incoming grenades. They provide protection
be removed for loading and unloading
from wire stretched across the road to decapi-
operations; thus reducing the operating
tate personnel. However, windshields should
time of the truck. In some instances, a
be removed when they interfere with the use
truck top interferes with the driver’s vision
of weapons, and during blackout operations.
to the rear and with the gunner firing to
To prevent windshields from breaking
the rear—a distinct disadvantage.
because of shock and vibration when
lowered, a piece of plywood or similar mate- (4) By leaving the cab top on POL loaded
rial covered with sandbags should be placed vehicles, some protection is afforded the
between the windshield and the hood. driver if the cargo tank ruptures and the
470
contents are ignited. Tankers of 1,200- this information has been collected, the staff
gallon capacity can be effectively dis- can complete planning for fire support, road
guised by rigging bows and canvas over outposting and clearing, escort forces, and
the cargo tank. Except at very close range, engineer support. Based on this information,
this gives the appearance of a general pur- detailed instructions go to the convoy com-
pose 2½-ton truck. mander and affected units in an operations
order. The operations order does not elimi-
g. Additional precautions. Loaded ve- nate the requirement for a briefing. This is
hicles in the assembly area present a profit- usually conducted by members of the battal-
able target to the enemy. To prevent sabo- ion staff.
tage, the area should be secure against ene
my infiltration. When vehicles are equipped
with gas cap locking devices, these should be
locked. An adequate guard force should be on
duty at all times.
U-10 Convoy Commander
a. Briefing. An officer or NCO
appointed as convoy commander should con-
tact the unit S3 officer and determine when
he can be briefed for the operation. The brief-
U-9 Staff Actions ing should cover all topics mentioned in para-
a. Planning a convoy operation re- graph U-9 and any others affecting the
quires high quality, aggressive staff action convoy. The convoy commander should ask
on the part of the truck unit staff. The officer questions on any facet not covered or not
designated as convoy commander has only a clear. When the responsible staff officer can-
limited period to reconnoiter the route. He not answer the question, he should get the
must give instructions to subordinate ele- answer, while the convoy commander is pres-
ment commanders and other supervisory per- ent, if possible. Before leaving the briefing,
sonnel, and achieve final coordination with the convoy commander should bring his
the security force commander. These duties maps up to date.
cannot be neglected for functions that are a
truck unit staff responsibility. b. Route reconnaissance. If a choice of
routes is possible, the decision of which route
b. Units through whose tactical areas of to be used will depend on these factors:
responsibility the convoy is to be moved must • Time.
be contacted. This is to determine what re- • Distance.
strictions and requirements are placed on • Current and expected enemy activity.
convoys in each area and what convoy sup- • Availability of security forces.
port can be furnished This support could in- • Availability of fire support along the se-
clude the following:
lected route.
Security forces • Trafficability of the roadbed and any
Escort vehicles bridges.
Fire support • Other critical factors.
Vehicle recovery and repair
In many instances the route will be pre-
Engineer road repair
scribed by higher headquarters. In this case a
Medical support.
map reconnaissance will enable the convoy
Any special problems that may interfere commander and the unit staff to select tenta-
with the convoy must be reconciled. After tive checkpoints or confirm those already
471
established. This reconnaissance should could be lost in establishing his identity. In-
ascertain all units whose tactical areas of formation furnished the artillery unit should
responsibility they will pass through. It include the convoy’s start and release points,
should also identify potential trouble areas time schedule, checkpoints, and size. Call
and ambush sites. signs, frequencies, and other signal operat-
After the map reconnaissance is completed ing instructions (SOI) should be exchanged.
and the route selected, the convoy com- Information received from the area security
mander should conduct either a ground or officer or obtained by route reconnaissance,
aerial reconnaissance of the road. If aerial regarding critical areas of enemy activity is
reconnaissance is made, it should be con- important. It should be used to plan addition-
ducted, whenever possible, several times al fire along the route. An overlay may be pre
prior to the date scheduled for the convoy. As pared for the convoy commander’s map,
many subordinate convoy leaders as possible showing the reference points and concentra-
should be included in these reconnaissance tions planned by the artillery. Fire can be
flights. This enhances the convoy command- called for and adjusted from these points
er’s briefing of the convoy leaders on the much more quickly and with greater accura-
route and its potential trouble areas. cy than if unplanned. Further coordination
Military police should be able to conduct a may include
hasty reconnaissance of the route to be used
by the convoy. At least a map reconnaissance • Types of ammunition to be fired under
various conditions.
is necessary. All sources of information
should be consulted, especially the engineers • Number of rounds to be fired at a given
and highway traffic headquarters. Aircraft target.
should be used if possible. Classification of
• Types of targets that warrant fire mis-
the route is important.
sions.
The following administrative color codes
Any no fire zones should be designated. If
are used to classify roads. (Designations are
the artillery unit cannot provide support
made on the basis of intelligence available at
along the entire route, its range limitation
the time. The designation can be incorrect.)
should be noted on the map. Actual calls for
• Green-generally free from enemy fire missions and adjustment of fire should
activity and may be used unarmed. also be coordinated and rehearsed, even
though these calls are standard throughout
• Yellow-risk of enemy activity. All
the Army. The convoy commander may coor-
military personnel should be armed and each
dinate fire on the assumption that the artil-
vehicle should carry at least two persons.
lery officer is the authority on fire support.
• Red-in the combat zone and may re- He is capable of planning available artillery
quire offensive or defensive action by combat resources to the convoy’s best advantage.
troops in the field. Another element of fire support that should
be planned is the use of gun ships and air-
c. Fire support and coordination. The borne rocket artillery (ARA). Through coordi-
convoy commander should not rely on his nation, these guns ships and ARA can be
knowledge of the battery’s call sign and fre- either on alert status or overhead while the
quency in lieu of direct coordination. An artil- convoy is en route. In either situation, their
lery unit sets up priorities of fire for the units radio frequencies must be known to convoy
it supports. A staff officer or the convoy com- radio operators and control personnel. A
mander must coordinate to obtain a priority means of marking the target should be estab-
for the convoy. If a request for a fire mission lished. to obtain the full benefit of these weap-
is received from an unknown observer, time ons systems. All communications and con-
472
trol personnel should be trained in calling for onset of an attack, key leaders are elimina-
and adjusting artillery fire. ted. Consequently, communications with
other elements and reaction forces are dis-
d. Convoy organization. After being rupted. The ambush force can be placed at
briefed by members of the unit staff, the con- some disadvantage by avoiding a set
voy commander should have sufficient infor- pattern in the location of control vehicles.
mation to enable him to prepare his convoy You can create further deception by using
organization plan. Local conditions will dic- a cargo vehicle (2½-ton or 5-ton truck) with
tate the details of the plan; however, the fol- radios installed for the command vehicle.
lowing should be considered under most cir- When a cargo truck is used, conceal an-
cumstances: tennas under the truck body. The military
police planner decides the best method of
(1) Deployment of vehicles loaded with
escort to use. The types of escorts are des-
critical cargo. The convoy commander
cribed in FM 19-25, Chapter 1, Installation
should give special consideration to the
Traffic Control. Considerations are ter-
placement of vehicles loaded with ammu-
rain, persons or cargo, volume, length, en-
nition and POL supplies. The grouping of
emy actions, and resources available to the
vehicles loaded with critical cargo pro-
convoy and MPs. Methods of escorts are:
vides a very profitable and easily identifi-
able target for the enemy. To avoid giving Leading and following
the ambush force this advantage, POL
Empty truck (or modified)
and ammunition loaded vehicles should be
dispersed throughout the march elements Leapfrog
comprising the convoy.
Perimeter.
Another effective technique which has
been used when an ambush is expected, is
(4) Maintenance and recovery vehi-
a 500-meter distance between all vehicles.
cles. The size of the trail party and the
In many instances, because of the ex-
number of recovery vehicles is determined
tended vehicle distances, the ambush will
by the size of the convoy and the exper-
not be executed since only a limited num-
ience of convoy personnel. Normally, re-
ber of vehicles will be in the kill zone at any
covery vehicles are assigned to each
one time. To effectively employ this tech-
march element of the convoy. The recovery
nique, the convoy commander should be
capability of 5-ton tractors (bobtail) and
airborne. Overhead surveillance by air- 2½-ton cargo trucks without trailers and
borne forward observers and light fire
equipped with tow bars should be con-
teams must cover the entire length of the
sidered. The availability of these vehicles
column. Oncall artillery, airstrikes, and a
will leave wreckers free for the recovery of
ready reaction force must also be avail-
more critically damaged equipment. One
able.
tractor truck for every 10 tractor-semi-
(2) Deceptive measures. Deception trailer combinations is considered a satis-
should be used throughout the convoy, es- factory ratio. A radio mounted in the
pecially on POL and ammunition vehicles. wrecker enables the convoy commander to
Vehicles may be camouflaged with canvas effectively control vehicle recovery with-
covered frames or by placing lumber, wire, out being physically present. This pro-
or other cargo over the primary load. vides greater flexibility in the march unit
communications system.
(3) Control vehicles. Such vehicles, es-
pecially the convoy commander’s, are pri- (5) Armored escort vehicles. The lo-
ority targets for the ambush force. By cation of escort vehicles in the convoy is
taking these vehicles out of action at the dictated by the number available, size of
473
the convoy, terrain, highway characteris- This should include the convoy commander,
tics, enemy situation, availability of re- security force commander, march element
action forces, and techniques employed by commanders, and trail party commander on
the enemy. One hardened vehicle should the net. Each march element should have its
be located near the head of the convoy so control net with the march element com-
that fire can be placed on enemy personnel manders, lead and trail escort vehicles, all
suddenly encountered. The remaining es- radio vehicles, and the recovery vehicle in the
cort vehicles are located where they can net.
provide maximum protection for all con-
voy elements. Since it is easier for vehi- b. Except in hill country where it may re-
cles to move forward than rearward, some veal the identity of the command vehicle,
escort vehicles must be positioned in the control vehicles may be marked with aircraft
rear of the march element to which they panel marking. These markers can be num-
are attached. Under no circumstances bered with tape for easy identification from
should escort vehicles be located where the air. Numbers should correspond to the
they can be isolated from the convoy by the radio call sign of the vehicle.
enemy. They must be able to provide abase
of fire for the segment of convoy for which c. Vehicle distance depends on many vari-
they are responsible. ables. Normally it is 50 meters in urban areas
with heavy traffic and 100 meters on the open
(6) Unloading. When it will not compro-
road.
mise the security of the convoy, locate
trucks requiring the longest unloading
d. Convoy speed depends on the condition
time at the head of the march element.
of the road, traffic, and on the speed of the
This will achieve the fastest turnaround
slowest vehicle. Airborne command elements
time.
using the radio capability can make neces-
sary adjustments to maintain the prescribed
vehicle distance and gap between convoy ele-
ments. On a long move over rough highways,
the speed should not exceed 15 to 20 miles per-
U-11 Command and Control hour. Prescribed maximum catchup speed is
25 to 30 miles per hour.
Planning
a. When the operation order is e. Coordination should be made with the
issued, command and control must be com- local area military police for escorts through
pletely delineated. This must include: populated areas, traffic control at road junc-
tions and other critical points. Road outpost-
(1) Chain of command to be followed
ing and mine sweeps should be obtained
on the convoy.
when appropriate.
(2) Relationship between the convoy com-
mander and the escort commander.
(3) Procedures to be followed in obtaining
combat support.
U-12 Final Convoy Preparation
Elements to be on each control frequency
should be delineated. This insures proper use a. Time required. The convoy
of radio nets and complete reporting of essen- must be physically organized. The convoy
tial information. For adequate convoy con- commander and element commanders must
trol there should be a convoy command net. brief personnel. They must also inspect in-
474
dividual equipment and vehicles. The time nation of assistant commander and seri-
for this is influenced by the size of the convoy al/march unit commander, arm and hand
and the experience of the drivers and control signals, other prearranged signals, and
personnel. In planning the convoy prepara- the applicable radio frequencies and call
tion schedule, provisions should be made for sign.
the lineup of vehicles in the order of march at
least 1 hour before start point time. (6) Safety measures, to include hazards of
the route, weather conditions, and defen-
b. Commander’s briefing. The convoy sive driving.
commander holds his briefing after the vehi-
cles have been lined up in the order of march. c. Element commander’s briefing.
This briefing should cover at least the fol- After the convoy commander’s briefing, per-
lowing points: sonnel return to control of the march element
commanders. Here they receive final instruc-
(1) Tactical situation, to include locations tions concerning their elements. Control per-
of friendly forces, support units, and the sonnel make final inspections of loads to in-
enemy situation. sure they are properly secured and that vehi-
(2) Mission, including types of cargo cles are ready to move.
being transported and the destination.
d. Communications personnel check
(3) Execution, to include organization of
their equipment and enter the net approxi-
the convoy, time schedule, routes of march,
mately one half hour before start point time.
convoy speed, catchup speed, vehicle dis-
tances, and emergency measures to be fol-
lowed. e. Guncrews check their weapons and in-
sure they are clear. Rounds are not cham-
(4) Administration and logistics matters, bered until a designated geographical
such as control of personnel, billeting and marker is reached, or until directed by the
messing of convoy personnel, and refuel-
convoy commander. When an authorized
ing and servicing of vehicles.
area is available, guncrews may be directed
(5) Command and signal items, to include to test fire their weapons to insure all wea-
location of the convoy commander, desig- pons are operational before departure.
475
U-13 Rules of Engagement (3) Good field of fire for attacking force.
a. General. The two primary (4) Good exit route for the attacking
types of engagement likely during convoy force’s withdrawal.
movement are snipers and ambush. The
(5) Restriction of the attacked element’s
amount of damage sustained by the convoy
movements to one flank by natural or
when subjected to these attacks is usually in
man-made obstacles. Natural obstacles in-
inverse ratio to the amount of training in con-
clude cliffs, steep embankments, swamps,
voy defense and the adequacy of the briefing
steep grades, sharp curves in the road,
convoy personnel have received. narrow trails, streams, and heavily
wooded areas. Man-made obstacles
b. Sniper Fire. Extreme caution must be usually consist of mines, boobytraps, dem-
observed when sniper fire is received. We
olitions, roadblocks, and damaged
must insure that any return fire does not
bridges.
harm friendly civilians or friendly troops in
the area. Especially important is the preven-
d. Ambush—Road Not Blocked. Ex-
tion of indiscriminate firing by convoy per-
tensive road space is occupied by even a pla-
sonnel without a specific target. The best
toon size convoy. Because security or lack of
actions are passive. This should consist of in- available forces may limit the size of the am-
suring that all personnel wear steel helmets bushing force, ambush forces are seldom able
and armored vests at all times. When sniper to contain an entire convoy in a single kill
fire is received, all convoy vehicles should zone. More frequently, a part of a convoy-
move on through the area without stopping. either head, trail, or a section of the main
Escort personnel should: body is ambushed. The part of a convoy that
is in the kill zone and receiving fire must
• Notify the march element commander. drive out of the ambush if the road to the front
• Give the prescribed signal, usually a red is not blocked. Vehicles disabled by enemy
smoke grenade thrown in the direction of the fire are left behind. If they are blocking the
fire. road, they must be pushed out of the way by
following vehicles. Occupants of these ve-
• Attempt to locate and destroy the sniper by hicles may be picked up by following vehi-
longrange fire if in a free-fire zone. cles.
Fire must not be returned in a no-fire zone. Armored escort vehicles must not block
Under order of the convoy commander, addi- convoy vehicles by halting in the traveled
tional fire or supporting forces maybe placed portion of the road to return enemy fire. Ve-
in the area to destroy, capture, or drive off the hicles that have not entered the kill zone
sniper. Convoy personnel should be aware must not attempt to run the gauntlet. They
that a heavy volume of fire is frequently em- should stop, and personnel should dismount
ployed by the enemy to slow a convoy down and take defensive positions. Since escort ve-
just prior to an ambush attack. hicles may have left the road to attempt to
overrun hostile positions, elements of the
c. Ambush Sites. Ambush sites are convoy should not fire on suspected enemy
usually characterized by the following: positions without coordinating with the es-
cort force. Other actions available to con-
(1) Concealment of the ambush force by a voy personnel for neutralizing the ambush
screen of foliage, holes dug in the ground, force are:
or similar methods.
(2) Good visibility of target area and (1) Call for artillery fire on enemy posi-
approaches for the ambush force. tions.
476
Remember:
Vehicles in the kill zone
must keep moving!
(2) Call for gun ship fire on enemy posi- positions. Troops from vehicles that have
tions. passed through the ambush area dismount
and prepare to attack the flanks of the am-
(3) Direct gun trucks and other vehicles
bush position. The security force stays
mounted with heavy weapons to lay down
behind to protect the vehicles. Personnel in
a heavy volume of fire on the ambush vehicles who have not entered the kill zone
force.
follow the same procedure. Before attempting
(4) Call for reaction forces. to flank the ambush force, the officer or NCO
in charge should insure that his force will not
(5) Direct all nondriving personnel to be in the field of artillery fire that may be
place a heavy volume of fire on enemy
called in. Reaction forces should be called in
forces as vehicles move out of the kill zone
as soon as the ambush attack is launched.
as rapidly as possible. When a tactical escort is provided, the of-
ficer in command of the escort force takes
e. Passive Actions. Actions taken by charge and attempts to neutralize the am-
the convoy commander regarding support- bush; otherwise, the senior officer or NCO
ing forces will vary according to the situa- present takes charge. In an ambush situa-
tion. Regardless of his course of action, the tion, immediate reaction and aggressive
element of the convoy caught in the kill zone leadership are essential in limiting casual-
should clear it as rapidly as possible. A ties and damage to equipment. The maneu-
motor transport convoy with a limited escort ver plan may be altered by the supporting
is seldom able to defeat a hostile force and fire plan. Example, if immediate air or artil-
should not attempt to do so. When part of the lery is available, personnel are restricted to a
convoy is isolated in the kill zone, vehicles specified distance from the road to avoid cas-
that have not entered the ambush area may ualties from friendly fire. In this situation,
be required to turn around. They should re- personnel in the kill zone establish a base of
turn to the nearest secured area until support- fire. Others take up defensive positions
ing forces can clear the ambush. Normally, a around their vehicles and wait while support-
transport unit will not deploy to attack a hos- ing fire is called in on the enemy positions.
tile force unless it is necessary to prevent des-
truction of the convoy elements. However,
they will rely on supporting air, artillery, es- (1) Fire in the kill zone maybe from only
cort, and reaction forces. one side of the road with a small holding
force on the opposite side. To contain the
f. Ambush—Road Blocked. When an convoy element in the kill zone, mines and
element of a convoy is halted in the kill zone boobytraps are frequently placed on the
and is unable to proceed due to disabled vehi- holding force side. Caution must also be
cles, a damaged bridge, or other obstruction, taken in assaulting the main ambush force
personnel must dismount, take cover, and re- as mines are commonly used to protect its
turn a maximum volume of fire on enemy flanks.
477
(2) When the enemy is dislodged, the road pended from trees and command detonated
must be cleared. Convoy movement must when a vehicle passes.
be resumed as soon as possible. Wounded
personnel are evacuated, usually by medi- b. The following guidelines have proven
cal evacuation helicopters. When dis- effective in decreasing damage by mines in
abled vehicles cannot be towed, their cargo convoy operations:
should be distributed among other vehi-
(1) Track the vehicle in front.
cles if time permits. When it is not feasible
to evacuate vehicles and cargo, they must (2) Avoid driving on the shoulder of the
be destroyed upon orders from the convoy road.
commander. When possible, radios and
(3) Whenever possible do not run over
other critical items are recovered before
foreign objects, brush or grass in the road.
vehicles are destroyed. Under no circum-
stances will such items be allowed to fall (4) Avoid fresh earth in the road.
into enemy hands.
(5) Watch local national traffic and there-
action of people on foot. They frequently
g. Employment of Non-Air Defense give away the location of any mines or
Weapons Against Aircraft. boobytraps.
(1) In the absence of orders to the con-
(6) When possible, arrange for the engi-
trary, individual weapons operators will neers to sweep the road before the convoy
engage attacking aircraft. Engagement of is scheduled to move over it.
all other hostile aircraft must be on orders
issued through the unit chain of command (7) Heavy vehicles, such as tanks, are use-
and must be supervised by unit leaders. ful in exploding small mines when de-
ployed in front of the convoy.
(2) A full discussion of this subject area
is in FM 44-23, TC 7-1, and TC 23-44.
U-15 Halts
U-14 Mines and Boobytraps a. On long trips it is usually neces-
a. Mines and boobytraps are fre- sary to make one or more scheduled halts for
quently employed by ambush forces. In fact, refueling, inspection, and maintenance of
a command-detonated mine usually signals equipment, mess, rest, and relief. Locations
an ambush. Mines, either command- or for halts should be selected before departure
pressure-detonated, vary in size from a few of the convoy. They should be situated in a
pounds of explosives to several hundred relatively secure area and, when possible,
pounds. Some are recovered, unexploded under the surveillance of a security force.
bombs or artillery rounds planted nose up in
the road. Mines also are planted along the b. The convoy should be halted only at
shoulder of the road for harassment and in- points where there is an unobstructed view of
terdiction. A boobytrap system employed about 200 yards from the head and tail of the
against personnel in vehicles consists of column. There should be no restrictions,
hand grenades attached to tree branches curves, or grades. Vehicles should be pulled
over the road where antennas or other pro- over to the side as far as possible. Drivers
jections from vehicles will snag and detonate should maintain the prescribed vehicle dis-
the grenades. Claymore mines may be sus- tance. Scheduled halts should not be made in
478
populated areas or where there is a heavy while the driver attempts to repair the
volume of local traffic, especially on foot. vehicle.
Local civilians should not be allowed to (Road shoulders are frequently mined or
gather around convoy vehicles. All vehicles boobytrapped. Before a driver or crewman
remain off the road, keeping the traveled por- dismounts, filled sandbags can be thrown on
tion clear. Guards are required at the head the ground from the protection of the vehicle,
and tail of the column to direct traffic. then used as stepping stones. The impact of
the sandbags will detonate most pressure
type antipersonnel explosive devices near the
vehicle.)
When the trail of the march element ar-
U-16 Road and Bridge Damage rives, the escort vehicle commander notifies
Roads or bridges can be damaged, the convoy and march element commanders.
either by natural causes or by the enemy. He then attempts a recovery until the head of
When alternate routes are not available, en- the next march element arrives. At this time
gineer support is required to restore the roads he returns to his trail escort position.
to a serviceable condition. One of the benefits If the disabled vehicle requires towing, the
of an aerial reconnaissance prior to the con- wrecker or other vehicle to be used, stops 25
voy’s departure is the identification of prob- to 50 meters in front of the disabled vehicle.
lem areas along the route. Also, it enhances The tow bar is then attached to the disabled
selection of a bypass or alternate route. vehicle. A hasty reconnaissance for mines is
conducted in the space between the disabled
vehicle and the tow vehicle. Then the tow ve-
hicle is backed into towing position, con-
nected to the disabled vehicle and, if between
march elements, moves under escort to the
U-17 Vehicle Recovery rear of the march element ahead. If in a
a. The assignment of a trained passing march element, the driver of the tow
maintenance officer or maintenance ser- vehicle waits until the trail of the passing
geant to command the trail party is essential. march element arrives. He then takes a posi-
He must be capable of determining whether a tion to the rear of the march element. The
disabled vehicle should be repaired, re- most important elements in recovery are ve-
covered, or destroyed. hicle security and speed in recovering the dis-
abled vehicle. This recovery keeps the road
b. The trail party must have security, es- clear.
pecially during recovery operations. Trail The march element and convoy com-
party vehicles should be hardened and per- mander must be kept informed of the status
sonnel armed with automatic weapons. of disabled vehicles. If a vehicle is disabled
because of a mine, fire, wreck, or enemy wea-
c. An effective policy is that the first re- pons, the convoy commander must decide if
covery vehicle to reach a disabled vehicle re- the vehicle is recoverable. If it appears that
covers it unless orders directing other action recovery is impracticable, he may decide to
are received. Normally, a disabled vehicle destroy it in place, provided such action has
pulls to the right side of the road to allow been authorized by the appropriate com-
those following to continue to move. The mander. This can be performed by the engi-
shotgunner and any passengers dismount neers using explosives, by gunfire from the
and take up positions from which they can escort force, or by artillery or tactical air fire
observe possible sniper fire or other enemy after the convoy has cleared the area. All per-
action. This protects the driver and vehicle sonnel should understand that destruction
479
of equipment is a command decision. Des- port, and reaction forces becomes more criti-
truction should be employed only to prevent cal as visibility decreases. It is important
it from falling into the hands of the enemy. that all personnel understand the correct use
Critical parts of the equipment to be des- and interpretation of pyrotechnic signals.
troyed should be recovered if sufficient time Night convoys should be made up of vehicles
is available. with uniform capabilities. Outsized or over-
loaded vehicles should be avoided.
c. Speed, Vehicle Distance, and Light

Discipline. Whether a convoy moves under
blackout conditions or with lights is
U-18 Release Point determined by local conditions. Under
blackout conditions, the vehicle distance is
Prior to arrival it is a good policy to closed to approximately 15 to 20 meters.
contact the receiving units by radio. This no- Speed seldom exceeds 5 to 10 miles per hour.
tifies them of the expected time of arrival. It When operating with lights, vehicles usually
enables them to meet the convoy at the re- maintain a distance between vehicles of 50 to
lease point and guide the vehicles to the pro- 100 meters at a speed of 15 to 20 miles per
per unloading points. As the vehicles are un- hour.
loaded, they should be dispersed and after-
operation maintenance should be performed. d. Escorts. Due to control and security
Drivers should be informed where and at difficulties resulting from reduced visibility,
what time to assemble for the return trip. it is essential that march elements be orga-
Since forward locations present an especial- nized in easily manageable sizes. They
ly profitable target when a convoy is present, should have an adequate security escort.
light and noise discipline should be strictly When possible, additional radios should be
enforced. provided to insure rapid communication be-
tween all elements involved. Gun jeeps, ar-
mored cars, helicopters, armored personnel
earners, and tanks can be effectively used as
escorts and security elements. Tanks with or-
ganic searchlights and high firepower can be
U-19 Night Convoys highly effective deployed throughout the
column as security vehicles. In case of an am-
a. Due to their extreme vulnera- bush, they may be driven directly into the
bility to ambush and sniper fire, night con- ambush, employing shock as well as fire-
voys are not recommended as a routine power to neutralize the attacking force. As in
operation. However, intermittent night all ambushes, it is critical that convoy ve-
moves that do not set a pattern can be very ef- hicles caught in the kill zone keep moving.
fective in keeping enemy forces off balance Those that have not entered the kill zone
and in maintaining high resupply levels. must halt until it is safe to proceed.
When employed, night convoys are much
smaller than normal day convoys for easier e. Release Point. Receiving units must
control. Familiar routes should be used. have guides available at the release
point to expedite the movement of vehicles
b. Planning and Coordination. Night to their unloading points. Confusion or
convoy moves are planned the same as day delay at the release point is an invitation
moves. Effective coordination between con- to an ambush with the resulting loss of men,
voy personnel, escort troops, artillery sup- equipment, and supplies.
480
U-20 After Action Reports writing, depending on occurrences during the
trip. The primary purpose of the report is to
The final action in any convoy es- provide a record of any unusual occurrences.
tort operation is submission of an after ac- It provides current intelligence and serves as
tion report. This can be either orally or in a record of lessons learned.
Railroad Security Section II
U-21 Vulnerability (1) Route reconnaissance by Army air-

craft.
a. Railroads are profitable targets
for regular and irregular enemy forces. They (2) Occupation of critical terrain features
are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla at- along the route prior to and during move
tack because a train’s movement is directly ment.
determined by the condition of the rails.
(3) Use of special observation cars that
Cutting the rails can produce effects com-
permit surveillance of the entire train.
parable to direct attacks—stopping the
train or preventing delivery of critical (4) Placement of the locomotive at the
goods. middle of the train to minimize damage to
the locomotive in case of sabotage. An al-
ternate method is to place two or three gon-
b. Even when friendly forces dominate dola cars, filled with rocks, sand, or other
the area, railroads present a target for de ballast, in front of the engine to absorb the
liberate sabotage or overt attack. These effects of any detonation of mines placed
targets are present in CONUS and the the on the railway.
ater of operations. They range from a switch
that can be thrown the wrong way to a trestle (5) Use of empty and decoy trains to pre
that can be demolished. The destruction of cede critical shipments.
switches, signals, or trackage may be only (6) Use of escort or scout trains to patrol
harassment, or it may trigger a chain re- the right of way.
action of a larger scope. The destruction
of a bridge or a tunnel may disrupt a whole (7) Use of special armored guard cars.
railway system and may require a long time (8) Placing of mobile maintenance trains
for repair or replacement. Each individual in strategic locations along the route or
bridge and tunnel must be considered as moving with trains.
a separate security problem.
(9) Consolidation of trains to assure the
most economical use of available air cover.
c. Security measures for railroad opera-
tions are determined by the. situation and (10) Movement at highest safe speeds
area of operations. General protective mea- through areas where guerrillas or parti-
sures may include the following: sans are active.
481
(11) Placing of security patrols along the them to pass under a bridge. The security
length of the line to be traversed. force should be quartered at a safe distance
from the bridge, but near enough for person-
These measures are discussed in more
nel not on duty to be readily available in an
detail in the following paragraphs.
emergency. The full length of the bridge
d. In addition to the train security opera- should be inspected at irregular intervals.
tions discussed in this section, mili- Sentry dogs may be used to supplement per-
tary police may be tasked to provide secur- sonnel.
ity of railway yards.
U-24 Tunnels
The most vulnerable point of a tun-
U-22 Bridge Vulnerability nel or tube is the place where it passes
A railroad bridge, because of the through loose or shifting earth, sand, or other
weight it must support, may be rendered un- unstable material. At such a location, a sabo-
serviceable merely by weakening it. Bridge teur may attempt to destroy the lining by
approaches or abutments are extremely vul- placing explosive charges along the crown or
nerable to attack. On a single span bridge, upper sides. It may be sufficient to destroy
the destruction of an abutment is usually suf- one side of an arch ring in this manner. If this
ficient. In this case not only is the bridge occurs, the pressure of the over-burden may
wholly or partly demolished, but the destruc- bring down the roof and fill a section of the
tion of the abutment makes it difficult to ob- tunnel. This type of destruction is normally
tain a footing for the foundation of a new not possible in firm soil or solid rock with-
bridge on the same site. On a multiple span out the use of large breaching charges. Sabo-
bridge, the demolition of an intermediate pier teurs usually avoid this due to the difficulty
usually has the same effect as the destruction of placing the charges surreptitiously. How-
of an abutment. ever, a similar but not as serious result may
be obtained by derailing a train in the tunnel.
Ventilating shafts are also vulnerable
points.
U-23 Bridge Security

The security measures appropriate
for a bridge are based on its sensitivity. This U-25 Military Police
is determined by the bridge’s location, its re- In TRS Security
lation to other structures and alternate
routes, and its proximity to populated areas. a. Transportation Railway Service
Usually the most effective security measure (TRS) personnel are highly trained with one
is a stationary security force. Mechanical primary mission—to operate and maintain
aids may be used to supplement security. railroads. TRS units are organized especially
Forces should be placed at both ends of the to fulfill this mission and this mission alone.
bridge so they can observe its understructure All TRS personnel have specific jobs in the
as well as its roadway. The draw-mechanism rail operation. Therefore, security functions
of drawbridges should be guarded at all beyond the capabilities of TRS units must be
times. Guard boats and upstream booms per- handled by those trained and equipped to do
mit inspection of vessels before allowing the job—the military police.
482
b. The military police brigade, organic to the units may provide additional support and
the area support command in TRANSCOM, protection as necessary.
provides military police services for the TRS.
The brigade has two military police guard g. The NCOIC also should have an intelli-
battalions, and each battalion has four mili- gence report covering the route. This pro-
tary police guard companies. One MP guard vides information as to any sites or locations
battalion is assigned to the transportation where sabotage may occur, attacks may be
command for each railway group in the TRS. expected, boxcar thievery is on the increase,
MP guard companies are assigned on the and similar information.
basis of one per railway battalion.
h. TRS training. Military and civilian
c. When the TRANSCOM organization security units attached to the TRS should be
does not exist, military police may be detailed given a brief training program based on the
for railway security operations from local material presented in this section. This train-
area MP units. ing should familiarize members of these
units with basic railway operations, rail
d. Military police units assigned to the terminology, and railway signals. It should
TRS have the specific purpose of providing also teach them how to coordinate their ef-
security for train operations. They may be forts with those of the train crews for better
supplemented by civilian guards; but this train protection. All security units should be
practice should be avoided when possible. thoroughly familiar with the requirements of
their duties, and know where their duties end
and the train crew’s begin. The conductor or
e. Train security forces must have all train commander has the responsibility for
items of equipment and supplies needed for the operation and security of his train. He
the operation. In addition to their regularly will make all decisions affecting both of these
assigned individual weapons (pistols or ri- responsibilities. The conductor is the train
fles) and ammunition, special armament commander unless a TRS officer is assigned
may be necessary. They may require bed- to that train for specific reasons. Close co-
rolls, rain gear, fire extinguishers, rations, operation between train crew members and
flashlights, lanterns, protective masks, and security forces is imperative.
many similar items. They also must have ra-
dios capable of establishing communications
with units stationed along or near the rail-
way line. Contact must be established at the
earliest opportunity.
U-26 Operations Security
f. The NCOIC of the security force should a. The primary mission of the train
obtain a time schedule for the movement. He
operating crew and the security forces on-
should make a map reconnaissance of the
board is to get the train to its destination with
route, so he will be able to plan his actions
its freight intact. Normally, a train operating
at scheduled stops, at relief points, if any, and
crew consists of four or five people—the engi-
to deploy his forces accordingly. He also neer, the conductor, a fireman, the senior
should plot the locations of military police brakeman, and the brakeman or flalgman-
units and other friendly forces along the
and this crew has control of the train. The
route, together with their radio frequencies
number of men in a train security force will
and call signs. The NCO should establish
depend on:
communication with such units as the train
enters their areas of responsibility. This way Sensitivity of the freight
— 483
■ Priority of its need and responsibilities of the train crew. They
work with the train conductor on all matters
■ Terrain over which the train will pass.
pertaining to the passengers. If they desire to
Security forces may ride in a specific car check passes, they do it at the same time as
that requires protection, in the caboose, or in the conductor is checking tickets or the pas-
a security car or cars if provided. If only one senger list. Military police assigned to pas-
security car is used, it should be near the senger trains should be selected with care be
center of the train. If more than one is used, cause their duties involve people rather than
spacing should be arranged to provide the inanimate objects of freight. They should
best protection for the train. When security possess such personal qualities as tact, poise,
forces are assigned to each train, their names and the ability to work harmoniously with
are listed on the train dispatcher’s roster with others.
the names of the train operating crew. The
same security and train crews should, as far
as possible, work together on every run.
Train crews are either freight or passenger
crews, and each type of security force then
would need to be trained in only one kind of
U-27 Ground Attack
security Duties differ on passenger and a. Security of the rail lines, instal-
freight trains. lations, and right-of-way are only part of the
job. Trains operating in the threatened area
b. The security force on a freight train and their freight also must be protected. Mili-
must keep a constant check on car doors, tary police units attached to the TRS help in
seals, wires, and locks to detect tampering. accomplishing this task.
They also must be on the alert for cars that
may be loaded in a way that would invite pil- b. Underbrush and thick forests should be
ferage. It is standard railroad practice in cleared from the sides of the roadbed to elimi-
making up trains to group the cars according nate cover for anyone attempting to interrupt
to their respective destinations. However, traffic. Railway gondolas carrying mounted
cars containing easily pilferable freight machineguns, mortars, and rocket launchers
should be grouped within the train to obtain may be manned by military police. Also rail
the most efficient use of security forces. This cars loaded with rock and dirt or scrap mate-
grouping may be feasible when all cars of the rial may be pushed ahead of the engine for
train have the same general destination. protection against mines, sabotage, or ob-
When flatcars or gondolas are used for trans- structed tracks. Passenger trains should
porting sensitive or easily pilfered freight, carry a supply of ammunition and hand gre-
the security forces should be placed where nades for the crew and passengers to use if
they can continuously observe and protect needed. They should also contain fire ex-
these cars and their freight. If a car is set out tinguishers and first-aid kits. All vestibule
on a siding because of a defect, a member of doors should be kept closed. This prevents
the security force must stay with the car until guerrillas from boarding. Windows should be
it is either unloaded or repaired. If more than covered with securely fastened heavy
one car is set out, two or more guards maybe mesh wire screen to prevent hand grenades
required to protect them. or other explosives from being thrown into
the cars. With security troops posted at stra-
c. Military police may be assigned to pas- tegic positions and trains carrying armed
senger service to help maintain discipline security forces, rail interruptions resulting
and order. Normally, two men are assigned to from sabotage and guerrilla action can be
a train. They do not interfere with the duties greatly reduced.
484
c. Should the train be attacked, either by greatest damage. Bridges and stations for re-
sniper fire or by ambush in force, the first fueling and watering locomotives are also
consideration is to keep the train moving, likely targets. It is highly improbable that
if at all possible. The NCOIC of the security train operations could continue with any
force should deploy his forces in the best great degree of success under sustained air
manner to return fire and repel the attack. If attacks.
the train is halted they should remain in the
car if the security force car will withstand the
fire of the attackers. If not, they should get off
the train and take up the most advantageous
firing positions. All possible fire should be di-
rected to neutralize or destroy the attackers. U-29 Freight Security
They must, however, be familiar with and The physical security or safekeep-
alert for the train whistle signal for reboard- ing of freight requires that all personnel are
ing, so they will not be left behind or injured well trained in all phases of movement and
trying to board the train as it moves out. protection of supplies. Because of the poor
economic state that results from the ravages
of war, pilferage and theft are continual
threats in theaters of operations. Favorite
targets of pilferers are food, clothing, fuel,
U-28 Air Attack tools, and other supplies that sustain life.
This threat does not always come solely from
a. Trains, track, and all rail facili- local inhabitant. Freight must be protected
ties are exceedingly vulnerable to air attacks. against removal by any persons except those
When trains are operated in areas subject to authorized to receive freight shipments.
these attacks, antiaircraft weapons may be Usually, pilferage centers around small easy-
mounted on cars spaced throughout the train to-carry items. Mail and high-priority
and manned by members of the security force materials always present security problems.
attached to the battalion. When the train is The following paragraphs discuss some
attacked in open and exposed areas, it should methods of achieving freight security at the
continue to move if possible. Heavily wooded origin of movement, while in transit, and at
areas or deep cuts through banks or hills pro- its destination.
vide some cover. Trains attacked in such ter-
rain should use whatever cover is available.
Tunnels afford excellent cover for trains if
the tunnels are long enough. Short tunnels
can be used for hiding locomotives or cars
containing special equipment.
U-30 Security at Origin
a. The shipper is responsible for the
b. If possible, trains operating in areas security of all carload freight until it is turned
subject to air attack should run at night and over to the TRS and the loaded car coupled to
stop in concealed places during the day. a locomotive for movement. Carload freight
Diesel-electric locomotives can be camouflag is that loaded by the carload, as opposed to a
ed to look like boxcars. Steam locomotives are few boxes or crates of freight. The shipper is
much more difficult to conceal. As a rule, rail also responsible for properly loading the
lines are not considered profitable targets for cars. This includes blocking and bracing,
airstrikes because they are quickly repaired. closing and sealing the car doors, icing if re-
Rail installations such as terminals, port quired, and documenting the cars. Before
areas, and railheads generally suffer the loading a car, he should inspect it thoroughly
485
to insure that it meets security requirements. items are not identifiable from the outside of
Doors should be securely in place. No holes a box or crate. A thief will not usually go to a
should be in the roof, sides, or floors. If he lot of trouble to steal something unless he
finds a defective car, he should report it im- knows that he can use it, sell it, or deprive US
mediately to the railway organization that forces of critical material.
supplied the car. It is very important that rail
cars be loaded properly when they are turned d. The standard method of sealing a rail-
over to the TRS for movement. The shipper’s way car door (in addition to locks or wires) is
responsibility in getting them ready to move by a soft metal strap or cable seal). Sealing
is discussed in detail in the following para- the cars and containers may discourage pil-
graphs. ferage but does not prevent it. Broken seals
indicate that the car and contents have been
b. One of the most vulnerable places dur- tampered with just as unbroken seals
ing movement of cargo is the loading point. normally indicate that the contents are se-
Rail cars should be loaded as soon as the cure. Train security forces or operating crews
freight is brought to the carrier. Loads should can easily check the seals on cars when the
be evenly distributed over the car, so that no train stops and before it starts again. Any
side or end is more heavily loaded than the broken seals help pinpoint the time and place
other. Improper placement of the load can of the theft. It is important that a broken seal
cause the car to sway and the load to shift. be reported immediately.
If shipments are made in open cars, they
should be covered with securely fastened tar- e. Rail cars and their loads are document-
paulins if the contents can be damaged by ed to aid in identifying and controlling them.
bad weather. If boxcars are available, small When proper documentation is presented to
items should be shipped in them. CONEX TRS personnel, they are authorized to move
containers are also ideal for shipping small the railway car. The document normally used
items on flatcars. They reduce the turna- in TRS operations is the Freight Waybill, or
around time of the rail equipment, protect Government Bill of Lading (GBL). This form
freight from weather, and greatly reduce the is filled in by the shipper or field transporta-
chance of pilferage. tion officer. It shows the car number, gives a
brief description of its contents, weight of the
c. The main objective of blocking and load, names the consignor and consignee,
bracing is to insure that freight will be im- and tells the origin and destination.In addi-
mobile during, transit and will arrive at its tion, it may show special instructions for the
destination in good condition. Lumber used movement or security of the car and contents.
for blocking and bracing should be sound One copy of this form accompanies the car.
and free of knotholes and splits. These impair Each car has its own waybill rather than one
strength and interfere with nailing. Great large waybill for the entire train; because one
emphasis should be placed on proper block- or more cars maybe set out on a siding while
ing and bracing of loads because of the en route if they become defective. An ade
danger of their shifting, and thereby break- quate system of documentation is essential
ing equipment and freight. Also, if a load for the security of all rail shipments. Through
shifts and a box or crate of small items breaks the use of documents, it is easy to determine if
open, the chance of pilferage and theft is something is missing from a shipment. They
greatly increased. There are two very good prevent the loss of a car or contents and pro-
reasons why this is true. It is much simpler to vide a means of locating cars loaded with
steal something that can be easily moved and critical cargo so that priority movements can
hidden, and a thief is more likely to tamper be authorized. Transportation movement of-
with a broken crate or box. Second, most ficers are responsible for the completeness,
486
correctness, and proper handling of waybills. depot siding, or track. The consignee or re-
TRS is responsible for moving the freight and ceiver assumes responsibility for the security
insuring that all instructions on shipping of loaded cars at the time they are delivered at
documents are followed. When the trip is the designated depot, siding, or track.
completed, the secured cars are inspected by
the receiver or his authorized agent. The c. Before moving a car from its loading
NCOIC of the security force must obtain a re- origin, TRS personnel inspect it for defects,
ceipt for those cars. proper loading, secure seals, and proper docu-
mentation. The train operating crew and the
f. Insuring that cars containing perish- train security forces are responsible for the
able commodities are iced is the responsibili- security of the car and cargo. They must re
ty of the shipper. The TRS must insure that port any discrepancies or interruption in the
the car is routed so that any necessary re normal operating procedures during the en-
icing can be accomplished. tire movement. When operations permit, cars
containing highly pilferable freight, high-
priority cargo, or special shipments are
grouped in the train to permit the most eco-
nomical use of train security forces. If neces-
sary, the shipper or loading agency also may
U-31 Security in Transit assign specially trained personnel to safe-
a. In a theater of operations, when guard critical or highly sensitive cargo in
property and material are in transit, security transit. Military police or other patrols
problems are prevalent. Loading procedures, should be stationed at critical portions of the
placing the cargo into carriers, and moving route where attempts at pilferage may be
these carriers all present security hazards expected. When cars containing such freight
of varying degrees. Sabotage and pilferage arrive in a rail yard, the yard-master makes
may be encouraged because of the economic note of the receipt of them. To expedite the
state or the political sympathy of the local shipment of sensitive cargo, information
population. All elements that contribute to about the movement is normally transmitted
security hazards must be evaluated to obtain from division to division by the chief train
the most effective security system possible. dispatcher through his telephone circuit.
One way of insuring the security of cargo in This method provides an efficient integra-
transit is by having the responsibility of the tion of high-priority shipments into the
consignor, the earner, and the consignee movements program.
clearly established. In general, the protection
of property and material in transit is there d. The train security forces prepare and
sponsibility of the person who has the ship maintain a record by car number of all
ment in his custody. However, this varies guarded cars in the train. They note and re-
according to its size and the means of transport any irregularities in procedures, the pre
portation. sence and actions of any unauthorized per-
sons, and any deficiencies and/or incidents
b. For shipments by rail, as stated in para- that occur en route. If these forces are relieved
graph U-30a, the shipper is responsible for by other security forces while en route, an in-
the security of loaded cars until they are prop spection of the guarded cars is made jointly
erly turned over to the transportation rail- by both crews, and the relief forces sign the
way service. TRS responsibility commences record.
when the loaded and sealed cars are coupled
to a locomotive or train. It ceases when the e. When the train is traveling at slow
loaded cars are delivered to a designated speeds on steep grades, through tunnels,
487
cuts, villages, or in wooded, restricted, or con- material must be stored, every possible effort
gested areas, the danger of looting or attack must be made to achieve the desired level of
increases. Security forces and operating security. Remember, both open and covered
crews must be more alert for persons attempt- items in storage are vulnerable to all types of
ing to board or damage the train. When the sabotage.
train is stopped, security forces dismount and
check the train on both sides. They verify
that seals, locks, and wires are intact. They
check for any damage to the cars, including U-33 Trip Reports
overheating journal boxes, which may cause At the conclusion of the trip, the
damage to the axles. NCOIC prepares a report covering the trip.
There is no prescribed form, but the report
should contain, in addition to the items listed
in par. U-30d, the following:
U-32 Security at Destination • Dates and times of commencement and
completion.
a. Because unloading points are
highly vulnerable to pilferage and sabotage, • Personal data of the security forces and
cars should be unloaded as soon as the train train crews.
arrives at its destination. This may not • Any recommendation for correction of de-
always be possible; but immediate handling
ficiencies or improvement of duture train se-
of freight reduces opportunities for its loss.
curity operations.
Speedy unloading of rail cars also increases
the availability of the rail equipment. Additional items may reincluded, either as
required by local or command directives, or at
b. The wire sealing on closed car doors the discretion of the NCOIC. The receipt ob
should be removed carefully to avoid break- tained for the secured cars (par. U-30e) must
ing the door latches. After unloading, if the be attached to the report.
Pipeline Security Section III
U-34 General system is either permanent or semi-

permanent. A tactical system is either
a. Pipeline (and hoseline) systems temporary or semipermanent. A tacti-
are used extensively, especially in active the cal system consists of rapidly coupled pipe
aters of operations. They are used for eco- or tubing systems and rapidly emplaced
nomical delivery of large quantities of bulk storage tanks. It furnishes fuel to advanc-
petroleum products, especially automotive ing units in corps or division areas. A varia-
and aviation gasolines, diesel and jet fuels. tion of the tactical system is an assault
They are generally designated as logistical pipeline system. This is composed of
or tactical pipeline systems. A logistical hose, collapsible fuel cells, and portable
488
pumps. It is rapidly installed to supply construction of beach manifolds. It also is
rapidly advancing troops in combat areas. used for unloading lines leading to off-
shore tanker anchorages. Hoselines also
b. These systems consist, in general, of are used in forward areas, such as at pipe-
discharging facilities for tankers at ports, heads. They also may be used as tempo-
water terminals, or other points of entry; in- rary lateral extensions from rigid pipe-
land tank farms, terminals, and other stor- lines to supply points and airfields. Hose-
age and dispersing facilities; pump stations lines also can be used as temporary
(which may be designated as trunk stations bypasses when sections of rigid pipeline
or booster stations when used on the main are being repaired or replaced.
line, or as branch stations when used on a
branch pipeline or hoseline); and pipelines
that extend as far forward as practicable
from the point of entry. Branch pipelines or U-35 Security Hazards
hoselines are lines leading off the main pipe
line to major users, such as airfields, or to a. Pipelines are vulnerable to a
general support suppliers. variety of security hazards throughout their
lengths, from point of entry to point of final
c. Pipe and tubing used in the construction delivery.
of military pipelines are of three main varie
ties—standard lightweight, standard b. Pilferage is the most common hazard,
weight, and special. especially in areas where gasoline is scarce
and expensive on the civilian market. Pipe-
(1) Standard lightweight steel tubing lines are tapped by loosening the flange bolts
makes up most of the length of the pipe- that join the sections of pipe. Gasoline drain-
line. This tubing comes in 20-foot sections. ing through the opening is poured directly
Lightweight tubing, because its wall is into containers of any type (depending on
thin, is not normally buried nor used in space available beneath the pipe) or permit-
submerged water course crossings. It also ted to fall into a hole dug under the line. From
is not used in populated areas and other the hole it is transferred to containers. Much
places where the hazards of fire and physi- gasoline can be pilfered in this manner. Gas-
cal damage are great. oline can be pilfered from hoselines by either
(2) Standard weight pipe is used where loosening the couplings between sections of
standard lightweight steel tubing does not hose, or by cutting holes in the hoseline.
give sufficient strength. Such pipe is used
c. Such pilferage frequently causes fire or
in submarine pipelines, river crossings,
explosion along the pipeline. This is due to
and other critical locations. Standard
the spilling of highly volatile fuel during pil-
weight pipe may be either coupled or weld-
ferage and afterward because flange bolts or
ed. In the Army it is usually coupled. It is
hose couplings are seldom properly tighten-
fabricated in diameters of 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 18,
ed. Also, the holes in hoselines are not
20, and 22 inches. However, it is not nor-
plugged or mended.
mally stocked by the Army in diameters in
excess of 12 inches.
d. Even when such actions of pilferers do
(3) Special pipe and tubing includes pipe not result in fire or explosion, they add
and tubing made of aluminum or other immensely to the total loss because of the
alloys or material. It is used where light- continued flow of petroleum from opened
ness of material is essential. Special tub flanges or holes. Experience indicates that
ing includes the flexible hoses used in the losses may exceed 16 percent over a 5-month
489
153-846 O - 94 - 22
period from this type of activity in a theater should include consultation with the com-
of operations. mand engineer. The engineer is responsible
under the provisions of AR 415-22, for physi-
e. Sabotage is always a security hazard. It cal protection measures, including the hard-
is committed by any method such as simply ening or dispersion of petroleum storage and
opening pipe flanges, cutting hoseline, or set- related facilities. Types and methods of pro-
ting fires and causing explosions to destroy tection mentioned in that AR include
portions of a line.
f. Security hazards also exist at pumping • Buried or semiburied construction

stations, frequently at locations remote from • Floating roof, suitably protected
supporting units. They are vulnerable to at-
tack primarily for sabotage by destruction of • Splinter-proofing, blast walls, and re-
either the pumping machinery or the entire vetments
station. • Use of natural terrain features
• Dispersion
• Use of security guards
• Other physical aids for protection a-
gainst sa48botage.
U-36 Organization and
Planning for Security The type and level of protection best suited
a. Pipeline security may be per- and economically feasible for all elements of
formed either by military police units or by petroleum installations is determined by
infantry units assigned to military police target analysis and feasibility evaluation.
units, or both. Organization of forces and This is also an engineer responsibility. Pro-
planning for security can be a responsibility tection from strafing, high explosive bomb
of the military police commander. He must ing, atomic blast, and fire must be consider-
coordinate with the security officers of the pe ed. The AR contains a table that reflects the
troleum group and petroleum operating bat- degrees of protection afforded by various
talions. He must coordinate with other securi- means of construction against various types
ty officers, especially those with a physical of attack. The physical security officer
security responsibility for any area through should be familiar with these procedures and
which the pipeline passes. cooperate with the engineer in his target
analysis and feasibility evaluation.
b. He should, where possible, coordinate d. The level of intensity of the warfare situ-
with the pipeline construction and using ation has a considerable effect on the type
agencies prior to construction. Here he can and extent of the security hazards to be antic-
provide advice and recommendations on ipated. In a peacetime or stable situation, the
physical security. If the pipeline is al- chief hazard is usually pilferage. The extent
ready in operation, he should cause a of pilferage depends on the local availability
thorough reconnaissance of the pipeline to be and prices of petroleum products in the area.
made from point of entry to terminal. He As the level of intensity increases from low to
should include any branch lines, pumping high intensity, the hazard of sabotage be
stations, or other facilities. comes increasingly important. Security mea-
sures should be increased and altered to meet
c. The MP commander’s coordination this threat.
490
U-37 Security ever, if he does, he should recommend those
Considerations locations that lend themselves most suitably
to static security. These may best serve as
a. One of the first security consid- central control points for his static and rov-
erations is to coordinate all efforts, tactical ing patrols along the pipeline.
and nontactical, in the area of the pipeline
system to provide surveillance, report obser-
c. The pipeline itself should, insofar as
vations, and to take immediate actions to pro-
possible, be laid in accordance with FM 10-67.
tect the system. Forces dedicated entirely to Adherence to the following guidelines will, in
pipeline security are rarely sufficient in num- addition to logistical considerations, provide
ber for complete and continuous surveillance the most beneficial situations from a security
of the entire system. The security officer must
standpoint:
deploy his forces in the best manner to pro-
vide coverage, by static, motorized, and air (1) The pipeline must follow the main mili-
patrols, of the most vulnerable portions. tary effort. In general, the route should
Other portions must be covered by surveil- take advantage of existing facilities and
lance by other forces. These other forces in follow the most direct route feasible.
the course of their normal duties, can ob-
serve and report items of intelligence for (2) The fundamentals of route selection
further investigation. Some suspicious activ- are discussed in TM 10-1118 and TM 5-343.
ities in the pipeline area might include the The latter also contains information per-
unusual presence of commercial tank trucks, taining to laying pipelines. Some of the
appearance of gasoline drums or cans, or in- more important considerations that in
creased use of motor vehicles in fuel-scarce fluence route selection are listed next:
areas. These also include any unexplained (a) Location, availability, and con-
personnel in the vicinity of the system, es- dition of pier or wharf facilities.
pecially in remote places. All commanders
must be impressed with the necessity for re- (b) Geographic and topographic consid-
porting such information, since the pipeline erations in establishing tanker unload
system represents such an important part of ing and base terminal facilities.
their subsistence. (c) Location, availability, and condi-
tion of existing military or civilian pipe
lines and petroleum products tankage.
b. A second consideration is the locations
of terminals. These locations, as well as (d) Probable need for dispersal of facil-
the size and number of terminals, depend on ities.
tactical, logistical, and similar military con- (e) Planned or actual location of major
siderations. The principal military factor is fuel-consuming installations, such as
the capability of an enemy to destroy one or naval supply depots and airfields. Pipe
more of the terminals. Another factor is the lines used chiefly to supply bulk avia-
ability of other terminals to take over the tion fuels generally follow the most
functions of the terminals that may be de- direct route to the airbases, with branch
stroyed. Such mandatory locations represent
lines as required. Hoselines may be used
risks the commander must consider. The sys-
when necessary as expedient branch
tem represents a compromise between the
lines. Responsibility of the Army ends
requirements imposed by military necessity
with the delivery of the product to the
and the requirements for technical efficiency.
Navy or Air Force base perimeter.
The concern of the physical security officer is
the defense of these terminals. It may be that (f) Use of secondary all-weather roads
he will have no voice in their selection; how- to support construction of the pipelines
491
and to facilitate their securit y, supply, cal security officer should stress these advan-
and maintenance. tages and recommend burial when practica-
ble. As an alternative, all possible means of
(g) Maximum use of cover and conceal-
ment consistent with other criteria. cover and camouflage must be recommended.
If burial is accomplished, it should be at a
(h) Avoidance of such natural obstacles depth sufficient for protection against small
and barriers as swamps and rivers. arms fire or fire from any aircraft called in for
Avoidance of urban and industial spraying (par f, next). It should also protect
areas and other potential profitable tar- the pipe and tanks from aircraft or mortar
gets. Pipelines should not parallel op- flares falling to the ground before burnout.
crating railroads; neither should they be
laid near railroads used by coal-burning
locomotives, unless there is no other f. The physical security officer should co-
place to locate them. ordinate with appropriate agencies for air
surveillance of pipeline systems. He should
(i) Compatibility, as required and feasi-
arrange for helibome night illumination
ble, with post-hostilities requirements when required. He should arrange for air-
and plans. strikes on call to “spray” particular portions
d. Pump stations are vital elements in the of the system area when essential to drive off
pipeline system. Not only do they push the saboteurs. Plans for such actions must be
products through the pipeline, they also feed carefully made to preclude damage to the sys-
the pipeline and may be used to transfer fuel tem or injury to friendly forces or innocent
between tanks and supply dispensing out- civilians.
lets. The location and spacing of pump sta-
tions depends upon the hydraulic design of g. Arms and equipment for security forces
the pipeline and the topographic features of vary according to the tactical level of intensi-
the pipeline route. Location and spacing also ty, the prevailing situation, opposition antici-
depend upon the type and properties of the pated or experienced, and similar factors.
fuel to be pumped, operating characteristics Radio communications are essential, and
of the pumping units selected, and the fric- should be tied in with all available support-
tion head losses for the selected size of pipe. ing forces in the area.
In addition, spacing of stations must take
into account effective control and mainte- h. Finally, the physical security officer
nance of the line and efficient administra- must be aware and alert for changes in the
tion of the troop units that build and operate type and density of the population in areas
it. Underground shelter should be provided, adjacent to pipeline systems. The need for
when practicable, to protect personnel civic action requires coordination with ap-
propriate military and civilian authorities
against attack.
for the education of local populations in the
e. An important consideration for security importance of the pipeline to their welfare.
is the question of whether the pipeline should It should address the dangers to them if they
or should not be buried. Also to be con- interfere with its operation. This is particu-
sidered is whether tanks should be buried, or larly important when rapid population
covered with earth or other protective cover- growth is observed, such as the springing up
ing. (Note: Standard lightweight steel tubing of new refugee hamlets or villages in the vi-
is not normally buried. Standard weight pipe cinity. The reasons for such growth must be
is required for burying.) The advantage of analyzed. Any indication that it is connected
burying pipe and tanks is greater security, with access to the pipeline for pilferage or
concealment from aerial observation, and re- other such activities should be investigated
duced maintenance requirements. The physi- thoroughly.
492
Figure U-1 Mode selection
493
Figure U-2. Classes of supply.
494
Appendix V
References
Army Regulations (ARs)

1-4 Employment of Department of Army Resources in Support of the
United States Secret Service
10-5 Department of the Army
10-6 Branches of the Army
10-23 United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
18-7 Data Processing Installation Management, Procedures, and
Standards
20-1 Inspector General Activities and Procedures
20-3 Superseded by AR 190-53, Interception of Wire and Oral
Communications for Law Enforcement Purposes.
27-40 Litigation
36-75 Audit Procedures for Nonappropriated, Trusts, and Other Official
Funds Other Than Army Club Systems
37-103 Finance and Accounting for Installations; Disbursing Operations
40-2 Army Medical Treatment Facilities General Administration
40-3 Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care
40-61 Medical Logistics Policies and Procedures
40-202 Assignment and Utilization of Army Medical Department Person-
nel
50-5 Nuclear Surety
50-6 Chemical Surety Program
55-16 Movement of Cargo by Air and Surface-Including Less Than
Release Unit and Parcel Post Shipments
55-29 Military Convoy Operations in CONUS
495
55-38 Reporting of Transportation Discrepancies in Shipments
55-55 Transportation of Radioactive and Fissile Materials Other Than
Weapons
55-162 Permits for Oversize, Overweight, or Other Special Military
Movements on Public Highways in the United States
55-203 Movement of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Components, and Related
Classified Nonnuclear Materiel
55-228 Transportation by Water of Explosives and Hazardous Cargo
55-355 Military Traffic Management Regulation
59-11 Army Use of Logistics Airlift (LOGAIR)
70-1 Army Research Development and Acquisition
95-27 Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Dangerous Materials
190-5 Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision
190-10 Security of Government Officials
190-11 Physical security of Weapons, Ammunition, and Explosives
190-12 Military Police Working Dogs
190-13 The Army Physical Security Program
190-14 Carrying of Firearms
190-18 Physical Security of US Army Museums
190-21 Security Identification Credentials and Application
190-22 Search, Seizure and Disposition of Property
190-28 Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and
Security Duties
190-40 Serious Incident Report
190-45 Records and Forms
190-49 Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives In-
Transit
190-50 Physical Security for Storage of Controlled Medical Substances
and Other Medically Sensitive Items
190-53 Interception of Wire and Oral Communications for Law
Enforcement Purposes.
195-2 Criminal Investigation Activities
210-10 Administration
220-5 Designation, Classification, and Change in Status of Units
220-58 Organization and Training for Chemical, Biological, and Radiolog-
ical Defense Operations
230-1 The Nonappropriated Fund System
230-6 Amusement Machines
230-7 Auditing Services and Audit Compliance for Open Messes,
Revenue—Producing Funds, and Other Sundry Funds
230-9 Internal Controls
230-65 Nonappropriated Funds Accounting Procedures for Revenue
Producing Sundry and Welfare Funds
310-1 Publications, Blank Forms, and Printing Management
310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms
310-31 Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment
(The TOE System)
496
310-49 The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS)
310-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
340-1 Records Management Program
340-3 Official Mail
340-16 Safeguarding for “Official Use Only” Information
350-4 Qualification and Familiarization With Weapons and Weapons
Systems
360-5 Public Information Policies
380-5 Department of the Army Supplement to DOD 5200.1-R
380-20 Restricted Areas
380-25 Foreign Visitors
380-55 Safeguarding Defense Information in the Movement of Persons
and Things
385-40 Accident Reporting and Records
385-55 Prevention of Motor Vehicle Accidents
385-63 Regulations for Firing Ammunition for Training, Target Practice,
and Combat
385-80 Nuclear Reactor Health and Safety Program
405-20 Federal Legislative Jurisdiction
405-25 Annexation
420-70 Buildings and Structures
420-90 Fire Prevention and Protection
500-50 Civil Disturbances
500-60 Disaster Relief
500-70 Military Support of Civil Defense
570-2 Organization and Equipment Authorization Tables-Personnel
570-4 Manpower Management
600-40 Apprehension, Restraint, and Release to Civil Authorities
604-5 Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Informa-
tion and Material
606-5 Personnel Identification: Identification Cards, Tags, and Badges
614-3 Assignment of Military Personnel to Presidential Support Activi-
ties
670-5 Male Personnel
670-10 Furnishing Uniforms or Paying Uniform Allowances to Civilian
Employees
(0)700 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Materiel
-65
710-2 Materiel Management for Using Units, Support Units, and
Installations
740-7 Safeguarding of Sensitive, Drug Abuse Control, and Pilferable
DSA Items of Supply
DA Pamphlets
27-21 Military Administrative Law Handbook
570-4 Manpower Procedures Handbook
497
Field Manuals (FMs)
3-8 Chemical Reference Handbook
3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
3-15 Nuclear Accident Contamination Control
3-21 Chemical-Biological Contamination and Control
5-15 Field Fortification
7-10 The Rifle Company, Platoon and Squads
9-6 Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations
9-38 Conventional Ammunition Unit Operations
9-47 Special Ammunition Unit Operations
19-1 Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades
19-4 Military Police Support, Theater of Operations
19-5 The Military Police Handbook
19-15 Civil Disturbances
19-20 Law Enforcement Investigations
19-25 Military Police Traffic Operations
19-35 Military Police Working Dogs
20-20 Basic Care and Training of Military Dogs
20-32 Mine Countermine Operations at the Company Level
21-6 How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training
21-11 First Aid for Soldiers
21-15 Care and Use of Individual Clothing and Equipment
21-40 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense
21-41 Individual Defense (NBC)
21-48 Planning and Conducting Chemical, Biological, Radiological;
(CBR), and Nuclear Defense Training
21-150 Combative
22-5 Drill and Ceremonies
22-6 Guard Duty
22-100 Military Leadership
23-9 M16A1 Rifle and Rifle Marksmanship
23-35 Pistols and Revolvers
30-15 Intelligence Interrogation
31-36 Night Operations
(Test)
31-50 Combat in a Fortified and Builtup Area
31-85 Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations
55-17 Terminal Operations Specialist Handbook
55-30 Army Motor Transport Operations
55-70 Army Transportation Container Operations
101-5 Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure
Training Circulars (TCs)

7-1 The Rifle Squad (Mechanized and Light Infantry) (How to Fight)
7-3 The Rifle Platoon
498
Technical Manuals (TMs)
3-220 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamina-
tion
5-225 Radiological and Disaster Recovery at Fixed Military Instal-
lations
5-315 Firefighting and Rescue Procedures in Theaters of Opera-
tions
5-805-8 Building Construction Materials and Practices: Builder’s
Hardware
5-820-4 Drainage and Erosion Control: Drainage for Areas Other
Than Airfields
5-830-3 Planting: Dust Control
5-6350-262 Appropriate to Installed Joint-Service Interior Intrusion
-Series Devices System
9-1300-214 Military Explosives
9-Series Appropriate to Assigned Weapons
11-Series Appropriate to Assigned Communications Equipment
21-300 Driver Selection and Training (Wheeled Vehicles)
55-311 Motor Convoy Security in Stability Operations
55-312 Military Convoy Operations in CONUS
55-602 Movement of Special Freight
Technical Bulletins
MED 291 Guidance for Inventory, Control, and Accountability of Drugs
and Injection Devices of Potential Abuse at Medical Treat-
ment Facilities Worldwide
5-6350-262 Selection and Application of Joint-Service Interior Intrusion
Devices System
DOD Regulations and Manuals

4160.21-M Defense Disposal Manual
4500.32-R Vol I - Military Standard Transportation and Movement
Procedures
4500.32-R Vol II - Military Standard Transportation and Movement
Procedures-Transportation Account Codes (TACS)
5200.1-R (DOD) Information Security Program Regulation
5200.28-M Manual of Techniques and Procedures for Implementing,
Deactivating, Testing, and Evaluating-Secure Resource-
Sharing ADP Systems
499
Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP)
19-97 Military Police Physical Security Company
Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE)

19-97G Military Police Physical Security Company
19-97H4 Military Police Physical Security Company
Miscellaneous
9 (MCM) Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised)
International Standardization Agreements

(STANAG) and Standard of Operations and
Logistics Agreements (SOLOG)
2041 Operational Road Movement Orders, Tables, and Graphs
(SOLOG No. 51)
2042 Method of Challenging by Guards and Sentries
2047 Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (SOLOG No. 110)
2079 Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control
2154 Definitions and Regulations for Military Motor
Movements by Road
2155 Road Movements and Transport Documents
2158 Identification of Military Trains
500
Preface
Introduction through local command levels (AR 190-13).

These are as follows:
● Law Enforcement Division, Deputy Chief
This field manual sets forth guidance for all
people responsible for physical security. It’s of Staff for Personnel—DA policy and proce-
the basic reference for training security dures, Army-wide guidance, assistance, and
personnel. It also covers requesting addition- development of physical security equipment.
● Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence—
al equipment and manpower.
assessment of counterintelligence in physical
The two primary concerns of this manual security plans and programs.
● Chief of Engineers—final technical review
are prevention and protection. Both serve the
security interest of people, equipment, and and approval of plans and specifications for
property. To be most effective, this interest installing intrusion detection systems esti-
must be supported at all staff and command mated to cost more than $5,000.
● Local Commanders—all reasonable pre-
levels. This support must be unified.
cautions are taken to safeguard the people
and property of their commands. Each
commander must designate a physical securi-
Physical Security ty manager to plan, formulate, and coordi-
Responsibilities nate physical security matters (AR 190-13). In
short, the physical security manager formu-
Major responsibilities in physical security lates the plan; supervises physical security
exist at Department of the Army (DA) inspections, coordinates required support
iv
(personnel and equipment); and reviews all Physical security is only part of the overall
plans for new construction or modification to defense of an installation. Defense against
insure all possible physical security safe- direct enemy attack and natural disasters
guards are built in, and deficiencies eliminat- must be blended into a system that includes
ed or minimized. Normally, he is also respon- physical security. This blended effort begins
sible for physical security education with planning.
programs for all personnel (chapter 3).
It is not economically possible or theoreti-
cally necessary for installations and activi-
ties of every kind and character to achieve the
Arrangement of This Manual same degree of protection. How much protec-
tion is warranted in any particular case
You will find the arrangement, of this depends on certain factors. If the installation
manual different from that of the previous is highly critical and highly vulnerable, an
FM 19-30. It should make physical security extensive physical security program is neces-
easier to understand and easier to apply. sary.
There is a brief introduction to each major
area; and critical points are highlighted All military installations are valuable in
throughout for rapid review or scanning for some degree to the national defense structure.
important items. The guidance permits you Some are more valuable than others. To
the flexibility so critical to effective applica- determine the degree of importance, the effect
tion (based on location, size of installation, of partial or complete loss must be calculated.
etc.). There are also new checklists for If the influence on the national defense effort
standard security operations in CONUS and is great, then criticality y is high. Within each
overseas. installation, certain facilities are essential to
the mission of that installation. Facilities
such as primary and auxiliary power sources
How To Use It are highly critical.
Because of the monetary and manpower

This manual is to be used with the policy, costs of physical protection, many com-
doctrine, and training set forth in those manders will not be able to achieve maximum
references listed in appendix V. protection for the entire installation or
activity. Therefore, the specific criticality and
vulnerability of various areas must be deter-
Considerations mined, and available resources divided ac-
cordingly. Special protection is thus provided
for the most critical and vulnerable areas,
Perfect or absolute security is always our while areas of less importance and suscepti-
goal. However, a state of absolute security bility are given less protection.
can never be attained. There is no object so
well protected that it cannot be stolen, A highly critical area is one in which
damaged, destroyed, or observed by un- partial or complete loss would have an
friendly eyes. The purpose, then, of physical immediate and serious impact on the ability
security is to make access so difficult that an of an installation or activity to perform its
intruder will hesitate to attempt penetration, mission for a considerable time. The relative
or to provide for his apprehension should he criticality of such an area may have no direct
be successful. Security must be built upon a relationship to its size or whether it produces
system of defense in depth or upon accumu- an end product. This must be determined
lated delay time. upon the basis of its importance to the
v
installation or activity as a whole. finance, and many other operations. They
are, in greater or lesser measure and with any
Vulnerability depends on the hazards that necessary modifications, applicable to virtu-
could cause sufficient loss, damage, or de- ally any physical security situation.
struction to influence operation of the activity
or installation. If one or more hazards exist This manual contains doctrine appli-
that could easily achieve this result, relative cable to the security manager and to the
vulnerability is high. As it becomes more guard. There is no need for the guard to know
unlikely that existing hazards will interfere the procedures needed to obtain personnel
with the mission, vulnerability becomes low- and equipment. However, the manager—and
er. to a lesser degree, the supervisor—must have
this knowledge at his disposal to properly
support and train all security personnel.
Applicability The techniques described in the following
chapters can be readily adapted to a host of
All of the general considerations previously systems to be secured. But remember, physi-
discussed are equally applicable to units and cal safeguards, like tactical barriers for
other operations. They are applicable to port defense, require the backing of a trained and
and harbor security; to docks and wharves; to alert (security) force. Also, there must be
security escort operations; to POL distribu- proper execution of administrative/opera-
tion methods, including pipelines; to postal, tional checks and procedural safeguards.
vi
Index
Access Central system, par. 7-22c, p. 108

Cargo, par. I-56, p. 363 Commercial Alarm Monitor Interface
Commissaries, par. J-1, p. 366 (CAMI), par. 7-31b, p. 115
Computer facilities, par. 11-1b, (4)(a), p. 200
Enforcement, par. 4-11f, p. 52
False, par. 7-36a(12), p. 129
Identification systems, pars. 4-3 thru 4-9,
Local audible, par. 7-19, p. 106; par. 7-22a,
pp. 49 and 50
p. 108
Implementation, par. 4-10c, p. 50
Military police station, par. 13-7b, p. 224
Public, par. 16-5, p. 251; par. 16-12, p. 254
Propriety system, par. 7-22d, p. 109
Responsibility, par. 4-3b, p. 49; par. 15-2,
Purpose, par. 7-19, p. 106
p. 241
Report systems, par. 7-22, p. 108
Rosters, par. 4-16, p. 54; par. 15-15c, p. 242
Special Application Alarm Monitor Sys-
tem (SAAMS), par. 7-31d, p. 116
Accountability
Special nuclear facilities, par. 15-6, p. 243
Badges, par. 4-10c, p. 51 Testing, par. 13-7a, p. 224
Commanders, par. A-11, p. 279
Mail items, par. N-7, p. 383 Analysis, ch. 17, p. 263
Seals, par. 12-22, p. 214
Inspections, sec. I, p. 264
Items and functions, par. 1-6a, p. 6
Alarms
Probability of theft, par. 1-6c, p. 6
Alarm Line Security Attachment (ALSA), Range of loss, par. 1-6d, p. 6
par. 7-31c, p. 115 Risks, par. 1-6, p. 6
Auxiliary system, par. 7-22b, p. 108 Surveys and evaluations, sec. II, p. 265
AR 50-5, pars. 7-37a(2) and c(2), p. 133 Targets, par. B-6, p. 287
AR 190-11, par. 7-38a, p. 134; par. 7-38f, Vulnerability, par. 1-6b, p. 6
p. 135 Vulnerability tests, par. 17-11, p. 266
Cargo, during shipment, par. 12-19, p. 212 See also Evaluation and Inspection
501
Anchorage security Awareness (ref. AR 190-13)
Anchor chain collar, par. 10-9b, p. 193 Personnel, par. 2-5, p. 10
Shipboard guards, par. 10-9a, p. 192 Shippers, par. 12-9, p. 209
Supervisor, par. 2-5, p. 10
Army Corps of Engineers (see Construction
projects) Badges
Exchange of badges and cards, par. 48,
Areas
p. 50
Area layout, fig. 10, p. 65 Multiple badge use, par. 4-9, p. 50
Compartmentalization, fig. 9, p. 64 Responsibility, par. 4-11h, p. 52
Depot complex, fig. 8, p. 63 Single badges, par. 4-7, p. 50
Other considerations, par. 4-23, p. 60 Specifications, par. 4-10, p. 50
Restricted, par. 4-21, p. 58 System, par. 4-6, p. 50
Temporary tactical exclusion area, fig. 7,
p. 62 Barriers
Temporary tactical restricted area, fig. 7,
Benefits, par. 5-1, p. 67
p. 61 Building face, par. 6-7b, p. 89
Types of restricted areas, par. 4-22, p. 58
Considerations, par. 5-2, p. 67
Controlled, par. 4-22d(3), p. 60
Construction, par. 5-6d, p. 73
Exclusion, par. 4-22d(1), p. 60
Fences (see Fences)
Limited, par. 4-22d(2), p. 60
Other perimeter barriers, par. 5-6, p. 72
Signs, par. 4-21, p. 59
Positive barriers, par. 5-3, p. 67
Protective barriers, ch. 5, p. 66
Arms facility structural standards, ch. 5,
Utility openings, par. 5-5, p. 71
sec. II, p. 79
See also Physical security plan, par. 4a,
p. 315
Arms Room Security checklist, app. Q, p. 384
Base Installation Security System (BISS),
ARTEP 19-97 (see Security force basic train-
ing) see IDS
Bomb threats, app. D, p. 297

Assessment of security posture, par. 1-3, p. 3
Bombs as terrorist weapons, par. E-4, p. 303
Resource criticality, par. 1-3a, p. 3 Countermeasures, par. D-2, p. 298
Resource vulnerability, par. 1-3b, p. 3 Definitions, par. D-1, p. 298
Handling bombs, par. B-10, p. 291; par. D-3,
Audit procedures (employee theft), par. A-9, p. 299
p. 276 Threat telephone checklist, par. D-3d,
p. 300
Authority and jurisdiction, par. 9-2, p. 156 See also Sabotage, Terrorism and Threats
Guard forces over US Merchant Seamen,
par. 10-6, p. 188 Bridges, railway, pars. U-22 and U-23, p. 482
Protection of designated individuals, par.
14-1, p. 229 Budgeting
Command operating budget estimate
(COBE), par. 2-11, p. 12
502
Concepts, par. 2-10, p. 12 Pilferage, pars. 12-3 and 12-4, p. 207
Directors, Major activity, par. 2-15, p. 16 Precautions during shipments, par. I-6,
Execution, par. 2-16, p. 18 p. 364
First-half-year data, par. 2-17, p. 19 Protective security measures, par. 12-17,
Formulation, par. 2-13, p. 14 p. 212
Objectives, par. 2-9, p. 12 Protective security service (PSS), par.
Program budget advisory committee 12-12, p. 211
(PBAC), par. 2-14, p. 14 Recovery cargo, par. I-3, p. 361
Purpose, par. 2-12, p. 11 Seal accountability, par. 12-22, p. 214
Sample request, sec. II, p. 20 Seals, pars. 12-20 thru 12-25, pp. 213 thru
Special equipment funding request, p. 27 216
Sensitivity, par. 12-16, p. 212; par. 12-31,
Cargo p. 219
Shipment, par. I-4, p. 362
Alarm devices during shipments, par.
Special cargo security considerations, par.
12-19, p. 212 12-8, p. 209
Areas vulnerable to manipulation, par. Stacking as added security, par. 10-8g,
12-6, p. 209
p. 191
Surveillance by armed guards, par. 12-13,
Cardpac, par. I-1, p. 361 p. 211
Carrier protective services, par. 12-11, Theft during shipment/storage, par. 12-5,
p. 210 p. 208
Considerations, par. 12-1, p. 207
Consignee management, par. I-2, p. 361 Cashiers
Container security operations, par. 10-8, Cash register procedures, par. J-8, p. 367
p. 189
Cash registers in consumer outlets,
Marshaling yard entry/exit, par.
A-14b(2), p. 283
10-8d(1), p. 190
Cashiers at finance and accounting offices,
Pedestrian control points, par. 10-8d(3),
par. M-3, p. 378
p. 191
Vehicle control points, par. 10-8d(3), Civil works projects (see Construction
p. 190 projects)
Documentation, par. 10-7, p. 189
Firearms during shipments, Use of, par. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), app L,
12-29, p. 218 p. 373
Guards for shipments overseas, par. 12-30,
p. 218 General operation, par. L-3, p. 374
Intangible losses, par. 12-10, p. 209 IDS, Use with, par. 7-27, p. 111
Legal considerations of cargo escort
guards, par. 12-26, p. 216 Commissaries, app J, p. 365
Management controls on cargo, par. 12-9,
Construction, par. J-2, p. 366 (also see
p. 209
Construction criteria)
Packing, marking, and addressing, par.
Controlled areas, par. J-1, p. 366 (also see
12-18, p. 212
Areas and Control)
Perimeter security, par. 10-8f, p. 191
Entrances, par. J-3, p. 366
Physical security plan, par. 12-2, p. 207
Incoming items, par. J-6, p. 367
Store configuration, par. J-5, p. 367
503
Communications Primary plans, par. 2a, p. 407
References, par. 3, p. 407
Alternate system, par. 7-25, p. 110
Sample plan/order, p. 407; fig. Q-2, p. 411
Data transmissions, par. 7-21, p. 108; par.
Secondary plans, par. 2d, p. 407
7-37c, p. 133
Primary system, par. 7-24, p. 110 Tactical Deployment Chart, fig. Q-1, p. 409
Signal transmission lines, par. 7-23, p. 109 See also Planning
Wiring, inspecting, and testing, par. 7-26,
p. 111 Control
See also Closed circuit television, J-SIIDS,
and Sensors Cash control (see Finance and accounting)
Computers, Through use of, par. 4-20, p. 56
Computer security, ch. 11, p. 197 Container seals, par. 10-8i, p. 192
Control units (see IDS)
Electric power, par. 11-1b(2), p. 198 Controlled areas in commissaries, par. J-1,
Emergency power, par. 11-1b(3), p. 199 p. 366
Five steps to computer security, fig. 77, Controlled lighting, par. 6-6a(2), p. 86
p. 205 Entry, par. 15-5c, p. 242
Physical protection, par. 11-1, p. 198 Hospitals, ch. 13, p. 220; circulation, par.
Procedures and control, par. 11-3, p. 202 13-3, p. 222
Program, par. 11-8, p. 204 Locks and keys, (see Lock and Key Sys-
Security measures, par. 11-1b(1), p. 198 tems)
System integrity, par. 11-2, p. 201 Materiel (see Physical security plan)
Personnel movement, par. 4-1a, b, p. 48
Construction criteria Sign and countersign, par. 4-13, p. 53
Arms storage ceilings, par. 5-16, p. 80 Signs, par. 16-20, p. 260
Arms storage floor standards, par. 5-17, Stations, (see Entry)
p. 80 Structures, par. 16-10, p. 253
Arms storage windows and entrances, par. Substances (see Hospital security)
5-18, p. 80 Two-man rule, par. 4-17, p. 55
Medical items, par. 13-17, p. 227 Visitors, par. 4-12, p. 52
Protective barriers, (see Barriers,
construction) Convoys, Trains, and Pipelines, app.
U, p. 465
Construction projects, ch. 16, p. 248 Convoys, sec. I, p. 466
Buildings and vehicles, par. 16-19d, p. 259 Pipelines, sec. III, p. 488
Planning, sec. 11, p. 249 Trains, sec. II, p. 481
Site security considerations, par. 16-19b,
p. 259
Tool and equipment security, par. 16-19c, Counterterrorism (see Terrorism)
p. 259
Crime
Containers (see Cargo)
Crime scene protection (computer
incidents), par. 11-4, p. 202
Contingency plans, app. Q, p. 406
Assistance to investigators, par. 11-6,
Computers, par. 11-7, p. 204 p. 203
Hydroelectric plants, par. 16-25, p. 262 Personnel at scene, par. 11-5, p. 203
Personal security of designated individu- Education in security (see Education)
als, par. 14-4, p. 231 Prevention of crime, par. 3-8, p. 44
504
Custodians, special nuclear materials, par. Entrances
15-8, p. 245
Entry control stations, par. 5-10, p. 77
Installation and activity entrances, par.
Dams (see Hydroelectric power plants)
5-9, p. 75
Dead bolt latches (see Keys and locks)
Equipment
Design of structures Game wardens, par. H-5, p. 358
Computer facility, par. 11-1a, p. 198 Justification for security equipment, par.
Crash beams, par. 5-9, p. 75; figs. 19,20,and 2-25, p. 40
21, pp. 75 and 76 Security forces, miscellaneous equipment,
Guard posts, par. 5-9b, fig. 22, p. 77 par. 9-29, p. 177
Mailrooms, par. N-2, p. 381
Primary/ alternate entrances to an Escorts
installation, par. 5-9b, figs. 20 and 21, Cargo escort functions, par. 12-28, p. 217
p. 76 Cargo shipments, guard/escort instruc-
Security force towers, par. 5-7, p. 74 tions, par. 12-27, p. 217
See also Construction criteria Communication, par. K-2b, p. 370
Protective actions, par. K-3, p. 371
Detect pilferage (see Pilferage) Public funds, par. K-1, p. 370
Use of escorts, par. 4-15, p. 54
Detection (see Intrusion detection systems) See also Convoys
Devices, Locking (see Locks and keys)
Espionage, app C, p. 293
Dogs, Use of patrol and marihuana dogs
Control measures, par. C-4, p. 295
(hospitals), par. 13-5, p. 222
Sources, par. C-2, p. 294
Duress sensors, par. 7-15, p. 103; par. What do they want?, par. C-3, p. 295
7-33c(9)(f), p. 123 Why, par. C-1, p. 294
Estimates (see Planning pre-occupational

Duties of guard forces (see Security force phase)
duties)
Education Evaluation
Cargo shipments, par. I-5, p. 363 Installation security posture, par. 1-3a(2),
Graphic media aid support, par. 3-6, p. 44 p. 3; par. 17-10, p. 266
Program formulation, par. 3-2, p. 43 Planning and implementation results, par.
Program objectives, par. 3-3, p. 43 2-7, p. 10
Program of instruction, par. 3-9, p. 45 Security risks, par. 1-7, p. 6
Requirements, par. 3-4, p. 43 See also Analysis, Inspection, and Surveys
Scheduling and testing, par. 3-10, p. 46
Explosives (see Sabotage)
Engineers (see Barriers, Lighting, Nuclear,
Planning and Construction)
Facility Intrusion Detection System (see
IDS)
505
153-846 O - 94 - 23
Fences Floodlights (see Lighting)
Barbed tape, par. 5-4d, p. 69
Forces (see Security force)
Barbed wire, par. 5-4b, p. 68
Civil works projects, par. 16-3f, p. 250
Game warden, app H, p. 357
Concertina, par. 5-4c, p. 69
Fence design criteria, par. 5-4, pp. 67 thru Equipment (also see Equipment), par. H-5,
71 p. 358
Tanglefoot wire, par. 5-4h, p. 71 Isolated areas, par. H-3, p. 358
Top guard, par. 5-4e, p. 70 Natural disasters, par. H-2, p. 258
Types of fence Pilferage, par. H-4, p. 358 (see also Pil-
Chain-link, par. 5-4a, p. 68 ferage)
Field perimeter fence, par. 5-4g, p. 71 Routine observation, par. H-6, p. 259
See also Barriers Security awareness, par. H-7, p. 359 (see
also Awareness)
Finance and Accounting, app M, p. 377 Sign use, par. H-1, p. 258
Cash controls, par. M-2, p. 378
Cashiers, par. M-3, p. 378 Gates
Class A agents, par. M-4, p. 379
Locks, keys, and combinations, par. M-6, Entrances (see Entrances)
Number required for an installation, par.
p. 379
5-4f, p. 71
Security of blank checks and savings
bonds, par. M-5, p. 379
Glossary of terms (see Terms)
Firearms, par. 9-27, p. 176
Grade change, civilian guard, par. 2-22,
Control, par. 9-27b, p. 176 p. 38
Emergency use, par. 9-27d, p. 176
Inspection, par. 9-27c, p. 176 Guards (see Escort guards and Security
Personal security of designated persons, forces)
par. 14-5b, p. 234
Use during cargo shipments, par. 12-29, Guidelines, basic, par. 17-1, p. 264
p. 218
Harbor (see Port and harbor security)
Fire prevention
Hospitals, ch. 13, p. 220
Alarms (see Alarms and Detectors)
Extinguishers, par. 11-1b(4)(b), p. 200 Circulation control, par. 13-3, p. 222
Firefighting teams, par. 11-1b(4)(c), p. 200 Controlled substances and medically sen-
sitive items, par. 13-10, p. 225 (also see
Fixed installation exterior, perimeter sensor Control)
system (see IDS) Dogs, Use of, par. 13-5, p. 222
Emergency treatment, par. 13-15, p. 226
Floating plants Lighting, par. 13-4, p. 222 (see also Pro-
Other security considerations, par. 16-16d, tective lighting)
p. 256 Patients’ personal property, par. 13-13,
Security measures, par. 16-16b, p. 256 p. 226
Types, par. 16-16a, p. 256 Provost marhsal/security officer, par. 13-2,
Vessel damage/larceny prevention, par. p. 221
16-16c, p. 256 Security checks, par. 13-16, p. 226
506
Security coverage, par. 13-1, p. 221 Intangible losses (see Pilferage)
Support hospitals, par. 13-19, p. 227
Integration, System, par. 735, p. 128
Hydroelectric power plants
Intransit security (see Transportation securi-
Critical/sensitive functional areas, par.
ty and Convoys)
16-4, p. 251
Dam control structures, par. 16-10, p. 253
Guard forces, par. 16-9, p. 253 Intrusion detection systems, ch. 7, p. 92
Protective lighting, par. 16-11, p. 254 Alarm report system, par. 7-22, p. 108
Public access, par. 16-5, p. 251 Application, chart I, p. 413
Security measures, par. 16-6, p. 251 Arms rooms, par. 7-38, p. 134
Commercial IDS equipment, par. 7-38h,
Identification, sec. I, p. 48 p. 135
Employee screening, par. 4-2, p. 48; par. Daily log of alarms, par. 7-38f, p. 135
13-8, p. 224 Installers and maintainers, par. 7-38d,
ID system, par. 4-3, p. 49 p. 134
Mechanized/automated systems, par. 4-20, J-SIIDS, par. 7-38c, p. 134
p. 56 Structures, par. 7-38a, p. 134
Media, Use of, par. 4-4, p. 49 Transmission lines, par. 7-38g, p. 135
Purpose, par. 4-1, p. 48 Base and Installation Security Systems
System types, par. 4-5, p. 49 (see also (BISS), par. 7-34, p. 124
Badges) Control unit, par. 7-17, p. 104
Facility Intrusion Detection System
Incident reporting (see Terrorism) (FIDS), par. 7-32, p. 118
FIDS certified use, par. 7-32f, p. 120
In-service training (see Security forces) Fixed Installation Exterior Perimeter Sen-
sor System (FIEPSS), par. 7-33, p. 120
Inspections Hospitals, par. 13-7, p. 224
Hydroelectric power plants, par. 16-7,
Arms rooms checklist, app. O, p. 384 p. 253
Conducting, par. 17-5, p. 265 Joint Service Interior Intrusion Detection
Coordination, par. 17-2, p. 264 System (J-SIIDS), par. 7-29, p. 112
Defective locks, par. 8-11, p. 152 J-SIIDS components, par. 7-30, p. 113; add-
Entrance interviews, par. 17-4, p. 264 ables, par. 7-31, p. 114
Exit interviews, par. 17-6, p. 265 Local audible alarm, par. 7-19, p. 106 (see
Library, par. 17-3, p. 264 also Alarms)
Narcotics and controlled drugs checklist, Maintenance, par. 7-39, p. 135
p. 223 Monitor unit, par. 7-18, p. 106
Reports, DA Forms 2806, par. 17-7, p. 265; Necessity and feasibility, par. 7-5, p. 94
fig. T-6, pp. 428 and 429 Nuclear reactor facilities, par. 15-6, p. 243
See also Analysis, Evaluation, and Sur- Nuclear storage use of IDS, par. 7-37, p. 132
veys, and Convoys Basic electronic security system, par.
7-37a, p. 132
Installations Control/data transmission, par. 7-37c,
Entry, par. 5-9, p. 75; par. 5-10, p. 77 p. 133
Perimeter roads and clear zones, par. 5-12, Interior sensor equipment, par. 7-37b,
p. 78 p. 133
Records, par. 7-37d, p. 134
507
Operation, Principles of, par. 7-4, p. 94 Types, par. 6-6, p. 86
Perimeter detection, par. 7-28, p. 112 Wiring, par. 6-8, p. 90
Point sensor, par. 7-16, p. 104
Purposes, par. 7-3, p. 93 Lock and key systems, ch. 8, p. 137
Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor
Ammunition storage, par. 8-9, p. 150
System (REMBASS), par. 7-36, p. 128
Signal transmission lines, par. 7-23, p. 109 Commissaries, par. J-9, p. 368
(see also Data transmission lines) Dead bolt latches, par. 8-5, p. 146
Systems, selection, pars. 7-6 thru 7-14, pp. Finance and accounting offices, par. M-6,
94 thru 103 p. 379
Technical review and approval, par. 7-2, Hospitals, par. 13-6, p. 223
p. 93 Implementation, par. 8-8, p. 151
Telephone dialer, par. 7-20, p. 106 Installation and maintenance, par. 8-1,
p. 138
Vibration detection, par. 7-10, p. 97
Issue and control, par. 8-6, p. 148
Jurisdiction Key control officer, par. 8-7, p. 149
Lock picking, par. 8-4, p. 145
Counterterrorism reactions planning, Lock security, understanding, par. 8-3,
par. E-7, p. 304 p. 139
Over persons, par. 9-2b, p. 156 Locking devices, par. 8-2, p. 138
Place of jurisdiction, par. 9-2a, p. 156 Mailrooms, unit, par. N-4, p. 382
Narcotics and controlled drugs, par. 13-6,
Justification p. 223
Guard personnel changes, par. 2-24, p. 39; Nuclear storage, par. 8-10, p. 152
par. 2-25, p. 40 Special nuclear material, par. 15-7, p. 244
Security equipment, p. 2-25, p. 40
Mailboxes, par. N-5, p. 382
Key control officer (see Locks and Keys)
Mailrooms, app. N, sec. I, p. 381
Library, par. 17-3, p. 264
Emergencies, par. N-8, p. 383
Lighting, protective, ch. 6, p. 82 Operation, par. N-3, p. 381
Responsibility, par. N-1, p. 381
Arms storage, par. 6-4h, p. 84 Safes, par. N-9, p. 383
Characteristics, par. 6-2, p. 83 Security, par. N-6, p. 383
Commander’s responsibility, par. 6-3,
p. 83 Management
Hospitals, par. 13-4, p. 222
Limited and exclusion areas, par. Installation, sec. III, p. 13
6-4g, p. 84 Planning, programing, and budgeting,
Maintenance, par. 6-9, p. 90 ch. 2, p. 8
Nuclear reactor facilities, par.15-11, p. 246 Responsibilities, par. 9-21, p. 171
Other locations, par. 6-4i, p. 85 See also Budgeting
Other uses, par. 6-7, p. 88
Planning, par. 6-4, p. 84 Manpower
Power sources, par. 6-10, p. 90 Guidance, par. 2-8, p. 12
Principles, par. 6-5, p. 85 Management, par. 2-20, p. 38 (see also
Requirements, par. 6-1, p. 83 Management)
508
Procedures, sec. V, p. 36 Mission accomplishment and responsibili-
Requirements, par. 2-21, p. 39; par. 9-4b, ty, par. 14-2, p. 229
p. 160 Mission orientation, par. 14-5, p. 232
Planning, par. 14-4, p. 231 (see also Contin-
Material control (see Control) gency plans, )
Principles, par. 14-3, p. 230
Meat disposal, par. J-7, p. 367 Special requirements, par. 14-6, p. 234
Techniques of protection, par. 14-7, p. 236
Medical sensitive items (see Hospitals)
Personnel
Monitor units (see IDS)
Change justification, par. 2-24, p. 39
Motor vehicles, par. A-13, p. 281 Justification for additional security per-
sonnel, par. 2-25, p. 40
Movement control, ch. 4, p. 47 (see also Movements, par. 4-1, p. 48 (see also Identifi-
Identification) cation)
Position changes, par. 2-22, p. 38
Proponent-initiated changes, par. 2-23, p.
Multiple card or badge (see Badges)
39
Security personnel at entry and exit points,
Natural disasters
par. 4-19, p. 56
Game warden’s assessment, par. H-2, Selection, par. 9-3, p. 157 (see also Security
p. 358 forces)
See also Threats Staffing guides, pars. 2-26 and 2-27, p. 41
Notices, par. 5-11, p. 77 Physical security plan, app. F, p. 312

Operational phase, par. 2-4, p. 10 (see also Pilferage, app. A, p. 267
Planning)
Basics, par. A-1, p. 268
Organization of security forces (see Security Cargo pilferage, pars. 12-3 and 12-4, p. 207
forces) Consumer outlet employee pilferage, par.
A-14, p. 282
Control measures, par. A-7, p. 274; par. A-8,
Organizational effectiveness, app P,
p. 275
p. 403
Detection, game warden’s role, par. H-4,
Command understanding, par. P-1, p. 404 p. 358
Interpersonal communications, par. P-2, How to stop employee pilferage, par. A-10,
p. 404 p. 277
Mission accomplishment, par. P-3, p. 404 Methods, par. A-6, p. 273
Motivation of pilferers, par. A-3, p. 271
Patrols (see also Security forces) Opportunities for pilferage, par. A-4, p. 271
River and harbor patrols, par. 10-10, p. 195 Patrol pilferage (shoplifting), par. A-15,
See also Game warden’s role p. 283
Pilferers, par. A-2, p. 270
Personal security of designated indiv- Targets, par. A-5, p. 272
iduals, ch. 14, p. 228 See also Convoys, trains, and pipelines
After action reports, par. 14-8, p. 238
Plans (see Contingency plans)
509
Planning Risks (see Analysis and Evaluation)
Development, par. 2-6, p. 10 Sabotage, app. B, p. 285
Evaluation (see Evaluating)
Objectives, par. 2-2, p. 9 Bombs, par. B-9, p. 291 (see also Threats)
Planning basis for security, par. 2-1, p. 9 Characteristics, par. B-3, p. 286
Pre-operational phase, par. 2-3, p. 9 Countersabotage, par. B-11, p. 292
Enemy agent characteristics, par. B-4,
p. 287
Port and harbor security, ch. 10, p. 183
Methods of attack, par. B-7, p. 288
Anchorage, par. 10-9, p. 192 Recognition, par. B-2, p. 286
Cargo documentation, par. 10-7, p. 189 Sabotage methods, par. B-8, p. 289
Container operations, par. 10-8, p. 189 Target analysis, par. B-6, p. 287
MP participation, par. 10-1, p. 184 (see also Analysis)
Pier security, par. 10-5, p. 187 Threat, par. B-1, p. 286 (see also Threats)
Responsibilities, par. 10-2, p. 187
Water terminal guard force, par. 10-4, p. 186 Safes (see Finance and accounting and Mail-
(see also Security forces) rooms)
See also Cargo
Screening (see Identification, employee
Programing (see Budgeting) screening)
Protection (see Barriers, Lighting, and IDS) Security analysis (see Analysis)
Protective Actions Security forces, ch. 9, p. 154

Backup forces, par. K-3c, p. 371 Basic training requirements, par. 9-10,
Cover during escorts, par. K-3a, p. 371 p. 165
Response plan, par. K-3b, p. 371 Civilian grade change, par. 2-22, p. 38
Training, par. K-3d, p. 371 (see also Secur- Enlisted duties
ity force training) 95B10, par. 9-13, p. 166
95B20, par. 9-14, p. 167
Protective barriers, ch. 5, p. 66-71 (see 95B30, par. 9-15, p. 168
Barriers) 95B40, par. 9-16, p. 168
95B50, par. 9-17, p. 168
Protective lighting, ch. 6, p. 82 (see Light- Execution of security activities, par. 9-7,
ing) p. 163
Firearms, par. 9-27, p. 176
Protective security measures (see Transpor-
Headquarters and shelters, par. 9-6, p. 161
tation security)
In-service training, par. 9-11, p. 166
Protective security service (see Transporta- Instructions, par. 9-5, p. 161; par. 9-19, p.
tion security) 170; par. 12-27, p. 217
Officer duties, par. 9-18, p. 169
Power plants (see Hydroelectric power plants
Physical security manager, par. 9-18c,
and Floating plants)
p. 170
Quality (see Personnel selection and security Platoon leader, par. 9-18a, p. 169
forces) Problems, par. 9-24, p. 174
Provost marshal/security officer (hos-
Remotely monitored battlefield sensor sys-
tem (REMBASS) (see IDS) pital), par. 13-2, p. 221
510
Responsibilities to management, par. Duress sensors, par. 7-15, p. 103
9-21, p. 171 (see also Management) Motion sensors, par. 7-14, p. 102
Security force supervision, par. 9-20, p. Point sensors, par. 7-16, p. 104
171
Supervisor profile, par. 9-22, p. 173 Security lighting (see Lighting)
Supervisor’s relationship to the force,
par. 9-22, p. 172; par. 15-12, p. 246; par. Signal transmission lines (see Communica-
16-9, p. 253 tions)
Supervisory supplements, par. 9-23,
p. 174 Signs
Uniforms, par. 9-25, p. 175
Unit commander, par. 9-18b, p. 169 Control, par. 5-11a, p. 78; par. 16-20a, p. 260
Vehicles, par. 9-26, p. 176 Other signs, par. 5-12b, p. 78
Organization and use, sec. II, p. 160 Prohibited, par. 16-20b, p. 260
Warning, par. 5-11b, p. 78; par. 16-20b,
Qualities, par. 9-3, pp. 157 thru 160
p. 260
Sentry dogs, par. 9-31, p. 180
Signal items, par. 9-28, p. 177
Training benefits, par. 9-9, p. 164 Support agreements, par. 16-21, p. 260
Training evaluation, par. 9-12, p. 166
Training requirements, par. 9-8, p. 164 Surveys
Transportation Railway Security forces, Evaluations, par. 17-10, p. 266
par. U-25, p. 483 Physical security surveys, par. 15-13, p.
Types of security forces, par. 9-1, p. 155 246; par. 17-8, p. 265
Auxiliary, par. 9-1d, p. 156 Survey report, par. 17-9, p. 266
Civil service, par. 9-1b, p. 156 See also Analysis, Evaluation, and Inspec-
Labor service personnel, par. 9-1c, p. 156 tions
Military, par. 9-1a, p. 155
See also Vulnerability tests and Convoys Systems approach, pars. 1-1 and 1-3, p. 2
(see also Management)
Security system design
Tape (see Fences)
Considerations of design, par. 1-2, p. 2
Mutually supporting elements, par. 1-1b, Telephone dialer (see IDS)
p. 2
Security-indepth ring, par. 1-3c, p. 4 Terminals (see Port and harbor security)
Systems approach, The, par. 1-1a, p. 2
Terms, glossary
Sensors
Computer security, p. 415
Penetration sensors, par. 7-13, p. 100
Intrusion detection systems, p. 418
Air conditioning, par. 7-13h, p. 102
Nuclear reactors, p. 420
Ceilings and walls, pars. 7-13c and 7-13d,
p. 100
Terrorism, app. E, p. 301
Construction openings, par. 7-13g, p. 102
Doors, exterior, p. 7-13a, p. 100 Counterterrorism, par. E-9, p. 305
Doors, interior, p. 7-13b, p. 100 Assault phase, par. E-9a(3), p. 308
J-SIIDS, par. 7-30, p. 113 Initial response phase, par. E-9a(1),
Walls and ceilings, pars. 7-13c and 7-13d, p. 305
p. 100 Negotiation phase, par. E-9a(2), p. 308
Windows, par. 7-13e, p. 100 Vulnerability, par. E-10, p. 310
Ventilation openings, par. 7-13f, p. 102 History of violence, par. E-1, p. 302
511
Jurisdiction, par. E-7, p. 304 Protective security measures, par. 12-17,
Methods of operation, par. E-6, p. 303 p. 212
News media, par. E-3, p. 302 Routing of security shipments, par. 12-15,
Reporting incidents, par. E-8, p. 304 p. 211
Target selection criteria, par. E-2, p. 302 Seals
Weapons used by terrorists, par. E-4, p. 303 Accountability, par. 12-22, p. 214
What to expect from members of a terrorist Application and verification, par. 12-24,
organization, par. E-5, p. 303 p. 215
See also Bomb threats, Sabotage, and Construction specifications, par. 12-21,
Threats p. 214
Issue to users, par. 12-23, p. 215
Theft (see Transportation security and pilfer- Law and breaking seals, par. 12-25,
age) p. 215
Use, par. 12-20, p. 213
Threats Sensitive shipments, par. 12-31, p. 219
Analysis guidelines, fig. 50, p. 127 Shipment security, par. 15-14, p. 247
Categories, par. 1-5, p. 5 Shipment types, p. 206
Human, par. 1-5b, p. 6 Shipper awareness, par. 12-9, p. 209
Natural, par. 1-5a, p. 5; par. 7-34d(3)(a), (see also Awareness)
p. 125 Special considerations, par. 12-8, p. 209
Definition, par. 1-4, p. 5 Theft during shipment/storage, par. 12-5,
External, par. 7-34d(3)(c), p. 126 p. 208
Internal, par. 7-34d(3)(b), p. 126 See also Cargo and Convoys
See also Bomb threats, Sabotage, and Ter-
rorism Towers
Design, par. 5-7, p. 74
Top guard (see Fences)
Use, par. 5-8, p. 74
See also Fences
Training (see Security force)
Uniforms (see Security forces)
Transportation security, ch. 12, p. 206
Alarm devices, par. 12-19, p. 212 (see also Utility openings (see Barriers)
Alarms)
Areas and functions vulnerable to manipu- Vibration detection (see IDS)
lation, par. 12-6, p. 209
Cargo physical security plan, par. 12-2, Visitors
p. 207
Carrier protective service, par. 12-11, p. 210 Registers, par. 16-22, p. 262
Escort functions, par. 12-25, p. 217 Rooms, par. 16-23, p. 262
Guards for oversea shipments, par. 12-30,
p. 218 Vulnerability tests
Legal considerations for guard escorts, Army installation, par. E-10, p. 310
par. 12-26, p. 216 Army property at local level, par. A-12,
Medical substances and items, par. 13-10, p. 279
p. 225 Corps of Engineers, par. 7-11, p. 266
Nuclear material, par. 15-14, p. 247 Neutralization of escort personnel during
Packing, marking, and addressing, par. tests, par. 9-30g, p. 179
12-18, p. 212 Objectives of tests, par. 9-30b, p. 177
512
Planting simulation devices, par. 9-30h, Test safety precautions, par. 9-30e, p. 179
p. 180
Review and analysis of vulnerability tests,
par. 9-30i, p. 180 Warning signs (see Signs)
Techniques for infiltration of security
areas, par. 9-30f, p. 179 Weapons (see Firearms)
Test instruction, par. 9-30d, p. 178
Test planning and preparation, par. 9-30c,
p. 178 Wire (see Fences)
513

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Field Manual Headquarters

*This publication supersedes FM 19-30, 3 November 1971, including all changes.

The word “he” in this publication is intended to include both the

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1994 - 153-846

T he commander must insure that

1-1 System Design Note: Selection and use of means

a. Total system approach is based on: 1-2 Design Considerations

c. Changes in mission and activities of

c. Security in depth (guards, physical d. Physical security is only part of the

Figure 1—Security in-depth ring.

Security Threats Section II

Snow and Ice— blocking patrol roads, (2) Temporary replacement

Planning, Programing, and

T o insure that the security responsi-

a. Employment of assigned and attached

Figure 2—Process steps in effective planning.

Programing and Budgeting Section II

2-8 Budget and Manpower b. DA’s budget and manpower guidance

2-11 Command Operatin

c. The COBE is a command, agency or c. The COBE is prepared by each com-

Installation Management Section Ill

At the installation level, you will be e. To facilitate and coordinate preparation

b. Development of a plan for preparation

Figure 3-Installation budget cycle.

Figure 4-Typical organization for programing and budgeting (OM

d. Segments of the BER are submitted

d. Coordinate with necessary installation

Sample Budget Request Section IV

Sample COBE (1 of 6 pages).

COBE summary (2 of 6 pages).

COBE summary continued (3 of 6 pa

Sample COBE continued (4 of 6 pages)-Travel and transpo

Sample COBE continued (5 of 6 pages)-Contrac

Sample COBE continued (6 of 6 pages)-Supplies and ma

Sample SPE funding request (1 of 9 pages).

Sample SPE funding request continued (2 of 9 pages).

Sample SPE request continued (3 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 7.

Sample SPE request (4 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 2.

Sample SPE request (5 of 9 pages)–Enclosure 3.

Sample SPE request (6 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 3 continued.

Sample SPE request (7 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 4.

Sample SPE request (8 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 4 continued.

Sample SPE request (9 of 9 pages)—Enclosure 4 continued.

Manpower Procedures Section V

* Security manager involvement

Figure 5—Flow chart for TAADS data.

application of civil service and DA civilian

b. The total strength of an activity at any a. To change security grade level

c. Evaluation of civilian personnel officer b. Proponent-initiated changes must com-

d. Application of job evaluation decisions c. Changes in the organization and man-

A ny security program or system

FM 19-20 provides detailed guidance on Staff judge advocate

e. It should then develop the necessary

3-10 Scheduling and Testing In any form of instruction, testing serves

erimeter barriers, intrusion detec-

Identification of Personnel Section I

4-1 Purpose of Movement (6) Using identification codes.

a. Prevent introduction of harmful

c. Personnel requiring access to restricted

b. This method provides extra security by

a. With this system, permission to

b. This system gives comparatively loose 4-10 Card and Badge