Professional Documents
Culture Documents
R.S.,
DONALD H. ZACHERL, MAJ, USA United States M i l i t a r y Academy, 1974 M . A . , Hofstra University, 1980
86-3483
Name of C a n d i d a t e :
T i t l e of T h e s i s :
Donald 11:
Zacherl
Approved b y :
T h e s i s Committee Chiiirmdn
Bobby L d C h i l d r e s s , Ph.D.
Member, G r a d u a t e F a c u l t y
D i r e c t o r , G r a d u d t e Degree
Programs
'The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f : t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s of t h e U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f r C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t agency. (References to t h i s study should include the foregoing stacement.
APSTRACT
F I R A N I A N MILITARY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS O OPERATIONS IN THE IkAN-IRAQ WAR: An a n a l y s i s of the nlodern I r a n i a n Army from Reza S h a h t o the I r a n - I r a q War. FOCUS i s on the e f f e c t o f the r e v o l u t i o n on t h e I r a n i a n A r m y s f i g h t i n g p o w e r , by D o n a l d H. Z a c h e r l , USA, 106 p a g e s .
T h e p r o g e s s o f the I r a n - I r a q War has s u r p r i s e d a n a l y s t s . I n o r d e r of g a i n i n s i g h t i n t o e v e n t s i n the r e g i o n a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , I p r o p o s e a n a n a l y t i c a l franleworl. u s i n g C a r l Von C l a i . i s e w i t z a n d M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d , which is u s e d to a n a l y z e the m i l i t a r y worth o f the I s l a m i c I r a n i a n
Army.
The t h e s i s ha!j three l o g i c a l s t e p s l e a d i n g t o t:he eventual conclusion. F i r s t , the I m p e r i a l I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s were f u n d a a c ? n t a l l y f l a w e d . From i t s i n c e p t i o n undf2r Reza Shah, the p e o i a l e , army, g o v e r n m e n t t r i n i t y had f a t a l attempting to cracks throughout. Muhamnled Reza P a h l a v i b u i l d on the s a n e ! 3 t r ~ 1 c t ~ i rie n, c r e a s e d the p r e s s u r e o n the p e o p l e , army, government t r i n i t y , r e s c i l t i n g i n a collapse. T h e w e a k n e s s e s o f t h i s t r i n i t y was d e m o n s t r a t e d by the p a t e n t i n a b i l i t y o f the army t o d e f e a t the r e v o l u t i o n i n s p i t e , o r e v m b e c ~ u s eo f , the l a v i s h a u g m e n t a t i o n o f
equ 1 pnien t
S e c o n d , the I i j l a m i c I r a n i a n a r m y p r o v e d t o h a v e r e m a r k a b l e power a n d r e s i l i e n c e i n the I r a n - I r a q War. S u r p r i s e d by a p o w e r f u l i n v a d e r , h a n l p e r e d by d e s e r t i o n , e r o d i n g e q u i p m e n t , a n d u n r e l i a b l e l o g i s t i c s , the I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s r e s i s t e d the a t t a c k a n d w e n t o n the o f f e n s i v e . A c t i o n s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o u r a g e a n d f i g h t i n g p o w e r , e x c e l l e n t s t a f f work, a n d o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l p l a n n i n g . T h i r d , the ch.ange i n the Armed F o r c e s was c a ~ i s a l l y l i n k e d t o the impact o f the 15lamic R e v o l u t i o n on the p e o p l e , army, government t r i n i t y . T h e s t r o n g bond between K h o n l e i n i a n d the p e o p l e , a n d the new army l e g i t i m a c y a n d e t h i c , h a d a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e e f f e c t o n the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y o f the <3rmy. T h e r e s u l t w a s a n arm9 w i t h resilience, f l e x i b i l i t y , a n d p o t e n t i a l f o r real growth i n m i l i t a r y power. T h e war, p a r a d o : : i c a l l y , h a s h a d a s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t o n the P e r s i a n Gulf Region. T h e r e g i o n now ha5 a v i a b l e c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t r r o r g a n i z a t i o n , le55 v u l n e r a b l e o i l l i n e s o f c o m m ~ u n i c a t i o n s , a n d i s c a r e f u l l y w a t c h e d a n d g u a r d e d by the U.S. H o w e v e r , the w a r , w h e n i t e n d s , i s l i k e l y t o h a v e a d e s t a h i l i i i n g e f f e c t on I r a n s n e i g h b o r s . I r a n has t h e m i l i t a r y g r o w t h p o t e n t i a l t o b e c o m e the d o m i n a n t r e g i o n a l power w i t h a c a p a b i l i t y t o c h a l l e n g e the S u p e r p o w e r s f o r c o n t r o l o f the P e r s i a n G u l f .
iii
ACKNOWLECGMEN'TCi
A s i w i t h most. I - e s u a r c h
t o p i c s r t h i s nrie e v o l v e d firm a
and
WEIS
g r a n d r ? r l more s w t ? e ~ : ~ i n ciid e a ,
r e d u c : c d by l i m i t a t i o n s
I mw a
I115titLlte,
w h o c o n e t a n t l y e n c u i . i r 7 e d me, p a t i e n t l r corrected my r e p e . i t o d
e r r o r s , .ind h e l p e d r r i e nlainta
debt o f g r a t i t u d e
ti7
1 1
my p e r s p e c t i v e .
I also
[.)WE?
Dr.
C h i d r e s ~ ,o f
the Departtnlent o f
woi.itd h a v e b e e n a d i f f e r e n t ,
I a l s n w o u l d l i k ! t o a c k n o w l e d g e thc h e l p o f
5c:holars:
other
r e s e a r c h a n d a n a l y s i s d i d not:
t h e n re-read, t h e i r u j r i t i n g s . ack?qi.iately a p p l i e d C l a u s e w i t :
until
I r e a d r and
T o the e::tent: I h a v e
a n d a d a p t e d Van C r c v e l d ,
is p o s s i b l e .
Finallu, b u t most i m p o r t a n t l y l
IIIY
I owe a g r e a t a n d
continuing debt to
w i f e , M a r i a n n e , who made i t p o s s i b l e
iY
TABLE O F CONTENTS
Thesis A b s t r a c t
......................................
' I
iii
C & y i
t v r 0 ne
C h r7 p t e r
1
O r (3 an i 2 a t i o n ,
.......................
Ckk-5!pter ' T b s g
T h e P o % t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y Army a n d
t h e I r a n - - I r a q War..
...................................
33
.................................. ...........
$,5
CtJ+p&!r
F i v e C o n c 11.1s i c i n s a n d A n d 1 !ds i 5 .
Ah
Maps....................
.............................
I,
- !;
Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.................
t 0O
Distribu~ion......
...................................
105
-IN
THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR.
By D o n a l d H.
Zacherl,
MAJ,
USA
Ctlapter O n e
i t 5 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o the g i v e n c a s e . As a t o t a l p h e n o m e n o n
i t s d o m i n a n t t e n d e n c i e s a l w a y s make war a p a r a d o x i c a l
tr i n i ty--conposed
o f pr i m o o r d i a1 v i o l e n c e , h a t r e d a n d enm i t y , t h e play
w h i c h a r e t o be r e g a r d e d a 5 b l i n d n a t u r a l f o r c e ; of
is f r e e t o roam; a n d of
i t s element of subordination,
a5 a n
instrument
gf
policy,
which m a k e s i t subject t o r e a s o n
alone.
C a r l Von C l a u s e w i t z
I.
Thesis Intent.
I s u g g e s t , was a f u n d a m e n t a l r e a l i g n m e n t nf
the p e o p l e , the army, a n d the
A s a r e s u l t , the m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e o f power h a s
r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n i n the P e r s i a n G u l f r e g i o n .
T h e thesis h a s f o u r s t e p s .
T h e f i r s t s t e p w i l 1 show
t h a t the M i l i t a r y Worth, of
a 5 d e f i n e d by Mal-tin V a n C r e v e l d ,
the p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y
elenlent5.
T h e s e c o n d s t e p a n a l y z e s the p e r f o r m a n c e o f the
War, d e m o n s t r a t i n g i t s h i g h
T h e t h i r d s t e p i d e n t i f i e s the
I r a n i a n army i n the I r a n - I r a q l e v e l of m i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c e .
w i l l s p e c u l a t e o n the s t r a t e g i c a n d o p e r a t i o n a l
f o r the use o f
l a n d p o w e r i n the r e g i o n .
11. A n a l y t i c a l Framework.
F i r s t , m i l i t a r y e v e n t s i n I r a n were, a n d
A t the time o f the R e v o l u t i o n ,
arc, unpredictable.
for
l a r g e s t i n t h e w o r l d a n d l a r g e s t i n the r e g i o n .
A military
m o d e r n i z a t i o n program c o n t i n u e d
LIP
t o the Shahs d e p a r t u r e ,
i t was i t s p r i m a r y
Yet,
outside observers,
c o u n t i n g the s i z e a n d q u a l i t y
Analysts,
in and
i n c l u d i n g Saddaa H u s s e i n , were
i n f a c t , t h a t he was o n the
v e r g e o f a n n o u n c i n g the a n n e x a t i o n o f K h u z e s t a n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n v a s i o n began.5
The shock o f
the s u c c e s s f u l
to p r e s s i n g for a
easef fire.^
Most r e c e n t l y , the r e n e w e d
I r a n i a n o f f e n s i v e once a g a i n c a u g h t the w o r l d by s u r p r i i l e .
Up u n t i l
the r e c e n t l a r g e s c a l e a t t a c k s , i t was a s s u m e d t h a t
I r a n was t o o e x h a ~ i s t e dt o c a r r y o n the war. 7 S e c o n d l y , the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n wa5 a p r o f o u n d and genuinelv unique political, social, and r e l i g i o u s event
w h i c h may p r o v e
ti2
he o n the same s c a l e a n d i m p o r t a n c e a 5
a r m y , g o v e r n m e n t 1i n k a g e .
T h e a n a l y t i c a l framework a d o p t e d i s a c o m b i n a t i o n o f
two related,
f o r m u l a t i o n o f M i l i t a r y Worth.
A l t h o u g h e a c h f r a m e w o r k is
vital.
I w i l l c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n s h i p by f i r s t e x p l a i n i n g
t h e n Von C l a u s e w i t z ' s model, a n d
Van C r e v e l d ' 5 f o r m u l a t i o n ,
is
e q u i p m e n t m u l i t p l i e d by i t s F i g h t i n g Power ( P f ) . e x p r e s s e d t h i s a s fOllOW5:
I have
T h e Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n i t r o f e q u i p m e n t are a d d i t i v e :
both t h e
numbe r o f t a n k s a n d t h e i r e x c e l l e n c e a s t a n k s a r e v i t a l . P u t a n o t h e r w a y , a 5IT1aller number o f excel l e n t American t a n k s a r e o f t e n e q u a t e d t o larger n u m b e r s o f poorer q u a l i t y Soviet tanks. T h e s e two f a c t o r s a r e m e a s u r a b l e , a n d armies
. .
I t manifests it
c o h e s i o n , morale,
i n i t i a t i v e , courage, Fighting
t o ~ i g h n e 5 sa ~n d the w i l l i n g n e s s t o f i g h t a n d d i e .
P o w e r is m u l t i p l i c a t i v e a n d h a s g r e a t e r immediate e f f e c t
t h a n t h e Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of equipment. However, a v e r y
I f e i t h e r set o f c o m p o n e n t s are
r e g a r d l e s s o f the e l e m e n t s when s e p a r a t e l y v a l u e d .
F i g h t i n g power is more d i f f i c u l t t o m e a s u r e t h a n t h e
Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of equipment.
on the I r a n i a n a r m y ' s d i s c i p l i n e ,
However, Van C r e v e l d p r o v i d e s a n
T h e secret o f
the p o w e r f u l i n f l u e n c e o f r e l i g i o u s a n d
a n d p r i m a r y g r o u p cohesion. 1 1 1 ~ Von
tool t o u n l o c k t h t s s e c r e t .
C l a u s e w i t z r e d u c e s the n a t u r e of war t o " a r e m a r k a b l e t r i n i t r " : a n i m u s , estimates, a n d p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . Animus, which m a i n l y c o n c e r n s the people, hatred a5 a natural force. is b l i n d , v i o l e n t
E s t i m a t e s , w h i c h a r e the p r o v i n c e
is the p l a y of c h a n c e a n d
5
o f the commander a n d h i s a r m y ,
probability.
e x i s t s i n a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n these t h r e e t e n d e n c i e s ,
o b j e c t s u s p e n d e d b e w t e e n three magnets". 14
" l i k e an
law,
d e e p r o o t e d i n their s u b j e c t a n d y e t v a r i a b l e i n their
m
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o one another.
15
society, a n d personal
army
( t h e C l a ~ i s e w i t z e a ne l e m e n t s ) , I c a n
I r a n i a n F i g h t i n g P o w e r , ( i n Van
A p p l y i n g F i g h t i n g Power t o t h e
Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of equiprrlent,
I r a n i a n army's M i l i t a r y Horth.
An a c c u r a t e e s t i m a t e o f the
t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the r e g i o n .
I I I.
significance.
P r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n i a n army u s i n g t tie m e t h o d o l o g y
outlined. C h a p t e r two 5 e t s t h e h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d of the
Pre-revolutionary
army b e g i n n i n g w i t h i t s b i r t h u n d e r Re-a
a r m y s M i l i t a r y W o r t h ; the q u a l i t y a n d q u a n i t i t y o f
eqi..iipment a n d a n
e s t i m a t e o f i t s f i g n t i n g power b a s e d o n a n
arrrly, government r e l a t i o n s h i p .
a n a l y s i s of
the p e o p l e ,
of
the
war.
C h a p t e r three shows
is t h e
result o f a s i g n i f i c a n t l y i m p r o v e d F i g h t i n g Power,
t h e cause?
t h e Revolution
t o t h e I r a q i i n v a s i o n t o d e t e r m i n e i f the
t h e army, a n d the S t a t e , c h a n s e d i n
b o n d b e t w e e n t h e people,
s p e c u l a t e s o n t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f
laridpower
i n the r e g i o n .
IV.
Significance.
the r e g i o n s p e t r o l e u m e x p o r t s s t i l l e x i t t h r o u g h the G u l f
a]. t h o u g h
Never-
the-less,
Gulf Region.
Of that:,
the
w o r l d s known n a t i . . i r a l g a s r e s e r v e s .
of
Approximately onp t h i r d
the w o r l d s F e t r o l e u r n p r o d u c t i o n a n d 30Z o f
t h e US
p e t r o l e u m s i m p o r t s a r e from the G u l f r e g i o n .
i n t o r e d u c i n g their d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e r e g i o n ,
i m p o r t a n c e n f the r e q i o n i s c l e a r .
o n l g 22% of
t h e r e f o r e , Gulf s t a b i l i t y
her b o r d e r s , r e a c h a b l e by m o d e r n c o m b a t a i r c r a f t ,
includes
In addition,
I r a n b o r d e r s on I r a q ,
Persian Gulf
tankers. motive,
i s l a n d s a s t r i d e the t r a f f c l a n e s f o r o i l
S h o u l d I r a n a c h i e v e sciff i c i e n t m i 1 i t a r y poiuer a n d
i t impact w o u l d b e e n o r ~ o ~ i s .
T e r r a i n a n d t h e presence of r e s o ~ i r c e sa r e n o t r e l e v a n t
t o b o % h the s u p e r ~ o w e r s . I r a n i n h i g h among S o v i e t
e x t r a n a t i o n a l p r i c i r i t i e s a n d is a n a r e a o f h i s t o r i c a l
Russian s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . l9
P r e m i e r B r e z h n e v l i s t e d the
1921n1 a " t r e a t y o f
f r i e n d s h i p " which r e q u i r e s I r a n t o
prevent "anti-soviet"
a c t i v i t i e s i n I r a n i n exchange for a
T h e USSR has s u p p o r t e d
p r o m i se o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . 2 1
s e p a r a t s t movements i n I r a n , is i n v o l v e d i n the T u d e h
(Masses
party.
Additionally,
the S o v i e t U n i o n r e c e n t l y
22
I r a n is s p e c i f i c a l l y c o v e r e d tw the
Additionally,
I t i 5 a n area of s p e c i f i c c:ontingency
Finally,
the c u r r e n t government i n I r a n
i5 largely
u n a f f e c t e d by a t t e n ~ p t st o m o d i f y i t s f o r e i g n p n l i c y .
Its
a n d the
i t s p o s i t i o n a 5 an
It
terrorism a n d r e f u s a l t o a c t i n c o n c e r t : w i t h
is
r e l a t i v e l y encumbered and u n p r e d i c t a b l e .
T h e d a n g e r i s t h a t t h e P e r s i a n Gulf R e g i o n , w h i c h is
v i t a l t o b o t h the S u p e r p o w e r s ,
is i n d a n g e r o f
d o m i n a t i o n by
a h o s t i l e n a t i o n t h a t is l a r g e l y b e y o n d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e .
T h e war i t s e l f i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r p o l i c y a n d
professional reasons. First,
the s t r o n g I r a n i a n r e s i s t e n c e
a n d s u b s e q u e n t s t u n n i n g s ~ i c c e s s e swere c o m p l e t e l y 10
Additionally, the
tactical, operational, and strategic aspects are not: well known or understood. Until Iranian military power and the
Iran-Iraq war i s more adequately understood, re1 iable estimates are unachievable.
As a re5ult. policy regarding
Iran is likely to be ineffective. Second, the war is, or ought to be, of intense prof 85s onal interest.
use
of chemical weapons
and strategic rockets, and conventional strikes on nuclear targets. Further, the lessons o f the war are untainted by
Superpower 1ogis.t i cal sponsersh i p, un 1 i k e the Arab- Israel i Wars, and is a better harbinger of future conflicts of this
type.
Additionally,
it
and Islamic military tradition, the Islamic revolution and the I rani an mi 1 i tary leader. Given Irans potential a5 an aggressive, militant, and we 1 resourced force, a real understanding o f the war i s
essential.
revolution, fired by religious zeal, and tempered by war, i s arising. The forces that have shaped and are shaping this
potential militar!j power in one of the most volatile and vital area5 of Superpower interest are of global significance.
11
3. J o h n M. S m i t h , "Where w a s the S h a h ' s A r m y ? , " ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , K a n s a s , 1980), p. 2 . (Master o f M i l i t a r y A r t a n d S c i e n c e T h e s i s , PO R e y i s t r N19052.421-31) R i c h a r d F. N y i - o ~ , e d . , ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : U.S. O f f i c e r 1978), p. 399. 4.
Parn 550-68,
DA
5.
6.
Ibid.,
p.
679.
by
1-2.
11.
12.
13.
l-'' L.
12
14.
Clausewitz., Ibid.
On War, p.
89.
T h e G u l f a n d the Search
p.
Iran, C e n t r a l
Intelligence
"
21.
R i c h a r d F.
Nyrop,
ed.,
I r a n : A S t u d L k p . 52.
13
C h a Pt : er Two
T h e E v o l u t i o n o f t h e M o d e r n I r a n i a n Army f r o m R e z a S h a h t o the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n
"The f i r s t of people;
t h e s e t h r e e a s p e c t s m a i n l y c o n c e r n the
the t h i r d the
g o v e r n m e n t . . .These three t e n d e n c i e s a r e l i k e t h r e e d i f f e r e n t
c o d e s of
l a w , d e e p r o o t e d i n t h e i r s u b j e c t a n d yet v a r i a b l e
A theory t h a t
i n their r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o n e a n o t h e r .
ignores
a n y o n e o f t h e m or s e e k s t o f i x a n a r b i t r a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m would c o n f l i c t w i t h r e a l i t y
t o such a n e x t e n t
t h a t f o r t h i 5 r e a s o n a l o n e i t would b e t o t a l l y u s e l e s s . "
Carl Von C l a u s e w i t z .
14
T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the p e o p l e ,
g o v e r n m e n t , is coniple:.: a n d c h a n g e a b l e .
To g a i n i n s i g h t
into
Reza K h a n ,
Islamic r e v o l u t i o n .
F o ~ i n d a t i n n so f the I m p e r i a l I r a n i a n Army.
considerable.
H e b u i l t a n a t i o n a l s t a n d i n g army v i r t u a l l y
i n t r o d u c e d s o c i a l c h a n g e , e x p a n d e d c i v i l law, industrialization,
wd5
from s c r a t c h ,
and nationalism. It
the m a i n s t a y o f h i s p o w e r .
recal c i t r a n t
.
i n $.pi te o f r e m a r k a b l e i m p r o v e m e n t s i n the
However,
army's s i z e a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
i t c o l l a p s e d i n 1941 when
15
E e f o r e W o r l d War I ,
I r a n h a d n o n a t i o n a l s t a n d i n g army.
T h r e e n a t i v e armies, o f f i c e r e d by f o r e i g n e r s , p o l i c e d the
c o u n t r y a n d a c t e d i n d e f e n s e o f the f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s i n Iran.
l e a d by C z a r i s t l e a d by R r i t i s h l e a d by
R ~ i s s i a nO f f i c e r s ,
officers,
the S o u t h Persia r i f l e s ,
a n d the G e n d a r m e r i e , a n a t i o n a l p o l i c e ,
Swedish o f f i c e r s .
the
T h i s d e p a r t u r e g a v e R e z a Khan, w h o w a s a n
the
h r j . g a d e which was g a r r i s o n e d a r o u n d T e h e r a n .
The Persian
a p p e a l e d to the n e w S o v i e t U n i o n f o r s i . i p p o r t .
i n the m i d s t o f n e g o t i a t i o n o v e r the " T r e a t 2 o f
In
19'21,
s u p p o r t e d by H e z a titoan a n d the
s e i z e d power.
( T h e 1921 T r e a t y o f
F r i e n d s h i p i s o f t e n c i t e d by the S o v i e t U n i o n a 5 l e g i t m i z i n q
i t s i n t e r e s t i n the i n t e r n a l e v e n t s i n I r a n .
No modern
r e s o u r c e f u l and e f f e c t i v e . national
army by u n i f y i n g t h e s e p a r a t e f o r c e s ;
f i r s t s i n g l e army i n I r a n ' s
long history.
tie p u r g e d
f o r e i g n e r s a n d r e d u c e d f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e i n army
16
cat..15es i n e v e r y a s p e c t o f I r a n i a n l i f e ,
o f f i c e r s l o y a l t o h i m were
p l a c e d in i n f l n e n t i a l g o v e r n m e n t p o s i t i o n s .
Disloyalty w a s harshly
foreign influence.
were w e l l r e c e i v e d .
were a t o d d s w i t h the I s l a m i c c l e r g y .
W i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n
of a c o d i f i e d j u d . i c i a l system,
the c l e r g y l o s t i t s a u t h o r i t y
Marriage a n d
o v e r c i v i l law a n d r e l i g i o u s t r u s t f u n d s . 4
d i v o r c e c i v i l codis+ r e p r e s e n t e d a t t e m p t s t o r e d u c e c l e r i c a l
power,
R e l i g i o u s instruc:tion
was p l a c e d u n d e r c o n t r o l o f the g o v e r n m e n t : e d c i c a t i u n s y s t e m .
W e a r i n g o f a v e i l by women was f o r b i d d e n .
T h e c l e r g y , however,
aclnlinistration of c i v i l
ttle
g o v e r n n 1 e n t 5 c r e d i b i l i t y i n the e y e 5 o f g r a d u a l l y weakened,
as was
the p e o p l e w a s
the p e o p l e - g o v e r n m e n t
r e l a t i o n s h i P.
C o r r e s p o n d i n g 1y
the 1 i n k a g e b e t w e e n the
Rebellion,
whether t r i b a l ,
political,
or
T h e army, o s t e n s i b l y
w a 5 primarily used in
d e s i g n e d t o d e f e a t f o r e i g n aggression, an i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y role, 1i n k a g e .
f u r t h e r w e a k i n g the p e o p l e - a r m y
a c c e p t i n g German t e c h n i c a l a d v i s e r s , Rc:a
18
Shah w o ~ i l d n o t
a l l o w the t r a n s p o r t o f a l l i e d m a t e r i a l t o the S o v i e t U n i o n
t o cro5s I r a n .
event,
As C h u r c h i l l n o t e d i n d e s c r i p t i o n o f
this
" I n t e r Arnla,
s i l e n t leges. " - - ( b e t w e e n
Armies, law5
a r e s i l e n t )5
from G!asr-e-Shirin
t o w a r d Kermanshah.
A l t h o ~ i g ho n e b r i g a d e
a n d o n e r e g i m e n t waz a r m o r e d ,
e f f e c t i v e t h a n t h e other a t t a c k i n g u n i t s , r o a d bound.
c o n t r o l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d secure a r o u t e t o the C a s p i a n
5ea.
T h i s p l a n w t % s r e p e a t e d v i r t u a l l y w i t h o u t c h a i i y e by the
The Soviets, fighting
d i d n o t p u t their N e v e r the less,
I r a q i ' s almost 40 y e a r s l a t e r .
d e s p e r a t e l y w i t h t h e N a z i ' s on their w e s t ,
best t r o o p s i n t h i ? s o u t h t o i n v a d e I r a n .
they entered Azerbaijan,
i n t e n d i n g t o push t o Teheran.
The
of
h i s army t o r e s i s t t h e A n g l o - R u s s i a n
invasion.
In a
speech t o the M a j l i s c o n c e r n i n g p o s s i b l e i n v a s i o n by R u s s i a n
a n d B r i t i s h f o r c e s , he s t a t e d " C e r t a i n l y w e c a n c o u n t o n o u r disciplined forces.
..".
In addition,
19
he o r d e r e d the p r e s s
arid t h e Government:
propaganda a ~ p a r a t ~ t io s c o n c e n t r a t e on
w i t h a l l i e d demtands a n d r e m a i n e d i n c a l c i t r a n t l p r e f e r r i n g t o
o f f e r b a t t l e inctead. Defending with f i v e I r a n i a n d i v i s i o n s
the d i v i s i o n s a r e of
Reza S h a h c l e a r l y t h o u g h t so,
s i n c e h e h a d c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s arfrty, w h i c h he h a d e x p a n d e d
f r o m 4 0 , 0 0 B t o 1ZOrQQ0, a n d h a d u s e d i t s ~ ~ c c e s s f t . ~ a ls l ! his ~
personal
instr~iment
.
G i v e n the e v i d e n t B r i t i s h a n d
Russian need,
contmitment a n d c a p a b i l i t r l
i t w o u l d have b e e n
u l t i m a t u m was a
u n r e a s o n a b l e t o t h i n k the A n g l o - R u s s i a n
ruse.
H i s army c o l l a p s e d on c o n t a c t w i t h i t s
it.
No s e r i o u s r e s i s t a n c e wa5 e n c o u n t e r e d a n d c o n r j c r i p t s
d e s e r t e d i n the t h o u s a n d s .
I n ttte s o c i t t t ,
one infantry
b r i g a d e c a p t u r e d Abadanl w h i l e " t h e m a j o r i t y o f P e r s i a n
forces e s c a p e d i n lorries"
Kermanshahl
I n ttte c e n t r a l s e c t o r new
the d e f e n d e r s " a b a n d o n e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s
20
hastily".
On t h e 28thr J u s t a5 a c o n t i n u e d a t t a c k was a b o u t
t o b e l a u n c h e d , the I r a n i a n commander s u r r e n d e r e d . T h e t o t a l
n u m b e r o f R r i t i s h c a s u a l t i e s f o r the whole o p e r a t i o n was 22
k i 1 l e d a n d 4 2 wounded.
1Gl
There was n o p o p u l a r r e s i s t a n c e ,
i n s p i t e of a year
F a c e d w i t h the a n d the
Reza Shah o r d e r e d a c e a s e f i r e o n
the 2 5 t h r three d a y s a f t e r the i n v a s i o n a n d b e f o r e a n y major b a t t l e w a s f o u g h t or o f f e r e d by the I r a n i a n s . Mohammed Reia Shah, R e z a S h a h ' s s o n , p r o v i d e s the f i n a l e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n c r the poor M i l i t a r y Worth of
Army.
1941 I r a n i a n
'...except
for a f e w i s o l a t e d e n g a g e m e n t s , the
r e s i s t a n c e o f the I r a n i a n a r m e d f o r c e s was c o m p l e t e l y
i n e f f e c t i v e . "1' because of
The I r a n i a n army w a s o v e r w h e l m e d ,
not
i n f e r i c i r nnmbers, but b e c a u s e of
i t chose n o t t o
r e s i s t . Even i f t r i t a l l y o v e r m a t c h e d , a cohesive, d i s c p l i n e d
army w i l l r e s i s t v i o l e n t l y , a n d many t i n e s s c i c c e s s f ~ i l Y . I r a n i a n army,
The
T h e arrrly h a d a w e a k
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the I r a n i a n p e o p l e a n d r i g i d r e l a t i o n s h i p
w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t ,
T h e people,
r e f l e c t i o n the p e o p l e ,
army r e l a t i o n s h i p ,
a5 weak.
r e s u l t of trinity.
T h e F i g h t i n g P o w e r o f the a r m y was l o w a 5 a d i r e c t
the p o o r l y b a l a n c e d people, a r m y , g o v e r n m e n t
B r i t i s h f o r c e s w i t h d r e w o n the 1 9 t h o f O c t o b e r ,
a l t h o u g h S o v i e t f o r c e s r e m a i n e d p a s t the e n d of
RE!::a
t h e war.
a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n h i 5 a d v i s o r s . 13
intent to control
it5
own d e s t i n y .
A u t h o r i t a r i a n and n a t i o n a l i s t i c ,
he e x p a n d e d
s o c i a l c h a n g e , a n d e l e v a t e d the w e a l t h a n d s o c i a l s t a t : u s of
l o y a l mgilitary o f f i c e r s . However,
he n e g l e c t e d the p r i m a r y i t 5 army, a n d i t s
low F i g h t i n g P o w e r ,
people,
T h e r e s u l t wa5 a n army o f
a n d q u e s t i o n a b l e M i l i t a r y Worth.
.-,.-,
LL
h a n d l e t h e i m b a l a n c e s w o u l d d e t e r m i n e the f u t u r e o f
Iranian
a r ~ r ~ y 'M s i l i t a r y W o r t h , a n d u l t i m a t e l y the f u t u r e o f I r a n .
A blew Shah, A n O l d P a t t e r n .
Reza Motlaanled P t i a l a v i
the ShahanShah, s u d d e n l y a n d
twenty two.
H i s military e d u c a t i o n i n I r a n and S w i t z e r l a n d
was t h a t o f a n i m p e r i a l o f f i c e r c a d e t , a n d h a s f a t h e r h a d
t a k e n w e a t c a r e t o i n s t i l l the m o n a r c h y i n r o y a l p r i n c e .
H i s f a t h e r , i n e x i l e i n S o u t h A f r i c a , d i e d three y e a r s
a f t e r his abdication. Muhaninied R e z a P a h l a v i h a d t o d e p e n d o n
a l l i e s and s e n i o r military and
the a d v i c e o f r e l a t i v e s ,
sovernment o f f i c i a l s .
P o w e r b e c a m e more d e f u s e d a n d there
similiar t o h i s
f o r c e s throush i t s c o n t r o l o f the m i l i t a r y b u d g e t .
anguage r e a p p e a r e d ,
a s well a5
f a s c i s t , commcinis-t, re i g i o u s a n d n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l
~ a r t i e 5 . lHowevei-, ~
d e s p o t t h a t was
ti2
i t wa5 the c h a l l e n g e o f a n o t h e r w o u l d be
s h a p e S h a h P a h l a v i ' s a t t i t u d e a5 r u l e r ;
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , Mohammed M o s s a d e q . 15
23
M o s s a d e q h a d f o r m e d a coal i t o n o f n a t i o n a l i s t i c
p a r t i e s o f e v e r y s t r i p e , f o c u s i n g o n the c o n t r o l o f
Iran's
o i l . He was i n i t i a l l y w i d e l y
POPLI
a r a n d was a p p o i n t e d P r i m e
i n 1951.
As the o i l
c r i s i s l w h i c h he h a d h e l p e d t o p r e c i p i t a t e , M o s s a d e q d e m a n d e d more a n d more c o n t r o l .
worsened,
H e eventual lyl
c n n s o l i d a t e d h i s c o n t r o l by a s s u m i n g the r o l e o f m i n i s t e r of
The
d e p e n d a b i l i t y o f these o f f i c e r s ,
proved u n r e l i a b l e .
T h e p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s w o r s e n e d as M o s s a d e q lost s u p p o r t
a n d more d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n s e d the Shah, e v e n t u a l l y d e p o s i n g
him.
I n 19531 i n a s h o r t f o u r d a y p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h the
the S h a h .
rule."
Clearly,
t h i s v i e w p o i n t was s h o r t s i g h t e d , a n d the
shism b e t w e e n the p e o p l e l
the a r m y , a n d the g o v e r n m e n t l
24
e v i d e n t d u r i n g the r u l e o f h i s f a t h e r , a l t h o u g h i n i t i a l l y abatedm, would soon r e 5 ~ 1 ~ i1 ts e growth. T h e S h a h b e e a n by p u r g i n g o f f i c e r s a f f i l i a t e d w i t h the c o m n ~ n n i s t Tudeh (Masses) p a r t y a n d o u t l a w e d +:he p a r t y i t s e l f , as h a d his f a t h e r .
of
He tool:: s t e p s t o r e d u c e the p o w e r
the M a j l i s by c . L . i p e r v i s i n g the n o m i n a t i o n o f c a n d i d a t e E
He c r e a t e d s e v e r a l
and e l e c t i o n s .
internal securitg
organizations, (Saznlan-i
I t t i l a a t va Amniyat--i t i e s h v a r ; Nat-ional
I n t e 1 1 i g e n c e a n d Cwcur i t y ( h g a n i z a t ion ) 17
SAVAK was c l o s e l r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the mi1 t a r y a n d was
r u n ti9 h i g h r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c c r s . wm-e a r r a n g e d i n
EI
These o r g a n i - a t i o n s
50
bewildering system
AS
that
e v e r y b o d y was
w a t c h i n g somebodr e l s e .
a n example, a s u p e r s e c r e t
p r e s ~ i r r ~ a b lt yo a c t a 5 t h e
A comlprehensive s t u d y o f
S h a h s w a t c h d o g of SAVAK i t s e l f . l9
these o r g a n i z a t i o n s is w o r t h y of a thesis i n i t s e l f . S u f f i c e
t r u s t was the
c o n t r o l o f h i s mi1,itary o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
The General S t a f f
a c t e d a5 a p l a n n i n g a n d c o o r d i n a t i n g a g e n c y , b u t n o t a s a command b o d y . S e r v i c e C h i e f s o f S t a f f , major s u b o r d i n a t e
25
T h e r e s ~ i l t , i n terms o f the C l a u s e w i t z e a n t r i n i t y ,
potent:ially i:atastrophic.
A v i c i o u s cycle of b r u t a l
were
r e p r e s s i o n a n d r e s i s t a n c e f u r t h e r s e p a r a t e d the g o v e r n m e n t ,
i n the p e r s o n of the Shah, f r o m the p e o p l e , a n d the p e o p l e
T h e Shah p u t a
army, government
r e 1a t i o n 5 h i p t 1 1 a t e v e n t u a I 1 y p r o d u c e d a r n a jo r r e v o 11.it i on
However,
these t r e n d s a r e n o t a complete a n a l ! ~ s i s a n d
a sustained
o i l r e v e n u e w i n d f a l l s , a n d the m i l i t a r y b u d g e t d r a m a t i c a l l y
increased correspondingly.
T h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n the Wual i t y
a n d Q u a n t i t r o f e q u i p m e n t p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y
t o e v a l u a t e the I r a n i a n a r m y i n Van C r e v e l d s t e r n ~ s , a n d
w i l l p r o v i d e g r e a t e r i n s i g h t i n t o the a r m y s F i g h t i n g P o w e r .
the
since
T h e sudden influ:: of
e q u i p m e n t was i m p o s s i b l e t o a b s o r b w i t h o u t waste a n d
ti.irmoi 1 .
In a d d i t i o n ,
the r a p i d m o d e r n i z a t i o n b r o u g h t w i t h i t a
g r o w i n g d e p e n d e n c e o n f o r e i g n s o u r c e s f o r war m a t e r i e l , a
c r i t i c a l w e a k n e s s i n a p r o t r a c t e d war.
A l t h o ~ i g hp r o d u c t i o n
o u t s i d e 5 0 u r c e s f o r major items a n d t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e .
T h i s w a s f u r t h e r c o n ~ p l i c a t e dby a d e l i b e r a t e g o v e r n m e n t
d e c i s i o n t o p u r c h a s e equipment from d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s .
some c a s e s ,
In
m a i n g u n of a n o t h e r . T h e r e 5 i . i l t i n g mi:.: o f weapons, c a l i b e r s ,
a n d r e p a i r items t o s u p p o r t them was a l o g i s t i c a l n i g h t m a r e .
In addition,
the c r i t i c a l s h o r t a g e o f t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l
T h e e x p l o d i n g economy h a d
e i t h e r l e f t the s e r v i c e , o r b e g a n t o c h a f e u n d e r the
r e l a t i v e l y low m i l i t a r y s a l a r i e s .
12
--
27
C r i t i c a l l y important
on these t e c h n i c i a n s ,
they began t o g a r n e r an i m p o r t a n c e f a r
3 a v e them no s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n , i m p o r t a n c e t o the
T h e y were a d i s t i n c t l r n e w f e a t u r e
f o r c e was e r o d i n g a 1 5 0 .
L a r g e l y s h o r t term c o n s c r i p t s ,
''
Poorly t r e a t e d a n d p o o r l y p a i d , e v e n b e f o r e
their m o r a l e ,
the s u d d e n i n c r e a s e c i v i l i a n w a g e s ,
cohesion
a n d l o y a l t y s u f f e r e d e v e n more t h a n the o f f i c e r C o r p s .
As a n i r o n i c twist,
i n an i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y r o l e h a d the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t .
C c m s c r i p t s were r o u t i n e l y s t a t i o n e d i n a r e a s o u t s i d e t h e i r na.tive region.
T h i s was t h o u g h t t o assure t h e i r l o y a l t y i n
the e v e n t o f a l o c a l i n s u r r e c t i o n .
ZH
However,
the y o u n g
soldier,
l o n e l y a n d s e p a r a . t e d f r o n t his f a m i l y ,
friends,
and
coroaunity,
a s the c l e r g y
conscripted soldier
i n the r e v o l t , some t u r n i n g o n t h e i r
o f f i c e r s a n d k i 1 1 i n g them. - '
, 7
these p r o b l e m s g r e w
B e t w e e n 1975 a n d the r e v o l u t i o n ,
moi-e p r o n o u n c e d .
I n s p i t e o f e n o r m o u s i m p r o v e m e n t i n the
i t c o u l d n o t r e s i s t the
I n Van C r e v e l d ' s f o r n u l a t i o n , t h i s c a n o n l y o c c u r
T h e p e o p l e , a r m y , govcrnmtent l i n k a g e was so w e a k a n d so
imbalanced that v i o l e n t ,
T o the
e x t e n t t h a t w e can g a i n i n s i g h t
i n t o the F i g h t i n g Power o f
the arrrty d i d n o t o n l y n o t
The final
o v e r c o m e the r e v o l u t i o n ,
military d e c l a r a t i o n of
m a r k e d the e n d o f
the P a h l a v i r e i g n a n d b e g i n i n g of
the I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c .
28
29
the I s l a r n i c R e p u b l i c ,
ttle
qnestiori i s a n
important one.
If
I r a q h a d i n v a d e d b e f o r e the v e v o l u t i o n ,
w o u l d the I r a n i a n army s t i l l h a v e b e e n so w e a k ?
T h e q u e s t i o n is u n a n s w e r a b l e i n a n y m e a n i n g f u l way.
real external threats d i d n o t h a v e t h i s e f f e c t .
materialized,
The
I f o n e had
the s i h i s n ~ b e t w e e n the p e n p l e ,
the army, a n d
the q o v e r n m e n t w o u l d b e a s s e r i o u s a n d the w e a k n e s s e s i n
military cohesion,
morale,
remained.
r e v o l u t i o n a n d i t s c a ~ i s e sb e f o r e we a g a i n h a v e a n I r a n i a n a r m y o f r e s p e c t a b l e F i g h t i n g Power a n d M i l i t a r y Worth.
This
I n the
low
low
t h a t i t c o u l d n o t r e s i s t the r e v o l u t i o n .
M i l i t a r y Worth i n s p i t e o f r e c e n t
I t was of
l a v i s h augmwntations i n
Q u a l i t y a n d ( 3 u a n t i t y o f e q u i p n l e n t a n d b e c a u s e o f poor
F i g h t i n g Power. I t w a s of
poor F i g h t i n g P o w e r a s a r e s u l t of
arnly,
b a s i c weaknesses i n t h e p e o p l e ,
government l o y a l t y and
r e l a t i o n s h i p and e r o s i o n i n m i 1 i t a r y cohesion,
morale.
p e r f o r m a n c e i n the I r a n - I r a q
war.
36
ENDNOTES
CHAPTER TWO 1. S i r W i l l i a m S l i m , D e f e a t I n t o Victorcr, D a v i d McKay, I n c . , 19-51), p. 3.
(New York:
p.
2.
39m.
3.
ed.,
I r a n : A Countrcr S t u d q ,
P.
4.
Vol
7.
400.
W i n s t o n S . C h i . i r c h i 1 1 , Ihe S e c o g d W o r l d War,
R i c h a r d F. N y r o p , W i n s t n n S. I b i d , , , p. ed., I r a n : A Studcr,
p.
P.
8.
9.
481.
391
C t w r c h i l l , T h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, P. 483.
10.
11. 49. Countrcr,
Georqe L e n c z o w s k i ,
p a n Under. t h e P a t l l a v i 5 r P .
p m i i for Mu.
70.
P.
13.
ed.,
Iran:
A Countrcr Studcr,
55.
14. 15. 16.
P.
60.
62.
1 7 . ErvancJ A b r a h a m i a n , I r a n : Petioeen TWO R e v o I i . i t i o ~ , ( P r i n c e t o n , N e w J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 2 ) - PP. 4 19-420. 18. Theconomlist, 1 1 November, 1978.9
P.
13.
31
19.
R i c h a r d F. N y r o p , Ibid.,
401.
ed.,
Iran: A
Count:rli S t u d l i ,
P.
373.
20.
P.
the S e a r c h
P.
R i c h a r d F. Ibid.,
p.
ed.,
Iran: A C O L I I S ~ tctdg,
InterprAive
25.
73.
24.
J o h n M. N i k k i R.
Smith,
26.
83-84.
29.
Keddie,
Roots o f R e v n l u t i a n , p .
7.
PP.
27. J o h n .
M.
Smith,
p.
Ibid.,
90.
32
Chapter T h r e e
T h e P o s t - r e v n l u t i o n a r y Army i n the I r a n - I r a q
War
a n d the s t r e n g t h of h i s
will.
tt1oLigt.l
T h e e x t e n t of
measurable.
t o d e t e r m i n e a n d c43n o n l y b e g a u g e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y by the
s t r e n g t h o f the m o . t i v e a n i m a t i n g i t . "
C a r l Von C l a u s e w i t -
33
C h a p t e r three is s u b d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e s u b s e c t i o n s ; a
and a n o v e r v i e w a n d
war
i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s a n arrrly o f c o n s i d e r a b l e M i l i t a r y Worth
inspite of
low l e v e l s o f
t h e Q u a l i t y arid h a n k i t 3 of c o n s i d e r a b l e F i g h t i n g Power. If
e q c i i p f r l e n t b u t b e c a u s e of
t h i s is s o ,
i t s t r o n g l y i m p l i e s t h a t the Revoli.i+:ion
was +:he
p r o x i m a t e cacise f o r the c h a n g e i n F i s h t i n s P o w e r .
I t then
b e c o m e s t h e p u r p o s e of
Chapter f o u r t o a n a l y z e the
t h e apparently unsteady
i n I r a n , g a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e S h a t t a1 A r a b water
a n d I r a q s s t r a t e g i c l i n k t o the and
( c o n t r o l l e d by I r a n ,
P e r s i a n G u l f ) , assert i t 5 d o m i n a n c e i n the r e g i o n ,
d e s t a b i l i z e the r e a c t i o n a r y I s l a m i c r e p u b l i c a n d p u t a n
early e n d to t h e threat of
I s l a m i c fi.indanientali5t r e v o l u t i o n
To h e l p c a r r y out
t h r o u g h o u t : the Mos1er11w o r l d .
its i n i t i a l
military o p e r a t i o n s ,
I r a q elicited c o n s i d e r a b l e d i r e c t and
34
she f o u g h t
a n enemy t h a t t h r e a t e n e d thern a l l .
A l t h o u q h no d i r e c t
e v i d e n c e e x i s t s t h a t Iraq was e n c o u r a g e d i n i t s a d v e n t u r i s m
or s o ~ i g h t a d v i c e i n this r e g a r d ,
condoned thc? action.
i t is c l e a r t h a t t h e y
Iraq h s d a n o t h e r c l e a r i n t e n t w h i c h can o n l y b e t e r m e d
an o v e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f
i t s sense o f
its rightful
d e s t i n r as
l e a d e r o f the A r a b w o r l d .
Egypt,
A f t e r the Camp D a v i d a c c o r d s ,
too g o o d t o miss: a w e a k ,
d i s l i k e d non--Arab n a t i o n ;
J u s t i f i a b l e g r u d g e ; the p r o m i s e o f a p e r m a n e n t r e g i o n a l
power r e a l i g n m e n t
i n I r a q s a d v a n t a g e ; a n d the g l i t t e r i n g
p o s s i b i l i t y of stage.
Additionally,
the a r e a o f p l a n n e d i n v a s i o n l o o k e d
K h u z e s t a n , a l s o known
d5
especially vulnerable.
wa5 a t
Arabistan,
l e a s t 4Wi A r a b , a n d i t s o i l workers h a d r e c e n t l y
the r a c i a l f a c t o r i n
p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s a n d m a y h a v e o v e r e s t i m a t e d i t 5 impact o n i d e o l i J g i c a 1 ground!;.
T h a t K h u z e s t a n w a s a l E o almost
35
e x c l u s i v e l y S h i i t r . was d i s c o u n t e d , e t h n i c l o y a l t r w o u l d provf? d o m i n a n t .
to b e l i e v e t h i s .
The c o r r e s p o n d i n g b o r d e r area o f
a l s o S h i i t e a s was the I r a q i e n l i s t e d f o r c e .
If racial
then,
the i d e o l o g y
destiny
1:uril
dOwn a
power a g a i n s t
t h e K u r d i s h rebel
t h e S h a t t e l A r a b i n 1975,
toward t h e G u l f v i r t u a l l y g u a r a n t e e d s u f f i c i e n t a n i n ~ o a i t y i n
the r e g i o n .
S i n c e the I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n t h i n g s h a d g o t t e n d e c i d e d l y worse. I r a n held, w i t h m a l i c i o u s i n t e n t , American f o r ransom;
Embassy a n d m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l
the I r a n i a n
Revolutionary Party
( I R F ) was e r r a t i c a l l g a n d b r u t a l l y
to revolt
36
tool o f i n f l r m c e i n i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y a r s e n a l , a s s u r e d
r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l e n m i t y .
However,
i t r e m a i n e d i n OPEC,
and Libga in t h e
a group of
l i k e minded r a d i c a l
Post-revolutionary d i f f i c u l t to f a t h o m .
I r a n i a n i n t e n t t o w a r d I r a q i s more
t r o o p r e d e p l o y m e n t other t h a t f o r i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t r .
Khomeini's strategic p e r s p e c t i v e appears to have an Hominem q u a l i t y .
H e made a n u m b e r o f
theatening statements
d i r e c t e d a t the p e r s o n o f S a d d a m H ~ t s s e i n , c a l l i n y h i m a t o n e point
H e also d i r e c t e d personal
both
i n c l u d i n g the S a u d i l e a d e r s a f t e r
1982.
'
l a t e r i l l u s t r a t e d d u r i n g t h e attempt t o n e g o t i a t e a t r u c e
betmeen I r a n and Iraq: h e i n s i s t e d that H u s s e i n b e put on The key
t r i a l a n d b e h e a d e d b e f o r e an armistice b e c o n c l u d e d .
to t h e i n f l u e n c e of
I r a n may be t h r o u g h a p e r s o n a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the A y a t o l ah.
Geography of
The Iraq-Iran
f r o n t the P e r s i a n G u l f border.
i n t h e S o u t h t o the common T u r k i s h
plains, d e s e r t and mountain
I t t r a n s i t s swamplands,
37
wasteland.
I n t h e s o u t h e r n b o r d e r r e g i o n t h a t has s e e n t h e
g r e a t e s t f i g h t i n g , the t e m p e r a t u r e r a n g e s f r o m j ~ ~ below s t
f r e e z i n g i n J a n u a r y i n the a i d - n i n e t i e s i n July. Winter
r a i n f a l l s are quite s e v e r e , w i t h a n a n n u a l r a i n f a l l of a b o u t
20 i n c h e s .
S i n c e the T i g r i s a n d E u p h r a t e s , w h i c h d r a i n t h e
a n d the K a r u n r i v e r ,
o u t of
c e n t r a l Iraqi b a s i n ,
the I r a n i a n
Zaqros m o u n t a i n . . ,
roi..itinel!j f l o o d s , swamplands.
the r i v e r
low lying
S e a s o n a l r a i n s can v a r y a5
a s 40%, tlc.weverr
a n d d u r i n g the f a l l o f
1980 r a i n s were u n u s u a l l y h e a v y .
The
the I r a q i f i e l d 5 a r e 100
t o 2012 miles w e s t o f
i n the N o r t h a t t i i r k u k .
I n t h e N o r t h e r n a n d c e n t r a l s e c t o r s l t h e Zagros r u n s a l o n g the I r a n i a n s i d e of
the b o r d e r c r e a t i n g a f o r m i d a b l e
obstacle.
T h e I r a q i t e r r a i n i n t h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r i s rrlcich a l t h o u g h i t is more
These a r e a s
f l a t t e r a l l the way t o B a g h d a d ,
m o u n t a i n o u s i n t c ~ i r d i s t a n a5 closer t o Turkey.
a r e r e l a t i v e l y a r i d , a l t h o u g h there a r e w o o d l a n d 5 i n the
hisher a l t i t u d e v a l l e y s a n d l a r g e c u l t i v a t e d a n d i r r g a t e d
a r e a s f r o m K i r k u i r to the S y r i a n b o r d e r
i n the west. 8
~ l a r j 5a
T h e Shatt:
to t:he w a r .
is a m e a n d e r i n g c h a n n e l ,
Karun r i v e r s , and makes
the lower b o r d e r b e t w e e n I r a n a n d
Iraq.
I t i s f r o m o n q u a r t e r t o three q u a r t e r s o f a m i l e w i d e
LIP
and silt5
rapidly if
i t is n o t k e p t c l e a r .
P o s s e s s i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f the S h a t t h a s r e m a i n e d a b o n e
of c o n t e n t i m i s i n c e i t wa5 u s e d a s a d e m a r c a t i o n ,
; ! i
lowever,
the c u r r e n t d e b a t e b e g a n i n 1 9 1 4 . T h e 1 9 1 4 t r e a t y , c l a r i f i e d
i n 1 9 3 7 , g a v e the b u l k o f the S h a t t t o I r a q , t h e n u n d e r
B r i t i s h control.
T h i s g a v e the I r a q i s the p o t e n t i a l o f
Iran continued to
r i .ii n g t e n s i o n e n s u e d .
W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of a t e m p o r a r y r a p p r o a c h m e n t d u r i n g
the 1 9 7 3 A r a b - I s r a e l i
war, f o r c e s a n d a c t i o n s o n the b o r d e r
c o n t i n u e d t o b u i lcl,
culmiinationg i n s e v e r a l border c l a s h e s
T h e l r a q i n e g o t i a t o r was S a d d a a H ~ i s s e i n , l a t e r
t o become the f i v - s t I r a q i c i v i l i a n h e a d o f s t a t e , a n d
i n i t i a t o r o f the I r a n - I r a q Following
thEs
war.
c o n t i n u e d t o imprcrve their m i l i t a r y f o r c e s ;
39
warl
a n d I r a n as p a r t o f Gulf r e g i o n .
i t s e m e r g i n g a g e n d a of s e c u r i t y f o r the
A more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f the f o r c e
powerful a l l i e s ,
c e n t r a l i z e d government i n f i r m c o n t r n l .
T h e I r a q i armg was c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e a g o o d
capabi l i t y l havinq undergone i n t e n s e s c r u t i n y , reorganization, and t r a i n i n g following its l a c l r l ~ i s t e r
p e r f o r m a n c e i n the 1 9 7 3 A r a b - I s r a e l i h a d more t h a n d o u b l e d i n s i z e .
War.
By
1 9 8 0 +:he army
IUAC
S p e c i a l emphasis
given to
A i r Forces and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n i t s .
T h e s e c u l a r R a a t h p a r t y h a d made u s e o f the i n c r e a s e d
p r o f i t a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h o i l r e v e n u e s a n d the s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g had improved. military a l l y of Additionallyl
the S o v i e t U n i o n was a
l o n g s t a n d i n g l h a v i n g s u p p l i e d the I r a q i
40
w i t h t h e Pei'ath
s o c i a l ism, ; ~ n t i - c o l o i i i a l i s r r ~ , a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f
I s r a e l . 10
A c c u r a t e f o r c e c o m p a r i s o n s are a l w a y s d i f f i c u l t .
This
any kind.
The
a l t h o u g h d i f f i c u l t o f v e r i f y o u t s i d e of c l a s s i f i e d
Ac, i l a u s e w i t z s t a t e s i n
SOC~~CFS.
the i n t r o d u c t o r y q u o t a t i o n , means
a r e l a r g e l y a matter o f f i g u r e s a n d e a s i l y m e a s u r e d ; the
s tr en gth of Iran's w i l l , ( i n Van C r e v e l d ' s
terms, " F i g h t i n s
P o w e r " ) i s . t h e b a s i c thesis q u e s t i o n .
T a b l e 3.1 shows s e l e c t e d e l e m e n t s f o r c o r n s p a r i s o n i n
T h e s e f i g u r e s c o v e r the p e r i o d I
w i l l f o c u s o n i n tmy a n a l y s i s o f
the w a r .
41
T a b l e 3.1
80-81
8 1 -82
82--83
Unk
D e f e n s e Spending,
t$
Ril)
4.2 240
4.2
195
1410
235
1735
1770
700 1300
67
1 075
1100
Un Ir
1100
665
725
7
Naval S e a g o i n g Warships
80-81
81-82 Un k 252
2600
2100
860
82-83
U n Ir
342 2300 3000 9013
D e f e n s e Spending,
(B R i l )
2500
1040 332 0
335
0
335
0
Naval S e a g o i n g W a r s h i p s
What c a n be y a t h e r e d f r o m t h e T a b l e 3. 1 i 5 t h a t r o u g h p a r i t y e x i s t e d i n q u a n t i t y o f e q u i p m e n t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of
the war, a l t h o u g h
especiallr i n A i r c r a f t .
armored f i g h t i n g vizhicles,
I n Naval S e a g o i n g W a r s h i p s ( F r i g a t e s a n d D e s t r o y e r s ) , I r a n s
edge a1 lowecl a n i n l i r l c d i a t e a n d p e r m a n e n t b l o c l . : a d e o f
Iraqi
o i l sea l i n c ! o f coirlrrlcinication.
T h e Q u a l i t y corr~parisori i s more d i f f i c u l t .
generall Iraq spent
Sincel
in
the q u a l i t y of
however,
t h e defensct! e : : p e n d i t u r e s
~ o ~ i r c( et . he Soviet U n i o n ) a n d l o a n s r e c e i v e d f r o m other
n a t i o n s ( n o t a b l y S a u d i A r a b i a d u r i n g the W a r ) . a f t e r t h e war c o m m e n c e d ,
The Iraqis,
Soviet a i r c r a f t o r d n a n c e ;
t h e q u a l i t y of Additionally,
t h e I r a q i p i l o t s w a s more t o b l a m e .
d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e d by the poor l o g i s t i c a l
p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d a n d t h e s i m p l e n e g l e c t a f t e r the Revolution.
A 5 a n example, almost 60X o f
the army h a d
Irans
the war
for m a i n t e n a n c e .
As I r a n s t i l l h e l d t h e A m e r i c a n e m b a s s y
personnel,
i t was i ~ i n l i k e l y t h a t i t w o u l d receive l a r g e s c a l e
43
l o q i s t i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m the west: f o r i t 5 h i g h e r q u a l i t y
western
esi.ii
pnien t
.
T h e E:quipment
I t is aszurr~edt h a t n o g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d b e t w e e n
I r a q a n d I r a n i n the q u a l i t y o f the e q u i p m e n t .
a n i n d i c a t i o n of I r a n s problem, Israel.
i t wirc:haced
d e s p e r a t i o n t o s o l v e the l o g i s t i c a l
r e p a i r p a r t s f r o m i t 5 5worn e n e m y ;
limited,
T h i s s n i . i r c e was
s t a b i 1i zed.
What i s n o t s t a t e d i n T a b l e 3.1
t w o s t r a t e g i c a r e a 5 of
i s major i n e q u i t e c i n
t o t a l ~ o p u l a t .o n 7
a long c o n f l i c t ;
GNF, a n d r e s e r v e m a n p o w e r .
44
79.--80
T o t a l population
(Mi I
)
80-01
38. 5
81-82 39.57
82-83 39.1
393
GNF
Ril)
84.7
30c1
Un k
4Gl0
112.1
IJn I r
Reserve Manpower
400
440
(0Q0s)
79-80
T o t a l popcilat ion
80-01 13.11
e 1-82
13.84
92-83 13.5
12.73
(Mil)
GNP
($
Bil)
21.4
39.0
Unk
250
Un k
75
Reserve Manpower
330
33Q
(000s)
45
What
is i r n n l e d i a t e l g n o t e d i s t h a t :
I r a n s popu1at:ion
is
o v e r three times Irac15; i n s i g n i f i c a n t i s a s h o r t war but d e c i s i v e i n a long one. Not u n e x p e c t e d l y , Irans reserve
m a n p o w e r g r o w s o v e r t i n e , while I r a q s s h r i n k s .
GNP a n d o i l o u t p u t g r e w d u r i n g the War.
Also,
Irans
Followiny a
1980.
Contrastinsly,
Iraq..
oil
l ~ ~
t o a c h i w / e rre-war
levels.
I r a q has a
P I 1 l i o n i n loan a n d l o a n s qi.i,.rrantees
T W D i m p o r t a n t f a c t s a r e e v i d e n t from a n a l y z i n g the
Oilualitr~ a n d Q i . i a n t i t y o f e q u i p m e n t a n d the s t a r t o f
the war.
First, Second,
c o n f l i c t b e c a u s e of
d e p e n d e n c e on o i l r e v e n u e . f a c t o r i s snia11 i n i t : i a l l y ,
T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of this second
but grows e x p o n e n t i a l l y a s t h e
war c o n t i n u e s .
RE!leVant
Denlographg.
I r a n is e t h n i c a l l y a n d r a c i a l l y d i v e r s e .
Primarily
(
lX!),
T h e Arab
is c o n c e n t r a t e d i n K h u z e s t a n ,
a5 p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d .
46
when i t
U J ~ Sf
o r c i b l y absorbed.
Conversely1 of
I r a q is e t h n i c a l l y A r a b w i t h the e x c e p t i o n However,
Turk a n d Kurd m i n o r i t i e s .
its p o p u l a t i o n is
s p l i t b e t w e e n t h e S u n n i i n t h e n o r t h a n d west a n d the
s h i i t e i n t h e e a s t a l o n q the I r a n - I r a q
LIF
border.
S u n n i s make
t h e ma,iority of o f f i c e r s i n t h e I r a q i a r m y , w h i l e
LIP
S h i i t e s make
the b u l k o f the e n l i s t e d f o r c e .
In s h o r t l t h e e t h n i c a l l y Arab, r e l i q i o u s l y S h i i t e
p o p u l a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t e r n
Iraq a b u t s on t h e d e m m y r a p h i c a l l y
i n Khuze5tan. It
similiar I r a n i a n Population
is worth n o t i n g
t h a t the ap1wa15 t o A r a b b r o t h e r h o o d by I r a q a n d S h i i t e
l o y a l t i e s b!j
I
I r a n were b o t h s i n g u l a r l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . 13
T w o p e r i o d s i n t h e war a r e a n a l y s e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l ;
f i r s t b e c a u s e the outcome o f e a c h was u n e x p e c t e d , and second
b e c a u s e the u n e x p e c t e d o u t c o m e may h e l p d e t e r m i n e I r a n i a n
i \,,. \, -
! \,
F i g h t i n g Power. Iraqi
T h e f i r s t i 5 the I r a n i a n r e a c t i o n t o the
i n v a s i o n a n d the s e c o n d is the I r a n i a n
coun t e r o f f e n s i v e c a m ~ p a i g n
.
T h e N o r t h e r n a r e a wa5 a t t a c k e d
t w o w i d e l y separated p o i n t s .
w i t h one d i v i s i o n a l o n g a b r o a d f r o n t n e a r W a s r - e - S h i r i n
,
a l o n q the t r a d i t i o n a l B a g h d a d -- T e h e r a n i n v a s i o n r o u t e .
It
was a p p a r e n t l y a d e f e n s i v e m o v e t o s e i i e d e f e n d a b l e t e r r a i n
t h a t w o u l d b l o c k access t o the f l a t t e r , rolling terrain
b e t w e e n t h e I r a n i a n b o r d e r a n d B a g h d a d . 14
~t was s u c c e s s f u l
47
as f a r s o u t h as M e h r a n , roi.igh1y 30 miles, b u t o n l y 3 t o Ei
miles d e e p .
Importantly,
i t was an a r e a p r o n l i 5 e d t:o I r a q by
but not
the Shah a 5 p a r t of
the 1975 A l g i e r F : t r e a t y ,
surrendeed.
No f u r t h e r a d v a n c e wa5 m a d e i n the a r e a .
T h e r e m a i n i n g f i v e a r m o r e d a n d m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n s made
t o seize
Khorramshar a n d A b a d a n .
Three d i v i s o n s c r o s s e d the b o r d e r
f u r t h e r n o r t h a n d b e y a i j t o d r i v e a l o n g two axes t o w a r d A h v a z
( t h e c a p i t a l o f tit1ur:estan p r o v i n c e ) a n d D e z f u l .
The primary
c o n s u m p t i o n a n d export.
T h e o p e r a t i o n c l o s e l r r e s e m b l e d the
the s u c c e s s f u l B r i t i s h I n v a s i o n i n 1941 i n s e v e r a l p e c t i
area,. f o r c e s i z e , and i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v e s . Initial I r a q i r e p o r t s were e c s t a t i c .
W i t h i n the f i r s t
However,
p r o g r e s s was slower
I r a q i f o r c e s s t o p p e d short o f
the Karrin r i v e r
part,
48
l a r g e c a s u a l t ies. U r i q ~ p s i t o n a b 1y
however,
the v i r u 1c n c e of
I r a q was f o r c e d o n the
defensive; tactically,
o p e r a t i o n a l l y , and strategically.
LIP d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s ,
and
a t t a c k s c o n s i s t e d o f h e a v r a r t i 1l e r y bombardment.
A number
the war, c o n ~ p l e t ew i t h e n t r e n c h m e n t s ,
eventually,
a r t i l l e r g d u e l s and,
cherriical w e a p o n s .
w h o felt
Operationally,
,\
,
a c t i v i t i e s s e e m e d t o cease. H u s s e i n , and
h i s s u p p o r t w o u l d e r o d e i f c a s u a l t i e s were h i g h ,
by the I r a n i a n r e s i s t a n c e ,
\y/ surprized . .
i
abandoned any
operational initiative.
S t r a t e g i c a l l y too,
Iraq proclaimed
t!;s d e f e n s i v e .
H u s s e i n m a d e his f i r s t o f f e r o f a c e a s e f i r e
I r a q n e v e r r e g a i n e d the
T h e I r a q i a i c ; a s s e s s m e n t was made by e v e r y o n e e l s e w h o
h a d e v a l u a t e d the c o m p a r a t i v e s t r e n g t h . others,
What I r a q , a n d
h a d m i s s e d w a s the s u r p r i s i n g I r a n i a n F i g h t i n g
Power.
T h e Q u a l i t g a n d Q u a n t i t y o f e q u i p m e n t was more e a s i l y
a n d I r a q w a s g i v e n a n e d g e , or a t l e a s t p a r i t y .
mieastrred,
However, F i g h t i n g Power, d i f f i c u l t to
nieastlre
e l e m e n t o f M i l i t a r y Worth, n u 1 i t p l i e d
the I r a n ' s
r e a c t i o n . 17
c a p a b i l i t y out o f
p r o p o r t i o n t o the a n t i c i p a t e d
49
Of
or the
T h e Fasdran
infantrr
force.
I t was p r i m a r i l i j i n Teheran a n d
t h e IRP.
U J ~ S
the o v e r t
c o e r c i v e e l e m e n t of a n d the R e q u l a r
T h e i n t e y r a t i o n of the Pacrlr.an
I r a n i a n a r m y !was e v e n t u a l 1 3 a f f e c t e d o u t o f
m i 1i t a r q n e c e s s i t y a n d i s s e p a r a t e l v a d d r e s s e d .
Achieving s t r a t e g i c : and t a c t i c a l s u r p r i z c ,
the I r a q i
n o r t h e r n o b j e c t i v e s were s e i z e d e a s i l y a n d n o o p p o s i t i o n was
i n i t i a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d i n the c o u n t r y s i d e i n the s o u t t l .
However,
the I r a n i a n s t r a t e g i c r e a c t i o n w a s s w i f t =ind
A i r strikes b e g a n a l n ~ o s tL
a p p a r e n t l y well planned.
air
a t t a c k e d Iraq
r e s e r v e s mobi i z e d , Such a r a p i d ,
H S L .
T h e Shahs army h a d d o n e e x t e n s i v e p l a n n i n g
everit;
or
.j~ist
~ L I C ~a In
i t i s 1 i k e l : J t h a t the c o n t i n g e n c y p a n 5
w a s the s p e e d ,:And
What c a n b e
e f f i c i e n c q i n t h e e x e c u t i o n o f these p l a n s .
50
c o n c l u d e d is t h a t t h e I r a n i a n a r m e d f o r c e s a c t e d w i t h e n e r g y a n d d i s p a t c h t o a t~olt--otit--of-..the--blue attack.
I t was n o t
the r e a c t i o n a n a r m e d f o r c e f r a c t u r e d by i n d i s c i p l i n e or
indecision;
it
was the r e a c t i o n o f
and single i n t e nt .
F r o m the f i r s t m o m e n t ,
i t 5 o f f i c e r s d u r i n g the
r e v o 1CI t i o n .
T a c t i c a l l q , t h E ! r e s i s t a n c e wa5 a l s o n o t e d f o r i t v i y o r .
Khoram~shar, the I r a n i a n c i t y c : I o s e e t t o the b o r d e r ,
d e f e n d e d s u c c e s f u l l y f o r o v e r a nioritti, a n d local m i l i t i a ,
was
i n i t i a l l y by p o l i c e
l a t e r by r e g u l a r army a n d P a s d r a i ~ f o r c e s .
s t u b b o r n t h a t i t wa5 r e n a m e d t u n i n s h a h
50
ia
p r e p a r a t i o n for urban warfare d i d n o t
Iraqs lack o f
5top
i t f o r m l a u n c h i n g h e a v y p e r s i s t e n t a t t a c l . - s . Nor d o e s i t
l o n g a f t e r the
or the e s u a l l y s t u b b o r n d e f e n s e of
16
w h i c h was n o t c l a i m e d by I r a q u n t i l However,
November a n d was c o n t e s t e d c o n t i n u a l l y .
i t can be
T h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e f r o n t wa5 l a r g e l y s t a b i l i z e d
w h i l e f i g h t i n g f o r the c i t i e s o f A b a d a n a n d t \ h o r a n 1 5 h a r w e n t
on i n t o O c t o b e r a n d November. r e d e p l o y m e n t s a n d preparation
BY J a n u a r g 1901 I r a n i a n
for the initial
51
counteroffensives
were i n p r o g r e s s .
i : + r m ! j l
Thrr. P a s c l r a n ,
s t i 11
separate f r o m t h e
was c o n c l u c t i n g n i y h t t i m w c r o s s
b o r d e r s a b o t a g e r a i ds.
T h e f i r s t major c o u n t e r - a t t a c l : :
at
Ir a n ian
Po 1 i t i c s
.
the B a t t l e o f Susarigerd.
T h e f a l s e start:;
Thf
II
I r a n i a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e a t S u s a n g ~ i - dW Z ~ S
beqinning.
I t resi..iltcd i n a s h a k e
LIP o f
army corrlnlani-1 a n d
It: was a l s o the
c o n t r o l l a n d t h r i n t e g r a t i o n of
the P a s d r a n .
cause f o r t h e e v e n t u a l
d o w n f a l l o f B a n i Sack.
P.ani Sadr,
F o r a number o f m o n t h s , Minister,
t h e n t t r r Prirrte
had p l a n n e d f o r a l a r y e s c a l e o f f e n s i v e t:o d r i v e
I t was h i s i n t e n t t o d e v e l o p t h e a r m y a 5 h i s and
the I r a q i 5 o u t . power b a s e ,
t o c e m e n t his p o s i t i o n a s
Ktlonleini.
l e a d e r w i t h the p e o p l e a n d i.kq<.\inst t h e
He was a1s;o a n : : i o u s t o f o r t i f y h i m s e l f
a t t a c k s o f his p r i n c : i p a l r i v a l s i n the r a d i c a l c l r r y y , wh o r s e
m i l i t a r y power b a s e was i n the P a s d r a n . The b a t t l e p l a n w a 5 a m b i t i o u s , c o n c e n t r a t i n g armor i n a inkcr I r a q .
the a t t a c k was m a d e w i t h o u t t h e P a s d r a n l a
P . a n i S a d r d i d n o t want: t o share his
c l e r g y w h o o p p u s e d him.
largely i n f a n t r y f n r c e .
v i c t n r r w i t h t h e the? r a d i c a l
me
tanks
c o u l d not b e s u s t a i n e d or d e f e n d e d ,
illere
l o s t or a b a n d o n e d . 20
A nurnber of
c r i t i c a l d e c s i o n s were m a d e a 5 as a r e s ~ i l t
of
the d e f e a t o f t h e b a t t l e o f S ~ i s a n g e r d .
F i r s t was
war.
T h i s was a p p a r e n t l y d i r e c t e d a t a l l
i n c l u d i n g B a n i S a d r a n d the
the qovm-nrrlent,
a l t t i o i . i g h the c l e r g y
s t i l l c h a m p i o n e d the
the
T h e u l t i m a t e r e s u l t was the c 5 t . a b l i s h m e n t of
S t r a t e g i c D~!fen5e Council,
which i n c : l u d e d B a n i S a d r ,
IRP
representat i v e s ,
t h e Army a n d P a s d r a n Coninianders.
T h i s was c l e a r a t the I s l a m i c
peace c o n f e r e n c e i n M a r c h ,
where he i n s i s t e d t h a t I r a q
and e f f e c t i v e l y s c u t t l e d
withdraw b e f o r e n e g o t i a t i o n s began,
the c o n f e r e n c e by i n s i s t i n g t h a t H u s s e i n ' s K o r a n i c a l l y
c o r r e c t p n n i s h e e n t was b e h e a d i n g .
the P a s d r a n a n d the r e g u l a r a r m y .
i n May,
When t h e
the P a s d r a n w a s
.-..-
a v i t a l p a r t o f the a t t a c k a n d b a t t l e f i e l d command a n d
control, a l t t l o u q t s s t i l l a t t h i s time a s s e p a r a t e u n i t s . "
53
First, i t w a s a s t u n n i n g
IjLICceSs.
i t was c o o r d i n a t p d b e t w e e n the! R e g u l a r s a n d P a s d r a n ,
as u e l l a s other Naval a n d A i r f o r c e s . T h i r d ,
from an o p e r a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e .
i t was p l a n n e d
be one of
I t may,
i n fact:,
the c a m p a i g n e s t a b l i s h e d
considerable Military
the I r a n i a n a r m y a s an i n s t r u m e n t of
Worth i n s p i t e o f c o i i s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c i . . i l t i e S i n I I ! ~ i i . i 1 i t f j a n d
L!LI<.Int i t y o f
e q u i pme n t
.
attacl.,s f r o m the
The i n t e n t o f
out of
I r a n by c o o r d i n a t e d m u l t i - d i v i s i o n a l
unexpected fronts.
b a t t l e f o r A b a d a n i n September 1981, o p e r a t i o n U n d e n i a b l e
T h e two d i v i s i o n
i n f i l t r a t i o n bg
l i g h t i n f a n t r y t o i u e n t i f y weal: s p o t s .
I t was f o l l o w e d u p b y
a t i d e n t i f i e d weak p o i n t s . Iraq
bia5
A 5 a r e s c i l t , Abadan
E rec:overd,
f o r c e d t o wit:hdraw
t o more d e f e n s i b l e t e r r a i n
54
a n d I r a n i a n LOCs were r e s t o r e d i n
S h o r t l r a f t e r the b a t t l e ,
c o n m a n d e r s were k i l l e d i n a p l a n e c r a s h . of
the a r m y t o a n e x t e n t , i t d i d n o t l o s e i t s c o n f i d e n c ~or i t s
initiative; i n nther words,
its f i g h t i n g s p i r i t .
T h a t theq
s h u r t time.
R e f e r e n c e s i n the thesis t o t h e I r a n i a n a r m y
March w i t h
13
100,00@
I r a q had
r e g u l a r s a n d 30,O0G1 P a s d r a n l i g h t i n f a n t r y .
corrmando f o r c e s b e h i n d I r a q i l i n e s ,
T h e I r a q i s , s ~ i r p r i s e d by b o t h the l o c a t i o n a n d s i z e
l a t e r c l a i m e d o v e r w h e l m i n g o d d s a n d human -, -, i s wave i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t s by f r e n - i e d r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c s .
the a t t a c k ,
T h i s is almost c e r t a i n l y f a l s e .
W h i l e i n f a n t r y was
55
it W a c also
I n o r d e r t o apw-eciate t h e s k i 11 a n d e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f
the I r a n i a n f i g h t i n g f o r c e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o fi::plain i t i n
greater detail.
Night attacks,
Rl05t
d i f f i c u l t a n d r e q u i r e the rmst d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g ,
staff
worC:r
I-ehearsal,
t r a i n i n g a n d l e a d e r s h i p , were r c u t i n e
t h r o u g h o u t t: h i 5 cam p a i g n
of
Un i t 5 , w h i c h wer e f r c??cien t 1Y
Fur e : : a m p l u ,
m i t:
contact, a c t e d w i t h i n t i a t i v e a n d e l a n .
snia11 d e t a c h m e n t : s o f
s p e c i f i c I r a q i posit:ions,
t o mask
th~? a r m o r e d p c m e t r a t : i o n r a n d as~ji.ire d h r F i a k t h r o o u q h .
N o t u n l r is thts t.f f e c t i v e n e s s ,
. . ~ g g r e s s i , F n r 5 = a n d s1:i I 1
of
the a r m y d e m o n s t r a t e d b y i t s v i c t o r y i n t h e s f ? d i f f i c u l t
b u t also i n the h i g h r a t i o s of
the I r a n i a n
about
a n d complex n i g h t o p e r a t i o n s , enemy t o f r i e n d l y d e a d .
D u r i n g this carripalgn,
,two t o
e q u i p p e d enemy i n s t r o n g e c h e l o n e d d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , n i g h t . 24
at
I t was a
COuragous,
effectivr.
and l e t h a l
performance t h a t : a n 9 army w o u l d b e p r o u d o f .
I t wa5
c e r t a i n l y n o t a s e r i e s o f s u i c i d a l a s s a u l t s by c r a z e d f a n a t i c s s e e k i n g m m r t y r d o m . 25
The b a t t l e d e s t r o y e d a n I r a q i a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n ,
a n d f o r c e d the
b u t was not w h o l l y
56
sncces;sfi..il.
the d o u b l e
while I r a q i c a s i . i a 1 t i e s
I r a n i a n c a s u a l t i e s a n d M I A s were
26 c l o s e t o 10IOQO.
I n these b a t t l . e s ,
the I r a n i a n f o r c e s s e l d o m a c h i e v e d
the three t o o n e f o r c e r a t i o t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y f o r
succcssful attack,
h.it were s ~ ~ c c e s s f u al nyway.
li/
--
G i v e n the
g r o w i n g d s a d ~ / a n t a ? i c + zi n the Q u a l i t y a n d c h i a n t i t y of e q u ip in e n t:
the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e a s p e c t of F i g h t i n g Power i s
the I r a n i a n l a n d f o r c e s p m i E r f u 1
i n d i c a t e d as +tic: 5m.irce of
Close o n t h e
Three d i v i s i o n s u s e d i n the
D e z f c i l t o the s o u t h e r n
p r e v i o u s b a t t l e werc r e d e p l o y e d f r o m f r o n t n e a r tihoranlshahr.
Three s e p a r a t e d i v i s i o n s i z e
a s s a u l t 5 t o w a r d s e p a r a t e t a r g e t s p u s h e d a c r o s s the Kariin
i t w a s p r e c e d e d by
n i q h t i n f a n t r y a t t a c k s f o l l o w e d by r a p i d l y c o n c e n t r a t e d
armored attacks.
T h i s time, h o w e v e r ,
h e 1 i c o p t e r s were the
pri.mary a i r s u p p o r t weapons.
Rg 24 IMay,
1982, the I r a q i d e f e n s e w a 5 c r w n b l i n y a l l
a l o n g the f r o n t , Khui.estan,
I r a n i a n f o r c e s had v i r t u a l 1 . ~ cleared
a n d a d v a n c e d t o w i t h i n 15 miles o f the I r a q i c i t y
o f Basra.
Khoran~shahr~ which t i u s s e i n h a d v o w e d n e v e r t o
57
5 ~ 1 r r e n d e rf~e l l ,
a n d I r a q h a d l o s t almost 20.000 k i l l e d a n d
a l m o s t a 5 marig p r i s o n o - s t o I r a n .
I t war; a n i n d i c a t i o n o f the d e s p e r a t i o n o f the I r a q i
f o r c e s , t h a t n e w l y f o r r n e d " t r i p l e d i g i t " r e s e r v e u n i t s had
b e e n c a l l e d t o the f r o n t ,
a 5 w e l l as f o r e i g n w o r k e r s .
V o l u n t e e r s f o r other n a t i o n s ,
alreadir h e e n u s e d i n t h e f i g h t i n g .
F o l l o i ~ i i n q the f i r s t : two y e a r 5 o f
t h p w a r l major
th e
a c t i v i t i e5
1oilrc!d c o n s i d e r ; . I b 1y
I r a ? c o c i 1 d n o t b r val:
E e a
I r a n i a n h o l d o n thr? P e r s i a n G u l f
l i n e s o f r:ornmiiriicatiol.i, albeit
a 1 t hoLlg tl i t c a r r i e d o u t a n i n c r e a s i n g l r a m b i t i o u s ,
1 a r g e 1y
n e f f e c t i v e a i r war a g a i n s t t h e I r a n i a n o i l p o r t s a t I r a n a n o i l e::port.s c o n t i n u e d
K h a r i I5 and.
t o r i s e aiid h i t :
Iraq's
More r e c e n t l q ,
f f enc:d
c o n 9i d t ? r a b 1y w h 6.m
the W a r moved i n t o I r a q .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , r e d u c t i o n i n the
t e l l . 31
period.
T h e Khonleini g o v e r n m e n t ,
5 e t t i n g political ob.ject.ivss,
p a ~ i s e , alt:hoi.ic)h
i n s i s t e d t h a t t h c war c o n t i n u e u,ithoi.it
the
5s
m i l i t a r r l t ? a d e r s h i i > , e s t i m a t i n g j , t s lou, p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f
5 ~ 1 c c e 5 5 ,s t r i m s l y i::oi..inselled a p a ~ i s et o r e b u i l d .
Additionallr,
t h e r e ? was no s h o r t a g e o f v o l u n t e e r s f r o m the
T h e r e s u l t wa5 i n a d e q u a t e l y
During this p e r i o d ,
p e o p l e f o r the war e f f o r t .
n e v e r f a i l e d f o r lac:): o f c o u r a g e ,
of
b u t d i d r e d u c e the r a n k s
the P a s d r a n t h r o u g h a t t r i t i o n .
A f t e r si:: y e a r s of s t r u g g l e ,
the w a r c o n t i n u e s w i t h o u t
s i q n of a compromise.
Recpnt e v e n t s h a v e s u q q e s t e d t h a t the
t w o f r o n t o f f e n s i v e was a p p a r e n t l y s u c c e s s f u l , a l t h o u g h i t
i s s t i l l tni:) e a r l y to e x a l t l a t e the t r u t h u f
the m a t t e r .
In
any e v e n t ,
i t i s clg!ar
e v i d e n c e t h a t the war g o e s o n a n d
I r a n c o n t i n u e s t o press i n t o Iraq.
I r a q w i l l not s u r r e n d e r ,
I r a n is u n w i l l i n g t o s t o p , and
I n 5 h o r t r I r a q c a n not: w i n a n d c a n n o t
Barring
quit;
I r a n c a n n o t he d e f e a t e d a n d w i l l n o t s t o p .
(SLIC~I
unforeseen circumstances,
a 5 r e v o l u t i o n or l a r g e s c a l e
(such a 5 b e t w e e n
I s r a e l a n S y r i a ) , o r i n the g r a d u a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f I r a q .
59
the f i r s t two y e a r 5 of w a r ,
lcvo15. Depth
Wac
evident
in
the a i r d e e p a t t a c k s a n d e f f e c t i v e ~ { s o ef {jeep i n s e r t i o n o f
conmando forces. tactical
level,
T h e b a t + : l e s where ~ y ~ i c h r . o n i ; : e c a lt
carefully
t i m i n g the use of
i n f a n t r y and
armor 5 ~ 1 c c e s s f ~ 11 y 1a t n i g h t .
The c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e campaign,
198:;'
offensives,
were
a r t ; a c o m b i n a t i o n o f o f f e n s i v e s purichec.
i n t o t h e i r own t e r r i t o r y .
i t rests
and
A m e r i c a n d o c t r i n e is v e r y s i m i l i a r i n t h a t
also rest u p o n a y i l i t y ,
initiative,
synchronization, However,
d e p t h , a5 w e l l a5 on v i o l e n t e x e c u t i o n .
American
i n the I r a n i a n t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e , i u i t h
of IJS e l i t e f o r c e s .
However, the
the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t : i o n
I r a n i a n s c 1 c c e 5 s s u g g e s t s an u n e x p e c t e d l y o f f e n s i v e r o l e f o r
light i n f a n t r y f o r c e s .
G i v e n s u f f i c : i e n t F i g h t i n g P o w e r , and
60
adcqi.iater
c o o r d i n a t e d A i r a n d A r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t r there i s n o
50
redson t h a t c a s u a l t jes n c x d be
high,
a n d o v r r y reason t o
b e l i e v e t h a t such f o r c e s w o u l d b e s u c c e s s f i i l
rrmst d e t e ? r r a i n e d def c!nse.
a g a i n s t thc
T h e I r a n i a n s r by a g g r e s s i v e use of
assault force,
l i g h t i n f a n t r y a5 a n
s u p p o r t e d by a r t i l l e r y a n d f o l l o w e d by armor,
arc! r r i p e a t e d l r s n c c : e s s F u l
a g a i n s t a S o v i e t stvle e c h e l o n e d
p u ~ s i b l eu s i n g o f f r ? n 5 i v e l a g g r e s i v e o p o r a t i o n E r i f
the
ccimnlander is w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t the r i s k nf h i g h c a s u a l t i e s .
W i t h i n t h e 1 i n t i t : a t i r i n s of the t e r r a i n r a n d I r a q i a p p l i c a t i o n
of S o v i e t Doi:trine,
t h i s may b e a n i m p o r t a n t 1 r . s s o n .
AE
ntinimi.imr
i t deservt.!c, g r e a t e r s t u d y .
T h e c o n t i n u e d o f f e n s i v e s by I r a n t e s t i f y t o i t s
c n n t i n u e d abundarici: of F i g h t i n g Power, althoLiqh i t s 1 0 s ~ 111~
the Q u a l i t y a n d t > u d i i t i t y of e q u i p m e n t r e d u c e d i t s M i l i t a i - y
Worth.
However,
i t c o n t i n u e d t o p r o s e c u t e the w a r
s u c c e s s f u l l y r a5 rsc.:ent e v e n t s t e s t i f y .
I t is c l e a r t h a t s o n ~ e t h i n gh a p p e n e d w h i c h r a d i c a l l y a n d
p e r h a p s p e r m a n e n t l y c h a n g e d the F i g h t i n g P o w e r o f
the
T h i s o c c u r r e d w h e n the O u a l i t y a n d
Q u a n t i t y o f e q u i p a c n t was e r o d i n g .
61
I t i 5 l o g i c a l t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o i i iuas tlte
prc?::irrtate c a i 1 5 ~ of
t h i s r a d i c a l change.
The pcnpls,
t h e arrrty
a n d the g n v e r n r r t e n t ,
I t i s the p ~ i r p o s eo f
the C h a p t e r
Enlbat.tled,
Strsphr?ri R . Grirnmon, T h e I r a n - I r a q War: Islam ( W a s h i n q t o n D. C. : P r a e g e r P u b 1 i 5 h t ~ 5 , ICrEIZ), p . Cordesmanr The Gulf 545, 6 4 8 , 579.
650. 549.
15.
2. A n t t t o n g H. S t r a t e g i c S t e b i l i t y , p.
3.
4.
a n d the Search f o r ,
p.
p.
5.
5.
R.
p. p.
Grunimon.
Ttie I r a n - I r a q
War, p.
15.
A n t t i o i i j H. Ibid.,,
S i r a t e q i c S t : a b i l it!i,
7.
Cordesnlan, T h e G u l f h4D.
a n d the S e a r c h f o i -
545.
8.
Iraq: A-c,r~lrfi.!:rr
9.
Richatd F.
Flyrop,
ed.,
Iran:
A Ccriuritrcl
Study,
p.
36.
_ Iraq: _
il.Data i i i T a b l e 3.1, 3 . 2 , a n d 4 . 1 a r e t a l : e n f r o n t XI:. @.ilf a n d t h e Searcti f o r S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t c l by A n t h o n y H. C o r d e s m a n , pp. 756, 7 4 3 . Source o f S t a t i s t i c s i 5 T h e Pli1tars.i. R a l . a n c e a n d s t r a t e g i c S u r v e c l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , (Carribridye, England: H e f f e r s P r i n t e r s L t d . , various years).
12. A n t h o n q H. C o r d e s m a n , T h e G u l f a n d the S e a r c h f o r %.r&r?gic S t a b i l i t x , pp. 7 2 8 , 7 3 2 . A 1 5 0 see Hickman, Havayed a n d Reborn., p. 1 .
13. A n t h o n y H. S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y , p.
Iran-Ii-aq
14. W?E,
I b i d . . , p. p. 25.
651; A l c l : ~S t e p h e n R.
Cord1?5niai1, 640.
h63.
63
G r u ~ r l n ~ o n 1-h~. ,
15. A n t h o n y H. SStrategic, S t . : i h i l i t y , p.
Ttie G u l f a n d t h E ! . ~ e a r c I lfor-
16.
I b i d . , p.
17.
18.
19.
F ' . 6761.
26. l d i l l i a w F . H i c k m a n , F!avase!.!d and f < e t ~ > r nT : t~e, ( W a 5 h i n g t o r 1 , D. i. : T h e R r o o I ; . i n g s I r a n i a n Army, 19R':, I n s t i t u t i o n , 19S.2) P. 25.
21. E c o n o m i s t , F r b r u a r g 21, 1901. T h i s c h a n s e f o r I*:horneini, hut the e v e n t s u n d e r s c o r e d i t .
not a
Anthnn!.j H . S t r a t e g i c S+:i.ibilit~-i,p .
22.
__
C n r d e s m a n , T h e G u l f a n d t h r ? Sr?ar.ch f r r .
670.
'23" ::it.
3.
p.
673.
2b.
p.
674.
27.
28.
p.
p.
p.
673.
677.
3.
549.
39. C e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e Fi.11 l&.i~c., V o l 85, Flunlber 2 1 8 5 , Dec::ember, 1 9 8 5 p . 68. and Earry Rubin, "Pliddle East: Search f o r P e a c e " , F o r e i s r i Affa-, F e t w u a r y , 1 9 0 5 , p . .50Cio
31. 32.
Ibid., Ibitl.,
12.
727.
p.
68;'.
64
C h a p t e r Four
T h e E f f e c t o f the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n on t h e I r a n i a n Army
moral
f a c t o r s arid t h e i r of t e n i n c r e d i b l e e f f e c t ;
this is
t h e n o b l e s t a n d most z o l i d n o u r i s h m e n t t h a t the m i n d o f a
g e n e r a l may d r a w from
5ti.1dy o f
the p a s t : . . .
C a r l Von Clausewitz
65
I n the C h a p t e r
one?
F i , . ~ h t i n g Powk?r a n d t:hE!
army, a n d g o v e r n m e n t
trinitg.
the
t h a n i t a p p e a r e d due t o i t s weal:.
In
I w i l l p r u p o s e tlidt t h e 1 5 1 a m i c :
t t j e
r E ? v o l u t i o n wa5 t h e c a u s e O F
arrriy5 F i g h t i n g
signif icunt
increase
in the
Power, a n d e : : p l o r e the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h a t
i.15e
c h d n g e o n the mi 1 i t a r q
The revolution
of
h a d bottl d i r P c t ,
C h a p t e r two,
a revolution of
Islarnic revolution,
o f a 5ocietr.
I n the ca5e o f
i t was t i e d
c l o s e r t o the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e n t o f the p e o p l e % t i r o u g h t h e
n a t u r e of
t h e p o p u l a r r e v o l u t i o n a n d the a c t i o n s a r i d
Through d i r e c t
a t t i t u d e s of the s o l . d i w - s t h e m s e l v e = .
p r e s s u r e by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t ,
i t uras c t i a n q e d i n
The
5 p i r i t a n d i n t e n t t o f i t the g o v e r n m e n t 5 airas.
through
5 i s n i Ficantly
st w i g t hened
.
the i - e v o l u t i o n was n o t a n u n a l l o y e d b l e s 5 i n g
However,
f o r the m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of
a n d t h e I r a q i inva!;ion,
Iran.
Eetween t h e r e v o l u t i o n
Those r e m a i n i n g ,
t h e i r o f f i c e r s , were u n d i s c i p l i n e d ,
T o mal::e r n a t t : e r s worse,
g r e w r a p i d 1 2 worse
as w e s t e r n s o ~ i r c e 5c3f
eqi I
s u p p l y were c u t o f f .
Technoloqical
E tj o r
t age
of
T o e x p l a i n how the r e v o l u t i o n e n a b l e d t h a t a r m y , w h i c h
had 5 e r i o u s f l a w s equipment, .ind
,kc3
start: w i t h ,
rapidly deterioratinq
rebellious personnel,
to s t o p a n d defeat a
i s the i n t e n t o f
this
larqer a n d b e t t e r e q u i p p e d i n v a d e r , chapter.
E f f e c t on the P e o p l e ,
Army,
Government R e l a t i o n s h i p .
is h a r d t o o v e r e s t i m a t e .
ti.honieini
was
a p o p u l a r a n d a c c l a i m e d f g u r e a n d the revoli.i+:ion
nothing i f not
d
was
~10p~ilis rt evolt.
In Ira?,
e : : il e i n F r a n c e , b ; t m m i e i n i s s p e e c h e s a n d p h i l o s o p h y were broadcast:
from moEiqi..ies t h r o u g h o u t
Iran.
In f a c t ,
his exile
57
by S a d d a m H ~ i s s e i i i i n c i . e a s e d h i s a b i l i t r t o i n f li..ience t h e
'
so m a n i f e a t was tiis p o F i L i I a r i t y l
ac.:claim a n d P o w e r l
and a
that h i s r e t u r n t o I r a n was a c e l e b r a t i o n
e v e n b e f o r e the post-Shah
t.13
foi-in
y o v e r n m e n t f e l l l he a p p o i n t e d a new P r i m e M i n i s t e r
new yovernnlent. 5
ti o t orw i n i ' 5 p r i ma r 'J
t ti erne was a I. r ea c l ~ j ~
Ep R 1!-J
i n y r a i ri e cl
in
ttle
o f a r i g h t i c ~ t 5 l i f e ; a n d . t h a t d i s o b e d i e n c e t o them was an
act aqjainst Allah and
the tioran.
pc!rceivecl
in justices;
the S h a h ' s o p t i l e n t
l i b e r a l westrcrn n o t i o n s ,
a n d the d e l i b e r a t e t e r r u r s k r r a t l by
his s e c r e t o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,
i t is s m a l l
iuoi1dt.r
t h a t t\'horneini
then t o a
the
w h i c h were n a t u r a l l y a l l i e d by
common i n t e n t l
became f u r t h e r c e m e n t e d a5 chal l e n g e a f t c r
c h a l l e n g e l b o t h i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l , were s u c c e s s i 1 . ~l1 y
met. As w o u l d tie e x p e c t e d l
the f e e l i n g of the p e o p l e f o r t h e
a r m y was s t r o n y l q e f f e c t e d by Khomeini's a t t i t u d e a n d
w - o n o u n c e m e n ts.
d n s e r t : a n d j o i n the r e v o l u t i o n ,
At
w i t h con5iderable effect. b
t o r e s i s t the
army,
the s o l d i e r s a5 b r o t h e r s .
"YCJLI
R I L I ~a ~p p e a l
ti3
t h e s o l d i e r ' s h e a r t s even i f
the3 f i r e
on a n d k i l l you.
ILet them k i l l f i v e t h o u s a n d ,
ten t h o ~ ~ s a n d ~
t w e n t y thCiLlCiarid--thEy
WE'
this was a l s o
i n the o p i n i o n o f
T h i s a i y h t also have
b e e n a s h r e w d t r i c k by a s k i l l f u l r e v o l u t i o n a r y who i n t e n d e d
t o s i . { b v e r t the m i 1 i t : a r g .
Khomeini's
However,
a5 w e s h a l l see,
He w a s
l a t e r a c t i c i n s bore out t h i s a t t i t u d e .
sui. te s u p p o r t i v e o f s o l d i e r s a n d o f f i c e r s o f good I s l a m i c
c r e d e n t i a l s a n d had n o i n t e n t i o n of r e p l a c i n g t h e fact,
~I-IIIY.
In
he i n t e n d e d t o m a i n t a i n the a r m y , q u i t e u n l i k e the
c o n l m u n i s t l o a d e r s of the T u d e h r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s c o m m i t t e e s .
a l a r y e number
There
a l l grader; f l e d w i t h t h e i r
was a p p a r e n t l q n o w h o l e s a l e " r e i q n o f
terror" , w h i c h
O f F i c ~ r s , wtiu were,
5eixritg a p p a r a t u s .
the
R I C J S ~p
T h e remiaindc-r,
alnlwst 310,
were a l l o w e d
A l t h o u y h mr:lny
there i r l i t t l e
In f a c t , +:his
an indi5criminatt= housecleaning.
w a s r e s i s t e d b y the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t .
K h o m e i n i r e c o g n i z e d the n e e d f o r a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y a n d intended t o m a i n t a i v one. derrionstrations, ~onseqi.iently, pressure,
a n d d e m a n d s b y l e f t i s t e l e m e n t s to
a5
a g r e a t e r d a n g e r t o the r e v o l u t i o n i f the a r m y w a s
disbanded. S a i d a n o t h e r way,
he f e l t a g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y
t h r e a t f r o m the r i v a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y f a c t i o n s t h a n f r o m the
counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h r e a t o f t h e army.
12
movements.
As w i t h t h e S h a h b e f o r e h i m l
Khoaeini w a 5
the P a s d r a n at: a b o u t
AT-
the i n i t i a l
p u r g e i n the m i 1 i t a r c J was
I t wa5 a p p a r e n t l y i n t e n d e d as the c o e r c i v e
w i n g o f the I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n a r y P a r t y a n d a n a d d i t i o n a l
s a f e g u a r d i n the e v c n t o f
the C o ~ i p by r o y a l i s t o f f i c e r s , a s
had o c c u r r e d iuher1 M o s s a d e q h a d a t t e m p t e d t o o v e r t h r o w t h e
S h a h i n 1953. l 3
I t e v e n t u a l l y reached a s t r e n g t h of a b o u t
the
30,000 a n d remained i n i t s i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y r o l e u n t i l
Iraqi invasion. I n a n e f f o r t t o s u p p o r t the army a s a n i n s t i t u t i o n ,
1979 r e q u i r i n g s ~ i p p o r t f o r the
the I s l a m i c
i n % l u l y , 1979, K h o n e i n i
a n m e s t y f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e m e n l pol i c e m e n , m e m b e r s o f t h e S h a h s s e c ~ i r i t ya p p a r a t u s .
H i s amnesty
i n d i c a t e s h i 5 i n t e n t t o keep those
71
t h r e e elen1ent.5; t h e I r a n i a n arrny,
the g o v e r n m e n t (t\'honleini 1 ,
s t r o n g l y bonded.
a n d I and t h e n o b l e p e o p l e f o r g i v e t h e m .
15
However,
b~.!3 i 11.
Khomeini
U J ~ Sc
onvinced of
the n e c ~ s 5 i t yo f a rr~ore
Mi.ictafa
thorcxtgh p u r g e my h i 5 new m i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e ,
C ti amran
C h a m r ~ nh a d c o n s i d e r a b l e m i 1 i tai-y r e v o 1 u t : i o n a r y
the AMAL t c + r r o r i s t s
e x p e r i e n c e i n L e b a n o n a5 o r g a n i z e r of
regime a n d i n n e e d o f t o t a l r e v i s i o n ,
he began a thorough
a n d i t s e f f e c t was w i d e s p r e a d .
t h a t o v e r o n e t h i r d o f the f i e l d g r a d e o f f i c e r s were r e m o v e d
f r o m s e r v i c e , or roi..ighly 9000 a r m y o f f i c e r s . O f f i c e r s who
t h e a b o r t i v e h o s t a g e r e s c ~ i ea t t e m p t , were e s p e c i a l l ! ~
5juspect.
-IL
T h e S h a h had
sent the b e s t of h i v o f f i c e r s t o b e e d u c a t e d a b r o a d ,
t h e U n i t e d States.
many to
S i n c e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h U n i t e d S t a t e s uia5
e v i d e n c e o f q~iestic31lable l o y a l t y , most o f
these o f f i c e r s i n
the a r m y were r e m o v e d .
However,
i t a l s o m e a n t t h a t those
0 f . f i c e r s r e m a i n i n g were l o y a l
t o the r e v n l u t i n n , a n d more
importantly,
the g o v e r n m e n t ' s
In addition, half
it5 prerevolutionary s i z e .
thE!
h a d this a f f e c t on
c o n c r i p t e d e n l i s t e d f o r c e , arid t h 0 5 ~
T h e e n d r e w l t wa5 n o t a s h o r t a g e o f t r a i n e d o f f i c e r 5 ,
s i n c e t h e s i z e o f both the e n l i s t e d f o r c e a n d the o f f i c e r
c o r p s w a 5 c u t almost i n h a l f ,
c h a r a c t e r o f the o f f i c e r s a n d s o l d i e r s r e m a i n i n g .
was n o l o n g e r t o t h e S h a h
( p e r s o n a l pledg1?5
of
l o y a l t y were
r e m o v e d e v e n b e f o r e he l e f t ) , b u t t o t h e I s l a n ~ l cr e v o l u t i o n
Islam.
I n s h o r t the army e t h i c
"the
web 5 y s t e n i "
t o an e t h c o f mi i t a r y s e r v i c e t o the
thE1
r e v o l u t i o n and
n a t: on.
v a c i e 5 wa5
dl50
T h i s c h a n g e CI constitution.
r e f l e c t e d e d i n t h e new
C h a m r a n g a v e the a r m y two s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s .
T h e f i r s t was straisht f o r w a r d ;
to guard Iran's
as
independence,
( N o t to t h e S h a h or a n y other i n d i v i d u a l ,
73
u n d e r the P a h l a v i ' s ) .
revolution.
S i i i c e .I:hc! I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n w a s e x p l i c i t l y
a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n scope, dimensions. this
d e f i n e d a5 p a n - i s l a m i c :
mission had i n t e r n a t i o n a l
"Our d e f e n s i v e f o r c e s r t h e r e f o r e , s h o u l d be i n t r u s t e d n o t
o n l y w i t h the d u t i e s o f s a f e g u a r d i n g o u r c o u n t r y ' s
f r o n t i c r s ; t h e y s h o ~ i l da l s o be c a p a b l e o f w a g i n g d o c t r i n L 3 1
j i h a d i n the n a m e o f A l l a h a n d the e x t e n s i o n o f His d o m a i n . " --.The I r a n i a n Corist i t u t i o r i , The army, s u p p o r t of
19R3. 17
n e e d e d the
h a v i r i g a c c e p t e d the d u a l m i s s i o n s ,
the g o v e r n m e n t ,
a n d Chamran s t r e s s e d thc.
r e q u i r e m e n t : f o r o b E ? d i e n c e t o the c : h a i n o f
command,
but
the command" 18
the r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o u n c i 1s.
rlost i m p o r t a n t ,
however,
f o r the people, a r m y ,
the I r a n i a n I s l a m i c a r m y .
First,
the
el i m i n a t i n g c l a s s b a r r : i e r s a n d p r o g a n d i z i n g thc a r m y
nation's d e f e n d e r and protector o f
clr,
the
part
the r e v o l u t i o n .
111
74
the
p e o p l e t h e n the get u n t e s t e d arnii]; but: i t was alsm the o b s e r v a t i o n by Khoiriein i ' 5 d e f e n s e a d v i s e r s t h a t the r i g i d i t y " of
"
c 1a s s
pre-revolutionary
i n the
p i - o t r a c t e d warfare a n t i c i p a t e d . Second,
the,
e n t i r e n a t i o n was t o b e c o m e a n a r m y , w i t h
the' m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l s p r o v i d i n q the e x p e r t i s e . 2 0
"We b e l i e v e t h a t the e n t i r e I r a n i a n n a t i o n s h o u l d
bei:oae
the s o l d i o r s o f
the r e v o l u t i o n . . . . T h e
army shni.ild
a l s o be t u r n e d i n t o a s p e c i a l i z e d a n d m o d e r n t c c t l n i c a l
cadre. "--Chamran,
O c t o b e r 9,
1979. 21
professionals with a
i n f a c t the a r m y a n d t h e p e o p l e
the same s y s t e m .
Ktionieini's
s h r ~ rl ty a f t e r C h a n t r a n ' s s t a t e m e n t o n Q c t u h e r
began
d
T h e "Army o f 33 M i l l i o n "
sonietinies
r e f f e r r e d t o as the P a s s e j v o l u n t e e r s . Third,
out of
the a r m y a n d a r m y O f f i c e r s were to s t a y s t r i c t l y
T h i s l a s t was a l s o i n t e n d e d t o e n h a n c e ttle
politics.
s e c u r i t y of
the g o v e r n m e n t ;
however,
i t h a d the i n d i r e c t
75
e f f e c t of
c l a r i f y i n s the army, y o v e r n m o n t r e 1 a t : i o n s h i p a n d
As e t a t c d tiy
e n h a n c i n g the a r m y ' s ~ ) i ^ n f e 5 s i o n a le t h i c .
clear, separate
T h e y rerjtorecl d i E c i p l i n e l
and
e n h a n c e d c o h e 5 i c i n r a n d d p f ' i n e d the n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e : :
mi 1 i t a i - y m i s s i o n s .
T h i s was d r i v e n i n p a r t by the r i a t u r e o f t h e p o ~ ? u l i s t
Islamic revolutirin. i n p a r t by o t h f ? r t h r e a t s t o the a n d i n p a r t bu n t i z t r i i s t
f l e d 4 1 i n s r e v o l i . i t i o n a r y government:,
of
the o l d m i l i t a r y h c i r a r c h y .
A l t h o u q h t h i s wa5 n o t s o l e l y
m o t i v a t e d by a d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t t o e n t r a n c e the m i l i t a r y
power o f
r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n l i t had the c ? f f e c t o f
the C 1 a i . i s e w i t z e a r . i t r i n i t g , a n d t h e r e b y ,
the armq's
F i (3 h t i n g Fower.
Effects of
the R e v o l u t i o n the Q u a l i t y a n d c j l u a n t i y o f
E q u i pmen t
I n this s e c t i o n I w i l l e x p l o r e the e f f e c t o n the Q u a 1 i t y a n d Q u a n t i t r y a n d e q u i p m e n t a n d o n the F i g h t i n g P o w e r of
the p r e - i n v a s i o n
I r a n i a n army.
76
As was n o t e d i n e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s ,
the Q u a l i t y a n d
O u a n t i t y o f the I r c r n i a n a r m y s e q u i p m e n t was a r e f l e c t i o n Of
t ti t? S h a ti r,
e?i.iipnient
1t1
A 1 t hous, h t : toe
was p l c i n t i f c i l
a n d the b e s t a v a i l a b l e ,
i t came f r o m
I n the b e c t o f
--
I . .
t h i n g s b e c a m e d e c i d e d l y worse.
As n o t e d i n T a b l e 4 . 1 ,
the e q u i p m e n t w a s s t i l l there,
Defpnse
b u t i t s combat r e a d i n e s s was r a p i d l y e r o d i n g .
Acquistions,
same the f i r s t y e a r .
A c q u i s t i o n p a y m e n t s c o n t i n u e d i n rnany
w w e d r o p p i n g b e f o r e the r e v o l u t i o n .
s~istainrrlentand maintenance,
The
a n d i t was
the t r a i n e d t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l ,
largely
w w e a n t i . - r h a t I a n d made n o g r e a t e f f o r t t o
In
a n y c:aser d u r i n g ; i n d a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n ,
there were a f a r
77
T a b l e 4.1
77-78
D c f e n s e S p u n d i n s ($F,i 1
ManpouJar
7.9 342
(0005)
Reserves ( 0 0 0 s )
Tank5
300
16::o
300
1735
1735
103
A r r r m r P d F i 3 t~ ?: i 11y ?.r? t~ i c: 1 e5
A r t i 1lery
2250
714
40 1
1075
782
78;:
715
7
Hi 3 h P e r f o r miin c u A i i -c r A f t
Naval Seagoing W a r s h i p s
669
7
78
the 1 9 7 9 l e v e l .
However,
m i l i t i a b e g a n t o g r ( 3 w c o n s i d e r d b l y , w h i l e the d e f e n s e budget:
rerrla i n e d r e 1 a t i v e 1i j 5t a b 1F! 3
~t ttse
5dlllE
time,
combat Therefore,
1 0 5 5 e 5 f o r c e d the a c q u i s i t i o n o f new e q u i p m e n t .
once a g a i n ,
m ain tenance.
l i t t l e money wa5 a v a i l a b l e f o r s u s t a i n m e n t a n d
E s t i m a t e s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y of
e=!i.iipmwnt
the m i l i t a r y
a f t e r t w o y e a r s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t v a r y T h e r t e f o r e ? , e v e n t.hough
by tqpc? a n d r a n g e f r o m 40% t o 7 0 Z . 24
509%. 5
( I t i s a l s o w o r t t s n o t i n g t h a t : a f t e r the i n v a s i o n , the
Iranian t:echnicians and maintenance personnel t o
especially aircraft, w a s
a b i l i t y of
T h i s c a n b e a t t r i h u t e d t o the conlnlitnlent of
the s u p p o r t f o r c e , a1t:hough
i t may d l 5 0 b e a t e s t a m e n t t o
111 a n y
the courage of
case,
the p i l o t s w h o f l e w the a i r c r a f t .
the i t is a r e f l e c t i o n o f the c o h e s i o n r m o r a l e ,
i n ~ i t s c i r t , the F i g h t i n g Power of the Armed
dedication, forces,
t h a t : allowed i t t o o c c u r . )
T h e e r o s i a n of materiel r e a d i n e s s a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n
If Fiqhting
79
t o meet a n d d e f e a t the I r a q i s , e v e n t h o u y h I r a n s o v e r a l l
Q ~ i a I i t ya n d Q u a n t i t r o f e q u i p m e n t c o n t i n u e d t o e r o d e v i s a v i s the I r a q i s .
up
Clearly,
the i n c r e a s e i n F i g h t i n y P o w e r rrlade
the d i f f e r e n c e .
A 5 w i t h Re-a Shat.15 army, Muhammed R e z a F a h l a v i army,
a n d the w a r t i m e I a l a n l i c r e v o l u t i o n a r r a r m y ,
the c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e of
I have r e l i e d u n
of
i t 5 M i l i t a r y Worth ::lnd F i g h t i n g P o w e r .
However,
t h e e::anwles a r e l i m i t e d .
arrrly
the p e r f o r m a n c e rJf
in t h i s period i5 indicative of
ef f e c t i v e n r s s ,
a n d i t s new r e l a t i o n s h i f i . t o t h e people a n d
the g o v e r n m e n t : .
During this p e r i o d ,
i n these operations,
a5 w e l l a5 again5t s e v e r a l
attempted m i 1 i t a r r cocips.
I t is d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e
d i f f i c u l t circrinlstancus:
ti
h a r d e r a i ~ j s i n n i n more
the s u p p r e s s i o n o f r e b e l l i o n w i t h a
r e b e l l i o u s army i n the m i d s t o f a t h o r o u g h p u r g e w i t h
d e t e r i o r a t i n g equipment,
i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h a watr:tid~g
para-mi 1 i t a r r f o r c e .
However, i n s p i t e , o r p e r h a p s b e c a u s e o f the
conditions,
in
80
r e b e l l i o n s i n the g e a r s b e f o r e the r e v o l u t i o n :
n.l. r e b e l l i o n c e a s e d a n d d i d n o t
->
the r e p o r t s
T h e New M i 1i t a r y Leader
Among the most i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t s o f d e m o n s t r a t e d i n the I r a n - I r a q
the R e v o l u t i a n ,
as
war i s the n e w I r a n i a n
m i 1 i tar9 l e a d e r .
corpE,
l i e p e a t e d pi-irges h a v e p u r i f i e d t he o f f i cer
a s s u r i n s i:oinmittrrlent,
largelcJ a p o l i t i c a l ,
t o the
I r a n i a n Islamic r e v u b l i c .
O f f i c e r s i n key p o s i t i o n s i n the
m i l i t a r y h a v e repe8:+t:eclly p r o v e n t h e i r l o y a l t y by I s l a ~ n i c
c r e d e n t i a l s a n d t h e i r s e r v i c e t o the g o v e r i i m e n t . addition,
In
a s s u r e d that:
test5 o f
i d e o l o g y a n d l o y a l t y h a v e been advanc:ed.
prmces5 i s s t i l l o n g o i n g .
These o f f i c e r s a r e u n h e s i t a n t ,
powerful courage and
c l e a r h e a d e d combat: c o n m a n d e r s of
commitment.
T h e 9 dre a l s o a r r ~ b i t i o u s i a n d t h e i r f u t u r e is
Two s p e c i f i c e x a m p l e 5 a r e i n o r d e r .
T h e f i r s t i s the
Chairman of the $ J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f , C o l o n e l I s a n ~ e l
Sohrabi,
( t h e r e a p p e a r t o b e n o more promotions t o G e n e r a l
i n the I r a n i a n a r n l y ) .
" B u t c h e r of t i u r d s i t a n "
C o l o n e l S o h r a b i b e c a m e known a s the
d u r i n g the u p r i s i n g i n 1979-80 f o r
his b r u t a l s u p p r e s s i o n ; he a l s o p r o v e d c a p a b l e o f d o i n g
q u i c k l q a n d e f f e c t i v e l y w h a t e v e r the g o v e r n m e n t asl:.ed h i m t o do.
T h e s e c o n d i s C o l o n e l S a y y a d S h i r a z i , Commander o f
81
Ground Forc:es,
army C a p t a i n ,
As an
His rapid
of the Iranian
a r m y is a t e s t a m e n t t o h i s s k i l l as a m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l ,
the r e v o l u t i o n t h a t g a v e h i m the o p p o r t u n i t y , a n d t h e
r e v o l u t i o n i z e d I r a n i a n a r m y . 29 In t h e f i n a l analysis,
Easerj v o 1 1 . 1 n t e e r t o C h i e f o f
f u t t i r e w/eiit:s. A f t e r
c u r s b a t s i n c e the
q~ie5tii~ii
i.5 n o 5hortiiqe o f
v o l ~ i n t e e r s , nu
of retreat, n o loss of
i n i t i a t i v e , no drop i n conmittnlent,
no search f o r c o m p r o m i ~ eor n e g o t i a t i o n . T h e r e i s i n s t : e a d a n
e a g e r n e s s to d e s t r o y the e n e m y a n d a d v a n c e the r e v o l u t i o n u n d i m m e d a f t e r si:: y e a r s o f the h a r d e s t f i g h t i n g i m a s i n a b l e .
rrluch
s e c o n d a r y ; the
t h e troops t o F i g h t ,
82
i n thl:?i.r caulje, a n d t h E ? i r c o n f i d o n c e i n t h e i r
were p r o f o u n d ,
fundamental,
pre5s~ires, n o t e r o d e d .
G i v e n a c o h e s i v e l o g i s t i c a l system,
i t s r e g i o n a l p o w e r w o u l d b e i..inrnaf:ched
o r a r e l i a b l e bacl:c?r,
a n d i t 5 g l o b d l s i g n i f i c a n c e c h a l l e n g e the 5uperpowers.
93
1.
William F. H i c k n i a n ,
Ibid.,
p.
R a v a g e d a n d Re-tx~:.~., P.
1.
2.
16.
Ibid.r Ibid.,
p.
50.
5.
p.
51.
a n d RctmrXr P .
5.
York:
W i l l i a m F. Hicl:.manr R a . ; a s e d
7.
(b1tl.1~~
9.
William F. H i c k m a n ,
Ibid., p. 9.
Ravayed a n d
Rehorn,
P.
El.
10.
"Military a n d P o l i t i c s i n t h e 9.
a n d Hickman,
P.
Ibid.,
p.
10.,
11.
Nader E n t e s s a r ,
P.
" P l i l i t a r y a n d P o l i t i c s i n the
I s l a r r ~ i cR e p u b l i c o f I r a n . "
in.
R a v a g e d c?nd Reborn.,
p.
W i l l i a m F. H i c k m a r i ,
11.
15.
16.
Ibid., Ibid.
p.
12.
15.
p.
William F. H i c k n i a n ,
Ravaged a n d RebEn.,
12.
20.
William F. H i c k m a n ,
14.
84
21. F e d e r a l Proadcast Informatiori S e r v i c e , Daily Report: Mirjcll.c! E a s t Area, O c t o b e r 9 , 1979, P . R13. a 5 p u b l i s h e d i n Hickniaii, 6 7 . 13. Dona1 ( I L ' o u q h t , " I r a n ? " F i g h t i n g A r m i e s : , ~~-tayoiiiFj i~ n.~ +:he Middle E a s t L A Combat Assessment, Ric:hartJ G a b r i e l , e d . , ( W e s t . p o r t , C o n n e c t i c u t : Greenwood P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 . 1 , N o P a g e Number.
LIZ.
-.
23.
See T a b l e 3 . 1 ,
3.2.
24.
See T a t i l e 3 . 1, 3 . 2 .
18.
29.
Ibid.,
F'. 15.
85
I n t r o du c: t i o r i
.
the t h e s i s is i n t e n d e d t o r e v i e w
T h i s f i n a l seckii::)n o f
their
i m ~ , l i c a ? i o n s , a n d t h e i r l o n q term e f f e c t s .
II
1 ~ . e5 a d i n g t:n t t , e
e v ~ ? n k ~ . i ac l onclrrsion.
F o r c e s were fi.indamt:!iit.:ll
First,
1 y f 1diiJed.
Re;:a
Shah,
t h e peoF:rle, arnl!ir
yovw-nnlent
ci-ticks.
ll~ihairimied f?t.;:a
Pahlavi,
a t t e n ~ p + : i n t o b u i l d un ttle
army,
same f o i . i n d a t : i o n r
i n c r e a s e d t h e pi-ess~ire o n t h e p e a p l c i ,
gcivernment t r i n i t y j , r c ? s u l t i n g i n a c o l l a p s e .
of
T h e weaI;.nesses
t h e a r m y t:o d e f e a t
S u o o n d , the I s 1 ~ 3 m i c I r a n i d n a r m y ,
p r o v e d t o ha\:u
eroding
a n d u n i - e l i a b l e l o s i s t i c s , the I r a n i a n
Armed F o r c r i s r e s i s t e d
A c t i o n s w e r e charac:t.ori;lcd
power, e : : c e l l e n t st::aff
work,
Third,
07
qovernmen t
.
1
vr e t:.lt?cc?s5nr s , i t
I t has b e a t e n b a c l
d e t e r m i n e d a n d we1 1 e q u i p p e d i n v a d e r a n d h a s h a s since
c a i - r i e d t h e war i n t u I r a q i t e r r i t o r y o v e r s t r o n g enEmy
opposition, without
a r e l i a b l i - . a l l y or l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t ,
as5~t5.
a n d w i t h v e r s l i m i t e d a i r potuer or h i g h - t c c h n o l o s y
Irans
was e r o d i n g .
Iran did 88
50
wheri
Iraq h a d bolt1
f r o m the other A r a b n a t i n n s ,
1 w 3 i~i k i c v 71
wafr
LIPP POI^.
f LI ndarrlen t a 1 1g
A F t e r s i x y e a r c o f the most b r u t a l w a r f a r e s i n c e W o r l d
' W a r I,
I r a n shows n o ssign o f flagging in its resolve, and
i~
c o n t i n u e r , +cj p r c s e c x t a the w a r .
I r a n g a i n e d the i n i t i a t i
I t has,
iii
fact,
j u s t recentlg r e n e w e d +.tie
19S6,
Ii-dii
ofFensi:/e.
att:ac:I:.ed i n
I n the e a r l y ~ l o n t h scrf
ti012
EiiccFc;fiilly
art?.s5; t h e s t r a t e y i c a l l : ~.,'it.\i
A 1 raw
ttli.5 w r i l.in'd
arparently at
s i n c e I r a q a p p e a r s i i n a b l e t u make a n y i n +:he I r a n i a n g a i n s - .
substantial reduction
11%.
Reqiorial
I m p ~ i ~ of t
the War.
reqion.
As a d i r e c t r e s c i l t : of
str*:rteric i n t w - e s t s .
I t has g e n e r a t e d t h e Cart.ei-
doc:trine, interests,
w t l i c h i c l c ? n t i f i e s the a r e a a5 a v i t a l to (J.5. a n d t ~ u oq J o i n t C o a m a n d s t o r e s p o n d t o c r i s e s ; US
T h e U.S.
strateqic
cotrmitwewt: c\nd c a p a h i l i t g ,
maI:.es a l l n a t i o n s
regii:)na1 c o l l e c t i v e sen..irit:!d1 t h e r e b y
hi].
F internally.
Throi.igh
the G u l f
C o o p e r a t i m C o u n c i l ( b e g u n i n r e s p c m 5 e t o the war a n d t o f e d r s of
the d c s t a b i 1 i : i n g
e f f e c t c3f
the I s l a m i c
C , ~ L I I I ~ F ?~ I- n q lr
r3n,
a n d k e e p i n g t h e C u ~ ~ c ? r ~ i ~ i out u e r s uf
t h e Ck11r:.
1-tI
t> = _ F .,
a i.inI f y i n q
Focu~:j.
F i n a l . 1 ~i~ t ha:
also c a u s e d
el
d i f f u 5 i o n of
the: u i l
t o b u i l d new o i l p i r ; e l i n e C
khe f2cd
f r o m the o i l f i e l d s t o p o r t s on .the M e d i t w - a n e a n ,
Sea,
a n d b e l o w t h e S t r d i t s o f Horniu::;
a l l outcidc2 t h e G u l f .
d e f e n s e a n d r e 5 t r u r : t ~ i r i n y o l d one*>.
threat: o f war.
T t l i s i s 1 , i k ~ l yto h a v e a l o n s term
s t a b i l i z i n s P f f e c t mi the export o f o i l f r m k h e r e g i o n ;
.far.
t h e e n d o f +:he war w i l l l i k e l y
the? I r a n i a n Aving,
t o the ex t en .: i o n
of the r e v o l u t i o n ,
d
t r a i n e d i n b a t t lev a n d s u p p o r t e d by
p m l i c y o f s t a t e terrorism,
l a r g e l y unencunibered
w i l l b e f r e e t o meddle w h e r e v e r
i t chooses.
A 5
WAS
noted,
Khomeini c a n c a r r y
el
grcidse
10119
ti,rrler a n d is ~ . i n l i l : i ? l g t o f o r q e t t h a t the F e r r i i a n G u l f
n a 1: i t i n s , w i t h o u t e': c : e vt i o n , s u p p o r t e id I r ~
erid w i t h o u t :
Fr.)rces,
r7
( 4
C jtiou
1 d the war
ct1aii*3ei n I r a n i a n p o l i c i o c ,
thcr
I r a i i i c i i i Armed
i d e o l o s i c a l l y c o n m i t t e d a n d h a r d e n e d to war, c o i u l d
i m
have a d + ~ . s t a b i l i z i n a effect
t h e P e r s i a n Gcilt, Lcbanon,
a n d i n other a r e a s o f
To t h i 5 n i ~ i s tb e d d d e d the i n f l u e n c e o f
a n d the p e r c e p t i o n of
power c x i t s i d e o f d i r e c t m i l i t a r y
action.
Ttle G u l f nc:tt:ions h a v e l e a r n e d I r a n is a n i m p l a c a b l e ,
d e . t a r n i i n e d enemy.
P o c t war I r a n i a n t h r e a t s w i l 1 ha~:e
a n d r e s ~ i l t a n t i n f l u e n c e o n tlle G u 1 F
t r e n i o n d o ~ i 5c r e d i b i l i t y ,
s t a 1: e s
.
IS
10.
P o s t War I r a n i a n Army
The p r e s e n t I r a n i a n militarg c a p a b i l i t y m a t c h e d by
i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r m i l i t a r y p o w e r growt:ti.
I t has t h e n a t i o n a l
will,
i n a qlob,illy
vital
=ires.
91
is d o c x r r i e n t e d t.iy i t s war.t:into
p m - f o r m c ~ n i : , k ? CJVEI-
t h e l a s t si:: y e a r 5 .
I t has qeni.iine,
e : : e r c i s e its m i l i t a r y p o w e r :
retribution
t g is
t o the r r t n n a r c h 1 a I a n d auti:)crert:ic
s i c i n i f i c a n t d e n o q r c i ~ h i c 5 . T h e f i q h t i n s r:iower
nf +:ti+!
Iranian
A r m y i s well d o c u n l e n t c d a n d the p o t e n t i a l
g r o w t h is e v i d e n t .
for. m i l i t a r y power
I f i t d e v e l o p e d a s o i r n d l . o s i s . t i ~ . : a l bast:?.
support,
or was c o n f i d e n t o f r e l i a b l e l o q i s t i c a l
have i.inparallt:led
i t cortlrl
i t wa5 a b l e t o i n c : r e a s e ! Its
in spite of
I r a n s r e v e n u e b a s e , ~ ~ u r c h a s i r ia gb i l i t y a n d l e g i t i n i , 3 t e f i n a n c i a l power w i l l incrcaEt?.
tables,
i t has a ~ m F x i l a t i o n
app:)ro::imatel!j 45 n i l l i o n ,
males b e t w e e n 15 a n d 25.
I r a n s p o p ~ i l a t i c i n groiuci a t a b o u t 3%
m i l i t a r y a g e males a r e
a n n ~ i a I 1 1 4 . Pi-it a n o k h c r
aclikd e v e r y y e a r .
combat e::per i e n c c
U I ~ L I b00,L100 ~
Plore t h a n 2 m i l l i o n nla1i.s
had railitary
times a l l the o t h e r G u l f n a t i o n s
of
toget:hcr.
i i n l y 5oJ01000
these h a d c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e l m~ostly I r a q i s .
In addition,
I r a n s l i t e r a c y r a t e o f 50:! i s t h e h i g h e s t i n t h e G u l t ,
next
to h u w a i t .
(Figi.irt:!E
riot l i s t e d i n T a b l e s 3.1,5., d n s 4 . 1
LC.
a r e f r o m T h e IntE?ri.i,:it i . o n a 1 I n c t i t u t e f o r S t r a t w
1959-1984 1
V.
Studies,
1J.S.
IJ. S.
Lonq T e r m S t r a t e g i e s .
lon5j term i n t e r e s t s drc s t i - a l q h t . f o r w a r d : re-establish
the c o n t i n e n t a l
s k t e
t~rri3ri~ir1.
F h e S o v i e t Un on a n d c o i i n t e r
s t r a t e g i c , q O a l s r n o matter how s i i n p l g s t a t e d , do
up
n u t make
a strat.c.Jqcj.
The 1J.S.
has t h e p n t e n t i a l o f b a l a n c i r i q the p o w w o f a
a 5 we1 1 a s S o v i e t r e g i o n a l
Iran,
advt.?nt:i.irism.
S i n c e o n e of
i s t o k e e p the SuFe!rpowers
Mitt1 t h i s i n m i n d w e s h n u l d e n c o u r a q e the G C C s
eventual expansion to include Pakistan and Iraq.
A t soire
9K
fi.iti.irc time
i t w i l l a l s o be i n I r a n ' s i n t c r c ! s t
t:o
join,
in
or:) pi35 i t i o n
t 13 9ov i $2 t
6:'
: . : pan 5 i mi j
SRI
.
)
iT h i s i E n o t. w i t: t Imit
= I
p r e c e d e n t i rr~i.it:i.id e n e r r l i e s have o f t e n j o i n e d i n
i n d e f e n s i ? a s a i n s t a c.:omrr~on t h r e a t .
ccalition
Next s t e p is t o enr.:ourage
5t:rong
the GCC t o a d o p t
C o u n t e r - t a r r ~ o r i s t policy and c a p a b i l t y .
illel
This i s
coiintw-.;
c e r t a i n l y i n their b e s t i n t e r e s t a s
the p r i m a r y
1 aL;
OLII-L~,
Iranian poteiikial
t h r e a t , a n d w c u l d c.:ntlance G!'C
.
fiuusia i %
Ira11 m e t 1
mairitain c?nt.:!my,
=I
nun-a1 i g n r d IrL3n.
30
t:raditional
dnd
loris a=
ntLi1ns
AII
indepk!ndent
5c)i.i 1: h w r i r
d e:: F a n 5 i on .
t hD
61.1 1f
pr CWF
r F! 1 I : i vc' 1,J
rc!sistant
t o 1 1 - a r i i ~ ~ ri. i i f l w n c e ,
I r a n mag t u r n i t v ; mil l t a r g
lran;
Finally,
i t i s a d v i s a b l e t o c o n c l u d e a defe!nse ti-c.a{:'j
she i s a t t : a c k e d by
t h e S o v i e t Union.
c o r i l d c r m t a i n a n y r e s t r i c t i o n s I r a n i:hooses t o
l o n g a5 she w o u l d a c c e p t IJ.2.
l o g i s t i c a l suppnrt:
i n the e v e n t o f a g g r e s . ; i o n
T h i s wo1.11d e x p l o i t the r e a l
It
Iranian
p o l . i c 9 , a n d a 1 l c . 1 1 more ~ n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s a t a l a t e r tlatc?.
94
T h i s is a l s o n o t w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n t , a l t h o i r g h g i v e n t h e
a i i i n i o s i i t ? l of +:he pec:)pl.e o f aqreerrlent
IIIC!I.I~~
I r a n t o the U.S.,
~ L . I C : ~ Ia
tia\.r.! t o tie c o v e r t : .
However, 3 i v e n that: I r a r i
b o u g h t a r m from I s r a e l ,
i t s s w o r n enemyy Irari w i l l l i k e l y
a c l o p t a n1or? p r a g m w t i c : a p p r o a c h t o
i t s d e f e n s e when f a c e d
w i t h a S o v i e t tt1rea.l:.
I t i 5 a l s o worth n o t i n g t h a t I r a n s p o t e n t i a l
e a s i l y b e t u r n e d t r ) the S o v i e t V n i o n s a d v a n t c i y e ,
cncild a5
d5
t n the
acbantaqc nf
the U.S.
I t is i n o u r i n t e r e s t t o coopt I r a n ,
if
or k e e p i t n e u k r a l ,
on19 to p r e v e n t
ttle r e q i o n
truiri
f a J 1 i n y u n d e r Sovirit. i n f l u e n c e .
VI
Surriniarg
.
the
I t . waE
WE
5ignific:ance
are
J L I E ~
beginins to understand.
T h e army h a s d i r e c t l y a n d i n d i r e c t l y
a n d s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e t o the 1,J.S.
a n d the
revolut ion,
d e s e r v e greater s t ~ i d y
95
Sudan
PO.,
E " 0 . "
'.
Yemen
*S.M
97
9n
1 om
Slim,
i n t o Victnrcr.
N e w Yorl:: D a v i d
Clausewit-, Carl. (11. War. T r a n s l a t e d a n d e d i + e d by Michacl Howarlj a n d Peter P a r e t , P r i n c e t o n , New J e r c e y : P r i 11 c e t o n Un i v w 9 i t L I P r e55, 1984.
ZoIra, Yahya.
ART1 CLES
103
104
I FI IT I AL D IS~T'RIPIJTIClbl 1. IS'T
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.