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Tijing vs. CA, 354 SCRA 17; GR No.

125901, March 8, 2001


Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Adoption: Custody of a minor) Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child. The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor. Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

Moncupa vs. Enrile , No. L-63345, January 30, 1986


Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic) Facts: Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondents custody. Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom. Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained persons release with restrictions. Held: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Courts inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal. Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainees temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors) Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently. Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers care. Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxx xxx xxx The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

In Re: Azucena L. Garcia, 339 SCRA 292, GR 141443, August 30, 2000
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus: final judgment and bail)

Facts: Petitioner is convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document. In the case at bar, petitioner is out on bail and is seeking for a relief via a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of the judgment rendered. Petitioner contends that were proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the accused; the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus. The OSG, on the other hand states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained by his liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ. Issue: WON a person convicted by final judgment and/or out on bail is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Held: No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order release of the detainee. It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas Corpus) Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband. The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition. Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife. Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights. Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling. Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.

Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus) Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment. In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records. Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

Cruz vs. CA, G.R. No. 137560. January 19, 2000


Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus: Requisites) Facts: Maria Cruzs filed a petition for habeas corpus. Her son, David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425). He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December 31, 1993, R.A. No. 769 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws, including the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was life imprisonment to death. Under R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana became punishable by reclusion perpetua, to death. The penalty for the sale of less than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon the quantity of the drug. The amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correctional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The continued detention of Cruz at, the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as already illegal. Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted. Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person.
Camara vs Pagayatan, GR No. 176563, April 2, 2007; 520 SCRA 182
Posted by Pius Morados on April 28, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus, contempt) Facts: Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBPs failure to deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of

P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period. LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial courts clerk of court. However the respondent judge found LBPs compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily withdrawable. Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Issue: WON a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance. Held: Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial courts jurisdiction to issue the Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is respondent judges refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance of the full amount of the preliminary compensation. This is grave abuse of respondent judges contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdiction.
Arguelles vs Balajadia,484 SCRA 653, GR No. 167211, March 14, 2006
Posted by Pius Morados on April 28, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus has become moot and academic due to release) Facts: Petitioners officers of the standard chartered bank and their counsels were detained for direct contempt of the Senate Committee. Petitioner in their petition endorsed the allegation that the investigation was in aid of collection instead of in aid of legislation. Petitioners filed this petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the Committee acted in violation of the Constitution and without jurisdiction. Notwithstanding their release, petitioners submitted that it is imperative that the issues involved in this case be resolved, because they are of unprecedented and transcendental importance and they involve the impact of the exercise of the powers of Congress upon human rights. Issue: WON the petition for a writ of habeas corpus has become moot and academic due to petitioners release. Held: Yes. The petition has become moot. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. Petitioners have been released. While the issues raised by petitioners are important, it is not appropriate to resolve them now in these proceedings.
Leave a commentPosted in Special ProceedingsTagged Habeas Corpus, Moot and Academic, Special Proceedings

Andal vs. People, GR No.138268-69, May 26, 1999_digested


Posted by Pius Morados on April 28, 2012

(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus is not granted) Facts: Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim of mistrial and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused. Issue: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Held: No. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violation of the petitioners constitutional rights and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. The jurisdiction of this court has been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. In this case findings show that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, February 28, 1966_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent, Abandonment and Collateral Attack) Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners care and custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption. Subsequently eight years later Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them. Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso. The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding. Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children. Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.
Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption) Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac. Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain badges of fraud. The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt. Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities. Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered the judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations

of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
Republic vs. Miller, GR No. 125932, April 22, 1999
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption by aliens, vested rights) Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC. Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same. Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Change of Name) Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption. Held: No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
Perez vs. CA, GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996
Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings Custody: A child under seven years shall not be separated from his mother) Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare. Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore. Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father. Held: No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation. The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the childs age to 5 years.
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment) Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees biological mother.

Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee vs. Concepcion and Lee Voo, No. 33281, March 31, 1930, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on February 23, 2012

(Special Proceedings Insane persons; discharge from custody; respective powers of Trial Judge and Director of Health; Art. 8, Penal Code and Sec. 1048 , Administrative Code) Facts: A Judge of the Court of first Instance acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and has ordered the confinement of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently permitting the same to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution by the Director of Health. Section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code. Issue: WON a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health. Held: No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together in such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are complimentary to each other. The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.

Manuel Barredo vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-17863, November 28, 1962, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Claims against estate; Rule 86, Sec. 2: Statute of Non-Claims) Facts: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough. On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneys fees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDnough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title. The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period. Section 2, Rule 87 provides: SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month. Issue: WON the tardy claim will be allowed. Held: No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time. The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958) However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the

mortgage embodying the instant claim, (as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.) The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012

(Special Proceedings Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance) Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar. Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs. Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

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