2ac Bricks-Cuban Oil working

Add-ons

Caribbean Stability
Plan creates the framework for US-Cuban relations-thats Benjamin-Alvarado US/Cuba relations are key to effective Caribbean stability Birns 13 (Larry COHA Director, Best Time for U.S. Cuba Rapprochement Is Now, 1/30,
http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/) The Obama Administration should be prepared to take, in quick progression, three important initial steps to trigger a speedy rapprochement with Cuba: immediately phase out the embargo, free the Cuban five, and remove Havana
from the spurious State Department roster of nations purportedly sponsoring terrorism. These measures should be seen as indispensable if

Washington is to ever mount a credible regional policy of mutual respect among nations and adjust to the increased ideological diversity and independence of the Latin American and Caribbean regions . Washingtons path towards an urgently needed rehabilitation of its hemispheric policy ought to also include consideration of Cubas own pressing national interests. A thaw in USCuba relations would enhance existing security cooperation between the countries,
amplify trade and commercial ties, and guarantee new opportunities for citizens of both nations to build bridges of friendship and cooperation. For this to happen, the Obama Administration would have to muster the audacity to resist the anti-Castro lobby and their hardline allies in Congress, whose Cuba bashing has no limits. Nevertheless, it is time to replace belligerency with dtente.

Caribbean instability causes global war Griffith, 2k (Ivelaw L. Griffith 2k, professor of political science and dean of the honors college
at Florida International University, U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security, JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2000, Issue 26) The strategic importance of the Caribbean is found in its resources, sea lanes, and security networks. The Caribbean Basin is the source of fuel and nonfuel minerals used in both the defense and civilian sectors. Of particular significance are petroleum and natural gas produced in Barbados, Colombia, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Moreover, though several countries and U.S. territories in the area do not have energy resources, they offer invaluable refining and transshipment functions (Aruba, Bahamas, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, and U.S. Virgin
Islands). Other mineral resources from the Caribbean include bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, cobalt, emeralds, and diamonds. The

Caribbean Basin has two of the world's major choke points , the Panama Canal and the

Caribbean Sea . The former links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and saves 8,000 miles and up to 30 days of steaming time. The canal has military and civilian value. And while it is less important to the United States than it was two decades ago, other countries remain very dependent on it, and many, like Chile, Ecuador, and Japan, are militarily or
politically important to Washington. Once ships enter the Atlantic from the canal they must transit Caribbean passages en route to ports of call in the United States, Europe, and Africa. The Florida Strait, Mona Passage, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel are the principal lanes. The

Caribbean is also our southern flank. Until a decade ago the United States maintained a considerable military presence throughout the Caribbean, mainly in Puerto Rico at the
Atlantic threshold, in Panama at the southern rim, and in Cuba at Guantanamo on the northern perimeter. In 1990, for instance, there were 4,743 military and civilian personnel in Puerto Rico, 20,709 in Panama, and 3,401 in Cuba. Much has changed since 1990, requiting strategic redesign and force redeployment. Today Puerto Rico is home to fewer forces, and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) relocated from Panama to Miami in September 1997, leaving behind only small components. Guantanamo,

long considered to have little strategic value, serves essentially as a political outpost in the last remaining communist bastion in the hemisphere, with about 1,200 military and civilian personnel. During the 1980s the Soviet presence in Cuba included modern docks and repair facilities, reconnaissance aircraft,
and satellite and surveillance capabilities. The 28-square mile base located at Lourdres monitored missile tests, intercepted satellite

communications, and relayed microwave communications to diplomatic posts in the Western Hemisphere. The facility was reputedly the largest maintained by the Soviet Union abroad. It is still in operation, but not at Cold War levels. Yet fear

of foreign encroachment persists. The United States is concerned about increasing Chinese interest and investment in Panama. Although such strategic affairs may not be crucial to Washington, they affect allies as well as regional stability and security and thus bear watching. Geoeconomics The mixture of geography, economics, and national power in the area exercises influence over trade and investment. For
example, the Department of Commerce found that for the four-year period prior to 1988 a total of 646 U.S. companies invested over $1.5 billion in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries. Moreover, from 1986 to 1995 U.S. trade surpluses with the area grew from $297 million to $2.6 billion. In 1995 exports grew by 15 percent, to $8 billion, with the Dominican Republic and Jamaica accounting for 55 percent. That year also saw surpluses with every country except Aruba, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago. Last year the U.S. Trade Representative told an InterAmerican Development Bank forum, "Taken

as a whole, the Caribbean Basin is a larger market for our goods than ... France, Brazil, or China. Likewise, the U nited S tates is the area's natural market, taking 80 percent of its exports and providing nearly $50 billion in foreign direct investment." The United States is the largest trading partner and source of capital flows for Caribbean Community and Common Market countries. CBI nations are a principal market for U.S. exports, totaling $21.1 billion in 1998 (9.1 percent over the previous year). Exports to the
Caribbean Basin accounted for 3 percent in 1998 (up 2.8 percent over the previous year). An estimated half of each dollar spent in the area is returned to the United States compared with 10 cents from Asia. Further, this

trade supports some 400,000 jobs in this country and many more in the Caribbean. Moreover, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) reported in 2000 that from 1995 to 1999 it assisted in 38 projects in the area involving $3.2 billion in investments, which are expected to generate $1.5 billion in U.S. exports and, in turn, support 4,500 jobs in this country. Moreover, in February 1999, OPIC and Citibank established a $200 million investment facility for Central America and the Caribbean to help meet needs for mediumand long-term capital.

Geonarcotics

There are four dimensions in the drug phenomenon: production, consumption,

threaten the security of states around the world . Narcotics operations and capital ventures which they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among state
trafficking, and money laundering. These activities and nonstate actors in the international system. Because of the global dispersion of drug traffic and physical, social, and political features of facilitating countries, power involves securing compliant action. In the drug world, this power is both state and nonstate in origin, and some nonstate

sources exercise relatively more power than state entities. Politics revolves around resource allocation through the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, when, where, and how. Because power in this milieu is not only state in origin, resource allocation is not exclusively a state function. Drug operations generate complex relationships. Some involve nonmilitary pressures such as political and economic sanctions by the United States against countries it considers not proactive enough in combating drug traffic. Yet the problem entails more than the movement of drugs from and through the area; it involves money laundering, organized crime, corruption, arms dealing, and matters of sovereignty. Such activities are reported in the International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report issued annually by the Department of State and are reflected in the following vignettes: Operation Dinero, an international money laundering sting conducted out of tiny Anguilla from January 1992 to December 1994, led to the seizure of nine tons of cocaine and $90 million in assets, including expensive paintings, Head of a Beggar by Pablo Picasso among them. Cocaine seizures in only five nations--Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica--totaled 3,300 kilos in 1993. Seizures for those same countries amounted to 6,230 kilos--almost double--during 1999. Between 1993 and 1998, over 9,000 deportees were returned to Jamaica, most for drug-related offenses in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In November 1998, American owned Cupid Foundations closed its business in Jamaica after 22 years with a loss of 550 jobs. Cupid could no longer afford the fines incurred with the seizure of its merchandise by U.S. Customs because of attempts to smuggle drugs in its clothing. Operation Conquistador, conducted March 10-26, 2000, involving the United States and 24 nations in the region, led to the issuance of 7,300 search warrants, arrest of 2,300 people, and seizure of 12,000 pounds of cocaine, 120 pounds of heroin, 150 pounds of hashish oil, 30 pounds of morphine base, 172 vehicles, 13 boats, and 83 guns. Between November 24, 1999, and June 6, 2000, 12 freighters were seized in Miami on arrival from Haiti with over 6,000 pounds of cocaine hidden in their cargo. Since midOctober 2000 Jamaica has produced a drug-related drama involving high-level police corruption, illegal wire-tapping of government officials, and the attempted assassination of the head of the National Firearms and Drug Intelligence Center. Traditional and Emerging Issues Security

in the Caribbean has political, military, economic, and environmental implications and includes internal and external threats. Nonstate actors are as important as state actors. Indeed, many nonstate actors can mobilize more economic and military assets than some countries. Thus the security landscape reveals both traditional and nontraditional concerns. Territorial disputes and geopolitical posturing are core traditional issues . Belize, Colombia, Guatemala, Guyana, Suriname, and
Venezuela have serious disagreements, some of which Involve multiple disputes. For example, Guyana faces claims by Venezuela for

the western five-eighths of its 214,970 square kilometers of territory and by Suriname for 15,000 to the east. Drugs,

political instability, migration, and the environment are major nontraditional issues. There is no uniformity in
the importance ascribed to them, but a comparison of the traditional and nontraditional categories reveals a generally higher premium on nontraditional issues. Some states, such as those in the Eastern Caribbean, face no traditional security concerns or overt threats. The

foremost nontraditional threat involves drugs. This multifaceted problem has increased in corruption, and arms dealing dramatically impact on national security and governance in political, military, and economic terms. They also infringe on national sovereignty. Two decades ago most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to acknowledge that their
scope and gravity over the last decade and a half and added security effects. Crime, countries faced a drug threat Two decades ago most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to acknowledge that their countries faced a drug threat. But the severity of the problem grew until the danger was obvious inside and outside the area. For instance, at a meeting on criminal justice in June 2000, which was attended by officials of Europe, Canada, the Caribbean Basin, and the United States, the attorney general of Trinidad and Tobago spoke of "the direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by parents, and other evils," and remarked that "aside from the very visible decimation of our societies caused by drug addiction and drug-related violence, there is another insidious evil: money laundering." Engagement Challenges Leaders

in the Caribbean and the United States share a common assessment of the principal security concerns in the area: drugs, border disputes, poverty, corruption, natural disasters, illegal migration, insurgencies, and the environment. Consistent with this view, SOUTHCOM is focused on counterdrug operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. One basic challenge in redesigning policy or strategy is determining which instruments and modalities should be changed. Except for Cuba, engagement does not warrant revamping existing practices .
Some things work well and should be retained; others do not and should be modified. This discussion addresses both types. Robert Pastor, who served on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration, noted that Caribbean

nations are too small and poor to directly challenge the United States. What really moved Washington was the threat of powerful adversaries from other parts of the world forging relationships in the area that facilitated the harassment of or attack on the United States or its neighbors. "When the threat
diminishes," he remarked, "so does U.S. interest. That accounts for the apparent cycle between preoccupation at moments of intense geopolitical rivalry and neglect at times of geopolitical calm." Today's

relative geopolitical calm justifies the concern of scholars and statesmen about the likelihood of a new phase of benign neglect or even worse. Hence it is important to highlight the challenge of staying engaged in both symbolic and substantive terms. Some
years ago, the prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines declared: "We have to behave like Grenada or Fiji to get attention, and when we stop misbehaving we are left to languish in blissful obsecurity." Engagement demands flexibility and adaptability. For some missions, political expediency may require that nonmilitary personnel take the lead, or perhaps coastguardsmen as opposed to soldiers or marines. And flexibility and adaptability may be compromised by pushing the economy of force envelope too far. Also, engagement programs must not mistake silence for satisfaction. In addition, engagement

requires the first team. U.S. leaders must not relegate decisionmaking to uninformed interns, junior staffers, or freshman bureaucrats. Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela are clearly hot spots that should be
watched closely; but so must other countries. Guyana bears scrutiny because of resurgent territorial claims, the impact of that dispute on investment and development (especially because U.S. and Canadian investors are involved), the likelihood of political instability, and the influence of drug trafficking. Another concern is violent crime in Jamaica, some of which affects foreign tourists and investors. In addition, Jamaican organized crime poses transnational dangers to law enforcement and economic interests.

Drug trafficking and economic deprivation could also lead to renewed political instability. The
Dominican Republic faces issues of drug traffic, transnational crime, illegal migration, and political instability as that nation strives to translate rapid economic growth into less deprivation. The economy grew by 6.5 percent in 2000, 8.3 percent in 1999, and 7.3 percent in 1998, yet many Dominicans do not benefit from this wealth as some 20 percent of the country's 8.5 million people live in poverty. Puerto Rico also warrants attention. Although a domestic question for the United States, Vieques detracts from U.S. conflict resolution credibility. While Vieques is allegedly indispensable for Navy training, this issue highlights a troubling aspect of relations between the mainland and the island. Programs must operate on several tracks encompassing broad interagency activities. Multifaceted engagement is especially vital in counternarcotics efforts. Countermeasures must be multi-level--regional and international as well as national--because drug operations are transnational. Moreover, the measures must be implemented on a multiagency level to grapple with jurisdictional, legal, social, and economic issues precipitated by the drug problem. In addition to government agencies, a range of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and international bodies such as the Organization of American States and the U.N. International Drug Control Program must play critical roles. Multilateral

security measures do not preclude bilateralism. Indeed, such measures may be more politically expedient because they can be designed
and executed faster. There may be budget incentives to act quickly. Moreover, in light of resource difficulties, a premium should be put on regulatory and operational aspects of interagency work to guard against turf and prestige battles. Whether

it is an

issue of drugs, territorial disputes, migrant flows, or the environment, engagement should be pursued on the basis of mutual interest. This is not always achievable. Sometimes even leaders of comparatively
wealthy states, though partners, are unwilling to agree to collective efforts because of concern about their impact. Domestic factors such as political change and public opinion often make it difficult to honor or renew pledges. But despite such complications, leaders must not let the possibility of conflict undermine cooperation. There

are high stakes for the United States in the

Caribbean . The stakes are also high for the Caribbean countries. New defense and foreign policy initiatives may encourage effective engagement and investment of the resources to match the national interest in an area that represents a global crossroads and an essential element for regional stability .

LNG
Gaining access to US oil tech through lifting oil restrictions checks a forthcoming wave of Cuban LNG imports Benjamin-Alvarado 10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 111-12 The authors of chapter 2, Jorge R. Pin and Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, find that there are a number of key issues to consider regarding the productive capacity of Cubas oil and gas resources. First, Cuba has seen close to $2 billion of direct foreign investment since 1991 in its upstream oil and natural gas sector, with very good results. Crude oil liquids production reached a peak level of 65,531 barrels per day in 2003, up from 9,090 barrels per day in 1991. Since 2005 Cuba

has seen its crude oil production level off at around 52,000 barrels per day. Second, Cubas realized crude oil value could improve substantially once the country is able to monetize its heavy oil production by means of its own future heavy oil conversion refinery processing capacity, or to market its crude oil to U.S. Gulf Coast refining companies. Third, Cubas onshore and coastal heavy oil production seems to have reached a plateau at around 52,000 barrels per day, but once Cupet has access to the services, technology , equipment, and capital available through independent U.S. oil and oil services and equipment companies (when the trade embargo is lifted or modified), Cubas heavy oil production potential could grow to an amount in excess of 75,000 barrels a day. Deficiencies in Cubas oil-refining sector including outdated technology that is unable to process heavy crude coupled with an environmentally sensitive tourist industry will force Cuba to consider developing an energy policy that relies heavily on clean-burning natural gas as its fuel of choice for power generation. Cubas future natural gas needs could be sourced as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Trinidad and Tobago, as Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic currently do, or from future Venezuelan production. A
regasification facility to receive Venezuela-sourced liquid natural gas is being planned for the southern coast port city of Cienfuegos by Venezuelas PDVSA and Cupet. Two one-million-ton regasification trains are planned for 2012 at a cost of over $400 million. The natural gas is destined as fuel for that citys thermoelectric power plant, local industry, and future petrochemical plants.

Increasing LNG imports specifically through waters causes accidents outweighs everything Hunter and Amory Lovins 2001 (analysts, lectures and consultants on energy, resource and security policy,
Hunter Lovins has degrees in Law, Political Studies and Sociology and an honorary doctorate, and is a member of the California Bar. For six years she was assistant Director of the California Conservation project. Amory Lovins is a consultant experimental physicist, educated at Harvard and Oxford, who has published 23 books (many co-authored with Hunter) and several hundred papers. He has held various academic chairs, received six honorary doctorates, served on the US Department of Energy's senior advisory board, and consulted (often with Hunter) for scores of energy companies, manufacturing firms, governments and international organisations. The Lovineses have received numerous awards for their work. Brittle Power : Energy Strategy for National Security Rocky Mountain Institute -http://www.rmi.org/images/other/S-BrPwr-Parts123.pdf -- also available @ http://www.transitcommerce.com/Harpswell/weeks.asp)

Disasters Waiting to Happen : Liquified Natural Gas

Natural gas can be sent by pipeline over long distances. For a price, it can be piped from North Sea platforms to the British mainland, from Algeria to Italy, or from Siberia to Western Europe. But pipelines are not a feasible way to send gas across major oceansfor example, from the Mideast or Indonesia to the United States. A high-technology way to transport natural gas overseas has, however, been developed in the past few decades, using the techniques of cryogenicsthe science of extremely low temperatures. In this method, a sort of giant refrigerator, costing more than a billion dollars, chills a vast amount of gas until it condenses into a colorless, odorless liquid at a temperature of two hundred sixty degrees Fahrenheit below zero. This liquefied natural gas (LNG) has a volume six hundred twenty times smaller than the original gas. The intensely cold LNG is then transported at approximately atmospheric pressure in special, heavily insulated cryogenic tankersthe costliest non-military seagoing vessels in the worldto a marine terminal, where it is stored in insulated tanks. When needed, it can then be piped to an adjacent gasification plantnearly as complex and costly as the liquefaction plantwhere it is boiled back into gas and distributed to customers by pipeline just like wellhead gas. Approximately

sixty smaller plants in North America also liquefy and store domestic natural gas as a convenient way of increasing their storage capacity for winter peak demands which could otherwise exceed the capacity of trunk pipeline supplying the area. This type of local storage to augment peak supplies is called "peak-shaving." Such plants can be sited anywhere gas is available in bulk; they need have nothing to do with marine LNG tankers. LNG is less than half as dense as water, so a cubic meter of LNG (the usual unit of measure) weighs just over half a ton.1 LNG

contains about thirty percent less energy per cubic meter than oil, but is potentially far more hazardous.2 Burning oil cannot spread very far on land or water, but a cubic meter of spilled LNG rapidly boils into about six hundred twenty cubic meters of pure natural gas, which in turn mixes with surrounding air. Mixtures of between about five and fourteen percent natural gas in air are flammable. Thus a single cubic meter of spilled LNG can make up to twelve thousand four hundred cubic meters of flammable gas-air mixture. A single modern LNG tanker typically holds one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters of LNG, equivalent to twentyseven hundred million cubic feet of natural gas. That gas can form between about twenty and fifty billion cubic feet of flammable gas-air mixtureseveral hundred times the volume of the Great Pyramid of Cheops. About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in
about five minutes.3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hotter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The resulting gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes.4 It might ultimately reach much fartherperhaps six to twelve miles.5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away.6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No

present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG+... fire.7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fiftyfive Hiroshima bombs.

Spills
Independently, hurricanes cause spills. Quick reaction from the US is crucial
Stephens 11
et al, Sarah Stephens Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf

The BP disaster highlights the needs for a timely response to spills , the containment of damage, and
clean-up. There were approximately eight rigs capable of drilling relief wells to the depth of Macondo that were available in the Gulf. If the blow-out occurred in Cuban territorial water, the embargo would not allow rigs capable of drilling relief wells to be contracted by the operator (Repsol or CUPET, in the first instance). Companies under the current rules

a U.S. firm to drill a relief well. In fact, legislation 50 introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2010 would have greater risk and concern, however, is that spills are often more likely because of hurricane activity prevalent in the Gulf, and are exacerbated by the role hurricanes play in spreading oil after a spill. 52 In the event of a spill, were assistance from U.S. firms permitted, relief would take 2448 hours to arrive on scene. Barring their participation, however, it would take 3050 days for help to arrive from Brazil, Northern Europe, Africa, or S.E. Asia. In
cannot hire penalized such activities under The Helms-Burton Act. 51 Of the case of the BP spill, as Lee Hunt said, Admiral Landry 53 (8th Coast Guard District Commander) had personnel 24 hours x 7 days a week on phones to get booms; can Repsol or any subsequent operator do that? 54 OFAC, the

Treasury Department office that administers and enforces trade sanctions, has authority to issue licenses on an emergency basis, but the BP spill shows that the early, critical response needed would be made slower by the time required to procure licenses. 55 The Obama administration argues that some
firms are pre-cleared to respond. But experts say the current scheme makes it impossible to pre-clear the correct technology, and that much more needs to be doneand can be doneunder current law.

Another major spill would crush the US economy plan solves National Commission 11
Commission is co-chaired by William K. Reilly. Reilly was Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency under President George H. W. Bush. He has served as president of World Wildlife Fund, as a founder or advisor to several business ventures, and on many boards of directors. In 2010, he was appointed by President Barack Obama co-chair of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling to investigate the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Report to the President; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling January 2011 http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf Chapters 4 through 7 lay out the

results of our investigation in detail, highlighting the crucial issues we believe must inform made in drilling the Macondo well, the attempts to contain and respond to the oil spill, and the impacts of the spill on the regions natural
policy going forward: the specific engineering and operating choices resources, economy, and peoplein the context of the progressive degradation of the Mississippi Delta environment. Chapters 8 through 10 present our recommendations for reforms in business practices, regulatory oversight, and broader policy concerns. We recognize that the improvements we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to implement. But inaction, as we are deeply aware, runs

the risk of real costs, too: in more lost lives, in broad damage to the regional economy and its long-term viability, and in further tens of billions of dollars of avoidable clean-up costs. Indeed, if the
clear challenges are not addressed and

another disaster happens , the entire offshore energy enterprise

and security. We suggest a better option: build from this

is threatened and with it, the nations economy

tragedy in a way that makes the Gulf more resilient, the countrys energy supplies more secure, our workers safer, and our cherished natural resources better protected.

And, broad statistical models prove economic decline lead to global conflict Royal 10 [Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction U.S. Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic
Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215] Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms

in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between
global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future

expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has
the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary

theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and
Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the

tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more
susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that

periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the
economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

China

Energy wars

2ar Overview
The only thing the neg has on this advantage is some impact defense which we have started preempting since the 1ac- High risk of the advantage means any risk of <insert neg argument and what defense we have extended> means you default aff. US-China resource wars outweigh on magnitude- oil assets are considered zero sum and increasing scarce supply means militarizing in the region to get more oil- draws Russia into a three-way struggle for geopolitical advantage in areas with oil such as the Middle East-turns <>- thats Cabral No risk of defense- their impact defense doesnt assume declining oil suppliesonly having a backup source that can hedge against declining oil stock prevents China and Russia feeling threatened and militarized- thats Benjamin-Alvarado Cooperation arguments dont apply in current relations between the US and China perception of crisis management is flawed due to mistrust- that Lowther

2ac analysis
Xtnd Lowther and Cabral, their military to military dialogue doesnt assume energy conflicts and bypassing crisis management , our ev is specific- to USChina war

AT: no US-China war

Resource wars over oil make US/China conflict inevitable Gagan 10
(John, MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Homeland Security; MAJ, U.S.ARMY B.S. Criminal Justice, East Carolina University THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INSECURITY-THE OIL NEXUS, 11/06/10, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531222.pdf)

To meet its demand for oil, China is engaged in an aggressive global hunt to secure its sources of energy. In addition to receiving imports from the Middle East, China has oil agreements in place with, Iran, Sudan, Burma, Venezuela and most recently Russia. Furthermore, China is engaging energy producers that have traditionally, almost exclusively, supplied oil to the U.S., specifically Canada. In 2005, China signed three agreements with Canada
to gain access to Albertas oil sands and join a pipeline project to transport oil to the Pacific coast for export to China (San Francisco Chronicle).Chinas aggressive pursuit of oil has raised energy security concerns in Asia. Smaller countries such as Singapore and Vietnam are worried that Chinas

dominance in the region could pose security issues for contested or disputed areas of oil discovery. Some analysts contend that the U.S. and China are on a collision course over resource competition. As mentioned in chapter 1, the current resource competition for oil can be likened to a West verses East effort to build coalitions and forge alliances in securing access to oil supplies. This could create a friction point between the U.S. and China, especially since China openly seeks trade relations with nations with whom the U.S. is at odds including Iran and Venezuela. Another
potential U.S.-China flashpoint is on the continent of Africa (Institute for the Analysis of Global Security). In 2004, approximately 29 percent of Chinas oil imports were from Africa. Currently, China is vigorously pursuing energy initiatives in more than a dozen African countries (Ghazvinian, 276).

AT: No South China Sea conflict

SCS escalates and causes Asian econ collapse Michael Klare 13 is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, The
Next War, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/23/the_next_war_100500.html
Don't look now, but conditions are deteriorating in the western Pacific. Things are turning ugly, with consequences that could prove deadly and spell catastrophe for the global economy. In Washington, it is widely assumed that a showdown with Iran over its nuclear ambitions will be the first major crisis to engulf the next secretary of defense -- whether it be former Senator Chuck Hagel, as President Obama desires, or someone else if he fails to win Senate confirmation. With few signs of an imminent breakthrough in talks aimed at peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, many analysts believe that military action -- if not by Israel, then by the United States -- could be on this year's agenda. Lurking just behind the Iranian imbroglio, however, is a

potential crisis of far greater magnitude , and potentially far more imminent than most of us imagine. China's

determination to assert control over disputed islands in the potentially energy-rich waters of the East and South China Seas, in the face of stiffening resistance from Japan and the Philippines along with greater regional assertiveness by the United States, spells trouble not just regionally, but potentially globally. Islands, Islands, Everywhere The possibility of an Iranian crisis remains in the spotlight because of the obvious risk of disorder in the Greater Middle East and its threat to global oil production and shipping. A crisis in the East or South China Seas (essentially, western extensions of the Pacific Ocean) would, however, pose a greater peril because of the possibility of a U.S.-China military confrontation and the threat to Asian economic stability. The United States is bound by treaty to come to the assistance of Japan or the Philippines if either country is attacked by a third party, so any armed clash between Chinese and Japanese or Filipino forces could trigger American military intervention . With so much of the world's trade focused on Asia, and the American, Chinese, and Japanese economies tied so closely together in ways too essential to ignore, a clash of almost any sort in these vital waterways might paralyze international commerce and trigger a global recession
(or worse). All of this should be painfully obvious and so rule out such a possibility -- and yet the in recent months, as

likelihood of such a clash occurring has been on the rise

China and its

neighbors continue to ratchet up the bellicosity of their statements and bolster their military forces in the contested areas. Washington's continuing statements about its ongoing plans for a "pivot" to, or "rebalancing" of, its forces in the Pacific have only fueled Chinese intransigence and intensified a rising sense of crisis in the region. Leaders on all sides continue to affirm their country's inviolable rights to the contested islands and vow to use any means necessary to resist encroachment by rival claimants. In the meantime, China has increased the frequency and scale of its naval maneuvers in waters claimed by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, further enflaming tensions in the region. Ostensibly, these disputes revolve around the question of who owns a constellation
of largely uninhabited atolls and islets claimed by a variety of nations. In the East China Sea, the islands in contention are called the Diaoyus by China and the Senkakus by Japan. At present, they are administered by Japan, but both countries claim sovereignty over them. In the South China Sea, several island groups are in contention, including the Spratly chain and the Paracel Islands (known in China as the Nansha and Xisha Islands, respectively). China claims all of these islets, while Vietnam claims some of the Spratlys and Paracels. Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines also claim some of the Spratlys. Far the ownership

more is, of course, at stake than just of a few uninhabited islets. The seabeds surrounding them are believed to sit atop vast reserves of oil and natural gas. Ownership of the islands would naturally confer

ownership of the reserves -- something all of these countries desperately desire . Powerful

forces of nationalism are also at work: with rising popular fervor , the Chinese believe that the islands are part of their national territory and any other claims represent a direct assault on China's sovereign rights; the fact that Japan -- China's brutal invader and occupier during World War II -- is a rival claimant to some of them only adds a powerful tinge of victimhood to Chinese nationalism and intransigence on the issue. By the same token, the Japanese, Vietnamese, and Filipinos, already feeling threatened by China's growing wealth and power, believe no less firmly that not bending on the island disputes is an essential expression of their nationhood. Long ongoing, these disputes have escalated recently . In May 2011, for instance, the Vietnamese reported that Chinese warships were
harassing oil-exploration vessels operated by the state-owned energy company PetroVietnam in the South China Sea. In two instances, Vietnamese authorities claimed, cables attached to underwater survey equipment were purposely slashed. In April 2012, armed Chinese marine surveillance ships blocked efforts by Filipino vessels to inspect Chinese boats suspected of illegally fishing off Scarborough Shoal, an islet in the South China Sea claimed by both countries. The

East China Sea has similarly witnessed tense encounters of late. Last September, for example, Japanese authorities arrested 14 Chinese citizens who had attempted to land on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to press their country's claims, provoking widespread anti-Japanese protests across China and a series of naval show-of-force operations by both sides in the disputed waters. Regional diplomacy , that classic way of settling disputes in a peaceful manner, has been under growing strain recently thanks to these maritime disputes and the accompanying military encounters. In July 2012, at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian leaders were unable to agree on a final communiqu, no matter how anodyne -- the first time that had happened in the organization's 46-year history. Reportedly, consensus on a final document was thwarted when Cambodia, a close ally of China's, refused to endorse compromise language on a proposed
"code of conduct" for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Two months later, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing in an attempt to promote negotiations on the disputes, she was reviled in the Chinese press, while officials there refused to cede any ground at all. As 2012 ended and the New Year began,

the situation only deteriorated . On

December 1st, officials in Hainan Province, which administers the Chinese-claimed islands in the South China Sea, announced a new policy for 2013: Chinese warships would now be empowered to stop, search, or simply repel foreign ships that entered the claimed waters and were suspected of conducting illegal activities ranging, assumedly, from fishing to oil drilling. This move coincided with an increase in the size and frequency of Chinese naval deployments in the disputed areas. On December 13th, the

Japanese military scrambled F-15 fighter jets when a Chinese marine surveillance plane flew into airspace near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Another worrisome incident occurred on January 8th, when four Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese-controlled waters around those islands for 13 hours. Two days later, Japanese fighter jets were again scrambled when a Chinese surveillance plane returned to the islands. Chinese fighters then came in pursuit, the first time supersonic jets from both sides flew over the disputed area. The Chinese clearly have little intention of backing down , having indicated that they will increase their air and naval deployments in the area, just as the Japanese are doing. Powder Keg in the Pacific
happening now? Several While war clouds gather in the Pacific sky, the question remains: Why, pray tell, is this

factors seem to be conspiring to heighten the risk of confrontation ,

including leadership changes in China and Japan, and a geopolitical reassessment by the United States. * In China, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and on what might be called national assertiveness . At the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held last November in Beijing, Xi Jinping was named both party head and chairman of the Central Military
Commission, making him, in effect, the nation's foremost civilian and military official. Since then, Xi has made several heavily publicized visits to assorted Chinese military units, all clearly intended

to demonstrate the Communist Party's determination, under his leadership, to boost the capabilities and prestige of the country's army, navy, and air force. He has already linked this drive to his belief that his country should

play a more vigorous and assertive role in the region and the world. In a speech to soldiers in the city
of Huizhou, for example, Xi spoke of his "dream" of national rejuvenation: "This dream can be said to be a dream of a strong nation; and for the military, it is the dream of a strong military." Significantly, he used the trip to visit the Haikou, a destroyer assigned to the fleet responsible for patrolling the disputed waters of the South China Sea. As he spoke, a Chinese surveillance plane entered disputed air space over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble those F-15 fighter jets. * In

Japan, too, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and national assertiveness. On December 16th, arch-nationalist Shinzo Abe returned to power as the nation's prime minister. Although he campaigned largely on economic issues, promising to revive the country's lagging economy, Abe has made no secret of his intent to bolster the Japanese military and assume a tougher stance on the East China Sea dispute . In his first few weeks in office, Abe has already announced plans to increase military spending and
review an official apology made by a former government official to women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II. These steps are sure to please Japan's rightists, but certain to inflame anti-Japanese sentiment in China, Korea, and other countries it once occupied. Equally worrisome, Abe

promptly negotiated an agreement with the Philippines for greater cooperation on enhanced "maritime security" in the western Pacific, a move intended to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Inevitably, this will spark a harsh Chinese response -- and because the United States has mutual defense treaties with both countries, it will also increase the risk of U.S. involvement in future engagements at sea. * In the United States, senior officials are debating implementation of the "Pacific pivot" announced
by President Obama in a speech before the Australian Parliament a little over a year ago. In it, he promised that additional U.S. forces would be deployed in the region, even if that meant cutbacks elsewhere. "My guidance is clear," he declared. "As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region." While

Obama never quite said that his approach was intended to constrain the rise of China, few observers doubt that a policy of "containment" has returned to the Pacific. Indeed, the U.S. military
has taken the first steps in this direction, announcing, for example, that by 2017 all three U.S. stealth planes, the F-22, F-35, and B-2, would be deployed to bases relatively near China and that by 2020 60% of U.S. naval forces will be stationed in the Pacific (compared to 50% today). However,

the nation's budget woes have led many analysts to question whether the Pentagon is actually capable of fully implementing the military part of any Asian pivot strategy in a meaningful way. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at
the behest of Congress, released last summer, concluded that the Department of Defense "has not adequately articulated the strategy behind its force posture planning [in the Asia-Pacific] nor aligned the strategy with resources in a way that reflects current budget realities." This, in turn, has

fueled a drive by military hawks to press the administration to spend more on Pacific-oriented forces and to play a more vigorous role in countering China's "bullying" behavior in the East and South China Seas. "[ America's Asian allies] are waiting to see whether America will live up to its uncomfortable but necessary role as the true guarantor of stability in East Asia , or whether the region will again be dominated by belligerence and intimidation," former Secretary of the Navy and former Senator James Webb wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Although the
administration has responded to such taunts by reaffirming its pledge to bolster its forces in the Pacific, this has failed to halt the calls for an even tougher posture by Washington. Obama has already been chided for failing to provide sufficient backing to Israel in its struggle with Iran over nuclear weapons, and it is safe to assume that he

will face even greater pressure to assist America's allies in Asia were they to be threatened by Chinese forces. Add these three developments together, and you have the makings of a powder keg -- potentially at least as explosive and dangerous to the global economy as any confrontation with Iran. Right now, given the rising tensions, the first close encounter of the worst kind, in which, say, shots were unexpectedly fired and lives lost, or a ship or plane went down, might be the equivalent of lighting a fuse in a crowded, over-armed room . Such an incident could occur almost any time . The Japanese press has reported that government officials there are ready to authorize fighter pilots to fire warning shots if Chinese aircraft penetrate the airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. A Chinese general has said that such an act would count as the start of "actual combat." That

the irrationality of such an event will be apparent to anyone who considers the deeply tangled economic relations among all these powers may prove no impediment to the situation -- as at the beginning of World War I -- simply spinning out of everyone's control. Can such a crisis be averted? Yes , if the leaders of China, Japan, and the United States, the key countries involved, take steps to defuse the belligerent and ultra-nationalistic pronouncements now holding sway and begin talking with one another about practical steps to resolve the disputes . Similarly, an emotional and unexpected gesture -- Prime Minister Abe, for instance, these minor disputes in the Pacific get out of hand, however, not just those directly involved but the
pulling a Nixon and paying a surprise goodwill visit to China -- might carry the day and change the atmosphere. Should

whole planet will look with sadness and horror on the failure of everyone involved.

Asian economic collapse causes nuclear war Auslin 9 resident scholar at AEI (Michael Averting Disaster, The Daily Standard, 2/6,
http://www.aei.org/article/100044

when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on
As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for

Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any
so long. previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saberrattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in

Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia
Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a

it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people,
systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up

There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past.
to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history.

Credibility
South China Sea is a geopolitical hotspot due to energy resources- high risk of conflict due to rising tensions over US challenging Chinese claims to the regioncross apply analysis from above about how need for energy makes countries desperate (US- China nuclear war turns the ag scenario from the politics disad) Russia resurgence only happens when US influence is down- Blank indicates Russia will use this opportunity when the US is focused elsewhere to assert its WMD dominance- overconfidence in escalation control heightens risk of accidental launch- which destroys alliances and causes retaliation- breaks down current international structures of independence which turns the <> Obamas credibility and his influence is key to stop these forces from striking out because they feel the US is overstretched and cant do anything- and even if they dont perceive that- no country listens to Obama because hes punishing Cuba Obamas strength is uniquely key to solve conflict Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt
Romneys successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, The disease of a weak president, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weakpresident/ The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles heel all politicians are born with the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike. In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least
take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldnt bet against the soldiers of Shi n Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But

Obamas

weakness could in other places have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons. If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when not if Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device. Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets Indias natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little

notice from the outside world. In my book, Coup DEtat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup dtat. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies . And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president . It doesnt have to be this way. President Obama could if he chose develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The
status quo is simply not an option.

Concessions to Cuba are uniquely key to Obamas credibility French 10 (Anya, Director for the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation,
Stiffing Havana, http://cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/stiffing_havana_38758) In the high-stakes world of international diplomacy, bluffing is a seldom-seen practice -- the stakes are simply too high to risk getting called out. But, that's precisely what seems to have happened with the Obama administration's stated policy of dtente toward Cuba. Havana is making concessions, but Washington seems incapable of responding in kind. The United States may be fumbling away its best chance at influencing Cuba in the way that it has claimed to have wanted for decades. It was nearly one year
ago that President Barack Obama delivered a message to President Ral Castro via Spain's prime minister, Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero: "We understand that change can't happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those changes began," Obama said. "We're taking steps, but if they don't take steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to continue." If

Cuba proved willing to improve relations with the United States, Obama seemed willing to reciprocate. Obama's conciliatory message may have been on Castro's mind as the Cuban government began making improvements to its much maligned human rights record
this summer. More than 40 Cuban political prisoners have been released from jail in recent months. Dozens more might soon follow as part of the government's unprecedented human rights dialogue with the Cuban Catholic Church; it's the first such dialogue of its kind for the church, an institution that previously had been treated with suspicion, if not hostility, by the Cuban government. The

political changes have been paired with sweeping labor and economic reforms that have, however
belatedly, begun to liberalize the moribund economy: 10 percent of Cuba's workforce will shift into the private sector by next year.

The ball, clearly, is now in the United States' court. But so far, the Obama administration has failed to respond to the very concessions Washington has long demanded, and very recently promised to reward. Rather than greet the changes, Obama has replied with mild skepticism. "I think that
any release of political prisoners, any economic liberalization that takes place in Cuba is positive, positive for Cuban people, but we've not yet seen the full results of these promises," Obama told Hispanic media at the White House Tuesday. Washington

and Havana remain locked in their 50-year dispute. The U.S. trade and travel embargoes have only gotten
tighter over the decades; under President George W. Bush, tensions threatened to reach a tipping point. Obama has called the inherited status quo a failure, but most of the Bush policies remain in place today. (Some in Washington argue that Obama has already made significant gestures to Havana by easing restrictions on Cuban-American families' travel and remittances to the island last year. But that change was more a gesture to Cuban-Americans in Miami -- where he campaigned on a promise to ease Bush's harsher restrictions on Cuban immigrant families -- than it was any significant political concession to Havana.) The

Obama administration should instead be honoring the changes in Cuba by taking considerable steps of its own: A bold response by Washington will put the spotlight back on Havana to continue with its reforms. Obama's choice isn't between the status quo and a wholesale abandonment of the embargoes: There are many ways to craft a foreign policy that could help spur the economic growth needed to support the half-million
new workers in Cuba's fledging private sector. Only Congress can lift the Cuban travel ban entirely, but the president possesses

broad authority to allow some Americans to travel freely to the island. Cultural and academic trips to Cuba by Americans are currently permitted under U.S. law, at the discretion of the federal government; the Obama administration could easily broaden the definition of such "people-to-people" trips. That policy would trace its roots to the successful citizen diplomacy with the Soviet Union that President Ronald Reagan championed during the Cold War. President Bill Clinton successfully enacted such a policy toward Cuba during his time in office, but it was rolled back by Bush. But what

if Obama chooses to do nothing or the president fails to move now, after Cuba has apparently acted in good faith to the offer of an outstretched hand, his administration will lose credibility --not just in Havana, but among global allies that will see the president's reversal as a sign of weakness, incoherence, and even dishonesty. No one can say for sure, of course, where Cuba's reforms will
dithers so long that this historic opportunity to influence Cuban reforms passes? If lead. But it's clear -- even to Fidel Castro in his most unguarded moments -- that the old model just doesn't work anymore. Ral Castro's reforms, deeper and broader than the limited Cuban reforms of the 1990s, signal

that Havana is in search of a new system. It may or may not be the model America would choose, but if Washington wants to have any influence at this pivotal moment, the time to engage Cuba is now.

Cuba

2ac
Naval power can deter all conflicts - means if we do not do the aff, the neg has no tangible way of preventing wars from happening, a strong navy is key thats England and Eaglen

2ac Analysis

Venezuela will cut off

Maduro will be pressured from opposition to end the Chavez policy of providing cheap oil to Cuba- Maduro will cave in soon and cut supplies thats Keppel Venezuelan cutoff will come inevitably only offshore drilling can meet demand CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico,
U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf) 3. Cubas arrangement with Venezuela is unsustainable over the long-term. Cubas energy dependence on a single country is a significant political and economic risk, as it learned when it lost its access to Soviet oil. A change in Venezuelas government or policy could devastate Cubas economy overnight. Jorge Pion of Florida International University expresses concerns about the durability of Cubas oil arrangement with
Venezuela and the impact on Cuba and the United States if the relationship were to summarily change. As he told the CDA delegation, The

political risk and strategic risk to Cuba and the United States is huge. What if Chavez loses an election, or loses power , or if Venezuela disconnects Cuba from oil for some other reason? That risk is not in the best interests of the United States or Cuba. 7 Additionally, the arrangement is controversial in both countries. Some Venezuelans, who oppose the Chavez governments close relationship with Cuba, claim that this is a waste of their countrys oil revenues. The oil for doctors program has also
been controversial in Cuba. Cuban citizens complain it has depleted the supply of physicians in their country. According to MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), about 20,000 Cuban family doctors provide health services and health education in medically underserved communities in Venezuela. 8 Cuba recognizes the risk of its dependence, and has engaged in diplomatic outreach to other allies (including Angola, Russia, Algeria, South Africa, and Brazil) that produce oil. But the

better solution may lie offshore , if supplies are recoverable and in amounts that meet Cubas own domestic requirements

Plan solves
Developing just a few wells solves Cuban dependence on Venezuela majority of the discovered oil will go to Cuba Katusa, 11(Marin, 11/1, 321Energy, Will Offshore Oil Lubricate U.S.-Cuban Relations? ttp://www.321energy.com/editorials/casey/casey110111.html)//SEP
And yes,

finding and developing oil resources in Cuban waters would provide a major boost to the country's struggling economy and would help to reduce its total dependence on oil-rich, leftist ally Venezuela.Fidel Castro's close ally Hugo Chavez currently dispatches 120,000 barrels of oil a day to Cuba on very favorable financing terms. However,the arrangement is heavily dependent on the friendship between octogenarian Castro and cancer-stricken Chavez hardly a recipe for permanence. Cuba's oil contracts with Repsol and various other international partners probing its waters call for Cuba to get 60% of the oil, so a few good wells would make a marked difference for the Caribbean nation.

Oils key to Cubas economy-current domestic production means Cuba has to rely on Venezuelan imports Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida
International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation) The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked , as Cuba produces about 85 percent of its power using liquid fuels, a very high percentage compared with other countries.3 The total value of the energy consumed in Cuba has been estimated at 14 percent of GDP , compared with a world average of about 10 percent. In 2007, domestic production of crude oil accounted for about 40 percent of total consumption and the rest was imported from Venezuela. About 50 percent of the total supply of fuel oil is applied to power generation and 50 percent for transportation and other uses; this is consistent with the usage breakdown seen in other countries.

AT: Dependence on Venezuelan Oil Inev

US lifting restrictions on the oil embargo allows for the best firms to come and drill. They have the best technology in the world for drilling and the reason Cuba is hesitant to drill is because of high costs due to lack of tech and deeper rigs require better and more technology both of which is necessary for the US to provide. Cuba has already singled out the US as the sole country that can provide Cuba with the necessary equipment for expanding its domestic oil sector- that gies a bit of breathing room that allows it to reform its economic system to be less reliant on oil- thats Pinon and Benjamin Alvarado

AT: No impact to naval power

And, Only the Navy can solve a litany of conflicts because of fast and forward operational capacity
Asbjornsen 12 (Rear Admiral Douglas J. Asbjornsen, United States Navy, deputy commander, Navy Region Northwest, senior Navy representative for Spokane Navy Week, Guest opinion: Strong Navy still essential, May 12, 2012, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/may/12/guest-opinion-strong-navy-still-essential/) The Navys job continues to get bigger. The presidents national security strategy emphasizes our commitment in the
Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions: vast, maritime areas of the world ideally suited for naval operations and in which the Navy maintains a robust presence. Elsewhere in the world, we face diverse challenges. We are a nation at war. We

face a terrorist network that has attacked our country before and vows to do so again. Unstable regimes are developing nuclear weapons. Rising powers have begun military buildups to match their economic growth. Weak and failed states create havens for groups that seek to do us harm, such as al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Somali pirates. Climate change is creating new conflicts, as Arctic melting foments disputes over shipping lanes and oil supplies previously locked in ice. The Navy is ideally suited for this kind of world because the Navy is fast, flexible and, by its very nature, ready and operating forward. Our ships, submarines and aircraft can go anywhere on the sea on short notice, and they can do all of their work from the sea.

AT: No impact to Korea

North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth, slight instability causes North Korea to attack- first strike is nuclear- even after that if war doesnt go nuclear North Korea is the most militarized society on earth and the US will have to spend lots of money on the military industrial base which tanks moves for deficit reduction- crushes the economy due to lack of fiscal discipline and spills over to the world economy- thats Metz Lack of fiscal discipline threatens U.S. global leadershipthis magnifies the risk of every major impact and turns the disad Lieberthal and OHanlon 12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior
Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt, Los Angeles Times, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-122012) Drones, kill lists, computer viruses and administration leaks are all the rage in the current political debate. They indeed merit serious scrutiny at a time when the rules of war, and technologies available for war, are changing fast. That said, these issues are not the foreign policy centerpiece of the 2012 presidential race. Economic renewal and fiscal reform have become the preeminent issues, not only for domestic and economic policy but for foreign policy as well. As the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, was fond of saying, national

debt has become perhaps our top national security

threat . And neither major presidential candidate is doing enough about it. This issue needs to be framed as crucial not just for our future prosperity but for international stability as well. The United States has been running trillion-dollar deficits, resulting in a huge explosion in the country's indebtedness. Publicly held debt now equals 70% of gross domestic product, a threshold many economists consider significant and highly worrisome. Making matters worse, half of our current deficit financing is being provided by foreigners. We are getting by with low interest rates and tolerable levels of domestic investment only because they find U.S. debt attractive, which may not last . According to the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible
Federal Budget, President Obama's long-term budget plan would allow publicly held debt as a fraction of GDP to rise further, up to 75%, within a decade. Mitt Romney's proposal, featuring tax cuts and defense spending increases and as-yet-unspecified (and thus less than fully credible) entitlement reform, appears worse. It would probably drive publicly held debt to 95% of GDP over the same period. Put differently, though both are serious and pragmatic men, neither major party's presidential candidate is adequately stepping up to the plate, with Romney's plan the more troubling of the two. Why is this situation so serious? First, we

are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things . That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard . Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut
what has been 70 years of strong national political

consensus in favor of an activist and

engaged American foreign policy . One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20
years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited. Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes.

Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad . Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future . Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable . Major war will become more likely . When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change , dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons . These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished .

Solvency

Cuba and US firms say yes

Cuba and US both say yes- the only thing blocking cooperation now is the embargo- thats Benjamin Alvarado

AT: No Drilling now

Cuba will drill solo new zones outside Mariel are being explored. All other evidence only assumes the old rigs- thats Gonzalez. Xtnd Tamayo, Russia will come next year, its inevitable because Putin wants to increase ties with Cuba through oil

Condo Bad
Conditionality is a voter for fairness and education Skews the 2ACmakes us accountable for multiple worlds and then the neg gets to choose the one we least coveredthat destroys the last aff offensive aff speech Kills advocacy skillsno-cost kick incentivizes irresponsible argumentation because theyre not responsible for contradictions or offense Not real world- no one in Congress presents contradictory arguments Neg bias- especially on this topic because Venezuela and cuba will most likely say no and mexico engagement in not inherent- also negs statistically win more out rounds One conditional advocacy and pre-round conditionality solves their offense

CP

Politics
1. Immigration reform wont pass five reasons
Silverlieb and Cohen 7/12 (Alan, Tom, Five reasons immigration reform isn't close to the finish line, CNN, 7/12/13,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/11/politics/immigration-reform-5-things/index.html) EK Two weeks ago, the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill on a 68-32 vote, with 14 Republicans joining the Democratic majority to send the measure drafted by a bipartisan "Gang of Eight" to the GOP-controlled House. President Barack

Obama pushed for the House to quickly take up the measure that would provide a path to citizenship for 11 million immigrants living illegally in the country while bolstering security along the Mexican border. The proposal also includes stronger worker eligibility verification standards and overall border entry-exit controls. However, House Republicans made clear Wednesday they opposed the comprehensive approach of the Senate and intended to consider the issue in a series of bills that will take months to reach final votes. In addition, the House GOP caucus was deeply divided on the question of eventual
citizenship for undocumented immigrants, with some calling for a path to legal status while others opposed any kind of what they labeled amnesty for those who broke the law. While

House leaders warned the party faced political harm if it failed to act on immigration legislation, a vital issue for Hispanic Americans who comprise the nation's largest minority demographic, the piecemeal approach and divisions over the legalization issue portend a messy and uncertain future for the issue. Here are five reasons why: Bipartisanship necessary in Senate, not the House. A 60-vote majority is needed to push major legislation through the 100-member Senate, which means Senate Democrats and Republicans usually have to work together to get anything substantive accomplished. The House, however, does not often require such a super-majority. As long as a simple majority sticks together, it can do virtually anything it pleases. Mix that rule with increasing ideological orthodoxy and a decreasing willingness to compromise -- particularly within the conservative ranks of the majority House GOP -- and you have a recipe for stalemate with the Democratic-controlled Senate. "Passing any version of the Gang of Eight's bill would be
worse public policy than passing nothing," conservative pundits Bill Kristol and Rich Lowry argued Tuesday in National Review Online. "House Republicans can do the country a service by putting a stake through its heart." In today's hyper-partisan political climate, doing nothing is the easiest path for House Republicans to take and even a bragging point for tea party conservatives who came to Washington to shake up the status quo. While moderate House GOP leaders call for passing some kind of immigration legislation to avoid a potential political backlash, conservatives in the rank-and-file say such fears are unfounded as voters will reward Republicans for opposing what they call a bad Senate bill. Republicans don't

trust Obama on border

security . Kansas Rep. Tim Huelskamp might have said it best. The two-term conservative Republican tweeted Wednesday that "trusting Obama (with) border security is like trusting Bill Clinton (with) your daughter ."
Ouch. Virtually every congressional Republican says the Mexican border needs to be properly enforced before Democrats get their priority -- a path to citizenship for America's 11 million undocumented residents. Sens. Bob Corker, R-Tennessee, and John Hoeven, R-North Dakota, added billions for Mexican border security to the "Gang of Eight" bill. For a lot of Republicans, though, the issue involves trust, not money. They remember the last major immigration reform effort, in 1986 under GOP President Ronald Reagan, that also called for tightened immigration controls while giving three million undocumented immigrants legal status. They say the amnesty occurred but the tougher border controls didn't, leading to the much-worse situation today. Now they don't trust Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to secure the border. They also claim Obama's recent decision to delay implementation of part of health care reform showed the administration can't be counted on to fully enforce any law. By taking a piecemeal approach, House Republicans hope to secure the tougher border security they seek before acting on a separate plan that could provide legal status for at least some undocumented immigrants. In short, pass a border security bill now, and then come back to the legalization issue once everyone agrees the border is sealed. Democrats reject such an approach. The

conundrum

of citizenship/legalization While the Senate measure provides a multi-year path to citizenship for most undocumented immigrants, House Republicans made clear Wednesday they remained split about 50-50 on the matter. Reasons for opposing any kind of legalization range from punishing lawbreakers to political protectionism, with conservatives fearing that most immigrants given what they call amnesty and the eventual right to vote will lean Democratic. However, the issue of legalizing immigrants is broad and complex, creating lots of uncertainty. For example, the Senate bill would automatically give immigrants living illegally

in the United States temporary legal status as "registered provisional immigrants." Only when certain border security steps had been taken could they apply for permanent residency, or green cards, as a step toward potential citizenship in process that would take more than a decade. Many House Republicans made clear they don't want any kind of legal status for undocumented immigrants until the borders are secure. Even those open to legalization don't want it to include a path to full citizenship. The labels and definitions of legal status will be a major sticking point in the continuing debate, but also could be a source of compromise. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia told Wednesday's GOP caucus meeting that children of undocumented immigrants brought illegally to America through no fault of their own should be provided a path to legal status, a position strongly favored by Democrats. The backing of Cantor and other House Republicans for such a provision showed room for maneuvering exists. After meeting with Obama at the White House on Thursday, GOP Sen. John McCain of Arizona called on House Republicans to negotiate an immigration bill. "We are ready to sit down with you and negotiate and bring this issue to a conclusion," said McCain, part of the

Sweeping reform isn't popular with GOP in either chamber. There may be more Senate GOP support for comprehensive immigration reform, but not that much. Only 14 of 46 GOP senators backed the "Gang of Eight" bill heralded in its creation as a triumph of
bipartisan Senate "Gang of Eight." bipartisanship in a sharply divided Congress. Why should House Republicans be more in favor? Remember that all politics is still local -- especially in the House. Many House Republicans represent ruby red districts with few Hispanics, where any path to

The Hastert rule House Speaker John Boehner has made clear that the House will only take up immigration reform that is backed by a majority of its Republican members. That is keeping with the maxim of former House Speaker Dennis Hastert that prevented votes on legislation that lacked strong support from the controlling party. Democrats contend the Senate version would pass the House with a few dozen Republicans joining
citizenship is unpopular and the big fear is a primary challenge from the right. Which leads us to ... them to overcome opposition by most of the GOP caucus. While it is unclear if that's true, permitting it to happen would antagonize many of Boehner's fellow Republicans. "If the speaker allows a vote on any immigration bill that results in passage despite a majority of the Republican conference voting against it, then it will be interesting to see if he can muster the votes to get re-elected after the next election," Alabama GOP Rep. Mo Brooks recently told CNN.

2. The DAs not intrinsic a logical policymaker can pass the plan and immigration reform 3. Obama PC fails now---action on OCS drillings a key olive branch that generates GOP support for other priorities like immigration CSM 1-20 Christian Science Monitor, 1/20/13, Obamas second term: Can he work with
Congress? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/DCDecoder/2013/0120/Obama-s-second-term-Can-he-work-with-Congress-video The president has been criticized by many people for his inability or unwillingness to spend a lot of time stroking members of Congress , says Ross Baker, a congressional historian at Rutgers University who is writing a book on bipartisanship in the US Senate. I think a lot of this
is based upon the widely-accepted theory [that the] power of a presidency is the power to persuade which is perfectly plausible, and it was certainly plausible in the 1950s.... The problem is, there are no persuadables" today.

But by focusing on issues of common ground with the GOP, Washington could generate some bipartisan successes in the next four years. Immigration and Energy For one, the president could team up with Republican moderates

and much of the partys leadership on immigration reform. We believe that immigration reform is different in that it has a past, present, and future of bipartisan support, said Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum. What weve seen over the last two years is conservatives, moderates, and liberals want this president and this Congress to act, and thats different from any other issue. And

the president could perhaps turn down the bellicosity on the Hill by working with some of his loudest critics (though risking the ire of environmentalists in his political base) in one area that the deeply-red right and the president could agree: energy policy . We were encouraged by
President Obamas 2012 campaign comments supporting an all-of-the-above agenda on energy, and his statements outlining support for oil and natural gas, said Jack Gerard, president of the Ame rican Petroleum

Republicans rage about a disconnect between what the president and members of his administration say they favor and what Republicans say is foot-dragging in building the Keystone XL pipeline, exporting natural gas, or freeing up more offshore areas for energy exploration . If the president were to get behind any of these initiatives hed likely have plenty of GOP support but that remains a large if.
Institute, the oil and gas industrys powerful trade association, in his annual State of American Energy address in Washington ear lier this month. But

4. Fiat solves the link

5. Obama cant pass anything in the status quo a win like the plan is key to build momentum for his second-term agenda Riley, 3/20 (Jason L., Wall Street Journal, 3/20/13,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324557804578372623790334676.html, Obama's Poll Problems, ADM) A CNN poll released Tuesday puts President Obama's job-approval rating at 47%, with 50% of respondents disapproving of his performance. Is the honeymoon over? According to the survey, Mr. Obama is "underwater with men and women alike and every age group except for young voters, among whom he still doesn't hit 50 percent approval.
The president retains dominant high marks with Democrats, but has sunk to 41/53 among independents." An article in the Hill newspaper puts the numbers in perspective. "History isn't on Obama's side," says the paper. "The last four presidents who won a second term all saw their poll numbers slide by mid-March with the exception of Bill Clinton, whose numbers improved in the four months following his reelection. Clinton may have only been delaying the inevitable. His numbers dropped 5 points in April 1994." By this point in his second term, even Ronald Reagan had seen his approval rating drop by double-digits. The

trend does not bode well for Mr. Obama's second-term legislative agenda, which includes gun-control, immigration and green energy. Without a significant achievement sometime soon , the president's popularity could stall and vulnerable Democrats eyeing the midterm elections could abandon him.

6. Overloading Congress with the plan causes agenda successfocusing his capital kills it Chuck Todd, NBC, 2/5/13, First Thoughts: Flooding the zone,
firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/05/16852487-first-thoughts-flooding-the-zone?lite Flooding the zone : Exactly one week away from President Obamas State of the Union address, the White House has spent the early days of the second term flooding the zone with its legislative agenda . Last week, the president delivered his big immigration speech in Las Vegas. Yesterday, he spoke about gun violence in Minnesota. Today, hes meeting at the White House with progressive, labor, and business leaders to discuss immigration reform and the budget situation. Whats going on here: The Obama White House wants to overload Washingtons political circuits in an effort to see what it can get through Congress -- without letting Congress define what issues get addressed. After all, Republicans want to solely talk about the budget before the March budget
showdown (see yesterdays multiple coordinated responses by House Republicans on the White Houses announcement it would be late with its budget). Yet by

flooding the zone, Team Obama -- with the bully pulpit and the State of the Union at its disposal -- wants to widen the political dialogue beyond that one issue. This flooding the zone concept is how the Obama White House operated in the first six months of the first term, and its where he got most of his legislative achievements. When the White House got bogged down on ONE issue (health care, debt ceiling, etc), officials determined they lost some of
their

political capital .

7. The plan falls to the bottom of the docket 8. Oil companies massively support the plan and lobby for it---determines Congressional sentiment Sadowski 11 Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, IN THIS
ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO, Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis
A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore

oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology. n34 Finally, the concern
over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights. ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For

U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes . n36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs , are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures . n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when thenVice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are , in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply" n38 This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters , equal higher stock valuation. n41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." n42

9. Normal means is Secretary of Treasury action---shields the link Pascual and Huddleston 9 Carlos, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy, the
Brookings Institution, and Vicki, Visiting Fellow, CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the Executive Branch to proceed discreetly . The president might first announce the principles he hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of en - gagement that promotes human rights, the well- being of the Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. To carry out the presidents vision, the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and publish the changes to the Cuban Assets Control regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends. The Secretary of State can quietly accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis without any need to publicize them . This quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in
what some refer to as megaphone diplomacy, in which our governments trade in - sults across the Straits of Florida, and which only contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully.

China SOI
1. US influence would be able to solve the terminal impact to the DA 2. Chinese influence doesnt undercut US hegemony
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 68-9]
Secondly, although

the U.S. pays close attention to Chinas engagement with Latin American countries, it knows that China does not really have the capability to challenge the position of the United States on the American continent. It is true that Chinese-Latin American relations have developed rapidly over the past ten years, especially in regards to three aspects: Firstly, China has established connections with the entire American continent, not only developing economic relations with the major powers
in the region, but also strengthening its cooperation with many medium-sized countries as well as regional organizations. Some countries in the region, however, do not maintain diplomatic relations with Mainland China, and do with Taiwan. Secondly, China

has begun to pursue universal cooperation with Latin American nations, with more and more
dimensions emerging in its various relationships including tourism, cultural exchange, security issues, climate change, etc. Thirdly,

topics of interest between China and Latin American countries have gone beyond the bilateral and regional levels, with these nations exchanging views on the world order and global affairs. Thus, China believes that its relationship with Latin America has strategic importance.2 Certain Chinese scholars have
pointed out that the Chinese-Latin American relationship has exhibited unprecedented growth in the new century (Zheng and Sun 2009). Chinas

increasing reinforcement of its relationship with Latin American countries, however, does not imply any intention to enter into geopolitical competition with the United States .

Economic development is the primary goal of Chinas cooperation with Latin American countries. Indeed, China wants to expand its exchange with Latin American countries to include other areas such as
education, culture, politics, security, etc., given Chinas belief that one-dimensional relationships are both unhealthy and unsustainable. Chinese-Latin

American economic cooperation needs to be both complemented and supported by diplomacy in other areas. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, developing comprehensive relationships with Latin American countries has little to do with strategic or military competition . In fact, Chinas engagement with Latin American countries in the realm of security is quite limited , compared with their other economic and political partnerships. The Chinese military has just begun to interact with its Latin American counterparts. There have been no regular or institutional arrangements between the Chinese and Latin American militaries, let alone any joint actions between them. Thus, the reality of the Chinese-Latin American military relationship is not that it has been developing too much or too quickly. On the contrary, the question becomes how this facet of the relationship can catch up with the rapid growth observed in other areas. What this implies is that China is not pursuing strategic competition with the United States in Latin America. If the U.S. is to be concerned about anything, it should be the potentially catalytic effects on Latin American economic growth caused by Chinas presence in the region.

3. Increased Chinese influence risks war over Taiwan Fergusson 12 (Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at
International Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-americaninterests/)
Taiwan domestic, or foreign policy? Chinas

goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the Peoples Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of Chinas main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally . The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.
The historical background Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy. When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the China seat to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The economics of international recognition In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the

ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that from the
late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwans direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean, *51+ highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic

solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition. However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008. Countries
Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay On the other hand, for

the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the Taiwan issue unilaterally . Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to outbidding Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with
terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that the regions leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. *53+ Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. However, even Taiwans economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has

contributed to the PRC picking

off the few remaining supporters of the ROC take for example, the Dominican case. In early 2004,
Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54] This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America. Political strategies of the PRC In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan, *55+ the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available t o an economic entity as powerful as China. It

refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domnguez suggests that the PRC has not been punitive
toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), *56+ the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. *57+ This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, Chinas

experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the
countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, *58+ further isolating the ROC. The effect on American interests

Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was
not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As

Chinas economic and political position in the world improves vis--vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force .

Taiwan crisis is likely this year---draws in the U.S. Michael Mazza 1-3, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise
Institute, 1/3/13, Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four_surprises_that_could_rock_asia_in_20 12?page=full Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened
their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010.

Some national security experts misinterpret this trend , thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence . Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6
percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support

for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012. Economic integration is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend . With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the
pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. Any

Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect , as a lack of progress on

these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration. And America would surely be dragged in : Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally - could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin . Global nuclear war Hunkovic 9 American Military University (Lee J., The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf) A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members.

Saudi Prolif
1. Non-unique. Iran prolif coming makes Saudi prolif inevitable. Samay Live 13
(Samay Live a leading Hindi news portal this report is internally quoting The Institute for Science and International Security This same article is released on Agence France Presse and is basically an international wire release. January 15, 2013 lexis)

Iran is on track to produce material for at least one nuclear bomb by mid-2014 as sanctions hit its economy but fail to stop the atomic program, said a US think tank, further adding that Islamic republic could reach 'critical capability' within this time frame without detection by the West. The
Institute for Science and International Security, a private group opposed to nuclear proliferation, called for tougher US economic sanctions against Iran and pressure on major trading partners to isolate Tehran yesterday. The group looked at Iran's "critical capability,"defined as the point at which the clerical regime will be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium or separated plutonium to build one or more bombs before foreign detection. "Based on the current trajectory of Iran's nuclear program, we estimate that Iran could reach this critical capability in mid-2014," the think tank said in a report. The think tank based its assessment on the growth in Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and number of centrifuges and what it described as an uncooperative stance by Tehran toward the UN atomic agency. The potential for preventing

institute said it was "deeply skeptical" of the Iran from developing nuclear weapons and painted a dire picture of the consequences if the regime developed the bomb. The think tank said that a nuclear weapon would "embolden
Iranian aggression and subversion" and questioned whether Iran's leadership, with its "apocalyptic messianism and exaltation of martyrdom," could be deterred from using a bomb. The report also said that an

Iranian nuclear arsenal could

motivate Saudi Arabia to develop a nuclear program ,fueling proliferation in a region where Israel is the
sole,albeit undeclared, state with nuclear weapons. The United States has championed sanctions aimed at crippling the Iranian economy by cutting off its oil exports,while Israel has not ruled out the possibility of a military strike on Iran.

2. No link and No Aff double-bind. Cuban oil can be sufficient to avoid extreme US energy insecurities without making the Saudis think theyve lost the US market. The US consumes a lot of oil. 3. No link Saudis not concerned about North American oil boom. AFP 13
[Agence France Presse US energy independence idea naive: Nuaimi, 05.01.2013, http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/gccbusiness/235108-us-energy-independence-idea-%E2%80%98naive%E2%80%99-nuaimi.html] WASHINGTON: Saudi

Oil Minister Ali bin Ibrahim Al Nuaimi yesterday called the US push for energy independence naive, saying the country will continue to need Middle Eastern oil long into the future. Ali bin Ibrahim said he welcomed the surge in US domestic energy production from shale oil and gas fields, which he said will add depth and stability to global oil markets. Newly commercial
reserves of shale or tight oil are transforming the energy industry in America and thats great news, he told an audience of policy makers and academics at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington. It is

helping to sustain the US economy and create jobs at a difficult time. I welcome these new supplies into the global oil market. he added. On the other hand, he said, it was not realistic to believe this would help the United States eliminate imports of oil, a goal of some Americans who argue energy independence is crucial for the countrys security. Despite the domestic production gains, US imports of Middle East oil in the second half of 2012 were higher than any time since the 1990s, Ali bin Ibrahim said. The United States will continue to meet domestic demand by utilising a range of different sources, including from the Middle East. This is simply sound

economics. I believe this talk of ending reliance is a naive, rather simplistic view. Ali bin Ibrahim, meanwhile, emphasised that Saudi Arabia remains able to sustain its reserves at the current 266 billion barrels and said that could increase, especially if technology for extracting tight shale oil and gas improves. But he
contradicted comments by another top Saudi official, former intelligence chief Prince Turki Al Faisal, on Saudi oil development plans. In

a speech on Monday at Harvard University, Turki said Saudi Arabia would increase production capacity to 15 million barrels a day from the current 12.5m b/d. Saudi Arabias national
production management scheme is set to increase total capacity to 15 million barrels per day and have an export potential of 10 barrels per day by 2020, Turki said. Ali bin Ibrahim suggested Turki misspoke. We have no plans for that, Naimi said. We dont really see a need to build a capacity beyond what we have today. Experts

say Asia and Iran are the keys to maintaining a strong - but evolving - US-Saudi Arabia energy relationship. As the United States produces oil at the highest levels in 20 years thanks to the shale boom, Saudi Arabias confidence in Asian markets could help keep relations between the two countries on track. The Saudis dont see the North American oil boom as a threat , not in the context of the global oil market, said a Washington-based energy consultant to governments and businesses. Ali bin Ibrahim said in a speech early this month in Doha that nobody should fear new oil supplies when global demand is rising, adding that Asias population growth should be a driver for future oil demand. Saudi Arabia, the main source of global spare oil production capacity, will be one of the few places with the ability to
supply China and other Asian countries. In contrast, extra barrels from North Dakota and Texas will be consumed in the United States, at least until laws are changed to allow the countrys producers to export substantial amounts of crude. The

relationship between Riyadh and Washington may be changing but the two countries still share important goals on balancing oil markets going forward. One is to keep oil prices from going too high in order to keep Iran from in check. The United States is trying to choke funds to Tehrans disputed nuclear programme through the application of sanctions on its oil sales. High global crude prices could hurt that effort. Saudi Arabia also does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons and is expected to keep oil prices stable. We are still partners but less intimate partners than we once were, said Chas
Freeman, who served as US ambassador to Saudi Arabia under former president George H W Bush. For decades Saudi Arabia and the United States had a special relationship: the kingdom provided the United States oil, and the United States provided Saudi Arabia protection against enemies. As Saudi Arabia becomes less of an important supplier to the United States, the worlds biggest oil consumer, some see that special relationship declining. Even

as Saudi looks to other markets, it still is the second largest oil exporter to the United States after Canada, with shipments averaging 1.4 million barrels per day in the first 10 months of last year.

4. If there is a link, then growing US domestic production should also cause it. Fox News 13
*Fox News, 3/8/13, 'Secret energy revolution' could hasten end to dependence on foreign oil, http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/03/08/secret-energy-revolution-could-hasten-end-to-dependence-on-foreignoil/#ixzz2W406KHfi]

A wealth of new technologies -- from underwater robots to 3-D scanners to nano-engineered lubricants -- are transforming the energy exploration industry in ways that will hasten the end of Americas reliance on Middle East oil. Thats the take on Americas secret energy revolution, according to a report in the Washington Guardian. And the proof is in the balance sheets: According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, monthly imports of oil peaked in Sept. 2006 at 12.7
million barrels per day and has declined 40 percent since then, to 7.6 million barrels in Nov. 2012. Thats partly due to falling demand, as the U.S. economy contracted and drivers with smaller wallets balked at the high price of gas. Cars became more fuel efficient as well, often powered by batteries rather than gas. But its also largely due to the increased production of oil on U.S. shores, the IISS said. Rising

production of liquid fuels in the United States accounts for 60 percent of the fall in U.S. oil imports since 2006 and nearly 100 percent since 2010, the group reported. If the trend continues, the U.S. could become oil independent in the coming years, they added. Whats led to such a surge? An assortment of new technologies and innovative means to tap the oil trapped in shale rock formations, helping sip every last drop from deep wells beneath

U.S. soil. Nanoengineered materials, underwater robots, side-scanning 3-D sonar, specially engineered lubricants, and myriad
other advances are opening up titanic new supplies of fossil fuels, many of them in unexpected places perhaps most significantly, North America, wrote Vince Beiser in Pacific Standard. The

problem for domestic oil has never been a lack of supply, surprisingly. Its been the inability to tap into that oil, Beiser noted. Fracking is the most
high-profile means of doing so, a method for pumping pressurized, specially treated mud into the dense shale formations that trap oil and gas. Fracking has brought with it real environmental concerns, however, including charges that it increases the risk of earthquakes and pollutes ground water. But

theres no doubt the process succeeds in getting fuel out of

the ground. Fracking is about as popular with the general public as puppy kicking, but its very big business, Beiser wrote.
American shale gas production totaled 320 billion cubic feet in 2000; in 2011, the number was 7.8 trillion. Thats by no means the only innovation. To

hit some of the deepest ocean wells, Houstons FMC Technologies wants to move oil production to the bottom of the ocean, with special undersea robots built to survive the
incredible pressure at those depths. We are not far from this vision. Maybe 15 years, Paulo Couto, a vice president of technology for FMC, told Pacific Standard. Other companies are using chemistry to tweak the mud shot down pipes into the ground to lubricate the path for drills, and using new means to detect the pockets of oil that do lie nearby. The wrote.

dynamics of

abundant fuel supplies will be a catalyst for major geo-political shifts, the Washington Guardian

5. Saudi Arabia will never prolif Lippman 8

[Thomas W. Lippman is a former Middle East correspondent and a diplomatic and national security reporter for The Washington Post (1966-1999, 2003). He covered the war in Iraq for The Washington Posts online edition in 2003. He appears frequently on radio and television as a commentator on Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of several books about the Middle East and American foreign policy, including Inside the Mirage: Americas Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (2004), Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (2000), Egypt After Nasser (1989) and Understanding Islam (1995). He has also written on these subjects for several magazines, including The Middle East Journal, SAIS Review and US News and World Report. His latest book on the history of US engagement in Saudi Arabia and US-Saudi relations will be published in January 2008. Lippman is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy The Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdf] It is widely believed among policymakers and strategic analysts in Washington and in many Middle Eastern capitals that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will feel compelled to do the same. In some ways this belief makes sense because Saudi Arabia is as vulnerable as it is rich, and it has long felt threatened by the revolutionary ascendancy of its Shiite rival across the Gulf. Moreover, some senior Saudi officials have said privately that their countrys hand would be forced if it became known beyond doubt that Iran had become nuclear weapons capable. The publication in late 2007 of portions of a US National Intelligence Estimate reporting that Iran had abandoned a program to weaponize nuclear devices in 2003 did not put an end to the speculation about a Saudi Arabian response; the NIE made clear that Iran was continuing its effort to master the uranium enrichment process, and could resume a weapons program on short notice. It is far from certain, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to

acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue if destitute North Korea
can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. In the fall of 2007, the Saudis reported a budget surplus of $77 billion, and with oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or

development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would likely weaken the kingdom rather than strengthen it. Such a course would be directly contrary to the Kingdoms longstanding stated goal of making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone . According to Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, the Defense Minister and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, nuclear weapons by their nature contravene the tenets of Islam . Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabias commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabias leaders know would not be in their countrys best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil.

6. US-Saudi ties unbreakable oil not key. Smith 13

James B. Smith is the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Prior to his appointment, Ambassador Smith had served in a variety of executive positions with Raytheon Company involving corporate strategic planning, aircraft manufacturing, and international business development. Smith was a distinguished graduate of the United States Air Force Academys Class of 1974 and received the Richard I. Bong award as the Outstanding Cadet in Military History. He received his Masters in History from Indiana University in 1975, and is also a distinguished graduate from the Naval War College, the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College. Smith spent a 28 year career in the United States Air Force US-Saudi relations: Eighty years as partners Arab News 20 March 2013 http://www.arabnews.com/news/445436

FOR over 80 years the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a strong relationship based on mutual respect and common interests. Diplomatic relations were established in 1933. That
same year Standard Oil of California signed an oil concession agreement with Saudi Arabia. That initial partnership, of course, developed into the largest oil company in the world in terms of crude oil production and exports; Saudi Aramco. As Secretary Kerrys recent visit shows, our close relationship continues to today. The United States and Saudi Arabia share a common concern for regional security and stabilizing the global oil markets. We also share a charitable impulse to aid the less fortunate, as our foreign assistance efforts, both public and private, demonstrate. Two key pillars of our relationship are economics and commerce. Trade, investment, education, and tourism all help deepen the relationship between our two countries, because they are not just about government to government relationships, but about people to people relationships. The US-Saudi trade relationship has grown considerably over the past few years with our total two-way trade last year reaching almost $ 74 billion. In President Obamas 2010 State of the Union address, he set an ambitious goal of doubling US exports from their level in 2009. We are well on our way toward achieving that goal with Saudi Arabia, with the value of US non-defense exports to Saudi Arabia increasing by almost 68 percent. From Saudi Arabias perspective, Saudi exports to the United States have more than doubled during the same period. Our services trade also continues to expand. In 2010, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the US exported over $ 5 billion in education, business, and professional consulting services to Saudi Arabia. As might be expected, oil remains an important part of our bilateral economic relationship. With Saudi Arabia exporting between a million and a million and a half barrels per day to the United States, it is by far Saudis largest export to our country; just as our largest non-defense export to Saudi Arabia remains motor vehicles. However, our

relationship has developed far beyond oil

chemicals, machinery,

and automobiles. Saudi

Arabia is an

important market for US aircraft,

to oil, some

ag riculture, and computer products . In addition

of our largest imports from Saudi Arabia include chemicals, metals and textiles.

Another measure of how much our bilateral trade relationship is growing is the number of new US exporters to Saudi Arabia. Last year over 150 companies entered the Saudi market for the first time.

7. Iran prolif also non-uqs their disad, Edelman says that emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. 8. Saudi ties resilient if they withstood fluctuations like 9-11, theyll withstand the plan. Coleman 13
(internally quoting Prince Turki Al-Faisal, chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies Michael Coleman is a contributing writer for The Washington Diplomat. The Washington Diplomat Uploaded on January 31, 2013 http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8818:us-saudi-relationship-weathers-arabspring&catid=1496&Itemid=428) Prince Turki Al-Faisal,

chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, has spoken at the NCUSAR conference for the last several years about the ups and downs in U.S.-Saudi relations the low point being 9/11, when 15 of the 19 attackers turned out to be Saudi citizens though he insists the relationship remains on solid footing, for the most part. "Are we content in our relationship with this country? Yes and no. We are entrusting more than 70,000 of our youngsters

to your universities to show our confidence in your educational system," Al-Faisal said, referring to the number of Saudis studying in the United States this year. "We also differ with you on Palestine and wish that you would adopt
the Abdullah Peace Initiative and that you are more evenhanded in promoting what is a declared policy of your government: a viable and contiguous Palestinian state," he added, citing the dormant peace initiative first proposed by the then Saudi crown prince in 2002 that offers Israel a complete normalization of relations with the Arab world in return for its withdrawal from Palestinian lands.

9. There is a huge logical jump in the disad that should make you treat their link scenario skeptically, I doubt a country that has 267 billion barrels of proven oil reserves really fears a country that has about 4 billion barrels in generous estimates and start doing a dangerous thing like proliferate. Pepsi challengenot a single card says Saudi Arabia fears Cuba. 10. Obamas recent presidential memorandum on increased focus on green tech should trigger their link or shows that theirs no brink to the link

Dip Cap
Kerrys already overstretched and failing Mohammed 6/2 (Arshad, Reuters, Analysis: Kerry pushing for Middle East peace, but is he a Lone ranger?, 6/2/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/02/us-usa-diplomacy-kerry-analysisidUSBRE95106X20130602)//LA
(Reuters) - Four months into his term, Secretary of State John Kerry

is trying, simultaneously, to end two of the world's most intractable conflicts: the Syrian civil war and the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians. The two issues, according to an aide, have consumed the vast majority of Kerry's time and energy - he has already flown more than 100,000 miles to 23 countries, including four trips to Israel - since he took office February 1. What is unclear, however, is whether all the movement will lead to progress, or whether it will go down as the quixotic, if laudable, efforts of an enthusiastic new secretary of state..

Kerry talks a good game but, has yet to produce, focused on too many things
7-1 KLAPPER (BRADLEY KLAPPER, Correspondent at AP, Talk is cheap: Kerry battles to deliver
results, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/01/world/talk-is-cheap-kerry-battles-todeliver-results/#.UdHKxCqF_6k// SC) Kerry has certainly promised great things. Now he has to deliver. He has raised hopes in the Middle East that his solo diplomatic effort can produce a historic breakthrough to end six decades of Arab-Israeli conflict. He has pledged to bring Syrian President Bashar Assads regime to heel and to work with Russia to end Syrias civil war. He has suggested rolling back U.S. missile defense in the Pacific if China can help rid North Korea of nuclear weapons. And he has hinted at possible one-on-one talks between the United States and reclusive North Korean leader Kim Jong Un if it would help. In his current round of breakneck shuttle diplomacy to coax Israel and the Palestinians back into peace talks, Kerry flew to the West Bank on Sunday to hold a third meeting in as
WASHINGTON In his four months as U.S. secretary of state, John many days with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. American, Israeli and Palestinian officials have declined to disclose details of the past three days of closed-door meetings, but Kerrys decision to fly from Jerusalem to Ramallah to see Abbas again before he leaves the region was an indication that the top U.S. diplomat believes there is a chance of bringing the two sides together. Working

hard is all he would say when a reporter asked him if any progress was being made. Since succeeding Hillary Rodham Clinton as head of the State Department, Kerry has issued several as-yet undelivered and perhaps undeliverable pledges to allies and rivals, proving a source of concern
for President Barack Obamas policy team. It is trying to rein in Kerry somewhat, according to officials, which is difficult considering he has spent almost half his tenure so far in the air or on the road, from where his most dissonant policy statements have come. The White House quickly distanced itself from both Kerrys North Korea remarks and has now, since Obamas meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Northern Ireland this past week, seen up close the strength of

Moscows resistance to

Kerrys Syria strategy. All the officials interviewed for this story spoke on condition of anonymity because they werent
authorized to evaluate Kerrys performance publicly. Reporting for work at the State Department in February, the former Democratic senator from Massachusetts quickly outlined his ambitions. Clinton still harbored thoughts of a second potential presidential run when she arrived at the department. But aides say Kerry, a 69-year-old Vietnam veteran, is giving himself completely to a job that in many ways is the climax of his political career and the realization of a lifelong dream, after years as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Now he wants

to tackle head-on the worlds thorniest foreign policy conundrums. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said that Kerry believes this difficult moment in
the world requires a willingness to address complicated issues. He believes the risk of high-stakes, personal diplomacy (is) far less than the risk of leaving difficult situations to fester or spiral out of control, Psaki said. That is why he has invigorated our efforts in critical areas, such as North Korea, Syria and the Middle East peace process, and has personally invested time and effort to move the ball forward. No challenge may now be bigger than Syria, where the two-year civil has killed at least 93,000 people. Signaling a shift from the cautious approach of Obamas first term, Kerry announced his first trip abroad would focus on changing Assads belief

that he could prevail militarily and on pushing him into eventually relinquishing power. Since then, however, the fighting has only gotten worse. Thousands more have died as Assad firmed his grip over much of the country and the

U.S. hasnt even delivered all the nonlethal aid Kerry promised Syrias rebels let alone any of the weapons or ammunition that Obama recently authorized. Having failed to reshape the conflict, Kerry changed course by going to Russia to re-launch a peace process for Syria that Clinton engineered in June 2012 but had been all but
forgotten in the months since. In Moscow, Kerry boasted that the former Cold War foes just accomplished great things when the world needs it by deciding to convene an international conference, perhaps by the end of May, that would include Syrias government and opposition. That

conference has been delayed until at least July, and possibly August, and it might never come off at all given the Syrian oppositions refusal to negotiate while it is losing land to Assad and getting so little help from the United States and other Western powers. That failure falls directly on Kerry, who
as part of the U.S.-Russia approach was tasked with delivering the opposition to the bargaining table. Russia may have lived up to its end of the bargain by guaranteeing the Assad governments attendance at any future peace conference. Bu t Putin and the Kremlin also have been undermining peace efforts by sending more weapons to help the Syrian governments counteroffensive.

Kerrys one-man diplomacy in Syria is in some ways emblematic of his tenure. Officials say he opted
to revive the U.S.-Russia strategy for a Syrian transitional government during his walk in the backyard of a Moscow guesthouse with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, informing aides only after of his decision. He afterward insisted he wasnt simply rewinding the clock by a year because the United States and Russia were now going to find ways to put the plan in place. More than two months later, there has been no progress.

The DAs not intrinsic a logical policymaker can pass the plan and Kerry can call India Obama has had talks with Cuba about mail- means either this thumps the disad or no link

Pink Tide
1. Treat this whole scenario skeptically, Their Walser 8 ev in the 1nc impact module says that , Venezuela represents the single most difficult diplomatic and security
challenge facing the U.S. in the immediate future - NOT CUBA

2. Too unique Pink Tide cant be revived. Chile, Honduras, and Chavezs death have all crushed the movement. Paul 13
(not Jonathan Paul but SUDEEP PAUL, who is an assistant editor with the Opinion Pages of The Indian Express Chavez and the oil curse Indian Express March 9th, 2013, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chavez-and-the-oil-curse/1085285/#sthash.LquL047o.dpuf)

By 2008, the Pink Tide had overwhelmed nearly half of the 20-odd Latin American countries, excluding permanently red Cuba. El Salvador and Peru were conquered subsequently, in 2009 and 2011 respectively. But by 2010, Chile and Honduras had already left the fold and Brazil's Lula da Silva had made way for his protg Dilma Rousseff. It was believed by all, except perhaps the starry-eyed hosts of late
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Kolkata and Delhi's JNU, suicidal path taken by Christina Fernandez de Kirchner in

that the Pink Tide was ebbing. One look at the

Argentina, and you can rest assured that the

Bolivarian revolution will end with Chavez.

3. Turn pink tide at the crossroads. Softening embargo to Cuba boosts the US cause in the region. Tisdall 13
Simon Tisdall is assistant editor and foreign affairs columnist of the Guardian. He was previously foreign editor of the Guardian and the Observer and served as White House correspondent and U.S. editor in Washington D.C. Time for U.S. and Cuba to kiss and make up CNN April 8th http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/08/opinion/opinion-simon-tisdall-cuba

There are other reasons for believing the time is right for Obama to end the Cuba stalemate. The
recent death of Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's influential president, has robbed Havana of a strong supporter, both political and financial. Chavez was not interested in a rapprochement with the U.S., either by Cuba or Venezuela. His revolutionary beliefs did not allow for an accommodation with the American "imperialists." His successors may not take so militant a line, especially given that Venezuela continues to trade heavily with the U.S., a privilege not allowed Cuba. The so-called "pink

tide" that has brought several left-wing leaders to power in Latin America in the past decade is not exactly on the ebb, but the hostility countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia felt towards the Bush administration has abated. In fact, according to Sweig's article, U.S. business with Latin America as a whole is booming, up 20% in 2011. The U.S.
imports more crude oil from Venezuela and Mexico than from the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. The U.S. does three times more business with Latin America than with China.

The stand-off over Cuba is an obstacle to advancing U.S.

at the United Nations, and at sharp odds with its major allies,

interests

and business

in Latin American countries, and vice versa. The continuation of the

embargo has left the U.S. almost totally isolated

including Britain and the EU.

4. Embargo fails means Castros already will get oil profit- thats Sotolongo 5. Russian-Latin American ties wont cause US-Russia conflict Russian intentions arent hostile. Ramirez 10
(Dr. Paul Telman Sanchez Ramirez Professor and researcher at the Department of Global Studies, ITESM, Mexico City Campus Latin American Policy; Volume 1, Issue 2, Article first published online: 14 OCT 2010 appears in the December edition obtained via Wiley-Blackwell Full Collection) Russia is demonstrating to the White House its position of establishing a global strategic equilibrium and its capability of defending its own national interests. There

is no ideological conflict between the government of the United States and its Russian counterpart like there was during the Cold War because the latter shares the values of democracy and a market economy. Russias strat- egy in Latin America does not consist of establishing a political regional alli- ance to face the hegemonic power of Washington, but it does send a message to the White House. The Kremlin is moving closer to Latin America with the objective to establish not an ideological or military competition with the United States, but a compe- tition guided by considerations that will prioritize pragmatism and mutual advantage. Russia is attempting to increase its presence in Latin
America and will accomplish this through the signing of commercial, energy, and military agree- ments with some left-wing countries of the region such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, and Cuba. There is also the possibility of signing energy and military agreements with left-wing countries such as Peru, Colombia, and Mexico.

6. Plan solves Russian resurgence- thats Ghitis and Eaglen 7. Cuban financial support not key to pink tide Elites will crush Leftmovements unless theyre more extreme. Robinson 11
William I. Robinson a professor of sociology and global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Latin America's left at the crossroads 14 Sep 2011 Aljazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/2011913141540508756.html

The US and the right wing in Latin America have launched a counteroffensive to reverse the turn to the left. The Venezuelan revolution has earned the wrath of Latin American and transnational elites, but Bolivia and Ecuador, and more generally, the region's social movements and leftist political forces are as much targets of this counteroffensive as is Venezuela. In Chile, a right-wing neoliberal defeated the socialists in last year's elections; in Honduras, the army deposed the progressive government of Manuel Zelaya in a 2009 coup d'etat with the tacit support of Washington; and the US has expanded its military presence throughout the continent, including the installation of new military bases in Colombia, Panama, and Honduras.

The Pink Tide governments will

not be able to stave off this counteroffensive without mass support . And it may be that the only way to assure that support is by advancing a more fundamentally transformative project.

7. Drilling is inevitable which means the plan wouldnt change a thing- only a risk that the plan solves the terminal impact