The Communists and 1942

SUMIT SARKAR ARUN SHOURIE'S four articles in the Illustrated Weekly of India (March 18, 25, April 1, 8, 1984) on the "great betrayal" by Indian Communists in 1.2 represent an unusual combination of archival research (more than 800 documents have been used, we are told) with up-to-date techniques of flamboyant 'investigative journalism': flaring headlines, photographs, photostats and all. The unwary reader might be tempted to confuse this heady mixture with authentic and original historical research, presenting at last "what actually happened in 1942". But going through and quoting from a set of documents, however exci-ting or scandalous, is only a preliminary step in the craft of the historian. A piece of historical reconstruction has to be judged ultimately by the degree and nature of the grasp it reveals over the total historical pers-pective relevant to the events being examined, the setting against which the motivations and relative significance of particular documents are being necssarily evaluated. The extent of Arun Shourie's command over history becomes apparent right from the beginning in the paragraphs on the international situation in the 1930s. Stalin and the Communists, ye are told, were "among the factors that helped Hitler the most to acquire absolute power", though Hitler "eventually turned on the German communists" (my italics). What is never mentioned is that the Red scare was absolutely central to the strategy of Mussolini and Hitler throughout, with Communists branded as anti-national agents of Moscow in a manner which Shourie in his present mood might find pleasantly familiar. The admitted sectarian mistakes of Stalin and the Comintern during 1929-1933 are conflated together with the NaziSoviet pact of August 1939 to produce a picture of the 1930s with no room at all for anti-fascist popular fronts and Litvinov's strivings for collective security. Very rernarkably, the Western appeasement of Hitler is not mentioned even once. The British and French governments are described with some affection as "indecisive and incompetent and also weighed down by scruples of a salslay were allegedly concerned with protecting .the small nations of eastern Europe from Stalin. Shourie prefers to remain absolutely silent about what these same governments had been doing for years about other nations, big or small, facing fascist attack: Abyssinia and China, Spain and Austria and Czechoslovakia. It does not matter to him that the

Indian National Congress, and particularty Nehru, had repeatedly expressed solidarity with every one of these victims of aggression. Indian nationalist leaders evidently become heroes only when they are bashing the Communists and the Soviet Union, otherwise silence is golden. In passing, Mao Zedong is quoted justifyiny the Nazi-Soviet pact, just in case those present-day Conimunists who are critical of the Soviet Union but less so of China managed to slip out of Shourie's net. As compared to Shourie's remarkable deknce of Chamberlain, the passagequoted from Mao unkrtunately fits in rather better with standard historical interpretations of the 1930s (by AJP Taylor, kr instance): "The plan of Britain, the United States, and France was to egg Germany (on) to attack the Soviet Unionsitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight." The essence of Shourie's method is clear from the opening para-graphs: sweeping generalisations about whole periods or movements, based on a few facts, more half-truths, and a series of omissions and interesting silences. Let us now turn to his central thesis: thc Communist behaviour in 1942 was part of a "secret deal" with the British, a .'great betrayal" flowing inevitably from their subservience to Moscow, and that these arc grounds sufficient to condemn Indian Communists for all time as anti-national traitors who must never trusted. That there was much that was dubious and perhaps wrong-headed about the communist line of 'People's War' (as well as in their near-support to Pakistan) would be accepted by many today even among the Party faithfuls, abd we shall be.coming to this problem a little later. But even assuming for the sake of argument that thc 1942-1944 policy was as terrible as portrayed by Shourie, is it sufficient ground for generalising about the entire history of the Indian communist movement? Here the question of overall perspective is vital. In a national move-ment spanning several generations and a variety of social strata and political groups, differences over degrees of militancy or compromise are normal and indeed inevitable, and no group or tradition within the movement can claim absolute consistency over time either. At practi-cally any given moment between 1905 and 1947, it would be possible to find groups inclined to immediate struggle and others more pro. to negotiation or compromise (i e, sell-out or betrayal if one likes to call it so), and the Shourie method of selective generalisation can therekre play havoc with our history, producing endless polemics but little real understanding. As an experiment, let us try to apply the Shouric style of argument to the Gandhian leadership: the result would be a gross caricature, but not very such more so perhaps than that presented about the Communist movement. In April 1942, P C Joshi promised to help the British recruitment drive. Gandhi had done

the same a quarter-century earlier, going out to Gujarat villages as "recruiting sergeant" (as he himself described it), just three years after Jatin Mukherji and many Ghadr heroes had been shot down and at a time when a large number of patriots were jailed or interned under the Defence of India regulations. The move was resented by the peasants of Kheda, whom Gandhi had just led in a no-revenue satyagraha: "peasants who had met them (Gandhi and his companions) with garlands now refused them food, Gandhi's total opposition to revolutionary terrorism is wellknown, and his failure to insist upon a reprieve for Bhagat Singh before concluding the Delhi Pact with Irwin in March 1931 even led to black flag demonstrations at the Karachi Congress. It was again largely at Gandhi's insistence that a move towards redefinition of the Congress creed in terms of complete independence was rejected at the Alimed4bad session of December 1921, and the passage ol the Purna Swaraj resolution was delayed by him for nearly two years during 1928-1929. Gandhi's habit of calling off movements abruptly and unilaterally produced repeated doubts and controversies, most notably in 1922 and 1931. Nehru recalls in his Autobiography that the Bardoli resolution withdrawing Non-cooperation was deeply resented by the bulk of the Congress leaders and even more by younger militants while the GandhiIrwin pact which terminated the first Civil Disobe-dience movement led Jawaharlal to muse on the world eliding "not with a bang but a whimper". Turing to the period specifically discussed in the articles, Shourie states, rightly, that Gandhi and the High Command, between 1939 and 1941, took the stand that "while the Congress would continue to fight for India's freedom it would do so non-violently in a way that would not impede Britain's war efforts". Not impeding British war efforts evidently becomes unpatriotic collaboration only when Communists are doing it, for Shourie passes this without criticism, and in fact abuses the Communists for attacking such moderation. The Communist about-turn in December 1941 was blatant enough, but was the somersault in the oppositc direction by the Congress High Command in 1942 (along with Shourie's double-standards hi 1984) very much less so8 There is ample evidance, finally, that the Congress leadership repeatedly couraged mass upsurges in the winter of 1945-46 around issues like the release of INA prisoncrs, preferring a path of compromise and negotiation which ultimately led to a freedom truncated by partition and communal holocaust. During the great RIN strike in Bombay in February 1946, for instance, thc provincial bosses of the Congress and Muslim League (S K Patil and Chundrigar) offered "the help of volunteers to assist the police", There was remarkable anti-British unity on the streets among Hindus and

Muslims in Calcutta and Bombay during these stormy months, in sharp contrast to what was to happen from August 1946 onwards. Gandhi however condemned such "a com-bination between Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action as `unholy'provoking Aruna Asaf Ali, celebrated under-ground leader of 1942, into making the prophetic rejoinder that it would be far easier to `unite the Hindus and Muslims at the barricade than on the constitutional front,. Shourie had flayed the Communists, with some justification, for their brief flirtation with the Pakistan idea, it was not the aimmunists, however, who accepted the Mountbatten Plan despite the deep agony of the Mahatma. With the single exception of the period 1942-1944, the Commu-nist record, so far as anti-imperialism is concerned, is actually more consistent than any other. RevolutionarY terrorists apart, the Commu-nists were the first organised group in the country to demand complete independence as the basic national objective. Indian Communist policy was certainly marked at times by gross and counter-productive sectarianism, most obviously during the Civil Disobedience movement. But, again with the exception of 1.2, the occasional breaks with the nationalist mainstream came not from any softness towards the British rule, but rather from a misguided militancy: Gandhi and Civil Dis-obedience were condemned (wrongly) for not being anti-British enough. Shourie condemns the Communists for oroitting, obviously for tactical reasons, any reference to forcible overthrow of British rule in the pro-gramme adopted at their first legal Congress in 1943 (in contrast to the Draft Platform of Action of 1934). If exclusion of such an item is 15 94 termed unpatriotic, the Indian National Congress remained so through-out its history. Even Shourie's account makes h obvious (though by implication and forced admission, not emphasis) that 1.2-1944 was the one period during the British rule when Communists were not being persecuted usually more intensively than any other nationalist group (terrorists apart). Despite their insignificant numbers, the Communists, from the very beginning, aroused a holy fear in official minds, reflected in the Kanpur and Meerut conspiracy cases, as well as in innumerable archi-val files with which Shourie must now be familiar. Shourie himself mentions (in passing) that in early 1942194 party organisation had been virtually srnashed through repression intensified since the beginning of the war. The logic of a certain kind of journalism becomes blatant here. The ban on the CPI in 1934 (formally; in practice Communist groups had been more or less illegal throughout) has to be mentioned, as Shourie wants to stress the lifting of the ban in the context of Quit India. But 194 1934 decision is not highlighted or explained, nor

is it put in the perspective of the more or less simultaneous withdrawal of repressive measures against most other sections of the national move-ment, The Communists during 1934-1939, it needs to be recalled, remained illegal 115 time when the Congress was rapidly advancing from jail towards ministries in most provinces. And even thedocurnents cited by Shourie repeatedly point to continuing British suspicion about Communists even at the height of `People's War': the Punjab government in 1944 going to the length of suggesting a ban on the CPI. Perhaps the best testimoney to the patriotic bona fides of the Communists is provided by the entry into its ranks of a very large number of nationalist militants, men and 'women whose patriotism and sacrifice even Shourie would find difficult to question. Whatever be the the rights and wrongs of the charge of `Moscow dictation' (of which mare a little later), it remains a historical fact that Indian Communists sprang basically from within the national movement, whether revolu-tionary terrorist, Gandhian or socialist: MN Roy and Ghadr veterans like Sohan Singh Bhakna, Ajoy Ghosh (compatriot of Bhagat Singh who was himself clearly moving towards atheisrn and Marxism on the eve of his execution) and Most of the veterans of As Chittagong Armoury Raid, EMS Namboodiripad, P Ramamurti and P Sundarayyaall promi-nent Congress and CSP leaders in the 1930s. One could go on adding to the list, but let us confine ourselves to those most relevant to our present context, the leaders and activists of 1942. Shourie's logic makes it incomprehensible how it was that within a decade of Quit India, 1942 leaders of the stature of Aruna Ass f Ali, Nana Patii, Jharkhand Rai or Sarjoo Pandey could have become prominent members of the CP1. Not unnaturally, silence is preferred here, once again. It would be absurd, but perfectly logical, if one adopt. As methods of Shourie to denounce Gandhi and the Congress High Command as anti-national traitors on the basis of the deliberately selective survey made just now. The Shourie style of argurnent merely leads to endless and unnecessary recriminations, whereas what genuine historical reconstruction demands is sober analysis and evaluation of specific controversial decisions and attitudesof `People's War', certainly, but also of the Bardoli resolution of 1922, the GandhiIrwin pact of 1931, the performance of Congress provincial ministries in 1937-1939, or Congress policies in 1945-1947. What then, finally, of the CPI in 1942 itselfrThe charge of secret collaboration through Joshi-Maxwell contacts, going beyond the public opposition to Quit India, is.not new, The expelled leader Batliwala made it in 1945, and the Cangress from 1946 onwards had made repeated electoral use of it a more recent example, interestingly enough, would be Sanjay Gandhi during the last

months of the Emer-gency. The documents, along with certain People, War excerpts and cartoons, still do make unpleasant reading. But a few qualifications are in order. As noted by Shourie himself, )here is an evident gap between what appears at times as a near-servile tone struck in some of the secret correspondence, and the public statements and actual functioning of the Communists in 1942-1944which included campaigning for the release of Congresi leaders and did not rule out opposition to many specific govern-ment policies even while pursuing a general line of `Peoples War'. Shourie argues that the second was mere opportunistic eyewash, the first the real Communist line. Is it not possible or even likely that the reverse would be nearer the truth ? Practically every one of the letters contains pleas for the release of party comrades, and end to repression, and a few specific favours like additional newsprint for Party journals. 'Opportunism', certainly, but not entirely unnatural for a party which had never enjoyed legality. The tone of the British officials in the correspondence and marginal comments remains remarkably lukewarm and suspicious throughout. Shourie himself notes the continued hostility towards Communists on the part of the lower-level bureaucrats and the police, and Communist collaboration and the "secret pact" could not even save some Party comrades from the gallows (the Kayyur martyrs). Incidentally, it is very surprising that Shourie has made no use at all of the Transfer of Power volumes edited by Mansergh, which contain numerous official documants full of deep suspicion regarding possible Communist ulterior motives in offering cooperation in the war effort. Archival documents no doubt lose glamour on being printed, but remain firsthand sources nevertheless. One has to note once again the double standard of Shourie. Other Indiari politicians were also hostile to the August movement and were collaborating in various degrees with the British. Ironically enough, the lectures on which the articles are based were delivered in honour of M N Roy, consistent supporter of the British throughout the war, who received Rs 26,000 a month from them for his publicationsfacts briefly mentioned by Shourie, but without any of the usual journalistic barrage. Rajagopalachari opposed Quit India and urged negotiations. with Jinnah over Pakistan, without being branded a traitor then, later, or by Shourie. Golwalkar's disciplinsd and militant RSS cadres were nowhere to be seen in the August rebellion, while Savarkar, on September 4, 1942, ordered Hindu Mahasabha members of local bodies, legislatures and services to "stick to their posts and continue to perform their regular duties", Shourle has to mention M S Aney, Hindu Mahasabha member of the Viceroy's Council, as the Communists tried to use

him in their early contacts with officials; he sloes not refer to Aney's party colleague Shyama Prasad Mukherji, minister in the Bengal government while Midnapur was being suppressed. Compared to such high standards, the Communist level of collaboration, and even more, the benefits they obtained from it, appear almost trivial and rather patheticand yet only Communists were the 'traitors' of 1942. Where the Commnnists (and the Royists) differed from the others was that they were acting on the basis of certain principles, possibly mistaken, derived from an international perspective, right or wrongand it is this that makes Shourie so furious. In the concluding section of his onslaught, Shourie attempts 555 major generalizations: Communists "recognized only one fatherland" and showed "craven subservience to a second-rate (sic) foreign power", and "this genetic deformity continues to influence the behaviour of the Communnists till this day" they must never be trusted or allied with (a point underlined by Minos Masani with his warning to Janata and PUCL). Shourie undoubtedly is on relatively firm ground when he argues that the equation of prole-tarian internationalism with unquestioning adherence to all the twists and turns of Soviet (and later, for many, Chinese) state policy caused a lot of harm. He quotes from an interesting Party document from October 1941: "We, in India, to reach the same objective have to adopt a different tactical line"and it does seem a pity that such gropings among some Indian Communists towards an alternative conception of anti-fascist struggle which allowed greater scope for the specifics of a colonial situation were cut short in December 1941. But what is remarkable once again, is the habit Shourie has of jumping from partially valid premise to illicit conclusions. In the first place, the repeated warnings about permanent Communist"genetic deformity" sound extremely odd at a time when virtually every section of the now-splintered Indian .mmunist movement is clearly moving away from subservience to Moscow or Peking. Today, the CPI, .the CPI (M), and ML groups are all hostile to Indira Gandhi, despite her excellent Soviet connections and tolerably good relations with China. A 'no truck with Communists' line can only splinter the democratic opposition, and one is tempt. to askt who is Shourie really helping through his vitriolic attack? A seoond logical leap is the implicit conflation of dependence on Soviet guidance with interest in and warm admiration for the Soviet experiment, which Communists in the 1930s and 19403 shared with a very wide section of the national movement and patriotic intellectuals. Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore possibly did as much or more to popularise the Soviet model as the obscure and persecuted Communist groups. Hindsight about the mistakes and

crimes of the Stalin era might make such admiration appear starry-eyed and partially misplaced today, but can we really deny its basically positive role in the Indian context in the late 1930s ? Interest in the Soviet experiment led to a novel appreciation of the need to integrate the struggle for political freedom with the socioeconomic aspirations of peasants and workers, as well as with the world-wide struggle against imperialism and its most rabid manifestation, fascism. S Gopal's standard biography has emphasised the crucial role of the 1927 Soviet visit in the evolution of Jawaharlal Nehru. Returning to 1942, what Shourie's reconstruction misses out completely is the real agony, for anyone with an awareness of international developments, of a time when a Hitlerite victory seemed not only possible but even likely. The world would have *been a very different place if Stalingrad had been lost and 551 won. The People's War cartoon showing Sublias Bose as ft midget holding on to Japan was in atrocious taste, but one has to seriously ask what India's position could conceivably have been in a world ruled by Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo, ;vith Jews, Communists, and liberals wiped out everywhere in a Nazi `final solution'. Nehru, it needs to be recall., shared for a long time much of the Communist agony. He tried desperately for an agreement with Cripps, and came perilously close to 'People's War' in his talk of the need for guerrilla resistance to Japanese invasion till the very eve of August 9. Even the Q,uit India resolution reaffirmed the general Congress support to the Allies, and particularly for the Soviet and Chinese resistance. The epic popular heroism of August 1942'is undeniable, and the Communist slandering of it difficult to pardon. Yet a question of timing remains: was it en-tirely Wise to embark on an all-out confrontation at a moment when India was full of Allied troops and when the British would have a unique chance of justifying the most brutal of repressive measures before world democratic opinion by the argument of the necessities of anti-fascist struggle? It was, in a very real sense, a choice of evils for many: supporting a hat. foreign government, or going in for actions which could quite possibly help towards a fascist victory. As for the Communist volte face of December 1.1, Shourie trivialises the issues unpardonably when he reduces a six-month inner-Party debate to a matter of waiting for a delayed letter from Ha, Pollit. A student militant of those days, now a distinguished Marxist historian, once recalled to me that he had wePt the whole night when the Party line changed. The Illustrated Weekly articles thus present a 1942 roblxd of all its most significant nuances, conflicts and anguish. The tragedy, so far as divisions among Indians were concerned, lay precisely in the fact that irrespective of contemporary

labels, it was not a clear-cut confronta-tion between patriots and traitors, or of antifascist warriors and fifth columnists. There were patriots on both sides, sharing a common hatr. of foreign rule and often similar social aspirations, comrades-in-arms only yesterday (and often once again in the near future), but bitterly divided for the moment over a question of timing and immediate strategy. It seems appropriate to end with the wonds of a young Communist poet of Bengal, written foi his comrades but not inapplicable alsti to those on the other side of the barricades of 1942. The fog is lifting, will lift today or tomarrow. The filth of slander shall be washed away... History, we know, is our silent witness today: We too have sought to free our motherland. (Sukanta Bhattacharji) Arun Shourie's articles seek to perpetuate the fog and the filth. 1 D Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat, Delhi, 1981. p 110. 2 Bombay Governor Colville to Viceroy Wavell, February 27, 1946, in hlansergbfer,