Question 3.

How can you as a military professional benefit from the study of the changes in warfare covered by the H100 block? Use specific examples from H100 to defend your position. Clausewitz, Napoleon, Sun Tzu, and Mao Tse-Tung offer unique theories of war that offer a strategist insight, perspective, maxims, and illumination on war. A new theory of war builds on the capital established by the old masters and combining them. The modern theory of war on display here gives an example of what that could look like. The Theory of Modern Warfare War exists because man exists, not an idea or thing but a sentient being. People fight wars over one single baseline thread that binds an entire series of threads. Power is the core thread. Power drives Leaders, Leaders drive ideas, ideas drives groups, groups drive quests, quests drive activities, and all drive wars. Power is the core thread that binds all other threads outside the core and forms an intertwined, interconnected rope. Power and either its expansion or preservation are why wars are fought. Power and wars are two things at times, other times they mirror each other, and sometimes one wears the skin of the other. People desire power usually at the cost of others, sometimes with the alliance of them, and rarely in cooperation. In todays age groups suffer at the hands of other groups because of the interconnectivity and closeness of todays world. At the core of all human activity lies the expansion, preservation, and wielding of power.i Wars are the result of the mechanisms of power. At the strategic level of war the leaders expansion or preservation of power is primacy, at the operational level the enabling function of the Officers to project that power is equally second, and the tactical level the execution of that power by the Soldiers is a just as important third.ii The competition for power leaves groups of people in either an expansioniii or a preservation group. Wanting to either expand more, or preserve what they have, they form a best guess or strategyiv on how to win. They visualize the end state of where they see themselves at the conclusion of the war, where they

see the organization, and where they see their cohorts. The groups then apply this guess as part of a strategy based on a myriad of things to include culturev, paradigms, education, and wisdom. During the initial stages of conflict, both groups apply their strategy as a best guess on how to win. One side will inevitably take the lead early on, usually with a greater strategy or aggressionvi. The other actor reacts to this greater strategy, aggression, or both by adjusting their strategy, aggression, or both. The lesser(s) in the initial stages inevitably go on the strategic defensive in order to regain momentum using time, space, deception, and diplomacy as tools to regroup.vii Equilibriumviii between the groups is balanced or otherwise the contest is decided. These early stages may involve more soft power mechanisms such as diplomacy, and less of hard power mechanisms such as physical hostility. The pinnacle of expansion or preservation of power is never resorting to violence in the first place.ix These mechanisms will ebb and flow depending on the leader and where he needs to weigh them. If the lesser(s) in the opening stages of war adjust to compensate, then the side with greater leadership wins.x This is the primary mechanism of power. Leadership is the primary apex mechanism. If leadership capability is similar, then the side with greater willxi wins (the second mechanism). If

leadership and will are similar, the side with greater popularity wins (the third mechanism).xii Groups can compensate for popularity temporarily. If leadership, will, and popularity are similar, then the side with greater resources wins (the fourth).xiii Resources are tremendously subjective but are subordinate to the other three. Resources include things like human survival needs, technology, and weapons. If all the above are similar, or can be equally balanced to compensate for the enemy, then the side with greater untapped potential in these areas wins (the fifth). In most cases the group that can wield to greater effect the five mechanisms of power, or compensate a particular mechanism to make up the difference of their enemy, will win. If both real and potential mechanisms of power are equal, then the side that makes fewer mistakes wins. Conversely, the side that can take strategic advantage of their enemys mistakes and vulnerabilities,

while limiting their own to less than the enemy can, wins. Put another way, the side that can make betterinformed relevant decisions, and apply those decisions using planning and preparation, to greater effect than the enemy, while limiting their own mistakes to less than the enemy, will win. Quality decisions trump quantity of decisions, but the leader must expend a value of quantities to get to the qualitative best decisions. If all cognition is the same, then the side that can apply greater decisiveness than their enemy will win. Decisiveness is the highest value of the leader. If cognition and decisiveness are the same, then the side that applies available mechanisms of power in both a synchronized and simultaneous fashion wins. In other words, the leader that can devise strategy, apply strategy, that can lead more effectively than their enemy, apply all mechanisms of power and potential power, while limiting his mistakes to less than the enemy, while capitalizing on the enemys mistakes and vulnerabilities, wins. The key to war is deception.xiv The fog of war exists because the enemy is trying to conceal or deceive their plans, intentions, and activities. The leader must be able to cut through the debilitating fog of war, and uncover the deceptions. The leader must understand the enemys deceptions by getting ground truth through leading from the front, getting fingertip feel, use of directed telescopes through the chain of command, or applying all three to varying degrees. Psychology comes into play as the more information you know about the other leader and the enemy group, the better tailored the deception plan. Psychology also helps to understand to what degree the enemy leader will think his weaknesses and insecurities are, and what s/he values.xv The leader that can uncover the enemy leaders wants, needs, and desires as it pertains to the physical, moral, and cognitive will gain advantage. This in turn affects the physical, moral, and cognitive realmxvi as you get inside the others psychology and decision cycle. The leader must have a better decision cycle and learning curve than the enemy must. The leader must set in motion multi-dimensional compound warfare, or be able to scale war up or down at the enemys critical vulnerabilities. Multi-dimensional warfare involves fighting in the physical, moral, and cognitive realm. It is imperative that the leader is able to fight in these realms equally and to varying degrees, as often employing only one or two leads to loss. Compound warfare involves allies and proxies that can

assist, and using irregular militia not part of the original group.xvii Your cause becomes their cause in the accumulation or preservation of power. In all matters, the leader that can bring to bear powerful strategic effect, enable that projection through the Officers at the operational level, and execute that power by the Soldiers at the tactical level, will win. The masters of war provide value to modern war fighters. The teachings of Clausewitz, Napoleon, Sun Tzu, and Mao Tse-Tung together offer the hard lessons of wars in the past, to be studied holistically as one congruent theory of war. Future war fighters do not have to learn the hard lessons and principles of war firsthand in battle when they simply could abide by what the masters taught, and apply those teachings as lessons learned already. Studying the masters enables the war fighter to avoid mistakes, and develop practical knowledge to place into modern application.

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (published by Praetorian Press, LLC, 2011 Kindle edition), 451. Loren Kije, Koniggrtz (excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H109 The Brain of a Modern Army), 11. iii Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 174. iv Sun Zu, The Art of War, (translated from the Chinese by Lionel Giles published by Petra Books-Kindle edition), 176. v Clausewitz, On War, 27. vi Ibid, 148. vii Ibid, 3. viii Ibid, 60-63. ix Sun Zu, The Art of War, 71. x Ibid, 62. xi Clausewitz, On War, 180 xii Tse-Tung, 2993 xiii Clausewitz, On War, 85 xiv Zu, The Art of War, 29. xv Christopher Bassford, Jomini and Clausewitz-Their Interaction (excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H107: Explaining the Revolution: Jomini). xvi Clausewitz, On War, 104. xvii Thomas M. Huber, Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare (excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H105: Perils of Imperial Overextension: Decline of Napoleon).
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