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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS /

COMMANDANT

Major General J. R., Thurman

DEPUTY

COMMANDANT

Brigadier

General William C.

Louisell

Editor in Chief
COL Rose Stauber

Production Editor
Dixie R. Domingnez

Associate Editor
COL Paul R. Hiltu Jr. ArmU War College

SpanishAmerican

Editor

LTC Rafael Martinez-Boucller

Assistant Editor
LTC Joseph E. Burhw

Brazilian Editor
COL Pedro L. A. Braga

Brazilian Assistant Editors

LTC Sergio R. N. Franco LTc Geraklo P. Almeida Filho

Features Editor
LTC Jamie W. Walton

Publication

Officer

Amos W. GaRawa#

Managing Editor
CPT John W. 1. Ball

Art and Design

Jerome

F. .%heele

Military .Review
Professional
FIFTY-FOUR VOL LVII

Journal
JANUARY

of the US Army
SERVICE NO i! 1977

YEARS OF MILITARY

ARTICLES Peasant Participation in Revolution of North Vietnam Soviet Airmobility: An Overview . . The Spanish Civil War and Sowet Aid . . Oaily Life at Fort Atkinsonon the Missouri1820.27 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . Soviet Ground Forces and Conventional Operations Austrias Defense in Transit . . Guerrilla Politics in Argentina . . Military Art and Science: A Place for It? . Military Leadership in the PRC . . . Americas Revolution and its Legacy . .

. .

. , Roger Darling MAJ David A. Bramlett, USA . . Peter 1. Gosztony .

3 14 26

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COL Virgil Ney, AUS, Ret 36 . John Erickson 49 . Dennis Chaplin 57 . Peter Janke 62 BG Edward B. Atkeson, USA 71
W 82

MAJ Karl p. piotmvs~,

MAJ Lynn L. Sims, USAR

90

Reader Articles Others Military Military

Forum . oflnterest in Review Notes . Books .

DEPARTMENTS . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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...2 ...34 ...95 ...96 ...102

COVER A soldier on patrol from Fort Atkinson pauses to survey the Missouri River from his promontory near Council Bluffs, Iowa, 1824. Cover art and illustrations for the accompanying article on the historic fort were done by the Military Reviews Features Editor.
MILITARY REVIEW is publlshed monthly m English, Sparrlsh and Portuguese by the US Army Command and General Staff College, II Leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for pmrfirrg this publication aprrroved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 Oecember 1975 Controlled circulation postage pa!d at Leavenworth, KS 66048. Subscription: $8.00 per year US and APO/FPO; $1000 foreign, Single copies $1.00 US and APO/ FPO; $125 foreign Address all mail to Military Rewew, USACGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027 Telephone (913) 684.5642 or AUTOVON 552.5642. Unless otherwise stated, the {Iews herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department Of Oefense or any element thereof. Basis of official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade ofbcers. US ISSN 0026.4148

m
Confederate

READER
Great Grandson

FORUM
Alabama to join Forrest in time for the battle.
MAJ J, A. Bsrton Campbell, USAR

.,

In looking over the materiel recently supplied for use in the US Army corn. mend and General Staff College Nonresident Course, Phase III, I noted with interest the article, Until Forrest Is Dead by, Colonel William R. Btooksher and Captain David K. Snider (MiIitary Review, June 1976), on the Battle of Brices Cross Roads between Union General Sturgis and Confederate General N. B. Forrest. While I enjoyed the article, I am afraid it is not totally accurate. Reference was made several times to Johnsons troops under Forrest, and these were identified as belonging to Colonel Bushrod Johnsons brigade. This is not correct, I believe the authors confused the proper brigade commander with General Bushrod Johnson, also in Confederate service. The brigade was, in fact, under Colonel (later Brigadier General) William Arthur Johnson, my great grandfather. General Bushrod Johnson, while having served some time in the Tennessee campaigns, was an infantry officer and was at the time in Virginia, having recently taken part in the Battle of Drewrys Bluff, just north of Petersburg. For a reference, see Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume 4, 1956 edition, p+ges 196 and following. For references to Colonel W. A. Johnson and hk part in the Settle of Bnces Cross Roads, see John A. Wyeths Life of Forrest, pages 397-418 (reprinted es That Devil Forrest and referred to in the notes of the article). The Civil War Times Illustrated megasine, April 1968, also has a good article with W. A. Johnson mentioned several times. As a matter of interest, the brigade was made up largely of the 4th Alabama. They made a forced march from north . . 2

Dull

Saber

The reprints appearing in the July Military Review of soldiers representing militia or Regular Write from the 13 Original Colonies, at first, appeared femiliar to me. My first reaction wee that they vmre from Ogden originals. However, after examining my prints, it was obvious they were not done by Ogden. Closer examination of the attic reprints reflects some errors in accuracy. For example, muskets were either threeberrel lxmd or barrel-pinned stncked. The prints indicate many muskets with top and middle barrel bands but without lower berrel bands and othem without the middle bends. The most glaring inaccuracy appeared, of all places, on the cover picture. I know of no saber or sword, the guard of which faces the direction of the back of the blade or the quillon of which faces the direction of the cutting edge of the blade. In other words, in the picture, the position of the blade at the carry is correct with the track of the blade against the shoulder seam and cutting edge forward. The knuckle guard end quillon are 180 degrees reversed. The knuckle guard should be facing forward. However, they were of great interest to me, end there is indication that the artist was familiar with the other equipage used by these troops, and it is regrettable they could not have been reproduced in color. But costs bahrg what they are, I appreciated even the black and whites.
Stephen DArrigo Military , Jr. Review

For Writers Only The Military Review occupies a unique position among periodicals in general. We are a professional journal catering to a well-defined segment of society. However, as part of the US Army Command and General Staff College, we take on the responsibilities of an academic journaf as well. Our dual role, while not mutually exclusive, has been the object of some comment among our readers. One faction believes that all articles appearing in iVfR should reflect extensive research with appropriate footnotes to document the text. Another detailed authors faction wants footnotes eliminated entirely and the more articles replaced by ones reflecting only the individual thoughts and concepts.

There is a place in A4R for both types of articles. A timely essay on subjects of professional interest is just as important as a scholarly piece examining another aspect of the military profession. And vice versa. The real test of an article is whether it has a message and is readable. We give no prizes for using four-syllable words or verbosity. Slang and colloquialisms do not win gold stars either. Since we rarely use two-part articles, length is a consideration. Our articles normally run from 6 to 20 double-spaced, typewritten pages excluding endnotes and artwork. Over the course of a year, we receive many fine studies and term papers; however, these are not articles, they are studies and term papers. We have found that returning these papers to the authors for revision rarely motivates them to attempt a second try at getting their works published. We have missed some potentially significant material because our authors have been unwilling or unable to transform their documents into article form. Perhaps there is a Clausewitz or a Liddell Hart out there waiting to be discovered. If you are one of these, your article appearing in the Milita~ Review may spark the recognition you so richfy deserve. Let us have a look at your manuscript. Do it before the postaf rates increase again!!!

The Unique Capacities

, of North Vietnam.::~k: +..,:t ~$j ~:

in Achieving

,. ,,.

Peasant Participation
.

in Revolution
,.

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,,

Roger Darling URING its revolution, North Iietnam demonstrated unique capacities in achieving widespread peasant participation in South Vietmtm. This significant story \vas largely overlooked, and its importance not adequately appreciated, as a result of public preoccLlpation with tbe more colorfLil and dramatic military events of the conflict. It M not commonly known that this peasant participation, and the processes of achieving the motivation that stimlllated such involvement, constituted the basic strength of the North Vietnamese revolution. The precise nature of these processes, and the manner in which the North Vietnamese achieved this success, should be studied in depth. It is perhaps the most remarkable story to come from tbe Vietnam experience. In order that this story not be corn-,
Co~yright

]]letel.v lost :tmi{l the contemnororv ~]rerlilection to h(iry and for~et ail things Vietnam, this article provides a partial glimpse of those unique North Vietnamese capacities. Someone once said that the glory of the British Navy was that its men never mutinied, or at least hardly ever mutinied, except for higher pay. Much the same car) be said of peasants. 1 It is generally understood that peasants become hostile and revolutionaryoriented when their life-c irc L1mstances become intolerable. A ferment takes place and results either in organized opposition to the government causing the onerous conditions, or it results in a continuing undercLIYrent of resentful acquiescence to those conditions. True revolution is concerned with both of these elements. At the core of revolution is conflict
Darn. s.

rL3 1!)77 by Rtwm

January

1977

NORTNI VIETNAM over opposing ideas about social or, ganization. It is dispute about social status, social cohesion and access to political power; controversy over what a mans place in.society should be and what values shoo Id link him to other men. Bnt thisis only part of the total. These localized peasant actions constitute a process which is taking place within the even larger social-change process of bringing peasants into modem societyof imposing modern ecOnomic systems on archaic social organization. It is the grafting of the traditional world of the villages onto the modern world of the cities. The particip~tiun of peasants in such processes is the sto~y of most of the developing world in this century. The methods used by revolutionary leaders throughout the world to in. volve ~easants in their quests for power, however, are by no means as consistent as the fact of revolution itself. Strategic differences arise not so much out of diverse national characteristics, cultores and politics, but out of the degree that revolutionary leaders truly understand that their efforts are inextricably involved in bringing peasants into modern society. The range of sophistication in utilizing peasant force in revolution is, therefo~e, very broad. At one extreme is the abrapt revolution and power change arising from elite groups grabbing or losing power, with peasant interests more or less a side attraction. The peasant involvement is more a ~ropaganda element than a participatory reality. At the other extreme is the slow, plodding revolution or insurrection typified by a homogenons blend of revolutionary leadership and peasant interestall moving toward a common goal of true social change consistent with both the realities of the traditional and modern world. We ca~ consider the Cuban revoluYtirm und~r Castro as being near the former extreme, and the recent revolution of North Vietnam as being at the latter extreme. It is noteworthy that Castros strategy for revolution did not start with comprehensive peasant participation and work upward to Peasant interests national power. were, of course, very math in mind, but actual peasant participation was purposely geared for a later time. This strategy held generally true not only for the 1953 Moncada action, but for the November 1956 landing at Niquero and \he guerrilla actiohs that followed. Broadly speaking, the Moncada strategy was psychologicalthe use by Castro of a close personal following to launch a program of excepMilitaryReview

Rooer Davlinfl is with t]L@ State De, partments Agency for International Developnzent. He wceivwl a B.A. from Whittier College and an M.A. front Fletcher SclLool of Lam and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served with tlte Central Intelligence Agencg and witil the Depavtmenf of the Anag, and ltas traveled e.rtensivelg as a Departtitent of State spol<esman for US foreign policy, specializing in Vietnam, Southeast Asia and tlie Far East. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the autlto~ and not necessary those of the Agency fw International Development. 4

1
NORTH VliTNAM tiomdly audacious Consmanship vis-&vis the Orthodox Party. ~ The IX} rpose here is not to evaluate the Cuban revolution, Its sty fitegy is merely used to exemplify points of ~evolLttionary theory. The strategic genlns of Castro wss not in his daring guerrilla activities but, rather. in h]s uniquely keen perception of the already existing attittldes and cultural patterns of the . Cubnn populace rural and urban w h i c h he so skillfully explolted throLlgh a combination of heavy-handed guerrilla perseverance, charisma and rigid determination to sacrifice heroically and risk all for the Llltimate god-power. This strntegy could be described as sequential. It was psychological at the core, coupled with modest initial m]litant activity which V*X designed over time more to tap the latent popLllar hostilities than to achieve military gains. The perpetuation of this strat egY resulted in the increased unleashing of that pentup hostihty ~vithin popular sentiment until peasants In number openly supported the grmving guerrilla forces and created a national movement. What is significant to observe is that the strategy did not start with a finely conceived program of simultaneoLlsly building power with peasant participation and understanding. It was clearly a revolLlt]on at the top, with the significant politiml, social and institutional elements reserved in the mind of its leader and to be implanted when all opposition to him had ceased. This contention is sustained by the fact that, once power was achieved, authority was immediately personal and dictatorial, not built into a politicai strLlctLlre wherein clear, ideology and national objectives were broadly shared and understood. There was simply vast trust that Castro would produce something betJanuary 1977

ter than existed before. Anyone taking part stood to be better off if the rebels won. This view is confirmed hy the observations of Neil Macaulay \vho took part in the gLlerrilla activities: . . . [ the] Cuban ?yolut{on [lras] hrld togrthcr mom bg prrsanal tics thatl IJ!I idco[og~. . . . Material con- ,sidcratians K-WC zcnlilcel~ to lead to Iofficrr] niutiny , . . lxcaww the great majoritu of o/jiccrs were not propertierl mrt); MU matter what course the Rewlutian w i g h t take wlen it arliic Lwi power, they stood to gain. One might then legitimately say that the real CLlb3n re}wlution actunl]y CIILI not begin until 1959 when Castro assllmed power and the political and institutional impact of his ideas J,:IS felt. The revolution up to 1359 was in many respects undefined. i
Vietnam Revolution,

J?y contrast, the revolution in Vietnam is another situ: ttion entirely. It was !vell-conceived, finely honed and meticulntisly calculated as a thr~ist of social change. It was such a ekillful cotlcer)t~l:~lizatiorl of the key elements of traditional and modern societies, and reflected such a profound understanding of the peasant psyche, that it stands perhaps as the epitome of the revolutionary form. Because of its patient and qualitative implementation that is, theory in practice-it also represents the ultimate in revolutionary threat. For these reasons, a closer view of the fine instruments used by North Vietnam is worthy of our attention. Unfortunately, the military drama and other superficial aspects of any revolution are the elements that are 5

NORTH VIETNAM popularly reported and publicly observed. They are also the factors to which the haraesed government normally responds, And yet, as strange as it may sound, the military activity ie not the critical procees. There is much more to a qualitative revolution, That is why, to understand tbe North Vietnamese revolution fully, we must dig deeper to see what actually was taking place beyond the military scene. In doing this, it is possible to get a completely new perspective of this exceptional undertaking and to see more clearly the unique strategic, organizational, policy and motivational thrusts that gave it strength. The value of this new perspective is that it reveals how poorly understood were the real forces behind a highly qualitative revolution and why revolution in the future may be even more tenacious and successful. The secret of North Vietnams strategic conceptualization can be stated in a word-relevance. Its strategy for social change, combined with political objectives, was relevant not only to the circumstances then confronting the coLintry, but relevant to its traditional ethos. To see this in propei. perspective, we must drift back briefly in historj to the late 1940s. Ho Chi Minh, as a goad strategist shoLlld, carefully contemplated the diverse array of social, political, historical and cultural factors confronting him. He realized that durable and lasting power for North Vietnam would arise only from linking the rural villager to a new sense of Vietnam as a people and nation. Ho recognized that guerrilla power as an avenue to sovereign power waa insufficient and temporary in itself. The substance of his perception and its resulting conceptualization was as follows: Ho found this secret in the peasants continuing senss of belong$ng to a la~ger, community beuond the vill~ge. B~ using old, persisting concepts, he created the framework for a new spirit of communit~ based on totall~ new values. His purpose was to link the villager to a new sense of Vietnam as a nation b~ making theiv traditions relevant to participation in the modern politics of revolution. Instead of tke extremelv limited participation in palitics characteristic of Vietnams Confucian kingdoms, Ho a,anted mass inuoleement. and to get it he had to persuade villagers to accept new ualues bv linking th~?n to familiar traditions. ~

Peaaant

Participation

At the core of this concept of revolution was peasant participation. Ho saw that, to be successful in his total strategy, villageys must become participants in a revolutionary movement which would transcend the momentary glow of revolfj and, in the longer term, offer them a means of sharing, in national political power and gaining access to the attributes of modern life. In this sense, Ho Chi Minh generally accepted what Professor Huntington describes as the political essence of revolution: The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of neto groups into politics at a speed a,hieh makes it impossible for e.aisting institcttiotzs to assimilate them. Revolution is the extreme case of the exploeiorz of po2itical participation. . . . The. measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapiditv and scope of the expansion of political participation. ;
Military Ravlew

. .

NORTH VIETNAM In this sense. Ho chose the better parts of both Marx and Lenin. He required the total class participation of the people (Marx), and he made the party the means, though not the exclusive means, of ultimate participation and authority (Lenin). This long-term strategy was effective against the French in the early 1950s, and it essentially was unchanged as applied by North Vietnam against the Americans and South Vietnamese. Its dominant element is patience. History records the unhurried, plodding perseverance of North Vietnamese stra. tegic implementation over the years wherein there appears no significant instance of haste or lagging fortitude. It is noteworthy that the Vietnamese Communists formed their own brand of socialism and did not merely erect a fa$ade. They w,ere dealing realistically with the situation as it truly existed in the social and political milieu of Vietnam. They addressed the countrys traditional ethos and linked it pragmatically and rationally with a more modern future social structure. Noteworthy also, and perhaps the most important aspect of their strategY, was that it did not rely on military force powerful enough to overthrow an incumbent regime and its allies. For the North Vietnamese, the revolution was always a social and political process of long duration. Because it was conceptualized so well at the outset, was so uniquely social and political and was so consistently followed over the years, it resides somewhat outside the standard conceptual framework Westerners are accustomed to in viewing both revolution and the social-change processes in developing nations. The revolutions true nature, therefore, has been understood poorly to the present day. What are soma of the specific elements that K?ke he January 1977 North Vietnamese revolution unique and which explain the unusual motivation that propelled it?

SocialStrategyDominant

To the North Vietnamese, the revolution was a stage-by-stage social processit was managed social conflict. The strategy Mao Tse-tung prescribed for a backward agricultural countrythat is, contest the urban areas and gain victory in the rural areas through a worker-peasant alliancewas pursued. But what was uniquely different about North Vietnamese strategy is that the concept of force it embodiecl had an explicit social and not a military content. In Communist writings, force is cOnceived as a group of people capable of acting so as to determine the actions by persuasion, of others, whether coercion or by other means. In the Communist view, motivation is determined by interest and cannot be created hy compulsion; force is linked inextricably with motivation. ~ This concept runs counter to the Western view of force (power) which is basically militaryfor $xample, a military force in a village, or guarding an area, is felt to be the main determinant of the security status of that village or area. In the Communist view, the military element does not e~,en constitute a force aa defined. What is basic here is that North ~ietnam had both a social and a military strategy. The social strategy was designed to motivate forces; the military strategy was designed to apply forces. Both were designed to advance a just Cause-but, in pursuing this goal, the social strategy was dominant. Further, the North Vietnamese con7

NORTH VIETNAM cept of victory was tied in with this concept of force. North Vietnam gould, therefore, quite logicall# have # victory in a village occupied by government troops ! Why? Because the presence of the troops could not determine, the actions of the resident villagers, while the lone Communist party member could apply bis concept of force and control the actions of tbe ~illagers that is, motivate them not to provide informfltion to the government troops. nentral or to cooperatd positively with North Vietnamese elements. The strategy purposely excluded the small number of rural landlords. They were conceded willingly to the government. Tbe genius of this strategy lay in its relevance to local interestsstructuring a new social system of values and political programs (not economic or administrative programs) that were of importance to tbe peasants daily life. The government saw this insu~rectionary activity as an attempt to overthrow the Saigon Government rather than what it really wasan at. tempt to overthrow the existing social (value) system. The government, in responding to it, overlooked tbe key element of peasant personal interest and succeedingly resorted to suppression. Not only did the go~fernment fai 1 to see the social process taking place, hut its attempts to explain events, and its ineffectiveness against them, in terms of invasion, nationalism, communism, inadequate aid, corruption, terror, and so forth, all failed to interpret the true facts adequately. Clearly, the Communists were manipulating the social forces while the government was manipulating the military and economic forces. Which of these efforts was relevant to the ricepaddy view of the rural peasant, and which formed the basis of his motivation, is now obvious. We might let Mao judge the government counterstrategy with his words of scorn for approaches wherein weapons decide everything. Hos conceptualization of strategy for revolution, therefore, was not only relevant to peasant values, it was uniquely comprehensiy$ and modern. The key organizational criterion of the North Vietnamese lay in answer: ing the question of how well an activity contributed to the political effort. Military Iieview

Preemptive

Strategy

Tbe primary purpose of North V~etnamese strategy was preemptive. It was to achieve a superiority of force in the hamlets ancl villages, the key geographic units of social significance for the targeted rural population. The strategy was preemptive in that it was to create an environment in which tbe majority of the population chose either to fight against the government in defense of its own interests or chose at least not to fight against tbe North Vietnamese elements. This strategy was not designed to set aside a geographic area or a group of people, but, rather, simply to deny the government tbe mind and full physical cooperation of the peas= ant. This is why it was counterproductive for the government to hold secure ~~illagesthe people provided no useful information and were indolent in cooperating. The careful conceptualization of this strategy provided for the inclusion of the majority of the target populationthat is, such key elements as the landless and middle peasants, as well as the weaIthy peasants. Most of these were successfully influenced by North Vietnamese policies to remain 8* .,

, A basic difference between the Dosture of a revolutionary and the government he opposes is that the latter is deeply involved in an administrative program oriented basically toward modern values and the cities, while the former is deeply involved in a POlitical and social undertaking oriented more t o w a r d traditional values and the rural areas. While the government was thus preoccupied with programs, constructing facilities and maintaining the conventional paraphernalia of an established social syst~ the North Vietnamese deferred the building of conventional economic infrastructure and concentrated instead on creating a social-polit]cal system which addressed local interests and preempted rural peasants from government allegiance and service. Organization was hased on the principle of local authority. Rather than letting political authority stem from a power base in a distant city or office, the North Vietnamese allowed authority to emerge automatically through a simple political system at village level. The system allowed power, as well as responsibility and opportunity, to reach down to the lowest village citizen. The village Chi Bo (Communist part y political leader) was the most important echelon, and the one at which binding decisions were made. ~ This was not a position imposed from the outside, nor was tbe position occupie[! by a stranger, Local personnel filled all positions thus putting down deep political and social roots. The system provided for an indigenous outflow of aspirations and interests conforming to the needs of the immediate area. Widespread opportunity for local participation thus was provided. This entailed not only administering local tax, land, justice and January1977

NORTH VIETNAM simple economic matters, but military activity as well. It simultaneously preempted personnel from government use while offering them to the service of North Vietnam. Local authority was a tradition in Vietnam, and this structure was relevant to that tradition. Local youth were able to serve politically and militarily in their own village areasomething very important to the rural Vietnamese sense of home and family. ; L
Promotion System

A promotion system by echelon also was established. This started at hamlet level and worked up through not only the military, but also the political organization as well. It extended all the way to the Central Committee in Hanoi m a continuous chain of authority. Promotion in this chain was thus a mark of prestige in the eyes of ones peersthat is, family and friends in the local area. With authority and power thus vested in local apparatus, peasants who had never before been confronted with such outlets had an opportunity to perform and demonstrate talents wh]ch were to prove not only remarkable, but extensive. The tremendous impetus for peasants to serve, win promotions and exercise authority stood in stark contrast to the rigid obstructions the government social system had placed in their road to personal advancement. This structure, therefore, represented a unique organizationone addressing not only North Vietnamese military and political needs, but simultaneously serving the real needs of the peasantry in South Vietnam! Its strength was sincerity. There was no gimmickry or artificiality about it. Status, power 9

NORTH VIETNAM and advancement. were true realities which could be acquired by predictable means. head of the peasant, &en if he desired the governments new presence, was the h:frd reality of tbe eventual return of North Vietnamese forces or party ~ersonnel and the restitution their presence wouid bring. In this respect, the strategy of North Vietnam was uniquely designed to work on a principle simikar to judo-that is, having your opponents actions work to reinforce your own moves against him. In this way, what were perfectly logical actions by the government actuaiiy served to disturb rural social norms. Statns policies offered alternative routes to valued roles for those who had been excluded from the existing social order. The largest such excluded element was the rural peasantrythe very group targeted by North Vietnam, ,Not having the baccalaureate and other poiitical amenities to advance ivithin the governments social system, vast numbers of the rural population were precluded from meaningful p:lrticipation and uppmtunity in that system. North }rietnam, by contrast, made class origin the very key to its recruitment-giving priority to the rLirnl peasantry and offering it both power (ability to inflaence) and >Wtas (prestige) in countless small ways. Combining the many opportunities for local participation with impressive systems of promotion, and otherwise shom,ing a deep sincerity for peasant social and status needs tbroagh snch devices a< having, senior officials live with the peasants, North Vietnam tapped deeply into iocal interests, enthusiasm and motivation. With such a startling system of new social valnes, it is little wonder that the simple peasants cooperated with the North Vietnamese strategy. This goes far in explaining why South Vietnamese Government cadre corn. ing into a rural area were considered MilitaryReview

Secret

of Success

The secret uf North Vietnamese success in Vietnnrn wus not, how,ever, its strntegy or its organization. Success kIy in the (development of social policies leading to superior motivation. IIeOnOmic policies w~re impOrt:mt in that they addressed the agricultural base of the 14urhl area and hence touched the broadest common Iivelihnod interests. North Vietnam undertook land distribution nnd pYovi[ieci a tax baseci on the ability to pay rather than on the regressive tax formula Imsed on use and consarnption used by the government. This meant that, under the North Vietnamese, the peasant pniti n tax p e r h a p s onetwenty -tifth of what he wus force{i to yield to the Ian{llord under the go\lernment system. Landlords merely paid the modest Inml taxthe peasant paid the i:Lrge use and consumption tax. The naturai personai incentives to sustain such a system are obvious. Thus, when the government drove North Vietnamese elements from a given area, it disrupted the functioning of this beneficial system and injured the peasant in unseen ways. The government in trying to re-establish the old land and tax system only aggravated the situation. It ran head-on into a natural peasant resentment and his reticence to clarify his true interests even though, in government eyes, it had liberated the area. The government found it difficult to. understand the attitudes of vii. lagers recently freed from North Vietnamese control. Hanging over thq 10 ., .,

..
NORTH VIETNAM as ol]tsiders. I.;ven ecun~mlic {Ievclupment programs brought in by gtlvernment personnel were not only irrele. vant to indigeno!ls I)(]litic:il interw t+, b~lt :Llien it, origin. They [lid IIOt :lrise from lt)cal initiatives 01 stren~ths. I%n(led by the Lnlted States, these prmgrums contained u lu~tur;il eleme],t nf artificiality. Ii:lving the {)]q)orllinlty to take actions of cial gled SOCI:II that bel]]g to elements, defend gains. IVOIIIII treutwl the lead tts rvIr:Il these the tuxv;!rxl l,,!ve+t peafi nelv]y an (If ;I(x](lire(l en[i ,.(,. Consequences of System

ants strug-

Thus, in terms ~,f the t,~i, m$!,t<l~North Vietn:lmese obJevt]ve. to get Ivilli]ig pc:is:lnt s[ll~lh]rt Ur t{, get )masant rl(lrlcof}ljer,tti,,tl Ii ith the g<,ver!!mcnt--the [Joliries !tvye WVY
.tlrc(wflll.

loltcies th;tt cnablml f,,lmer Vietminh, youth h,]l)ing to av,>ld the Snuth Vletl):irne.e ArmY SerVICC and ,)ther
SO L1i:li reject,+ nam Ivcre t,, wwrk !~lth N,,rth Viet.

f[,rm~llate[l. rhese v,ew hnsed on iricetitive.that Is, N,)rth Yiet nam !!twld help the.w [Itltca.t> as III!l.c as thL>YWnfo?med and cO]ltrli)utml It) Its etForts. It w:i,., of UIIIYW, in t h,.] r interwts tn do M,, Tht[.s, the :lcqttl~tt]on of :I[ltht)rlty, statu., kind and frulitic:tl oi)tmrtunity Ii as lngenit)usly llnked \vith the nee{[ to l)resemw it by the pns.se+sur ! (-onsidering th:it this system of advancement ~vho had Wtls never created before among had true a people acces,s

to .atatus and power, it cnn be seen that it ~vas a potent instrument in Nnlocking reservoirs of inner rnotit,atlon and ambition. In vie!v of the many fine attribute. in Vietnamese character, this system unlocked skill and talent that astonished the world and shocked those who trmfitional]y have felt the peaaant was only capable of simple farming. Thus, it can be seen that the disciplinary and pnnitive twJanuary 1977

The ctJ]I.cvIIlkvIvcQ of sllch a .ystem, :tlheit ~lw,r]l)e(l here \l,ry I)rlclly, New t{) re[luve the IICC(Ifor military sectlr. ity fnr<es to prwt~cl ({mmtlnlst ,Ireas, Ill c..enw, the whole v<,tintry !v,i< ({)mmllnr,<t :Iwa .In(,e It CVUII,I [Ieal \\ith PI>I,I)IC< ml!lds :Lnylvhcre Its IwoIIICcx]stetl. N,,thlng mow f[illy >hmvs the ]mp[)tencc {If .shccr m]llt,lry force In [Ic:tiing I! ith ,s,N,]:LI,]mlltt<,:ll ant] 1).Juh,,l,,glr:il elements. Secon{lly, it cnahlwl the (<)mmun)sth t,) 610 ,LIY;(,V J{Ith <It[tp<wt., Ollt]m.t, were ..lml)ly t hc homes [If the pm)ple ~)h,) u (Irked \vtth North Vietnam, and, sin,. c I,WXI ]nterwts were rwmm[)n!y sh:lretl, there )va. n<)t milch r,)om f,)r the pe:lsunt \vh[) NONI[]not tit i]] \v]t h Ih,> grmup as a wh, )le. The diswntcr (I) the North \]etname.e t,iew thl}+ e]th~,l ch:lnged his ulltlook or left the alc,u. The empha.is t,n I,n:)l oririn, concentmti~, n nf :~<hth<)rltyat low levels, the cnntinum[. ])n,mr, tion vh:kin and pre(iictnble xcce.s t~) ]mlitical power and stattls thtts forged z rl~trable bond l)et\veen revrrlutionary leatlerxhip and the trwditirrnul pe!want ethos. This bond not o1lIYaccounted for the preservation of those archaic values thut rnral People are not prone to abandon hastily, bnt it enabled those people to reach out simnltaneonsly for those elements of personal advancement that 11

NORTH VIETNAM

,,,
were natural to their natures and which were relevant to their desires. In this way, the peasant was being changed, not by outside forces, put by his own qesponses to positive external stimuli. Hie change was gradual, at his own pace, making it more firmly rooted politically and more consistent with the patient strategy of North Vietnam. There was no need for haste. The genius of the strategy was not only in enabling North Vietnam to function effectively for years in the rural areas in the midst of hostile enemY forces, but, in a broader sense, enabled the revolutionary leadership to harness the valuable talents of the peasants without these people having to understand the complexities and confusing aspects of Communist ideology, economics or the structuring of a modern state. The peasants were thus unwittingly molded into a force that simultaneously served both local and national interests. Simple explanations such as nationalism or communism wpre unable to account for the enthusiastic behavior of the peasants in supporting North Vietnam. Further, attempts to understand the Vietnam conflict in military terms is an exercise completely outside the conceptual frame~york used by North Vietnam in formulating its strategy and programs. . The peasant acquired a new and personally< satisfying role in the activities of his community. The community, in turn, serves national interests because the continuous vertical career structure and promotion system assures loyalty to the objectives of the Central Committee in Hanoi. This entire program of activity was not expected to win victory quickly. The Communist concept of victory was based on its unique concept of force that is, the ability to intfuence, the actions of others. Hence, only through this unusual conceptualization of the social and political elements of the revolution, North Vietnam, in a slow and protracted way, worked to build loyalty to itself through political participation by the peasants. This SIOW erosion of willing support for the government would result eventually in the governments losing the ability to exercise meaningful authority over the populace outside of the cities, The government then wou Id have lost the force contest with the most significant part of the population. This is precisely what hfippened. The final stages of the war constituted a situation of total government frustration with attempting to administer the countryside and a total dependency on its city supporters. In view of such facts about what was really happening in the rural area, it ie interesting, if not stunning, to note and compare the perception of the former American Director of Central Intelligence on this contest for peasant participation and also why $uccesa eluded the United States in Vietnam: America got into Viet Nam and then decided that tke~e ave some tk{ngs we carzt do. Well, I tkink we didnt do it right. But 1 think we could kave done it. . . . Tke military equation didnt too?Vc. But we won tke peoples war.. . .

Unique

Combination

The North Vietnamese revolution was a unique combination of revolutionary leadership and peasant vaIues and interests wherein the leadership was imbued with a desire to establish power based on a broad peasant role of political participation at every level. }2 ,..

,-

Military

fkwiew

.
P

NORTH VIETNAM

.
The people /oere all on the governments side. , , . ~ Returning to our comparisons with Cuba, it is fair to say that the North Vietnamese revolution was not tom. parable to Castros revolution from Moncada to his takeover in 1959. This is because that period of the Cnban story was not a true revolution at all. Considering that the real Cuban revolution started in 1959 when institutions, values and political,mci{]l sYstems began to change, a comparison with the North Vietnamese revolution quite naturally raises the following evaluative questions: Which revolution recognized the need of bringing peasants into modern society ? Which revolution embodied the critical modernizing element of popular participation ? Which revolution resulted in the abrupt implantation of new institutions ? While both have been Successful, their differences in approach to achieving n modern society are noteworthy. If, as modern political science appears to indicate, political participation is the szne qua non of trae revolution sion and mu+ modernization, IM that the conclu

realitiw of both traditional and modern society and, in so doing, accomplish the difiicu]t task of bringing peasants into modern eociety via the participatory route. It further illustrates that qualititative revolution is not based on such popular explanations as nationalism and ideology alone-rather, it must also be based on the fundamental interests, values and ospiratimrs of the people involved. The North Vietnamese revolution stands as a sobering demorrstration of the exceptional power of inspired motivation in unleashing heretofore hidden, but extensive, capacities of the lesser peoples of the world. If there is a b:wic lesson to be derived olution, thought a peasant North down Americaa the from it the is It North not what is not Army, force, Vietnamese it is a lesson aided slowly of by revhow, the nnd wore popularly

to be. Yletnamese

guerrilla S o u t h military

Vietn:Lmese

North Vietnam has discovered heir to achieve its implementation in a developing nation. The North Vietnamese revolution prowdes an excellent example of hm}, perceptive revolutionary leadership can conceptualize its program to harmonize the

forces and their \vill to continue the conflict. The Ies,son of revolution in Vietnam is in its being the epitome of social revolution it is that the opportunity for predictable access to political power by village people is a more ])otent form of power than a primarily mditary
force arrayed the against it. In Vietnam,

po!ver of the West had its we:!kness exposed by the political power of peasant peoples. ]1
therefore, technological

NOTES
P Hu.tmrton, CI,, Z,,,,,, CO,,. <.,, t,<.,, Yale Haven, CT, 190S, P

1 S.mud

:{74.

I,ol, tz.,!l 0?1!., z,, Lrn,. er., t, We,., New

I H,mtnw

t,,.,

o],

.,f

r, 261L ,,,

,,J,r, w
A,, su, t ; [kzd *

R,,,. ,, H\>\. TkL.Y Won . ,1,,<,>< .S.,,,, 19:0, P 629, J> 67x

$! Ern.t HdPeI m, Fdcl (k.tm.~ Road to 180WV. Center for Intro .:!t,. n.l Sturl!m M:,~Achufi.ros In.titute of Technc,ku?y, Cmnbvt,kre, , , P 70. , York Bo.ks/Ne$v :{ Nd MIImukw, A Rcbd !,, Cttbn. Tsme.. NY,

s rb>d.. n G!o. ,) /&,L, p 647, Fit,.t,ntinm,

1$170. P 126.

CL.mlmnde

In Intmv,
Tnm,

4 John T. M. AlktQr J.. ..<1 Pad ?4.,, TIM V;< t,,rame.e aud Tkctr Rcudritwn, Ha, per & RUW Lubli.hem, Ic,, NY, 1970, p 24.

cw, ,,lt,s Mucl, knlnx ml 19 J$in.ry 1910. n 17. oncl Mus, o,,. .,1.

1 I McAlf>tvr

D 166

January 1977

13

Soviet Airmobility:

An Overview

Major David A. &amlett, United States Army HOUGH the recent death of Marshal Grechko removes the architect of the present imposing Soviet military posture. his legacy is secv re. Marshal Grechko recognized the importance of enhanced and potent donventiomd forces and directed the dramatic Soviet improvements in these areas. Among the many sectors of conventional warfare, airmobility has made perhaps the most significant advance during the Grechko era. The Soviets currently possess a potent airmobile threat that retlects a working appreciation for the tactical applications of helihorne forces in all levels of warfare intensity.
Reasons for Heightened Current Interest

tion quately

that

the and

helicopter logistical

was asset

an

adminnot ade-

istrative

This posture of airmoblle +,wareness has, been occasioned by a ~ariety of discrete and continuous fact~s during the post-WorId War 11 peribd. These influences changed the Soviet percep. . 14

suited for the rigors of the modern battlefield. From here, events and factors contributed to this change in perception: the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, the Soviet perception of the US, NATO threat in Central Europe and an appreciation of the lethal, modern battlefield. The Korean Conflict was the firet combat shOw. case f.er the helicopter, and the Soviete bore witness to US innovation in both logistical and tactical employments. In fact, US successes in medical evacuation and othW logistical usee probably precipitated much of the emerging Soviet interest in helicopters during the 1950s. Graham Turbiville contends that, even at this early stage, the Soviets were seriously considering the tactical delivery of troope by helicopter in special situations. I Curiously, the Soviets cite US experiMilltaryfteview

SOVIET AIRMOBILITY ences in airmobile operations in the Korean War as examples of airmobile potential in Tkc Motorized Riffe Battalion in a Tactical Airborne Landing by I. S. Lyutov and P. T. Sagayctak. This 1969 publication, probably the most comprehensive treatment on Soviet airmobility by Soviet writers, discusses October 1950 and September 1951 air assaults of modest proportions. ~ This citation of relatively obscurs operations, particularly in the panorama of extensive US alrmobile activities in Vietnam, would seem to corroborate Turbivilles contention of early Soviet awareness of tactical potential for the he}icoptet, The second historical factor is the Vietnam War with the highly publicized role of US airmobile operations. Though obviously aware of US heliborne operations and the reported successes garnered by the increased mobility, the Soviets generally were reserved in their commentary regarding the ultimate viability of the helicopter on the battlefield, notwithstanding an apparent embryonic intereet stemming from the Korean Conflict. However. in 1968, the Soviets began to write publicly in comparative detail and in afhrmative fashion regarding the uses and applications of airmobile warfare. Such interest continued Ilntil, in 1974, there appeared numerous articles in Vam?nvi Vextni/c (MilitarU Herald)
dealing with ths \,arious facets of air-

M=j~T David A. B~am/ett is,(,it}Ltkc 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentuck~. He received a B.S. from the USMA, an M.A. from Duke University and is a 1976 graduate of the USA CGSC. He has served two tours in the Republic of Vietnam with the tbth lnfantr~ Division and the 10lst Airborne Divi. sion and has been an instructor at the Florida Ranger Camp, US Awn ~ Infantry School, and the Department of English, USMA.

mobile operations. Concurrently, analysis of the US helibol.ne doctrine softened perceptibly, and Soviet commentary moved toward a more positive objective evaluation of the various US doctrinal and tactical practices in Vietnam. This shift in the public forum of Soviet journals daring the latter \stages of the Vietnam experience is hardly coincidental, and the apparent willingness of the Soviets to profit from US experiences is becom. ing a matter of historical record. The third external factor is the Soviet perception of the thrent posed by NATO forces deployed along its western frontier. Certainly, this overriding interest motivated much of the Soviet attention directed to US airmobile initiative in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Soviets are acutely aware of tbe marriage of doctrine and technology in the development of military power, and US advances in helicopter development are monitored by the Soviets. The moat dramatic recent example is the Soviet adoption of the helicopter as a considerable antitank weapon and the consideration of using a tank-helicopter team. The Soviets closely observed the US-Federal Republic of Germany tank-helicopter teste, and clearly they have endorsed the employment of an15

January

1977

SOVIET AIRMOBILITV titank guided miseiles ( ATGMs ) from helicopter platforms, The Mi-24 Hind ie the fulfillment of the Sdviet requirement for a helicopter gunship and/or attack helicopter in the tradition of the US AHJ Cobra series. This pointcounterpoint approach to advancements on the part of the perceived threat is both practical and economical, and it seems to provide a prod to Soviet development in the field of airmobile operations. Additionally, the Soviets now view the helicopter as an asset that militates against the lethality of the battlefield and offsets the disproportion between the capabilities of new weapons and the mobility of troops. :) The Soviets also must grapple with the paradox of the nuclear battlefield that considers both dispersion and massing to be essential for success. * As early as 1965, the Soviets pondered the helicopter as a possible addition to the mobility inventory when Major General Bochkarev cited the necessity to attack at high tempos and advantageously i? tanks, armored transport and helicopters. h Tbe earlier reservations about helicopter survivability such as its vulnerability to small arms, its relative slowness and the technical limitations of noise and vibration 6 seem to, have been overcome gradually by the exigency of mobility on a lethal battlefield. Colonel V, Savkin, the noted Soviet military theoretician, may well summarize current Soviet thinking of Me role of the helicopter on the modern battlefield with his comments that: . . . combat actions ave now conducted on a broad fro t with airborne r landings [botk bII parachute drop artd air landing ]. This characteristic f ea. ture of moderm combat is baeed on ite extent in space, resulting from tlte increased combat potential and mo16 .

bi[it~ of tlte troops, tlteir air transport and ae~iat capabilit~, and tlte e.rten7 sive use of Helicopters.
This the the conclusion battlefield factors to of history on the nature interof with modern external combines recent produce

the current Soviet endorsement of airmobility as an integral part of contemporary warfare.

national Assets and Technological Trends

The significant assets in the Soviet helicopter inventory that support the land forces in airmobile operations are those ,produced by the Mil (Mi) Design Bu rean. The Soviets are nearing completion of their transition from the piston-driven helicopter to m all-turbine force. During this transition phase, the Soviets have steadfastly applied their general technological principle of upgrading and modifying when possible rather than arbitrarily tooling for a new asset. This principle was most vividly apparent during the period preceding the introduction of the Hind attack helicopter, when the Soviets modified existing airframes to function as armed helicopters. Soviet assets can be examined in four general areas though the lines of demarcation are not always clearly defined: Ligh ti Utilit y Helicopters. Used for administrative and liaison purposes, the Mi-1 Hare and Mi-2 Hoyiite have been the standard carriers in the class. The Hmre, introduced to squadron service in 1948, is being replaced by the larger turbine-powered Hoplite. The expanded capabilities of the Hoplife make it somewhat comparable to the US utility class of helicopter. Utilit~/Medium Helicopters. The oldest representative in this somewhat arbitrary class is the Mi-4 Hound,
Military Review

SOVIET AIRMOBILITY first introduced ]n 1951. A piston-device aircraft, the Ifo IInd was the standard troop-carrying helicopter until its replacemerjt by the Mi-s Hip, a transition process still ongoing. Hwzr~ Lift Hclici)ptrrs (f{LH). The worlds learier in HLH development, the Soviets feuture three considerable assets. The lfi-6 IfmJL, first Introdllced in 1960, has prov]derl the technological basis for the subsequently rleveloped .tfi-10 Harl<e and M1-12 Howrr. The Hoolr fentures clamshell doors and
folding in romps to to accept a slingoutsized lo:)d cnrgo Mi.24 Hind addition capability,

k &[*a ~d .

The Hnr/re is a flylng crane with both a long-leg and short-leg ~,ersion. The Ffomcr ~vith four engines has nu near equi~wlent and shmild he precminel]t in HLH development )n the foreseeable future. A/ mei Helicopters. With the introduction produced armed of the their helicopter. Hind first series, the Soviets rlty craclle-to-m:ltll

Designed for a variety of nrmed helicopter roles, the Hind can carry ATG.Ms and rockets,
has date a machinegtln an infantry and squad, can accommo-

This aircraft will supersede the existing armed helicopters, those modified ?f,~zruds and Hips that hnve ser~,ed in the interim as gunships.
Forces

regiments which form it part of the Tactical Air Army. I)llri!lg li:irtlme, a T:wtiu;il Air Army ni,rm;llly \v,Nil[l be plaue(l under the uper:ition;il cow trol of II i, ,,!!t comm;ltld?~, ~rho, in tttrn, \voul(l nllocate the helicopter regiments to hub[jrclinate utlits, elthev ulmies nr {Iivl.l[lns, fur s]wc]tit c)pcrntiom. Generally s])e~iking, the as.ets of a mixed ( mecli[!m and he;~vy) helicopter regiment can lift all organic personnel and eqllipment of the mntorized rifle battalion (MRi3 }. 1 Though the Soviets may not ha~e

Though there are rumors that the Soviets may be experimenting with airmobile units-those incorporating organic helicopter assets and troops in a single organization ~the trend has not been in that direction. Rather, the Soviets maintain separate helicopter units that are assigned as needed to troop units. At the end of the airtransport phase of the operation, the helicopter units revert to their parent organization in aviation channels. The helicopters are organized into
January 1977

Mi.8Hip

SOVIET AIRMOBILITV borne Troops, rscently recognized such a dual Capability when he announced that depending on the way the airborne troops reach the ground, the assault can be called parachute,, landing, and P a r a c h u t e-landing (or mixed) . II Chaplygins remark would seem to formalize much of the Soviet thinking on the use of the helicopter as an attractive alternative in the employment of airborne forces. As early as January 1968, Colonel Ya. Samo?Ienko, an articulate advocate for the use of airmohile operations, argued: The a d u e n t of helicopte?w has

Mi.2

Hoplite

any specifically designated airmobile units, they contend that existing units with a modicum of training can be used effectively in heliborne operations. Soviet interest in this area focuses on the airborne and motorized tifle battalions. The use of airborne forces would appear attractive to the Soviet planners as these are the only infantry units lacking organic transportation, Additionally, the airborne forces could be tnined with a minimum of disruption in their existing routine. Lieutenant General P. V. Chaplygin, Deputy Commander of Air-

...

Mi.12

Homer

ML1O

Harke

hmuyht the practice of the aircraft landing metkod of assault operation, Iekich has great adva~tages over the parachuting method: the landing fo~ce is set down compactl~, as a podrazdeleniye [subunit], and, whats more important with its arms and equipmetif. This makes it possible for the fowe to immediately go into action. This philosophy underwrites much of the current Soviet interest in the application of their considerable airborne assets in an airmobile role. The MRB is the unit most often cited and discussed for use in airmoMilitary Review

18

SOVIET AIRMOBILITY bile operations, The MRB is particularly suited for the variety of roles and missions envisioned for the airlanded force. The Soviets argue that the MRB equipment is air-transportable, and, thus, the unit can displace with its impressive transport aud firepouer assets; sach au eql[ipped llnit could sustain itself effectively in prolonged, independent or semi-independent operations. ] ! The considerable lift caf)abilities of their existing helicopters allow for these serious consider:lt ions of displacing mechanized transport nlong with the troops, thus eliminating the traditional !veaknesses of the light infantry usually associated with airborne and alrmobile operations. Again, the Soviets do not feel that any significant amount of training is needed by the troops to conduct an airmobile assault. Thus, any MR!3 is considered a potentiul airmobile force. The Soviet viel~r mly be best summed up by Lyutov and Saguydak ;vbo endorse the kRB in ~n airmoblle role \vith the following: To arcamp[isb such rariwi n!{s. si[, n.?, podrazde]eniye [,VR13 units in th?s case] are assigned as tactical ai?borne Iairmubile] fuvces !chirlz pasae.ss higl! firepower and woneuuerability; as a ?wle, the!! displace an armnved pcvsonnd carrier. .SMcb podrazdeleniye are armed with cambat eqaipafent wbicl[ can be lifted into the enemy rear by air tran,vpa?t and ave supplted u,ifll waferial weans which are rleces. sary for file conduct of prIJangPd batfle. 1$
Employment Soviet employment of airmobile

forces reflects a sound appreciation for the advantages inherent in a mode of operation that capitalizes on mobility and surprise. Their range of Projected uses includes the traditional and
January 1977

the innovative, and the various missions envisioned reveal considerable thought and analysis. Generally, the missions feature a beliborne assault foru,ard of a main uttack $\,ith an objective selected to facilitate the uninterrupted udvance of the main force; a relatively quick Iinkup between the airmobile forces and the main element is essential. Most airmobile operations prescribe that the uir-hfted unit remain tinti] linkup, but there are also special raid missions that conclude with helicopter extraction rather than Iinkup. The following missions include ckpsu]e discussions of the distinguishing feature of each operation: Seizure of Riuer-C? os,>ing Sites. This task tvould be essentird to the Soviet doctrine of an aggressive Offense that must rely Un uninterrupted momentum. The network of river~ in Central Europe further underscores Smvet interest in the me of airmobile forces to breach the integrity of an enemy de fen>e anrhored along suc cessi~,e river lines. of Bcaclfl, cud [ortion. Seizure Launched in conjunction with nn amphibious assault, this operation could isolate the beachhead, seize o key partion of the beachhead areu or be used .a.s .a deception measure. Sci~u? e of Key Mountain Areas. Usually oriented on a key pass that can be defended after seizure, this oPeration of% requires the attachment of a number of helicopters for the duration of the operations. These assets would transport ammunition and cas Ilalties among the dispersed units. 1 Delay KnfrU of JN[cat!I Rese~vm. Oriented on an enemy force rxther than a terrain objective, the airmobile force either may be extracted after the blocking mission or await linkup, dependent upon the success of the main f(mce attack.
19

SOVIET AIRMOBILITV Disrupt{on of Enemy Withdrawal. Also oriented on the enemy force, this operation probably would conclude with a linkup though the same force might be lifted again behind the withdrawing enemy to continue the harassment and interdiction. Prompt Reconnaissance After Nuclear, Ck emical Attacks. Relying on speed of entry and exit, the airmobile force could conduct immediate, accurate reconnaissance and damage assessment after nuclear or chemical attacks. The tasks could include determination of radiation or toxicity levels and terrain analysis for subsequent operations. Destruction of Nuclear Weapons .SVstems. An obsession with the Soviets, the destruction of an enemys nuclear systems by precisely targeting airmobile forces into the area is a frequent topic in Soviet publications. The emphasis is on the determination of exact locations, and the deployed force may be company or platoon size. Destructwn of Com?nand and Con. trot Facilities. This operation also relies on exact intelligence and a]s~ would be conducted as a raid \vith helicopter extraction terminating the mission, Seiztwe of Water Suppl~ in Desert. Peculiar to desert operations, this task envisions the airmobile force landed at a key oasis to control and deny this essential resource. Linkup with a larger force would seem to be the natural conclusion of this operation. Sei.rcwe of Road Junctions in Polar Re~ions. Another area-peculiar tack, this mission recognizes the criticality of roads in the extreme northern regions during the thaw period. The resultant impassability of off-road terrain, during the thaws makes the road junction an important military objec. tive. Seizure of these choke points 20 could have many applications during various phases of the battle. The ifnpressive variety of tasks considered for airmobile forces indicates a significant awareness and appreciation for its capabilities and potentials. The exactness and detail related to their writings on airmobility suggest that the Soviets have been diligent in the testing and evaluation of many of their employment concepts. Significantly, the Soviets have been including ai rmobile Operations as integral parts of their major field exercises. During the famed Exercise Dnieper of 1967, the largest field exercise since World War H, the Soviets commenced the operation with the airmobile insertion of forces along a river line. Landing and extracting a three-battalion landing force of airborne tfoops by two helicopter units, the Soviets conducted tbe air assault llnder fire. Later in Exercise Dvirta in 1970, the Soviets dropped an airborne force by helicopter 1 with the implications that helicopters may have played an additional role in the exercise. Again, in 1971, during Exercise luo, the Soviets apparently used helicopters during the operation, but exact details have not been forthcoming. 1? This willingness to field-test concepts and employments of airmobile forces reflects a trend to increased reliance on the assets and capabilities of helicopters on the modern battlefield. Tactics Soviet tactical applications of airmobile doctrine are deliberate, perhaps conservative, and generally wellconceived. Perhaps the best approach to understanding Soviet airmobile tactics is to discuss< a typical operation as it reflects the various tactical principles common to most airmobile operations. The mission of seizing a Military
Review

..
SOVIET AIRMOBILITY

Airnrobile

aSS.WJlt in conjunction

with

an armorattack duringSoviet Exercise

Ovina

river-crossing vancing, most encompasses representative

site attacking most

forward main of the or,eration,

of force

an is and

ad. the it

commonly

3-hour period to a 24-hour period. The latter figure is tied to a desert operation with dispersion of forces permitting extended time distance factors. Given the Soviet &ttention to the necessity for a rel<~tively quick Iinkup, one may conclude that the Soviets ~vou]d most likely use the airmobile thrust during periods of uninhibited success such as during the exploitation and pursuit. During these phases, the Soviets could estimate accurately the key Iinkup times nnd thus employ the airmobile leapfrog forward with assurance that linkups would be timely. The airmobile operation designed to seize a river crossing ahead of the main force may be examined by the

and practiced Soviet airmo. discussed bile tactics. When considering the employment of airmobile forces forward of the main force, the fundamental question is how far forward should the force be employed. This factor is measured hy the prescribed or accepted Iinkup timethis parameter is key to Soviet airmobile planning. Soviet views vary on the time allowed for Iinkup, and the determination is tied to a variety of factors such as the enemy situation, the defensibility of the objective terrain and tactical necessity. However, the estimate ranges from a 2 to January1977

21

SOVIET AIRMOBILITV phases characteristic of most airmobile operations. Training. Though the Soviets regard the MRB as the basic potential airmobile nuit, most training for heli borne opemtions should be conducted st company level. H The unit should
receive with G to ( I?Z ) tions. stresses directed 2 7 1 8 to hours and to 3 10 hours of dedicated the helicopters to zone the the particular pickup (LZ) subjects instruction to the and zone operaare hours of landing T h o u g h teamwork, to the devoted
Priority of suppressing enemy antiair defenses. D&traction of aerial targets after landing. r Identification signals. Sig.pal data. ,Method of identifying friendly troops. Target designation for aviation. c Readiness time. r

characteristics

instvnction

audience. The individual soldiers would be taught the techniques of loading and unloading combat equipment, the embarking and disembarking from the aircraft and sctions upon landing; the n uit commanders would learn the SLIpervlsory techniques associated with airmobile-re} ated these functions. lluiniug also could include practical exercise with mockups and the actual helicopters, if available. Training is considered essential, but the amount of training prescribed suggests that it is not among tbe most important or indispensable aspects of the operation. P~cparat{rw and Plannin{!. This pha~e is time-dependent. The troops may well be conducting the airmobile training while their leaders prepare and plan for the assault. Generally, the buttaliou commander makee the detisions on sII key matters, and the staff, guided by the chief of staff, provides for and implements the details. The battalion commander considers the following factors to assist him in the control of the operation:
Assembly areas (primary and alternate). ,. ., Flight paths. Landing zones (primary and alternate).

These would be a part of his order, usually oral, given personally to all subordinate leaders, company and platoon, asually with the assistance of a terrain model prepared by a higher headquarters. 1 This order would be based on a thorough reconnaissance. The order also would contain the ground tactical plan based on the objective of the operation. Additional concerns of the airmo- , bile unit during the preparation and planning phsse inclade the insistence on secrecy, SLIPPIY matters, the Organization for loading, political indoctri no= tion and finalization of the command and control. : The battalion commander assigns units to helicopters with emphasm on unit integrity, and the chief of staff ensures a workable seating plan in consonance with the commanders concept. :) Apparently, the helicopter unit commander enters lnte in the planning and preparation sequence, and be assists in the finalization of the existing plans thoagh his role becomes more prominent once the loading at the PZ commences. The Soviets stress the planning phase, and the operations order for the conduct of the air assaalt and subsequent seizure of the objective reflects an appreciation for the complexity of the operation. Force St?wctureContposition. From the earliest Soviet writings on airmobile operations, the combined arms
Military Review

22

SOVIET AIRMOBILITY principle has been st resserl, They do not compromise on their insistence that the combined arms force is most suibable and the reinforced MRB as the most acceptable force. The reinforced MRB might be compose[i of the foiiowing units:
MRB [~vith seieeted motorized trmsport). Helicopter units. 122mm artillery battery. 120mm mortar bsttery. Antitank weapons. Combal engineers. Radiation chemicai teams. Artiilery forward observer team for main force artiiieyy. Tacticai air contl.oi elements, Lndemvater demolition team element ( for seizure of river-crossing sites ).

The imposing size of the force enhances its cfipabiiity to sustnin itseif for a prescribed ijeriod of time ag:Linst a relatively strong, but initicdiy surprised, enemy. The Soviete endorse the taiioring concept in depioying the force for a fmrticuiar operation. Tbe Soviets further ta~k organize the MRFi along functional lines for the particular river-crossing operation. The importance and frequency of this operation probably have contributed to this refinement into taskoriented groups. The force is organized into four distinct groups: ~ Seizure Group. The size of the group is determined by the requirements to seize tbe objective. Such requirements are based on the enemy presence on the objective, the physical featnres and any speciai considerations that distinguish the objective area. Covering Grow. Somewhat of a security force, this group is a function of the enemy strength and capabilities
January 1977

in tbe objective area. The force ueaaily inciudes ground forces, artiiiery, mortars and engineers. Supp[lrting ami Fire Suppovt GN)UP. A sapport grOIIp, usufil]y one to two piut nuns :Ind :L1l Cllgineer eiement, reconnoiters the enemy nnd terrain. Tbe fire supiwrt groLIp, consisting of the artiile~y and mortnw not in tbe covering group, remains umier the centmiized rontroi of the bnttaiion communder. Bczttati,,n R,,srrrr. IJsualiy pintoon size, the reserve may be attached to any of the above gruups Ishou]d the initini task nrg:inimtion prove ineffectual. Security is rnnintuineci ciuring the preimration and PZ activity phase by restricted comrnunicr. tions and relying aimost exclusively on \Yire, ~LIU1lWS and visual signais. The ground force> and helicopters complete their finmi coordination immedistel,v before commencing the oper:Ltiml. Prior to boarding the helicopters, the troops are dihiwr~ed thrOLlb~houttbe PZ srea in locations called disposition areas. If the situation does not permit ian(iing in the dispositio!l arem, the helicopters Jviii proceed to neaLby landing nreas. The cilspersion may be more thnn 10 square kilometers. Whiie in this posture, the units complete their last-minute preparations, to include the exhortations from the political officers. The Soviets place great importance on the need for this poiiticai Inspiration, given tbe inberentiy risky aspects of operating behind enemy iines. The units move from disposition areas to loading areas and commence loading the helicopters under crew supervision. The troops ioad the helicopters some 5 to 10 minutes before takeoff. ~; Command and control features inciude the use of both r~dio and signal 23

SOVIET AIRMOBILITV rockets for communications. The helicopters use ultra-shortwave radios for control of the air move, and the trans. missions are monitored by ground control points. The helicopters are linked to the escort tactical aircraft by a common frequency. :x The individual soldiers are encouraged to fire on the enemy during the flight, but only under the supervision of the leaders. . The landing is immediately preceded by a preparation fired from the escorting aircraft, both helicopter and tactical aircraft; a nuclear preparation also may be employed. The assaulting units should [Inload their accompanying equipment m)d assume attack positions within 10 to 15 minutes. ::1 Usually, the initial lift will contain the entire MRR with appropriate supporting weapons sufficient to o>rerwhelrn the expected enemy force. Subsequent lifts may bring in heavier equipment sllch as B.UFS, trucks and ammunition. The timing of these multiple lifts would be keyed to enemy resistance and the responsiveness of the helicopter assets. However, apon landing, the immediate objective is the seizure of the crossing-site nrea; the subsequent objective is the defense of that area until relief and linkup with the main force. :{c1 During this defensive phase, the unit will rely on the antitank defense consisting of company strongpoints and integrated antitank systems. In support of this defense, helicopters can carry engineer elements to the periphery of the . defense to place mines along likely avenues of approach. ]1 During the entire operation, an independent com,. munications channel will be established between the airmobile force and the main force driving for linkup. ~~ Soviet tactics clearly address the unique problems inherent in the air24 mobile operation though they do not lose sight of the basic tenet that the ground tactical plan is still the essence of the entire operation. The apparent thoroughness in planning an air assault in no way dilutes the Soviet interest in ground operations. A Forecsst With the Soviet en~orsement of a violent ground attack of undiminished momentum to achieve quick victory on the modern battlefield, there can be little doubt that they will continue to develop and upgrade those forces compatible with that doctrine. Accordingly, airmobile forces s ould be9. come increaelngly more prominent m Soviet tactical planning and training. The capability for heliborne forces to leapfrog ahead of rapidly advancing gmand forces and to disrupt the integrity of forming enemy defenses is one }vell-recognized by Soviet tactical and strategic planners. The Soviets will continue to improve their helicopter inventory and should systematically widen the airmobile training experience in the airborne and motorized rifle divisions, Given the current Soviet surge in the area of conventional weaponry, helicopter asset development should continue to keep pace. The remm-kable development of the H!nd series portends a capability for rapid techno logical development once the doctrinal decision has been made. Airmobile employment is almost completely assetdependent, particularly in the case of the Soviets with their maseive land army. Their airmobile threat is limited only by their assets. With the heightened public interest in airmobility operations, the Soviets can be expected to increaee steadily, if not dramatically, their helicopter inventory. Soviet intereet in the HLH should MilitaryRe)iew

SOVIET AIRMOBIIITY increase. Their avowed belief in the MRB and its organic assets as the most potent and viable a]rmobile force will drive further applications of the HLH in a tactical role. The considerable lift capabilities of their existitm assets permit them to falfill this doctrinal principle which also negates the traditional complaint that armoblle forces have all the inherent weaknesses of light infantry. The employment of the Hind will be the barometer by which to measure Soviet airmobility. As the role for this helic{)pter becomes more clearly defined, so the Soviet intentions with regard to the extent aarl boldness of airmo bile ~ipplicntiuns should be correspoadiagly more apparent. The versatility of the }Iitzd with regard to armament and troop-carrying capability m~~kes it pnrticalflrly saitable for a vsriety of armed helicopter tasks.

NOTES
i Graham H. Tutbiv,lle. ,,A Hcl, borne @ndt Oeratwns,,, October 19,6, ]) 3. Sc,v,et Vwv of Md<tcm, J<c?,! w,

31 S. Lwto. .nd P. T. Sww.dsk, .Mvloaln 1 KCWJII Btztalc.,t . Tnkt, ckc.dorn VozdI@lI, nom Dew>, t, ( The Motorized Mb, fl<lttrtkz, t?, ,, T<Lctical A srbor,te LII,tch,arr). Milltc,ry l>.ldi.ht. x Howe, Mr,mow, USSR, 1969, PP 89-00. 3 M. 11<4.v, ,.N.w Factor, ,. the D<.vduImwnt of Modern A nnics .$, Sot,zct MdtlwII Rwmw. V.brullly 1!)74, 10. 4 The US qumwlam of dcfm.e LW.0,. frcmtnge. ..,s an analoxoua prublem. c%lendod

?1 Se.m<,ylenko, 22 I.wtov J{ Tjwhko., o.(I 07,

o,,.

.,? , I>,, (M.67. 01,, ctt I> 10

Su@yduk, ([t.,

n 83.

0 M Il.].., ,. Hehcc@ers m 0,.8. ,. Hcr<dd), August 1971. P 203.

Swtml. -

1,0,1, w, vcf!?clc (Mdttflrti

Tm.t.res IM,htarv <,f Modem ComHc.rtld), March

the

Troop

Rem..

7 Colo.el V. Savkm, VO,>, >,W Ve,t>t,k bat,,, 1374, D 44, 8 Turb,ville, !I Ibid.. D 6. or,.

ret., PP14.15.

?4 As ,epo.ted ,. Majol V. Chc., nYak, ,,A ff.ttal!,>n f ,,. A,Ihome Lo J,. K,,, Vom,U, t V<. t,,, k :M>Iz1<,vIJ H<rcdd). Jun. 1968, PD 29-$4, C,>]..,] .,commu$cat! on. Dum&? a Tadtmal A,rbor. e A.wdt Ltmdix,., VW,, ,WZ lrctit trilc (Mditar,, Hwrddl Dec,,mbiw Ill; d, ,, 20,+11, V. .,BY Jo, nt ElTo, t% [ Coor, <.mtiu. uf Kokhaov, FoI cc W dh Advanced Airborne ),,, Sovttt Md,taw R<v,?.,c., Dccanbm Detachment 8.<[ Sx.wdak, m> mt 1974, DP 20-21, and Lytov

s. C.ryadlkl.

Taeti.al Lnnd,nx

discuss the move. 10 Sev.m.l Sm.iet D.bhcxtm.s by s single ment of the moto!med rifle battalion the assets moyed by hebcopter u.,t BY nnrdwins that lt con. the hekc.pter unit. one can concl.d~ lain? a mm of rn.?d, um and heavy l>ft h:licomem. dmc..s the OP., Again, LwItov and Sr.mwds.k, det8d. kmditw plnn in conwdernble

.0,... 2!0 Gomwmhk 07J. Cit.. P 205 .

d..

as in11 Lieutenant General P. V. Chtm@n ,, Cmp+bd,tie+ of Airterviewed by Ye, Me.witsev, bed. So..Mw Fal.lot lSOborne TIOODS Dem, PatvtotJ, 30 March 1975. as repmtcd m Forci,t Militaw Dwm+, JUIY 19?.5. U 2.

?7 Much of th s Icki, P ZO. C d,.cuwmn ,s baaed o Lyutov a d Snmwdnk, OP. ctt , DP 21-22. >.

mt

2!1 Urtluw, 30 Lyfltov 31 Ibid,.

!3!,. m; . p and PP Swwdok,

41 .1,.

1S Colonel Ye.. Smnwdenko, .Ts@t~al V, X,Z, W Vmt,nk Lending Forces. Hwold). January fJ68, P 63. 13 Lyutov ad Sasaydak,

Airborne fMdztwI

cit., P 33.

16-17. op. ctt , II 210.

OP. C:t.. PP 7-8.

82 Goryachkin,

January 1977

25

Peter 1. Gosztony ORTY year: ugo, on 18 July 1936, a war began on the Iberian Peninsula which really formed the prelNde to World War II. The war lasted two years and 254 days. It began as a conspiracy by the generals, degenerated into a civil war and shortly thereafter became a theater for military intervention by foreign powers. It claimed over a million dead and determined the course of events and the fate nf the country for a long time to come.
France, Hitler and Mussolini

The war began with the revolt of tbe generals which. was incited by Generals Sanjurjo and Mola, planned as a result of the Popular Front victory- in the Cort6a elections of 16 February 1936. Tbe rebellion of the various. garrisons against the legitimate government in Madrid did not produce the immediate success wiiicb tbe ex26

reme right desired. The Spanish Republic put up a defense: a mi]itia army was raised, and it became apparent that not all army units agreed with the rebels and declared themselves ready to defend the democratic achievements of the Republic with wwapon in band. Tbe resistance began to take shape. 1 However, this resistance was limited to the defensive, at the most to diversionary raids while the rebels took up the attack. Only in this way did rebels have any chance to conquer all of Spain. After the unexpected death of General San jurjo (he died in an airplane crash 20 July), a previously littleknown generalFrancisco Franco took over the leadership of tbe insurgents.. He tried to overthrow the Popular Front government in Madrid as quickly as possible and to establish in tbe country an authoritarian, nationt

Military Fleview

SPANISH CIVIL WAR ally representative regime based on a national party. ~ The rebels enjoyed the materiel and moral support of National Socialist Germany as well as Fascist-ruled Italy. Great Britain and France tried to skay out of the war. On 2 August 1936, the Paris Government officially - suggested signing a treaty with the other big powers for nonintervention in Spanish affairs. Although the head of the French GovernmentSoci~ list Lb Blumdid manage in London to form a nonintervention committee under the direction of Lord Plymouth and although the most important European countries (including Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union ) declared their \villingness to do all in their power to support the activity of the committee, the policy of nonintervention in the Spanish Civil War proved to be a farce. Hitler and Mussolini had no intention of keeping the international commitment. Frances troops were supported with more and more weapons and military advisors, and the German Ll{fttcajfe helped the rebels transfer their troops f com Africa to the mainland. Thereafter, Franco continued to receive aid from the German and Ital. ian Go\rernments. On 28 November 19S6, the rebels concluded a secret treaty of collaboration with Rome, on 20 March 1937, a similar agreement was made with Berlin. SovietIntervention The Soviet Union closely watched the e},ents in Spain. Finally, the Moscow Communist P a r t y leadership strongly opposed any commitment of Italian and German troops to Spain, even if these units wrere disguised as volunteers. The Sbviet Union no longer felt bo~lnd to the guidelines of the London Nonintervention Committee. Beginning in the fall of 1936, the Soviet Union supplied the Spanish Republic with various forms of militsry support (weapons, war materiel, military advisors, and so forth). Exact figures and information concerning these shipments, which reached Spain via 23 sea transports between October 1936 and the fall of 1938, \vere officially released recently. Subsequently, over 2000 Soviet \,olunteers fought on the side of the Spanish Republic. Among them were 722 members of the air force, 351 tmk officers, 222 general military ad\,isors and instructors, 77 members of the navy, 100 artillerymen, 52 other military specialists (among them sev. eral members of the Soviet counterintelligence and intelligence services), 130 skilled workers and engineers, 156 radio-telegraph operators and communications specialists as well as 204 translators. The Soviet Union delivered the following supplies and equipment to the Spanish Government: 806 combat aircraft, 362 tanks, 120 armored recon27

Peter I. GosztonU is c!mrently Head of the Stoiss East European Library in Berm, Sn,it.zerlnnd. He studied at the Univemitu of Zurich, Switzerland, wlt ere he graduated in 1962. His article S11 ield and Sword: Thoughts on the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Warsaw Pact appeared in the Decent be~ 19?5 MILITARYREVIEW. Januaw 1977

, SPANISH CIVIL WAR naissance v e h i c 1es, 1555 artillery pieces, about 500,000 small arma, 340 grenade launchers, 15,113 machineguns, about 110,000 bombs, about 3.4 million rounds of artillery, 500,000 grenades, 862 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 1500 tons of ex. plosives as well as torpedo boats, torpedoes, radio stations, vehicles and fuel, ~ T,he Soviet support (which was much less than that given by Hitler and .Mussolini to France) ~ can in no . way be rated as an unselfish act on the part of the Russians. They profited at various levels from their aid. Viewed militarily, the Spanish Civil Wai. was an ~xcellent chance for the Red Army to test its new weapons (especially the BT2 through BT7 tnnks ) under conditions of modern war. The otlkers of the Red Army, who as a general rule served under false names Iso-called war names) on the staffs and with the troops of the Republican army, took care of intelligence matters as well as warfare. The top advisor of the Republican army wss General G. M. Schtern ( General Grigorovitch) ; General J. \V. Schmuschkevitch ( Douglas) served in a similar capacity in the Republican air force. Even the future Defense .Minister and Soviet Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky ( Comrade Malo ) was active as an advisor in Spain. A. 1. Rodimtsev, N. G. Kuznetsov, P. I..Batov, W. J. Kolpaktschi and N. P. Gu?yev to name just a fewbelonged to the staff of the Soviet advisors in Spain and were able to prov& their worth as troop commanders later in the war against Hitler. General J. K. Bersarin (later Chief of Soviet Defense and .Military Intelligence\. and A. I. Orlov of the NKVD ( Peopls Commissariats of Internal Affairs), whkh wae responsible for guerrilk training and 28 espionage, were just as involved in the evente @ Spain as the future Soviet Marshal and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army K. A. Meretskovwho dedicated a whole chapter in his memoirs to his service in Spain. 3 Politically, the Soviets (and here we can make no distinction between government and party leadership) endeavored to gain a foothold in Spain. In the continual left slide in the Republican g o v e r n m e n t, they saw chances to bring to power the Spanish Communist Party under its leader JOS6 Diaz. The Spanish Communist Party, which had a considerable membership (abOut 250,000 party members ), was more dynamic and, therefore, also more successful than the other parties in Spain. It saw the civil war as a fight between democracy and fasciem and assumed a posture in favor of the national independence of Spain. In June 1937, the Spanish Communist Party was the dominant party on the Republican sideand Stalin had every reason to hope that the Spanish cpmrades could retain or even expand fhei r position in postwar Spain. Of course (and this also belongs in the history of the civil war), even during the heavy fighting, the Soviets made preparations for. carrYing out a private war nrith the diverse Communist but anti-Stalin opposition on Spanish soil. The anarchists were fought, and the Trotskyists were bandied with particular severity. Frances Triumph The most important military events during 1936 and 1937 occurred on the Spanish mainland eince the col~nies of Madrid and the overseas territories either kept out of the war or were already in the hands of the Francoists. By the end of 1936, Madrid was deMilitary Review

SPANISH CIVIL WAR

N. G. Krrznetsovand General & hf. Schtern

P. 1. Batov

largo Caballero,

head of the Spanish Government,

greete

Soviet tank crew

January 1977

29

SPANISH CIVIL WAR fending euccesefully againet the four rebel assault columns: heavy fighting broke out in February-March 1937 on the Jarama and Guadalajara fronts. With the vigorous support from Germany (Legion Condor ) and Italy (Mussolini cent an entire expedition corps to the Iberian Peninsula), the Francoiets were able to roll up the Republican north front ( Vizcaya campaigns from 31 March to 21 OcIn the process, the tober 193?). Basque town of Guernica was leveled by German aircraft on 26 April 1937 and Europe was given an example of how a total war could be fought in the future ! At this time, Franco was strengthening his power. Six months before in Burgos, he had been named head of state with full authority, and, on 19 April 1937, through the fusion of the two meet important rebel political movements (the Carlists and the FaIangists), he was made Chief of the Spanish Falange Party. Two months later (in June 1937), Chief of State and Party Chief Franco received the full support of the Spanish church. The Spanish episcopate directed an official communication on that subject to the bishops of the world. - However, the Republicans did not give up-in spite of the front eituation and the internal difficulties of the government. The Caballero cabinet resigned in May 1937, but the former Finance Minister, Socialist Juan Negrin, formed a new Popular Front government. The International Brigades Although the democratic world public stood on the side of Republican Spain, it did not provide the Madrid Government any substantial or effective help. Of course, it promoted tbe formation of so-called International 30 Brigades which origin~ted in the fall of 1936 at the behest of French and Belgian - Communists. A great many volunteers from many countries in Europe and America reported for duty to fight with weapons in hand in the Spanieh arena for democracy and agaitmt fascism. 1 The Kremlin leadership, namely Stalin, viewed the formation of the International Brigades with mistrust at first. He feared strong Trotskyist currents and an anti-Stalinist attitude among the volunteers, for it was clear from the start that the command of the International Brigades could not lie exclusively in the hands of the Soviet Corn- . munists. The notoriously f a m o us proceedings against the alleged opposition or against the old guard of the Leninists were staged in Moscow from 1936 to 1938. These acts of terror by the government subsequently had a strong influence pn the political countenance of the Interbrigadists ! Stalin first had to be convinced of tbe necessity of the volunteers before he gave the Communist International the order to take the organization of the combat troops in hand. For almost two years, the Interbrigadists participated in the Spanieh Civil War. Besides many idealists and true anti-Fascists, there was a large number of Communist functionaries (professional revolutionaries ), who later, after 1945 (if they survived the war and the bloody purges of Stalin), held leading rolee in the East European peoples democratic countries. The International Brigades were organized at the national level. The Germans formed the Thiilmann Battalion; the French and Belgians, the Commune of Paris Battali&; the Italians, the Garibaldi Brigade; the Hungarian, the Mfity4s R&kosi Battalion; the Poles, the Dabrowgkl Bat. MilitaryReview

..
SPANISH CIVIL WAR

lnterbrigadists takinga break

A Soviet T26 tank occupies a positionin Azai[a

do.it.yourself vshicle of the Thalmann Battalion January 1977 31

SPANISH CIVIL WAR talion; and so forth. Even the Swiss volunteers, about 800 in number, had their unit in Spain. Noted among them was the Zurich Communist Otto Brunner who was a major in the International B r ig a d e. Altogether, 25,000 to 30,000 men fought in these brigades, and, thanks to their discipline and the military experience of their commanders, they proved themselves in many battlea. T However, in November 1938, the Spanish Government dissolved these international units in orderin the last phase of the civil warto fend off foreign interf erence (even if unilateral). It was a bad decision, for, after Franco had formed at the beginning of 1933 a government which officially received aid from Berlin and Rome, the fate of the civil war had already been determined. Stalin had nothing against the dissolution of the International Brigades. From mid-1 938, it was acknowledged in Moscow that the ship of the Spanish Republic was on the verge of sinking. As a result of the political trials in Moscow and the further purges, the NKVD also intervened in Spain. The corps of Soviet advisors was decimated: many were ordered to Moscow wherewith or without trialthey were abruptly liquidated. This fate befellto name only a fewthe Brigade Commanders Kolev and Valua who had organized the tank troopa of the Spanish Republic; Jan Berzin who had acted as chief military advisor in Madrid under the narpe Grischin; and General Gorev who was arrested two days after President Kalinin had bestowed upon him the Order of - Lenin award in a speciaJ ceremony in the Kremlin for distiriguished service in the Spanish Civil War. Alexander , Orlov also received orders to return to Moscow. However, it was not so ,. 32

Dolores I!x%ruri easy to lure him, the old Cheklst, into the trap. He made a timely departure to West Europe and later wrote a unique documentary report entitled The Secret His t o r y of Stalins Crimes, in which he also rendered an account of his Spanish activity, ~ Some leading Communists in the International Brigades shared the same fate, such as the Hungarian Jhos Golf, who hzd commanded the 15th Republican Division for a time, was ordered to Moscow in mid-1937 and disappeared there at the beginning of 1938, never to be heard from again. 0 FrsncosVictory The year 1939 brought victory of the Falanges to the Iberian Peninsula. The nonintervention policy of the democratic powers had hampered the internationalization of the civil war and indirectly helped the Popular Front government dig its own grave. At the beginning of 1939, the Soviet Union no longer showad any interest in conMOitary Iteview

,.
,

sPANISH CIVIL WAR

tinued existence of the Republic. After the battle at Ebro ( November 1!)38) came the campaign of tbe Francoists in Catalonia. Barcelona had fallen, and, on 28 March 1939, Madrid also had to he given up. That was the last act in Spain. The Russians were able to evacuate all. their people from the danger zones in time, and the gold National treasure of the Spanish Bank was rescued by ships to Odessa. In Arnil 1939, the war in Snain came t: an end. The Snanish . people paid in blood. Besides the war dead, there were the victims of the acts of revenge of the Francoists. Their numbers must range into the ten thousands, The lessons for the Soviet Union Certainly, Stalin did not want to withhold aid initially to the Popular Front government: he hoped for the defeat of the rebels and, with the victory of the Republicans, for the strengthening of the Communist position in tbe West of Europe. At \th,e same time, he wanted to tie UP Hitlers war machine far away from Eastern Europe or from the borders of tbe USSR. The Communists made no secret of that. Mrs. Dolores Ib&-

ruri, who later became President of the Spanish Communist Party, said: Spain was therefore the /ir8t cotdnt vu ah e?e in t!)e couree of figlz ting against fascism tit e de?uacr atic dicta. t,,ysh ip of the workers and far?ners, of fhc sntall and tke medium f)ourueoi.sic Mm estflb[iel{edf 1{> Militarily, the Soviet commanders saw the Spanish battlefields us a realistic area fur maneuvers. Even if they profited from it, their decisions ( for ~ example, that of dissolving the antonomonsxtank units and dividing them lip as support weapons for the infantry ) were nnt uhvays right. The work of the AKVD in Spain, its intrigues and the etTect of the Moscow purges, finally brought the Communists into disrepute in Western Europe, Even Stalins decision to leave the Spanish Republic alone in its agony ( because he was already seeking an agreement with Hitler) must also be recorded aa a negative aspect. In a sentence: the Soviet commitment in Spain during the civil war had in the end brongbt to none of the participating parties Iasting advantagesone can even say that, in some respects, it was a disaster for the international Communist movement.

NOTES
1 For a detmlecl hiatmy about the Simrtish Civxl W,,, see H. Thonxw. De. el>a,>, mke BWW+WO, VeFlas ullstein, Fmmkfu, t, Wc.t Germany, 1962: and G. Jackson, A Co!, cIm H!$torv of tke SP.0W6 Cwd War, John Day Co.. NY, 1974. 2 About Franco pem.n.b and h,. political XO.lS, comrmre the excellent book h= Dr. Helhnuth Gunther Dahnm, Fr.zt!ctaco Fmnco, Soldat und Muste!nchmidt Verhw, G,,ttmse., West Germany. 1972. 3 -UdSSR.Hdf. fuv dw SD.,M.8.6. Nwnbe, 2, 1976, P 7. V,dkmrnw, 12wmb1ik,8,

SW.W, Z,
Riitten

a L,w

Long., D,. t,, t<r,,<,fio,$l,,>, Tin. ]stcd fmm the Italian, & Locnin~, Emt Uerh., 1968

n,<g. d,,, ,,,

VcrlnK

St.at.ckcf,

Cr,me.%

RAlexander 0,1.,, ?%. SC-.,.1 OJ Stalin> Random HOUW Inc., NY, 1963.

H,.to,y

9 See Jiinos Gilts curricula wt. i the volume Mu,akamozo,zlomt,, rtd?toti I,vztkon, Kom.th Kimd6, B.damst, Hungary, 1970, D 190 and fo90wi.x Dlwes.

Januaty 1977

33

Daily

Life

at Fort s Atkinson

F
7

~ ~
1820-27 Part I

on the Missouri

L-N

Colonel Virgil Ney, Army of the United States, Retired

Lhwing the CWIlLI part of tke l!)tl! CerIt R?y, tke United States Armg on the frontier spent its meager resources e.rploring the vast untamed regions west of tli e Mississippi and cond?wting pwnitive raids against kostile Indian tribes in tke new temitories. Colonel Henrg Atkinsons expedition up tke M/ssuuri River in 1819 was one such excursion. In 1820, wken Atkinson tww appointed head of tke Amys Weste?n Department i?t St. Louis, lie directed that a fort be constructed near the site of present-da~ Council Bluffs, Iowa. His old unit, the 6tk In fantrg, completed the fort in 1821. Aptly named Fvpt Atkinson, it was tke first US Army post zoest of tke Missouri. Colonel Henru Leavenworth took over command of t?te Oth Infantry and Fo?t Atkinson shortly after its completion. Life at a f?ontie~ fort for a soldier was not the martial - glory he might have envisioned, but a conetant struggle for survival against a backdrop of boredom and loneliness.Editor. .

Part 11 of this article will .Dmar in the February 1977 MJitaw

CJ 19/7 by I%lmwl Virgil NeY, Arnw of the United State..

Rcuicw.. Retire<!.

Copyright

36

Mititary Review ,,

FORT ATKINSON T A US ARMY post of the 1820s, the daily activities were traditional and routine, Broadly, they fell under activities such as post and unit administration, dvill, guard duty, fatigue (work) parties, sick call, stables, weapon care, instruction and recreation, orgmlized and unorganized, In accordance with a dai Iy schedule, prom ulgti tedby the commanding ufficer, every individual in a duty stfltus complied \vith its requirements. At Fort Atkinson, the daily life of the gurrison was regulated by the drum, fife and b[tgle. T Altl{oagl, drill receiced its sltorc of at fwttirm, tl, c muj{,r part of tbe tJ7ens tinle 7rL7s uccapied with tbe U(I1 icalfaml activities of the post or with ?epai~ing barracks nnd otbcr str7<rturcs. At n,,[,u, anntlfm mll call a,as made. rmd tl?o men i}i resp(,nxe t<, tl)c $i![nal, Icas Upllnttbe TreNcbe> , sat douw tu eat. Faiiguc drua[ beat agai>! nt one oclock. Roast f3ee~ was the signal for tile cucnitt!l meal. 2

At reveille, the morning gun, genemlly ~ six.lj,~undcr, or tour-puunder

was fired by the guard detail, senfling thunder-like reverberations rolling tu the north and west where they spent themselves against the hills. DrUm, tifea, bugles and the hand, when available, helI}ed to (tsher in the new day with stirring martial mi]sic such as T//, ila,shin!l i!//ltc Sergeant or other favorite murches. Sleepily, the soldlers tumbled frum their hay-mattress wooden bunks and, pulling on uniform, fell into stroightenin~ ranks in front of the rough, cottnnvywd log barrw=ks, After ru]l c+III,bunks were made, or aired, floors suept and the qu; irters readied fur Inspection by the first sergeant or a company officer, This flinctiun over, the sick !vere marched, or carried, to the surgeon nmier the supervision of the cumpany first sergeants, After breakfast, eaten in the compa~ly Iwrracks, or s mess building, the 6th Infantryman cleaned his nenp(m, polished his brass belt plate or cleaned other equipment. During this period, he made himself an[l uniform presentable, then fell nut for parade at the troop, be~lten by the drummers, at nine oclock. When the cnmpanies ~vere formed on the parole, the national colors were raised to the top of the garrison flagpole as the troops, with the regimental band playing, presented arms in salute, At the field piece,

Colonel Vir.qil Neu, Ava7v of tl!c United States, Reti?ed, is Theses Director for tke Natzonal War College, Was}i ington, IJC. He bolds a P1l.D. from Georgetown Un{versitu whew he Jias taught history and political science. He bas been Senior Military Analgst with the Combat Operations Research Group, Tecllnical Operations, Incorporated, Ale.randria, Virginia, and Chief, Social Sciences Division, Research Associates, Incorporated, Silver Spring, Mar~land. He Ilas written and lectured e.ttensivel~ on militarv and historical subjects.

January1977

31

FORT KTKINSON f%s.s in f?eview March command, the troops were marched in review before , the commanding officer. ~ At Fort Atkinson. the schedules \vere similar to usual Armv routine except that, instead of drill, the troops not on other details assembled and marched to the farm fields. There they plowed, sowed seed and cultivated corn, potatoes, cabbage, asparagus, carrots, wheat, beans, turnips and hay, not only in the company gardens but in the larger post farms. ~ Farming was so important to the survival of the garrison that all military activities except guard duty were suspended for many months at Fort Atkinson. Thus, the soldier found that, instead of martial glory and adventure at Fort Atkinson on the frontier, there was but the hard work of the farm, For many, this was ironic, for what they had sought to escape by en- . listing was the drudgery and loneliness of the farm. Yet, for many, tbe hard work on the post farm kept them occupied, \vell.fed and healthy. Only a few years before, hundreds of their fellows had died of scurvy at the post because of the failure of a civilian contrwtor to deliver the proper food. Tbe troops had very little time for idleness. However, regardless of the crowded routine of drill (when possible), farming, f~tigue and gnard duty, there were certain days set apart for recreation. For many, this took tbe form of hunting and fishing short distances from tbe post. These excursions usually took place on Saturdays, Snndays or holidays. All national holidays such as Christmas, New Years, Washingtons Birthday and the Fourth of July \vere observed as holidays by the troops. After the appropriate military ceremoniesthat is, a review of the troops, and a national salute, one gun for each statethe soldiers ~vere dismissed and were free for the day. What they did to amuse themselves and their companions was divided into t~vo general classes: for small groups in barracks, cards, gambling with dice and a game called Hustle Cap ; for crowds and spectators, horse racing was the most popular form of recreation. 5 Horse racing had the additional advantage of offering the opportunity for wagering-with the post gamblers taking a heavy toll of the eoldiers cash. Card playing forbidden by garrison order was at the risk of punishment. Lieutenant Colonel Willoughby Morgan, of the 6th Infantry, who w,as in command on 31 October 1821, wrote General Atkinson in St. Louis the following: ,

It is true the Soldiers hav u,orlied kard; but I beliet,e tt is not tke wisk of tke Government tkat t }[ey should be idle. TkeV are clothed well; fed well; in addition to the ordinary ?ation tkey are supplied witk a variety of vegetables. Wken they haue leisure, they are allowed to take tkeir guns, and go .in the woods, a,here tltev amuse themselves in killing ducks, geese, turkeys and otket fowl. They are someti?aes permitted to nzake excursions to a considerable distance from tke Fort for tk e Purpose of killing deer and enc. $ After horse racing, dancing was the chief group recreation. The soldier musicians of the regimental band, supplemented by privately owned violins or fiddles, made the stockade area resound with rhythm and Iaugbter. Cus38 ~ I

MilitaryReview ~ ,

.
GeneralHenry Atkinson

tumarily, at a military dance or ball, the commanding ufiicer and his lady led the first dance, then the otTicem, followed by the troops. The scarcity of women partners, except for the ~vives of the oliicers and the civilians attached to the post and the laumlresees, made the dance not much more than a spectator event for the balk of the troops. But many were not dancers, so they grouped around the dance floor, enjoying the music and watching their more fortunate, sophisticated friends swing their partners. The following is an account of the band activities at Fort Atkinson:

An important adjunct to tbe garrison aws tbe reqin7ental band. Na nie~e decorative brancli of the Scrt, ice, tbe music coordinated all activities and duties of tbe men within tbe post. It was to ma?tial music that the soldie?s awakened in the 7nurning, lea) ned to march, were in fovn?ed of tkeir duties each hour, and paraded. Tbe SergearLt -Majar was responsible for tbe accuracy of tbe calls and tbe fimt signals a,ere jimt sounded by the orde?lg at his ?oom and then repeated by tke police gua?d and conlpaxies. A band house was bt~ilt outside tbe walls of Fort Atkinson, presumably at a distance where tbe ?ebearsa[s (could not interfere with tke lCo?kof the garrtson, and here tbe men practiced daily. Tbe chief ntusician, Se~geant Riovdan, received fifteen cents a day for di?ecting tile band. The Musicians accounts ae~e alwags settled generoaslu. At various times nea, mas{cal instruments u:ere purcltased, i?zcluding a set of B clarinets, two B flutes, two C flutes, one trztntpet, and one serpent. (T)lis latte~ a~as a bass wind inst~ament, now obsolete). 7 At the post on the Council Bluffs, horse racing became the real passion + of the garrison, The horse, race was especially attractive to those officers . and men with a strong penchant for gambling. The horses entered were usually the mounts of the officers of the regiment, particularly those of the January 1977 39

FORT ATKINSON

artillery as the infantry officers were not mounted, except the field grade officers-that is, those, above the rank of captain. The officere indulged in hunting as they ,took to the field with their flintlock fowling pieces and rifles and helped enrich the garrison larder. But for the hunting skill of certain members of the Rifle Regiment, the detachment on Cow Island, prior to the advance of the main body up the Missouri, would have starved to death due to the breakdown of the civilian contractors transportation. s The Missouri River was a great source of fish, especially the large channel catfish and the highly edible carp and sturgeon. The area surrounding Fort Atkinson was a sportmans paradiseto be shared by the local Indian tribes, with careful regard for their hunting rights. Troops could swim in the backwaters sloughs and small inlets. How well ~ the troops at the post were trained in swimming may be adjudged by the fact that drownings were of frequent occurrence. The loss of six men by drowning in the 1823 campaign against the Rse Villagee would seem to indicate the unfamiliarity of the troops with the dangerous currents of the Big Muddy. ~ Money was wagered by the men of B Company that their representative in the guard mount would be selected over the men from C and D Companies. This minor gambling event helped to relieve the monotonous daily routine of the simple private soldier of that day. Another very minor event, which offered a wagering base to the soldier, was the unloading of the weapons of the old guard as it went off duty. In the days of muzzleloading muskets and rifles, the withdrawing of the load (rather than firing it out of the barrels) was accomplished by means of a worm screw attached to the ramrod. This was a nuisance operation, very much disliked by the soldiers as it could be dangerous. Hence, a target was set up near the guardhouse, and the old guard discharged its loaded weapons at the mark. The soldiers would wager on who would come the closest to the bulls-eye. Customarily, the soldier making the high score was given a pass from all duty, for a specified period of time, by the commanding officer. Usually, the military community held dances at Christmas, New Years Day, George Washingtons Birthday and the Fourth of July. Other times were arranged at the desire of the command. Turkey in tk e Stracu and Mo?zewn USIC were played along with the favorite minuet and waltz tunes. Whiskey-inspired exuberance sometimes required the guard to restore order by removing disorderly participants. II) Officers and their ladies were occupied with a social life of dining out among their neighbors within the post and down the river at Cabannes and Lisas Trading Posts,. Whist was a favorite card game for whiling away the long winter evenings, Amateur theatrical also were important entertainment for troops of the garrison and the officers and their wives as they participated as players. The sutler, James Kennerly, was very social and delighted in entertaining the commanding officer and others at dinner, after which there was dancing for those who remained. II He also possessed a mtisic box which w doubt entertained his guests. Fort Atkinson contained within its walls one of the first public, libraries 40 # Military
Review

FORT ATKINSON

Mkmson pTivateshad to take turns sokliermg and farming

north of the Platte River and west of the Missouri River. The Post Library was under the direction and support of the Council of Administration. The enlisted mens literary tastes were catered to by the purchase of light readingthat is, romances, travels and voyages. An officer vws detailed to serve as librarian. Careful rules were formulated, and frequent inspections m~de. Post officers were fined for failing to return books on time, In one year, the sum of $500 was appropriated for the purchase of books, newspapers and magazines. The library contained Brackenriclges Views of Louisiana, Scotts Poems and Redgaunf/ef, a book of Montesquieu, Gibbons Dcclzrze and Fall of the Roman Empire and Robinsons Historu of .%tkznrf. Among the magazines were Edinburgli Review, Edinburgh Magazine, Nea, London Mrmtl!ly Review, North A mericarr Review, Gentlenzens Magazine, American Repository, Amateur Magazine and an agricultural journal. In addition, the sutler received a copy of Coopers Pilot and was a subscriber to the National Irrtelligenrer and the St. Louis Republican, IZ Bachelor officers and those whose families were not present often gathered at each others quarters for a session of conversation, social drink. ing and singing. The latter activity, especially after lights out at 10 oclock, was apt to become a bit too noisy for the commanding officer. One of the most unusual episodes in Colonel Leavenworths service at Fort Atkinson was his preferring of charges and arresting his adjutant, Lieutenant Joseph Pentland, for disobedience of orders in connection with such a party. Lieutenant Pentlands court-martial was a long-drawn-out affair in which Colonel .Leavenworth was both a witness and prosecutor! The Lieutenant

January 1977

41

FORT ATKINSON took the stand in his own defense, and it was so eloquent and able (and so replete with the mannerisms and verb] age of the times) that he was acquitted and resumed bis sword by the unanfmous verdict of the courtmartial. At Fort Atkinson, there was a Post School for the children, and it was the first public school in what was later to become the state of Nebraska. I~ The student population of the post was made up of the officers and ncmcommissioned officers sons and daughters, as well as those children of the laundresses and other civilians attached to the station. In addition, there were the children of the sutler, the Indian agent and the farm superintendent. 1~ The following extract explains how the Post School at Fort Atkinson began:

On January 24, 1822, the adjutant was instructed by Colonel Leaven woyth to select a proper- non-commissioned o~cer or private to teach the children at the post, WI1Othough far from tlte settlements, 7uere not to be deprived of their opportunity to receive an education, The Council inspect ed tk e class toom and reported its condition to the commanding oficer. Classes began at 9 :A.M., recessed for an hour at noon, and were dismissed at 8 :P.M. No classes were held on Saturday afternoons or on Sundays. Then, as today, children played hook~; and Colonel LeavenlLWth was compelled to order those having the care of children to do what the sfrongest principles of nature dictateto send their children regvlcrl~ to echool. Summer vacation, dear to ever~ chihls heart, began in June and ended in September or October. ~$ Sergeant Thompson Mumford was appointed the teacher by publication of the following order: Head Quarters 4 Feb 1822 6th Inf Fort, Atkinson

Orders: The school room being completed a school will commence on Wednesday next under the direction of Sergt. Mum ford, who has been appointed teacher and mill be respected accordingly. G

Sergeant Mumford is shown on !fhe Descriptive Roll of the 6tk Regiment of U.S. lnfantr-~ as having enlisted in the Army at Hartford, Connecticut, on 31 August 1813. He was described as 5 feet 10 inches tall, age 19 years, dark complexion, black eyes. His occupation was listed as a distiller. 17 The Council of Administration, which acted in place of a school board, voted to pay Sergeant Mumford the sum of 15 cents a day in addition to his pay. Officers were to pay him 50 cents a month for each of their children under his tutelage. 18 In addition to the pay indicated, Sergeant Mum-. ford was granted an extra ration (one gill) of whiskey a day. Whether this extra ration was a reward for his bravery in assuming the task, or for the daily reinforcement of his courage, will never be known. But, regardless, the young noncommwsioned officer dld function as the first school teacher at Fort Atk]nson. This was a full-time duty for him. The problem of educat42 MilitaryReview .

FORT ATKINSON

--Soldiers discharging their weapons after leaving a tour of guard. Such target practice was often the only marksmanship training they received.

ing the children at the frontier poet was a most serious one for the parents. How the Post School and its soldier-teacher met the challenge can only he judged by the reports of visits to the Post School by the Council of Administration. It is of interest to note that Major Daniel Ketchum, an otlcer of the 6th Infantry Regiment, addressed the following letter to the commanding officer: Fcwt Atkirsaorr 24 Sept 1822 Colonel Henry Atkirzsmz, Brevet Z3rig.Gerzt Comdg. Sir: 1 am desirous of establishing mu fanlr1~ at Franklin [Missouri] fov the purpose of educating m g c{(ildren, there is now an oppo?t unity to descend the river in the Sutlers bocf and should it be convenient with the nature of the Service I solicit tile favor of an indulgence (Furlough) to accomplish tile above object, and o remain absent until the 1st of May shouid it meet your approbation but will do me the favour to lay nsg ( applicatioti before the Generrd for his decision, I have the honor to be Sir with respect YouT obt. Servt, D. Ketchurn Major, USA g January 1977 ,, 43

..

Sergeant charges

Murnford into the

checks

his reluctant schoolroom

==s. ---

Fort Attdnaon

Colonel Atkinson approved the request and forwarded it on to Major General Edmund P. Gaines, the Western Department Commander, at Louisville, Kentucky. It should be noted, in connection with tbe above letter, that the Post School had begun in February 1822. It had been in operation for at least six months before Major Ketchum decided to place hk children in school at Franklin, Missouri. We may assume that his request wae based upon an opinion that the Post School could not educate hie children as he desired them educated. Perhaps the children of the family were too advanced t be enrolled in the sergeants classes. On ~ February 1824, the Council reported its inspection of tbe Post School in the following:

The Council tken examined the Post SCkool &find it conducted to their satisfaction. They also find that Drum Major Sergeant McClements & CorpL Martin neglected to send their children to school. The Post School wasvis{tedby tlte Council& they fonnd that some of the scholar-s had made improvements during the last month & they resolved that studies here after would commence at 1 oclock & dismiss at s oclock on ever-v week dug. Saturday afternoon excepted. zo Atthe beginning of theschool year in 1825, Sergeant Mumford decided not to teach the Post School for that term. The beet inducement the Council could advance was the offer of 2 gallone of whiskey to a soldier who.had , been a distiller incivifian life. Sergeant Mumford could not be lured by the promise of more epirits, and a new teacher, Private Bunnell P. Berry, was assigned as his replacement. zl With a bit o~imagination, one can vieualize the sergeant and private facing the children and imparting instruction, not in the same manner as MilitaryReview
.

. 44

,,

FORT ATKINSON with soldiers, but with the discipline of the Army tempered to the childs size. Towheaded boys in knee breeches and girls in their pinafores sit on the crude cottonwood benches, Outside, the wind howle across the parade ground from the frozen Missouri River below the bluffs. MUkipliCatiOtI, addition, subtraction, spelling, writingall are recited in turn. Sergeant Mumforde replacentent, Private Bunnell P. Berry, as a schoolmaster met the requirements of the Council of Administration and was, from all reports, a highly successful teacher of the Fort Atkineon Post School.z On 8 January 1826, the Council made tbe following commentary:

The Council of Administration visited the Post SChool and find it tinder good regulations and tlte scholars progressing fast. The Council examined the account of B. Rervy Teacl!er of the Post School amounting to $10.20 and find it correct and resolve tl!at the same be paid and the Comdg. Oficer be accordingly re?uested his warrant for that amount.s The children of the soldiers were educated at no expense to their parents. However, the officers, because of higher pay, were required to pay thesumof 50cents amonthto the Councilof Administration for each child atfending the Poet School. These funds were used to buy books, paper, ink, quill pens and slates for the Poet School, or to help pay a minuscule salary to the soldier-teacher. ?~ In April 1827, when the 6th Infantry Regiment moved dowm the Missouri River to Jefferson Barracks, the commanding officer was of the opinion that the Post School to be established there should have a paid professional teacher. H. Qrs. 6th Reqinzent Fort Atlcitzmm 23 April,

1827 Extract No. 63 Orders: The Council too; ~nt~ coneide~ation a communication from Lt. COL Woollsyon the subject of emploginga person as an instructnv and for other purposes, and recommend that the further consideration of the subject be deferred till the Regin?ent isperntarzetitlg eettled at Jefferson
Barracks.

BII ozder of Lt. Col. Woollev$ In 1815, during the reduction of the Army, the office of chaplain was abolished as an economy measure. Spiritually, tbe troops were left to shift for themselves. Fortunately, in every military unit, and the Gth Infantry was no exception, there were religiously inclined officer~ and men who saw to it that the spiritual neede of the soldiers were not neglected. Officers, men and attached civilians served as volunteer preachers, Sunday, ScbOO1 teacbere and leaders at various religious gatherings. These latter wrere in the form of the old-fashioned camp meeting or small-town revival. Supplemeriting these dedicated efforts was the appearance at frequent intervals of Januaty1977 45

FORT ATKINSON a missionary circuit rider or an Indian missionary. For the Catholic membersof the garrison, tbe missionary prieste en~oute to their stations with the tribee said Mass when paseing through. If no priest was available, a Catholic layman of the command usually acted as a lay reader. The lack of feminine companionship in the frontier Army poet was solved partially by the traditional institution of the laundresses whose duty waato wash the clothing of the troops. ~ These women were carried on the Tables of Organization and as such accompanied the troops. They were not %ampfollowere) in the sense of unattached women of questionable morak+ following the troops, hut were part of the military organization. According to the customs of the times and the Army regulations, the institution of the laundress, copied from the British Army, served as a means for the low-ranking soldier to secure a modicum of female companionehip aid, at the same ~me, have clean linen.ZT The regulations provided that soldiers would deliver their linen to one specific laundress and pay pro rata the weekly or monthly laundry bill.

Perhaps thegr-eatest probleme forthe Counci~ [of Administration] mere those involving the lacmdresses a,hose function was to wash the clothing of the oficers and enlisted men. Each woman washed for seventeen men, and the Council established the rate of pav. At one time the allowance was jifty cents per month for- every non-commissioned oficer and soldier; ufficer-s paid seventg-fitie cents per dozen p{eces or only sixty -tu,o and one-half cents if the oficer provided the soap. Soap being comparativel~ scarce, a bount~ of four cents per pound was offered for any grease satied that could be made into soap with lye leached from the ashesof the fireplaces. z8 Obviously, the presence of these women did lighten the burden of the lonely soldiers. In a large command of almost a thousand men, the competition for romance was great. Generally, the sergeants with more pay courted and eventually married them. The system was crude and rough, as were the people, but, for the times and the manners, perfectly acceptable. Quartered on the post in their houses or huts, they were known as the inhabitants of Soapsuds Row. As members of the command, they drew their whiskey rations and were subjected to military law and discipline when they devoted too much of their time to matters other than those associated with the waehtub. The positioti,, eince it enabled them to follow the Arm~, attracted many of tke wivesof the men in the ranks. Some of the 7oomen in camp Loere hard-working, industrious, good uibme?z, who lived quietlv with tlzeirhusband sandmadehornesas best the~ could under crade fronti~r conditions. Other laundresses were a source of contention and tronble. gg ~ > Forthepri;ate, who could nof compete with the sergeants for the affections of the laundresses, there was na way to romantic attachment exaept perhaps with an Indian maiden of the tribee to the east acrose the 4s

MilitaryReview ~
I

FORT ATKINSON Missouri River. From the time of Lewis and Clark, both officers and men of the US Army were not immune to the physical charms of the dusky beauties. One such individual at Fort Atkinson was Dr. John Gale, the surgeon,. who had a daughter by Nicomi, an Iowa Indian woman. :lo But there were dangers i; the trysts with the daughters of the prairies. Customarily, friendly tribal chieftains offered women to visitors as a token of hospitality; others were dallied with at the risk of life or infection (spread through some of the tribes, years before, by the trappers and traders). Hence, for many of the soldiers, life at Fort Atkinson was almost monastic in its. character. But men in barracks, ]solated . as they were at Fort Atkinson, become bored in s~iteof what is done to make their lives more bearable. The lack of female companionship tends to complicate the situation, Thel complication led to the bottle and too frequent access to the charms of alcoilol as an aid to escape. Compounding the availability of whiskey, wine and rum at the sutlers was the fact that rum was issLled to the troops as a Government contribution to the fact of their hazardous hardship-type service, The rum ration was considered by the Army as a privilege to be retoked for bad conduct or drunkenness! At Fort Atkinson, even the Iaundr,esses drew their rum rations, and, on the record, so~e of them had them revoked or suspended!!! 31 Some commanding otiicers, and those at Fort Atkinson were no exception, tried to solve this serious morale and h+th problem by resorting to strict measures of punishmentthat is, court-martial and so forth. Obviously, the commanding officer was faced with a serious situation of the payday spree-type activity. Colonel Leavenworth endeavored to stop the introduction of whiskey from other than ofiicialorsutler sources. The following extract will explain:

. . . numerous orders concerning its sale and corwumption were is,sued. In one of tkem Leavenworth said, The men are caroming and getting drunk almost et,er~ night. Following one pag day 156 persons were court-mavfialed, thirty-eight of tkem for drwtkerzness. @ivate Josiah Elkircs drew twenty-four gills of whiskey for a wood chopping party of six and kept it all himself. Tke sutler- recorded on a certain day that allkis men were drunk e.rcept Foote and Rider.9~
In addition to the punishment others such as: adjudged by court-martial, . there were

. . . solitary cortfinewtent, wem-ing a Vail and chain, fine, reduction in rank, police duty, and stoppage of whiskev rations. More ingentovs purrishments werer iding tke wooden korse, wearingan iron collar toith projecting points, and standing on a block in a conspicuous place, wearing a placard inscribed 1 stand for theft, or 8I stand for- sfander-. Trae genius, however, presided in tbe court-when one deserter was ordered to be drummed out of camp with his coat on backwards and with a straw halter about his neck.~~ ,1 47 January1977

FORT ATKINSON NOTES 1G.,,o,d

Rcyr,,lat, ona for and f..
tl,c

ArmIJ.

A,t:,l,

26, Baa.
,Fort

of I,ttwwr . . 8.16.

l>olicc the

n,, d S..,.,,., IRuIIs,,, Xol,nzek,z

2 Marti. F. K,vctt Hbtoru, March 1959. 3Gc,,eral R<gtd<ttmwa

SIIIIY A, tk,

J.hmo.,

Atki..u.

Cmnxd

A,mv,

OZ, CIt

amg,aDhs

S.%ldwte I Row, L Nichols, 1827.+, ,VCbrmka if,, toru, Volume

cm,

os Fe.rmms. W, Numb.,

ArrnY

Ar?!culturiht~

in

the

M,sso.vi

VIIlleY,

1s1!.

3, Fall

1971, 1823.1! 326,., JO,WZZZ! of tlw Anun.i.

1824, Fort Atki. mm,, PD 984-36.

h Edg8~ B, WCb).Y, ,Life at . IWoliti.?r POW: Fott Atkmwm, df,ktaw 1,,. t,t. te, VO1un)e111, W,nte, 1929, PD 203.9, 0 Letter
7 Kwctt Book, end Gth Infantry, Johnson, 6th op. lnfantIY, 28 JIIn..rY ctt., P 23. 1 June 1819, Mart,. 1817 to 7 SopmmbCr

80,,1.2, Book, M!smb,i. D 477.

Contuntnent,

15

Mrch

1%21, Cantonment

,CO.,11110. of tke M,lititry Estddi,hrncnt,,1823, AffctIm, Orders, Hmxkumrtem, Western Dqmrtnmnt, Lou,su,ll,,. KY, 21 September 1823, tmtin~ Colonel LeavcnwcwtWs report .f the R*. Ext,wl$tmn and the small Io,.., au.tain.d by tbe ArmY-that i,, Sergeant StnckD<dc and .,x privates dtowned ,,.,1 one I),>vr,te wounded. See SIM Lcttrr Book, OP. c:t.. Letter fr.m Colonel Leavenworth to Mawr F.mter. c:mw.ol /.. tlw Armv, OP. at.. A,ticke 84, A,nrn,,,,, t,o,,, pa,axranh 2.

DAmwicnnStat. Palm-n MddanJ

Rwd.tmm

10 Kivett

and

J,,h.. VI, r,t,.

o.,

.)>

mt.

I>p 19.20, pp by EdgIIr B, We,lcy, 7:; and 95 Mfmo. ri H{.t.rictd Socmty, St.

11 Tl, c f7tarf[ Loui., MO, Volume 12 WC,lq., .,,,

of JcL.,,. Kc, I,,wIv, Edtited

Numbr.r D 208. Sheldon. H,, to.v 1, 1928,

13 Addiw. Erwin COXO, IL, l!)l :!, D 51.

s,, d storim EIw,

of

N,rw,mkn,

Ulver*itY Atkmw on

Pt!blisb, !! the C<,u.cd

C..,

Chi-

14 S@.llY A. Johnson. Nvbtc,.l.rz Hk+m,,, March 16 [bid. Ill Order Book Number

,. The Sixth,, 1!759, D 22.

r,dd>-Fott

Blufib...

1% [r, [as,tq, 1Tj7.1,! 27, N~,tkmcJ Archives,

17 The Dmcnj>t?te Gth Infatm, G March 180,4,, l!l Letter 200rder Bok Book, Book,

Roll of the 17tk Rec)tnwnt OJ US. 1822 to 6 October 1823, P 13 18 28 J.?.,Y 8 October to 2 Fcbrumy 1823

Numb,,

f,th Ifttry. Gth Infantry, D 22. 22,

1824,

D 222, nP 16-16.

to 24 October

1S24.

21 Juhn, o, 22 Order 230,11cF

OP. cit., Numb., Number

Book Book

12 September

1823

to 3.

1S24.

32, 8 January dfdttar,,

1820, ,2rTrmr, 1826 SWtmn, of Ma,; ,ol Law, 1827. F,c(t S,,,
*828

volume2,

2* Amo,,

c.n Stat. p 21%

Book, 28. to ad P 23. 03. Book, cit., 6th

Pczrers

Fwld S,,,,,,

o,, d Pofw,

Z: Order 0P.

OkbInfantry, 8 JmnmrY
pnrasr.wh
~,dc, BoO~,

to 29 December SWtcmS
~ M.,c~

26 Ame,ic,zn cit., Article ra.t,on

Stat, Pane,.

~~ ~eg[me.~a,

Jfd,t,wI/ Af?,mr,. 10, D 211.

Fo,~ *~k,.&O.,

of Ma,t, [ Lam, ,~~z ~.

6

),,. awl (r..~,i,~i.n

f%licr, .f

~.t.be~

wb,skw

lsudresses), Johnson, W.

DD 864-65. ctt,. D 22. \

28 Kivett 201 b,d., 30 Sbeldom 31 Order

175-77. 2 AuE.st 1819 m 31

In frytry,

December 1620, w

100-7,

32 WeaIW, on. c;t, r, 207. 33 Ibid.

we
40
Witary Ileview

from

Soviet Ground Forces and the Conventional Mode of Operations

John Erickson

GAINST a background of growing Soviet interest in and preparation for large-scale and et,en snstained conventional operations in the European theater, perhaps a brief refresher course is in orderif only because the Soviet military command is launched upon just such a program itself. This is the very juncture at which to renew a reading of General Eike Middeldorfs 7akfik im Rtms/arzdfe[dzug 1 for the Iight it throws on the evolution of Soviet breakthrough tat-a tics, or possibly that collection of papers and studies ProrIIv podgotow lennoi oborony strelkouumi soedi?etiiyanri emanating from the Frunze
Condensed June 1976. January from the Journal @ of the Roysl United

Academy. Certainly, it is pertinent to turn to one of the latest soviet military publications, a four-volume set of tactical studies deallng with wartime ( 1941-45) operations at regimental, battalion, company and section level. A fifth volume covering division operations will appear shortly. This is not the pluce for lengthy historical disquisition, but one of the prime rules for studying Soviet military organization and operational practice is simply to follow the Soviet lead; in other words, to do what the Soviet military itself is doing. In this context, there can be no doubt that a serious and prolonged appraisal (or
Services Institute for Defence Studies (Great Britain),

Copyright

1976. 49

1977

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES

,<
reappraisal ) of conventional capability and rapid breakthrough techniques has been in train for sometime, leading (as I hope to indicate) to no small amcmnt of controversy. invnlving principally .wtbzt nit pt?formance and effectiveness. This is an observation \vith which Colonel Vinnikov might \vell agree since, along with others, he has been in the vanguard of suggesting in the ground forces journal voennyi Ves/nih a more flexible approach to Vactical forms and some revision of accepted, not to say stereotyped, practices. This suggests the ~elevance of pursuing systematic microstudies of Soviet tactical performance though the. first problem here is to set present Soviet preoccupations with conventional operations into the o~,erall framework of their theater capability and the restructuring of the ground forces. a relatively prolonged conventional campaiffn, to use the phraseology of Mr. Donald H. Rnrnsfeld in his Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977. Note the significance of relatively. I Judicious though that formulation is, the same cannot be said for the overly generous references to the Sovi et blitzkrieg, a term which can be somewhat mishmding for all its d~a. matic impact. Strictly speaking, there w,ould be the greatest irony in the 50viet command embracing that very war-fighting style whose ruination it professedly contrived on the battlefield. Tbe Soviet concept of shock power-witness, for example, t h e shock army, udamaua armi~a is undoubtedly based on .tbe primacy of the offensive and the exploitation of surprise, with a rapid operational breakthrongb designed to inhibit any effective military response from the adversary and, in this instance, to render any initial resort to nuclear weapons on the part of the defender fruitless by virtue of being too late. The Soviet use of nuclear weapons would depend largely upon the degree to which its own strategic objectives had (or had not) heen attained by conventional operations. Looked at in these terms, Soviet views do combine elements of the blitzkrieg but are even more deeply rooted in and dependent on prewar, wartime and late postwar concepts of 4battlefield annihilation ( neutralizationpodaulenieto be precise) and the P~ofessoe- Erickson is with the Department of Defence Studies, Edinburgh University, Scotland, and is CoDirector of the RUSI/RMAS Research Centre for the Study of Soviet Affairs. His article Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe appeared in t!ze January 1976 MILITARY REVIEW. Military fleview 7

Initial

Phase

While theater nuclear forces continue to comprise a major element of Soviet war-fighting capability, serious Soviet interest in and attention to improved conventional capability has increased steadily since the late 1960s, This does not, however, represent a switch in strategy. On the contrary (and again by way of reference to historical evolution ), this increased capability largely embodies the attainment of that dual capability which was predicted as far back as the mid1950s. Recent Soviet developments do not mean embracing a conventional option in its own right but, rather, must be understood in terms of admitting a conventional mode in the initiul phase of operations and sustained for some considerable period50

SOVIET GROUND FORCES battlefield norms governing levels of manpower and w e a p o ns developed largely during the final two years of World War II. To put it m briefly ns possible, it ,yould appear that, while the Soviet command places grent emphasis on mobility and high-speed operations (the nonstop offensit, e), here mobility is assigned to assist and nug ment firepower: Mobility plus firepower translates into immediate superiority. All this gives critical significance to the initial stage of any mujor to military involvement or coll]sion, which must now be added the vita} importance attached to the tactical breakthrough in conventional terms. This , is tvhere the sLltJstantini change hw occurred; conventional opernt ions even in the initial phase are now admitted to be of great significance. eliminate the track-shedding shortcoming of tbe T62. In addition to this reinfnrcernent of and improvement in the Soviet tank forces, new troop-carrying fighting vehicles copable of moving the inffintry with the armor have made their appearance. The more modem of these machines must be classed as fighting vehicles in their uwn right. The BMP76PB doubles very effectively as n light fighting vehicle or us a truop transporter, designed to uccomp:my the tanks up to and beyund the immediate ub,jective. Weighing 12 tons and with a crew of three PIUS eight riflemen, the BMP76PB mnunts a 73mm high-anrl-lowpres<ure gun firing eight rounds per minute as well us a Sagfler antitiank guided \veapon ( ATGW) ii combination and a 7.62mm PKT machinegun co:lxial with the main gun. The lighter airborne combat vehicle. the BMDI, weighs some 10 tons, mounts the same 73mm gun and .%gfler ATGW missile, with 40 rounds nvailable for the main gun. Like Its bigger BMP brotber, the BMD1 has full nuclear, biological and chemical protection, u crew of three and can take six riflemen fighting fully closed up since both gun and engine gases are exhausted externally. Both the tank division and the motor rifle division have increased their manpower, the former from 9000 to 11,000 and the latter from 10,500 to 13,500. The most striking change has occurred within the motor rifle division whose tank strength has now increased from 188 to 266 (an increase of 41.4 percent). The tank battalion organic to a motor rifle regiment has now 40 tanks, and the irrdependerzt tank batta[ion recently added to the division disposes of 45 tanks. In similar style, the tank and motor rifle divisions have increased their towed artillery strength, the n u m b e r of 51

Structure

and Armaments

Changes in the structure and the armament norms of Soviet theater forces Obvionsiy must he seen against this background. Not unexpectedly, Soviet tank strength has continued to grow, rising by some 2000 in EastCentral Europe over the past five years. The latest 272 tank is also being introduced, armed with a new 122mm smooth-bore gun whose barrel length suggests that armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot projectiles can be fired accurately up to 2000 meters. It is equipped with an automatic loading system (thus redueing the crew to three), a laser range finder and a diesel engine of some 1000 horsepower supplying a gOod turn Of speed (43 miles per hour) to this 40ton machine. o The Z72 chassis is new, with six road wheels and four track support rollers which may, in fact, January 1977

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES pieces in a motor rifle division rising from 105 to 165, and in a tank division from 36 to 70pieces. Added to this increase in artillery has been the huge expansion in the number of multiplerocket launchers held by divisions, with a rise in the number of tubes from 192 to 720. No less significant has been the introduction of modern self-propelled guns, the 122mm D7.4 gun on a seven-wheeled modified PT76 chassis and the 152mm D30 how,itzer mounted on a SA4 transporter vehicle. Thus, Soviet artillery is being equipped to keep pace with the armored strike and motor rifle assault formations, all covered by self-con. tained and mobile battlefield air defense systems. The latest addition is the SA8, a system more recent than the SA!7 short-range surface-to-air missile with its quadruple ramp on a small turret and utilizing a missile heavier and hwger than the SAT. The SA8 and the SA9, both designed for defense against low and very low-level air attack, supplement the 70 or more SA2S, SA3S and SA4S and the regiments of SA6S. The SA8 is mounted on a three-axled vehicle and appears to be air-transportable for a system which could well be comparable to that of the l?a~ier or Crotale. r This is in addition to the ubiquitous ZSUZ.?--4/ Shilka gun system. meters to their existing stocks af 480 meters of bridging. Th~ bridging battalions have acquired more heavy amphibious vehicles and GSP ferries. Modernized mine-sweeping plows and high-speed mine-laying vehicles also have been brought into service. As for logisticsoften pinpointed by many as the consuming weakness of the Soviet theater forcesthe present stockpiling belies that, with more thad. one months ammunition and substantial petroleum, oil and lubricant supplies being held forward. The new 7ton truck, plus a growing number of petroleum tankers and supply vehicles, indicates that the logistics gap has been closed even further. The East ELI ropean/Soviet rail network, upon which the Soviet command places great reliance, is obviously adequate in terme of volume of traffic, but recent attempts have been ,made in Soviet-Polish railway links to ameliorate the gauge differences which could impose bottlenecks of rail traffic. As for the significance and scope of airlift and reinforcement, this is heavily underscored by the biyearly rotation of Soviet troops in East-Central Europe. Over a period of 14 days, a round total of 100,000 men are transported, using Aeroffot as well as military transports ( Voennotransportnaua aviatisya), all without seeming to inconvenience Aeroflot and its civilian schedules. Unlike the men, their equipment does not have to be moved since it is there on the spot (in glaring contrast wit! the depletion of war reserve stocks underlined by Mr. Rumsfeld who pointed to a shortfall of almost 70 percent in tanks, 60 percent in armored personnel carriers and 50 percent in artillery in US Army holdings in Europe). The range of this improvement, impressive as it is, must, nonetheless, be related to Soviet perceptions of and
Military Review

Logistics The Soviet command has not neglected to improve (and expand) its assault bridging and field engineering resources, n as well as its logistical capability. Additional PMP folding bridge stocks have been provided, and the six assault bridging regiments have added a further 120

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES attention to the more obvious shortcomings in their force structure and the deficiencies in tactical .perf ormance arising from this etiate of affuiys. The first was clearly the vulnerability of Soviet attacking columns; the second involved artillery strength as the redt~ced availal>ilit~ of gItns fer artillery preparation; and-perhaps most striking, if not the most importantthe skortage of rifle anits on tke main axis or a.ves of adoaace where Soviet armor nvas to make the push. A quick review of recent changes shows this process of self-correction at \vork. The motor rifle division is now only slightly smalker than the tank division in tank strength, while the tank divisiou has increased its artillery component for direct fire support and has added a rifle element to its forward detachment, the peredouyi otr~ad. At the same time, a motor rifle cmnpany has heen added to each tank regiment. Flank cover fnr the attacking column has been increased as has organic air defense and the defensive nntitank component reinforced with the tankfighting capability of the newer ffMPs (the antitank element is well forward in any action). The strengthening of Soviet artillery speaks for itself with new self-propelled gun regiments at army and divisional level. The total effect, with the increase in range and performance, has been to raise that availability figure for artillery preparation from its previous two-thirds to augment artillery support for attacks off the march. Finally, the addition of infantry to tbe tank forces committed to the main line of advance is seen clearly in the assignment of motor rifle troops to a tank regiment. The logic of this surely must be ultimately to turn the motor rifle divisions into genuine combined arms formations. January1977

Controversy None of these actions have proceeded w,ithout some controversy and demarcation disputes. The tank troops \h:ve embraced the presence of motor rifle umts (though the latter cannot have been too pleased at this subordination). Antitank defense has been a focus of debate and rlivi>ion though Soviet antitank defense has emerged strengthened and, in Asense, confirmed in its specialized f{)rm. There has also been (and there still is) some diversity of view o~,er how the Z?MP should be empluyed )--in the Februari 1976 issue of Voennyi Vestnik, Marshal Mosktilenko had to face this question. Not surprisingly, the marshal could give no definite answer, and it might be (as I hfive suggested elsewhere) that the Soviet Army will solve this simply by a kind of military Dar\vinism, turning loose these and other military beasts and seeing who and what survives. On the other hand, there has been a clnse and technical exchange over the role of the L3J2P. ~olonel Vinnikov has :ilso referred to the need for greater tactical ingenuity and effec-

tiveness, particularly in breakthrough operations on a narrow sector against prepared defenses. Regulations supply due prescription for turning from cOlumn into line, but this makes sense only under conditions of weak resistance, and Colonel Vinnikov believes that a sound case can be made for the echeloning of fighting vehiclesabove all, tanksin the subunits committed to the actual assault. He argues, for example, that the most effective combat deploy merit of the tmk company should be in two lineswith two sections in the first combat line and one section plus the company commanders 53

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES tank in the second, keeping the intervals between the tanks at 100 meters. The frontage of a sabanit (where nuclear weapons are not employed ) would imply 500 meters for a tank company and 1000 to 1100 meters for a battalion, The second combat line would be disposed some 200 to 250 meters from the first, the third 600 to 700 meters from the second (and thus up to 950 meters from the first ), giving the company greater freedom of maneuver. This arrangement also allows the first combat line to be reinforced within some three to four minutes and some two to two and one-half minutes for the second combat line to close on the assigned objective. The tank company should fight in two-line formation, the battalion in three combat lines. However, in the two-line array, the battalion can hnld a company ]n reserve, which is useful for exploiting success, covering the flanks or eliminating small enemy groaps left in the rear. Here is but one example of a rliscussion of tactical performance, in this instance expressly Iinderlined by the editors of Vuermui Vcstnih as interesting but in some respect controvew sial,,, II principles rather than an actual case study ~hough that might be done subsequently with reepect to the 3d Shock Army presently deployed in the Magdeburg area or the 8th Guards in the Weimar region. The first precondition is a high rate of advance in operations pursaed day and night (thOugh the true effectiveness of night operations may be restricted to battalion level). The rate of advance in a conventional mode seems to stand presently at some 30 kilometers per day (as opposed to 50 kilometers in nuclear conditions). It may be assumed that Soviet aircraft will strike at NATO airfields and also at the means ,of tactical nuclear deliv-. cry, all preceded by heavy electronic mmntermeasu Yes and ant iradar measures. The coordination of air and artillery strikes is nf major importance, with artillery preparation lasting for some 30 minutes, concentrating on enemy artillery, strongpoints and command posts. For these parposes, the Soviet division will occapy a frontage ranging from 2 to 8 kilometers, all with the purpose of amassing a superiority of some 50 to 1 along the line of the main thrust. From the starting point, which in all probability would be some 50 kilometers from the Iron Curtain itself, and with the area of the first echelon stretching back some 30 kilometers, Soviet helicopter-borne assault units (17 battalions of which can be lifted at one time) would be used tO SeiZe &dCtiCally Vital CrOSSirIg points, 1: with the advanced groups (peredovi otryari) of regiment 01: battaliOn groLlp size at divisional level striking oat to join these assault forces. (It must also be recognized that special Soviet and Warsaw Pact air commando units, acting under both military and KGB (Committee of State Security) control, may be used to operate with agents already emMilitary Review

lactical Conventional Breakthroughs But let us now return to the main issue of the tactical breakthrough managed in conventional terms, involving both podat,lerrie (neutralization ) and pora%henie (annihilation). These two concepts are linked, for, as I have said, tbe Soviet objective is by conventional means to neutralize any
effective response, particularly the

resort to nuclear we~pons on the part of the defender. For obvious reasons, what follows ie merely a r6sum6 Of 54

SOVIET GROUND FORCES Lwdds,with the immediate task of joinulaced, and this does not Drechlde the wider employment of airborne forces ing up with helicopter-borne assault proper. ) troops. The task of the leading unite is The division will have two, if not to open gaps for the regiments and divisions following, the main Soviet three, regiments in its first echelon, with regiments sending their advanced objective being the exploitation of a group in battalion strength for reeon. p a r t i c u 1a r breakthrough sector nuissance purposes and to cover the achieved by attack off the mnrch. m:~in deployment. The reconnaissance The leading regiments advance with thus rolls into the sttnck though this artillery support for attwk off the is not to belie the careflil presttack march, deplaying their sir defense registration of txrgets: 1:{ elements und enfpneer units well to the . . . they [eommandevs] will cavcfront, \vith column speed maintained wconnaissan.e of t},c full~l oryani2e as high as possible, There ure three enenig and es fablis~z tl>e e.rort location special feat[}res of this ndmitted]y ef I/is stronq pnints, antitank weaprude hcenario: the Soviet exploiti~tion ens, obscrpaf ion pasts, artillery Jirin!l of the successful brwkthraagh sector, pnsitims and clecfronic means af Yadin dq,loyrnent for the meeting engagecu!lnter-lit caszlres. ment SS well as control of that crucial The type of forwa7d edge ,,f the batencounter and the introduction of the f[e area (FEBA ) attack is also a matsecond echelon, even ns Soviet forces ter of some debate with due recogniforward ride out a small number of tion that a battle formation for FEBA nocleur strikes directed against them attack does not necessarily suit that without resorting to nuclear weupons \vhich is needed for operations in the themselves. It follows, conversely, that the prime consideration for the defen. depth of the defenses. .The close cosive forces must be to smother or stifle operation of all arms (often woefully inadequate in wartime) is essential. the initial breakthrough, to deny the Soviet command any ewy swing into Commanders of attached and supporting nrtillery subunits are to be COIIO. the meeting engagement and, above all, to disrupt the concentration of the cated with the commanders of all-arms second echelon. By the same token, the anits, while artillery fire is to continue %viet command seems to concern ituntil the tanks come within minimum self with achieving moxim urn sllccess safe distance, so that there will be no in the initial breakthrough phase, pause in shifting fire into the depth managing and mastering the meeting of the defenses. Motor rifle units will engagement and not so much passing advance some 150 to 200 meters behind through divisions in complex movethe tanks with the object of preventing the enemy from delivering aimed fire ments between echelons, but, rather, just piling them on, if I might use at the attacking force. The principle that phrase. Disruption of these phases of the counterattack against enemy particularly the meeting engageforces is to maintain aimed fire on the ment, with its very fluid formcoald move. 1a severely disconcert the Soviet comThe light lead units, with reconnaismand at all levels. sance troops in the van, will precede To sum up whqt has been of necesthe tank/motor rifle strike forces sity a very brief survey, the Soviet though both will advance at maximum interest in relatively prolonged conspeed along (or parallel with ) main January 1977 55

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES . ventional operations must be eontirmed. The present modernization and expansion program has gone a long WaY to eliminate the tactical deficiencies of, say, five years ago. The con. cepts of podaulenie and porazhenie are assuming the form of preemption, with increasing emphasis on blinding the enemy through electronic warfare. The initial stage of the tactical breakthrough is crucial, hut there seem to be reservations ~vitbin the Soviet command about uresent levels of tactical flexihiliW and thus the ability to engage and fully exploit the available resources for shock power. And, formidable as it may all seem, there is a limit to piling equipment on equipment. The armament norms now more or less meet the stipulations of doctrine, and the gap will close still further, at which the Soviet command will have to concentrate fiercely on the men and their performance,

NOTES
.WO. cimcm for or, tice.1 target t,,,, of lb, radar a.sembly, tmckmz cm the

K Amo. K :, con. dr-rable Soviet literature. . . . V. Y., Plwtakin et nI ,, lvz!Lw,ro<, obo*r><@L<,,ttc olJsl, t,hcvo!.k.oo bova, Second Edlti. n, Voe. IzIIat, M... WW. USSR, 1972, and subsequent ed~tios. Also, see Colonel General ( Engmeem 1 S. Azanov, ,. .Unaelo mekat - adacb, i,,d,e, <ewogo obo,,,ecke,<!1,,, bow,,,, Vow ,,w Ve.t>z d,, Numb,, 11, 1975, ,, 45-4V. General Ax. conmmd, the exieer t,ot>m !7 TrIkttkc u born@ prim, ml,k, Vuen,z,lot, M<,sCOW. USSR, 1974. Poll< ( Rm+,nmnt) Ed,te<l by Army Gcneml A, 1, Radzit-vski,, BatczVcm ( IItit. ta]io. ) and f?ota ( CmnDan Y ), Edited by Limten. ant General E. T. M.mhenko, and I,*ToII I sm. ticm ), Edm?d by A. M. Ads.mo. et al, The volume cm the divia, on ie due to e.DIIcar shortly. 4 Secretary of Defert,e Donald H. Rumsfdd, An,tual D<fmwe D,mwtme>,t ReWTt, FY US Department of Defense, S.peri.tmdent of Document,. US Gwernmet Print, E Office, Wmb. ,ngton, Dc, 1976, P 118. 1 Reportedly. two railway lines , no~thcm Iolan<i w,I1 be co.?rted to the %iet xze Tki. ,, ,18. out of custdemtio? vf the .weake+s ,,f the Poh, h mad network wh, cb has ],ttle stratw,c .1,.

1f177.

$ Group of Sovi.t Forces m Gmnmrw ( GSFG ) includes one %h.rk army,,. the 3d deDloyed m the Maxdebu,g area. At the Dresent tmm. 3d Shc,ck s-v. Udamnva-m for all Dtnctical WNDOW$ a tank armY, with Its five diviwons, There t,re two tank s.nni.m (Zd Guard, and I.t Gumrds), 1. Sth G.. rd6 and 20th ArmY. That is, more or le... a full ,, Front command.,, As the Gmtnan. WA, tc P=n<V jrJ75 {1976 points ont, these 20 dwis~ons have the ecmiwdent ,tsnk Dowcr,s of 26 di.!.,ons , f viewed f mm St re.gth levels of some Ii.. years ago.

11 Colon.d V. Vinniko., ,<Atczk,z u d.. i tvi bcx-vve linti,-Voe,wJ, VmItmk, Number 12. 1975, DD 51.54. 1? Sowet a,rbornc troops consist of se.e.plus airborne dxvi.ioa ( w,th p..awmmmndo units in tbe GSFG and two rurborne &,vision. i. tbe Baltic and Leingra~ Mi]!t.ry Distmcts. Soviet .ombat helimmer rwmnmts are .t.tioed i parcbim and Shmdal .S main bases. Tbe Soviet command ha, raised o special elite .ir-mmmado force, but mmably a h.d.picked mmwmy of each ml. mmment {. earmarked for this asm.lt rule. Sm-cial Par.trooP units include botb non-Soviet nits such .S the E.a.t Germ.. 6th Parmbte B.ttali. end Soviet .lt+, Tbe Polmb 6th Airborne Di.isio would .1s. be ,.olved i these operations which now need much .1.8.? ,mection and investig.tm ) . 13 See Cbvia Don.lly, ,, Soviet Reconaie,.n.e of tke ROW1 Uttited .%-ut.c. Inati. ll,,S tt,tc for Dcfe,,ce Stud,.?. March 1976, DP 6S.76 ( and P. H. Viz... %wet Reco.n.im.nce: Part 1,,, Joumml of tk., ROW[ Uwtted SWWC.8 I,mtituta f.. D.f.n.. December 1$7.5, PP 41.46).

Journal

7 The SA8 mobile surface-to-e.fr missile system (four missiles) bas a radar assembly with II Iarge circular, dish for target t.ackig, mmvedla..e a.te.n. on top of the launcher. Tbe two small diahe. could be for missde tracking m for cuidanm command (or both?). There aDDe.r8 to h, a t.]+.

Studw.,

14 For a general di.cumio, see M.>or General (T.nk Tro.m ) A. ZYrr.ov, .<Tbe Reglntios and Commadm% litiative,}O Sovidt dfditmy R..iet.. Number 2, 1976, w 26-27.

Military

Raview

,,.
,.

-.,., % . .,,,:.
4 .-, -.:

.,!,

,.

-!. ... .

,.

..--, ,, .

~Austrias Defense

in Transit

Dennis Chaplin

Europe which is significant to NATO security planning. At a glance, one can see how Austria effectively separates Italy from the other Eur~pean ~ATO countries, and, since it shares a border with both the Balkans and Czechoslovakia, it is clear that Austria could one day become an Achilles heel in NATO defenses. Acting as a territorial wedge separating northern and southern NATO areas, Austria presents a particular security problem in terms of its neutrahty and mditary weak. ness. H could be overrun easily by sudden Warsaw Pact operations, and the Russians would then be able to effect a rapid fait accompli by stationing forces in an area which would isolate Italy, subject it to Soviet influence and push Warsaw Pact forces farther westward. One must remembef that, until 1955.56, the Russians stationed forces in Austria quite legally, and, given Austrias weakness, it is conceivable that they might again exert pressure on Austria to reacquire such rights. The danger of Austrias position and neutrality is the way in which this gives the Warsaw Pact a means of outflanking and separating NATO forces, as well as enabling a Soviet military buildup deep within Central Europe. This is an unpalatable idea, but, with piecemeal, sudden and low-intensity operations, the Russians could achieve these ends without allowing the West sufficient justification for severe military reactions or danger of provoking the dreaded nuclear ex. change. The crucial problem in a nuclear world is always: IS it worth it? Are the ikues involved that essential? It is this kind of dilemma that the Russians hope to exploit in piecemeal aggrandizement. January 1977 57

LTHOUGH the

a neutral problems

country, of NATO

with

defense,

Austria should alwavs be considered m connection arei in southern It covers a geographical

AUSTRIAS DEFENSE . A curre~t Soviet Army war game, the Polarka plan, envisages a peaceful occupation of Austria from the Moravian area in the direction of Croatia, preferably in a context of stimulated political unrest in Yugoslavia, another awkward gray zone in NATO calculations. In other words, there is evidence that the possibility of a move against Austria is being considered seriously by Russia. Unfortunately for NATO, Austria cannot be relied upon to resist such Soviet em croachments due to its unpredictable neutrality anti its military weakness. Militarily, Austria is in a state of fragmentation and transit, literally a sitting target for any one determined to march in and use it as an additional base of operations. The defense forces could not even engage in a successful stopgap conflict despite the reforms being made by General Spannocchi. It is feared that Austria will remain a military and political vacuum as far as NATO security is concerned. The law fixing national service at only six months, passed in July 1971, has caused a Iongterm debilitating effect on the Austrian defense system and is still obstructing improvement plans today. This short period of national service no doubt won many young votes, but, in military terms, it negated the whole purpose of conscription. National servicemen cannot be trained to perform effectively in this space of time, trainers time being more or less limited to acclimatization, basic drill and how to pull a trigger. Moreover, psychologists agree that a young civilian cannot adJust to and come to terms with the peculiarities of military life in less than 12 months; any shorter period prevents him from resigning himself to the army as a temporary vehicle for self. expression. The process of adjustment to the idea and full implications perhaps the most important aspect of national service, and this in conditions where the young conscript is aware that his normal being interrupted for a few weeks and that it is merely a question until the ordeal is over. of civic service is cannot be instilled way of life is only of knuckling under

In July 1971, the opportunities for ensuring such adjustment were removed. Although young Austrians no doubt rejoiced, those responsible for security planning despaired,

Dennis Chaplin is a researcher from the lJniuersitv of East Anglia, specializing in militarupolitical analysis. He received his B.A. and Ph.D. at the School of European Studies, Norwich, England. He lorites for various international defense and political journals, and his article NA TOs Defense in Depth-Conundrwn or Challenge ? appeared in the December 1975 MILITARY REVIEW. 5a

\ ..

e
d. h

Military Review

AUSTRIAS DEFENSE for the move threatened to undo all that the previous 16 years of hilitary develop ment had createdand this at great expense to a relatively poor republic. The training of 720,000 men and a financial investment of nearly $2 billion over that period was to be wasted away, The cost of Austrian defense was admittedly only five percent of total expenditure (compared with 39 percent in neighboring Switzerland), but it still represented a considerable investment. From 50. operational battalions ant! reserves of 118,000 in 1971, the Bundesheer degenerated over the next five years into an anemic shadow of its former self despite the efforts of military leaders to make the best of a bad job. By 1974, barely a single full+trength battalion was available. Manpower shortages meant that many units had to be disbanded, accommodation was wasted and maintenance of equip ment suffered through neglect. To offset this blow to manpower and training programs, the Austrian Government offered thd compensation of very extensive reforms in the military sector in an attempt at rationalizing the resources available. These involved reorganizing the armed forces into a Landwehr and a permanently prepared Bereitschaftstruppe (alert force) of 15,000 Iongterm volunteers who could undergo intensive and consistent training to develop a nucleus force capable of leading and controlling a larger con. script force in emergencies. There are indications that planners originally intended the alert force to be modeled on a tightly knit professional force like the British Army, but it has now become clear that such a goal remains a pipe dream. The money, training personnel and esprit de corps were too difficult to muster. Apart from the structural changes, the reforms also threatened to introduce in creases in administrative complexity and cost forcing even greater staff shortages. There was considerable opposlfion to the reforms among officers, but, luckily, two Defense Ministers (Generals Freihsler and Lilgendorf) managed to soothe dissenting voices, and the reforms were pushed through by late 1971. This was only the beginning of the difficulties, for the Bundesheer soon found chaos growing in its ranks. Although the reforms were initiated on paper, the government was unable to offer sufficient money to support the reforms as envisioned. By General Staff calculations, the immediate layout alone demanded at least $1.8 billion. Many officers pointed to the need to prepare the ?menities for the projected alert force to make that setting attractive enough to attract dedicated career soldiers. To effect this involved improving existing living conditions and facilities in barracks, improving training facilities, ens ing the availability of enough and attractive urltforms and equipment, providing ade ! uate transportation, modernization, increasing firepower and mobility and offering carefully planned career lines in the armed ~ January 1977 59 ,

AUSTRIAS DEFENSE .

~ z .: i ~ ~ c -G ;

General Sparmocchi

forces. Even in the face of such necessity, the military budget fell to as little as 3.5 percent in 1973, indicating the governments inability to match intentions to reform with practical efforts, There were hopes of rapid improvement when the energetic General Spannocchi took over the new army command in July ~973. But even hecould work no miracles with the minimal resources available. Although he is optimistic enough to suggest that another three years will produce results, the Austrian Army remains something of a military enigma. If the Wehrmacht found little difficulty motoring into Austria in 1936, they would have found the situation luxurious today. Even arguments that the modern highways can be quickly neutralized by destroying the antilandsiide barriers above many crucial routes presupposes a permanently ready squad of demolition men at every point. Apart from there being an enormous number of such points, many are inaccessible to anyone wishing to reach them at short notice. The opacity of intention and advance as witnessed in August 1968 would certainly not allow Austrian hoteliers and farmers to activate the myth of natural defenses in good time. Spannocchi hopes for combat groups at all fortifications and natural obstacles to harass invaders and make them pay a high price for staying, but some cynical observers have already sug gested that the only people likely to do so in the long run are the tourists. The alert force is supposed to have 27 poised battalions, but, at present, 12 are mere references on paper, with the other 15 having a total strength of only 6600 men. This figure is worsened by the fact that these are predominantly short-termers who have barely emerged from basic training and who have been channeled into this force for appearances sake. By operational standards, perhaps two of these battalions are usable. The list of deficiencies remains a headache for Spannocchi. They cover important pplies, emergency resources, spares factors like weaponry, transport, munitions, J of the Bundesheerthe Gebirgsjager and even clothing. Even the traditional eht are not permitted to use their special footwear for everyday service because of the shortage of replacements and repair materials.
60

Militery-Review

AUSTRIAS DEFENSE Even the Larrdwehr is still far short of its target of 100,OOOafter mobilization, and, if Spannocchi is serious about using this territorial force in wide.scale partisan harassment tactics. his actual manoower requirement would. in fact. be nearer the 400,000 figure. Th/s marmower ixoblem is his immediate concern. There is still a 40.percent- shortage of nancomrnissioned officers (NCOS) and junior officers, and even the number of reserve officers available for periodic training stands at little aver 350 compared with 1450 in 1969. Of the conscripts who do their mini.stint in the forces, very few are interested enaugh to volunteer for NCO training courses. Since the alert force remains dependent on the canscript intake, this means that all sectors af the defense forces suffer fram taa few chiefs and too few Indians. Nor can Spannocchi hape ta offset human weaknesses by automated means of infantry support. Apart from an unimpressive array of light armored vehicles, the troops cannot even be assured of effective air support fram the 38 Saab.105E fighter bombers intended for defense of Austrias air space, Due ta prablems of aircraft age, spares, munitions, maintenance crews and pilot training, barely 10 of these can be considered operational. There is a critical lack of missile defense systems, antiaircraft batteries and infantry rocket systems. Spannacchi offers the, following universally accepted ideas: The infantryman with an anti-tank weapon costing 4,000 Shillings can destray an enemy tank costing 12 millian withaut excessive risk to himself. An enemy aircraft costing 100 million Shillings cannot find targets because the defense forces will be barely visible fram the air. No effective antitank systems are available to the Austrian troops, and it is unlikely that air attack will figure prominently in Warsaw Pact operations against Austria. So the prospects for Austrias defense remain bleak. Althaugh it is NATOs implicit policy ta favor a self-sufficient Austrian Army capable of securing the territorial neutrality of that part of southern Europe, even on a short.term basis, it looks as if this potentially impartant area will remain a military question mark. According to Spannocchi, it will be 1978 when the improvements begin to show, but, by present standards of development, Austrias military capabilities will remain negligible at least until the turn of the decade unless more pasitive steps are taken to rectify the situation. Already, the Russians have been from their Austfian affices and have tensions between Slavs and Austrians in the Tyrol. Austria, it seems, could NATO reactions to Saviet maves. removing pro.Western diplamats and officials tried to invalve themselves in the increasing in Carinthia and between Italians and Austrians become the first European testing ground for Wlt
January Kr77 !, 61

from

BRITISH ARMY REVIEW

Guerrilla
I

Politics in Argentina

Peter Janke

This articlc dates from before the euents af Mavclc 1976 in whiclt the military seized power in A ?gcntina. That takeover was a logical development of much tl)at Dr. Janke has written here. He provides an ad?airable anal~sis of the frujidr.tp of a gue?rilla campaign wltic}t remains z,altrf despite the collapse of President Isabel Penins gowv?rwent.-Erfitor, British Army Review.

modern history of guerrilla movements in Latin America dates from Castros Cuban victory in 1959because that victory made guerrilla warfare appear successful. On this basis, a number of campaigns were launched in Guatemala, Vene. zuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil. They failedmainly because counterguemilla action in the field !vas successful and the guerrilla movements themselves were not united. Revohltionary intent can never be entirely eradicated; it merges with the grumbling of dissent and manifests itself wh$n general dissatisfaction grows. Sometimes, as in Venezuela, prosperity can take the motive out of revolt; the government suddenly has enough patronage to buy loyalty from all classes. Elsewhere, in

HE

countries not blessed with oil revenues, ne~v conditions arose or were felt to become increasingly intolerable, as, for example, in Uruguay which IVaS confronted with a major insurgency from the Tupa maws in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This campaign could never have reached the stage it did without the economic depression and inflation which afflicted that country, well-known, incidentally, for really good government in Latin terms. It was led, as are all Latin-American revolutions today, by young middle-class students and professional people. It was suppressed only by the ruthless curtailment of democratic government and trade union rights: The cost to the average Uruguayan of the insurgency in human liberties bas been very high.
Copyright @I 1976 by Her Majestys Stationery Mifitary Office. Review

Condensed 62

from Brdish

Army Review,

August 1976.

..
The next 12 months will show whether this cost has proved intolerable, for there are indications that the Tupamarws are re-forming abroad alongside Argentine revolutionary forces and they. may yet find the broad support at home which so signally

GUERRILLA POLITICS

,
a power base that looks secure. Castroism also enjoys a certain popularity because of its home-grown South American qualities-qualities which may be more apparent than real, for Cuba has not ceased to be an economic hostage of the Soviet Union. The second ideological strand to be distinguished is revolutionary Peronism, a much more elusive movement which has moved a long way from the romantic image of Che Guevara toward hard-nosed communism. If Peronism ever represented anything, it was org?nized trade-union powerthe only power of its kind in South Americaand it opposed the naked authoritarianism of thut continent. During Per6ns exile in Spain, the tensions within Argentina produced a Marxist Left from what, in some ways, was a National Socialist Movement. In order to return to power, Per6n supported the violence of a new generation of militants who bad never known the leader before he was ousted by the military in 1955. In this way, mountguerrilla disturbances ing urban helped pave the way for Per6ns return in 1973 as the only political force to which the military could hand over power after their co plete failure to solve the countrys e x nomic and social problemsof which the chief was inflation. One of those early Peronist movements wa k the Fuerzas A wnadas Permristas (FAP) active in 1969 and 1970. This is only one example of a number of groups which split and reformed. Membership of one did not exclude membership of another. But the Peronist group that has outlived them all is the Montoneros. They first surfaced as a commando group in 1970 when they kidnapped the former President, Aramburu, on 31 May and subsequently murdered him. The Mon63

escaped them.
from To Caatroism understand to Peronism

Argentine guerrilla politics, the roots of the present strwggle must be clearly distinguished. There was in Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, a Castroite attempt to export revolution by infiltrating guerrilla columns from southeast Bolivia into Salta Province. The group concerned was captured in April 1!)64. Nevertheless, Castro has continued (despite the hostility which Moscow has at times displayed toward guerrilla warfare and armed struggle) to support such endeavors, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout the past decade. In mid-1968, a relatively large number of individuals returned to Argentina from guerrilla training in Cuba and abandoned rural tactics for urban guerrilla warfare. One of the groups formed was the F u e rz as Armadas de Liberaci6n (FAL ) ; another was the Fuer.ras Arrnadrts Retioktciorzarias (FAR ), both of which staged a series of small attacks on banks and military establishments throughout 1969 to raise money and steal arms. Although today nothing is heard o! the FAL or the FAR, the Cuban interest is, still present, behind all the noise of Peronist and Trotskyite violenceand Castroism is the one ideological strand which has Dr. Peter JanIce is a member of the staff of tlte Institute for the Study of Con ffict and a leading autltority on guerrilla warfare.
January 1977

GUERRILLiS POLITICS toneros took their name from a traditional rural vigilante group-rough riders of the past. From the start, there had been contact and exchanges between the Castroite and Peronist groups, both of which elected the vloIent road toward a Socialist revolution, Yet another ingredient, the third, was the activity at this hmelof members of the Third World Priests Movement founded in 1968. Scattered throughout Suuth America, many hundreds favored armed struggle. A few were active in Argentina, teaching, for example, in the Catholic University of C6rdoba from ~vhich some of the guerrillas had graduated. Among the better known priests were Father CarlrIs MIigica \vho ~sas killed in May 1974 and Father Alberta (arbone, accused of complicity ]n the Arambartl kidnapping. The final and fourth element in the guerrilla ideologlc~l spectrum is Trotskyism. Historically, of cotlr se, Trotskyism broke away from the Stalinist line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by holding an international meeting of supporters in France in 1938. This Wras the famous Fourth International, to be distinguished from Lenins Third International, which Stalin led in 1!)19. From the start, it }vas subject to crmstant splits and only involved tiny groups of people. With the development of the Sine-Soviet split in the 1950s, Trotskyism leaned toward Peking. In the 1960s, it supported Castros guerrilla war tactics on the mainland. The Trotskyist Partido Reroluciorcq?io de 10S T~abajadores ( PRT ) set UP an armed branch known as the Ejircito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) in 1970. Some of had already been trained its militants in Cuba two years earlier. In this way, Castroism had a seminal influence on both Trotskyism and Peronist guer6* rills violence in Argentina, needs to be highlighted tends to be overlooked.
Irrtsrnational Once this Command

a fact that because it

is unCastroite influence derstood, the new development which emerged in February 1974 should not sarprise us. After the I?RP had proved their success in the field, an interna-, tional revolutionary coordinating command was established, This linked the moribund Castroite Bolivian Ejdwito de Ltbemci6n National (ELN ) (sup. posedly important strategically because it had frontiers with so many the Tupan!a? m (who, countries), without being Castroite, sustained these and ~vere afforded immense publicity in Havana) and the Macirrrie?zto de lzqaierda Rcwducmnaria ( MIR ) in Chile which was also a pro-Castro movement. Each of these groups has money from the ERP, part rereived of a $14-million ransom for tbe Exxon oil executive Samuelson. But no action has yet occurred outside Argentina for the moment, foreign nationals are content to operute as guerrillas inside Argentina. The journal of the new command is called Che Guevara, indicating Its Castroite sympathy. Finally, the most recent development has been a de facto alliance between the ERP and the Mowtonevos
altho{tgh differences. there Both are have still now ideological

been declared illegal. By attacking the military for the first time in October 1975, the Montoneros seemed to have abandoned their dream of winning military support or at least neutrality in the political struggle to assert re\,olutionary Peronism. The principal vehicle for collaboration between the two groups was a splinter group called the ERP-22 de Agnsto which welcomed Per6ns return in 1973 when the ERP
Military Review

1 GUERRILLA POLiTiCS proper did not. The 22 de Agosto group has since returned to the parent body but has remained a bridgehead between the two movements. To earn up: On the ideological side, from the four original strands in Cas. troism, Trotskyism, revolutionary Peroniem and the Third World Priests Movement, the recent past has seen the gradual development of a coalition which tends to favor the Castroite banner. Obviously, nothing of this nature is permanent, and the new situation is far from a firm lineup, but it represents a distinguishable pattern of events. Ironically, there has been no public recognition of this fact from Cuba, partly because of pressure from the Soviet Union to abandon support for guerrilla warfare (which Cuba has never entirely done ) and partly from the good relations which Per6n established with Cuba on his return from exile. These remain, despite the governments swing to the Right under ex-President Isabel Per6n. Cuba is, in any event, always in a position to give clandestine help. Montoneros in June 1975. It amounted reputedly to one-third of the Argentine defense budget ({27, million). With these amounts In hand, the guerrillas are clearly in a position to challenge the state with military hardware bought abroad, Yet this does not seem to have occllrwd, for the vast majority of guerrilla arms are stolen. They are also able to subsidize groups in other countries. Kidnapping has now replaced bank raids as a source of finance but bay not yet been Ilsed as a lever to extract political concessions from the government. It has been useal, however, to enforce changes in industrial policy. The MrInfonrms demanded the reinstatement of 200 dismissed workers as one of the conditions for the release of Heinrich Metzthe West German production manager of the Mercedes Benz subsidiary near Btlenos Aires. Assassination has been used by all gTOLIpSto settle old scores, particularly to revenge 16 guerrillas killed at Trelew Naval Base on 22 August 1372 whds allegddly escaping. They had been recaptured after a jailbreak a week earlier when six had managed to flee to Chile and then Cuba on a hijacked airliner. Assassinations have been highly selective in character and iuclude the Chief of Police, Alberto Villar, who was blown up while boating, and, last year, the head of intelligence in the Defense Ministry, Vice Commodore Rolando Sileoni. Most of the politically motivated murders in 1973-74 were the result of factional fighting within Peronism the left wing against the right. This gangsterism was not new, being part of a traditional fight to control union elections. Increasingly, it has been couched in political terms ~hich boil down to a Left and a Right. The violence increaeed after Per6ns death in
65

Profitable Kidnapping On the guerrilla front, what is perhaps uppermost in peoples minds IS the escalation of kidnapping in Argentina. Urban guerrilla groups first resorted to this in March 1970, bat the example had already been set in Guatemala, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. It was the Castroite FAL and the Peronist Montorzeros who made the first etrikes in Argentina, seizing the Paraguayan consul and ex-President Aramburu. Since then, kidnapping has become the principal source of raising funds. The victims have mainly come from foreign companies in Argentina although the kighest raneom paid so far was by the Argentine consortium Bunge u Born to the -< Ianuary 1977

July ]974. There were over 1000 denth< last year which compapecl \vith o~er 200 in Ulster. Of the 433 oot of 500 bodies which conld be identified in the period JtTly 1974 to ,J!lne 1975, 190 were ]eft-\vingers, Nbile only 38 Lelonge[l to the Right. The cause !vas the il]creasillg activity of right-v ing pi~ramilitary groLIps, tJy nO meaus for
the sity iug by h;w ( entiy first mo.<t Isabel ha> been time, nf the to but c:llled credit have a,lvisur, retired of to the new the in their intenA tak. I a gro!II) thou~ht Pertin> since he:ird l~ec+tll.e Triple been

.;. )
~., ,

%4$7..
BOLIVIA

,!
,P. --., ; j >

~-i,
8RAZIL /

1, ,aNd

members
protected Rega, Les~ A re-

were
u ho

Lopez hladrld. Tr]pie

it dcclttrerl a tr{ice in .J(Ily 1973, but other tleofmci~t organix;ltl(]]ls h:ive surf>{ced stfch :M the Glir!ld;il R(.stol(! ado] a A ,,t,,s~,),;t~, (nt~,/i//,, aml the I;kwk Ilrig,i{le, This snrt c)f ngly reavtlon ,. Ilable t,] <o,,. f~]se the (Ib>el~er :1)1(I{Iistrnct his iitte]ltion fr{lm the csficntial contlict \vl]lch h~l: been the c{)ncern of the poIICC {illtll I~el~r\l;iry 1975 Jvhen the milit,!ry .juined the se~{!rity f~)r~es In rliv:il jnierrilla operations, The overri~ling point ,ibout the g~lerrilkt uam]w{gn o~er the p:l+t f[,(tr ye;irx has I)een Its succe+. ful escal:ition. In the first stages, kisti])g two to three years. group+ of 6 to 12, ]ncl[ld]ng f!{,men, attacked factories, lalhwly stat ion.a and facilities. The numbers then grefr. In ,January 1974, betn een 60 and 100 g(lerr]llas attacked Az(!1 Garrison. The i]]tention had been to kidnap senior ofikers, blit resistance foiled the plnn although the command. ing [Illicei Nas killed. O!I 11 Angust 1074, there was an attack agmnst the 17th Airborne Infi~ntry Regiment qlmrtereci in the
Catamarca barracks. Nineteen guer-

,.1

FALKLAND maws

TTIERRA DEL FUEGO

rillas were killed, 15 \vere captured and the remaining 50 fled into the hills where they ]Vere subsequently 66

ro[!nde(t (III. Hov ever, on the same day, it s]mtlltaneo~ls ,attack was made on ~in explosives factory near (6rdoba, an[l this nas sue,ces.sfl l]. At 2 a.m., a ~uerri]]a unit seized an ~d.loining mt)tel \vhere they set up a liaison unit with radio equipment, Shortly after, 60 guerrillas, in army nniform, attacked and escaped with arms, mlinitions and equipment. Similar operations were undertaken in 1975. On 24 March, 70 guerrdlas attacked the police headquarters of V]lla Constituc]6n and withdrew after 10 minntea heavy fire. But an attack by 40 guerrillas on Rosario army barracks on 13 April lasted an hour in full daylight, and a quantity of arms, ammunition and 200 uniforms were stolen. On W June, there was an at-

MiJitsry Review

.
GUERRILLA POLITICS tack with heavy caliber weapons on the headquarters of the Argentine Army First Military Region. It took place at 9:45 p.m., and the shots were fired from a nearby constriction site. Qnite the most spectacular action of 1975 occarred nn 5 October when a small unit hijacked a plnne from Ruenos Aires to the city of Formosa while the main group attacked the barracks of the armys 29th Infantry Regiment and yet a third unit took over the airport. The attack on the barracks was repulsed lmt with the loss of 11 soldiers. Fifteen guerrillas were reported to have died, Some managed to reach the airport, board the hijac,ked plane and escape by landing on a cattle ranch 400 miles away where cars met them. They scattered nails -on the road to prevent pursuit. Those who failed to make the airport took to the countryside where most ~vere canght. A simultaneous attempt to break Into the local jail failed, and 10 attackers were reported wounded. Two days before Christmas, an equally well-planned nrban operation was carried out by the ERP in the sprawling suburbs of Buenos Aires. Estimates vary as to the number of guerrillas involved, but there may have been as many as 300. The main group of about 130 rammed the gates of the Domingo Viejobapno military arsenal in Monte
Chingolo drove with through a stolen track and afterward

in a convoy

of vehicles. Armed with grefiades and heavy and light rnachineguns, the guerrillas were. nonetheless, repulsed by the guards who shot and killed 56 inside the garrison. Outside the building, diversionary attacks were made by smaller units seizing the bridges whiqh connected the suburb to the capital, machinegunning two police January1977

stations and an army garrison and setting fire to as many m a dozen buses. All told, 85 guerrillas, many of \vhom were teenagers of both sexes, were reported to have died in the conflict, while seven members of the security forces lost their lives. Ten civilians Nere nlso killed in the cross fire. The security force response was massive but reasonably quick. It involved a combined operation of military. POIIW2 and border guards under the command of the militaryas are all countergllerrilla operations now. Within half an hour, a large cordon was thrwvn arnund the area, and helicopters and even a Ca)lherM bomber \vere on the scene. This heavy response \vas repeated in January 1976 in the city of Rosarlo where French AM.k13 tanks xvere used on the streets. The loss of so many guerrillas in one action did not prevent their hunching an attack on a communic.atirms battallon immediately afterward, or attempting to make off with helicol]ters from a police academy on the outskirts of the capital. Both attacks were repulsed so that, to date, the guerrillas have failed in larger groups to match their success in small units. Alongside these large-scale operations, s m a 11e r actions continued throughout the year. Targets included smnll-towm police stations, bombs in railway stations and at foreign embassies (the British included), consulates and the otiices of the Communist party in C6rdoba. Fire bombs went off in department stores in C6rdoba and Buenos Aires. There waa also a letter bomb sent to President of the Senate Luder, on 16 July, and thefts of weapons from arms factories and ambushed military trucks. A Hercules troop carrier with 114 men on board was sabotaged by an explosion 67

GUERRILLA P~LiTICS on the runway in Benjamin Matienzo Airport in Tucum&. A frigate was dynamited and damaged in the Rio Santiago shipyard on 22 August. Thus, a third level of insurgency the larger actionshas been imposed upon the second. IndustrialSubversion Parallel to these military actions, the results of a long-term campaign of industrial subversion manifested themselves. The principal target was the industrial belt around Villa Constituci6n. The inspiration was Trotskyist, and the movement was known as the Revolutionary Workers Power Organization. The political branch maintained the level of discontent in the work force, radicalized its demands, recruited among the most hothearleti and extolled subversive and violent actions as tbe only way to achieve social justice. Tbe armed branch kidnapped industrialists, intimidated workers, sabotaged production and murdered opponents. Tbe object was to paralyze tbe productive capability of basic industries. On 26 May 197.5, the Minister of the Interior, Alberto Rocamora, said: Several factories are employing subversive workers because of fear of threats they received and, what is worse, they do not report this. The tactic is to win over the natnral labor spokesmen to a violent and disruptive campaign. An earlier report by the Minister had this to say: To a,haf at tbp begin >7i>7g could kut,e appeared a pro!iferafion of agitators and prouocateurs, tcho, using various iwe[evant pretexts, sparked union agitation and tke implementation of systematic measures of force, was added tke conviction that all tkis was part of an elaborate infiltration supported by a solid f~arnework of material ele68 ments and carefulh] planned substantial investments. Greater proof of this emerged on 5 June 1975 when a dozen arrests were made of people working in the iron and steel industry in Zirate and Campana. All had allegedly engaged in violent terrorism since November 1973. Finally, on 28 July, a raid in Buenos Aires uncovered a card index of 200 company executives, with complete reports on their movements. On 29 October, Marrtoncro gunmen murderedor as they put it executeda 43-year-old Fiat executive in C6rdoba. The firm had closed the plant on 20 October because of threats against executives although the government compelled it to reopen. Rural Warfare ERP guerrillas set up a rural front in Tucurnin Province in a bid to elevate the insurgency into its finaI phase, actually claiming to have liberated areasliberated, that is, from government control. They chose the same areas as did those who emulated Castro in the early 1960svery difficult terrain for security forces to operate in, offering plenty of cover and bordering on other states with all the possibilities this gave for infiltration, supply routes and refuge. Tbe population is scattered and works on sugar plantations. It was largely because of this new rural threat that the military was called in to take over these operations from the police in February 1975. Witbin three and a half months, 30 camps had been located in Tucum&n, and 380 guerrillas had been killed or captured, with the loss of 22 soldiers. An action at the end of May indicated the scale of guerrilla logistics when the military ambushed a convoy of 32 ERP vehicles. However, it is expected that a new MilitaryReview

....-. - ...... . .

.- .....

.-

GU.ERRII.LAPOLITICS rural front in Salta Province will be announced before long. Very few guerrilla groupe in Latin America have put up alternative programs as substitutes for the societies they attack. The Tupamuros, deceived by the apparent ease with which they flourished in chmdestinity, sought a popular mandate to govern by giving tacit support to the extreme left Frente Arwptio (Broad Front) coalition in the November 1971 elections. It received less than 20 percent of the vote. There is no reason to think that the ERP or the Montoneros would even equal that percentage if they ever resorted to electionswhich, because it is a bourgeoie practice, they would not do on principle. Still, in August, the ERP offered a t uce in exchange for the releaee of #olitical prisoners and the lifting of the han placed upon it two years ago. It proposed calling a Constituent Assembly with full popular participation to set the foundations f~r the countrys pacification. No further details were explained (the Argentine Congress is elected democratically, and no party questioned the results of the previous presidential elections which returned first Campora and then Per6n to the presidency). In June 1975, Mario Firmench, the ilforztonero chief, called for the resignation of President Isabel Per6n and for elections so that the people can freely express themselves. He, too, ignored the fact that the Argentines had just done that. In addition, he arbitrarily condemned the Presidents advisor, Lopez Rega, to death and indicated that the principal opposition leader, Ricardo Balbin, was unacceptable. The new National Liberation Front government was to include the ERP and the minuschle pro-Moscow Argentine Communist Party. FirJanuary1977 mench added: the installation of a Popular Government, anti-imperialist and democratic, would put an end to the wave of violence, On 11 August 1975, the kforztorzeros somewhat expanded on their economic policy. Foreign trade was to be reeetablisbed with the Socialist countries, and foreign exchange transfers were to be stopped, except for the payment of essential raw materials. A moratorium was to apply to all foreign obligations. Tax policy was to shift income distribution in favor of the small and medium size artiean and agricultural operations and to the state, instead of toward the oligarchic agricultural system. A statesupported credit policy was to consolidate the new income policy by promoting the development of national companies, small and medium size businesses and by stabilizing the real wage. One might wish politics were so simple, for such a policy would achieve nothing of the kind,, The Monfoneros chose to go underground and were only outlawed last year when it became clear that, like the ERP, they, too, would wage war against the state by attacking military targets. This new dimension to the conflict had nothing to do with the violent struggle for power between tbe Left and Right of the Peronist movement itself from which the army could stand aside so it intervened.
Prospects Per+n movement different Long Struggle left an Ahead legacya two utterly

impossible contained

which

wings which were agreed on only one thing, the return of Peronism. Not even he tried to effect a reconciliation other than by failing to pronounce for one side or the other. Furthermore, he encouraged the guerril69

GUERRILLA POLITICS las from exile, and they contributed to the demise of the former military regime under President Lanusse. The great divide within Peronism will continoe with a vengeance since an Au. thentic Peronist P~rty was formed
on the Left under ex-f+esident Campora. It was outlawed on 25 December 1975 although it seemed unlikely that it would develop into a credible politicnl alternative. So, with no political channels open to them, the guerrillas must continue to fight the army. The military has, in fact, been increasingly

drawn into the fray. It now considers that a state of total war exLsts between them. But can the military eliminate the gLlerri]kl+ ? First, much of the battle ]n the rural areas depends upon sociopvliticul measures, consisting of s hearts-and. minds campaign. This is more dilficult to develop when tbe ruling Ideology is split, bankrupt of ideas and unable to stop inflation, until recently rising at a rate of about one percent a day. Secondly, the military has to rely enormously on police support and cooperation, especially for intelligence, and the police force has recently proved motinous and unreliable. Thirdly, if gucrri]la recruitment among Argentines themselves drops, there is an ample reservoir of willing foreigners. Six thousand Chilean refugees fled to Argentina in September 1973, and there is a constant seasonal flow of labor in Mendoza Province, for example, to help with the grape harvest. This provides cove; for transit. To screen the flow, 8000 police detained 5000 Chileans in April. Tttpamaros have been involved in Argentine extremism for several years and have been caught operating out of A&ntina across the river. On 3 June, a group of Paraguayans were
70

arrested. So, the imposition of restrictions on recruiting is not going to be easy ei~her. Next, the pattern of ransoms and protection money upon which the guerrillas rely for their funding has taken hold of society. To attempt the hard line now would prove almost impossible politically. Lastly, in a country as huge as Argentina, it is not difficult to find safe ground for training, and there is always the possibility of facilities backup from Cuba, On the other hand, the security forces can rely upon friendly governments around them Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia and they can be encouraged by the failure of the Tupamaros. The Tupamaros put their own defeat down to four factori: underestimating the military after having run circles round the police; a failure to take proper security precautions; the . unsuitability of Uruguayan cattle lands for rural guerrilla units and, finally, to their concept of the struggle as a battle between t~vo armies. With the exception of the terrain which is favorably to them, it may be that the Argentine guerrillas make the same mistakes. Fundamentally, they are amatea rs and unlikely to stand up as well as professionals to prolonged stress. On the other hand, one might argue perversely that, the longer the conflict, the more professional they become. In balance, a long struggle might be predicted with victory of a sort eventually going to the security forces because, unlike Vietnam, there must come a point beyond which the conflict cannot escalate, The cost in terms of Iiberty will be high, and it seems improbable that Argentine society will be any the more just for having undergone such a harrowing experience. MC Military Review

Militapy

Art and Science:

-7

Is There a Place in the Sun for It? .

Brigadier General Edward B. A tkeson, United States Army

The Awuu War College is dcdicatcd to the l(igltcst professional militar~ education of care full~ sclcet cd, ltighlg individual huntun beings. . . . The academic discipline undcv[ying OUT pvogr;nls dci it,cs fwm our purpose and mission. It incorporates stud~es in t[~ose fields ,)f academic and pvactical endeauar 7u/fich constitute the militorv profession. This body of knowledge, a wide on~, can be called militar!j at t and science. I HE US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, is charged by the Department of the Army with a dual mission. The first element relates directly to the educa. tion of selected military and civilian students. The second element encompasses the conduct of studies in areas of professional concern which is at least implicit in these remarks. ~ At various times, however, commandant of the College, and other interested officers, have raised questions which transcend the functions of the institution, focusing upon what it should be rather than what it should do, Generally, such questions have tended to Jsnuary 1977

groLIp themselves around the notion that the Army War College should strive to become the leading center in the United States concerned with intellectual efforts directed toward those aspects of national security affairs related to land warfare. In one instance, the concept was framed as a respondeveloping an earned sibility for . reputation . . . as a national center for contemporary military thought.:] More recently, the Department of Defense Excellence in Edacation CoWmittee (Clements Committee) stated: The ,Seniar ,Seroice Colleges should be wellsprings of pwfessiona/ thought, tlt?ough which o~cers can develop and 71

/-MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE e.l,panddtheir teckn ical and ptmfessional military e.rpertise. ! As frequently as the concept has been enunciated, however, broad understanding and ameptance have been slo~v to emerge, pmacloxically retarded primarily by those lvithin the military profession who either disngree on philosophical grounds or fuil to grasp its significance and spirit. Fortunately, lack of unanimity of view has not inhibited the cfevelupment of important collateral ad~,ances in the man- ner in which the Instigation has approached its mission.
Progress number 50. of soch electives now exceeds

The advances which have been made in recent yean at the College are both apparent and substantial. While a
number lum, relate many directly to the curricu-

The curriculum itself has been restructuled to provide for a broad common overview of essential professional subjects daring the first half of the academic year II and for a period Of appropriate study and research into matters of individual importance during the latter half. The result has been the emergence of a far more sophisti: cated range of intellectual opportunities than previously offered by the College at any time since its establishment in 1901. NO less significant developments have occurred external to the curricula. The entire intellectual ambience has been upgraded through the expansion of a wide range of separate

concern other aspects of the institution and Its qualifications for recognition and excellence of reputation. Curricular changes in the first half of the current decade have transformed the Army War College from an essentially single-program institution into an educational center man. aging a complex array of courses based upon the varying requirements of different student situations and needs and different career objectives. A department of nonresident instruct ion (subsequently renamed Depart. ment of Corresponding Studies) was established in 1368, offering a twoyear program paralleling the regular course, for selected correspondence students in both the Active Army and the Reserve components. The range of elective courses has been steadily broadened over the years to meet the demands of increased opportunity for pursuit in depth of Army career specialties under the Officer Personnel Management System ( OPMS). 5 The 72

Brigadier General Edloard B. Atlceson is Director, Ofice of Policy and Planning, Intelligence Communit~ ,Stafl at the Centra/ Inte/tigence Agency. He received a B.S. from the USMA, an M.B.A. from Sgracuse University, and is.a graduate of the USACGSC and the Army War College. He haS served with the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Militavg Opsrat ions, Washington, DC, and as Deputy Commandant, US Army War CoUege, Cavlisle Barracks, Penns~lvania. His two-part article The Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense to US Security Interests appeared in the May and June 1976 issues of MILITARYREWEW. Military Review

,.. , n

but mutually enriching activities. In 1974, the Strategic Studies Institute, the research arm of the College, initiated an annual assembly of senior military and civilian officials in a strategic issues symposium to address papers on topical matters prepared by members of the War College faculty. The compendiums of papers from the first two symposiums have been published as books, with forewords prepared by General Maxwell D, Taylor and General Andrew J. Goodpaster. ~ Paralleling the compilation of professional books has been an effort to extend the intellectual reach of the College through in-house publication of military issue research memorandums addressing specific issues of professional importance and conversion of ParanzetersJournal of tlte US A rvay War CoUege from a biannual to a quarterly publication. In addition, the College has sought to develop links with a number of civilian colleges, universities and research institutes through attendance at and sponsorship of many symposiums and academic workshops and by encouraging its faculty and students to publish their works in respected journals. A number of other important projects are under development, including the assembly of a three-volume work on management and its various applications to the military sphere. This text was written hy members of the faculty and the student body. Equally as important has been a formal program initiated in 1974 to enha~ce the expertise of the faculty through a more careful selection process, expansion of opportunities for sabbaticals and a retention program. Faculty members have t r a v e 1e d throughout Latin America, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the Far East in pursuit of Januarf 1977

better and areas of

understanding their of geographic concentration,

of

their and Military

subjects functional mem-

bers have been detached for periods up to a f u11academic year at Shippensburg State College and the Foreign Service Institutes Senior Seminar in Washington, DC. A number of officers have been recruited to join the faculty after serving as fellows at such institutions as the Hal<vard University Center for International Affairs. Still others have attended the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard BusiIWSS School and the Management Program for Executives at tbe ~niversity of Pittsburgh. Most hold graduate degrees relating to their specialties and are graduates of one of the senior service colleges. 8 The totality of these programs for improvement of the Army War College was formally recognized by the A m e r i c a n Council on Education ( ACE) in January 1976, following a three-day visit by a specially constituted group of educators. Tbe findings and report of the group essentially equated the College curriculum to an academic year at the graduate level and recommended acceptance of virtually any part of the resident course for transfer credit by civilian universities offering graduate degrees which require similar course credits. ~] No mention of accreditation of the War College itself was made, as such would have exceeded the charter of the group. However, the implication is clear enough: US Army War College students, in the main, PUrsue courses which are essentially the equivalent of one full academic year at a graduate institution. The ACE statement immediately 73

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE raises .a key question: If i ndeecl the War College operates at the graduate level, what is the principal academic discipline under pursuit ? Notably, the faculty displays significant expertise and holds well-recognized credentials
related plines, to all a of wide which spectrum of disci.

ing as an academic endeavor h& enjoyed some success. Following World

War 11, the University of Maryland experimented with a program offering a baccalaureate degree with a major science. Certain weakin military

have a bearing on the common overkiew, but the central focus is ill-defined. One department staff seems particularly strong in the social sciences but, like the others, it includes officers \vith advanced degrees )n a numbey of other ayeas. No particular pattern is readily apparent save the unifying tie of broad and extensive familiarization with the formulation. development, Organization and utlllzatinn of military force, together with both its obvious md more hubtie intltiences on wxiety; its legul and ethical bases; its role in naticmsl POIICYdevelopment and execution; und the complex skein of political, econnmic and btrategic imperatives shaping its structure and orientation, It is this unifying tie to which the commandant of the College was referring when he identified the body of professional knowledge as military art nnd science. It is a combination of subjective and objectii,e disciplines of extreme importance to the viabillty of any society. Awarenessin Academic World Over the years, there has been a glacial drift toward awareness of the existence of this body of knowledge in the academic world. The pw,sage of the National Defense Act in 1916 established the R es e r v e Officers Training Corps for recruitment and training of potential officers at cOlIeges and universities throughout the country. While the training has had varying acceptance for undergraduate credit, the principle of military school14

nesses in the program, however, led to its gradual deterioration and practical demise in 1963. MeanwhiIe, the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, initiated a request for recognition and accreditfltion by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools to grant related degrees at the masters level. Authorization for tbe action was established by act of Congress in 19G3. In instituting its program, the College provided its own definition of the field: . . tltc studu af the develapmen;, opmation, and sup~ort of military fl,rces iri peace and war and of tlte tntcr ) clati(,rrships of the ecorrora{c, geographic, political, and psycllmocial ele. metits <if natianal pawer with the application af milifa~y fame {n order to acl[ieve national objectives. ?<) In s{tpport of its program, the College suggested that: .4 distlrcguishing cllaracteyistic of a rcrogr!iwd prafession is its ~elated scholastic discipline. Militar~ art and science is tlt e scholastic discipline of the n)(litaru profession. 11 While it is apparent that some progress has been made by the alleged discipline of the military profession in gaining legitimacy and recognition, a strong body of opposition has coalesced Ibehind a set of arguments Ivhich have served to make that progress tenuous at best. It is a gross oversimplification to characterize critics of the discipline as traditionalists, but so they must ap~ear to those who wtppOrt the concept of military art and science in the framework sugMilitaryReview

..
gested by the Command and General Stiaff College., We should examine the traditionalist point of view. . The Traditional School The most fundamental tenet of the traditional school appears to be a belief that the military profession is aniqae. Any resemblance of a military career to life work in medicine, law or any other civil profession is deemed specious. The military draws upon the arts and sciences of all the others and molds them into a coherent whole which. in turn, constitutes the intellectual underpinnings of the Armed Forces of the coantry. There can be no single academic ptlrsait \vhich prepares an officer for any bat his mvn particalnr specialty within the military comma nity. The notion of a military art and science, traditionalists argae, implies a body of thonght which does not, in fact, exist and, to enshrine it in academic terms, componnds the error, They see the stady of militarf affairs (to the extent that they recognize the term ) as of significance only within the profession and not an endeavor of intellectual value in its own right. While virt~lally all concede the importance of an officers exposure to the broad spectrnm of subjects offered at the higher military colleges, they argae that diplomas and certificates, rather than academic credits, are the appropriate docnments to attest to saccessfal completion of the courses becaase of the lack of relevance of the work to any field outside the military service. Not directly tied to the basic traditionalist argnment, bat exhibiting high correlation with it, is a second tenet which holds that the proper area of emphasis within militm-y educational institutions is the realm of the teal world. This approach tends to
January 1977

focas unoa the imrwrtance of acaaainting students with the wny things are rather than the way they might be. At the Io\vest and simplest level, it manifests itself in the impartation af set or established tactical doctrine as approved by appropriately cansti tated authority. It emphasizes the training of tbe strident to assume his place in mllitacy satiety, nccepting the instruction as n basic teal so that he may falfill his assigned rqle and perform his assigned fanct]ons. Higher ap in the educational system, it reveals itself in the form of dactrinal cancepts, same~vhat more discretionary in application but, nevertheless, restrictive and pedagogic, Tbe battlefield (ar the military logistical trnin) is held to be of such camplex natare and overlaid with sach .an ambience af crisis that clear limits must be established beyond \vhich subordinates cannot be permit. ted to operate-either physically or intellectually-withoat endangering the sawessful achievements of org~~nizatiannl adjectives. At the highest military educational levelwithin the senior service colIegesthis viewpaint is manifested in argaments for emphasi~ apon instruction in how the military departments aperate, which plans pravide grist far which pragrams and by what means the current administration pravides gnidance to the military services for shaping their forces and budgets. The traditionalist holds that the ideal pradaet at any of these educational Ievele is ane wha can immediately step inta a position in a military unit ar departmental bareau and perform at a high level of efficiency. The praduct is not expected to be a tlteoriet; he is a functionary. He need not be an innovator; 75

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

. ..

..V.l

p -. .-
Root Hall,headquarters of the USArmy War College he needs to be a well-rounded executor of policy and orders. A third general characteristic of traditionalists is a lack of enthusiasm for the notion that a military educational institution should be concerned for what it is as well as what functions it performs. Traditionalist views of the Army War College, while not necessarily hostile to any specific program cited among the recent advances noted above, are incompatible with the idea that the institution should aspire to become a national center for contemporary milita?y thought. Mach better, the traditionalist would suggest, would be the devotion of the Colleges full talents and attention to pursuit of the dual mission of teaching and research without incurring risks of distraction by peripheral activities. Under the pinch of austere military budgets, he might aver, the Army can ill afford the niceto-have frills of symposiums, sab. baticals and writing for intellectual 76 fulfillment. Traditionalists tend to be no-nonsense group of a practical, seasoned professionals who appear to value short-term gains over the longer, tangible issues over the intangible and proven methods over the unproven. On the whole, they tend to be satisfied with things just about the way they are. TheProgressive School Again, with some oversimplification, we may group and label those with somewhat different views about the military profession and about its intellectual underpinnings, and generalize to some extent concerning their thought processes. With probably only slight injustice, wemay call these men the progressives. By and large, progressives attach greater importance to the impact. of ideas on human endeavor than do traditionalists. To the progressive, principles and theory merit greater attention than do standing operating proMilitary Review

cedures. He tends to be somewhat less interested in ho to a task is accomplished under present circumstances, and more interested in wh~ it is done and what alternatives there may be for its execution (or how the function mny be avoided if it seems to make only marginal contribution to the ac. complishment of the overall mission). He tends to be somewhat more iconoclastic than his traditionalist colleague, hence less preoccupied with the way things are. He looks backward for historic analogy, for examples of what has been applied in the past, but then be tends to shift into the future, skirting the present except as it constitutes a springboard from which that which might be can be launched. The future is his natural domain, tbe haven where the fruits of todays intellectual process are to be found. He sees the present as n burden imposed by yesterdxys ideas to be borne until tomorrow comes. In sum, the progressive reverses the traditionalists view of the present as the environment of action and the future as the environment of theory. He tends to view tbe present as a time of intellectual opportunity which, if usefully exploited, will yield a sounder environment of action cm the morrow. The progressive views a military career as a legitimate calling similar in most respects to medicine, law and the clergy. While he recognizes a somewhat broader core discipline lying at the heart. of the military profession, he woald argue that the similarities dedication to service, firm basis in de.
veloped theory, promulgation and en-

forcement of professional standards by members of the profession themselves and balance between art and scienceare stronger than those aspects which tend to set it apart from the other professions. January1917

With respect to the pursuit of formal curricula in service colleges, the progressive draws strong parallels -. with similar activity in civilian professional educotion. He is quick to point out that, while the administration of business is certainly an interdisciplinary pursuit, business administration is a well-recognized field of study at both the undergraduate and graciuate Ie\rels. Why, he asks, has the study of military art and science lagged behind ? It i+ not, he asserts, that the profession is unique. Rather, it is that military erluc:ltlonal instigations have held a near monopoly over the military disciplineor orchestration uf di+cipiines-and that this cloisterization bus Inhibited its recognition and acceptance. Lack of understa,! ding and acceptance, he contends, is the only real difference between militi~ry studies nnd others. Indeed, there are many studies related tu military art and science which be can point out in graduate and undergraduate school catalogs throughout the land. l! Ho~vever, thus far, civilian institution+ have given little thought to the comprehensive and logical marshaling of these studies into coherent programs as is done in the service colleges. In pointing out tbe inadequacies of the civilian academic community in dealing with military studies, a Senior Lecturer in War Studies at Sandhurst wrote: . . . academic specialists on a,ar today, man~ of whom aye unable to tkink bewmd fheir original academic discipline, [are more limited by their baflcgrounds than are milita~v Oficers] wltetlle~ they are historians, economists, political scientists or sOciok@fs. J.
71

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE >. The.progressive argnes that a military-centered curriculum is every bit the intellectual equal of one focused upon smother profession and points to sach testimony as that provided hy the ACE with regard to the Army War College to battress his argament. Accordingly, he levies a demand for broader recognition and acceptance of undergraduate and graduate degrees in military art and science. The he-. stowal of a degree, he contends, is the normal and proper manner of recognizing academic accomplishment. It has no more inherent worth than a title or decoration; its value iies in its puh]ic acclamation of achievement. It is peculiar to the academic world but eujoys, oniversal acceptance. UnIike the general diploma, it signifies both the level of accomplishment and the area of spec]alty. It is not intended to have any particular transferability to other parsuits but does normally carry a sociaI value as a badge of intellectual achievement. Thus, the progressive argues, it is a fundamental error for an institution, such as the Army War College, to adhere to the practice of granting a parochial diploma in lieu of the more universal degree for essentially the same level and extent of academic pursnit. In one form or another, this point has been underscored by some of the Armys most gifted senior officers, including Geaeral Harold K. Johnson, former Chief of Staff, 14 and Rhodes General C. R. Bonesteel, Scholar and former Commander in Chief, LTnited Nations Command, Korea. 13 Finally, progressives argue, the concept of the advanced degree in military science is well-established elsewhere. One estimate of the number of Candidates of Military Science in ,the Soviet Union (roughly the equiva78

lent of the Ameri~an Ph. D.) runs into the hundreds. Beyond that, the Soviets award a Doctor of Military Science which signifies that the officer has defended a dissertation and is a recognized authority in his field. 1 auo Vadis? What is to be done in the face of the traditionalist and progressive cogent and germane as arguments, they both appear ? Both ostensibly support the fulfillment of the College objectives 17 while clashing over issues of emphasis and approach and, ultimately, of the form of recognition granted upon graduation. How, one may ask, has the institution managed to come this far with such internal contradictions if they are as they appear ? Some of the answer may lie in a baiance within the structure of the CoIIege itself. While certain departments may reflect a tendency toward one or the other of the primary philosophical views identified, other departments and components of the College tend to offset those views with regard to most practical issues, providing a nominal balance and stability if not always a harmony. The degree to which disharmony impacts upon the curriculum is a matter of continuing concern to the faculty but hardly constitutes a serious threat to the students learning profess. One question which does appear to lend itself to solution through analysis of its merits is that of the academic legitimacy of military studies and the propriety of the establishment of graduate degree programs at the College in the professional military field. The traditionalists say no; the progressives say yes. For as long as the issue has existed, the traditionalists have been preeminent. There Military Review

has been no serious consideration of an effort to secure academic recognition of the College beyond the type of assessment provided by the ACE. At Carlisle, there seems to be no place in the san for military art and science as a scholastic discipline. But one is styuck by the zero-sum game flavor of the traditionalist-progressive debate as it applies to this issue of academic degrees. The traditionalist view has not just prevailed, it has enjoyed exclusive control. The merits of the opposing points of view, as \ve have reviewed them, would not seem to justify in operation the absoklte supremacy of either view over the other. Tbe total exclusion of any sort of degree program \vithin the College, no matter ho~v selective it may he, or how structured, seems to be an unwarranted commitment to a point of view that may have no better chance of being correct than fifty-fifty. Some, however limited, program for recognition of academic achievement in the conventional mode, on the other hand, would seem to make senee, considering the probable locus of balance for the College between the two extremes. If this is true, how might such a program be structured, and wh;it would he the most important factors shaping it? Probably the most important factors we have identified in the foregoing discussion are these: The existence of analogous academic programs in other professional areas ( for example, business and public administration). A definition of military art and science. The existence of a selective Program for a masters degree in mihtary art and science at an institution below the senior service college level. Recognition by the American January 1977

Council on Educntion of the academic quality of instruction at the Army Wflr College. . The limits of a 10-month academic year. Consideration of these factors indicates that the Army War College should probably offer to certain students with high academic interest in

national security affairs opportunities to futtlli requirement for either graduate or undergraduate degrees while in residence, depending upon their particular backgrounds and previous educational achievements. lH Possession of a masters degree in military art and science, or in a related field, if the stadent also has credit for graduat ion from q mi Iitary staff college, should be a bawc prerequisite for entry into a doctoral program. Short of this, the student should be eligible for consideration for a masters program if he holds a vnlid baccnhtureate degree from an accredited institution. Those few who may be without degrees should be afforded the opportunity for completing requirements for one at the bachelors level if a compatible program can be developed, considering the students particular educational background. There is much truth and \visdom in the traditionalist argument, nnd it would protmbly be a mistake for the Army Way College to allow degree programs to become a central point of focus. That is not to say, however, that it should offer no such programs at all. Certainly, the 10-month limitation of the resident program indicates that few students could expect to complete both the necessary course work and the appropriate research and writing required for a gradaate de79

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE gree while in residence. While completion of course work and a substantial portion of the research for a thesis or dissertation may be a realistic objective, it would seem appropriate to permit the student the customary five years after completion of the course work to deliver an acceptable masters thesis and an indefinite period to complete a suitable dissertation. Considering the selective nature of the student body, It would seem likely that those few who do not hold degrees upon entry into the College wOuId be able to earn sufficient credits (as recognized by the American Council on Education) to graduate with ba~ca]aureltes. There are at present lively cooperative degree programs at the Army War ~ollege which afford students opportunities to earn masters degrees in public or business administration or communication at Shippensbucg State College or The Pennsylvania State University. The programs are designed to contribute to the fulfillment of important requirements in the Army for officers with advanced degrees in particular specialties. ~ They do not, howe~,er, encourage or recognize advanced scholarship in the core discipline of the military profession. They are a valuable adjunct to the basic Army War College resident course but in no way substitute for an advanced program in military art and science. Experience with the design and inauguration of the masters program at the Command and General Staff College indicates that the administrative road to full operation and accreditation of formal programs of study at an Army institution is a long and tedious one. Federal legislation is required as is full investigation and assessment by the appropriate associa80 tion of colleges aid secondary schools. For all. the arduousness of such an undertaking, the rewards show considerable promise of net benefit for the modest number of individuals who might choose to pursue it and, more Importantly, to the quality of the total educational experience of the whole student body. Over time, an important segment of the faculty at tbe Army W?r College would probably come to be composed of officers who had pursued the more thorough educational experience, upgrading their basic credentials and professional expertise. Also, the presence in the regular seminar discussions of students pursuing advanced research in the . core discipline of the profession would serve to further enrich the total learning environment. In a broader sense, the gradual ev&Iution of a group of serious scholars in the military field, perhaps witli specialties such LLS strategy, force de~,elOpment,, Or military management, would alter the intellectual landscape. It is very likely that, in time, these men would begin to make a contribution to a broad spectrum of intellectual pursuits related to tbe public sector. Today, many academic institutions are engaged in the study of topics related to national security affairs and to the multifaceted ramifications stemming from them. Research institutions with current programs in related areas are abundant throughout the country. Many of these institutions have considerable weight in the deliberation of issues affecting tbe expenditure of public resources and the execution of public policy. All too often, bowever, tbe conclusions and recommendations of studies produced by these institutions have been drawn without consideration of many of tbe factors which compriee tbe heart of MilitaryReview

the military scholastic discipline. The continued deprivation of the intellectual community of the contribution which advanced military scholars might make seems particularly u nwise from the points of view of both the military and the civil community. It would appear that some action is called for, both within the Army and outside, by the administration of the Army Way College, by educators \vith an interest in public affairs, by legis. 1Ma,o, G.n.,zl D.W,tt C.

lators and by members of the informed public, to bring about uppropri:tte authcwization for institution of intellectually rigorous degree programs at the Army War College. The public interest, as it depends upon the health of the intelleetu~l Llnderpinnings of the Army, would seem to de: mand it.

NOTES
Smith Jr B. on mtdrem to the 21,t Annutd NationiIl S,,., ,ty Smn,nar. US Army War COIICRC, C., 1,.Ic Un!m,c k., PA, 3 .JunQ 1976, 2 ArmY R.nulation 1&44, Om,owtwu and FwLctio>z8 U,tttcd SLatcs Ann IJ W., Collc O,, D.. Pmtm.. t of the Army, Wmnhmzton, DC, 18 SeDtmnber 1872. 8 M.Jo, Gme, study d,mct,, c, Affair. ( Colonel May 1973. nl 17rnnkkn M. Da,,. .1, ,. ,, to Lhc U,rc,,to,,t(, of A{ ,,d, m,,, NIV.. J. Baird) .IIprw imamly

rl!t?t< d SoYt cc. W.,,,, ,10,,,,,.! of t!,, a<,?,<d 1,,,1 >1>,1, for D.fc>,r< S0,(1,.., Dwernbe, 1976, P 27.

I:< Kmth

It

Sinn,.ou,

,, The

Pr<>f<,..mno!

St,,dY

3 l%, Office.r Pmmonel Mmaremmt SY+C!I! w.. in. t,tuted ,. the Army ,. 1972 The fnda. mental COC,IIL rmov,des for each officer to dtw,l,,n two cnrmr specu,ltwa ( for example, in fnntm 2.. <1 comptmllm.h, p) The Army mlucat,,,nl sy.t,.m ,. dest=ned to cnhanc, the om,cer,s knowl+e of his snceialtlw, in many .asw s.pnlmnmtcd wtth w.<l.. t. work don. at c,vthe.n in.titutiom. G The comnm overview at the Army War College K. department?: Nattonal ad Interne.tie.l Smrity Studies, Cmnmad and Man.sement ad 16ditmY and OPemtms. Strategy,

m..,d.d by three mhn.ry mstrcmn.1 Planmw

17 M,vnomvd,,m for fiecord V,., t W,tb GL.,,,,,L1 I?o,zot<.<.l o,, :8 J<,,,,t<,rt, ,J72, Odicc of the Corn. In.m!o.t, US Arnw war Cc+l. r., Cn.hsle ffmracks, PA, P !, 1d A. A. S],1,,, cko, Tho Ofl,,, s,c [A S.,,,, t l~wto), Tran.lat.d and mddt,hml ndcr the mlswces of the US AIr Force. Super: htcnd.nt of Dommmt., US G..ernment Pxttm!x Oak.. w.+ ,nizto, DC, 1070. D vi, 17 US Army War College oh,eet,ve, are stated wtth r.le.cmce to the rmhtmv prof.m. mn, t,, the ,tudcnt and to the stml ad fcky. S,. US ArtnY war Ccdlme Lettev, Sub>cct. ,, United Stmtcs Army War Colle!m Philo.cwhy nnd Ob>mtives,,, 14 July 1975, DD 6-7. 1 R H,uh,, t dqzre,, held hy the Army WaI. Cl. I.E. .1,., of 1976 were: d,,ctond G, law 2, master,, 89, Imchdor,. 127, o degree 6. 1$1E,ghty.seven members of the. Army W., College clam of 1!776 were mvlb?d in three PIoKram.. AdditmnnllY, one w.- cn.ollml m a wJoLleIntive Udorurnduotc m qzrmn.

7 NC-W DW,WUC8 z,, N.t,mml Stm<tmTV TILC P(znmfoc of l%,... Thomas Y. Cmwdf Co.. NY, Thonm. 1!375, and Nat,o,, nl Scm,r, tv and Y. Crmvell Co., NY, 1976.

17ctmtc,

S The faculty ( in.1.diz the Strc.tezic St.dlm Inmi+,te staff) is commxsed of 23 civdian~ and 64 nmhtary officer.. Of the civil,. ., e.DDroximatel~ S5 Lwrcet hold Ph.D. degr?es., Fiye h... held full pm feswmshin. .t other mstm.tms. n The Anmrim.n Council o Education recorn nmnded up to 24 graduate cted~ts for the common overview, two or three cre,d, ts for each elective course .snd up to six cred, t ho.m for rescmch paper.. 10 US Artq, Conmimrd wd Gmmml Staflp CollWC, 76-76 Catalom Fort Leavenworth, KS, P VI-1.

January 1977

81

Mil~tary Leadership in the Peoples Republic of China

Major Karl P. Piotrowski,

Umted States Army

fOrc@ of more th:m fnur milllou is a potent fiictor in the international b:dnnce of po~ver, There is
tMY

f urmtd ed~!uttt inn, demon stinted superior abil]ty as ground commanders md nnly rudimentary knowledge of sophisticated s t r n t e g i c ,~veaponry. St:lnding in the wvng-s is a cast of third :md f m rth-generat ion leaders who are more professional, mnre form;llly and technolngicnl]y trained and !vho possess a more international! strategic vielv. The military ]n China has main. tained a significant, thoog-h tloctnatil]g, power position in the overall scheme of Chinese politics. In the past 20 years, tbe m]litary has occllpierl, on the average, half of the key riecisionmaking positions in the political infrastructure fit the province level and above. Their influence ranged from a low of 45 percent in 1956 to a high of 74 percent in 1968 ~ and is cnmently believed to be at or near that peak. It is evident that PLA militnry leaders play an important Military Review

a definite need for a c[)ntirluing analysis of the cap~bilitie~ and limitations of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army ( PLA ). The recent resurgence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution has brmlght fvtth it significant shift> in top PLA leadership. These moves, coupled ~~ith the i]lcmasing We of present military Ietiders, point to a need to m-examine the entire spectrum of military leadership in the Peoples Republ!c ,,f China ( PRC }. The must distinguishing characteristic of current PLA leadership is their membership in the second military generation-the group who entered the Red Army from Jnne, 1928, through November, 1931.1 With an average age of 65, these ofticers coll@ive experience is one of limited 82

PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP role in the nolitical urocess of allocat ing the resources w:ithin the governmental
Recent

struture
Personality

of the
Changes

PRC.

Chnu Emlais death In J:mu~iry 1076 was the third death \vithin the ninemember St:mdlu!g Committee of the PRC Polit!mlro in the last year, Of the six rernaini]]g members, nut m(wc than t!vo #till are active in day-to-thy
pnliticill df:lirs. Two of the five Vice Chairmen wf the Chinese Commllnixt Party \CCP ), :ilsu hake dieti in the past year. As a res[llt,. the organiza-

tion chart of the PRC is unriergolng change brought on by the metamorphosis nf age as well ns internal st roggle. In December 1973, >1ma.lor shakeup of military region commands resulte(l in an important realignment of leariership wlthin the third find fourth military generations. Seven of the 11 powerful military region cnmm:~ndem \vere transferred to new posts. SIX of the qeven had been holding the top civili:m position in their regions concurrent }vith their military duties. In Aogust 1975, at the Ministry of Niltional Defense reception mmrking the 48th anniversary uf the PLA, there was e~,idence of a massive reinstatement to powfer of numerous former high-ranking military officers, many of whom had not been seen publicly for more than 20 years. These : shifts, when viewed in the context of the unexpected eclipse of the rising star of Teng Hsiao-ping, long acclaimed as Chou En-lais successor, attest to the volatility of tbe current state of military affairs in the PRC. The official line of the CCP con-

. Tht+ article w.. Mm,, death Editor.

written

prior

to

Ch. i, m..

Maj(>r I<ad P. Piatrowslti is a Cl/inese-lan{jwwe stwfenf at tile Drfm. w Lang]/agc Institute, .tfcmtcrrg, Calzfarnia. He received an A.B. in Economics frwm Ripen Crdlefte, an M.S. in International Relations front Indiana State Unirxrsitu and is a oraduat,e of the Armed Force.! Staff COliege. He has scrwd a%ifh the .ifh Armored Division in Germany, the US Militarw Assistance Cammand, Vietnam, and fhe 20tlt Engineev B~igade, Fo~t Bragg, No~tlt Carolina. He is a member of the Foreign Area Of)icers SpecialfU Prwgvam, 83

January 1977

PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP

>
This point of vi>, is counterbalanced by other articles which place greater stress on the purely technical aspects of the military profession. The following illustrates this counterpoint: Mean while-, a fine mill tar~ art is also one of the important facta~s for our arm~s fi~htino poaw. We must ?mderwland and rnastcr (:hairman Maos principles of strategy and tar. tics, Landle skillfully the weapuns in olt~ ha}zds, flc.rilrly ripply t,arimls tech niqz[rs, and be good ix bot]f offense and defense, in v?arc}lirzg and in fighting. ~ As in other armies of the world, It seems that Chinas younger military
leaders see u need tu mi][lernize their force, a move that is hampered by what they ~~r)nsiderto he tbe e.zcessive ammlnt of time and re,s[,urcw thot must be tiiverterl to purwly pulitical work. As a resu]t of the Kore:m experience

Maoist doctrine of the supremacy of man over weapons. It is, however, still quite evident that the historic Chinese characteristic of avoiding direct confrontation s t i 1I functions within the military, at least in the name of national unity. Civilian control of ths Military Early in his reign as the ruler of the PRC, Mao Tee-tang laid down the edict that, although political power grows out of tbe barrel of a gun, the gun must at all times remain firmly within the controlling grasp of the Communist party. Many China anulysts muint ain that the: . . . aneasg rclatiansl lip brtw~cn tlie Armu and tlte Pa~ty has rcs?i[ted in the PI.A suffering a series (If internal ,stres,scs and strains !rl!iclt wrist haue rrdaccd its effectiz,crzess and combat preparedness at various rritical peri,,t{s d//7 infl tlfe past twerrt~ vears. 7 A cyclic trend in tbe role of military ufficers as polltical f(lnctiunaries seems quite evident in PRC history. During times of increased ]nternal tension, military officers appear in key civilian politlcnl positions. As tension subsides, these officers are replaced by civilian appointees. This phenomenon hus heen ~,lewed by msn y Chins watchers as an indication (If the C(~Ps Continuing efforts to bring the military back under civilian control. a task that is still Ilnder umy and still not fully accomplished. In the aftermath of the Cultarul Revolution, the PLA W:W wt a zenith of politictd intiuence, iInd the cycle of removal of the military from civilian posts began. However, the recent rekindling of the revollition~iry flames offers the military at least a shortterm reprieve from the iisuol decllne in its political power. There is little cioubt that the PLA had come out Military Review

:Ind the debacle of the 1958 Great Leap Forward campaign. there has been a continuing t!uof old drive twvard regu. Iarization and morlernizatiun of the PLA. The periodic setbacks which have occurred :,. a result uf diversions uf PI.A efforts to ptirticipate in, and or si[ppress, the v~lrious pt,litlcul c,tmpaigns huve been a re:~l suuwe of frustration for many PLA otficers. I.imited saccess In the etfnrts to divorce military tra]ni]lg from political inclurtr ination lvas evident in early 1974. A ne~v emphosis on purely mihtary training wus proclaimed at the national level. In A1igust 1974, for the first time since 1964, a national martial arts mmpetitiun was held in China. It was reported that .Army commanders }velcomed a redistribution of emphasis bet~veen political indoctrination and military training. c Ostensibly, this was a triumph. of military professionalism over tbe pure 84

~ PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP

of the Cultural Revolution with unparalleled political power, both in the province< and at the center. ~)Before this power could be attenuated, internal stresses in the CCP appear to have dictated, a return to the themes of the Cultural Revnlutinn to direct mass attention elsewhere while an inner party balance is being struck. Thus, the military presently has a rare opportunity to consolidate the political power it was given by the party to bring under control the rrverzealous Red Gunrds and other rnnaway participants in the party-initiated mass movement. There is evidence that the older generation of PLA leadership eagerly sought such political opportunity. The younger, now rising military generations are more militarily professional in their outlook and do not seem to aspire to political power. It is argued that the younger generations of Chinese military leadership see a role for a modern military force in a hostile, unstable world environment which dictates that the cornerstone of a modern army is s professional [Iffiuer corps, whose members make the art of war their vowti on. 1
Military In on the Self-restraint view of the as contr~:
strikitlq

and relieve military command. ers. This power, coupled with the partys political ability tn control the allocating of the nations resources as well as its mantle of legitimacy derived from its role as the keeper of the sacred ideolngy, tends to mitigate ngninst the military making an open break with the party. The learlership of the PLA also: . does not, nat?{rall~j, form a cohesive political g?oup across the spectrf(m af issaes. 13~ its natl<re, it is mum of a special intcrwat grcmp than a paliticrd factian. . . it tends to be conserrat ice in outlfmk and to fauor stability, ardcr, and m ct hf,diral sala tif,ns t,, prwlJ/?ms. 1> aesign

partys :1 menns

heavy to

reliance malutam

PLA

population

is tl, c rrctefltancc by the coantYus most di.stirr~ufsltcd generals of sabartfirraticj?z ta local political leadership, altl{oa(lh mm rwiwcntal commanders m{(st know l[UIC much poa,er theg C<,f(ld .scizc aith the w}jif of gcapeshot. 1t The apparent reluctance of the military to exercise its power fully may be due to several factors. Among these is the partys acknowledged and often demonstrated authority to re-

Regional Warlordism Recurrent regiuntilism also enhances the abihty of the CCP central nnthorities to control the PLA. This tendency toward %arlordism is ns old it> recorded Chinese history. It Is quite natural for local military cum. manders to build their own mullntaintnp, as it IS termed in the current Chinese press. The u,mplex structure of personal Ioy:tlties devel,,pe(l g,]es far beyond the Ilnw of uuth~]rity depicted on the rek,i~, nul v(]mm:tnds orgunuatlun chart, This procesh is assisted Ivhen the e,xtreml ties of central party prrlitlcs force l(wal millt:try commanders to tlssame piditicnl func timw fur reasnns of psrty expetliency, A umque insight into the extent of th]s problem and its resalting itltern;il disruption wws provided in 1963 when
several captttred secret PLA direc\vritten in 1960-ijl, \vere retives, leased for public scrutiny. These drlcuments provided cuncrete evidence of secti(aml and factional strviggle for power, owing both to personal rivalries and palicy differences. l! The Wnhan Incident of Jaly-August 85

lanuary 1917

PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP 1967 further illustrated that warIordism does still exist in the PRC. In July 1967, Peking Wras forced to deploy four army divisions to suppress open defiance of party control by the Wuhan mi Iitary commander, Chen Tsai-tao. After x month of stand-off artillery duels and limited probes, negotmtions led to the capitulation of Chen and his relief from cnmmand, but not before the fallibility of absolute party control wxs revealed to the world. ~ More significantly, the incident, by not erupting into open warfare, served to demonstrate the PLAs capability to avoid damaging internal te~ts of mihtary power and pblice its INVnhouse. Since I!)(;7, there hxs been a COnwrted pitrty effilrt to weaken the imp~wt [If regional]>m on elite groupings within the PLA. A continuing progmm of transfers t,f rising young ofti~ers between military regions W>W initiated to reduce the localism of military region affiliation that so strongly ties the older military generations. It is believed that, if this p(,licy of personnel turbulence continues. A burea[lcrutic functional system of rival loytilties may replace the system based (m military regi{mh 1The Economic Challenge of Leadership Another aspect of the functioning of military leadership in the PRC that runs counter to the drive for grefiter professionalism is the continued use of the PLA in an economic stabilization role. Indications are that these assigned economic tasks conflict with military training priorities. The heavy commitment of troops to such nonmilitary missions m farming and construction projects is resented by the younger professional ofiicers who maintain that training in 86 the use of new weapuns with their complicated technology should be fuRtime duty. The use of the PLA as a ready labor force has created a serious challenge for PRC military leaders. As an example, Peking claims that the PLA 196th Division like other army units, is equipped not only with guns, but with sickles, hoes and tractors for agricultural production. 10 The div]sion is said to produce over 5.5 million kilograms of fresh vegetables yearly as well as tending to 2,800 pigs. To confuse fllrther the continuity of military dedication, officers at the regimental level and above are required to devote two months of their time each year to special duties. One month is spent in productive Iahor ot the company level as ranlsand-file soldiers, and, a second month eaeh year, these snme officers must work as manunl laborers to solidify their empathy with the proletariat.7 It is reported that those who participate in this program include corps, division and regimental commanders snd that (they learn modestly from the ordinary fighters. Tbe true extent of this participation is difficLl]t to judge, but, surely, even minimal participation must seriously disrupt a busy military officers schedule, as well as be severely ego bruising, It always has been the case that the common soldiers of the Peoples Liberation Army have had to devoie considerable time to raising a portion of their own food. 1: In the case of the 196th Division cited above, Peking boasts this division is able to supply nearly all the vegetables and part of the food grain and meat it needs by requiring that some companies devote most of their time to farming with the provision that they fulfill military training requirements. ~J HDW well Military Review

PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP

87

PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP

thk

t~aining can be accomplished is questionable when viewed in terms of the technical nature of modern warfare. The militwy felt the impact of the e c o n o m y most fully when strength reductions we~e ordered in 1974 and the military budget was reduced by at leaet 25 percent in what appeared to be a reaction to the spiraling coats of sophisticated weaponry. The PLA seems subject to the same economic constraints that control military spending in other nation-statee.
Conclusion It wouid seem that a new, generation of military leaders is emerging in the PRC, more professional and more international in their world view. These new leaders are Paced with the same type problems found in any modern military force, as well ae a set of problems unique to China. This younger generation of PLA leaders w,ill rise rapidly to power as the PRCS present aging party leadership fades from the scene. With the changing attitudee of the new generation, the schism between political dedication and m i 1i t a r y professionalism will widen. This state of affairs is neatly summarized by Kenneth R. Whiting, a noted PLA analyst: The new officer must have the abilit~ to supervise the use atid maintenance of such weapons as aircraft, antiaircraft guns, tanks, and artillery, and be skilled in the logistics demanded by the new tools. In short, he should be a trained professional with technical competence, not jxst a semiliterate enthusiast, kowever brave and determined. In this new accent on professionalism, however, la~ the seeds of a long and bitter conflict within the PLAthe conflict between ce# and expert, and one that is still going on today. *Z

resurgence of the CUlwill again weaken party control of. the military and offer an opportunity for the PLA to consolidate and expand ite political power base. An increase in CCP internal stress is likely to result. One outcome of this interaction may be a changed civil-military relationship. In a detailed study of this relationship, Profeesor Myung Cheng summarized the changing state of affairs as follows: Although the PLA may continue to play its participant role, it is verv unlikely that it will appear as a military oligarciz~ or take over the government and operate it directlg. ., . it mag not be too misleading to argue relations in that the civil-military China will undergo a change in the future. . . . tt is dificult, if not impossible, for the party to curb the gro?uth of military professionalism among the PLA officer corps. Despite the part~s effort to impose functionally difluse roles on the military, the PLA will continue to articulate its interests in order to emerge as a reliable autonomous profession. Professionalism will become a salient feature of the PLA with the technological advancement of modern warfare. Z2 The CCP has attempted to retard this emergence hy a series of musical chaira reassignments of regional mi]itary commanders. The outcome of this strategy is still not clear. However, TO eay that the command structure of the PLA ia in a state of flux is a masterpiece of understatement. 23 Many scholars feel that the military has been the most important factor in the shaping of modern Chinese history. It seems probable that the PRCS new ruling class will emerge from the third and fourth-generation military officers presently active in the regional military commande. Their more proThe recent
tural Revolution

88

military Review

..
PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP fessional military attitude and more . strategic world view bear careful watching by all of Chinas potential adversaries. It appears that: Tke Peking government is not offensive-minded, but even if U were, the Amn~ has neitker tile weapon~y no~ logistics sttpport to engage in large-scale operations be~ond its frontiers. 2$ In view of the changing outlook of the PRC military leadership, it would be dangerous to assume this condition will endure. The PRC has over 100
young men who, given dedicated, professional leadership, could be quickly mobilized to form a potent offensive force in spite of the initially limited industrial baee that presently exists in China proper to support the deployment of such a force. It is clear that the PLA has survived numerous p u r g es and various political campaigns, with attendant disruptions of the armys training programs, to emerge as a vinble force with a rising set of lwders who are dedicated, professional and potentially a!wressive. million

NOTES
1 Willittm W. Whitwm and HuanF, Chen.hski. T!,. C),,,,.,. Hz!, Command A H{, tow of Co,,,. m,,tti,t hf,t,:,ati, PoM;c8, 1S27- 71, Pr.Mgm Pub. Hshers, Inc., NY, 1978, D 662, 2 George C. S. Sung, A Dtormqd,,ccd A,,,,rmd, to Cht,mm Political Awdw,e. The Rand Corn . . . tmn, R.16G6 -AILPA, Santa Mom.., CA, October 1976, Ll 38. 3 Ltbmati.n AnnII Dad,,. A.Eust 1967, Quoted m Ks. Ymz-nmo, TAc Pcwvl&a Lzbcratzrm Arnw rtnd Cl, <ne% N.tmt&-Lfzuld,?,r,, lntcrnztm. s.l Arts & Sciences Prom, Inc., Wh,te Plains, NY. 1973, P 265. 4 Red F(w, D 366. 1 May 1972, uoted i Kr.u, o,,. cit., 10 ,PLA a, n Ptoduct,ve Form, -, P<k,,,n vzc w. 14 November 1076, UP 22-2-! 17 Ib, d,. p 2:1. /zemud Poht,c.d Control 1949 -1!764, Harvard MA, 1966. P 6. 11 G,,o<l, tIIdt, 12 Poirmr, 01, 01, mt ,,, tbc CA,,,,.. 0/.ficcr CO,,,.. Un, vew, ty P,.., Cnmbm<lKc. c,t., P 32,

D 64.

1:< J. Chmtcr Ch<,nx, ., fh.blmm of Cl,,.., COmm.. i+t Lmdersh!i, . . S... ,. the Smr<4 Military Pruxw,,, ,lmo,, Surt, <w,Juno 1!164, D 809 see 14 F., z more Actailml .cc<,unt of tbm ,ncidmt, Potrier, .), W.. D :34 nnd follmvins.

r, For a mom d.ta] led o.nn.lysis of thi. fm. tration, 8.. J. Chestar ChenE, .<The Dynamic. of tbe Chrome People<, L,beratmn Army: Remdm imtion and Revolutionizati.n, 1$49-59,. MIIItm I f?.vi.w. May 1974, 7.?-89. Leo Good, tadt. Place,,, Fe, Pc,,tcww ber 1014, D 31. 7 Gerard c.nwmnm Books, 1..,,

,, PuttinE l?cowmtc

lhe Army i. Its lh.icw, 29 Novem-

Pcl,,,zgR,,,,,,(.

1 R ,.Ol%c.?r8

Se! .C .s Rmnk.mnd. File Soldiers,,, 12 Scmwnber 1975, D 31.

CIL,,WW Red Arm LI H, Cor, , The mud Poictms Sm.. 1949. Schocken NY, 1974, m 141-42.

1!) Wmbcrfc Chai, T/tc S..,,/, for a Not,, CA, U. A C,,]>.m!c Htstoru OJ the Cl, i?)em Cmnrnt?z #et P.vfv, 1921-1973, G. P, Iutmn% Son., NY, 1976, D 165. 20 ,,PLA as n Pmdu?t, ,.!0. 01). at., P 28. :>1 Whiting, cm. ctt,, ve Force,,. 1+1<, >,n Rc-

s Kenneth LL Whit{s, TIM Chi,we Commu?wt Armed Forma, Air U.iyaity Doc.me.t. m. Re. ~6~h Study. Maxwell A,, Force Base, AL, 1974, n Job T. Pcdner. TIM R.!. OJ MJitq, LeaderShip i?t CA. cmnm.nis! Chinese Pohltc.1 Swtom. Air War Collfzfe Reserm.h Report Summary, M8xwell AI. Force Base, AL, Awl 1976, D 40.
10 Ellis JoRe, Partv .z,uJ A.mII Pr.fcmnt.wdiam

D 69. Party nnd Unlvms*tY

22 Myun!J Cheg, Army in China,,, of lIhnms, Urbana, 23 Wbitinx, 2* on.

.The Dynamics of Ph,D, Dismrtc.tie, IL. 1970. D 204. <Lt., P 74, 162,

co,,, .,>. cit., P

.
4

January 1977

89

w
Americas Revolution and Its Legacy

HAT caused the American Revolution ? A concise and

unimpeachable anawer is not easily foand in the years before 1775.

Perhaps Stephen Vincent Ben& touched on the essence of the conflict when he wrote: And tkose who came were resolved to be Englishmen. Gone to the Worlds end, but Englisk euerv one, and they ate tke a,kite covn kernels, parched in the sun and tlteu knew it not, but tkey-d not be Englisk agairt. Americas distance from England in space and time was quickly translated to distance in perception and understanding. New values in a frontier setting created a different attitude toward life and a fresh look at associations among people and relationships between government and governed. Such a direction of growth was encouraged from the beginning of English colonization hy the philosophy that supported that movement. From the first shipload of Englishmen that sailed for America to the last that arrived prior to 1775, the English systematically stocked the Colonies with dissenters from all aspects of English life. England used its 13 Colonies as a dumping ground for those who did not fit into society at home. It exiled those who had raised penetrating questions, the answers to which cOuld have served as the bases for progress. England was intellectually bankrupt because it had forced out the religious dissenters and second and third sons with no inheritance but unfulfilled dreams of land ownership and influence. Also forced out were Military Review

Major Lynn L. Sims, United Stetes Army Raserva

,.

90

.------ ..- ------... .. ..

those who were debtors. omhans.
prostitutes and criminals. These were gathered up by the sbiplond and carried to the dumping ground-

This Stamp Act, which seemed to have solidified American opposition, was repealed by England in 17GG,
thereby avoiding a collision but

America. For 175 years, this process continued and England survived, but did not change for there were few to challenge the system. By the 1769s, England had the opportunity to ask itself, Why wont these Englishmen in America take our directions any longer ? Perhaps a better question might haye been, Why have they taken directions for more than 160 years? This approach to colonization was qpposite to the philosophy that drove French, Spanish and Portuguese settlements. In those countries, to become a colonist, it was necessary to pass tests and take oaths of fidelity to the mother country. Only the most loyal could colonize. This was probably a better way. Spain began colonizing 100 years before the English, and its colonies remained faithful for 30 years after American independence. To describe these people who would no longer listen to England, several words spring to mind, such as headstrong, independent, dangerOLW and rebellious. Americans had, to the great surprise of the English and themselves, come to the place in their development where they were willing to stake their lives on the principle of being autonomous. At that pointperhaps in 1765 with the unified front presented to the Stamp Actthe revolution was complete. Men would die to decide the question when, not if, the fact would be recognized. January 1977

leaving Americans more united than before. The Towrnshend Duties were dropped; troops were sent to America, then withdmwn. For tbe first year of the fighting, British generals tried to fullow the impossible dual policy of conciliation as well as victory on the battlefield. When it became obvious that England was trying to subdue a continent not merely punish Boston, the English people wavered \vhile King George 1II stiffened and continued to follow m unsound policy, and thereby postponed the inevitable outcome for six years. During the fighting, most Americans persisted in their determination for self-direction. On the British side, actions were characterized by indecision which only confirmed ~vhat Americans had grown to believe about the English anyway-not fit to lead or follow The American Revolution was ti.eated erroneously by the government of the mother country nnd historians since as a war, rather than the rebellion it was. In a war, especially an 18th-Century war, the victor \tas one who could bring his opponent to a place where the losses were no longer commensumte with the issues at stake. If too many cities were destroyed, if too many men were killed, if too much territory was occnpied or if too much money was spent, a country would sue for peace and the war ended. But a revolution is for keeps. It is an ideological struggle that cannot be 91

AMERICAS REVOLUTION
defeated in the conventional sense because territory, money and even human lives are not the issues. Perhaps it can be suppressed for a time, but that is not like being defeated. For that reason, tbe outcome of the American Revolution never hung in the balance as some have tried to show by pointing to crucial events in tbe struggle. The British had an almost unbroken string of victories, and, when the Americans did gain an advantage, it was a single conquest usually on a small scale, England could have gone on for another six years winning battles and never have won the war because they faced a revolution, not a war.

more quickly tryirig to conquer 13 forces rather than just one ! No one state could say, Our army beat the British. Washingtons role was indispensable in that he kept a unified front that greatly facilitated establishment of a single government after the revolution. In that sense, the greatest contribution Washington made was keeping the states from fragmenting into many di~ections. Truly, he was the father uf the united countryor, as it has become known, the United States of America. The first yew of the rebellion, 1775, saw the most fanatical support by Americans. In that year, zealous patriots, on fire for the ret,oiution, invaded Canada to bring it to its senses as the 14th colony. Needless to SLLY, the camwaign was a failure. In that year, ardor waned and interest in exporting the revolution lost popularity. Since then, the United States has grown steadily a\vay from rei,oltltion until today it stnnds opposed to the practice. Why does the United States serve as the great object lesson of a people who went from radical revolu tlontwies to antirevolutionaries in one lifetime ? The radical nature of Americans in 1775 was tempered by tbe mild changes actually brought to life after independence, once revolution had served thqm and their needs. Americans never really made any fundamental changes in institutions or attitudes, and the fighting was a struggle for independence to practice what was already happening in America. The King was replaced by a President, the House of Lords and House of Commons were turned
Military Review

Even George Washingtons part In the action was not critical to independence. Many have shown that Washington was not the greatest tactician, blit, despite what can be snid against him, he did preserve the Continental Army, as a symbol of unity for Americans. The British were fighting n war of attrition with overlvhelming resources when compared to the Americans. Washingtons task was to endure, but, the longer the combat kwted, the more costly it became in terms of destruction and loss of life. This hanging on by Washington was evidenced by the fact that he fo~ ght no major battle from June 1778 0 the last battle at Yorkto\vn in Oc ber 1781. The American people i ecame tired of the conflict, but the English people became even more weary. If there had been no consolidated army under Washington fighting England, hut, rather, 13 state armies, independence still \vould have been won. In fact, England may have tired 92

AMERICAS REVOLUTION into the Senate and House of Representatives. The wealthy and well-positioned still ruled, and slavery was not touched as an institution. The rebellion did prodace a new base from which the United States had since developed, but in the development has turned its back on revolution as a means to an end or an end in itself. The United States horn in revolution, but not radical change, has cooled considerably to the very process that gave it life and a separate destiny. That may he, in part, the legacy of a successful rebellion, for the United States has had no interest in the success of revolutions since that time in other parts of the world or at home. In the case of the French Revolution, the strife was among countrymen. not as in the United States case, against a government across the ocean. The French broke violently with the past in the last decade of the 18th Century, and, m the process, excesses were committed that were wrong in the eyes of the Americans. It was too radical, and the United States neutrality wns a cool condemnation of the whole sordid blood bath, totally unnecessary in the American experience:. By the
Century, were beginning people in

Later in the 19th Century, Americans did find something useful about the revolutions in Texas and California all areas that found the culmination of their revolutionary process within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Ilowever, sympathy with North Americans was not the criteria for obtaining help from the United States. The American Civil War confirmed the hatred against the Souths right to revolt in order to farm a more tolerant government. Ry the 20th Century, commerce had influenced the United States value system and the realization that trade flourished best in iL setting of peace and tranquility not revolution and unrest. Under the guise of a prorevolutionary banner, the United States dld encoamge and speedily recognize the Panamanian rebellion from Colombia, not for the sake of Panamas self-determination but, rather, for the sake of Americun commerce \shich would move throagh the proposed WLUd. In 1911, Mexico went through a re~.olution without the United States interest being greatly aroused, and, six years later, the Russians did the same thing. One might expect the United States to ignore the RLlssiSn Revolution, but the Mexican Revolution was closer to home and different in nature from the Russian. Still, the United States was unsympathetic to botb revolutions. For 175 yeare after freedom; the responsibility of world revolutionary leadership was shunned by Americans and picked up by other nations. In recent times, the Cubans, 93

of the
Latin

19th

America

in the process of breaking away from their pother countries of France and Spain, not unlike what the United States had done a quartei-century earlier. Surely America would respond with sympathy and even material support. But no aid was forthcoming from the United States. It was not until 1823 that the United States became interested.

Jsnuary1977

AMERICAS REVOLUTION Peruvians, Chinese and a host of Af ricrrn countries have taken their turn in the headlines as the revolutionary leader. After using revolution to create self-government, Americans reverted quickly. to conaerwrtism w a means of orderly growth and development. American history has shown that, when a revohltiurr succeeds, it becomes conserwrtive. The American Revolutimr was so successful arrd so mild thzt the vaccination turned America to nltraconservatisrn in a generation. It hua only been since World War 11 that the nature of the Americnn Revolution hns taken a radical turn as the changing position of tbe blacks and women in America indicate. What generalizations can we glean from nll of this? Orre of historys uses is that it should be able to serve as an iqdicator for the future, How can we understand American attitudes to the world revolutionary movement in light of its past? The world through the 19th and 20th Centuries seldom noticed that America was a paper dragon espoosing the right of self-determination but not willing to become in~,olved in the revolutionary process necessary for self-determination. It actually feared the process and had no empathy with the men in revolt because America never went through n radical change that seems to have been necessary in all subsequent revolutions. Has America, like its mother country 200 years ago, maintained an archaic policy that is only recently receiving a closer lorrk?

f-, \ -.

Majo~ Lynn L. Sims, US ArmO Reserve, is tire L.recutitw Director of tke Rfch?nond Independence Bicentennial Commission in Virginia and u ?nernbe~ of the Consulting FaccrltU, USACGSC. His mobilization aseigrrment is with tke Historical Division, US Army Training and Doctrine Conrmand. He received a B.A. from Wkcaton College a?rd an M.A. and Ph.D. from New York University. He omsPrOfessO~Qf
History at TkeKin# sCollegeandtlle US Military Historian at tke USA-

-f

CGSC. His Bicerrtcnn<al Featcr~e Crime Does M Pay appeared in the January 19Y6 MILITARY REVIEW.

94

Militsry RevieN

. ,,

, ~

ARTICLES

OF INTEREST

,m
Espionage By Dr. Friedrich.Wilhelm Schlomann ASMZ, July-August and September 1976 (Switzerland)
c Commtmicating network. Following the Soviet example, there is a military intelligence service called the Administration for Coordination. Division A is in charge of defense ministries, the ~undestuekr, allied troops, zone bor. ders, the FRG border patrol, military supply installations and allied and FRG au forces. DiYision C is directed against NATO troops and facilities, Division T has three groups dkected against chemical and armament industries. Other agencies include part of the Institute for Politics and Economics responsible to the German Democratic Republic Cabinet and some Soviet intelligence agencies such as the well. known KGB (Committee of State Security). The typical East Berlin spy is well-educated, very self. confi. well-equipped, dent, ideologically engrossed with no loyalties to West Germany and highly esteemed politically in the East. Recruiting new military contacts in the West takes various forms some times money, blackmail and other types of threats, pressure and coersion. Other methods include approaching those in the West who agree, at least in part, politi. cafly with Eastern ideology and radical left students. Sometimes, the new contacts do not know they are engaging in espionage just answering a few qtfestions for a survey conducted by a nonexistent research center supposedly based in a friendly country. There are various types of agents such within the agent

Since 1948. in Switzerland. there have

been 120 known cases of espionage involving 200 people, This article cites methods and examples of Eastern esPionage not because only the E.ist conducts such activities, but because Lt has probably the most extensive network of agents. The Ministry of National Security in Be,-lirt. Lichtebt.rg overs the Federal Re. public of Germany (FRG) and other Western European countries. This agency has 1,500 officers and noncommissioned officers and 1,600 civdians. Lieutenant General Markus Wolf heads the more than 500 members of this agency who specifically conduct espionage against the FRG. The eight subdivisions of his group work in the following areas: . Against the FRG Government and ministries. . Against parties and organizations. .Against Western embassies and to NATO policies. Against NATO armed forces and military bases in the FRG. . Against science and technology. For gaining access for agents into the FRG. Evaluating.

dkrupt

34

Military Review

..
as the prospective agent prepared years in advance for his mission, the influential
agent planted high in the structure or the East.West gOvcrnment truck-driver

ARTICLES OF INTEREST
Guerrillas bec~me strong enough to attack army garrisons, finally establishing a base in the northern province of Tucumin as the Peoples Revolutionwy Army. Urban guerrilla activity arose from left-wing Pcronist youths, the Montotieros. In

agent assigned tO certain pickup pOints transferring information to and fro, The Eastern bloc countries pay all their spies, whether they are pressured into service or ideologically agreeable. This gets them accustomed to the financial rewards. The Wests best protection rcqlains alert awareness of the potcntids. The hope for the genuine d(tente wc all seek must not duU our defense readiness either militarily or politically.

1975. there were 1,000 political

nations, the equivalent

assassiof a decentralized

civil WJI. The army waited, putting dOwn One revolt in the air force, tintil the time was .ippropriate and then took over the government in March 1976, suspending party and union Activities. The new President, GcIIcrai Vidcla, has the reputation of being a liberal. He faces two big problems: The economic austerity measures that must bc taken are certain to make the workers restive; ehminating the guerrill~s will require re. pressive measures, and military tribunals will be ,used. With both guerrillas and right-wing extremists doi~g the shooting, the violent death rate has risen co 100 a month. The 6uerriUas have mdde contact with revolutionary groups in Chile, Uru. guay and Bolivia. The Cuban succcss in Angola has given them hope. The double problem of leftist guer. rillas and economic chaos (inflation at one percent a day) is forcing Argentina toward the eventuality of asking for US aid. From both ends of the political spectrum, many now realize that the Argentina of this generation cannot be governed without the labor unions or the hrmy; the two are condemned to work together.

(7ke author is an editor with the German radio network Deutsche WeUe. )

Time for the Military in Argentina: End of the Illusions By Alain Rouqu16 D#fense /Vatior?a/e,July 1976 (France)
Translated and condensed by COL John W. Price, USAR The military ruled Argentina from 1966 until Aprif 1973 when the govern. ment was ousted and the charismatic Peron returned, When he died in July 1974, his widow tried to carry on with the aid of Rasputin-like Lopez Rega. He established a police state and conducted mass arrests and assassinations of leftists. The Peronists then split, with some going underground. The country moved rapidly toward political and economic chaos.

.
These synopses ace published as a service to the readers, Every effort is made to ensure accurate translatmn and summarization. However, for more derailed accounts, readers should re. fer to the original articles. No official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements !

in these items is intended or shmddbe inferced.-?%eEditor. L Y- ary 1977 Jan

I 35 ...

IS America Decadent?, Peter L. Berger, There has been a marked decline in the esteem in which capitalism is held by the American people, or at least by large segments of the Iatter, andwidcspread anta onismto the businessman and all he represents. Yet nearly all Americans bene PIt from this economic systcm every day. Berger says a regeneration of the beliefs and values upon which our society was buift is still possible but not through Government fiat.. hfilituryCh~pkins Review, Summer 1976.

Roland

Meets the Challenge, Robert L. Roderick. Selection of a forcigndmigncd weapons system for deployment with the US battlefield forces has made the Rokmd an object of much discussion in the American defense communit However, it is simple in design, quality-engineered and uniquely capable o ? doing the job. Roderick (who incidentally is the project manager of the R&mdmissile program) thinks we definitely made the right choice in opting tousethe German airdefense system. -N7utional De~ense, July-August 1976.

China, AsianSecuritya

ndt heSoviet

Factor,

Joseph Schiebcl, The reduction

on the and the terms, future existing Council

of US political relationships with the Republic of China is dcfcndcd grounds that it may besafely considered since American military power ability to project it into the area wifl remain constant. In purely technical this may be true, but are we prepared to substitute mifitary force forthc prevention of national confrontations so effectively checked now by political relationships? China-~e 7zuning Point, aMonologue by the on American Affairs, 1976,

Whos First in Defense, the United States or Russia? In a round-table discussion, aired on CBS television 3 June 1976, four defense policy experts
assess our countrys military strength in comparison with the USSR. Former Defense Secretary Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze and Senators McIntyre and Mathias all agree that, despite a vast difference in size of forces, the United States stiJl cannot be considered as number two. Each, ofcourse, has his own motivations for the judgment. -American Enterprise Institute P~mpMet,

1976.

Has the Middle East Conflict Overturned the Superpower Balance?, Bernard Schechterman. The authot says that the erosion and collapse of American
credibihty may well be attributed to many foreign policy i}sues that the Secretary of State has maria eddurin hk term inofflce. Theoverridhg factor, however, is attributed to t R: e Unite States handJing of the Israeli clientele relationship inthe Middle East. Middle East Revietu, Spring/Summer 1976.

Jenuary 1977

95

MILITARY NOTES

UNITED STATES

XV15 f+ESEARCH

AIRCRAFT

Bell aircraft The planes

Helicopter

Textron,

working Flight

under

a joint Center the

contract has rolled in Taxas.

with The

the US Army first hover

and the National tilt-rotor flight research is scheduled

Aeronautics

and Space Administration

(NASA),

out the first XV75

et she Arlington tilt-rotor for

Research to combine transportation.

earl y this year. is expected best features to civilian be Ah conducted Mobility of helicopters will over and military the Research and conventional initially years to by Labfast point-to-point the application and Research at Moffett operational Center Field, Two will of tha aircraft be producad missions. next few and Development

investigate Technical NASA/Ames oratories

of tilt-rotor

technology

research

and the US Army

California,

The

Ml LITARY

REVIEW Items

and the U.S. are printad

Army

Command contained

and General

Staff

College NOTES andorsem

assume sec on nt of (

no responsibility of this publication. the views,

for accuracy or factual

of information statamants

in the Ml LITARY No official Editor.

as a service to the readers. is intended.-The

opinions,

96

Military Reviaw

..
ARMY TO BUY COMMERCIAL
In granting $347.9.miOion tacticel uete a Army %-ton and recommended the Army Fi.stal support the %-ton over 90 percent Year 1977 request Congrass program million for vehicles, truck of its for has evalto find The 5,212 by $3 million, mercial reduced also may K-ton million Army, @1976.

NOTES Wlt VEHICLES

saying units amount. apply to buy received vehicles. that could The to future The 1,686 the sama ba number of corm with the directive $14.4 the

procured Marina

Congressional Marinas 14151A2s requestad but,

service

expeditiously

Corps buys of unlike

ita M151A2 had trucks,

commercial substitute for the vehicle.

requested $43.1 hut Congress cut the figure

full funding.-DrtfS

/nte//igerrce,

XM204

SOFT

RECOI

L:

HOWITZER

The

XM204

is a helicopter.transportable recoil firing system stability to than forward bettar differs

105mm provida from under

towed greatar

howitzer. range, howitzers

This waapon improved now

employs and The in to the

a soft howitzer that rear. Programad XM204 capabla externally The

recoil-type

reliability in the fiald. weapons

significantly

comparable

substantially

in appearance

conventional

recoil artillery

it has a single trail

extending

the tuba and no trails extending

to replace will of and baing

the World to

War battery.

I I-vintaga artillery Weighing in the

M707A / and the M102

whose 4657 or Iargar organization pounds, Air only

howitzers, contains XM204 aircraft tha

the a is and

ba organic

a field

battalion C723

headquarters

headquarters transposed

internally

Force

by mediurmlift firas supar

helicopters. standard charge. in currant 105mm charge, ammunition designated in addition XM200, to a new single provides increased

XM204

all current propelling be fired

incremant,

This fialded

renge and cannot Ianuary 1977

howitzera. 97

Nlt NOTES MULTIPURPOSE WATER PURIFICATION UNIT

-7.

This 600.gallon.per-hour military Command. A dry membrane water purification development

reverse units.

osmosis The

unit will replace Equipment

four previously

used

purifiar

is the smallest Research

in a serias under and Davelopmant

by the US Army

Mobdlty

element

is the

heart in reverse potable when

of

the osmosis

unit

and

represents technology.

an

advancement Tha system

in the state.of.the-art is capable certain of producing

membrana pollutad

water

from

fresh water It can

and sea water avan ramove

and of removing

chemical

and radiological aided with

contaminant. postchlorination. .

viruses and bacteria

JAPAN
SPECIFICS Japan zation ativa for . when Michita Agancy. The 9s mission of tha subcommittee is to for body, Dafanse former Sakata, OF DEFENSE States REACTION heve agread on organiof consult. proposed James in tha event The was naw first STUOIED conduct tion, taken studies and consultations of USJapan for actions concerning coopen+ to be by Japans in the event heve their attack Joint had no coordiupon Security

and the United dafanse attack

the establishment an armad

of a joint on Japan.

consultative

tha scope and modalities including to ensure guidelines coordinated Forces and the

cooperation

measures

to be known Cooperation, US

as the Subcommittaa Secratary

Self-Defense Japan previous Japan Treaty

and US forces United to States study

of an amergancy.
arrangements Article

Defense

%chlasinger

visitad

Japan last year for talks with Ganeral of tha Defense

Director

nated actions althmsgh

in the event of armad 50fthe

calls for them.l~pan

/?epoti.
Military Review

NOTES Wlt
NORWAY
COAST GUARD SERVICE PLANNED the huge under has papar. armed futura forlongranga sion white about An patrol million) have The new service with will patrol ba boats aquipped and with helicopter.carrying sized helicopters medium. report paper initial boats on surveillance, which makas Unlike thacommis. howavw, tha

A new coast guard sarvica to patrol offshore Norwegian baan Raplacing aarvica, forces. aea araas expected in tha to jurisdiction the itwillbe axisung organized near

come white

it builds,

no detailed program 735

recommendation of saven kronar new ($134

proposad

in a government fishwias

tha final size of the service. building costing million

surveillance

aspartoftha

istentatively notyatbeen untlltha fisheries

auggeated, designed, early

but, sinca they vessels will Until then, by

these 1980s.

not be ready axisting hirad civilian

surveillance

vessels backed

L7riorr.type

naval aircraft

craft will be used,

POLAND

Tha for

Polmh

Militar

yTechnological gunners. loss common betwean The

institute helmat in artillary

for Armament is designed craw mambers.

hasdweloped

anew

helmat noise and

usa by artillaty the hearing

spacificaliy

tosuppress

raduce

Communication an interior system circulation in addition the halmet tiles. AFSTC January 1977 is affective

tha gun crew composed up to 30 temparaturas considerable ballistic

and battary of miniature maters. within sound

commander earphones

is achieved ensure

by maans of The air adequate

electronic

system at ranges

and microphones.

Ventilation tha halmet.

dwices

and comfortable to providing also provides naws item.

attenuation from

and effective artillery

communication, and projec.

protection

fragmants

99

NOTES
sWEDEN
CROSS-COUNTRY HYORAULIC VEHICLE

.,
.

The

Swedish

National vehicle gasoline run

Defense by engine

Research hydraulics. drives steering

Institute The

hasdeveloped vehicle pumps. motors,

a prototype with pumps a These

crosscountW 65-horsepowr supply powers to

is powered

which

twohydraulic hydraulic allows backing obvious per

oil, under

pressure,

to a series of four Hydraulic thus facditating to provide 50

each of which center difficult to allow of graui~ terrain wheel drive is ,

one of !he wheels. as desired, If desired,

the vehicles and making onto either its belly two tactical hour.

be shifted

manuevers. The and has uncertain.

the vehicle situations, speed of X-Mouse,

can be lowered operateson kilometers

change and, in military prototype, a top -Swedish road

advantages. or foucwheel Series production

dubbed

information

Sewice.

FEDERAL

REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GRADUATES
This from system

ENTER
I

CAREER
cadets to

PHASE
graduate academy The Hoch. in same academic iancsdlegesin four. of military 9495.) The officer opportunities three overall training training. years program (See as equivalent instead forthis 15 Jun dffl, civil.

summer, the first

West Germanys were promoted

new with

service troops.

of the usual new system months 1974, of PP

to the rank of lieutenant established prowdethe

and bagantheirsarvice Munich isnd tfamburgin

includes

schulen der Bundeswehr were

1973to

-Bundeswehr Aktuell.

100

MOitary

Review

NOTES Wlt
ISRAEL
NEW 155MM SELF-PROPELLED

GUN
for Israels stages. Feahas a range of 23.5 kilometers, compared with the Sherman L33? 20.5 kilometers. For simplified logistics, internal brdlistms of the L39 are identical to the US self-propelled M1L79A 1. The gun fires all NATO standard 155mm ammunition and carries 34 rounds in the turret. Total shell capacwy is approximately 60. The turret appears unusually roomy despite stow age. Thare ara two large side doors and three a of roof openings, as well as a cupola armed with a .50-caliber machinegun for air defense. Ammunition is loaded through a door next driver or through two small side ports hull. T!re nuclear, @1976. biological or chemical to the in the

A new self-propelled mount 155inm gun is now in prototype

turing a turret with all.round traverse that is suitable for almost any tank of 40 tons or over, the prototype represents mounted a great 155mm improvement gun which over the previous

was based on the frontal traverse. Designated modern M72

Sherman and has a limited

and

designed system

to provide

self-propelled

at a fraction

the cost of a purpose.built uses an adapted Centurion

umt, the prototype hull although the

turret is said to be equally suitable for the M47, rl148 and M60. The gun is the newly developed L39 which

M72 can be sealed in the event of a

attack .+lrmor

JOROAN
US ITJAWK Jordan, PURCHASED which had approached the Soviet

Union for new missiles because the US price tag was too high, has announced it will buy 14 batteries of HA W the United States. estimated tha at $514 antiaircraft missiles from Cost of the pachage is million. said Arabia

which had worked out details with the US Government. Earlier this year, Jordans King Hussein had balked at the price for the 14 batteries of. surface-to-air a homing missiles system which are equipped them altltudes with down enabling to zero in on

The brief. government announcement deal would be financed by Saudi

aircraft flying at no:mal to treetop level.

combat

REPUBLIC

OF KOREA

DEFENSE
The record The the increase increased north, the South $2,030 total over

SPENDING
Korean million the $1,500 with

WILL

RISE 30 PERCENT
will for seek a defense. for US.manufactured ware 1977. included Northrop Sikorsky proved Donnell addition, ordered Plerrrred the F5 HH3 defense between McDonnell fighters, 24 acquisitions equipment Fiscal Years Oouglas Rockwell three during and hard. 1975 this F4 and and 10 imMcIn Colt period

Government next more year than million forces their acquisition has

rapresants military weapons defense of

a 30-percent allocated enemy Facing to, the and to program, forced

countrys major Republic

in 1976.

0V70 reaircraft,

tensions

connaissancelnight

observation helicopters, missile battalions,

programs been

Raytheon 120

a new five-year submit Much defense January

modernization budget contained the

HAWK
Douglas

Korea dafense money

Harpoon missiles,360 Hughes

radar systems. to upgrade ebout 510,000 intends almost

the largest of the budget 1977

in its history. in tha 1977 for

TOW missiles and five mobile

the country 250 M16 tanks and co.produce

will

help

country

pay

riflas.DMS

Irrtelligance, @1976. 101

s11 John I.ortescue \\:ts Ii brurian at {Ielayed due to the difficulties in obWlndsor Castle frum lflOL to 1!)26. He taining a competent cartographer to !,,.k~an hl.s hihtory for publication by com])lete the maps. These latter volIl:t<mill;m of Lcnrdon as a one-volume es \rere not printed until 1920. pr,lject, subsequently expanded t The history itself bas been written four, These volumes only brottght th cle:trly, concisely and with an interest history La 1802, and, in hl. o~~n \vords, that is often lacking in this subject. < bc ci,akl not leave the Pe]linsukr and %he authors descriptions cover the p rids from tbe Corlquest of the Norfluterltx> unf[}t!~ht-nor could he leave the campaign in the (rime;{ unm as after H:wolds defeat at Has\vr]tten, Thus, he completed the work ti \ gs through 1rnnside Cromwells during 30 years <If his life from the victory at Illarstun Moor and the esend of the last century to 1920 when b~blishing of the New Model A~my. the final volumes N ere printed. He cnntinues with tbe Duke of Wellingtons battles with and final victory SIr Juhn said that his intention was over ,Napoleon to 1870 when the Crito compress the first GOOyears of the military tristo~y uf I?ngkmd from the mean War was over and the Charge of Battle of Hastings to the Battle of the Light Brigade already legend. Throughout the work, Sir John has Naseby. He achieved this admirably, shown a great understanding of the and then went on to complete his task and bring the history up-to-date. His British soldier and his officers. His aswork was interrupted by World War sessment of battles, his diary of events I, and, in particular, the printing of and his tactical appreciation are all Volumes IX and X dealing with the the more remarkable for a chronicler who himself never served in the army. Peninsula War and ending with Wellingtons victory at Waterloo was He confirms again Cromwells cre102 ,

MilitaryReview

,,
. .. . . .. .

,:.
.

,1

,, ,.

,, .:,

~..i

.
bined efforts of the army, navy and civil services had brought the English hmguage, administration :md commercial ways to strategic parts of Asia, Africa and the Pacific. At one time or nnother, the British had controlled areas as vast :is North America and China, all the while maintaining a balance of power in EUrope. Although the Anglo tide has ebbed, its cultural presence is still felt, and the bravery of British troops is very much within living memory. In short, the study of world history in the 18th, l!lth and part of the 20th Centuries must deal with the British Empire. Fortunately for many, the AMS Press h+w now republished this valuable work. The price for the complete works may be considered high, and individual volumes may be purchased, but this record of history is so wellwritten that it most remain available on library shelves. COL JOHN S. FOWLES, B?itiah Liaison OflceY, USACGSC

ation, though not in fact, of the NeN Model Army by discipline and regimental pride, Marlboroaghs genius in administration and Welhngtons clarity of mind and swiftness of decision. &rot all will agree with everything he says, and perhaps he was deliberately provocati},e, choosing to stimulate his readers with thoaghts and comments that would create discussion. His description of the American militiamen in 1813 may not be taken kindly, bat this does not affect his description of the battlee, and his political comments are, in fairness, matters of opinion and not fact. Today, no stadent of European civilization can afford to ignore British military history for two very practical reasons. Firat and most obvious is the British presence, by invitation or intrusion, in every part of the globe. BY the beginning of World War I, an often repeated boast was literal fact: The sun never set on the Union Jack. For more than two centuries, the comJanuary1977

103

t41t BOOKS THE ART OF WARFARE IN THEAGE,OF MARLBOR. OUCHby Oavid Chandler, 317 Pages Hippocrene Books.1976 $1750. Biographies and operational histories, helpful as they are, hardly tell the whole story of soldiering. Real understanding of the accomplishments and ideas of earlier soldiers requires an appreciation of the fundamental circumstances which shaped and limited their work. David Chandlers new book, TAe Art of Warfare in the Age of McsrlborougA, lays out the social, technical and organizational background of a very difficult period of military history quite impressively. Chandler, already known for his study of Mar] boroughs generalship, now presents a wider examination of the military art at its basic levels in

tury armies. but also relates how the foo~ soldier tried to preserve his bright uniform in the field and where the cavalryman learned to aim his saber stroke, All told, The Art of Warfare in tAe Age of Mariborougb effectively and thoroughly covers its subject. Best as an authoritative reference to augment tactical studies of the period, it is far more than a dry catalog of facts. It corrects a lot of misconceptions about the days of shoulder-to-shoulder fighting and thereby clarifies the professional lessons of the past. MAJ L. D. HOLDER JR., L7SACGSC
CUSTER IN 76: Walter Camps Notsa on the Custer Fight. Brrgham Edited by Kenneth Hammer. Press 303 Pages, Young University 1976.$10.95.

the technically dynamic, strategically inconclusive years from 1688 to 1745. His new book gets inside the deceptively neat unit symbols of the textbooks to reveal the complex workings of the military bodies of that time. He discusses cavalry, infantry, artillery and engineer matters separately and does not limit himself to the British Army by any means. Instead, Chandler comments on the men, units, battle drill and equipment of all the major European forces, and, although he does not speculate on developments beyond his chosen period, he never strays from the significant issues. He provides the kind of background information that makes the readers own generalizations and comparisons more accurate. Careful research supports the book, but Chandlers skillful blending of lively anecdotes and pertinent con- temporary views with the cold facts sustains his narrative on an enjoyable level. He not only explains the details of training and deploying 18th-Cen104

Obscured in this year of national celebration is the fact that 1976 marks the centennial of Custers defeat at Little Big Horn. The circumstances of that battle long have been the subject of speculation and controversy. Part of the trouble was the personalities of two of the major figures-Custer and Reno. Also, there was a lack of eyewitnesses. With the-exception of Curley, the Crow scout, two messengers sent back before the battle, and Captain Keoughs horse, Comanche, there were no survivors from Custers force. Like nature, such historical situations abhor vacaums, and historians and buffs alike have spent the last 100 years filling this particular gap. One of the most ardent Little Big Horn aficionados was Walter Mason Camp who, before his death in 1925, made nine visits to the battlefield and interviewed more than 60 survivors of Major Renos command and 150 Indian participants. Unfortunately, as is so often the case, Camp never got around to writing his book. Another Custer MilitaryReview

authority, Kenneth Hammer, has published Camps interview notes along with other Camp material, inclilding 7th Cavalry muster rolls und lists of various categories of Indians involved in the battle. Camps interviews must have been effective indeed. He questioned and cross-examined intensively. Curley, with whom he talked three times, said he was the most painstaking man who had ever interviewed him. As a result, these notes go a long way in answering detailed questions about the battle. The book closes with General Terrys instructions to Custer on 26 June. Much of the controversy hinges on the question of whether or not the impetuoue Custer disobeyed the orders of his superior. Camp thinks that he did notneither the letter nor the spirit. What Custer did do was divide his command into three parts and engage in battle with a faulty plan based upon fragmentary and faulty intelligence. That was enough. BaOOKS E. KLEBER, US Awn~ Truining and Doctrine Command

DROP ZONE NORMANDY: can and Sritiah by Napier 1976.$12.50. Airborne Crookenden.

The Story Aasardt 304

of the Ameri. on D Day 1944 Scribrrers.

Pages.

amphibious force and to contain the enemy until the bridgehead had been established. L)escriptlone of operations at all levels are based upon personal uccounts from the survivors, maps of the battles, photographs and the authors own experience as a participant in the campaign. This, combined with n valuable bibliography, makes the reader feel as if he were there from the beginning. However (and the author himself admits it ), coverage of the German side nf the battle was inadequate. The authors style is clear and direct although the personal accounts of the participants occasionally make the reading a little tiresome, especially when the reader is not inclined to foilow the operation closely. Although some words and abbreviations are difficult for the civilian reader to understand, there is a glossary at the end of the book which provides some explanations. The books most salient feature, however, is the ease with which General Cronkenden has captured the airborne spirit and locked it into print. I heartily recommend thie fine book to legs and paratroopers alike. LTC GIiRALDO P. ALMEIDA FILHO, Brmiliarr Arw?y
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANO NATO: Analytical Prepared by Harry 546 Pages. 1975.$8,65. Survey Mos.

Lieutenant G e n e r a I Sir Napier Crookenden has written a fitting tribute to the tough and highly disciplined paratroopers of World War II. The author describee, in great de-., tail, the history of the American (82d and 10lst) and FJritieh (6th) airborne divisions from their buildup in 1041 until their final battle at B6nouville, France, in June 1944. Their mission was to secure the vital flanks of the landing area at Normandy ahead the massive Allied January19i7

of Literature, ment Printing

June 1975. Office,

kowitzand Jack Roberts.

US Govern.

Thie analytical survey of NATO Literature is not meant for the average military reader, but it will provide the ideal starting point for the student or the researcher interested in the issues and problems confronting the Alliance. The book divides NATO into eight subject areas; for example, integrated structure, defense posture,
106

weapons and technology and so forth. Each of these is then divided and subdivided until the entire military spectrum of NATO has been covered. The authors have selected 800 extracts from several thousand periodical articles, books, studies and documents held by the Army library. These are arrangdd according to subject, and each identifies its source. For each NATO country, there is an appendix which provides details Of tbe armed forces, one which gives background information on the geography, economy and politics and one which provides information on the strength of the Communiet party. Although not a book that tbe average military reader will want to include in his collection, it is a must for all military libraries. LTC D. G. HANSON, Canadian Liaison Oficer, USACGSC
MEMOS OF A WEST POINT CAOET: The Inside Story That You May Not Want to Believe by Jaime Mardis. 261 Pages Dawd McKay 1976 $895.

Here is a collection of memos, a montage of experiences which will be interpreted more by the readers personal inclinations than by any single element the young author puts in his book. Jaime Mardis entered the US Military Academy in 1969 and left after his first year, largely because of and the tin soldier degradation humiliation of the fourth-class system. Now comes the readers reaction, probably one of two basic types: good riddance to the bozo, or why? Those who opt to question the authors motives for resigning from the corps will enjoy tbe books entertaining, anecdotal attempt to describe a unique experience. It is this second group of readers that will delight in Mardis comic timing and his abitity
106 ,

to cauture the types that can be found- in any militaryor academic or corporat+structure. We are all familiar with bootlicking junior officers, with college instructors unsure of themselves or their subjects or with a very special kind of nit-picking: three demerits for pubic hair on soap. If the reader chooses to see these too familiar realities through the impressionable eyes of a plebe, only the most strait-laced can fail to laugh. The dialogue of the characters combines street talk of the late Sixties with military clich& and a good measure of Holden Caulfield tough-guy talk inherited from ZlZe CritcAer in the Rye. Descriptions of formal hops, of trips to wicked New York City, of walking punishment tours and all the associated memories and miseries that are West Point will find the old grads nodding in pleasant reminiscence. But, ring-knockers, relax. The corps is still there, still strong, still keeping the best. And, in light of the very serious cheating scandals of late, even alumni of the Long Gray Line can be gratefully refreshed by a worthy book which pokes more fun at the author than at the inetitutirm.
PHILIP W. LEON, Department
VOICES

of English,
WAR

The Citadel
Richard Wheeler.

OF TtiE CIVIL

by

492 Pages. Thomas Y. Crowell

Co. 1976.$14,95.

Surveying the battlefield at Fredericksbu rg, Robert E. Lee observed, It is well that war. is so terrible, or we should get too fond of it. In the hundred years since, Americans have tended to forget how terrible General Lees war was and have grown fond of a romanticized, anesthetized version of that bloody struggle. In Voices of the Civil War, Richard Wheeler has attempted to strip away the gauze MilitaryFleview

of romanticism and to give the reader an idea of what it must have been like to be there when these events occurred. He has succeeded admirably, The book is composed of firsthand accounts, connected by editorial comments to fill ix gaps and which attempt to explain the relationship of particular battles to the overall war situation and provide continuity between events. While the collection includes diary entries by civil lxns, newspaper stories and postwar analyses by ranking officers, Votccs is at its best when the editor turns to the soldiers. Through the sometimes eloquent, occasionally semiliterate and most often down-to-earth words of enl]sted men and junior officers, the full panoply of the war and its impact on the participants is laid before the sensitive and imaginative reader. The paradoxes that characterized the Civil War are all here: the grandiose declarations of the leaders juxtaposed on the stoic resolution and grim determination of the troops; the evening camaraderie across the lines contrasted with the ferocity in the heat of battle; the humanity of individual soldiers intermingled with the callousness bred by the enormity of the holocaust; the courage and sacrifice of many which overshadowed but did not obliterate the cowardice of a few. The result of editor Wheelers montage of battlewith its hunger. maiming and death, its psychological and physical strainis a revealing insight into what the war meant to those caught in its vortex. Mechanically, the book suffers some defects. The numerous maps are welldone, and the frequent pen-and-ink sketches give flavor to the work. On the other hand, the editor occasionally uses e x c e r p ts from inappropriate sources in an effort to provide authen, lanusry 1977

ticity through persrmai remembrance, while his editorial commants fre. quent]y assume prior knmvledge on the readers part. Nforeo\,er, he foclises almost exclusively on battles. Finally, the reader must recngnize that firstperhon accnunts are not nlways reliable, that they are rarely complete find that they sometimes provide distnrted pictllrm. In sum, Wheelers presentation is inadequate for understanding the ~i~ri] War In its entirety, including strategy, logist ius, economies, politics and diplomacy. However, Voices is excellent for its portrayal of the war from the perspective of those \vho lived and died in the j:!ws of death. Glory there ~va. in abundance, but it existed in the midst of the horrors and gruesomeness of cnmbat. In fact, Wheeler is to be cnmmenrted for the strong emphasis he places on the carnage and the destruction of human life. Only by breaking through the romanticism and by understanding the real war can our generation appreciate the true valor nnd coilrage of our military forbearers in blue and gray. CPT ROBERTC. EHRHART, USAF, I)epaytmrnt .f Hisfmy, USAFA
GEORGE C. MARSHALL: Memoirs of My Services in

the World War, 1917.1918

by George C Marshall

Foreword srrd Notes by Brigadier General James L. Collins Jr. 268 Pages. Houghton Mdflin Co 1976.$1000

To say that this book is unique is to belabor the obvious. General Marshalls strong aversion to tbe publication of his personal memoirs is wellknownthus the discovery and publication of a heretofore unknown manuscript, written by General Marshall in the 1920s, is an important historical find. Aside from its uniqueness, this I 107

filt

BOOKS Pogue was able to capture some of the latters memories of this period. But these memories are of events more than 30 years after they occurred. They already have a certain glow of and they embellished recollection, leave out many of the revealing personal anecdotes disclused in this book. Moreover, Dr. Pogue is forced to deal with Marshall in the third person. Thus, we miss the personal flavor of Marshalls own account. To tell the story of the memoirs in detail would be to rob the potential reader of all the joy of discovering new, personal perceptions to be found on almost every page. But, aside from Marshalls own account of his wellknwvn role in the young nnd struggling AEF, there is a side of the young Marshall not heretofore revealed. The young Marshall is hLlman (a side rarely revealed in later years). A feature worth noting is the inclusion of a foreword and a series of biographical notes compiled by General James L. Collins Jr., Chief of the US Army Center for Military History. General Collins has performed a monumental service to the reader by clearly identifying each of the principal characters in the cast. Future students and researchers will be eternally indebted to General Collins for his yeoman services in producing meaningful history.

book deserves & special niche in milit+ry a~chives on three counts. First, General Marshall wrote it. Second, it gives a rare i~sight into the character of General Marshall as a young field officer. Finally, it gives us an understanding of the troop-level perceptions of the American Expeditionary Forces ( AEF) in World War I ( the World War, as they called it )the soldiers vieuq>oiut so noticeably lacking in most of the high command-type memoirs published about this confiict. General Marshalls place in the military hall of fame is undisputed. Al. most without exception, the great mili. tary and political leaders of his time have paid tribute to his attributes and accomplishments. G e n e r a 1 Bradley said of Marshal], He was my ideal of the best type of ufficer. President Truman, a man of few \vords, said to Marshal] . no man has ever given his country more distinguished and patriotic serk,ice than you. Students of military leadership are Yvell. aware of General Marshalls leadership qualities. But, up to now, there has been a void in our understanding of the young .Mnrshall. What was he like as a young officer? Can \ve detect in his development and his later rise to high command and great responsibilities any indication of the personal characteristics that were to contribute to his later high stature? Thanks to this short summary of his experiences in Wor]d War I, we can. It is true that Marshalls distinguished biographer, Dr. Pogue, has discussed this period in GeneraI Marshalls career in a few chapters in his authoritative work, George C Mardld, 1939.

Educafion

of a General,

1889.

But Dr. Pogue had to rely largely on secondary sources for his research. In a series of personal interviews with Marshall (1956-57 ), Dr.
108

could anyone sum up a great How historical find, perhaps the find of the century, as far as American military history is concerned, and, at. the same time, pay adequate tribute to the character of its author, .Major Marshall? A few words, however well-chosen, would inevitably fall short of the mark. As a literary effort, this book is not likely to attract much attention. But as an insight into the life and character of the greatest military
Military Review

BOOKS Wit .Ieader of our time, it is likely to be unchallenged. This book is beyond a mere critics praise or blame. Its fulfillment lies in the enjoyment and understanding it will bring to the render interested in military history und especially in military leadership. At long last, General Marshall speaks for himself. GE?J TIIEODORU .J. CONWAY, USA, Retired
ARMY POLITICS Perez Jr 240 IN CUBA, Pages 1898.1958 of by 10UIS A Pittsburgh

Unwerslty

Press. 1976 $995

The rea{lers of this bo[~k \vill lemm before they finish the two-p~tge introduction that since the United States supervised the organization of tbe Cuban Army, it NW respon~ible for its collapse in 1958 and the subsequent ACRONYMS, INITIAIISMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS rise to puwer of Fidel Ca~tro. At least DICTIONARY. Edited by [lien T Crowley 757 Pages Gale Research Co 1976 $3850. this is the central theme that the au. thor attempts to substantiate as he This is an extremely tlscf!ll bunk, describes tbe creation, evolution and and one uhich lvus ~~rected ~~ith cheem final demise of the (uban Army. But and by uur research stuff, Acronyms his efforts Pall and instead, the reader other alphabetic de.signation.s have discovers, through the very arguments thrived in tbe techn[)lr,gir:ll atmf)~. of the author, that, for an imperial phere f]f tbe 20tb (entllry. the past power, the policies of the L7nited t!vo decades in particwlur. No\vhere States were highly enlightened, parelse has this been demonstrated more ticularly ~vben viewed in the context dramatically than In military commu of the accepted moral vnlues that ruled nicntl on, and shortened versions of international relations at the turn of Iucubrat[jry terms and descriptions are the century. nmv tbe rule rutber th:ln exception. Dr. Perez literary honesty results From the purely mech~fiical vie~~point in a series of contradictions that, in of the ~vriter ;md printer, it sates a the end, exposes the real cnuses and lot of time and space, but, to the responsibilities for the Pailure of the publisber nud reader, acroeditor, Cuban Army and the nations experiand :ibbre\, iations nyms, initinlisms ment with democracy. From the auare a source of confusion and obfuscathors arguments emerges a picture of tion. Gale Researchs dictionary helps a small nation that becomes the victim clear things up tind bns been doing so of ambitious politicians incapable of for 16 years. The first edition in 1960 governing and of an officer corps incontaiued n mere 12,000 terms-today, capable to command, of an army that it has more than 130,000 and is an inwas the tool of the politicians until it January 197; 109

turned against its milsters nncl ini tiuted a p r o c e s s that eventually brought Custro to power. The United States was so deeply involved in Cuban uffnirs that it must inescapably share sume uf the responsibility for the tragic events in that country, But Cubns history may have fullo~veci n di Ifcrent path if, bath in 1907, its leaders bad heeded the \varnings of Americnn military wlvisers who opp(,sed the organization of & regular army \vbile :wking, IS the fllti!re of (ubn to be trusted to an ;irmy created by the direction of one political party? In sum. Armp If,lilics it~ Cuba is an interesting book that [Ieservw the titte]ltion of zII >tudents uf L:itiu-Americ:ln :iRairs.-RM 11

WIC BOOKS dicator of how the use and invention of these appellation have grown. The new editions expanded coverage can practically assure every type of user that no condensed term genre has been omitted. While the emphasis of AIAD is on terms that are associated with the United States, several thousand entries cover terms from R a ss i a n, French, German, Spanish and other major languages. Although new technologies have brought with them a proliferation of acronyms, AIAD also includes items that have heen with us for thousands of years. Obsolete entries from previous editions have not been excluded, but noted and cross-referenced, enhancing the value of this useful aid even further. Admittedly, tbe cost of the dictionary is high, but, for those of as who grope with this sort of communication on a daily basis, tbe volume pays for itself quickly,-JWW
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: The Fwst Twenty pages Indiana

W/e Years by Lawrence Umversity Prsss. 1976

Korb 210 $1095

Korb contends that much of the misunderstanding concerning the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS ) can be traced to the relative newness of the structure and lack of scrutiny by academic analysts. His stud y examines JCS responsibilities and relationships within the defense decisionmaking process, addresses planning and operational contributions a n d provides sketches of the men who have corn. posed the JCS. The study also provides a smattering of organizational history. Tbe author quickly establishes that JCS parochialism is rampant, concluding that staff procedures are so eoneerned with the Chiefs own service
110

interests that the JCS has become addicted to the status quo and has never been asource of innovation in the na. tional policy-making process. A third of the study is devoted to an assessment of the men who have served on the JCS. What emerges from these pages is a superficial analysis which suggests, for example, that JCS members will most likely be service academy graduates and have served in key command and staff positions in their services. To assess JCS contributions, Korb looks at its performance in terms of planning, budgeting, procurement and operations under varioue administrations. Tbe JCS, he concludes, hae had little impact on the budget because of inadequate linkage between planning and budgeting. In operational matters, the JCS has been intimidated by civilian leaders. Korb argues, for example, that the nation would have been better served if the JCS had resigned rather than support President Johnsons Vietnam policies. The future? Well, if history ie any indication, Korb maintains that the JCS will resist major modification SUC. cessfully in spite of planning inadequacies and the parochial views of ite members. The ~oitzt CII iefs of .Stati contains some historical information of interest, but the reader mast ask himself if the aatbor has supported all of his rather bold assertions with adequate analysis. Less important, but nevertheless annoying, is the authors inattention to detail; there are frequent errors with regard to names of documents and organizations. Flaws notwithstanding, the reader will find that the book sheds some light on the role of the JCS. COL WILLIAM M. STOKES 11, Harvard Universit~
MiJitary Review

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by Robert V. Haynes 338 Pages. Louisiana University Press 1976, $12,95. THE NORTH AFRICAN WAR by Warren 223 word by Manfred Rommel.

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