Militarv Review

The Professional Journal of the US Army

March

1986

FI=5
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see pages 4:60

% THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL

Published by . US ARklYCOMMN4DAN DGENERALST AFFCOLLEGE

OF THE US ARMY

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.691 O

HONORABLEJOHN LIEUTENANTGENERAL BRIGADIERGENERAL O.MARSHJR. ROBERTW.RISCASSI FREDERICKM.FRANKS JR. Secretary of the Army Commandant Deputy Commandant

MILITARYREVIEW Colonel Frederick

STAFF Zimmerman

Jr, Eddorln Ch/ef

1

Colonel Jayrnectos Santos Tacf@ Braz!l#an Army Ed,tor Lieutenant Colonel Lynn Havach. Associate Editor Major 1P) Thomas E Conrad Ma.agr.g Edztor Mrs Palrtcla L LVllson Secretaw FEATURES Mr PhllllD R Dav, s Books E>, iorlGerman Translator

PRODUCTION STAFF Mrs D,x,e R Doming.ez Procluct,on Eo!for. Mr Charles l,,e A, fafld Des,gn Mr D M G!angreco Layout and Des,gn Mrs PafrmaH Norman Manuscr,utllndex Ecl,ior Mrs Cynthia L Teare Manuscr80tlEd!tor!a/ A.ss, srant Mm Sherry L Letws BookslEd, ior,al Ass, s:a%t Mr Amos Vi Gallaway Prmtmg Of f,cer LATIN. AMERICAN EDITIONS Lieutenant Colonel Gary L Hoebeke Ed)tor SPANISH AMERICAN EDITION Mr Ra.1 ADOnte and Mrs AIxa L D!az Eortors Mrs Margaret M Blue Translator Mrs Wlnona E StlODle Eddonal Assrstant BRAZILIAN EDITION Mr Almerlso B Loves EO,tor ADMINISTRATION: Major L8nda M. Ew$ng Plans Oftrcer Staft Sergeant W#ll]am H Curt!s Admm!sfraiwe NCO Mrs Eun!ce E. Over f,eld and fv!rs Merr, am L Clark %bscrmtlons FAR ADVISORY BOARD Colonel John F Or.dorft Ass)stdnt Deputy Commam danl Cha!rman Colonel Robert F Broyles. SChool for Pro fess, ona! Develop ment, Colonel Orville N Butts Combmed Arms and Serurces Staff School, Colo nel Michael T Chase. Department ot Academ,c Ooeratrons Colonel Howard Daniel Jr DeDaltMPnl of Sustainment ano Resourcmg Operahons. Colonel LouIs D F Frasche, Combat St.d!eS Ins f, fute, Colonel Robert W Garrotr Jr DeIJartmenfof Tact) cs, Colonel C Kav Hutchlnson Armv Reserve Adv!ser. Colo. nel Fab!an J Robltallle Jr Army Nat!onai Guard Adv, ser Colonel Stewart Sherard, Cenrerfor Armv Leadersh?J Colonel R8chard Hart Slnnrelch School of Auvanced Mtlda,y Stud! es, Fr Donald W Smythe, John F ktomson Cha!r of Mmtarv H,storv, Colonel Richard H Taylor DeRarfment of Jomtand Combmea Onerat,ons

From ihe Editor

There are many fmrctions that a journal performs for a profession. Chief among them are its responsibilities to inform, educate, develop and foster discussion. This months issue demonstrates in bold relief a journal discharging these functions. It was with a great deal of pride that Military Reuiew responded to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command commanders desire to SIIOWhim to announce the republication of our most central and important doctrinal statement, Field Manuel ]00-5, Operations, through the pages of the journaL In fact, General William R. Richardsons initiative prompted us to make doctrine our focus for March. As the cover of the journal suggests and the other articles in the issue illustrate, doctrine is something that we alI are responsible for and play a part in evolving and implementing whether we know it or not. The interplay between field experiences, education and training in forming, refining and improving doctrine is a dynamic one. And nowhere has it been more important and more clearly demonstrated than in the evolution of AirLand Battle doctrine. It is a success story that is remarkable, crosses service end national boundaries, end reflects the visionary leadership, talent and professionalism that exist within our Army. We dont always agree as professional, but that ie exciting and important. The Army is richer for it, end we can see the results daily from our vantage point at Milita~ Reuiew. One civilian professional in submitting a manuscript to us for consideration mentioned in paseing, I think many critice would be surprised to learn of the qurdity of debate and freshness of thought displayed in the Armys renaissance in operational and strategic thinking. We at Military Reuiero echo that sentiment. We are proud to bring you an iesue that focuses on doctrine and strengthens our ability to dischawe our most impor. tant duties in peace, so we are pre&red regardless of tbe challenge.

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SYSWIM

LJSAREUR Program
Analysis

Seeks Nominees

Q I

Each year, the US hrmy, Europe (USAREURI, OpeTatlonsResearch and Program accepts five to seven civihan analysts fmm the fJnited States for a two-year tour at one of the USAREUR locations This ~rogmn provides a meaningful professional developmentoppo~unity for the pam.mipating analys~. Nominees are sought from major ArmY command cimban personneloffices and major amaiyt,c agenme.? Anyone interested in more mfomatlon about the program ~houldcontact G}orm Brown, Study W@am Management~fice, Managentent Directorate,office of the Chief of Staff. US ArmY. AUTOV~N 7.270026 m Commercial (2021697.0026

Help WK. Compile

Historv

The Nabonal Trammg Center (NTcI and Fort lrnnn m Cahfomia ha~ begun researching ]@ history. Anyone who has served w,th the NTC, F.rt lrvnn-or at any of its predecesaorw, including the MOJaVe AntuilrcraftRange, Camp Irwin, and the US Army Armor and Desert fkazn~ngCenterorany umts that trained there, m mv~tedto he)p vath the hlsto~ The hmtory wdl include the personal as we]] as the offic~a~)s,de of IIfe at Fort Irwin If You can heIp, send a postcard to the Pubhc Affairs office, ATTN Hmtonan, NTC and Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, CA 923IO, Include your ~ame, address. telephone number and your connection w~ththe poet. Pfeaae the pmt. indicate zf you have memorab]l]a or documenti relating to I @ : .

General

Palmer

Is S. L. A. Marshall

Speaker

Retmed US Army General Bruce R Palmer Jr. M the speaker for the 16 March 1986 presentation 10 the S. L A Marshall Iec$ureseries at Fort Leavenworth Palmers topic M US Interventionm the Domnucan Repubhc. !965. The focus of the current seti.?a which concludes m May, IS Low. Intensity Confhct. The Amerman Experience? Palmer is the author of the 1984 book, The 2.5.Year I& Anzencus Mzhtary Role m Wetnam

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Military Review
VOLUME LXVI MARCH 1986 NO 3

CONTENTS
4 12 21 FM 100-5: THE AIRLAND BATTLE IN 1986 by General William R. Richardson, US Army HARNESSING CREATIVITY by Major Robert L. kfaginnis, T.S = V by Colonel Jared and Lieutenant 32 44 US Army

L. Bates, US Army, Colonel (P) Jimmie

B. Quinn,

US Army

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AIRLAND by Major Wayne M. Hall, US Army PERSPECTIVES 46 52 56 ON DOCTRJNE: FM 100-5: WHO INFLUENCED WHOM? by Lieutenant Colonel Archie Galloway, AIRLAND BATTLE: THE HISTORICAL by John L. Romjue SOME VAGRANT by Jay Luvaas THOUGHTS

BATTLE DOCTRINE

US Army

BACKGROUND

ON DOCTRINE

61 66 76 60 64 90

WORLD WAR II DIVISION COMMANDERS by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, US Army PAKISTAN: ON THE FRONT by Edgar O Ballarme SUMMARIES LETTERS NEWS BOOK REVIEWS contemporary reading for the professional PORCH OF CONFLICT

the best from other /ourna/s

MILITARY REVIEW IS publmhed monthly m English, bimonthlY m Spamsh and quarterly in POr. iuguese Use of funds for the Printing of thm pubhcatlon has been approved by the secretary of the Army on 19 February 1985 m accordance With the prowslons of Army Regulation 310-1. Second! class postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66048-9998 and additional entry offices. English-language subscriptions $14.00 per year US and APO/FPO $16.00 foreign; and $9.00 for US Military Academy and Reserve Officers Trammg Corps cadets and Officer Candidate School candidates. Single copies $1.75 US and APO/FPO $2.00 foreign. Address all mail to Military Review, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910. Telephone (913) 664.5642 or AUTOVON 552.5642. Unlees otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof Basis of Official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade of fmera of the Actwe Army. and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. Military Review is available on microfilm from Unwersity Micro fr!ms, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106, and is indexed by the PAIS (Public Affairs Information Serwce) Bulletin Poatmaater Send change of address information to Mddary Review, USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910. MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123-630) A LiS ISSN 0026-4148

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Military Reuiew Salutes the Graduates of the US Military Academy

The US Military Academy at West Point, New York, was established by Congress with the Act of 16 March 1802 as a school of engineering. The academy has since graduated a long gray line of distinguished leaders for the nation. The gray tradition began at the Battle of Chippawa on 5 July 1814 when British Major General Phineas Riall, after mistaking gray-clad American troops for militia, exclaimed, These are Regulars, by Grid! The next year, the War Department ordered the uniforms of the academys corps of cadets to be the gray worn at Chippawa. In 1985, the US Postal Service issued postage stamps honoring two academy superintendents. Captain Alden Partridge, an 1806 graduate, served from Jrmuary 1815 to July 1817. Major Sylvanus Thayer, an 180S graduate, served from July 1817 to July 1833. Thayer is regarded as the Father of the United States Military Academy as he was responsible for reorganizing the school end led it to its place as an equal with the military academies of Europe. .

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conduct cavalzy saber drill from the 1800s at the US Military Academy. These drills were imported to the United States by foreign officers who came here to lead and teach colonial forces during the I+evolutionaryWcr. Inseti US Postal Service stamps honoring Thayer and Partridge.

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Force Integrations
Lieutenant Colonel Wi//iam

fNext Big Ck:

T. Marriott

tlge

///, US Army

Synchronizing the AirLand Battle

Colonel John B. Rogers, a US Army

Americas Strategic Character

Major Thomas A. Sevoie, US Army

The AirLand Battle in 1986

General William R. Richardson,
US

-Army

Recently, the US Army completed a comprehensive revision of Field Manual 100.5, Operations, the fundamental statement of its doctrine. Ttds article, written bg the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, is intended to introduce the 1986edition of the manual. It will describe how the new manual clarifies AirLand Battle principles and concepts, how it incorporates lessons learned from the field since the-previous edition was published in 1982and how it integrates eister services and NATO recommendations for improved execution in joint and combined operations.

March 1986

MILITARY

REVIEW

., A

in war demands totet prep combat leader must know how to fight, how to msrshrd bis courage end that of his soldiers, end how to bring his forces to bear at the criticaf time and place on the battlefield to impose his will on the enemy. The US Army Training and Doctrine Corn. mand (TRADOC) ie dedicated to preparing tbe Armys leaders for war. That role embraces three distinct elements of preparation intellectual, psychological and physical. Intellectual preparation begirre with the textbook in the classroom but moves quickly to the map, to the send table end then to the terrain. Intelfectuel prepsration providee the mentaf basis for a broad perspective on wrwfighting by thoroughly and systematically searching mifitery history while simultaneously scanning the future for new technology and new concepts. Psychological preparation enjoins the leader to commit himself to professionrd excellence and to develop the tacticsf and technical competence which lay the foundation for both the leaders confidence end the units cohesion and successful performance. Physical preparation is rooted in self-discipline. It requires the leader to set and demand high standards of fitness for himself and his sokfierw to execute tactice. techniques and procedures with precision: and to apply sound doctrine in every training opportunity and exercise. While difficult to overestimate the complexity of these tasks, it is impossible to exaggerate their necessity. Reading, understanding and applying doctrine are fundamental to the preparation for war, Doctrine describes how the Army wifl fight and support. Not only does doctrine govern training strategies in both units and schools, but it also directs force modernization efforts end helps orchestrate standardization and interoperability efforts with our sister services and our alfies. As doctrine changes, so must the Army.

UCCESS

amtkm. The

I want to impress upon the officer corps that Field Mmmal (FM) 100-5, Operations, is the primary tool for the self>ducation snd profeesiomd development required to achieve tactical competence. Without mastering the AirLend Battle, Ieadere wiK inevitably fell short in preparing for war. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 reiotrednced a fundamental concept to the US Armythe operationat level of war. Yet, the manual neither fnfly described the operations level as the linchpin between strategy end tactics nor clearly differentiated between tacticaI and operational warfightiug. The new manual dees theee ttdngs. It explains that campaigns and major operations constitute the operational level of war and that battlee and engagements encompass tacticef operations. In a major conflict. field armies, army groups, end joint and allied major commende will fight at the operational Ievel. ~tieions, brigades and rwments will fight @ the tactical level, The transition occurs at corps which can end wilf operate at both the operational and tacticat Ievele. { In the Korean War, for example, the X Corps conducted a major independent operation the Inchon Landing, clearly en operational-level action with strategic impact. SirniIerIy, todays corps, the Armys lerg-i i est unit of maneuver. may conduct major operations which have sigr$icant impact:,$ ~ on the strategic aims in a given theatef., Typically, however, the corps executes tac~ tical actions through battles and engege~ ments to influence larger operations, to decide the course of campaigns end to achieve strategic objective. Some mistakenly equated the notions of forward thinking, anticipation and maneuver solely with operationef-level endeavors while relegating fire and movement to only tacticef undertakings. The new text clarifies these notions and argues that maneuver, anticipation and forward thkking areas broadly

MILITARY

REVIEW

March 1986

applicable as are the principles of war. In the 1982 edition, leadership and the human dimension of warfare were raised to an equaf footing with the phyeics of war-weapons lethality, time, distance, space, speed and materiel quafit y. Experience in the past four years has reinforced the renewed emphasie on Ieaderehip and the cruciaf relationship between the soldier and his leader. The 1986 version continues to emphasize that leadership, unit cohesion, training, morale, skilf and courage collectively provide the decisive and winning edge. The-mandate for quality leadership remaina unwavering and compelling. From Reserve Officers Training Corps programs to noncommissioned officer academies to the National Training Center, Army training and education programs must produce tough, competent leaders. Some critics of the 1982 edition argued that the AirLand Battle ~veremphasized the offense. While the 1976 version of FM 100-5 was interpreted as emphasizing defense, the 1982 edition restored balance and more accurately described the offense than its predecessor. Actuafly, the 1982 version underscored initiative, momentum in the attack, quick-minded flexibility, violent execution and surprise and ofand shock effect, ail char?cteristice vitaf toan offeneive spirit. When taken

out of context, however, thie aggressive, terminology appeared to oversell offensive action. While the new text clearly eepouses the offensive spirit ae a prerequisite for euccese on the battlefield even in a defensive posture, it is more carefufly articulated to ensure balance and to avoid exaggeration. Within the expanded discussion of the op erational level of war, the new manual also exph-dne haw offeneive actions fit into major defensive operations and campaigns. Other critics of the 1982 version equated the AirLand Battle doctrine with the deep battle. They aseerted that the deep battle wae beyond the range of the divisions organic weapona aysteme and the division commanders influence. Thus, it could only be fought at the corpe level with air assete or longer range indirect fire support weapons. Extending their argument, critics maintained that indirect fires must be dedicated to deep targets, thereby strippingmaneuver forces of their fire support. Hence, the belief emerged that the deep battle was mo~e important thah the cloee or rear battles. The new edition explains the importrmce of the deep battle (renerned for the sake of clarity, deep operations) by e~phasizing the synchronization of all combat operations. While deep, close and rear operations

March 1986

MILITARY

REVIEW

FM 100-5

must be mutually supportive, close operations will clearly determine battlefield success or failure, end success in either rem or deep operations can only be measured by its impact on future close operations. Accordingly, the new text emphasises that operations in depth must be closely integrated with the close fight. High-risk deep maneuvers at the division level would be undertaken only if the payoff would produce results that fit the theater -Y cOmmaders or the North At]antic Treaty Organization (NATO) army group commanders concept or intent. The modem battlefield demands close end continuous Army-Air Force coordination. Yet, the 1982 edition did not specifically link the Air Forcee theater-wide view of air support with the Armys operational-level perspective of the &rLend Battle. The new edition recognizes that future campaigns end major operations will be joint undertakings with mutually supporting air end ground functions. Consequently, those functions-air interdiction, countereir operations, reconnaissance and ground maneuver-are best directed from the theater, campaign and major operation perspectives. The theater commander must concentrate air power against objectives critical to the succese of the campaign or major operation.

The new manual does not reeolve the dilemma of the corps commander who plans for air interdiction to bia front and then fails to get it. However, it does point out that, if planning is done properly, the corps commander will know well in advance whether he is or is not likely to get air sup port. If he is pert of the major operation which is the main effort of the campaign (es the X Corps at Inchon), there is little doubt that he will. If he ie in an economy-of-force sector, there is a high probability that his F sortie allocation will be Ieee then he wants. The manual does not address Army/Aw Force procedural issues, nor does it refer to specific Army/Air Force agreement? which ~ may be superseded in the future as the Am my ond W Force reeolve procedural issue~ end refine joint tactics, techniques end pM& cedures. Such items wilf be covered in,su& ordinate manuals which are updated Morb frequently. In my judgment, the unmistakdbleconclusion remains that the 198,2 aditidn !of FM 100-5 wee on target. Much to our delight, the concepts end ideas generated significant thought, reflection, investigation end resultant professional debate. In the midst of this legitimate end necsssary dialogue, the 1986 version took shape. Challenging the applicability of the AirLend Battle to a variety of scenarios end

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MILITARY REVIEW o March 1986

environments bolstered tbe value of the new version. Questioning doctrinal principles strengthened their basic foundation. The resultant doctrine has undergone extraordinra-y scrutiny and snsfysis from within the Army and from our rallies. The new manual addresses these concerns end adapts to the needs of the Army worldwide. The NATO review of the 1982 edition raised many significant issues. The crux of the NATO concerns, however, centered on an interpretation of AirLand Battle as US rnilitery strategy rather than doctrine. While written at the tacticrd and operationef levels, FM 100-5 was often misinterpreted as a strategic concept rather than US Army doctrine. References to defeating the enemy and decisive action were misread as strategic rather than tactical and operational injunctions. That viewpoint generated serious questions regsrding o Wartime objectives. e Inconsistencies between AirLand Battle and published NATO doctrine. @ Enthusiasm for offensive, crossborder operations. e Insensitivity toward the use of nuclear and chemicsf murdtions. @ The employment of foflow-on forces attack (FOFA). AirLand Battle doctrine does not ad-

dress strategic victory. Rather, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 stresses winning at the operational and tactical levels. Not winning is an anathema to the warrior ethos end is professional nonsense. Winning in AirLand Battle doctrine means defeating the enemy on the field of battle end destroying his wilf to resist in engagements and battles of major operations and cempsigns that sre governed by strategy and national policy. Clearly, tactical success wiff support allied victory, but defining strategic goals ,md strategic victory is beyond the purview of FM 100-5. The 1982 text of FM 100~5 end related briefings and discussions have been viewed as contrary to NATO doctrine and war plans. In the new text, we adopt NATO terrnirroIogy where appropriate and conscien. tiously seek to enrich, reinforce and hermonize our doctrine with NATO doctrine. The manusf is compatible with Alf.ied Tacticrd Publication (ATP) 35(A), Land Force Tactical Doctrine, end other NATO publications but, by-necessity, is more theoretics to satisfy US needs in other theaters. US trobps in NATO can operate in compfience with FM 100-5 and ATP 35(A) without having to violate the precepte of either. AirLand Battle doctrine can be applied at the tactical level of corpe, division and below to comply with forward defense-

March 19ES5 . MILITARY

REVIEW

FM 100-5

oriented war plane. The expanded text makes this cleex. AirLand Battle doctrine does not eepouse a need for cross-border operations in violation of etrategy and policy. In fact, the latest version discusses the prohibition of crossing international borders se a major consideration in planning operation and makes clear the primacy of poficy end strategy over operations end tactice in off cases. The decision to cross en international border must reside with the strategic command authority. The 1982 text has been criticized for insensitive language regarding nuclear and chemical weapone employment. The new FM 100-5 acknowledges the strategic significance of nuclear end chemicaf weapons. The mamraf also reiterates that the United States hae forsworn the fiist use of chemical weapone end that the release of nuclear or chemicaf weapons is a strategic decisionagain, well beyond the purview of the AirLend Battls doctrine. A great deaf has been said about the differences between AirLand Battle and NATO FOFA. First and foremost, FOFA is a part of the overeff Allied Commrmd, Europe (ACE), operationef concept for the defense of NATO territory. AirLand Battle, on the other hand, is Army doctrine for worldwide application which will be exe-

cuted according to the PIOUSand orders of bigher commanders and the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T). Therefore, in Europe, the US Army -apply AirLand Battle doctrine accordin to the ACE operational conT cept not ordy for FOFA but rdso for other aspects of the ACE concept. Second, FOFA appfies explicitly to NATO end, consequently, must accommodate afliance pofiticaf considerations. AirLsnd Battle, however, is universally applicable end flexible / enough to adapt to legitimate regionsf and pofiticrd considerations. Fhmfly, FOFA refies on a variety of assets employing rninimsf ground forces. AirLand Battle also employs avaifribIe,~ I and other assets but refies predominant i on ground forces to affect the close oper,,:, tion. Thue, though distinctions exist W tween FOFA end AirLend Battle, these ~ not contradictions. Rather, they are differences which stem from their very nature differences that disappear in combat be cause FOFA is directed toward a spe~c theater, while AmLand Battle doctrine must be tailored to each theater and the ~ factors of MEfT-T. In sum, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 clarifies its doctrinal role, distinguishes between strategic or poficy decisions end doctrine, end focusee strictly on the apera~

MILITARY

REVIEW

. March 1986

tionrd and tacticef levels of war. In the past few years, the Army has made great strides in adapting to the AirLend Battle doctrinal tenets of initiative, a~ty. depth ~d synchrotiation. There is stiff a long way to go, however, before our operation in the field truly reflect these tenets. AirLend Battle doctrine must be fully accepted end thoroughly ingrained in the officer corps. Combat leaders must master the doctrine, integrate it into plans end train according to its tenets to ieeue and execute miesion-type orders confidently and decisively. Only a Ieader well-grounded in the AirLand Battle can exploit opportunities to fix tbe enemy sad to attack at the decisive point in battle. Onfy tactical competence soundly based on our doctrine can generate the ekilfe required to fight with audacity end take necessary ricks while implementing solutions to the difficuft end dangerous problems encoun~red in wm. Mastery of the AirLend Battle is a key ingredient of the warrior ethoe and of the total preparation for war. To inetilf the tenets of the AirLand Battle io the officer corps, TRADOC is undertaking a number of initiatives. First, within the Department of Tactice at the US Army Commend end General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Ksneas. we wifl

eetablish a Center for Army Tactics. The Tactics Center wilf be on the cutting edge of tactical study, teaching, doctrinal writirig end evaluating lessons from those recently assigned to combat unite. As the centerpiece for doctrine end tactics, the Tactics Center wilf ensure the standardization of instruction throughout TRADOC end set the standards for excellence in tactical training for the Army. Only the Arrnye finest combined arms tacticians wifl be assigned there. Our studente will learn the most current end sound doctrine end tactics horn the Armys best. The synergism will elevate to n~w heighte the quality of our intellectual and psychologicef preparation for war by improving our doctrinal writing end tactical teaching. Second, we must demand that subordi- . nate doctrinal manuals add substance to the AirLsnd Battle teriets. Repeating FM 100-5s definition of initiative, depth, agifity and synchronization, for example, does fittle to train leaders in how to execute thoee tenets. AirLend Battle must be translated into tactics that combat Ieadere can apply in exercisee ae they hone their battlefield ekiffs in preparation for war. Without frequent practice, the tactice end . doctrine wilf remain eIusive and vague. We must doctrinrdiy standardize our %iersrchy of msnusle so that consistency ie

10

March 1988

MILITARY

REVIEW

FM 100-5

achieved throughout the force. Finally, TRADOC will develop and pubfieh the best poseible doctrine at each service school. I have cheflenged elf commandants to ensore excellence in the doctrinal product that we provide the field. Doctrine must be current, accurate end standardized. Field commanders must then assume the responsibility for executing the Armys doctrine. Commanders and leaders in the field must read, understand end apply doctrine with innovation and creativity in every training opportunity. They must fift doctrine from manuals and map sheets and bring it to life. Only then @f we inculcate the AirLend Battle doctrine from the classroom to the maneuver area and, finally, to the battlefield.

The new FM 100-5 is the most important doctrinal menuef in the Army. It responds to the questions which its predecessor generated; it ehuifiee complex concepte, im eluding strategy, operations end tactics;,it serves as a solid foundation for evolutionWY. docttitd changw and it ie the fundamentaf text for every Army officers mifftary education and training. Competent and confident leaders who know how to fight will make the difference between defeat end victory on the battlefield. Every F officer must understand that the great value of our doctrine is not the tlud answers it provides but, rather, the impetus it generates toward creative and fnnv vative eolutions to the problems of Win,- r bat. %

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MILITARY REVIEW

Geneml WilliamR. Richanisonis the commander,USArmy Tr&ung andDoctrize Comman4 Fort Mom.as,Virpni.z He mceiueda B.S. fromthe USMii2aTAcademy andanM.S.fivm George WashingtonUmuersity. He is a gmduate of the CanadianArrsy Staff Colkge, the USAC(3SC and the IndustrialCollege of the ArmedForces.He hasseruedas thecomma?de~ CombinedArms CenterandFort Leavenworth, commandant USACGSC and deputy chief of staff for .opemtiomsand plans. Hean@arters, Depatient of the Army, Washington. D.C.His articleKermitRooseveltLecture:O@cer Tmining and Education appearsdin the October 1984MIitary Raview.,

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March 1986

11

Nobody knows what the future holds but, as one cliche says, alu,ays expect the unexpected. How will the #mys leaders handle the unexpected changes that are bound to come? Unless the leaders change the u~ay they think about change, this author feels there may be problems.

REEK philosopher Heraclitus said Nothing endures but change. Change is an undeniable aspect of life; for both good and bad. Future Shock author Alvin To ffler says that change is a societal disease that is rapidly accelerating. He proposes that the future will be characterized by rapidly discontinuous {intermittent) change. US Army leaders need to study this phenomenon and its significant implications for peace and war. A study of this change epidemic will euggest that the Armys future effectiveness may depend upon ite ability to harnees creative thinking skills to help cope with the future nature of change. Harnessing these creative skills in- volvee the identification of dynamically

creative soldiers, the develo~ment of commonly held deductive creative skills and the fostering of a command climate encouraging creative procesees. The Army of the future will face rapid and discontinuous change during peace and war. In peacetime, the Army will frequently change mission; and reallocate resources to address a myriad of complex potential assignments. Technology and new doctrine will ch nge the Army. Geopolitical situations WI] > dictate military realignments as will changee of civilian and military leadership. Short suspense change swill characterize AirLand Battle and deep attack scenarios. The future nonlinear maneuver battles, in. stant communications and increasingly le-

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thef systems will contribute to rapid, unpredictable and violent change. Change will be the enemy of the smafl-unit leader who must take the initiative, act independently and execute the commanders intent without reconfirming instructions. Change is an able adversary. In peace, it can improve the force or waste taxpayer doiisrs. In war, it must be controlled to benefit the battle leader. An analysis of the evolving nature of change fofiows using a change matrix to facilitate this. (See the accompanying figure.) The matrix has two states of nature and two courees of action. The probability of the etates of nature are anyones guees. The first state of nature is linear (gradual) change. An example of linear change is the evolution of the individual weapon musket to modern rifle. The individual weapon evolved by a long series of steps spaced across two centuries. The second state of nature is rapidly discontinuous change. Consider the breakneck pace by which the microchip (and ite byproducts) have changed the American home and workplace. It eeems as if it was only yesterday that microcomputers were manufactured and sold from makeshift workshops in young entrepreneurs garages. Today, the microcomputer sales end service industry is a multibillion-dolkir bueinees impacting on all sectors of the economy.

The first of two afternative courses of action for future Army Ieadere is a status quo approach to change. Thie couree of action is Iabeled linear and sequential thinking and is a common pattern. The second course of action is labeled holietic end intuitive. Thie procese is creative thinking. Many futurists agree that rapidly discon-

Short suspense change will characterize AirLandBattle and deep attack scenario.% (i%efuture nonlinear maneuver battles, instunt communications and increasingly lethal systems will contribute to rapid, unpredictable and violent change.

ivlatrix of Future
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tinuous chdge wiii typify the fnture end cite the information and service industry explosion of the past 20 years ae an exani pie. They also argue for holistic and intuitive (creative) thinking processes. They explain that creative thinking providee a multidimensional insight process for cop- { ing with future change situation which the linear and sequential thinking processes cannot effectively handle. In few places wilf the need for creative, thinking be greater than in future milit+ry environmente. The Fiscal Year 1986 bud 7. et may reach $278 biIiion for national d % , fense, and the Department of Defene6 wifi constantly be required to justify these e~penditures. Creative thinking may provide more efficient and effective ways of usiiig tax dolktre without jeopardizing natiohai defense capabilities. Additionally, the future volatile battlefield will require crea- . tive thinking (at ail levels) beyond sn~tbing , heretofore experienced. Creative thinking is a term bantered about by theorists and practitioners. Induetry and government patronize the idew however, they seldom pursue techniques

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for harnessing creative thinking either because it is perceived as unattainable or as a novelty. The Army has not fully harnesssd this resource because it does not foster holistic and intuitive thinking. The Army culture encourages linear and sequential thinking. This thinking process * Creatiue thinking is a term bantered about by theorists and practitioners. Industry and government patronize the idea; howeuer, theg seldom pursue techniques for harnessing creatiue thinking either be. cause it is perceived as unattainable or as a novelty.

is encouraged by at least five significant institutional characteristics: e The US Army is slow to transition to new technologies. This resistance to change has fortunately sidelined many bad chang$s but has simultaneously delayed many important ones. For example, in World War I, the machinegun was initially resisted .as a novelty. It was not until many early war casualties were attributed to German machinegun fire that we finally adopted the weapon. In World War II, we initially employed tanks to support infantry. This was despite sage recommendations to copy the successful German armored assault tactics. e The US Army has a low tolerance for contacting information. This wae perhaps one of our greatest problems prior to World War II. The prewar efforts of a US military attache in Berlin to provide accurate in. telligence illustrates this institutional characteristic. During this volatile period, Major Herbert Smith collectsd intelligence concerning the Nazis Luftwaffe. Working through the famous American flier Charles A. Lindbergh, Smith persuaded General Hermann Goring to reveal the scope of the

Nazi eirpower buildup. Smith s~bkequently rendered detailed reports to the War Department. His reports conflicted with the opinions of the War Department staff and the American public. The WW Depertmehts inability to sort through thq conflicting information left the country ill-prepared for the significant air threat posed by the emerging Nazi air force. Prior to the Japanese attacks on Hawaii and the Philippines. US forces broke the Japanese code and discovered that the attacks were imminent. These military disasters are often attributed to our inability to sort through conflicting information. e The institutional US Army is also risk-adverse. Risk-taking is often the prelude to great successes and great failures. The following examples illustrate that battlefield success is often directly proportional to the risk exercised by leaders. In 1519, Hernando Cort6s destroyed his ships (to remove an escape route for wouldbe deserters) and, with his company of 250 soldiers, 12 horses end a few cannons, conquered hundreds of thousands of Aztecs. Union Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain took a great risk at the end of the first full day of the Battle of Gettysburg. Realizing that ammunition was low and a new Rebel assault was imminent, he ordered the 20th Maine to fix bayonets and charge down Little Round Top. The assault routed the- attacking Rebel soldiers and eventually led to the capture of hundreds of war-weary Confederate soldiers. Erwin Rommels finaf attack in World War I took place in the Italian Alps. He purposefully qfibbis mountain trmps loose from their ffehk security end supply lines and thrust 12 miles into the enemys territory to seize a strategic hill mass. This high-risk thrust ruptured the Italian defenses and precipitated a German victory. The 1940 German advance into France through the impassable Forest of Ar-

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The US Armg has a low tolerance for conflicting information. Th& wae perhape one of our greatest problems prior to World War H. . . . Major Herbert Smith collected intelligence concerning the Nazis Luftwaffe. Working through the famous American tZier Charles A. Lindbergh, Smith persua~d General Hermann G6ring to reveal the scope of the Nazi air-power baildup. . . . Hie reports cont7icted with the opinione of the War Department staff and the American public. The War Departments inability to sort through the conflicting information lefi the country ill-prepared for the eigniffcant air threat posed by the emerging Nazi air force.

dermes is an example of risk-taking. The German army committed panzer units to blitz forward with limited flank security. Within six weeks. this high-risk assault led to the defeat of French and British forces. The aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission is a more recent high-risk aff sir. In that cass, the president took the risk, and the country suffered a significant politicrd and military failure. e The US Army has hidebound tr-aditions that insist upon conformity. Not too many years ago, artillery crews had six men, and trad]tion dictated that they always had six men. It took the tenacious investigation of one soldier to clarify the requirement. He discovered that the sixth man was to stand to the rear and tend the horses. There is a hidebound tradition that says avoid controversy: espouse the party line. This concept was illustrated in 1940 when

the Franco-f3ritish Alliance was involved in the Phony War. During the war, the / French were victimized by German propaganda that focused on French disinterest in the war, historical distrust of the British and the divisive effect in France of the Soviet-Nazi Pact. The French acquiesced t! I the propaganda by biting t~eir @it ? activities to patrols designed to avoid cotI,., , frontation with the Germans. French Coti~ nel Goutard articulated the aflianqe~s msfsise: NO one dared give an order for fear of criticism or making a mistake. The officers remembered that, in 1914, d&iqg the first month of the war; Joseph J. Joffre relieved 47 generafs for inefficiency. . e The US Army demands strict obe- ! dience. While the Army leadership en- courages the discussion of courses of action, once the decision is made, everyone is expected to execute without forther discussion. Obedience of this nature permitted

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senior officers in the Iate 1930s to savor the horse caveIry and coastrd (artillery long after they outlived their usefulness. Strict military obedience was their military duty, or so cleiped many Nazi officers amused of war crimes. During the Liss trials, they claimed that strict obsdience was the commanders due. In 1941, Soviet commanders frequently executed pre-pkmned counterattacks, even when the enemy situation changed from

. . . many ot7ieersfocus upon facts because facts can be collected and uerified directly by the senses. . . . They make decisions regarding those facts by impersonal analysis because of their trust in thinking, with its step-by-step logical process of reasonin.qfrom cause to effect.
the time the plan was made. As a result, their obedient execution of counterattack plans rarely met with success. The Japanese soldier is another example of strict obedience. He was so propagandized by the nationaf military code and bis complete allegiance to the emperor that he fought to the death, even when the circumstances were hopeless. US forces captured only 18 Japanese soldiers at Iwo Jimw the rest fought to their deaths. Some continue to fight possibly even today in tbe far-flung tropical islands of the Pacific. These institutional characteristics tend to attract and retain linear end sequential thinkers who reIish certainty end conformity. They contribute to a military culture discouraging the use of creative skilfs. An empiriceJ study of the Army officer corps reinforces this institutional profile. Over 1,000 Army officers participated in psychometric assessments during the last few years. The results indicate that twotbirds of the officers fit the proposed linear

end sequential profile. The profile iridicates that many officers focus upon facts because facts can be collected and verifieddirectly by the senses by seeing, hearing, touching, counting, weighing and measuring. They make decis106s regarding those facts by impersonal analysis because of their trust in thinking, with its stepby-step logical process of reasoning from cause to effect. If rapidly discontinuous change is the future state of nature, then the Army must begin to train ite linear and sequential thinking leadership corps in the @ of creative thinking. We need leaders who can think holisticefly and intuitively. Carl R. Rogers, a distinguished psychologist, Ssick . . . in a time when knowledge, constructive and destructive, is advancing by the most incredible leaps and bounds into a fantastic atomic age, genuinely cmatiue adaption seems to represent the only possibility that man can keep abreast of the kaleidoscopic change in his world. Tbe kaleidoscopic nature of future cbenge is the argument used in this article to justif y a holistic and intuitive (creative) approach to thinking. This type of thinking is often misunderstood becikwe of the con. fusing arra of definitions for creative f thinking. One expert, John Dewey, defines creative thinking as a method of evading, circumventing, or surmounting through inflection, obstacles that otherwise would have to be attaclied by brute force. A classic case of attacking obstacles with brute force was evidenced by General Ulysses S. Grant. He said The art of war is simple enough, find out where your enemy is, get at him as hard [and] as soon as you can, strike him and hit him as hard as you can, and as often as you can and keep moving on. This suggests that Grant used the

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military proweee of en elephant. Fortunately. for Grant, the government could resource his uncreative philosophy of war. Future confficte may require more conservative and creative applications of scarce resourcee. The creative person is open-minded he doee not permit conftict with discipline, obedience or conformity. He causee something to come into existence or bringe it into being. Meet of us have theee skille, but they are euppraesed. George M. Prince, author of Pmctice of Creativity: A Manual for Dynamic Group Problem Solving, writes that, a few years ago, a study wae conducted to aeeess creative skills. Groups of preschoolers (5-year-olds) were evaluated in terme of imagination and resourcefulness. They were re-eveluated after their first year of echool (age 7). The researchers indicated that imagination and resourcefulness ecores dropped from 90 percent for 5-yeerolds to 10 percent for 7-yeer-olds. Apparently, our schooIs feif to encourage creative skills. Likewise, the creative adult is apt to get ground up in any organisation, apt to be afraid of it end apt generally to work off in a corner or en attic to himself. This snticreative result is unintentional but a rerdity of the modern organisational climate. Creativity can be subdivided into two creative skifl groups. The first one is labeled deductive creativity end is the most common form. It consists of ones abifity to collect en array of facts or ideas end then csrefufly search for heretofore rmrecogrized relationships between them.z The commanders estimate is en excellent example of deductive creativity. The hofistic end intuitive thinking commander collects the facts of the situation, reflects upon his experience end then process6s the information through his multidimensionef perception ecreen. The end reeult is a men-

The US Army has hidebound traditions that in.sietupon conformity. Not%oo many gears ago, artillery crews had ah me% and tradition dictated that they always had six men. It took the tenacious investigation ofone soldier to clarify the requirement. He discoveredthat the sixth man was to stand to the rear and tend the horses. c

tat picture of a complex battlefield situation end how MS unit fits into the scheme of maneuver. Deductive creative skills have frequently been harnessed for significant mifitaty proj-) ects. The M enhatten Project relied u~ , the collective deductive creative skills $ many experte. These experts methodicd;~ addressed the ubiquitous ambiguity sMovding ths early stages of the research ertd development of a military atomic de+ce. The U2 Skunk Works end the m~ch pubticiz.ed Apollo Moon Project were products of deductive creativity. A little publicized but very creative parallel project ; was the development of the Sidewinder miesile. An obscure navrd engineer in southern California built this very refiable missile with off-line funds. The engineere eupervisore recognized the potential of one

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,.

mans deductive creative skills. The second creative skill group is labeled dynamic creativity. This is a rare skill group. Dynamic creativity is evidehced when an idea rises almost spontaneously in the mind. This ekill is especially evident during times of accelerated danger. The ideas come from the subconscious and are generalIy primitive and simple. The. Gatling gun was invented by a dynamically creative doctor. Another ex-

The creatice person is open-minded; he does not permit conflict with discipline, obedience or conformity. He causes something to come into existence or brings it into being. Most of us haoe these skills, but they are suppressed.

ample occurred during the Normandy in~,asion when a young sergeant had the brainstorm to attach a blade to the front of a tank. This permitted the tank to go through French hedgerows in lieu of going over the berms exposing the tanks soft underbelly to enemy antiarmor fire. The Soviets were short of antitank weapons during World War II. The Molotov cocktail was created to serve as a daring alternative tank killer. This is an example of a eimple weapon that was spontaneously envisioned by a dynamically creative Soviet during a period filled with significant danger. Rommel displayed military intuition (dynamic creativity) durings tank battle in ,North Africa. Wbile observing the battle, he turned to his aide saying, Lets move over to that hill. I feel this is going to get warm around here pretty soon. Shortly after they relocated, a thunderous shelling of the former position took place, The Army can harness creativity by se-

lecting people with dynamic creative skilk+, developing deductive creative skills and fostering a climate that nurtures the uee of both skill groups. Dynamic creativity is a rare phenomen~n. Finding and retaining dynamically creative people will be difficult. One dynamically creative officer suggested why creative people seldom stay in the Army. He dis. couragingly said: I like to wnte and offer constructive proposals to improve the seruice. A public information officer who reviewed my manuscnpt reduced it to a bland pabulum of nothing. Tbe Army can identify and track these individual at the accession point. A combination of assessment technologies end a thorough study of past achievements will identify them. These gifted soldiers should be employed in positions requiring and encouraging their dynamic creative skille. It may be worthwhile to pull them out of the mainstream Army and sequester them in think tanks at the US Army Combined Arms Center or the US Army War College. Fail. ure to carefully monitor these custodians of a rare Army resource may lead to their pre$ mature departure. Developing latent deductive creative ekills is the Armys best chance for harnessing this seldom tapped resource. Abraham H. Maslow believes everyone has a measure of this deductive creative skill buried in the subconscious. It has unfortunately cefcified because of institutional barriers to creative thinking. This skill can be encouraged in numerous ways. The expaneion of oral exchanges in our schools and units will help. This might occur by sponsoring frequent small-group discussions among e~perte and students in formal and informal eettings. The advent of computer teleconferencing nets is a good start. These nets encourage professionals

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(a) Ordnance company welder aa. sembll fig rhino hedgerow cuttec (b) affixing cuttefi (c) the rhinos t ska (d) cutter M actlom and (e) in %3 ntor Sergeant Curtla G. Culin Jr., 102d Cavalry Rec6nnaissame Squadron, 79th Infantry Division

Dynamic creativity is evidenced when an idea rises almost spontaneously in the mind. This skiU is especially euident during times of accelerated danger. The ideas come from the subconscious and are generally primitiue and simple. . . . daring the Normandy invasion . . . a young sergeant had the brainstorm to attach a blade to the front of a tank. This permitted the tank to go through French hedgerows in lieu of going over the berm% ~ exposing the tanks soff underbelly to enemy antiarmor fire.

):

to exchange ideas without regard to rank, organizational boundmies and attribution. Promote writing on profeeeional topics. Most military writing is sterile. Encourage leaders to investigate, question and study the significant problems facing future Ieadere. These proactive changes will encourage tomocrows William Billy Mitchells, Alfred T. Maimns and Hyman G. Rickovers.

The t~rd step is to engender a command climate that nurturee creative ekiik, order to work, the command cIimate mu Pt satisfy the creative leaders safety and freedom needs. The leader must perceive that he is in a safe environment to exercise creative skills. This occure when personal worth is not questioned, peopie are encouraged to be themselves, external evaluation is absent

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The leader must perceive that he is in a safe environmenfi to e.+ereise ereat iue skills. This occurs when personal worth is not questioned, people are encouraged to be themselves, external evaluation is absent and errors are tolerated.

,.
and errors are tolerated. The leader must also perceive that he is free to express himeelf. This freedom indicates trust in him I em a responsible individual in the eyee of my boss.$ Creative skills are a valuable Army res urce that can be used and developed or t ey can be wasted and psrverted. If they encouraged, Army leadere will routinei ly arrive at improved solutions. The improved eolutions in peacetime f tranelate into better planning and better ( ~allocation of scarce resources. Soldiers who are encouraged to exercise their creative skills are more eatisfied and, therefore. stay in the Army. Army technicians encouraged to think creatively may find solutions to unresolved problems.

The reaf measure df mw cre~tivity progpnr wiIl be determined on tbmo~ows battlefield. Future leaders need to see new ways to defeat the threat. On-the-scene inventions will become mandatory. For example, during the Korean War, creative G IS rolled barreIs of napalm down hills at attacking Chinese. This combat creativity saved American lives. Another example occurred during the C&il War siege of Peters: burg. Union eoldlers dug and exploded a mine under Rebel lines. The defenders on either side of the mine crater fled in terror, leaving 500 yards of the Confederate works deserted. Union troops, however, failed to exploit thk creatively generated opportunist y. The inevitability of rapidly discontinuOUSs future change should force Army planners to seek better ways to use resources in peace and war. Harnessing creative skills (already within the Army) and fostering those skills via healthy. supportive command climates appear to be a near-term solution. The Army needs to identify dynamically creative soldiers. train them and retsin them for thk more difficult challenges of the future. IV&-

NOTES
ms, rumen,s are oaow ,.0 0,,,4 ,,,,, .,,0 , me OSchometr,c 1,,1S ab$l!t,e, and ,.0.,s,,s 7., ,,trm.+$ to Iea,;remental used !mcl.de me MYew Suggs Twe l.mal.r me Personal Prof!le S,,l,~ 0, PwIo,!w SY,le~,IW.WO,! ,.0 I,. FIRO Bh, W Schulz !JOSt01 the test, were ,Om, s,terea at I, S Am Ifa,ry CetwFort Bennmg Georgw .$ a Dart of ,...s, mograms of 8.

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mta.!rp -!rm. May s.pt. m,,

strum.. 2 Colonel Jams E M.azeh Creaw!? October 1987, L) 26 3 !B8L+ 4 Colonel Gore.. A Mm. II Creawtv

5 6.5,.p45

1967 II 44

Major Robert L Magcnnzs K c%ef of the leade? ~h,p branch, US Army In fantrv School Fort Bemung, Geor.qm He recezued a B S from the LS Mzlztarv Academy and an Pf S from the ,%>RIXZ1 Postgmduote School He has ,e,ued uxtk thwe in fantrv dwisiorm in a mmaety ofcmnrmznd and staff .rmwtions III Korea, Europe and the Continental Umted States. Hzs artzcle -AZ for the AtrLand Leader Stvles Preparing Review.

Battle appearedm the December19S5Mditary-

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rl

1
Colonel Jared L. Bates, US Army, and Lieutenant Colonel (P) Jimmie B. Quinn, US Army <
During the 1980s,the US Army adopted a new war-fighting doctrine, designed new organizations and began receiuing a wide range of new equipment. This formula for success (Technology x Table of Organization and Equipment x Leadership Style = Vietory) appears to contain all of the ingredients for success on the future battlefield. Or does it? . ) i Manuaf (FM) 100-5, Operations, presents succinct aml accurate picture of the futnr i: battlefield. This battlefield will, because # forcd ratios, frontages and potentipJ destructiveness of indirect fires, bb characterized by nonlinear operations. Penetrations, development of safienta ~d swirling clashes of forces from platoon through brigade size @l be commonplace. The Armys evolving war-fighting phi- ~ Iosophy accurately describes the opera- tional concepts necessary to succeed on this battlefield. FM 100-5 speaks of irdtiative, deptlf, agility and synchronization. Since 1980, our professional journals

F ONE studies our potential adversaries in Central Europe, reade the latest doctrinal literature and stays abreast of the modernization efforts directed at our heavy divisions, several thinge are evident: @ Our heavy forces remain numerically inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact. ~ Our philosophy for waging a succesafnl war in the face of this numericaf superiority has changed. e The modernization effort directed at our heavy forces is providing us with an unprecedented technological capability. The Armys key how-to-fight Field

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have been fifled with increased debate and dialogue on such iseues as maneuver tactics, initiative development at all levels based on an understanding of the commanders intent and synchronization of forces through a faster, more efficient decieion procees. Despite occasional lapses into theological debates on terme, the dialogue accurately depicts the future battlefield ae requiring boldness, rapid movement of forces, the abifity to operate baeed on mission-type orders, an offensive mindeet and an ability to operate ineide the decision cycle of the opponenLS In addition, ae framed by the term AirLand Battle, the Army bae recognized the need to think simultaneously of a deep, direct and rear battle. The technological modernization and reorganization of our heavy forces fits the Armye changed pbiloeophy perfectly. The Ml tank, M2/M3 fighting vehicle, and Black Hawk rmd Apaeke helicopter pro vide the potential for an extraordinary combat team. Tbe ability to shoot on the move, see at night, outrange equivalent ,Soviet systeme, and so forth are welldocumented. The ability of these systems (in tlie hands of well-trained unite) to move within the battle area is not appreciated until it is experienced. Appearing and reappearing with unprecedented epeed, at critiCSI placee, these systems can have both a tangible and psychologicrd effect. Inaddition tothe new combat systems, the Armys heavy brigades benefit from . . Z%Z;!;%lr~Z~e;&CkpZ vide flexibility as well ae a higher concentration of leadere. The restructuring of the mechanized infantrys antitank aeeets into a company of three platoons enhances op tions as does the addition of a second mortar fire direction control section in the heavy mortar platoon of both tank and mechanized infantry battalions. A new

family of wheeled vehiclee provides improved logistical support &d reduces maintenance requirements. Thus, the heavy brigade has both the equipment and the structure necessary to function more effectively on the projected battlefield.

there is an essential link required to connect the philosophy of FM 100-5 with the technological and organizational capability of the Division 86 heavy brigade. That link is the operational style of the commandersat battalion, brigade and division levels.

...

At this point, the reader would be correct in asking, so what? What is stated is far from a revelation. The facts concerning the battlefield, changing doctrine and sweep of modernization are well-documented. The so what is that there is an eesential link required to connect the philosophy of FM 100-5 with the technological and organizatiorraf capability of the Division 86 heavy brigade. That link is the operatiomd style of the commrmde~ at battrdion, brigade and division levels. The expreeeion of that etyle ie the training methods and battlefield procedures the commander employs as well as the tactics he chooses in developing operationrd plans. It is certainly not a new idea that the commanders operational methods will play a hwge role in determining the overall capability of an organization. Napoleon Bonaparte, for example, operated ineide the decision cycle of his opponents by sleeping from dinner to midnight, rising to receive reports and determining a plan for the next day. He then wrote instructions to his subordinates and passed them to a group of general officer sides who traveled through the remainder of the night to

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deliver and explain his plan. Thus, at about the time his army had completed the morning meal, Napoleons decisione were in the bands of his subordinates for executiona system which kept him one to two days ahead of hfe opponent.4 The slashing methods of the 1940 German panzer forces as they swept acrose Europe reflect the methods of Generals Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian and others. Theee methods were. without a doubt, the most significant combat multipliers of their time. The reader of Rommels account of his attack into Belgjum ie struck by the aggressive maneuver mentality he had bred into his division during training. Almost from tbe outset. his spearheading elements were separated from the follow-on forces. Not only were subordinate commander required to operate independently within the spirit of Rommels intent, but they were also controlling forces moving on multiple routee knowing full well that bypassed Allied units could cut off their supply linee. The tentative, conservative commander could certainly have found reason to pause. Yet, this over tbe ehoulder hesitation did not develop (at least not at the operational level). Certainly, this is a tribute to the training and operational procedure of the German panzer force. Likewise, Rommels use of light aircraft and a smafl highly mobile ground command post in his desert campaigns, coupled with a trusted staff capable of making decisions in his absence. enabled him to be at critical places on the battlefield, react to opportunities and infuse hie units with a spirit of aggressiveness in the face of a numerically superior enemy. Are we instilling this maneuver mentality in our maneuver commanders? Are they training their units to execute accordingly? Does tactical planning reflect current doctrinal philosophy? In short. are we getting

The reader of Rommels account of his attack into Belgium i8 struck by the aggres8iue maneuvermentality he had bred into lsi8diui$ionduring training. . . . Not only were subordinate commander8required t operate independently within the spirit of Rommel a intent, but they were aG80 controlling forces moving on multiple routes knowing full well that bypassed Allie~ unit8 could cut off their supply line8.. , ~

the mazimum from the enormous po&+@d of our modernized forces? The first place to look for the answer to these questions is in our maneuver $ompanics. Junior leaders (platoon and tiompany) should be imbued with the epirit of maneuver warfare. The following quotation ~ , emphasizes thie quality: Significant sectors of future battlefields will be everv bit as confused as our doctnne warns. Leaders at every leuel u,ill need to make their own decisions and execute their

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own plans when effechve command and control from higher echelon breaks down. . the structtiralism of old fashioned linear thinking will ho longer suffice. Events are bound to move too swiftly. . . . Every unit and subunit must possess the flexibility to concentrate their combat pou,ers in the

ecuting either option under the stress of the moment. Ask a second question, 1s there a senior officer maneuver zealot in your division wbo preaches the tenets of maneuver warfare to the junior officers at every Opportunisty? A third question to ask (in armor units) most important to your is, Whats bossesmaneuver training, individual tank gunnery, platoon tacticid gunnery or maintenance and appearance of vehicles? The same question (in Bradley fighting veh]cle-equipped infantry units) could be. Whats most important to your boeses dismounted training, individusf vehicle gunnery, platoon tactical gunnery or maintenance snd appearance of vehicles? These are not easy questions to answer, for they all include the issue of limitations on the time and space aveilable for training. Yet, if the answers to these questions fsil to reflect a training focus that places mounted maneuver training and tactical gunnery on a priority equal to other forms of trsining,-then it is virtually certain that the unit is not being adequately trained to operate in a high-speed, nonlinear environment. In addition to appropriate philosophy and frsining focus, it is essential that a modernized heavy brigade operate under a standard system of operatiomd procedures that will Wow rapid. wide-ranging operations. The first of these procedures must be a shorthand language for radio communication. There is a tendency to believe that the advent of better communication eecurity devices allows the use of plain text traffic on sfl secured nets. This belief leads to long-winded, confusing discussions of missions and concepts between seniors and subordinates. These discussions provide too much electronic signature and may lead to mistskes and misunderstanding in the beat of battle. ,!

Are we instilling this maneuver mentality in our maneuver commanders? Are they training their units to execute accordingly? Does tactical planning reftect current doctrinal philosophy?In short, are we getting the maximum horn the enormous potential of our modernized forces?

&

shifting direction of the enemy no matter how man-y reorientations may be involved. How me we doing at baptizing our lieutenants and captains with this maneuver. based spirit the Germans call Auftragstaktic (performing based on mission-type orders)? Ask the following question of a battalion or brigade commanden How many of your captains, faced with a penetration in their defensive sector and unable to communicate with their controlling headquarters, uou[d (al perceiue that a breakthrough is the most dangerous threat and attempt to u,ithdrau, to the next defendable terrain to the rear: (b) see the enemy penetration as an opportunity to get at the enem vs vukzerab[e flanks and immediately coun terat tack toward their own rear? Too often, for reasons to be addressed later, the answer is: my best compan.v commander would counterattack, m v second best u,ould consider it but hesitate. The rest would probably attempt to move to the next defendable terrain. Many would haue trouble ex-

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The dash speed of the Ml and M21M3 and the increased numbers of Army aviation attack and scout assets demand that a standard system of navigational control measures be included in the operational shorthand language. Unfortunately, our experience in Vietnam has given navigations control measures (and other operational shorthand methods) a bad name. In Southeast Asia, ~$e North Vietnamese were abIe to develop detailed order of battle data and determine the location of future operations baeed on interception and analyeis of the radio transmission of iarge, static US units using fixed call signs and simple points of origin systems. As a result, our communication security cOmnmnity has convinced our leaders that shorthand language is bad. This is simply not true. A heavy brigade must be more concerned with the length of transmissions and the clarity of its instruc. tions thnn whether the enemy determines wbo is Warrior 6 and where the unit is moving in the next 30 minutes. The intelligence is extremely perishable and, at the brigade level. the enemy wants to use direction-finding techniques, not analyze what is being said. The fact of the matter is that, faced with a legitimate need for simple navigational control measures, most battaIion commanders disregard the admonishments of the signal security copv munity and establish an ad hoc system anyway. This creates a battlefield filled with a variety of systems which, in turn, causes confusion as units attempt crossattachment in the heat of battle. Other essential operational procedures are: e A etandard means of marking combat vehicles to aIlow easy identification of units at extended ranges. e A system of mounted snd dismounted
I

The dash speed of the illl and M21M3 and the increased numbers of Army aviation attack and scout aasetsdemand that a standard system ofnauigational control measures be in- / eluded in the operational shorthand language. Unfortunately. our experience in Vietnam . hus giuen navigational control measures (and other operational shorthand methoo%)a bad name.

battle drills for both movement and enemy contact. e A system for controlling engineer obstacles to ensure that counterattacks and other friendly movements are not foiled by random application of barriers from platoon through brigade. Control of obstacles is an especially important requirement. For example, the division establishes obstacle zones (leaving areas between zones open for movement of large forcbs), brigades establish belts within zones (again, with maneuver space between belts) and battalions, establish obstacles within belts. Zone and belt overlays are issued across the division. Nobody places an obstacle outside a zone or belt. While no one srg& with the need for this type of procedure, few divisions appear to be using such a system. Tbe list of operational procedures must also include standard methods of controlling attack helicopters, standard logistical procedures and habitual cross.attachment of combat and combat suppor~ assets. in - the case of each of these procedures. the key word is standmd or, more importantly, standmd at division level. The capability of the heavy brigade and the fluid characteristics of tbe future battlefield d~mand that systems and prw cedures su~port rapid and frequent crossattachment and movement throughout a division sector. This means that all companies, battalions and brigades within a division must sing from a single sheet of 33msiz..< & <anlparly Serrrrnsmitr rnssz f= zdl%em pazz % U=*%=W-a% mm-% amT the division sector and {attached to another battalion and brigade) roll into the attack without a long pause to learn how his new headquarters operates. Finally, our heavy brigades and divisions must develop tactical plans reflecting both the realities of the battlefield and tbe capability of our force. We must move

away from emlier concepts of linearity. Consider the following . we remain dangerously in love with the line, that passive, comforting oddity among the dynamic images of battle. . Psychologically, and in some respects, actually, lines impose coherence on disorder. Experience has taught us that they do serve a valid purpose and so we employ them. But the danger lies in becoming psychologically dependent on what is, after al[, only an abstractio n, Neither our potential opponents nor our organizational structure supports a cOn-

The capability of the heavy brigade and the fluid characteristics of the future battlefield demand that systems and procedures support rapid and frequent crossattachment and mouement throughout a division sector. This means that all companies, battalions and brigades within a diuision must sing from a single sheet of rua.sic.

tinuation of the idea of a linear appr &h. 1n the defense, M2 Bradfey-@oun;ed infantry units are long on firepower and mobility and short on foot soldiers. Thus, the strongpoint with combat vehicles operating around it must become the norm. Likewise, our new tank is most lethal when moving rapidly from critical point to critical point, appearipg on the flanke and rear d s= ?sStmly. 1%:5 js?zz aa&&r tat& Wbmz S%* +%s a pzd%ox m a stat% d%+%msive TO% Offensively, scouts out, Iooklng for the we&. point and moving IateraUy to exploit. must be the rule. Tactical plans reflecting these changes must include the use of electronic assets to provide the eyes formerly p ovided by troops on-line. T L def&rsive nature of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commit-

..
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ment probably contributes to our continued reliance on a linear approach. However, even within the concept of forward defense, our tactical plane muet reflect a reliance on larger, tank-heavy reserves focused on a eeries of offensiveoriented, maneuver-based, counterattack plane throughout the divieion area. These plans must be dfecussed, rehearsed during commend post exercises (CPXS) and practiced routinely during field training exercises to eneure we can execute what we have on paper. This discussion of procedures end planning cauees us to return to tbe question of how we are progressing in the effort to combine new capability with new philosophy. Discussion with commander and former commanders suggests (as with the mentality of our junior leaders) that our progrese in standardizing combat procedures and rethinking tactical planning concepts may not be as rapid as it should be. There appeere to be far too little standardization of operational procedures at divisional level. Our Army is fifled with smart, hardworking commanders wbo recognize the need for the kinds of procedures we have outlined. Many have devised operational procedure end. systems. Unfortunately, too often the procedures change at the coordinating points between units. There are too few cases where sff the leaders of no entire divisiotl are using a common Iangoage and set of procedure. Our Armywide efforts at standardization have been largely misdirected. We have put a disproportionate effort on where we should tie the camouflage system on our infantry carriers ae opposed to how our mechanized infantry leaders wilt tsfk to each other on the battlefield. Similarly, we are spending untold hours arguing the relative merit of various engagement on Tank Table VIII (individuef tank qualifica-

tion) to etrmdardize rather than eneuring that we can connect end disconnect our tank companies from any brigade (including the aviation brigade) witbin the divieion.

In the &fense, M2 Bradley-mounted infantry units are long on firepower and mobility and short on foot soldiers. Thus, the sfrongpoint with combat vehicles operating around it must become the norm. Likewise, our new tank is most lethal when moving rapidly from critical paint to critical point, appearing on tfw flanks and rear of an enemy. It is just another tank when usedas apillbox in a static a!efenaiue role,

In eimiku fashion, our tacticsf plans are etilf too conservative. Faced with the very reaf threat of an enemy finding a seam in our defense, we hesitate to abandon a fineer approach. We are reluctant to mefse plarw placing more of our highly agile forces I d reserve, prepared to react as scouts or cavalry as electronic systems begin to paint the picture of the battlefield. The probIems of lack of standardization and conservative planning are m@nified by the fimited training opportunities f r brigade-sized units. The National tleini 3 ,+! Center (NTC) is a magnificent asset. Yet, its impact on the force is limited if one,cpnsiders tbe time between densities, persohnel turbulence end Iimited maneuver space at home station. Likewise, in Germqny, weather, competition for major trahiing areas and inadequate locet training areas can deny a brigade the ability to conduct; adequate maneuver training for periods in excess of 18 months. Despite the benefits of simulations, CPXS and smefl-umit trrdning, it is unrealistic to expect that a brigade or division can conduct high-risk, msneuver-

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Senior infantrymen are too apt to belieoe that infantry can be all things to all people. The statement u~e reall light infantry when the ramp comes down is symptomatic of this idea. In fact. there are major differences between the light, airborne, air assault and Ranger infantry and the mechanizedinfantry Fort Benning is attempting to support simultaneously.

based tactical operations if its full-up practice is limited to every other REFORGER. As a result. our capability remains inconsistent. Units that have developed a division-wide maneuver mentality, coupled with a division-wide standard way of doing business and blessed with repeated experience at the NTC or a good run of luck with the weather in Germany, can develop extraordinary fighting capabilities. Others will function well below this level.

In addition to these iseues, the heavv force. community continues to suffer from misconceptions and infighting among its members. Senior infantrymen are too apt to believe that infantry can be all things to all people. The statement were all light infantry when the ramp comes down is symptomatic of this idea. In fact. there We major differences between the light, airborne, air assault and Ranger infantry and the mechanized infantry Fort Benning is attempting to support simultaneously. In like fashion, many armor leaders believe that mechanized infantrymen are just like cavalry or that panzer grenadiers are part of armored warfare and should be appended to the armor community. ,4s a result. there is often an air of mistrust between the service school components of the heavy forces community. and joint solutions to common problems are slow to ap. pear. Despite these problems. there are indicators that our leaders, trainers and service schools are moving in the right direction. The training manuafs published jointly by the infantry and armor schools are reflecting not only the doctrinal principles expressed in FM 100-5 but al~ the need for the standardized procedures required to implement tbe doctrine. Common drills, operational language and vehicle markings are beginning to appear in our manuals and in our units. The number of battalion and brigade commanders who understand the concepts and the .requirements of maneuver-based tactics is on the rise. The key to wtstaining and accelerating this progress lies with the commanders of our heavy divisiohs. This commander, his principal maneuver assistant and his three brigade commanders create the chemistry which drives the division. One of the most fascinating phenomena in our Army is this change in chemistry resulting from the reassi&ment of one or more of these key

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players. Institutionalized procedures disappiar almost overnight as officers who have risen on the wings of innovation throw out the old methods and bring in their own. What was a sound tactical procedure, smart drill or clever control procedure becomes a doctrinal error, or w,orse, in the eyes of the new leader. teach, quiz. eavesdrop on radio nets and appear on hilltops to ensure procedures are understood and used. When a senior leader is reassigned, his replacement should be handed the SOP and told, This ia the way we operate. Youll need to be able to use and teach this language. This will cause innovative energies to be focused on execution. Ae discussed ear+er, the creation of the maneuver mentality is coupled with the development and sust@ment of a commnn set of procedures. As the commanding general and his principal subordinates create and teach the common language, they must encourage the units junior leaders to develop the initiative. aggressiveness and skill to react instinctively in accordance with any plans intent. This is done by drawing on blackboards and in the du~t on the side of a vehicle. Most importantly, it is done by creating training exercises that will let young leaders at. tempt to outthink and outreact an opponent. Rather than pouring over lengthy five-paragraph field orders, lieutenants and captains must be trained to hear: r Blue 6, this ts Raider 6. Enemv tank corn~ panv mol,ing northwest in column vicinity. f3d5 Blitz to C36 South l.s, tVest 3.0. Onent north west. Report set. Contact JAA T [joint air attack team/ on vour frequencv in Is minutes. The thought process developed throu /$ use of the staff estimate process and forrnb) order is equally important. It should,, $QWever. be developed in CPXS, tactical exercises without troops and other staff exercises. On the maneuver battlefield: the mental process must be instinctive. Commanders must be prepared to have young armor and mechanized infantry lead- ; ers get lost, rush into ambushes and leave , Ml and IW2 sections all over the countryside as they learn how to move rapidly and react violently. After-action reviews must contain the phrases great training,

As the commanding general and his principal subordinates create and teach the common language, they must encourage the unit a junior leaders to deuelop the initiative, aggressiveness and skill to react instinctively in accordance with any plan .sintent. . . . it is done by creating training exercises that will let young leaders attempt to outthink and outreact an opponent.

Battalion and brigade commanders are the biggest change agents: they have the most direct and frequent access to the company-level maneuver units. Since division commanders have been correctly schooled to deal in mission-type orders, they are often reluctant to mandate procedures Give me the task and the resources, boss. Don t tell me how Lo do it. While this command philosophy is correct in most cases. it will not work in the maneuver arena if the commander expects to produce a war-fighting organization of consistent quality. He must insist that common procedures are institutionalized across the division. That means some type of tactical. standing operating procedure (SOP) created at divieion and treated as the bible throughout the organization. Proponency committees, war-fighting conferences and other forums can be used to develop and agree on procedures but, once publisbed, they must be cthe law. GeneruIs, colonels and lieutenant colonels must

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completely screwed up, lets trdk about why and OK, lets try it again. In short, our division commanders must develop tacticaffy proficient risktakers throughout the division. F]nstly, the commander must insist on the development arrd exercise of maneuverbased tactical plans at division level. Whether these plans are for ror exercise at Fort Hood, Texas, or a general defense plerr in West Germany, they must reflecti e An understanding of the nonlinear nature of the present battlefield. e The nesd for large, tank-heavy reserves capable of rapid reaction. e An increased use of intelligence assets ae a substitute for a line of units shoulderto-shotdder along the front. Offensive operations must seek the seam, hold heavy forces capable of reacting laterally out of contact end aim for the indirect approach. Both offensive arrd defensive operation muet reflect the ability to rapidly synchronize combat capabilities errd apply them at the key point in time and space. Having placed the burden on the division commander as the key to getting the maximum potential from our new organizations and equipment, we ehould add that he needs help from outside the division. First of all, the training concept embodied in the NTC muet be expanded. The forces deployed in Europe must be given similar opporturdties for reetistic training at the battalion arrd brigade kevele. Competition for use of existing major training areas ie exacerbated by their limited maneuver epace. Continued urbanization and the weather complicate the prospects for acceptable trafrrfng opportunities on the countryside. Together, these factors argue for establishment of an NTC-east somewhere in NATO; Spain has been mentioned as a possible spot. Likewise, within the US Army

Commanders must be prepared to huve youny armor and mechanised infantry leaders yet lost, rush into ambushee and leave Ml and M2 eectionsall over the countryside aa they learn how to move rapidly and react violently. Atter-action reviewe must contain the phrases great training, completely screwed up, lete talk about why and OK, let e try it again.

Forces Command, we should continue to seek ways of decreasing the time between rotations to the NTC. Adding maneuver space, hotbedding equipment rmd adjusting the current NTC training schedule should afl be considered. Commanders continued frustration with the lack of adequate maneuver trairring must b~ addressed in Europe rmd in the United States. Finally, the US Army Trafrrfng and Doctrine Commend must continue its effort to train young leaders in the risk-taking marreuver mentrdity and produce trsirdrrg documente focusing on standard operationtd methods. %rmdnrdization neede to he carefully defined. Agonizing over standardization of load plans is the incorrect ap preach. Establishing a type divisional SOP codifying a common language and eet of control procedures will greatly advance our ability to exploit the new heavy brigade. . Tbfs article is full of opirrions that were developed, in tfre main, through experience

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in a heavy brigade with our newest equipment. The opinions were subsequently reinforced through lengthy discussions with other leaders who had recent command experience throughout the heavy side of our Army. We remain convinced that the operational style of the heavy force commander ie the key link between technical capabilit y and new doctrine. The command~s skill in development of the maneuver mentrdity, SOPS end tactical thinking reflecting the realities of the nonlinear battlefield must keep pace with the modernization of our heavy forces if we are to rerdize our meximum combat potential. It is equally clear that the division com-

mander is the key pert of the equation. In a modern heavy division, companies end battalions will couple end uncouple from higher headquarters rapidly and often. Thus, it is at division level that standardization must occur, and operational style must be set. If the commander and his immediate subordinate understand the need for common methods, a maneuver mentefity and tactical plans and exercises reflecting our new dpctrine. then this understanding will saturate the entire division. If the Army can pr}vide this organization with the time, money and maneuver space to practice its tjrade, the potential of the new heavy brigade will be realized. +

NOTES
T F,e,d Mm.a, W05, 00,,.,,0, Departrne, of the A,,!), Wasw@an, D C 20 Araust 1382,ChaDter 1 2 Ibsti chapter 2 3 colonel John soya Brrer!ng o. the Bo@ r...?Compe!,!,ve Obsewaffon OeclstonAccto. cycles, mtr.d..tlon W Wmam S L$d, 1 August 1978 4 Count Yock ,0 Wartenburg, N.cmleon m . General. US Arm war Co!leae All 01 war collOoJ#um. us Army war college Carlr,le Barracks. Pa November 1983 volume I D i04 5 Erwn R.ammel.Ronmw Paw,, .dJteL1 by B H LhddellHart, Ha, court Bra.. Jovmovtch m., N Y, 1953, C.amers 1.4 6 F W .0. Melte.thm. P..zer Bmlm A St.dY.! me Employment O ,l,,no, , ,/,, Second Wor,d War U,verslly Of Oklahoma Press, Norman 0K18 1956 w4356 7 Ftr$t Lmuten.nl Ralph H Peters Jr, ,%at!left.la l.ltlat!ve and the Small U!l,, Arm. December 19SZ D 50 8 rbtd

CoLmel Jared I. Bates is the commander, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne DLommm, Fort Bragg, North Carolina He receiued a bachetws degree lium Cornell University, . master s degree from the Umuwszty of Karmas and is a graduate of the USA CGSC and the US Army War Colkga He has held a uarwry of command and staff positions in both hewy and light forces, zndudin~ serumg as commander, 1st Battalion /Mechanized, 15th Infantry,andG3, 3d Tnfmm,-y Diuismn (Mechamzed), Wurzburg. West Germany

/f

,,.
Lzeuterumt Colonel (P) Jimmie B Quinn is the director of Resource Managenwnr, US Army Ar. mo r Center and Fort Knox, Ken tuck y He re. ceiued a B. S.B A. from Henderson State Uniue,stty, an M B A. from the Unwersity of Ark&nsas and is a graduate of the Air Force Command and Staff Cdiege and the US Army War Colkge. His assignments include serving as comptmUer. 3$ InfantryDiuzsion (Mechanized), and commander, Ist Battalion. 84th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) /

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AirLand Baffle in the accepted war-fighting doctrine of the US Army. However, there is much evidence that many otKcer8 da not understand it. This article attempta to provide an interpretation of some of the theoretical and intellectual aspects of the doctrine and suggests a direction for the professional development of the oficer corps.

IRLAND Battle has been the official doctrine of the US Army for almost four years. Yet, many leaders in the combat units remafn lethargic in accepting the doctrine. This is cause for concern. Seversl psrtiaf explanations,, for this lethargy are offered. One frequently heard is, We do not have the equipment to implement AirLrmd Battle doctrine, let alone time to think on it. Another goee, I do not understand the doctrinez besides, understanding doctrine ie for colonels and generals, and Doctrine takes 10 years to permeate the system. We can accept these explanations if we are willing to gamble that our opponents wilf not attack within the next six years.

The principal problem in underetsnding AirLand Battle doctrine, inculcating it into the coIfective intellect of the officer corps rmd prepsring our maneuver units to fight using the doctrine, remains cerebral That is, the officer corps understands neither the theoretical nor the intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine. Blame for this rests on the collective intellect of the officer corps. We, as bumen beinge, generally tend to resist change. Without pressures to do so, we often tend to leave interpretation and difficult thinking to they-tbose smart people in institutions and thinktanks. While they can be partially blamed for not helping to interpret AirLand Battle

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doctrine in sufficient depth, the smart people in divisions and corps also deserve some of the blame. At the division and corps levels, the theoretical can be merged with the practicrd. Thus, the divisions and corps are ideal places to interpret the doctrine in officer professionrd development seminars, in field training exercises, in command post exercises and in the numerous small-group interactions occuring daily. Without question, the authors of AirLend Battle doctrine developed it with indepth theoretical and intellectual underpinnings. They had a vieion of modern war connecting the present to the past and the future. This intellectual substance dissipated during the consensus-building process of doctrinaf development. Yet. the kernel of brilliance contained in AirLand Battle doctrine has the potential to grow and encourage creativity. After all. the doctrine is a compilation of the thoughts of some of the meet brilliant men in hietory. The challenge, then. is left to us. We are the professionrds who are dedicated to being prepared to fight and to winto help the doctrine mature, to capture and use its inherent power, to infuse our soldiers with its creative brilliance and, perhaps most importantly, to understand, to the greatest extent practicable, the complicated phen6mena of war. AirLand Battle doctrine assumes an intense interaction between two active and intelligent forces. These forces are attempting to defeat each other. In this respect, war is seen as a duel: War. . is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass . . . but rdways the collision of two fiving forces. This duel occurs at all levels, albeit with varying degrees of intensity and scope. The doctrine suggests a strong relationship between engagements, battles and campaigns. It also suggests a strong relationship between tactice, operations and

strategy. In this respect, engagements and battles are not viewed as discrete events. Instead, AirLand Battle doctrine seeks to join the functions of the battlefield to create

Without question, the authors of AirLand Battle doctrine developed it with in-depth theoretical and intellectual underpinnings. They had a vision of monkrn war connecting the present to the past and the future. This intellectual substance dissipated during the consensus-buildingprocess of doctrinal development.

synergism. This emphasizes the coalescence of several discrete parts to reinforce the strengths of each into a powerful whole. The doctrine cells for achieving synergism among the combined arms to enhance the chance of defeating a quantitatively superior opposing force. On the other hand, the doctrine recognises numerous constraints reducing the effecF tiveness of combined arms eynergy. Of criticaI importance in overcoming these constraints, the operational campaign plan serves as a guide to the tictivities of combined arms teams at various levels to ,re- / lease their full potential. To understand the doctrine. one needs ~ t . understand the doctrines tenets. The$d tenets are, in turn, linked to the seven iqk peratives of combat, the principles of wet and the theoretical underpinnings of tbe doctrine. Thus, to fully understand the@ stract and inherent intellectual power of the doctrine, one should understand the links between these aspects of the doctrine. AirLand Battle doctrine describes tbe way the Army intends to wage war and guides institutional thinking about the conduct of war. From a materiel perspective, the doctrine guides the development of

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technology to support the cohcept of wer. Field Msnusf (FM) 100-5, Operations: . . . deliberately attempts to bring the components of the tnad of soldiers, weapons, and doctnne into harmony. It relates todays dynamic technology to todays soldiers and leaders through forward looking ideas based on time-tested pnnciples. It provides the parameters with which technology should be pursued. 2 From a personnel perspective, the doctrine guides both training and education to enable the Arm ys soldiers to fight end win. The doctrine provides a common conceptual framework in which commanders end staffs at cdl levels cen plan to wage wer effectively. This assumes that the Army has mr officer corps that understands the doctrine well enough to accomplish both tacticsl and operatiomd goals. AirLend Battle doctrine identifies the Armys operational concept. FLM100-5 discueses this as: the core of its doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tuctics, procedures, organizations, support, equipment, and training. It must also be uniformly knou,n and understood. 9 The US Army$ operational concept revolves around four main ideas e The primary object of nll operations is to destroy enemy forces. e The importrmce of securing or retaining the initiative end exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy . .. is crucizl to success in combat operations. @ The intent of each bigher commander must be understood by the entire chain of command. e The tenets of initiative: depth, agility and synchronization sre important for success. The Armys operational concept can influence the entire organization with the somewhat abstract but, nonetheless, powerful

offensive spirit. Explanation of the concept sets a baee-line intellectual tone that must be accepted to understand modern American war. The full impact of theee conditions, taken together are difficult to imagine, much less to understand. But their study is imperative. In elmost elt conceivable situations in which our principal antagonist is the Soviet Union, US forces will be forced to fight at a significant quantitative disadvrmtage. We have, at best, a narrow qualitative advantage. The AirLand Battle doctrine has the potential, when fully implemented, to increase this advantage and offer a tremendous opportunity to exploit the qualitative edge that the NATO alliance should carry into the 21st Century. In the effort to emphasize qualitative superiority over quantitative inferiority, FM 100-5 emphasizes two criticel aspecte of modern wnrfnre. The doctrine is designed to accentuate the inherent psychological, social and cognitive strengths of the US eoldier. These strengths include using initiative, emphasizing flexibility, capitalizing on mobility, exploiting latent violence, emphasizing the inherent competitiveness of the American psyche, focnsing natural aggressiveness &nd doing the unexpected. These strengths are summarized by saying the doctrine . . . makes use of all available resources and auoids stereotyped patterns by calling for bold, flexible, offensively oriented defenses organized to meet the requirements of METT [missibm enemy, terrain and troops /. AirLand Battle doctrines complexity compels a quest for superior planning and superior execution. These, in turn, suggest a need for better thinking by our leaders. One authority states In executium the AirLand Battle means nothing more {orless) tftan figh ti.ng smart using every element af combat power from

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psychological operations to nuclear weapons to defeat the enemy. 8 Superior planning, superior execution and better thinking are intended to achieve several significant effects, to include: e Gaining moral ascendancy over our antagonist. e Gaining a decisive advantage over our antagonists by thinking and acting quicker, thus facilitating acquiring and maintaining the initiative. o Maximizing the use of all human resources and combat assets to achieve combat synergism. AirLand Battle doctrine has strong links to the theory of both Sun Tzu and Karl von Clausewitz. It refere constantly to its reliance on the principle of war and uses the seven imperatives of combat to bridge the gap between theory and reality. The strong ties to both theory and the principles of war serve eeveral pm-poses, to incIudw @ Providing perspective to better under- ) etand the foundations, thus the true meti-~ i ing, of the doctrine. fs Providing a broad conceptual framd-~ work in which to solve rnifitnry problems, ~ e Providing commonality of understanding. e Linking the present to the past ~d providing the vehicle for thinking about the future. e Providing depth to a somewhat broad ~ and abstract concept. AirLand Battle doctrine emphatically underscores the offensive. The offensive has a strong psychological effect on soldiers who are in the attack or who are in the

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defense going over to the offense Surprise, concentration, and violence can give the attacker his only significant advantagethe initiative. If the attacker loses the initiative, even ternporanly or locally, he will jeopardize the success of the entire operation. 9 Emphasis on the offensive suggests the quickest and surest way to either destroy or defeat the enemy. The offense is the de-

In almost all conceivable situations in which ourprincipal antagonist is the Souiet Union, US forces will be forced to fight at a significant quantitative disadvantage. We haue, at best, a narrow qua2itatioe advantage. The AirLand Battle doctrine has the potential, when fully implemented, to increase this aduantage. . . .

cisive form of war, the commenders only menrrs of attaining a positive goal or of completely destroying an enemy force.0 AirLsnd Battle doctrine suggests the com duct of the offense to achieve well-thoughtout ends; it does not emphasize mindless attrition. AirLand Battle doctrine emphasizes the physical znd the mud domains of wer, This twin thrust of wex mu be traced primerily to the theory of Clausewitx The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes. In formulating any rule concerning physical factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part that morale factors may play in it. . ..1 When discussing the physictd domain of war, FM 100-5 again borrows heavily from Clausewitz by emphasizing the destruction of enemy forces: of afI the possible eims in w=, the destruction of the enemys armed

forces always appears as the highest. A prominent historian who recently anelyzed FM 100-5 confirms this premise (emphasis on destruction) by stating The constant use of the word destroy is consonant with the interpretation. Even the destruction of the attacker is mentioned as a goat of the defense. Successful wars are fought with a sense of coherence that encourages the careful planning of campaigns Iinked with equally well-planned engagements end battles. Engagements end battles conducted in either isolation or with no purpose are impotent.: engagements and battles fought in consonance wit h a scheme snd an overall csmpeign goat are powerful in respect to having a unified effort. Tbe inherent violence of the battlefield encourages t kinking through the implications on the morel and the physicrd domains of wzr. Again, the writings of Clausewitz provide the theoretical underpinnings for this focus as, Every engagement is a bloody and destructive test of physiceJ and morel etreirgth.4 The necessity to think accurately and deeply about combat in this environment posee substantial mental challenges for those planning to implement Air Land Battle doctrine. While not discussing the concept, per se, the doctrine emphasizes the importance of identifying what the Germens calf a Sch werpunkt. This suggests the maneuvering of dispersed combat power to achieve a concentration of mass against en enemy vulnerability. One authority state= Schwerpunkt is the center of gravity or point ofpnncipal effort. . The movement of a Schwerpunkt is a continual seeking for the weak points of resistance, in order to attack them with local superionty. The Sch werpunk t concept emphasizes the need for intelligence, mass, maneuver and initiative:atl essentieJ to AirLand Battle doctrine.

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AirLand Battle doctrine places equal emphasie on the moral dom&r of wsr. This abstract but important aspect of combat involves tbe intmrgibles of wer-, including will, leadership, intuition, esprit snd collective intellect. Initiative ie one of the most important intangibles of con bat: the side that has the initiative also has momentum. Momeritum makes the enemy react. The side with the initiative has a powerful moral advantage in that it infects soldiers with the intangible but powerful notion of positive activeness toward a goel. A soldier who experienced German World Wnr II blitzkrieg doctrine stated, Initiative, surprise and speed, the keys to victory, nre able to compensate on occasions for lack of material superiority and are able to demoralize and disorder the enemy. Clausewitz further expkdrre the concept of surprise snd its relationship with moref ascendancy by stating Surprise therefore becomes the mban; t~i gain supenonty, but because of its psych logical effect it should also be considered a,, 1 , an independent t element. The two key f;btors that produce surpnse are secrecy aod speed. Along with the emphasis that Clausqwl i z places on the morsf domsin of wer, Sun ~zu SISO provides theoretics underpinnings. Sun Tzu emphasized attacking the enemys plan. 8 He goes on to state, Therefore, ~ determine the enemys plans and you will 1 know which strategy will be successful and which will not. g Sun Tzu suggests the presence of a mentaf contest between opposing commanders .

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at each level. Each commander attempts to turn inside his cpponents decision cycle. In effect, each commander ie attacking the will of his opponent and is also attempting to attack his opponents mind. To attack the mind of the opponent and to cause him to react, FM 100-5 suggests the uee of the indirect approach. While Sun Tzu developed this concept, B. H. Liddell Hart resuscitated it in time for the Germans to use it to great advantage in World War IL The indirect approach is closely related to all problems of the influence of mind upon mind. . .Zo The notion of the indirect approach is closely related to Schwerpunk t, initiative, surprise and speed. Liddell Hart etates that, Whatever the form, the effect to be sought is the dislocation of the enemys mind and disposition.1 AirLand Battle doctrine advocates striking the enemys vulnerabilities when least expected with a superior force. Use of the indirect approach helps the commander attack the will of the enemy commander and troops. AirLand Battle doctrine also emphasizes deception and operations security (OPSECI. These concepts deal with nuance and abstraction, and their true meaning can be sesn only when they complement each other to eupport the commanders intent. Sun Tzu addresses deception by stating war is based on deception. .Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of force. Sun Tzu also recognizes OPSEC when he states. The ultimate in disposing ones troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wiss lay plans against you. 2 AirLand Battle doctrine resurrects the operational level of war. The American way of war in the 20th century has revolved around the concepts of attrition and annihilation. Since tbe United States usually

outnumbered its opponents in human and materiel resources. acceptance of tbe concepts of attrition and annihilation was natural. Edward N. Luttwak explains this phenomenon by stating: In the Amerkan case historically the goal has been to accelerate the evolution of any conflict with maximum mobilizahon of the economy for the fastest possible buildup of forces, the deployment of the lnrgest forces sustainable against the largest concentration of enemy forces possible to maximize the overall rate of attrition. 24 While some US commanders in World War II for example, Douglas MacArthur and George S. Pattonpracticed the operational art, the war for the US Army was

Emphasis on the offensive suggests the quickest and surest way ta either destroy or defeat the enemy. The offense is the decisive form of war, the commanders only means of attaining a positive goal or of completely destroying an enemy force. A irLand Battle doctrine suggests the conduct of the offense to achieve well-thoughtout ends; it does not emphasize mindless attrition. &

basically a war of attrition at the tactical level owing to the superiority of materiel resources. The operatiorrd level according to FM 100-5 is: the theory ;f larger unit operations. It also in uolues planning and conducting campaigns. Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles.s The essence of the operational art has been capturetf by retired Lieutenant General John H. Cushmmr who states that operational art is:

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(AlflLAtw BATTLE

\ I#GTRINE (

. . . a grasp

of marfare as a duel between

opposing forces each of which is governed by the minds of men . . . a thorough understanding of what goes on in the dynamics of the air/land battlefield the ability of the responsible commander to think in terms of the hmmonious orchestration of time, space, force, and lo~stics toward his ends. . e Luttwsk expleine the primary purpose of the operations level of war as, The operational level of war seeks to attain goafs set by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics.1 Thfs concept implies the existence of a Ifnk between tactics, operations and strategy. Tactics, of course, muet be conducted within the scope of operations. In turn, operations muet be conducted within the scope of etrategy. It also reinforces the criticality of the operational judgment of commanders wbo actively devise tactics and operations to fit en overall plan or goal. The concept amplifies the increasingly complex but tightly integrated and closely linked scheme of engagement, battle end campaign ae Clausewitz diecusses in On War. One of the best ways to understand the operational level of war and to gain insight into its implications fies in contrasting selected aspects of the tactical and the operational levels. They first differ hy the emphasis on defeating and controlling the mind of the enemy commander. The tacticaf level tends to focus on the destruction of enemy forces. The enemy division, army or front commander has to be attacked mentally. He must be manipulated to shape bie plrm so friendly forces can either destroy or defeat him. The Mlendly commander must gain moral ascendancy over the enemy commander. With moral ascendancy, the friendly commander can gain and maintain initiative at the operational level. Through defeating the mind of the enemy commander, the wiff of the enemy can be bro-

ken. With a breakdown of will, the enemy can be destroyed in depth. J. F. C. Fulfer offers a cogent thought that serves to buttress this ergumenti The decisive point is not the body of the hostile army, just as politically the decisive

Initiative is one of the most important intangibles of combat; the side that has the initiative also has momentum. Momentum makes the enemg react. The side with the initiative has apowerful moral advantage in that it infects soldiers with the irstangible but powerful notion ofpoeitiue actiuenese toward a goal.

point is not the body of the hostile nation. Politically the decisive point is the will of the hostile natios, and grand tactically (operationally), it is the will of the enemys commander. To paralyze this will we must attack his phm which expresses his w illhis reasoned decisions. 28 Military thec!riet Colonel Wallace P / Franr supporte this by stating: Our objective is to inffuence the mind of the enemy commander. Mental impressions are more important than physical damage. A decision is achieved when a psfchqlo~$ @ effect has been produced on the me y an< he becomes conuinced that to contm, 7 ~ his present course of action is useless. W Attacking the mind of the enemy c~mmander, though, has seversf implications for both knowing the enemy and m~puIating MS thinking through friendly act@eness. Another key difference between the operational level aud the tactical level is time.: Operational plamrers, for example, while in- terested in today, primarily focus on the future. Tactical planners are more concerned with immecfifite combat. To concentrate on the future, operational pkmners

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have to know time-and-space relationships for both friendly and enemy combat, combat support and combat service support. The expansion of our focus end compression of the enemys time are criticsf in attacking

AirLand Battle doctrine resurrects the operational level of mar. The American way of war in the20th century has revolved around the concepts of attrition and annihilation. Since the United States usually outnumbered its opponents in human and materiel resources, acceptance of the concept8 of attrition and annihilation was natural.

the mind of the enemy commander, in shaping the battlefield, in moving forces and logistics to support operations and in maneuvering combat power to either defeat or destroy the enemy. Depth of the battlefield also serves to differentiate between tactics and operations. Depth at tactical levels usually applies to the limits of direct or indirect-fire weapon systems end the organic ability to see deep. But depth at the operational level can stretch for hundreds of kilometers owing to the availability of assets to see deep end at. tack deep. Depth also applies to dimensions of the battlefield, including rear, width and space. One author defends this assertion by stating, ccThe operational level, by its very nature, moves in dimensions of mass, space and time that are greater than those of tactics. Depth of the battlefield at the operational level is closely related to time and to shaping the opposing force and commanders plan. While the concepts of centere of gravity are evident in tacticaI, operational and strategic levels of war, the concept is

especially apropos to the operational level because of simple feasibility. A center of gravity is the hub of aff power end movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which alf our energies sheuld be directed. 31 While the center of gravity is often an opponents army, it can aleo be other critical aspects or assets of his operationsfor example, logistics; command, control, communications and intelligence nodes; enemy commanders; and pipe lines. The first step in planning for operational campeigne is to identify the enemys center of gravity. The operational commander, then, must eneure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offense. Once an opponents center of gravity is identified, coherent plans can be developed involving engagements, battles and campaigns to attack that center of gravity. The operational level of war requires an expanded capability to think. This capabil. it y is characterized by several requirements. Fir<t, due to the depth of corps and higher operations and to the time required for planning and conducting operations, the planner at the operation~ level must be able to think in the future. Planning for future operations requires anticipatory thinkingthat is, thinking that anticipates activities on both sides; thinking that acknowledges links bet ween engagements, battles and campaigns: thinking that examines effects; and thinking that identifies some of the contingencies possible when frictions of war alter a plan. Sun Tzu offers additional insight into anticipatory thinking in the statement, When the enemy presents an opportunity, epeedily take advantage of it. Anticipate him in seizing something be values. Thie type of thinking involves dding with vagueness, embiguity and less than certain information. The officer enga~ed in anticipatory think-

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Ist Cavalry

Division,Fait Hood, Texas

Wkilepast conventional wars have tended to demand a linear batfletfeld,AirLandBattle doctrine accepts the notion that US forces may have to tight on a nonlinear bizttlet?eld. This conjures image8 of a less than tidy battlefield in the theorists mind. Yet, it makes sense when thinking through the nature of a potential roaragainst the Souiets.

. J

ing must be comfortable with ambiguity. The planner at the operational level must recognize the relationskips between the physiczl and moral domeins of wer. Meneuver, for example, can be used to obtain the initiative. Initiative enables the friendly commander to achieve morel ascendancy end provides the physical means for the friendly commander to turn inside the enemy commanders decision cycle. Controlling the initiative encourages freedom of action, so friendly forces can maintain momentum and combat activeneee. While past conventional ware have tended to demend a linear battlefield, AirLand Battle doctrine accepts tbe notion that US forcee may have to fight on a nonfinear battlefield. This conjuree imagee of a lese thnn

tidy battlefield in the theorists mind. Yet, it makes eenee when thinking through the nature of a potential wsr against the} Soviets. .]. The Soviet vision of war, the way they I , tend to attack and the quantitative w&- ness of NATO combine to dictate thie W-WV linear battlefield. The Soviets will attack on a wide front, seeking the weakest spots for exploitation. We can assume multiple penetrations along the front very early in a conflict. Additionally, the terrain of Centraf Europe suggests that physical con. etraints for the attacker znd the defender wifl dictate a nonline~ battlefieldfor instance, narrow vslleys, broad pkins and dominating tercain featuree. The numeroue builtup areas in West Ger-

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many pose a dilemma for the Soviets. They must bypaes builtup areas to assure momentum and speed. However, they face the risk of significant attacks against their lines of communication from forces defending these locations in strongpoint positions.

Another key difference between the operational level and the tactical level is time. Operational planners, for example, while interested in today, primarily focus on the future. Tactical planners are more concerned with immediate combat. To concentrate on the future, operational planners haue to know time-and-space relationships for both fiiendlg and enemy combat, combat support and combat service support.

Another reason for the nonlinew battle fieId is AirLand Battle doctrine itself. In en effort to provide a broad approach for fighting outnumbered and winning, the doctrine advocates the indirect approach, countefi attacks, striking weakness with strength end depth on the battlefield. The nonlinear battlefield supports eff of these approaches. Significant portions of a war in Central Europe wiII be on a fast-moving, mobile battlefield. Penetrations and counterpenetrations will occur. Neither intelligence nor communications wilf rdways be effective. The battlefield at timee will be corrfueing end chaotic for both sides. While such chaoe is somewhat distracting for the coherence of a defense, a chaotic battlefield could be devastating to an attacker whose combat power is built on norms and combined arms cohesion. A nonfinezw battlefield offers sigrdficant advantages to the defense if weapone systems, terrain and human resources are used correctly. A nonlinear battlefield also implies different approached to com-

mand and controlless control and more command. A uftragstak tik the theory, practice end training in the use of mission ordereis closely associated with an emphasis on commend rather then control on a nonlinear battlefield. This concept encourages the choice of 4seneible courses of action which contribute to the desired outcome within the framework of the overall scheme. s This concept will be crucial when accepting the notion that units will be cut off and communications will be intermittent. In the same sense that Auftragstak tik servee to enable bigher commendere to make assumptions about their subordinates thought processes and actions, the subordinate can make assumptions about the superiors thought processes and actione. This applies particularly to reinforcement, combating rear area threats, breekout from encircIed positions and resupply. The nonlinear aspect of future battlefield has severef effects on the US officer corps. Fl~xibility of thinkhg muet be developed, nurtured and reinforced. The concept of initiative within the bounde of the overetl commanders plan neede to be reinforced. A common intellectual outlook and educational heritage must be developed to enable decisions to be made without normal meane of communication, and the officer corps must develop exceptional thinking and pIarming abilities. AirLand Battle doctrine is more descriptive then prescriptive of the phenomenon of war. Therefore, it does not provide definitive answers to ambiguous and difficult probleme. Officers should not learn what to think to solve complex military problems but, instead, they should learn how to think about war. AirLand Battle doctrine is inherently powerhd as it focuses on both the physicaf and the moref .domeins of war. The officer must understand many abstract relation-

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ships between the moref end physiceJ domains of wer. Furthermore, the officer must understand how seemingly unrelated elemente and events, in the moral end physical domeine, fit together on the battlefield. The doctrine ie strongly linlred with the theoriee of Clausewitz end Sun Tzu, so US Army officers must have a strong foundation in militery theory snd history to understand the doctrine. Part of the doctrines inherent power lies

in its emphasis on both nuance end relationship. Understanding these concepts, though, requires en extensive depth of knowledge in the art end the science of war. AirLend Battle doctrine provides the US Army with the potentiel power to emphasize our strengths, to expand our mentaf capabilities end to defeat a quantitatively superior foe. We must, however, stim~ate the thought processes that can turn latent power into active power. ~ .

NOTES
1 Karl .0. Cla.sewltz 0. War, translated and edltea w M!ch.el MOwardand peter Paret. Prl..eto. unlv.rsitY Press, Pmmeto., N J. 1976, P 77 2 H.ba Wass de Cze!ae,MI IIWMY Reform D.bale,, Toward. New Ame,tca- Amamach to W., US M!llt,rv Acaaemy Senior Co fweCe xx, us Wl$taw Academy, west Point, N Y. S5 J.ne 1982, P 10.1-31 3 F1,1o Manual (FM) 100.5, OPer.4110s, Dwmlmet of the Army. W.shlnnton, DC, 20 A.a.3t ?382, 02.1 4 fb;ti 5 Hub. was, a. Czege, challenge for th. F.t.re Eo.wtlng Pwec, Field Grade Battle Leaders ..5 Staff OlflC.,S, Ui?bl,,hed US ,4nnY Command and General staff college, Fort Leaven$+orlh, Km. 15 .%ptember Iw, D 5 0 Joseph J Redden, AlrL.nd 8.11!. Tim Global Doctrmw US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 18 May 1983, D 2 7 Lleulenant Colonel (P1 H.ba was, 0. Czege and Lieutenant colonel L D Hold.. The NevI FM t~5, Mlltt.rv Revtew J.lv 1982. w 53.70 8 was. de Czew Cha!lenW for me Future Educating Flerd Grade Battle Leaders and Staff Offtwrs. OD CIt, D 64 9 FM 1005, OPeretlmm w en, P 85 10 fb!d P 8.1 i 1 Cla,ewrtz, on 0!1 D 124 12 lbld, D39 13 ArCh9r JO..S, FM 100.5 A View From the IVOV Tower. M!!! WV Rewew, MaY 1984, P 18 233 14 Cla.sewl!z. rm 15 F 0 MIxscne, Attack A study of B!ftzhr@? T.ctlcs. Random House, N Y, !242, PP2 a.a 18 18 !btd, D17 %7 Cl,lsewttz, 0/7 .!1 L)198

d P

18 Sun Tz., The Art of War, translate by Samuel B Grliflth, 0.. ford Untemlty P,..,, L.do, Eg .1963 D 77 19 Ibfd, P 120 20 B H LladellHart St,ategv, Frederick A Pr.e9er Publ$sners. N Y. 195-4 PP 18 ?9 21 ILMo,p 1@4 22 S. T,, on Clt, P 106 23 !.9!5, P lCHI 24 Edward N L.twak, ,,The operational Level of War,, lntemn. tmn.! Sec.my, winter 193041, P 77 25 FM 10ck5,OLmr.flons, .,0 .11, P 2.3 of 26 dc.hnH c.snman, Org.!zation end OoeratlonEm,movment wcl..d Fomes, US ArmY War College, Carll$le Barracks, Pa, 1981, P 71 27 Luttwak, OD ml, P 61 28 J F c F. Iler, Tn. Fo.ndaticms of the Science of war, Hulchln. son & Co P.brishem Ltd, London, Eng, 1932, P 110 29 colonel Wallace P Fmz ,,Ma.eu.er The Q.amlc Element of Combat) M/w&vy flelew, MaY lW, P 12 30 Iblfl P 4 ) 31 clausw/iz w .11, cm59596 32 Colonel Wayne A Dw+nlng,WS Army operations Doctrtn& A. Challenge for the ?280s ana Beyond: Mllrtw Revtew, January 1983, D 67 $3 c1.usw+lz, w clt II 6>9 34 S. T,, w 011. P 140 35 oener.h a.mR 80 Meiie.thm c.. %9.11.s lmwc.fmn. fo~ NATO Mmtwy Doctrine, 8DM Comoratlon. M. Lean, V., 1980, PD 37.18, 36 Erich v.. Manstel.. 1.s1 Victorfes. Hew Re9.w p. ChlCago, Ill 1358, CID 54748 i

..+ 2
.3 , MILITARY REVIEW

Major Wayne M. Hall is the executive officer, KMth Military Intelligence Battalio?h Fort Car son, Colorado. He rsceiued a B S. fmm the University of Nebmskrz an MS. fmm Kansas State University and a Ph.D. fmm George Washington University. He is a.ko a graduate of the Command and GenemI Staff Officers Course and the Advanced Military Studies Course, USACGSC. He pi-euiously served as pkzns officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. His a~ck A Critique of the Dor mnelmining Pit appeared in the June 19s.5

,,

MilitsryReview.

,
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43

Perspectives
On Doctrine
- .0/ /=-----=.
~

. \

s===.

-@e

=4s===

Doctrine is the linchpin of an Army .s life. It gives direction to all of its endeavors. Understanding the basic doctrine of the US Army is the responsibility of all professionals. To aid in this understanding, the authors here present some perspectives on AirLand Battle doctrine. Some of the questions concerning why we have doctrine, who influencedthe current doctrine and how it euolved are addressed.

Indeed the euolution of tactical doctrine illustrates that the great value of doctrine is less the final answers it provides than the impetus it creates toward developing innovative and crea tiue SOIU tions for tactical , problems on future battle fields.

.$

,,

FM 100=5:

who
Influenced Whom?
Lieutenant Colonel Archie Galloway, US Army

UCCESS on the battlefield, most of us will agree, is attributable to an array of factors. Paramount among them is the commanders ability to synthesize his surroundings to include all aspects of the historical and human dimension, technology, geography end the enemy. As Robert A. Doughty implies, doctrinal stimuli greatly enhance synthesis. We are by no means limited to any one doctrinaf analogy, however. It is perhaps equally plaueible to relate doctrine to a crucible. In this case, the vessel (doctrine) provides a celcine environment for creating theoretical substances such as innovation, creativity, capability end synthesis. From thie analogy, we might offer the conjecture- that Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, serves the Army like a crucible. For example, the staffing of the current revision of FM 100-5 has produced a remarkable diversity of opinfon among the senior leadership. Although incorporating a wide range of ideas. the menuef provides a dynamic framework for thinking (and teaching) about war and stimulates the creativity that must take place on the battlefield. No doubt, the-conceptual roots of FM 100-5 can be traced to numerous origins. However, I intend to refute the popular thesis that FM 100-5 was influenced by the writings of any single theorist such ae Henri Jomini, Sun Tzu or Karl von Clausewitz. I have come to this conclusion because the perspective of FM 100-5 goes far beyond any .kingle theorist. Jomini, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz end other theorists impact

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on FM 100-5 only in certain practical and conceptual ways. FM 100-5 ie, in the final analyeis, a eyntheeie of many theorists.

AUTHORS PERSPECTIVE
Colonel Huba Wass de Czege hae etated that FM 100-5 ie a textbook (not a doctrinal writing effort) andshould bereadaseuch. His-perspective is certainly Clausewitzien inasmuch ae the theoretical intent of FM 100-5 is to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany bimto the battlefield. . .. The point is easily articulated and understood by a Claueewitzisn genik, but it remaine an overwhelming task for a somewhat Jominisn and prescriptive-type Army which prefers to be told how to do things. I am suggesting that the manuals authors furnished the Army and its commanders a vehicle for learning how to think about war. What, however. generated thie need for conceptualization, and why is it important? Before the 1982 manual, Army commanders were convinced that they would be unable to defeat the Soviets. What these commanders implied was that our theoreticeJ arrd doctrinal thinking about war via the active defense wae faulty. It put us at a disadvantage as a result of weaknesses in considering the basice of warfare-combat power, the morrd dimension, friction, initiative and historical perspective. In redressing these weaknesses, the authore of FM 100-5 drew upon the ieesons of bietory, the writings of the great mifitsry theorists [except Jomirrf apparently], the Armye historic approach to operations, and the strategic realities of a bipolar world to create a basis for the manuals theoretical content. The

authors felt etrongly that the foundations for theory and doctrine must be right this timeright for us as an Army. If not, then faulty logic would again appear in our analysis of battlefield problems. Conversely, if correct, then the ultimate outcome would be the destruction or defeat of the enemy and the achievement of our pofitical objectives. Among the military commurrity there is argument, however, that the drive f,o establieh the correct doctrinal foundation sent FM 100-5 from a prescriptive extreme to a Clausewitzian extreme. I do not believe this was the case. What has occurred in the manual is a much needed eynthesis of historical and theoretical ideas forcing the Army to embark on a corrective doctrinal course. As Yehoshafat Hsrkabi points out in his paper on theory and doctrine, military thinkers like Jomini. Clausewftz, Mao [Tse-tung], [B. H. Liddell] Hart, and [J. F. C.] Fuller all believed that military theorv is both uossible and vitaf for corn manders. d Theref@e, I suggest that tbe msnuale / authors, though greatly influenced by numerous theorists, are not, in the strict sense, followers of any particular one. Rather, they have assiinilated the many views of the masters and, in turn, >have / become influencers in their own right. k this capacity, they are attempting to dra d~,. the Armys attention to the possibility and, vital neceesit y for correct military theory and doctrine. In doing so, they are exposing the Army to a very basic theme which underwrites the entire msnual+e theme of totaf capability. FM 100-5 is an expression and an awereness of the current state of warfare, an expression of our influence and role as an Army in world affairs and an expression of how we view ourselves in relation to our adversaries. In the final analysis, the theme of total capability is an expression of

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I what we are-an Army which has come of age in the twilight of the 20th century. To add proof, however. to the central theoretical argument. an examination of the theorists themselves is required. supporting a particular theorist, but synthesis ia quite strong in FM 100-5 and appears predominant.

Sffff Tzu
&n Tzus The Art of War is by far the oldest military treatise in the world. Yet, Sun Tzu shows in a striking way how unchanging the principles of war are even though methods may have changed. It is indeed a comprehensive work, with a powerful set of principles that hardly require additiorraf explanation. lte impact on FM 100-5 and the writers can he seen in a number of ways. Fhst, Sun Tzus concept of policy does not assume that war is only a tool of policy, but indicatee that under certain conditions war itself may become policy. This is a concept rejected by FM 100-5 which subscribes to the Clausewitzian view of war as being merely a continuation of politicsf intercourse. carried on by other means. Second, Sun Tzu postulates that absolute w=- with its extremes is both feasible and rational CIausewitz again rejects such a notion as difficult to conceive. Nonetheless, FM 100-5 hae taken great pains and detail to examin~ the nature of abeolute war in its discussion of chemical and nuclear war. Sun Tzus ties to FM 100-5 are also evident in the concepts of deception, defense, maneuver, fighting outnumbered and winning, and in the key con. cept of the expanding torrent. Wass de C!zege stated: The attack should resemble the expanding torrent described by B. H. Liddell Hartthat is. it should moue fast, follow . . . successful probes through gaps in enemy defenses, and shift its strength quickly. . . . FinalIy, Sun Tsu believed that the moral strength and intellectual facrdt y of man were decisive in war, . . .5 Although

As suggeeted earlier, the authors chose to omit Jominis name from the bibliography in FM 100-5 end from Wass de Czeges article on the subject. If we accept the omission at face value, we might conclude that Jomini had no influence on the. new FM 100.5. However, this would be highly suspect because Jominian principles certainly carried over in the 1976 and 1982 manuals. Specifically, Jnminis style is set in the 18th Century tradition of precise operations analysis based on logisticrd needs and topographical timitations. . This operations analysis suggests that theory must be prescriptive, counseling the commander what to do in order to achieve victory. Clausewitz, on the other hand. argued that theory is only an analytical tool. . . . Certainly. one operational carry-over for FM 100-5 is found in the Jominian prirrciples of war reworked as combat imMore importantly, however, peratives. other Jornirrian concepts are found in the themes of strength attacking weakness, the concept of the decisive points and the concept of logistics planning and preparation for war. Clausewitz, it should be noted, Iikewiee argued the concept of attacking enemy weakness and the concept of the decisive point. His greatest weakness perhapsand hence Jominis greatest strengthis logistic., Certainly, Jominis operational ap preach in this area is still felt by us today as attested to by the manner in which it is discussed in FM 100-5 and in subordinate Logistical how-to-fight manuals. Therefore, we have strong conceptual evidence

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style is set in the 18th Century tradition of precise operational analysis based on lo~stical needs and topographical limitations. . . . This operational analysis suygests that theory must beprescriptive, counseling the commander what to do in order to achieve victorg. . . . .,C sided in comparison to Jornini or Sun Tzu. Ij Nonetheless, taking the theme of bomowing a step fnrther, in ensfyzing Clausewitz a emphasis on wca as the realm of the uncertain and unpredictable, a matching mot so : much of intelligence as of will, personellt~ and moral fiber. . . ,7 we can see why O1 War is so theoretical It speaks of belid~ reason and a systematic view of the S+P ject. Similarly, we can also see why the manual writers find its maxima so usefd,in getting the point across to a prescriptive audience. The maxims are explosive, hardhitting and to the point, yet they also refer to reason sad a systematic way of Iooking j at the subject. Aside from the maxims themselves, several key concepts from Clausewitz sfso have found their way into FM 100-5. Fust, more than any other concept, the new

. . . Jominis

not lifted directly, the writers of FM 100-5 apparently threaded this sll-important concept throughout the new version. Like Jomini, Sun Tzu has certainly influenced several key concepts in the mamd But, agsin, his influence, for the most psrt, is a synthesie of not only his views but SISOof other theorists who may have ititerpreted his works. The writers of FM 100-5 appear to have accepted him only in this manner. Clausewitz FM 100-5 demonstrates a pronounced sense of history in [its] selection of germane militecy maxims and examples. Borrowing from On War, the manual wciters used more than 25 of Clausewitzs mzxims in Chapters 2 through 5 alone. Certainly, this application of Clausewitz is one-

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manusf adopted Clausewitzs philosophy for the defeneeideeffy, a shield made up of well-directed blows.n For Army commanders, thie idea makes uee of all available resources (including morrde factors) while avoiding stereotyped patterns. . 1 It afso provides for those came com-

. . . Sun Tzus concept of policy does not aesume that mar is only a tool of policy, but indicates that under certain conditions war itself may become policy. . . . [He] postulates that absolute wrw with its extremes is both feasible and rational.

manders a much-needed interplay of possibilities between the defense and offense on the AirLand Battlefield. The second major concept is found in the manuals doctrine of the offense. Here. the authors introduced Claueewitzs idea that when we speak of destroying the enemy e forcee nothing obliges us to limit this idea to phyeical forces: the moral element must also be considered. *OThis is apm titularly significant development because the au~hore are drawing attention to a dimension of the battlefield which is often neglectedthe moral dimeneion. For Sun Tzu and Jomini, though both addressed the destruction of enemy forces and the attack of the enemys moraf element, neither did so with Clausewitzs passion orhie clarity of purpose. There are certainly numeroue other equally important CIausewitzian concepte that could be discussed. Among the rmaining significant ones are the concepte of center of gravity and culminating point which have little parallel in Sun Tzu or Jomini. Laet, and equally important, are Clausewitzs notion of friction and the conrept of war as an act of will.

Without question, in FM 100-5, the influence of Elm Tzu and Joraini, vis-&vis Clausewitz, is psfe by comparison. Certainly, some readers might logically deduce that, if the two ore inferior, then Clausewitz by ,default ie the most influential. Admittedly, this argument appears plausible, but it still falls ehort in absolute proof. To the contrary, it is sensible to assume that the authors have accepted Clausewitz as a powerful, practical ally in their efforts to change the Armye doctrine a doctrinal change from a fimited recognition of the dynsmice of the battlefield to one spanning the theoretical end the practical. Through this elow process of change and by the recognition of the Armys resistance to change, the best the authors can hope for, I believe, (in relation to Clausewitz) is to implant key maxfrns in the doctrine while synthesizing other key ideas where applicable. Given time and a stronger body of evidence. we might conclude Clausewitz is the greater influence in FM 100-5, but not now. Extreme difficulty exists in conclusively proving that FM 100-5 was most heavily influenced by Clausewitz ae opposed to Sun Tzu or Jomini. Rationale supporting this conclusion stems primarily from the fact that only illusory evidence can substantiate a claim for one theoretician or the other. Furthermore, neither the general officers involved in the project nor the manuals writere directly attributed development in a epecific case to any particular theorist. Coheequently, through logical deduction and the correlation between the numerous key points in FM 100-5, On War and The Art of War, we can deduce that the manual is primarily a syntheeie of effort and is partially influenced by eff three theoriste. One must develop a frame of mind thatpermite lemming the how, not the what, of their thinking process. Clausewitz took psine to point out the proc-

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~.-.: . - 4th Armored DMslon A44 Sherman and MIO tank destroyme move on Luirebols, Belgium, 1 Jwwwy 1945

. . . several key concepts from Clausewitz also have found their way into FM

100-5.First, more than any other concept, the new manual adopted Clausewitzs philosophy for the defenseideally, a shield made up of well-directed blows.

ess when he simpIy stated that theory is meant to educate the mind. . . . John L. Romjue, in his monograph discussing the development of Army doctrine, states that different dodlrinel perspectives of war are powerful tools in military doctrine which can be used to analyze the total military environment. By subscrib-

ing to this approachand I dothen this entire argument does not necessarily make us find an answer to the question, Who influenced whom in FM 100-5? More to the point, the argument requires us to objectively asseesall perspectives from all quorters as a way of furthering our methods of learning about war from books. I++

Major Robert A Doughty The Evot. t!on of US Arm, T.cf$cal Doc[rme f945 78 ,eeveworfh Pe!Jer$ Number 1 Combat StuOteS ,s,,,.,, US Arm, Co,m,d and General Staff College Fort Leave worth K,. A.gs! ?979 2 Karl .0. Cta.sewtz. On War WItea by Mfchael H.Ward end Peter Paret Prmceto. Unwerw, Press Prmmto. N J 1984 D 141 3 L$..te.nt C.amnel IP1 ..ba W.ss a. Czew and Lieutenant Colonel L D HOlder The New FM 1005 M,18taW +?er.w Jl 1982 053 .4 ,.,. .55 5 tl;u$;;~z 0. C(I D 227 6 Vehoshaf.t ..rkab, TheorY ma D.ctrme r. Crassm91 and Modern strategy ~~ A Refe,e.ce Text for lhe Department.1 MI!If.IY strategy P!annmg .na O.erafmm 79831984 us Arrw war college C.rltsle 8arracks Pa October 198i D 3 I i 7 The Theory ,.2 Pr.c(,ce of War ed,ted b, M$chael Howard lntitana un,verwy Press Bloomington 1.0 1965 D ?? 8 Hark.!) c% .s, P 3 2 9 John L Romwe From Acfrve Defense to AwL... .saltte The

NOTES
De.e!@nent 01 Army Ooctrme 1973 ?982, MonQgr@I. US Army Tra!mng and Doctr,ne Command, Fort Monroe, Va June 1984 II 55 10 S. T,. W, TheArt of War, ed!ted by L Gl!es, Military Sewrce Publ,sh,ng CO, HeJnsDurg Pa 1957 D 9 / 11 Thorn., R,,,, S. T, and S..1,1 St,atq , (fer.al,onal .! Defense Revtew Awl 79W D 390 12 Clausewttz OD .,t D 87 13 Sun T,, Fhe Arl of War, translated by Swnud B Grrffll~, OX lord U.wers,ty Press N Y 3973 D 10? ?4 Was, o, Czege and H02@r OP c!,, P 83 15 Sun 1, w c,! D 39 16 R.,.,, w c,l D 72 17 The Theory80 Pra.18ceof war 00 c?t ,8 Clau,awrtz. 0.7 C,, .357 19 Wass de Czege and Holder OD .1! D 69 20 R.amIe w cl! D 70 21 Clauswmz, 0. c,t P 141 22 ROm,e OD .8:, D 144

Lieutenant Colonel Archie Galloway is attending the Advanced Military Studies Course, USA CGSC. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He n?. ceiued a B A. fmm the college of William and Mary and an M,PA fmm Centml Michtgan University and is a graduate of the Command and Geneml Staff Officers Course, He has served i. troop assignments in Vietn&~ in the .Y.%hInfantry Di.isiom Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and m the 10lst Airborne Diuision (Air AssauItl, Fort Campbel~ Kentucky.

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March 19S6

Ai~Lan~ Battle: TIM? Historical Background

John L. Romjue

~ to form~late the doctrine of A~rLand Battle is a significant chapter in Army history. AirLand Battle sprang to a great extent from the doctrinaf views of General Dorm A. Starry, commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), between 1977-81. He was aided significantly by his deputy and Combined Arms Center ICAC) commander at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. Lieutenant Genersf William R. Richardson. AirLand Battle was c&,. a product of and a reaction to doctrinal currents that extended deep into the preceding decade. But neither the antecedents of AirLand Battle nor the doctrine to which they led can be fully understood outside the political context of the 1970s. The passage of time will shed increasing fight on the 1970s as a critical era in the nationaf defense posture of the United States and ae a time of formidable challenge for the US Army. To review that decade is to be struck by the sluggish natiomd awareness of the massive buildup of Soviet arms and by th~ delayed US politicaJ response to the Soviets worldwide power moves. Political advisers were divided about the prosecution of US foreign policy. Come home, America sentiments gripped a significant portion of the public during and after the withdrawal from the Vietnam

war.
The nations defense commitment in the 1970e to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance remained firm. However, neoisolationist sentiment found voice both in congressional restrictions effectively excluding US action to counter Soviet proxy movee and in weak defense budgets that extended well into the middecade. Although a turnaround in congressional mood and support had begun by the mid-1970s, t,be assumptions and psychology of detente with the Soviet Union con. tinued to prevail within the newly elected Carter administration. This abated only

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with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. For the US Army, these politicef currents translated into two operating parameters. The first was a decade of severely conatreined weapon budgets, although this gradually increased. The second was err rdmost exclusive focus on Europe end the NATO commitment. To the late 1970s focus on the NATO defense, rendered so urgent by the Soviet military buildup, was added enother factor. This was the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Doctrinal planners took a keen interest in its lessons during 1974-75. In clashes of massed armor not witnessed in 30 years, the Israeli and Arab armies sustained 50-percent materiel losses in less than two weeks of combat. US Army doctrinal analysts believed tbe tempo and destruction of the Middle Eaet War had signaled a new letb+ty in modern battle. Led by Starrys predecessor at the TRADOC helm, Geueraf WiRiern E. DePuy. they re-evaluated the Armys fighting doctrine, recasting it to meet the sobering NATO predicament. They strongly emphasized firepower in the weapons-oriented Field Menuef (FM) 100-5, Operations, doctrine publisbqd in 1976. They also emphasized the strength of the defense an actiue defense using maneuver to concentrate at the right time and place to defeat tbe powerful armor thrusts of the numerically superior errnies of the Warsaw Pact. A vigorous doctrinal debate soon began, both within end outside the Army. It led doctrinal planners to begin a forthright reassessment of the ideas and assumptions of tbe firepower-weighted active defense doctrine. Concentration tactics demanded an ease of lateral movement that seemed unlikely, end the doctrines lack of dedicatsd reserves entailed risks many viewed as unacceptable. BY 1978, new doctrinal ideas were

already gaining ground. Starry & doctrinal planners at TRADOC Headqum+,ers, CAC and the TRADOC centers and schools formulated severet successive concepts between 1977 and 1980. These included the centref battle, early interdiction and disruption of the enemy second-echelon forces, en integrated conventional-chemical-tactical nuclear battlefield end the concept of an extended battlefield stretching well into

,W
%-

*. :.= ~. ------ .

%%++ .....

US Army doctrinal analysts believed the tempo and destruction of the Middle East War had signaled a new lethality in modern battle. . . . They strongly emphasized firepower in the weapons-oriented Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, doctrine published in 1976. They aleo emphasued the strength of the defense. . . .

tbe enemy rear areas. These concepts ex: tended end deepened emlier views of the lethal moderu battlefield and pointed / toward a revised doctrine of AirLand Battle formed during 1980-81. The years 1979-80 sfso saw a sharp change occurring in Carter administration perceptions regarding the proper elate of ( militarv readiness vis-il-vis the So~e~ Union &d an unstable Third World. In thd mid-1970s, the world outside NATOs E& { ropean theater had become increasingly characterized by Soviet end Cuban-aided insurgences. Almost simtt+teneously with the Afghanistan invasion late in 1979t @e opening episode of the year-long Iranian hostage crisis occurred. These avents led to a shift in approach on the national level that gave impetus to policy changes concerning the tactical nuclear issue end rapid deployment worldwide. These changes had immediate impact on Army doctrine. For the Army, the formef change came in

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alrcrsft [or d;ploynrent ,

. .

In the mid-19708, the world outside NA TOs European theater had become increasingly characterized by Soviet and Cuban-aided insurgences. Almost simultaneously with the Afghanistan invasion late in 1979,the opening episode of the gear-long Iranian hostage crisis occurred. These eoents led to a shiff in approach on the national leuel that gave impetus to policy changes concerning the tactical nuclear issue and rapid deployment worldwide. These changes had immediate impact on Army doctrine.

a February 1980 chief of staff of the Army white paper. Viewing the decade ahead, Army Chief of Staff Generaf E. C. Meyer saw the most demanding defense challenge to be to develop end demonstrate the capability to meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe, but without compromising the decisive theater in NATO Europe. A return of tacticsf nuclear and chemical instruction to the US Army Command and Generaf Staff College KJSACGSC) curriculum at Fort Leavenworth during 197980 sigmded the new direction. In 1979, plannera undertook light division and contingency force projects as part of the major Army 86 studies then under way to modernize the Armys tactical and support unfts. The development of a new 10,000-man fight division would follow in 1983.

Out of the concepts of the late 1970s and the continuing cri~ique of the 1976 active defense doctrine, many OY the principal ideas of AirLand Battle emerged. Soon after Meyer directed a start on the revision of FM 100-5 in June 1979, doctrinal planners in both CAC and TRADOC Headquarters started further developing the integrated-extended battlefield concepts. In 1980, Starry and Richardson set in motion a revision of FM 100-5 by the USACGSC, naming three officers in the Deptwtment of Tactics as principal authorsLieutenant Colonel Hubs Wass de Czege, Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder and Lieutenant Colonel Richmond B. Henriques. The emecging doctrine got its name 1981, Starry selected when, in Maich AirLand Battle to describe the whole

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.. .. .= . %. c:&.-

.,

=
concept of interaction and published en initial operational concept. He envisioned not only the interaction occurring between the Air Force and the Army but eleo that occurring between all air and ground aeeete in a firepower and maneuver context. The Army at large participated in the review of the new AirLand Battle doctrine through an exteneive briefing effort and critiquee of the FM 100-5 coordinating draft. German army influence wasnotable in such concepts ae A uftragstak tik (responding independently within the commsndere intent to a changed tacticcd situation) and Sch werpunkt (the emphasis on a center of gravity or point of main effort). Acceptance of the AirLand Battle was sided by briefings by CAC to the Army and by the doctrine staff of TRADOC, headed by Brigadier Generef Donald R. Morelli, to US congressional and governmental circles. The active defense emphasis on firepower and force ratios was left behind. The doctrine of AirLand Battle published in 1982 wae an initiative-oriented military do trine that restored the maneuver-firepower ence, turned attention anew to the % mor factors and human dimension of combat, introduced into US military doctrine the ckri~lng notion of the operational level of war and signaled a return to the fundamental principles of attaining victory. Commitment to the new dynsmic fighting doctrine also signaled the ebbing of the

%====-: -------

The Army at large participated in the review of the new AirLand Battle doctrine through an extensive briefing effort and critiques of the FM 100-6 coordinating draff. German army influence waanotable in such concepts os Auftragstaktik (responding in&pen&ntly within tfw commanders intent to a changedtactical situation) and Schwerpunkt (the emphasis on a center ofgravity or point of main effofl).

systems enelysie end management view of battle. That view, at its peak in the McNamura era, sought measurable quantitative outcornee as the linchpin of military success. It aleo tended to overlook the immeasurable but enduring principles constsnt in the experience of men in battle such as leadership, initiative end the commanders intuitive feel end sense of time and maneuver-the f%gerspit.eengefiehl posseseed by schooled, ekilfed, imaginative tacticians and battle captsine. AirLen BattIe again emphasized the resourceful; leader as the dynamic element of decision. It reaffirmed the maxim-valid in tactical doctrine as in all human experience-that what is true must be repeated if it is nqt to be forgotten. AirLand Battle was a re~ to the tried and true principles of e -. ,,$ perience in war. % ,1: , s

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OCTRINE, in the military sense of the term, is of comparatively recent origin. The word has been around eince the 14th century. It originally meant the action of teaching or that which is taught or laid down as true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge, usually in the realm of religion or politics. Doctrine did not enter the military lexicon until a generation ago. It appears in none of the principal tZnglieh or American military dictiomwies of the 19th century. American doughboys trying to converse with their French Allies in World War I could not have found the word in the FrenchEnglish Military Technical Dictionary issued by the War Department. And somehow G. 1. Joe managed to fight and win in World War II without an official definition of doctrine in the 1944 Dictionary of United States Army Terms. Not until the 1950 edition of the dictionary was there any specific mention of the word. It was defined as the: compilation of principles and policies, applicable $0 a sub~ect, which have been d~. veloped through experience or by theory, that represent the best auailable thought, and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. Essentially doctnn~ is that which is taught. . a truth, a fact, ora theory that can be defined by reason zchich should be taught or accepted as basic truths. Although armies used to win victories without suspecting that military doctrine existed, the concept was clearly there. Certainly, the Roman; had prescribed training techniques and organization as well as a tactical recipe that succeeded for several centuries. Their doctrine in battle, camp and on the march was understood by every officer and Iegionmdre and eventually was written down in idealized form by Vegetius in the fourth century, The introduction of the standing &my in the late 17th century brought the possibility

Some vagrant Thoughts on Doctrine

Jay Luvaas

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of standardization-. The main instruments were drilf manuals and published regulations which instructed the officer in what he needed to know to train, drill, discipline, maneuver and maintain his troops. As long as armies remained small, there was little need for doctrine. Frederick the Great was probably the first to conceive of doctrine as such. After the Silesisn wars, he reiseued the regulation for the Prussian infantry end cavafry, adding hie own thoughts, and wrote secret instructions for his infantry and cavalry commanders in an attempt to indoctrinate them. He preferred the case method to communicate his doctrine, creating a number of hypothetical situations to show how tested rules or maxims might best be applied. During the Seven Years War, he wrote on the changes in Austrian tactice and the means by which these might be countered. A decade before his death, he prepared treatises to instruct his independent commanders on the principle of strategy and new ways of employing artillery.8 In the 19th century, doctrine came to be linked with professional military schools and the rise of the general staff. Here, the Pruseians led the way, for the Pruseian (later the German) Generaf Staff was actively involved in the production of theoretics works and historical studies. The order of teaching at the Knegsakademie specified that, before there could be good practice (that is, doctrine). there must be a true theory which could only be acquired from sound historical analysis. Theory, therefore, did not have en independent existence: it must always derive its sustenance from fresh contact with the historical reality of which it is the abstract. Conversely, it was assumed that historical study that did not yield a theory would be barren and useless.4 Other armies before 1870 had, at best, en informal doctrine, gleaned most often from

the Moxims of Napoleon Bonaparte and the works of meu of established reputations such as Marshaf Augwste Marmont and Baron Henri Jomini. Although such books were never officially adopted in England or the United States, they were widely read. Together with popular treatises by disciples in both countries, this literature

Although armies asedto win victories wi;hout suspecting that military doctrine existed, the concept was clearly there. Certainly, the Remans had prescribed training techniques and organization as well us a tactical recipe that succeededfor several centuries.

created a set of assumptions about the nature of future combat. Most Union and Confederate officere probably marched off to war in 1861 fully convinced that Lieuten: ant H. Wager Hallecks description of the tactics of combined arms-derived from / Jornini and portraying the ideafized Napoleonic battlerepresented the ultimate. They quickly discovered, however, that the increased range and accuracy of firearms had rendered such tactics obsolete J and, by about 1863, a new and inform 4 doctrine was emerging. A new role wae em.,,. braced for cavfiy, - field fortificatiori& more flexible infantry formations and d dif, ferent relationship in the relative impoitsnce of the combat arms. This imprwed doctrine was not reflected in the offic@ regulations and drill manuals ieeued on either side during the war. It was developed through experience and provided a constant theme in professional military literature after the war. The decade of the 1860s marke a turning point in doctrinal matters. If the Ameriuen Civil War experience did not make an im-

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...

German doctrine stressed hunting the hostile flank to win the decision bg envelopment. . . . The British und American armies both borrowed heavily from German tactical doctrine and instruction techniques. The first Field Seruice Regulations, which appeared in both countries in 1905, represent an eflort to develop a genuine doctrine. In both armies, the German int%ence SLWS unmistakable.

>

pact upon European armies. the Prussian victories over Austria mrd Frsnce did. For the first time, the general adoption of the rifled musket end the rifled curmon chsnged the tacticsJ literature of most European armies. As a Germsn writer observed: Our present peaceful leisure must be taken advantage of to pmuide our tactics with a firm foundation based upon the expenence gained in war; to establish a system more adapted to our present requirements. . . . so as to be able without prejudice to act on the field of battle as we have been accustomed to do on the drifl-gmund and to be less dependent . . upon the personal inspiration of su bordinate officers. . [thus providing~ an army with the cement necessary for enabling it to withstand the enormous fncticm of the battle field. By 1913, the doctrine of offensive a outrance had permeated not oufy the tacticrd manuals but also the new regulations entitied The Conduct of Large Formations. By

this time, French doctrine wae eo drenched with the offensive spirit that it was observed that even the customs officiaIe attack.6 The doctrines of the Russian and Austria-Hungarian ermies were likewise offensive in nature, while C&rman doctrine stressed hunting the hostile flank to win the decision by envelopment. The British and American srmfes both borrowed heavily from German tacticsl doctrine and instruction techniques. The first Field Service Regulations, which ap peared in both countries in 1905, represent mr effort to develop a genuine doctrine. In both armies, the German inffuence was un. mistakable. As one US officer commented in a lecture at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, two years after the first Field Service Regu. lations were issued Our Field Service Regulations unmistakably show the impress of German thought. [Helmuth] Vog Molt?+e teaches us ourstrategy, lfiobertl Gmepenkerl w~tes OUTOF

t
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March 1986 * MILITARY REVIEW

Since 1945,armiee have had to reepond to the nuclear battlefield, the polarization of internationalpolitics, the acceleratedpace of technology, an obvious andperpetual threat, and the rediscovered spectrum of conflict. What is needed for war in Europe may not suftice elsewherein one place we have allies to coneider: in another, local conditions to overcome. No longer may one doctrine be sufficient. [ ders, while [Kolmar] Von der Goltz tells us how they should be executed. Another, who bad helped to write the Infantq Dnll Regulations, 1911, asserted that German offensive doctrine was probably best suited to our nationeJ character.a After 1918, military doctrine everywhere became increasingly nationalized. Reflecting perhaps their experiences on the Eastern Front and limited to a small army by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, German military leaders sought to compensate by stressing quality and the offensive spirit. German doctrine in the 1920s emphasized maneuver and surprise. The mobility, French, obsessed with heavy losses and the conditions that prevailed on tbe Western Front, turned increasingly to the preponderance of firepower. In both armies, tactical tendencies were strengthened by the requirements of national security German military doctn.ne in the lcte 1930s was offensive, innovative, and integrated with the political aspects of German grand strategy [whereas, in France, ] the doctrinal parameters set by civilians, large{ ly for balance of power reasons, reduced to zero the probability of independent military advocacy of any kind of offensive doctnne. It is, therefore, misleading to depict what) happened in 1940 simply in terms of eo& flitting military doctrines. When civili~ leaders had asserted during tbe course!~} { World War I that war bad become toos@ ous a matter to be left in the hands of the generals, it followed that in peace the sources of military doctrine would r~~ct broader concerns. Since 1945, armies have had to respond to the nucleaz battlefield, the polarization : of international politics, the accelerated ! pace of technology, an obvious and perpetual threat, and the rediscovered spectrum of conflict.O What is needed for war in Europe may not suffice elsewherein

. .
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59

one place we have allies to considen in another, local conditions to overcome. No longer may one doctrine be sufficient. Doctrine seeme destined to periodic changes in emphasis, if not in direction, as we search for solutione to achieve the right balance between the offensive, defensive and deterrence. Doctrine can be a servant or a master. It can provide a useful context for etudying past or present military operations, or it can narrow our vision by dictating the questions and forming the basis for judgment as we view military developments elsewhere. It can be used as a guide. or it can be prescriptive. We should not forget that the originaf meaning of the word was teaching and, ae I look at teachers I have known, they seem to fall into one or another category. Some stress the importance of information per se others use the tools of the

discipline to guide the student in evaluating and using the information. Doctrine has been variously described as a common way of objectively approaching and handling a subject; the logic of professional behavior: a common philosophy, language or purpose; as codified common sense: and, on occasion, even as the opinion of the senior officer preeent. It is not an end in itself, nor does it seek to estabfish rules that muet afways be obeyed. It is essentially a teaching tooI, and the reader of the new Field Manual 100-5, Operations, would do well to rod the observation of a literary figure of the 18th century: A book ie a mirroc when a monkey looks in, no apostle can look out. The late Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall put it another way: reiteration of doctrine cannot transform human nature or change cockroaches into butterflies. %

NOTES
% ,,se w,, an ,ntro..ct,on SvePIem. nt end 8 bl,oqraf)h, .1 e N,. Fg,WI Drc tmnarv.. . s!. rtc., Pmnc,me$ Cla@dO. Pw3s oxford E.g 7933 Volume 1$1on 57273 2 SW.,., Regulation 3205 ? D,c$,onar, o, n,$ea S?.,., A,,, Ter15 Detmrlnwnt 01 the Arrnp W.$b, ngto. D C August i950 078 3 Es,., s.r !8 Gr..oe G.e,re ., M.. ., ua,,re o. (ns,,.c,mo m,,,,.,,. . . 9., d, P,,,, ,.., s,, q.nereu, LoOO Eng 1761 and FFeuer!c4me Gre. I o. I.? M of war ed$ted a.o tramlaled bY J,, LLva.s Free Press N t !966 ., 14966 an. 30537 mms, m 4 sDe. se. W$lk, nwn rhe mm of a. Arm? 4 POP.la, Account of ,. German Gene?,, S(,1< Macm>J Ia & Co Lone. Eg 1890 099 5 MaIor w . . . S.herif % Ne. racr,c, of ln<anl,k t,a.s$ ated m Col.ne, L.m,.v Granam Hen., S .,.g 8 Co LO.dO E.Q 7873 03 6 Rcmala ..,., Cole Forward W,fh fhe Ba,oner, The frwc. Arm, P?..,,,, /0? 0ff6$we tidrf are !91 , 19!4 XerO .er$ l!, M,cr. fc?m, A Arbor M,,. 7976 0224 7 6.,,, R Pose The SOur.es of w,,,.? 0.,,?,4 Fraoce Em! am and Gwlan, sew,,. ?.. Worwtiars come,, U.,er,$ty P.,,,

, 7.. o,,o,,j :.9,s. .mc,,o.. r, S,mg ,+CO,.,.,,.

,,.,, N 1984 Do ,& and 22 8 mm!., K .Nenntge. The ( eeven.vorth SC...,, g ,,, Orti 4,, 6..., <0 Pm!es.mna(, sm . . . ,, 0,,,.,, Co,.o, . ,.. U., fed S,a!e, 41!77 7887 ?978 Gree. v,ood Press We.tPo CO lg78 D87 and Cama(n John H Parker The M,lItar Eciucal,onof the You?. of [.$ Country for a Per,.. of at Least One Year es a L@ . . ..( De.e)oD<nq the M,l>tark SC,>,, ! of the Co.ntr for the Nat,. ,! De F,.,, JO.r.e! of ,, U1,1.r, Serwce , !,.,0 of ,., U,,,d S(.!,s Mercfi 40.,, ?932 Volume 50 II 224 % 9 Pose. . . ,>? DP 138.30 179 .0 CaDtmn B H L,QW,, H. The tlemaa,ng O?Mooem Arm es doll. M.,,. Lon60n E.g 1927, D021T34 10 r.a,,.g Reg.$ahon. ITR1 705 Doctrzes %.mnles anti Met.ods Ea,tc War Deoa,, menl Was.<ng,on D C ?3 LMcembe, 192? co %.3.3 ,0 TR 105 &f,l,tark F<.,,T 8,s,. w,, Dapart me! W,mll,gto D C 15 ..q,st 1928 DD35 1$ S L A Marshal, a, q.oteO > k!,]., Roberl A Dowj,ty The E..l.t,on of US Arm Taclcar Doc>rme 194676 Leavenwortfi Peer, NumOer : Combat S,.0(,S Isf,tute US Arm, Conmmncland Genera<Self Co,tege For! l.eavemwrt.. K, Atigusf 1979 D 50

Jay Luuaas N professor of military histmy, D.pmtment of National S.cw-ity, US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyhwnia He rPceiued . R A from .4 llegheny College end an hf A and a Ph D. from Duke University He has ser.ed as visiting professor of nalitary history. US Military Academy, West PoinZ, New York, and as the Harold h Johnson visztzng professor of military history, [1S Army Military Hzstoo Znstztute. Carlisle Barracks

\ -T.. m .> % h, & ,,.* ,s

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How do gou get 8electedfor the command of an Army divi8ion? This article offers some insight into the traits of tho8e who commanded during World War ZZand may offer indicators of what will be looked for in the event of a general mobilization in the future.

NE of the most significant accomplishments during World War H was the expansion of the US Army from a force of about 235,000 men in May 1940 to a peek of nearly 8.3 million men end women by the spring of 1945. Sir Winston Churchill, the wartime leader of Great Britain, declared that the magnificent management of the growth of the armed forcee during this period (coupled with the lend-lease program of eupplies for its Allies) by the United States had no precedent in history. The US Army used the division as the baeic building block end fighting unit in World Wsz H. Early on, a 100-division force was projected as being required for the tack ahead. Eighty-nine divisions were eventually fielded, end 87 of theee were em-

ployed in combat. The fighting records of these US Army divisions (with a few exmptions) deserve places of honor in military history. Given the problems encountered during expansion end overseas deployment and the successful tactical end operational maneuvering of theee units on the battlefield, one wonders about the people who commanded end led them. Who were they? Why were they selected for commend? How did their prewar experience prepare them for this responsibility? To answer these questions, a study wes conducted for the Combat Studies Institute at the US Army Conunand end General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kensae. The following is a brief summary of the study end its resuks.

World War 11 ~ DivisionCommander&

Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, US Army J*

OVERVIEW
As noted, the United States employed 87 Army divisions in combat. Forty-six of these divisions had one commanding general for the duration of their combat tours. These 46 divisions spent an average of 10.4 months in an overeeas combat theater, with a standard deviation in this area of comparison of 5.6 months. While one of theee divisions spent 38 months overseas sndsnotherstayed21 months. the majority of these one-commander divisions spent 10 months or less overseas. The41 divisions with twoormorecommanding generals during their combat tours averaged 25.6 months overseas. The amount of time these divisions spent overseas varied from five to 44 months. Each commander of these divisions spent en average of 9.8 months in command which compares favorably to the 10.4 months in command for single-commander divisions. In some cases. commanders had more than onedivision25 generals commanded two different divisions, andthree generals cornmanded three different divisions. The primary significance of these figures is that division commanders, in both categories, averaged 10months in command overseas although wide variations inthe length of command existed. According to Shelby L. Stantons Order of Battle. U.S. Army, World War II and The Army Almanac, 197individusls served as division commanders in the European theater of operations from December 1941 to May 1945, or from December 1941 to August 1945 for the Pacific theater. Since a study of all 197commanders wasimpractical, the list was pared. One commander, Brigadier Genersf Maxon S. Lough, afong with his Philippine division, was captured, he was not considered. Wenty-four division

commanders moved to higher command positions, and 20 of these are being exmnined in a separate Combat Studies Institute corps commanders study. They, too, were dropped. Since this studys focus is on war-fighting commander, the 42 division commanders who did not command in combat were eliminated. This left 134. A study of at least 20 percent of the division commanders was required, so 45 officers from this Iiat were rsndomly selected. Tbfs number was selected so that, if problems developed, it would stilf be possible to achieve a sufficient sample. Significant problems were encountered at the National Personnel Records Center. A fire there several years ago destroyed records onll officers. Nine officers had fittle available, twohadsome records and23 had relatively complete records. Thus, these 25 records available for detailed study formed the basis of the generalfzatione presented.

The average age of the sample group of commsndersin 1940 was47 ears old. The J youngeet division commander studied was 33: the oldest 58. These 25 combat division commanders had an average of 25.3 years of service upon assumption of command. By comparison, the average age in 1940 of Regular Army division commanders not taking their commgmde into combat was 52 years old. Retirement Sixteen of the 25 commanders retired as major generak, five aefieutenant generals sndfour as fdlgenerals. Without the war, it is probablethat many of these officers wOuld have ended their careers as ffentenrmt colonels. I

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DIVISIDN COMMANDERS
Promotion Patterns Figure 1 illustrates the average time these officers spent at each rank from second lieutenant to brigadier general. Theee officers experienced different promotion patterns. Most of them spent considerable time as majors (average9.6 years). Despite the variations in time in grade, theee officers averaged little over 18 years of service as captains. majors and lieutenant colonele. This illustrates that officere in these ranks have sufficient authority and responsibility to know how the Army as a whole works, yet they most often operate where their duties require understanding the detailed, mundane tasks of making units function. By and large, officers of these three ranke are concerned with routine unit operations maintenance, training, logistics,, and so forthnot with the loftier tasks of strategy. 10ng-range planning, budgets, and the like. Spending 18 years in the grades of cap tain. major and lieutenant colonel in the prewar Army gave these officers ample opportunity to learn their technical stock in trade of running a unit and provided a soiid background for division command. Naturally, thie generalization must be tkdidated through an analysis of the officers assignment histories. Assignments Discussions of time in service and time in grade only hint at what these officers actually did prior to division commend. Figure 2 chows the average amount of time spent in each of five assignment categories: time with troops, corps staff and below, major Army command staff, instructor du) ty and student time. Not surprisingly, the most frequent assignment wae with troop unite. Thue, the conclusion that these officers had ample opportunity to become experts in unit command is validated. ~ All but three officers had at least t+f~ ! years of military schoolin~ 15 had froa three to seven years of du~y as a studerit;, { The subject of military education is e~ plored in more detail later. It ie fair to say that the heavy emphasis on schooling ,ad instructing contributed heavily to the cre~tion of a common professional base among theee officere. Staff duty has the Iarge<t variance among the individual career patterns, particularly for major Army command etaff assignments. Six officers were never assigned to a staff higher than corps, and 14 spent less than three years on staffs at the

.,

Average Time in Grade Prior to Division Command

Years 12345678910 .7. Second heutenant Ffrst Ueutenant ,, ..-

Captain

MalOr heutenant Colonel Colonel

Brigadier General

7
~ ,,, 1

!, I

i~ , :,1:1 ;~ij~:

-1

Figure

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corps level and below. There were. however, not that many major Army command staff assignments available, and the records indicate that divisions and corps staffs benefited more from the assignment of these officers (78 percent of whom were General Staff Corps) than did the War Department General Staff. The second most frequent assignment was as en instructor. Although one officer was never assigned as an instructor, the majority spent between 49 end 108 months on school faculties and staffs. This is eepecielly significant considering the generally low regard held by todays officer corps toward instructor duty. Apparently, instructor duty had an important impact on the acquisition of the individueJ skills

Average Time in Duty Assignments

Years 12345678910 ..77.. WHh troops

Corps staff and below

Major Army commandstaff

Instructor duty

Mfhtary student ttme

nseded to command a division. Instructors are subject matter experts. The combination of the theoretical and technical knowledge of the instructor with the practical experience of a troop leader was a powerful one and was well-appreciated by the men selecting division commanders in World war II. The primary duties of these interwar officers were as leaders, teachers and students. For the most part, they were not hidden away on high-level staffs. They were either learning, teaching or practicing their profession. They were involved in the formulation and practice of US military doctrine. The interwer officer also gained experience in overseas assignments. Seventy-two percent had overseas tours before World War 11. Twenty-four percent served in Mexico and in Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during World War I. The others served only in the AEF. Twenty percent had other overeeae tours. The Philippines was the most common interwar overseas assignment, and a few officers gained diplomatic experience on presidential commissions in Latin America end Europe. The interwer officers assi went pattern of rotation between line, staff end school and periodic rotation overseas is similar to the current assignment pattern. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was nothing in these officers records to indicate that they were to be singled out for special consideration. The exception was the 36 percent who I attended the two-year course at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansae, and that program may have helped future corps commanders more than division commanders. Military Education At this point: it may be useful to take a closer look at the military education of

Figure

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OIVISION COMMANDERS
those division commanders. On the average, World Wm II division commanders came into the Army in 1915, with 1904 as the earliest date, 1929 as the latest and 1917 ae the meet frequent corn. missioning year. Fifty-t wo percent were graduates of the US Military Academy, West Point, New York. Twenty-four percent had college degrees from other institution, and en equal number held no college degree. All of these officers eventually became members of the combat arme: 44 percent infantry, 28 percent field artillery and 28 percent cavalry. Twenty-eight percent of the officers had no formal basic branch training, and an additional 12 percent had no advanced branch training. Of these two groups, 16 percent had neither baeic nor advanced branch training. For the most pert, these men were cavalry officers who received baeic training in units, or they were caught up in the World War I rush and did not have the opportunity for formal basic branch training. Amid these career variables, one common element is found in their educatiorc all were graduates of the CGSS, end nine of the 25 attended the two-year CGSS course. This course provided the officers with basic techniques and procedures. In a real sense, they shered a common military theoretical foundation. Furthermore, 76 percent were graduatee of the Army War College. Washington, D. C., and 78 percent were selected for the Genersf Staff,Corps. These last three elections were interww indicator> of high individual potential for future service and appew to have beerr important discriminators in selection for division command. On the other hand. hundreds of other officers received the big-her military education of the CGSS and the Army War College, yet they did not eerve ae division commanders. One must look deeper still at the performance of these 25 division commandere for clues to their selection end preparation for command. Outy Performance These future division commzmders began their careers as decidedly average officere. Their early efficiency reports, with one or two exceptions, reflect competent young officers of rather ordinary ability. To be sure, there are come superior comments in the reporte: One of the most efficient young officers I know, and This officer would have been rated higher but for age end experience. The genereJ pattern of efficiency reports describes slowly develop ing officers gaining competence with more experience. So, as senior lieutenants end captains. they received above average to excellent reports. By the mid-1930s, however, ell of these officers continuously received superiors, the highest rating possible. Even though they were all molded by the same school system, they were not off the same personality type. For almost every ) positive trait attributable to these officers, there can be found a counterbalancing trait. Yet, all of the officers were eventually selected as division commanders. There ap peare to be no euch thing as a etmded per-, J sonelity trait for a successful leader. Th&rl 4 hobbies were aIso vwied but dealt, for the:,,, most part, with outdoor activities. Hotse~-, back riding and golf led the list. Reflecting: the times probably more than anything else, 100 percent of the officers were married, , But wers these officers successful combat commanders? None were relieved for cause though some were sent home for health rea-. sons. One received an unsatisfactory efficiency report during combat but was not relieved of command. His next report was good and indicated remarkable improve. ment. Additionally, a few were found to be better in training than in combat, while

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&.--..&:-A&.. <
(a) Major General (MG) Maurice Rose (center), killed m action as hts 3d Armored Dwlsmn helped seal off two German armies m the Ruhr Pocket; (b) MG Clar. ence R Huebner assumes command of the I st Ifam try Division from MG Terry de la Mesa Allen. Allen !atercommanded the 104th Infantry OivIsIon, (c)MG Ira T. Wyche (right) of the 79th Infantry Divisiom (d) MG Donald A. Stroh of the 8th Infantry Dwfsion wdh a captured German general at 6rest, Franc& and (e) MG Maxwell D. Taylor of the IOlst A!rborne Oiwaion.

others were average combat soldiers but above-average staff officers. Twenty-three of the 25 officers held command positions shortly before becoming division commander: 10 were assistant division commanders, three were division artillery commmrdera. four were combat command commanders, four were brigade commander and one was a regimental commander. Only two officers were assigned to division command from staff positions. It appears that assignment as arr assistant division commarrder before commanding a division was the desired practice of the War Department. This was revealed in an interview conducted by Dr. John W. Partin, Combat Studies Institute, with Generrd Charles L. Bolt6. former World War 11 division commander and later vice chief of staff of the US Ari%y. During the 25 October 1984 interview, Bolte related that Generaf Lesley J. McNair said Boltk wasinline for a division, but hehad to be an assistant division commander first. If, indeed, it was planned for an officer to he an assistant division commander before commanding a division, then what was his assignment before that? Nealy50 percent of the officers were commanding troops 21 percent were cliiefs of staff at post, corps or division levels: and the remainder were spread out on staffs. Thus, over 70 pdrcent were in the field. These officers, for the most part, were not senior executives on staffs or assist&ts to importarrt men who could provide connections for future

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assignments. In proving their ability in the field, they dispIayed the trait found in nearly all of their records energetic. These officers could lack imagination or be sofid rather than enthusiastic, but they had to be energetic. Hardworking was eleo often mentioned on efficiency reports. They were men who did something whether their judgment was good or bad. In ordy one case was an officer not identified ae either energetic or hardworking. This leads to a tentative conclusion that, to be a division commander, it was not a matter of whom one knew but, rather, a resrdt of hard work, proven ability end endurance. Hard work atone may not have been enough. Luck may have played a part in their selection for commend-luck as to timing and location. They may have happened to be in the right pIace to command a brigade or to become an assistant division commander. But, once that happened, they had to prove themselves capable according to rnilitq doctrine and leadership techniques. It has already been stated tb~t these were

generalIy succesefut rrnrmnders. A look at the available World k 11 ratings for these men is also revealing. ! These officers were not aff superstars, neither the best poseible to study nor the woret. They were probably average division commanders, competent to accomplish the missions given to them. These officers were prepared for division command by varied field and staff assignments, teaching duties and Army schoole. They were among those seIected for the Army War College end the General Staff Corps. They had considerable military experience and were most tikely to be fieutenent colonels in 1940. They were selected for division command because they had proven // themselves in the field end bad mr extra quantity of energy and wfflingness to work hard. Finalty, they did the job required in combat. They may not have been shining stare, but they were proficient in military i doctrine, held their units together ti~ helped defeat the Axis powers in -eh, J:,J combat. . %
,-

...

w, .,

Lieutenant Cotonel Gary H Wade is professor of miliray science at the University of Nebnwka, Lmcol% Nebraska. He received a backefds de. gree from Cameron University, a masters degree fmm Lincoln University and is a graduate of tb USA CGSC2 He has serued in Vietnam, c mmanded troops in tbe Continental United Sta !-es, tke Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey: taught in the Reserve Officers Training Corps department of Lincoln University; and been a research felfn w for tke Cornbat Studies Ins titute, USACGSC

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There are conflicts and minor skirmishes in many places around the world between many different factions. Perhaps none of these has thepotential for growing into a confrontation between the superpowers as does Southwest Asia. Tkis author cautions that we should not ignore the US ally in the region.

ODAY, Pskistsn is a front-line state in the fight ageinst Soviet expansion in Southwest Aeia. Yesterday, it was ignored by the Weat, but now its strategic stabifity is of vitaf importance. The deily possibility exists that Soviet end Paldstmd troops may clash in battle as the Soviets press their policy of hot pur-

suit across the Pakistani frontier against the mujahidin who operate into Afghanistan from refugee camps in Pakistsn. In hopes of averting such an eventuality, the Pakistani government has adopted an slmost passive attitude along its 1,400-mile border with Afghanistan. Its antiaircraft gunners have orders not to fire at Soviet

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military aircraft (actually aircraft with Afghan markings but Soviet pilots), even if they fly into Pakistani air space. The Soviet intention is to destabilize Southweet Asia and thus penetrate further by threats, intrigue and diplomacy. Belatedly, the US administration has recognized the strategic value of Pakistan, allocating some military aid to improve and update its military capability. Pakistan ie no longer an unimportant pawn in the EastWest struggle. Previously, Western attention in Southwest Asia tended to be focused on India, the dominant giant of the region, where the United States and the USSR had long been vying with each other for influence and strategic benefits. The United States now followe the insurgent struggle inside adj scent Afghanistan with great interest, comparing it perhaps eomewhat erroneously with the Vietnam war. The Soviets had been working to turn Afghanistan into a puppet state at least since 1965 when the Peoples Democratic Party, a thinly veiled communist organization, was formed with Soviet help end advice. By 1973, this party was strong enough to push King Zahir Shsb from his throne and turn the kingdom into a republic. Successive Soviet-eupported Afghan presidents Mohammad Daoud, Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizrdlsh Arnin were, in turn, removed when they tended to stray too far from Kremlin guidelines. In December 1979, a Soviet military invasion force entered Afghanistan. It brought with it Babrsk Karmel who was installed as the Afghan president, an uneasy puppet position he still holds. Soviet troops were now within 320 miles of the Indian Ocean, within easy longrange bomber distance to the Persian Gulf and up against the Pakistani frontier. Afghanietzn is an ideal crossroad position from where the

Soviets, according to opportunity, can penetrate west, south or east; The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan evoked a spontaneous end countrywide insurrection by the mujahidin (wsrriors in the Holy War). It has been in progrese ever since, with neither the well-armed Soviets nor the poorly armsd mujahidin being able to completely dominate. Soviet repression tactics of devastation and depopulation have caused about ~ve rnilfion refugees (out of a probable population of about 17 ndflion) to leave Afghanistan. About three million or more are in Pakistan end the remainder in Iran. The Soviets allege that refugee cmnps in Pakistan are recruiting and training centers for the mujahidin who raid into Afghanistan. Also, the Soviets claim that arms routes from these camps lead across open frontiers to the mujahidin fighting in the interior. The Pakistani gov~ment denies this, insisting that only humanitarian help is offered to Afghan refugees. But they cannot deny that severrd mujahidin groups have their exile headquarters i f the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Quetta. Periodically, exasperated Soviet troops practice hot pursuit of withdrawing majahidin right up to, and even just across, the Pakistani border. Aerial bombfng end~ artillery and missile fire are used to: @t Pakistani frontier villages and mujahidr$ border crossing points, causing civifian ci& ualties. .)The Afghan mujahidin need weapotie, especirdly surface-to-air, weapons, such, as the SAIW7, to counter Soviet helic@er gnnehips. So far, only a few have reached there, and many of them have been unreliable and faulty. The Egyptian-based Arab ~ Organization for Industrialization, an arms ~ manufacturing consortium, has worked on this project. It ie producing an improved , SAIVf7 with a range of over 4 miles and which is better able to avoid defb+ing

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flares dIODDed from Soviet aircraft. These were to b~-ready for distribution in 1985 end, if they reach the mujahidin in quantity and proper training ie given, the course of the war may change. The mujahidin aim is to deprive the Soviets of their present control of air space for their helicopter gunshipe end force them to deploy infantry into mounteinoue terrain. There, the Soviets would be at a disadvantage end suffer heavy casusltiee. It remains to be seen if the Soviets fell for this. The Soviets like to use proxy troops for their ruifitsry adventures where possible. It wiff be some time, if ever, before the shattered Afghan government army is capable of meeting the Pakistani army on anything like even terms.

Strategic Problems
Pakistan, with a population of about 94.2 million end an area of about 310,400 square miles, is an elongated stretch of territory wedged between Afghanistan end India. It has en Indian Ocemr seaboard. including the important port of Karachi. Broadly speaking, the northern and western perte of Pakistcm are mainly mountainous, while there are expenses of desert end fertile land in the east end south. EconomiceXy poor, Pakistan is sfso relatively undeveloped and has serious problems, botb internrd end external. Besides many economic probIems, the main interred politiceJ problems are holding together the four disparate provinces of Sind, Punjab, Befuchisten end the NorthWest Frontier Province {NWFP); countering internal subversion; and coping with the huge Afghan refugee population. A proportion of these refugees do not seem to want to return to their Soviet-occupied, devastated homeland. They are putting

down roots, buying lend end developing businesses and commercial enterprises which often tend to infringe upon local interests. To halt increasing interred dieorder after @legations of electoral fraud, military rule wae imposed in 1977, bringing some stabifity to the country. The Pekistrmi leader, General M. Zia-ul.Haq, has offered law, order and eecurity as the alternative to the chaos end anarchy that would probably otherwise ensue. He is harnessing the Islamic religion end its sheria (religious law) in an attempt to prevent disintegration and unite eff factions. Zia sympathizes with end helps the Afghan mujahidin as much as he can. He has refused to recognize the Kermrd governmentor to discuss Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with either the USSR or the Afgben government. Tbe United Nations has made three firtile attempts to promote such talks at Geneva. This attitude brings him considerable Islamic support, both internally and from other Muelim countries. The mukipmty opposition (officially, elf political perties are benned, but they exist), should it ever come to power, has said it will establish relations with the Ksrmel government and repatriate%lf the Afghan refugees. Any attempt at forcible rep mation would cause a gigantic upheaval, as many of the men have weapons. This would also be eeen as sefling the mujahidin and the Afghan refugees down the river to a godless regime. Pakistans external troubles are even more serioue and mainfy involve nationaf security. One main threat is the USSR which might loee patience with Pakistan for sheltering the mujahidin and allowing m ujahidin organizations to be active in and to operate from that country. Hot pursuit, even carried t~ the extreme of bombing and shelfing Pakiei%ni villagee along the frontier, may not have much lasting effect, or

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f
any at all, as the horder is long an wide open. The Soviete maybe tempted to bomb refugee camps suspected of berboring mujahidin or to mount a military offensive against certain sectors of Pakistmis frontier territory to drive refugees welf away from it. Pakistans defense expenditures are low about 4.5 percent of the gross nationeJ productso its armed forces are comparatively smell for the area they have to defend end the potentisJ threats. Just under one-half million men are formed into 18 combat divisione and 20 independent or specialist brigades, with just over 2,OOO tanks and armored vehicIes, 1,000 guns of various types and over 300 combat aircraft. Such a force could briefly, but not indefinitely, hold a determined, concerted Soviet attack. The strain of doing so could

allow internef security problems to get out of hand, so prolonged resistance could be nationally suicidal. If attacked by the Soviets, Pakistan fnfly expects to have to fight on two fronts, as it fears Indkl wouldt eleo march against it to dismember t ,, $ country. Pakistem rdso fears fragmentation. & Soviets might stir up dissension in bqtli Bshrchisten province end the NWFP By having dissidents agitate for complete independence. Pakistani troops fought t~ee separate campaigns against BaIuchi rebels in the 1970s. The Soviets are coriditioning a Bsfucbi government in exile end ~ training political and administrati~e ( cadres in the USSR, ready to move them into Belucbisten province should en opportunity ever present itself. The Sovieta are reviving the old idea of an independent

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state of Pushturdetsn to embrace territory inhabited by the ethnic Pathan population which is mainly in the NWFP and in adjacent parts of Afghanistan. The Pekistani government has lees than nominal control over certain tribal lands in the NWFP. The scenario of a Soviet attack on Pakistan may not be as black ae it may seem. Formerly, Pakistan was hemmed in on the north by the trackless Himalayan mourrtain ranges and the Hindu Kueh maesifs, physically cutting it off from China. One of the first tangible results of changing Chinese foreign policy was the opeuing in June 1978 of the 500-mile-long Karakoram Highway over the 18,000-foot-high Ksrakoram ridge, the Roof of the World. This linked the Chinese road system with that of Pakistan.

The Chinese Factor

China is a potential military ally and could move hundreds of thousands of soldiers into Pakietarr. As neither the USSR nor India wants to tangIe with hordee of Chinese infantrymen in mountainous terrain, the Karakoram Highway is a vital deter-rent factor. Thie highway is also valuable economically as it opene up vast areas of northern Pakistan. Introvert and isolationist China is now slowly shaking off the devastating effects of the misnamed Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is questioning the teachings of Karl Merx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir I. Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, giving thought to its defense problems and turrring attention to the states on its periphery, especially those in southern Asia. For example, in February-March 1979, Chinese troops invaded Vietnam to undertake an 18-day punitive operation to

teach that country a lesson -a lesson that could perhaps be repeated or imposed upon another country. In recent years. China has given some military aid to Pakistan, including 1,000 Chinese-made T59 tanks. China helped construct the Ksrakoram Highway and alleg edly gave assistance to Pakistani nuclear weapon development projects. The Karakorarn Highway could be used for a Chinese flanking movement against India. It should be remembered that China launched an invasion of India in 1962 and could do eo again. China also has some chime on both Pakistani and Indian territory in that area end would be unlikely to stand passively by and watch Pskietan being dismembered to its own disadvantage. China and the USSR remain longtime traditional enemies, with a common 3,150mile border bet ween them. The Peking Ieaderehip, completely surprised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had previously tended to disregsxd that country. Since 1979, the Soviete have reportedly annexed the Afghan Wakhan Strip, a sliver of territory that touches the Chinese border in the high Himalayae, eo China sent some infantry weapons to the muja~din by way of Pakistan. To date, Egypt has been the only other country to send arms to the mujahidin. Iran gives moraf support to the mujahidin but so far hae not given any material help.

The Indian Factor

To the east of Pakietan lies India with an area of come 1.26 million square miles and a population nearing 800 million people. It has an army of about one milfion men, formed into 31 combat divisions and 30 independent or specialist brigades, the majority of which are deployed and orientated

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against Pskistrm. The Chinese strategic threat to India is the logical one, but India, emotionally and iflogkmfly, regerde Pekistan as its principal enemy. One has only to visit the region to diecover the depths of fear and euspicion between theee two countries. Pakistrm and India have fought three wars since partition in 1947, and the dieputed mountain province of Jammu and Kashmir, divided since 1949 by the ceasefire line. remains a contentious issue. Occasional clashes occur between Pakistani and Indian troops along this line. The last of ~Y eitific~ce was in July 1984 on a 47-mile-long glacier near the Nubra Vsfley in the north (in Indian-held territory). The United Nations has not yet succeeded in holding a plebiscite to determine the wiehes of the inhabitants of Jsmmu and Kaehmir. Indian military activity in 1971 helped to sever sEast Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from then-West Pakistan. India never really accepted partition when the mainly Muslim part of British-ruled India broke away to become the independent state of Pakistan after the British departed. Pakistan alleges that India covets its two provinces of Sind and Punjab and wants to possess the whole of Jammu and Kashmir even though the population is mostIy Musfim. India would most probably like to possese the other two Pakistani provinces (Beluchistan and the NWFP) as well. The suspicion in many Pakistani minds is that India might be prepared to trade these to the USSR for a free hand with the other two, and SI1OWBsfuchietan province and the NWFP to become independent states to eliminate tbe concept of Pakistan from the map. India has an uneasy but ptacticrd relationebip with the USSR, and the Pakistanis are convinced the two will one day gang up against them. India would not

Pakistani air force pllofe planning an exercise

want the Soviets to be up agsinet its northwest border and, to avoid this, might be prepared to see the region Balkanized instead. In such a ecenario, India may calculate it would be fairly safe from Soviet expaneion as Chinese troops could be rnshqf to the area along the Ksrakorarn Highway. Pskistan remains the focus of attention of the r Soviete, the Chinese and the Indians, and , they tend to deter each other from precipitous military action.

American Attitude

. b .3

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistsi wa~ a shock to the US administration. pre~OUSIY, Afghanistan bad been largely ignored by Washington, but now something had to be done. After the Iranian experi. ence, there was caution and hesitation. It wae obvious that eupport had to be given to Pakistan even at the expenee of Indian good will, if Pakistan was to stand firm. At first, then-President Jimmy Carter offered $400 million, only half of which was to be epent on military iteme. This wae rejected

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~. ..

.. . ..

by Zia who described the offer as peanuts. Eventwdly, the offer was considerably improved to a military package worth about $3.5 billion. The United States also agreed to seR Pakistan 40 F16 aircraft, but the first deliveries were refused because they were not equipped with all of the latest sophisticated devices and electronic countermeasures. Reluctant] y, the US administration reconsidered and sent properly equipped F16s. This military aid seemed grudgingly provided, perhaps partly because the country was under military rule, pertly because of Indian lobbying and partly because it was suspected that Pakistan was working to produce its own nuclssr weapons and would not agree to cancel its programs. These matters apart, realities should be faced. The elimination of Pakistan could only be of help to the Kremfhr leadership and a hindrance to the United States end the North Atlantic Treaty Organization generally.

More importa& to the United States is the kind of aid and how much should be given to the mujahidin in Afghanistan. Remembering that military aid wae given by the USSR to the Vietcong in quantity, one might think it only poetic justice for tbe United States to send quantities of materiel to the mujahidin. Belatedly, the Centraf InteRigence Agency (CIA) was ordered to organize an arms supply route for the mujahidin and for some training to be given. The CIA has been slow to start on these tasks, and even now there is some doubt whether any US arms are acturdfy reaching the fighters in the Afghan mountains. The United States problem ie that, if too much rnifitary aid is sent to tbe mujahidirr, which would obviously have to be dispatched through Pakistan, it might provoke the Soviete into retaliatory action against Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan or against Pakistan itself. If Pakistan were attacked cr came under intense Soviet military preseure, the US public would be unlikely to tolerate US combat troope being sent to Southwest Asia to help. Pakistan would probably have to rely upon China. This wouId mean Pakistan paseing from the United Statee splikn-eof influence to Chinas. If no aid is given to the mujahidiw their resistance might wither away, leaving the Soviets cafe and triumphant. It eeems to have been decided that sufficient arms should be sent to enable the mujahidin to be a thorn in the side of tbe Soviet occupation force, but not enough to be a provoking crown of thorns. Circumstances, ae much as unspoken consensus, have brought this about. It seems there is little else the United States can do but send enough mifitary aid to keep the Afghan insurgency going at its present low-intensity level end to elowly strengthen the Pakietard armed forcee. It

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PAKISTAN
seeme that inenrgent warfare may continue in Afghanistan end that Pakistan will continue to be the meio springboard for the mujahidin. It also seems that the Kerakormn Highway will continue to be the main deterrent to tbe powers involved in that region. tweerr In&a and Pakistan, it would be unlikely that India would be the first user of nuclear weapone. Indian armed forces m% more then double those of Pekistrm, so even setbacks on the battlefield ehould not be sufficient to cauee the Indian nuclear button to be pressed. The most likely fiist ueer of nuclear weapons in any conffict in Southwest Asia is probably Pakistan which is working to perfect a nuclear weapon and, according to most reports, wiU soon be successful. Outnumbered end outgunned, the Pekieterd government may have to ~hoose between employing a nuclear weapon or accepting a defeat, terminating Pakistan as an independent eovereign state. India accuses China of helping Pakistan achieve this nuclear aim. Despite official Pakistani de niels, other opinions are that Pakistrm wifl make a nuclear test explosion in 1986 when the present US military aid program has been completed. Pakistan is the keystone of stability and reeietence to Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia eod the Bellmnixation of that / region. If Pakistan disappeared, the area would undoubtedly erupt imto a conflagra- tion the United Statee would unfikely be able to influence. At preeent, Pakietsn rests ite ultimate security on Three/ Pillars: support from Islamic countiie, support from China end planned nucle,,~,, % weapone. A majority of the eenior milit~ officere I have spoken to have eeid thpre should be another pillar-the United Stat&s of America. % ,,

The Nuclear Factor

Should the situation escalate into conventioneJ warfare of come sort, with an aggressor hoping to snatch a quick victory, then a nuclear factor may appear. China has a military nuclear capability, but it is doubtful whether it would use it. The Soviet nuclear capability is vaetly superior, more accurate end more sopbieticated, end the Soviets would not overlook any opportunity to eliminate the Chinese nuclear complexes. The danger of nuclear war does not come so much from the two superpowers or from China but from smeller natione with a nuclear weapon or two which could be provoked into ueing them ae the last alternative to natiorud demise. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974. In 1978, when Carter vieited there, he persuaded Prime Minister Morarji R. Desai to agree to etop work on developing the Indian nuclear capability. When Indira Gandhi again became prime minister, she resterted the nuclear program. We muet preeume India is now well on the way to producing nuclear weapons. In a war be-

>
Edgar O%allance,retiredBritish army co.b>,4S .*. nei, is an author, a free-kmce journalist and a commentator. He kns written books specializing in defense and foreign affairs. His article Underwater Hideund.Seek appeared in tke April 19s4 Military Review. )

:q

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An Intellectually Superior Officer Corps

By Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Baucom Air (@verwty Rewew, July-August 1985 The number of intellectually active officers in the Air Force is below what is needed, writes Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Baucom in his final editorkd before departing as editor of Air University Reuiew. To remedy this, 13aucom suggeets how the Air Force can develop a critical mass of officers who are intensely interested in ideas and who stay abreast of defense debates by reading professional books and journals regularly. Improve the promotion potentiaJ associated with Air Force academic positions, Baucom writes. Thats the first step. He says developing a core of officers interested in ideas is radically dependent on the encouragement these officers receive from top leadership. All too often, this support is missing in the American military. Second, 13aucom advocates reforming the security and policy review process so that onIy the presence of classified material would be grounds for denying an article publication clearance. A manuscript should not be denied clearance cjust because an aoonymous staff officer decides that its content is contrary to policy+ inaccurate. misleading, or incompatible with his own views, says the author. Finally, Baucom recommends changing Air Force officer efficiency report procedures to reserve the top two ratings for

officers who have bad material published in professional journrds. Baucom says, A rating in the top block would go only to officers who had published at least one feature article in a professional journal. This, Baucom writes, is a way for Air Force leaders to chow that intellectual activity is an expected. vitaf pert of professional performance. Baucom maintains these changes would superior officer , foster an intellectually corpsthe most significant of the intangible factors in war. Intellectual superiority. according to the author, derives from the fundamentrd role ideas play in warfare Before a weapon is a piece of hardware, it is first an idea in a man s mind: before a weapon can be effectively used, someone has to develop a concept to guide its applica t ion. Baucom says ideas are crucizd to SUC. cess in w&, but adds, they are like fragile flowers. Without the proper environment, they cannot develop and flourish. Baucom, in his edi{orief, outlines the essential ingredients in creating this environment. He admits that none of his recommended changes will have an immediate effect on the intellectual quality of the Air Forces officer corps. But. he concludes: they should mark a significant step toward the goal of-ensunrzg an intellectual[v superior officer for the Air Force, one of the most important ingredients of an air force that can outffy and outfight the air force of any potential enem.v ELH.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort IS made to ensure accurats translation and summarization. However, for more detailed account% rsaders should refer to the originaf articles No official endorsement of the views. opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should he inferred Editor

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SUMMARiES Women in Combat?

conditions, do much better in nontraditional military roles than most men think. He concludes that evolving trends in the role of women soldiers will continue to surprise. All three articles acknowledge that the military is being forced by factors beyond its control to rely increasingly on women. Newsweeks team points out that the Carter administration faced a sharp dropoff in the pool of efigible males ae the baby boom paesed out of recruitment age in the mid-1970s and resorted to female recruits rather than to rick abandoning the concept of the All-Volunteer Force. Women have also been recruited to boost the quality of personnel. Additionslfy, the authors assert, the armed forces are ceding many of the high-tech communication, electronic and scientific specialties to women as male technician leave the services for jobs in the private sector. The Department of Defense has liberalized the combat exclusion rule over the years, but theee efforts, according to the Neu,sweek team, produced a military rife with anomalies. Today, in the Navy, women serve on deetroyer tenders bnt not / destroyer, even though tenders suil as part of the same carrier battle group. Army women carmot serve in infantry and artillery specialties, but they can work in come rniseile and signal units that, would ~ operate close to combat areas. according to the authors. And while women are barre from duties that would require them },, ! { shoot, they can serve in situation wherb they may be shot at, the authors say.. , : The Newsweek article eaye that, if cordbat restrictions are intended to limit female casualties in wartime, they are not lik~ly to do so, and it is suggested that the cluef obetacles to allowing women into combat are cultural and emotional. Women do : efficient work, are motivated and waut to ; defend their country. Now. it is up to the Pentagon to employ femafe recruits to their best advantage-to ensure the smooth operation of combat missions and to main- . tain an effective fighting force.

By Jennet Conant, John Barry, Vern E. Smith, Linda Prout, Debbie Seward and Liz Balmaseda Newsweek, 11 November 1985

Sex and the Military The Feminist Mistake

By Jean Yarbrough Current, November 1985

Female Gls in the Field

By Charles C. Moskos Society, September-October 1985

In the swirling controversy surrounding the exclusion of women from combat, there are several sides to the same story. According to Jennet Corrant and five colleagues in Newsu,eek: The U.S. military is definin~ combat ever more narrowly, and women are now so tkorougkly integrated into the armed forces and ham= advanced so far in key specialties that withdrau,ing them could seriously hamper the countrys combatreadiness In the event of war the Pentagon could well be faced with the choice of uiolating at least the spirit of the law-or risk hamstringing military operations. The consequences for readiness notwithstanding, Jean Yarbrough writes in Current that the case against women in combat recognizes genuine physicaJ and psychological differences between men and women. differences such as strength, aggressiveness and sexual attraction, that are important in battle. TO the extent that the prejudice against women is based on an appreciation of these natural and desirable differences. Yarbrough argues, it is valid and should influence military policy. Yet, Charles C. Moskos. in a study for Society based on observing women on longterm military deployments, disputes claims that female soldiers differ significantly from their male counterparts. He writes that women soldiers, under certain

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Yarbrowzh. on the other hand. sumzests there is m~re to women in cornba~{hazz their efficiency and motivation to defend their country. She suggests there are genuine difference between men and women that play significant roles in combat, and these differences cannot be ignored. She acknowledges that feminists sup port women in combat for ideological reasonsthey regard it as a measure of equify. She also notes that recent history and court decisions ignore the physiceJ and psychological differences between men and women in the pursuit of social equity. The demand for equity has widespread appeal because it is simple and reflects the egelitwian principle of American society. But Yarbrough argues that when ap plied to militmy affairs. it is wrong and dangerous. The militarys end is victory, not equity its virtue is courage, not justice; its structure is authoritmian, not pluralistic. In fact, she says the requirements of military life clash with the democratic commitment to equality, natural rights, and consent. Moskos approaches the issue from a different perspective. He reports on extsnsive interviews during 1984 with male and female Army soldiers in Honduras for Exercise GRANADERO I. He interviewed 48 of the. 50 femate soldiers in the 700-person contingent in Honduras at the time and says the results were surprising. He sees a changing attitude on the pert of both sexes regwding female privacy during field exercises. The men generally displayed increasing awareness of female sensibilities, while the womens concern for personal privacy quickly eroded. He says flatly that women worked as effectively as men and that categorical comments from males that women were shirking their work were rare. Over the course of the exercise, Mosk& says the women were increasingly judged as individuals and not by their gender. He also found that sexual herrassment did not seem to be a major concern of the female soldiers in Honduras. In concluding, Moskos proposes condi-

tions that would favor fulf inclusion of female soldiers into a military organization. He saye the higher the quality of women soldiers, the greater their acceptance by males, especially by male superiors. AIso, the better men and women know each other in Iongterm work relationships, the greater the likelihood of people being treated as individuals rather than as sexual categories. And when there are no pregnant women, the incorporation of women into nontraditional roles is greatest.ELH.

Doctrine-Credo

or Counsel?

BY Lieutenant Colonel Peter Morosoff Fie/d Arti//ery Jourrra/, September-October 1985 If we accept the principle that each combat situation is uniqua and that combat knows no rules, then how do military professionals use material contained in Army field manuals, Fleet Marine Force manuals and navel warfare publications? Lieutenant Colonel Peter Moroeoff asks, in a recent Field Artillery Journal article, Arent these manuale doctrine. and doesnt doctrine tell you what to do? Shouldnt doctrine be obeyed? Acknowledging that the. answers are Morosoff notes that tactical complex, manuals contain information not only on doctrine but also on administrative organization, tactics, techniques and pro. cedures. To say a field manual is merely a compilation of doctrine is too simplistic, he implies. Each item of information has different legitimate tises, and the soldier who learns to use them all possesses a tremendous advantage, writes Morosoff. Doctrines role is to provide an intellectual framework for thinking about military operations. According to the author, someone unfamiliar with warfare sees a battle as a series of random actions. The trained obeerver, however, perceives patterna. Those who understand doctrine, he writes, have a vocabulary to evahzate the world

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around them end to issue orders. If the doctrine is preeise, the world is seen in the came way and commands will then be precise. However, if a soldier does not know doctrine, cays Morosoff, hie observations and thoughts will probably be fuzzy, and his commands will be imprecise. The author adde that victory will go to thoee best able to adapt to whatever the next war brings and understanding doctine is a key to making those adaptations. The problem, according to Moroeoff, is that most soldiers coneider as doctrine anything published in a field manual. Some qualify that and euggest doctrine also includes much of what ie publiehed in joint manuals. But Moroeoff arguee, the facts are that very little of the materiaJ in these manuals is doctrine. He says meet of it should be lumped under categories such ae administrative organization, tactics, techniques and procedures. True. doctrine is of little use without a supporting set of tactice. procedure and the like, but these ehould in no way be construed as the fundamental principles of doctrine, he asssrte. Doctrine, unlike the detailed matter, is univereslly applicable and helpe us determine what needs to be done on the battlefield, Morosoff saye. The soldier who thinke everything in a field manual is doctrine that must be adhered to religiously will be a very busy fellow who will do much that is inappropriate to the situation, the author warne. Conversely, the soldier who understsmds that doctrine is a eet of fundamenteJ principle will chooee appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures in each situation and apply them successfully. Menuale ehould never become tyrants that restrict ue, Moroeoff observee. The truly successful leader, he saye, ie the one who understand doctrinee role and ite relationship to other elements found in field manuals. He is aleo the leader who can use training literature to help him solve the endlees stream of unique situations he will face in combat. ELH.

SUMMARIES
The Armys Agenda
By John G. Kester Military Logistics Forum, October 1985 The Army ie in better ehape today than at many timee in ite hietory, writes John G. Kester in the October 1985 iesue of Military Logistics Forum. But many of the Armys probleme have become accepted and then buriedlike a man who hurt his leg so long ago that he has forgotten that he Iimpe. There are some things the Army can do little to change. The author calls the Army the most marginal of the services in appeal .becauee land warfare is the most relentleed y demanding. This negative is not likely to change much, he eaye. But other Army handicape are not inevitable, and two of the meet crippling have lasted more or less for a generation. In rssponee, the Army hae coutorted itself to cope, asserts Kester. So familiar and painful are they that it has become taboo to talk about them. The first ie the 1948 agreement among the eervicee to divide the military market. f Kester claims this left the Army without the power to operate fixed-wing aircraft of any eize that mattere, end the Army needs planes to haul it to battle. He describes the Air Force ae at timee deco.ml $ modatimz. but notes it has its OWM. priorities=- mainly oriented around strate~,~, gic or tactical sir pilots getting stars. f2e also points out that the Marines can buy ~ sir wing for their divisional close-air SUPS port, but the Army cannot. So, to compensate, the Army has acquired at last count, 8,135 helicopters, ~a move Kester describes as flawed because, dokr-for-doller, helicopters are generally lees capable than fixed-wing aircraft, they are not designed for sir-to-air combat and they are vulnerable. What ie most discouraging and dangerous is that the drawbacks of helicopters are not openly discussed in the Army any more.

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The second handicap, or big brick in the Armys backpack, is the absence of a draft. This has forced contortions of the Armys force structure that a few years ago would have been thought inconceivable, Kester says. As missions increase and manpower shrhks or remains etable, the Army b .s turned to deceptive accounting practices. There are now more and more divisions with one brigade in the reserves which allows everyone to pretend that the Army has more divisions. More dangerously, most Army support units necessary in combat have stolen off into the reserves . . . as well, according to Kester. But the current meet fashionable adaptation to the lack of people is to create light divisions. These give the impression that the Army is getting bigger when it is not. He admits the idea of light divisions is not SK bad but warns that the Armys versions are more a product of political necessitylack of lift and personnel ceil-

ingsthan of military choice. Moreover, calling them Iight gives a misimpression of mobOit y when what they really are is lightly armed. Kester says: It will be embarrassing if some day a president dispatches U.S. troops to put down Third-World insurgences, only to find on arrival that t,$e enemy is better armed, Kester alleges that the Army today seems not quite sure what is expected of it, and not too eager to ask. Too often, the Army rationalizes any surprise that comes along. Kester concIudes that persistence has always characterized the Army, but only occasionally has vision. He ie not calling for rebellion, simply for articulate warnings from Army leaders. The unacceptable course would be for the Army to feel so content that it accepts the way things are as the way they haue to be. The responsibility of its leaders is to look far enough ahead to guide it in the right direction. ELH.

ManeuverDa

or

Nein?

5 man officer corps to his maneuver-oriented blitzkrieg concepts. During the 1940 invasion of France, the blitzkrieg thrusts of Erwin Rommel, Guderian and Erich vorr Manstein were reined in by high-ranking German generals who did not appreciate meneuver-oriented blitzkrieg. During the Germans war against the Soviet Union, many attempts to use ma-

I do not agree with Major George A. Higgirts claim in his October 1985 Military Reuiew article, cGerman and US Operationel Art: A Contrast in Maneuver, that German military doctrine in World War I I was essentially a maneuver-oriented doctrine. Heinz Guderisn, Father of the Germart Blitzkrieg, revealed in his writings that he found dogged opposition in the Ger-

Letters is a feature designsd expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their opinions and ideas on military topics. It is not restricted to comments or rebuttals on previously published mat erial but is open to anY variety of expression which may stimulate or improvs the vatue of thought in the mititary community. The right to edit is reservsd by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily m deference to available space.Editor.

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LETTERS
neuver technirmes were frustrated and many opportu&ies wasted because of the opposition not only of Adolf HitIer but also of many top members of the German officer corps. The greatest land battle in history, the Battle of Kursk in 1943, was not a maneuver battle but a headlong German battering match against strong Soviet de fensive positions. The German maneuveroriented blitzkrieg technique was actually appreciated and understood by only a fraction of the German military leaders in World War II. I think Higgins is very unfair in claiming that George S. Patton did not understand maneuver technique just because he used 108 battalions of artillery during the relief of Bastogne. Higgins seems to believe the oft-repeated falsehood that firepower, per se. is inherently incompatible with meneuver technique. In fact, it is not firepower, per se, but firepower used to defeat the enemy merely through crude attrition which ie incompatible with maneuveroriented warfare. At Bastogne, Patton used artillery to create breaches for his maneuver units a uee of firepower completely acceptable to a maneuver-oriented doctrine. I also want to comment on Major Henry S. Shields article in the November 1985 Military Review, Why the OMG? I cannot see any essentiaJ difference between the Soviet operational maneuver groups (0.MGs) described in Shields article and tbe Soviet forward detachments (peredoUOYotryad) described in the article. Forward Detachments and the Soviet Nuclear offensive, by Captain Stephen Shervais Jr., which appeared in the April 1979 issue of &fi/itary Review. Shervais article explained that the Soviet forward detachments are not new but were first organized in World War II to support Soviet offensives. Shields article presents deep Soviet thrusts as a fresh feature of Soviet military thinking. However, Major Mark P. Gays September 1985 Military Review article, Soviet and US Operational Styles of War, points out that the idea of deep battle (glubokaya hoi) with thruste as deep as 300 kilometers was advocated by Marshaf Mikhail N. Tukhachevski. He also states that the idea appeared in the 1929 Soviet field regulation. Since OMGS are to follow first echelons end exploit the breaches created by the attacks of the first echelons, I do not eee why OMGS cannot be regarded as a type of follow-on echelon rather than as units distinct from the echelonment of Soviet surge warfare. OMGS would not have more ~4eedom of action than other Soviet umts. OMGS would attack preselected, specific, predesignated targets, while follow-on echelons which are not designated as OMGS would be more opportunistic in attacking targets opened up and uncovered by the initiaf echelons. Both OMGS and other follow-on echelons would be stabbing deep into enemy territory. I have often come across the statement that we should not be very concerned about the Soviet follow-on echelons but should worry a lot about the Soviet OMGS, as if these were completely different from follow-on echelons and presented a completely different eort of threat. But I think it ie more accurate to think of OMGS as, in/ effect, a type of follow-on echelon.
JosephForims.Pitisburgb, Pennsylvama

f }

On the Operational

Level of War .~

The rrticles on the operational level kit war published in the October 1985 issue of Military Reuieu, were interesting, inf&&ative and provocative. Some additional views are offered in Russell F. Weigleys book, Eisenhowers Lieutenants. an~ Tin Nigel Hamiltons biography, Mo,ztgonzery: The Making of a General, for those who wish to study the subject in further detail. ~ In his article, German rmd US Opera- tional Art: A Contract in Maneuver, Major George A. Higgins contraste US and German methode and indicates that US operational art emphasized firepower over

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maneuver. Considering Lieutenant Genersf LesIey J. McNairs restructuring of the Army before World War H to make it a mobile army, I am not certain Higgins is entirely correct. Weigley would certainfy agree that US tactical operations reIied heavily on firepower and less on maneuver, whereae the Germans refied far more heavily on maneuver. The tactical differences were due not so much to doctrinsf differences as to the superiority of the Germans smaflunit leadership. Also, German tanks combined firepower end mobifit~ US tanks lacked firepower. However, at the division and corps level, the US force structure certsinfy was designed for mobile operations and not a set-piece battle. Weigley shows this was not consistent with US strategic concepts of hitting the enemy head-on where he is strongest. The mobility displayed by all US armies (and Britieh as wefl) after Cobra and later after crossing the Rhine argues that George S. Patton had no monopoly on mobile operations ah bough he certainly was the most vocsf advocate and readiest practitioner. Higgins assertion that US leaders ignorance of maneuver was largely responsible for the less-than-totnf success of Falaise-Argentan and the Battle of the Bulge counterattack is unfair. Last, Higgins says the US Army had no coherent concept of division and corps operations. Yet, almoet every division was required to participate in the Louisiana maneuvers (division and corps-level) prior to deployment to Europe. Major (P) Stephen T. Rippes article, Leadership. Firepower and Maneuver The British and Germans. contrasts German and British methods. Although his views regarding the timidity of Eighth Army commanders prior to Bernard L. Montgomery are well-taken, pi Richard OConnorthe victor of Sidi Bsrrani-probabIy is not a good example of inflexibility and lack of agility. Also, in April 1941, OConnors best formations were in Greece. For those interested in pursuing the sub-

.
ject of Montgomery and the British operational art, the first volume of Hamiltons biography of Montgomery is quite good. The chapter titled Training the Eighth Army merits speciaf attention. Hamilton aleo offers an interesting perspective on Montgomerys use of armor. Coneider his X Corps commande~ [Lumsden] had his own tank which was painted white and which he drove by himself. . . hed swan slf over t be place by frimseIf in his white tank. It is understsmdable wby Montgomery had little faith in MS armor and was hesitant to unleash it. The Gerdmns were also particularly adept at drawing their opponents into antitank ambushes. One could %ue that Montgomerys success at Akurr el Haffa end at E 1 Alsmein was partly attributable to his operational ablfity to force the German armor to attack MS arrtitrork guns and dug-in tanks. This success in Africa partly explains Montgomerys satisfaction with the defensive he conducted around Caen and why he was content (although Dwight D. Eisenhower certainly was not ) to let the Germsrr armor continue to attack him while the Americans built up their forces prior to the Cobra breakout. In the article, British and German Operational Styles in World War I I, Major Glen L. Scotts arrafysis of the dif-

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LETTERS
ferences is rdso fundamentally correct, particularly with regard to the British slowness to employ combined arms tactically. I do not understand how deliberate (detailed? slow? thorough?) planning and methodical execution necesswily produce operational ineffectiveness. The employment of 88s (antitank guns) by the Germans, as well as the nonexistent British artillery end infantry support of the tank attack, probably doomed Battleaxe as much as anything. And the proximity of German armor units near Arnhem, the long distance from the 1st British Airborne Division drop zones to Arnhem and the restricted route for the XXX Corps attack were more to blame for the failure of Market-Garden than were deliberate plsnning or methodical execution. Given the disastrous British experience in Africa with impetuous tank assaults on German tank/antitank defenses end the fact that the British were scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, methodical execution becomes understandable. Clearly, we should give thought to the operational level of war, and both Weigley and Hamilton have much to offer. Both gentlemen integrate tacticaf issues into their discussion. It does little good to have a doctrine of mobility and leader initiative if the equipment and force structure do not support the doctrine. World War I offers numerous examples of leaders imbued with initiative, the desire to conduct mobile operations and offensive spirit who led their men to disaster. In World War II. tactical-level leaders in the US Army tended to cease maneuver when they met the enemy and to rely almost exclusively on overwhelming indirect firepower to defeat the enemy. Such tactical methods do not support operationrd mobility. In contrast, the Germans continued to maneuver tactically to achieve more advantageous positions. All aspects of warmaking should be integrated. As Weigley demonstrates, the US Army fought the Germans with a highly mobile army with serious deficiencies in equipment and infantry methods. We had a strategy of direct, head-on confrontation with the enemys main army but a force structure better suited to highly mobile operations against the enemys weak points:
Ma] PhilipD, Allurn, USA. Fort Hood, TmW

How Vast the Nuclear Battlefield?

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Houses article, Leadership Challenges on the Nuclear BattIefield (Military Review, March 1985). betrays his lack of understanding of the rerdities of nuclear warfare. The rule is to use every arrow in the quiver. If it ever gets to tactical nuclear weapons, it wilt go all the way to fuff sferts on both sides then a flip of the coin as to who wilf launch the first pre-emptive strike (answered back by the other side, of course}. Houses reticle, ae I see it, is purely an acadefic exerciee. Wounded? Fit tO fight?. Evacuated personnel? Friends, it will be slf over for aff of us! /
VincentFrazzatta, Milford,
Connecticut

House Responds
The issue of escalation from a tticticsl I nuclear exchange to a strategic one ii, & very real and threatening issue for slf of u~ However, I reject the assumption that it i# inevitable. Tasked with the defense of our nation, the US Army must prepare itself for any and elf conditions of combat. As soldiers, we do the citizens of our countrf a disservice if we hide our heads in the Sand and pretend that either we will fight a totalIy conventional war in Europe or perish in en all-out nuclear exchange. If the US ! military refuses to engage in such academ ic exercises, who shall do so for ue?
Lt ColJe.flrevL. House, USA.

Cmtor forArmvLoadarship, iJSACGSC

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UNITED STATES

-==mm=i=
\ ,

AHIP CONTRACT I The Army recently awarded Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. a $223.2 million contract for the production of 44 0ff58D helicopters and advance funding for long-lead items in another 56 aircraft as part of the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP). The contract also includes training devices and ground support equipment for44 advanced scout helicopters. Bell hasalready begun deliveries of 16 0H58D helicopters purchased in a previous Army contract. The first aircraft In this latest contract will begin arriving in July. Under the contracts, existing 0H58 models are modified with new components, sensors, integrated controls and displays to provide the Army with a close-combat aerial reconnaissance helicopter. H will be capable of intelligence-gathering and surveillance as well as supporting attack helicopter missions and directing artillery fire. Among the 01Y58Ds f~atures are a mast-mounted sight that provides day and night longrange vision and precise laser designation for precision-guided munitions; a fourbladed composite main rotor and improved tail rotor; a powermatched drive train; and a fully integrated, multiplexed cockpit that greatly simplifies crew workload and provides rapid target handoff to other weapons systems.

The Military Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information co?tained in the News section of thrs publication. Items are printed as a serwce to the readers. No official endorsement of the wews,opinionso rf actual statements isintended. Editors.

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COMIN IN ON A WING AND A PARAFOIL Lockheed engineers are experimenting with gliding airdropped cargo to cushion-soft, pinpoint landings miles away via electronically guided, unmanned parafoils. A parafoil is a controllable, all-fabric flying wing like the rectangular parachute often used by sports parachutists. The innovative part of these tests is that the parafoils are controlled by ground operators using radios. For unpowered flights, the parafoil is packed and attached to a 300-pound box containing three car window motors and a 12-volt battery. The box is released from an aircraft, and a drogue parachute deploys the parafoil. Once deployed, the parafoils shrouds are adjusted by remote-control commands to the attached motors. In this way, a ground

or airborne operator can guide th parafoil and its payload to a SOI landing miles away. For powered flights, the parafoil controls are inside a 60-pound, ! foot-wingspan remotely piloted veh cie (RPV), with a 9-hor,aepower er gine. Once off the ground with a pa) load attached, the RPV and the par: foil are both controlled remotely.

GEE-NO,

GTE TO BUILD NfSE battlefield. MSE will provide multiple communications nodes with network features that automatically bypaes and reroute communications around nodes that have been. damaged or jammed. The GTE system uses major corn- ~, ponents of the French R/TA mobile communications system developed by Thomson-CSF and other French companies and sold to the French army. The GTE system also uses ~ some standard US military equip ment as well as components produced in Canada, Italy and Sweden. Officials expect the MSE fielding to begin within three years.E/ectrorric Warfare Digest, All Rights Reserved.

The Army recantly selected the GTE Corporation, working with Thomson-CSF of France, to produce its mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) communications system. In a hotly contested contract competition, the GTE/Thomson team won the contract expected to total $4.3 billion. A basic $63.25 million contract has already been awarded to GTE to begin work, with six fixedprice options programed in following years. MSE is a cellular, area communi. cations system designed to provide commanders with a survivable, secure, mobile capability to transmit and receive voice, data and facsimile products anywhwe on the

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..

e -----

MORE JAMMERS The flow of tactical jamming (TACJAM) systems to tfre Army will continue, following the award of a $30.8 million contract to American Electronic Laboratories (AEL) of Lansdale, Pennsylvania. The contract calls for AEL to provide another TACJAM system, additional reoair narta for the svatems it is currently producing and kits to provide chemical and biological protection for the TACJAM. The TACJAMknown in the Army as the AN/MLQ34is a groundbased, mobile electronic warfare system. It can obstruct and deceive multiple communication nets. The new contract will fund work over the next two and one-half years, most of which will occur at AELs tvfontgomeryville, Pennsylvania, manufacturing facility.
-r-.

F15 IN THE Wf4D TUNNEL Wind tunnel testing has begun on a scale model of an F15 fighter aircraft (MR. Mar 1985, p 77) modified to land or take off on runways of 1,250 feet or less and possessing inflight maneuver capabilities exceeding those of the F15s now in production. A one-of-a-kind demonstrator F75 aircraft patterned after the model will have thrust-directing engine nozzles, and short, controllable wings will be added to the forward fuselage. The specially built F75 will be capable of short-runway takeoff and landing in any weather and will show improved in-flight maneuvering at both high ,and low speeds. McDonnell Douglas representatives say current wind tunnel tests will determine how the air fkvw from the thrust-reversing engine nozzles affects the aircrafts aerodynamics at low speeds. During thrust reversal, the engine nozzles are closed, and exhaust ie expelled through a series of Venetian blind-like vanes above, below and forward of the nozzles. The angle o? the vanes is important to developers because, during thrust reversal, loose ground material blown about by the exhaust might be eucked into the engines and damage them. Wind tunnel testing will determine the boundary of the exhaust flow, and the vanes can then be adjusted to prevent ingestion of material.

March 19S6 . MILITARY

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NEWS
USSR I

NEW SOVIET

SAM?

A photograph from the 28 August 1985 issue of Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star), the official newspaper of the Soviet military, shows a Soviet soldier preparing to fire the new 5A 74 surface-to-air missile (SAM), nicknamed the Grem/irr. The weapon resembles the 5A 7 Grail, but there are significant differences. The gripstock assembly is located farther forward than on the 5A 7. Also, the 5A 7s thermal battery is in front of the grip-stock aasembly whereaa, here, the battery is not visible. H probably is located in the box behind the grip-stock. The new weapon has a cooling bottle for the infrared (IR) detector. Cooling the detector reduces thermal noise and permits the missile to engage targets head-on at extended ranges. The photograph also shows a missile with a cone-shaped IR dome extend:ng from the launcher. This differs from the 5A 7 missile which IR dome and is comhas a rounded pletely encased in the launcher. The cone-shaped dome reduces drag and probably allows greater maneuverability in flight. A guard, poasibiy made of foam material, is shown at the end of the launcher. It probably protects the cooling bottle during missile firing and is blown clear on launch. Unlike the SA7, with its grip-stock to the rear of both sights, the new weapons grip-stock is between the sights. The sights themselves apparently

can be folded into recesses in the J; ~ missile cannister. Overall, the new weapon closely ; resembles the French M/stra/ mis. . sile produced by Matra. Experts say the MLsfra/can intercept aircraft tak-! ing evasive action and pulling up to 8 Gs and can also engage head-on targets out to 4 kilometers. (Researched and prepared by Captain Gilberto Villahermosa, Headquar. ters, 3d Battalion, 73d Armor, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.)

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0A4AIWSA UD/ ARABIA

TORNADO COMING British Aerospace-built Hawk train. ers, 24 Tornado air defense variants and 30 PC9 aircraft ordered make the contract the largest ever secured by the United Kingdom. There is furtherspeculation that the Saudis will receive a full range of weapons and avionics packages with their Torrradoes. Orders for the Tornado from the three countries in the production consortium will sustain manufacturing through 1989. Reportedly, the three will slip their delivery schedules to allow Saudi Arabia to begin receiving its aircraft sooner. Armed Forces Journal /nternat/onal, @ 1985 and Janes De fence Weekly, @ 1985.

The government of the Sultanate of Oman has agreed to purchase eight of the Iongrange, air-to-air variant Tornado jet fighters (MR. J UIy 1984, p 85). The aircraft is produced as a trilateral project by the United Kingdom, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany but has thus far been a disappointment on the export market. Agreement was also reached between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to provide the gulf nation with 48 interdiction/strike Torrraclo variants. The Tornado version ordered by Oman is the same as that developed by British Aerospace for the Royal Air Force. In the Saudi deal, 30

ISRAEL
HYDROFOIL PUTS TO SEA even in rough seas because of three wings sit_uated just bel~w the eurface. Besides sophisticated computer-controlled navigational aids, it has commandant control computers, an advanced search radar and a computerized communications system. H carries a crew of 15 and has a 1,000-nautical-mile range. According to Israeli sources, the boat would be valuable in thwarting terrorists who. reportedly are acquiring speedboats from which to launch attacks against Israels populous coastal plain. Terrorists are also said to he seeking minisubmarines for coastal attacks.Afavy International, !3 1985.

After years of evaluation and adaptation, Israel is putting into service its Zivanit hydrofoil missile boat, first acquired in 1980 from the US company, Grumman. The boat, modified significantly by the Israelis, is armed with two Gabriel and four Harpoon surfaceto-surface missiles and a twin-barrel 30mm gun. H cruises at 19 knots but can reach 52 knots fully armed. A 5,400-horsepower Allison gas turbineengine powers the Zivanit, but there are two 660-horsepower auxiliary turbines as well. The Zivanitis nearly 84 feet long and 24 feet wide and is considered extremely maneuverable. It is stable

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NEWS
UNITED KINGDOM [
ENFIELD FIELDED Three new small-arms weapons known collectively as the Enfield Weapon System (EWS)recently underwent final acceptance trials, and 3,000 were delivered to the British army. Additional weapons, as they become available, are scheduled for delivery to the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force Regiment. The EWS, tagged by the army as the small arms for the 80s, is produced by the Royal Ordnance Small Arms Division at Enfield Lock. Names have been given to the three weapons for the first time. The L85A7 individual weapon is now known as the Endeavour, the L86A 1

light support weapon is called the. Engciger and a .22-caliber version of the Errgager to be used by cadets is named the Ensign. The Endeavour will have three interchangeable sights when full production is achieved: an optical sight, open iron sights with the rear portion doubling as a carrying handle and a night sight still being designed.Janes De fence Weekly, @ 1985.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY )

BURNER FOR COOKING AND WARMING A nonelectrical, multiple-fuel, pressure vapor burner has been developed by the West German firm, Progress-Werk, for use in field cooking equipment, field kitchens and ovens and as a warmer inside troop, medical and maintenance tents. The AS2hasa6-liter fuel tank with filling nozzle and fuel strainer that allows use of gasollne, diesel oil, kerosene or petroleum, and a 6-liter air tank with a filling valve, safety valve and pressure meter. Hand, foot or electric pumps are used to fill the air tank to 8 bars of pressure. When both tanks are full, the AS2 burns for 3 hours. A safety device

\<

&a-

with a magnetic Vakfe permits fuel to evaporate and flow to the starting nozzle only when the burner is lit. + The AS2 generates 20 kilowatts of power despite its relatively compact dimensions. It measures approximately 27 inches long, 20 inches wide and 7 inches high, and it weighs about 11 pounds.NATOs Sixteen Nations, All Rights Reserved.

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,.
PATTON:The Man Behindthe Legend, 1885-1945 by Martin Blumenson 320 Pages Wlll!amMorrow &CO., N Y 1985 $1795 Occasionally, boOks appe~ On the scefie that truly clsrify and provide insight. As such. they demand to be read and become pert of ones professions library. Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945 is one of those books. Martin Blumenson has produced another in a series of illuminating works on George S. Patton. providing a comprehensive. human portrait of the man. Blumenson could not have faced a tougher task. Many consider Patton an American superhero. Others ses him as ths epitome of the swaggering wsrrior. As with most figures who become bigger than life due to their role in pivotal historical events, Patton the man differed somewhat from Patton the legend. Blumenson, as only this distinguished historian could do. lays thie difference out well. leaving the reader with a new appreciation of how Patton became a great captain and leader of menindeed a legend. As a work that provides such ineight, the book has msny etrengths. It is well-documented nnd researched, providing a wealth of information and a detsiled look into the personality, chsracter and formative influences of our greatest wartime maneuver commsnder. Further, the book ie a precise word picture of the consummate professional soldier, constantly studying. thinking and lecturing about warfigbting, keep ing himself mentaIly prepared and physically fit for war in peace. Patton prepsred himself for those moments when his soldiers and nation needed him by a lifetime of etudy and reflection of wsr=fighting theory and practice. In effect, Blumenson makes the portraits snd statues of Patton seen all nround our Army come alive. The book provides clear explanations of Pattons warfighting beliefs, showing them to be rooted in a well-developed grasp of military history, his own driving spirit end successful practice. Blumenson does euch excellent work looking at Patton the man that be leaves the reader familiar with his other Patton works wiehing there might have been more. Ueeful for sokfiere would have been insights into the origine of many of Pattons masterful command and control techniques which are still applicable even in this dawning age of technological application. In addition, the lack of mape and tbe tactical and operationsI context of Pattons decisionmaking cauees tbe reader to look eleewhere or to recsll these from memory (not a bad test for soldiere to do). Yet, this was not Blumensons intent, nor do theee matters eeriously detract from the book. In summsry, the book reads quickly, is well-organized, contsins a fluid and clew style, and providee the reader with a compassionate yet realistic look at the man and the legend. It is recommended reading for anyone who wants to understand that behind Pattone exterior style was a dedicated and prepnred professional soldier who, with his soldiere, wae able to accomplish great feats on battlefield because be worked at prepsrirrg himself through a lifetime of study in warfighting. In these timee when the US Army Command and General Staff College motto Ad Bellum Pace Parati (in peace prepare for wad gains in meaning, this book provides all professional soldiers with a great example.

Wig GenFrederickM FranksJr., uSA.

Deputy Commandant, USACGSC

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BOOKREVIEWS
BOMBERHARRISby.DudleySaward. Forewordby Sir Arthur Bryant. 347 Pages. Doubleday& Co., NY. 1984, $19.95, Bomber Harris is a carefully documented tribute to a principaJ player in Englands World War II struggle against Germany. Sir Arthur Harrie, marshal of the Royal Air Force, served as the air officer commander in chief, Bomber Command, 1942-45. In that capacity, he led the fight against heartland Germany and, at the same time, successfully fought to preserve the integrity and priority of hia command against the continual onslaught of political and military Ieadere of the army ~.d navy who sought the commands diaintegration. In both battlee, his chief supporters were the ones who counted Winston Churchill and Dwight D. Eisenhower. While this biography covers the youthful years of Harris, his minimaf education, farming attempts in Rhodesia, World War I and flying service between the wars, the focal point of Bomber Harris is 1942-45 with the world at war. A pioneer in nightflying, and long en advocate of tecfmological innovations in the fields of navigation, precision-bombing and long-range aircraft development, Harris clearly was the ideaf choice to lead Great Britains Bomber Command. Throughout his tenure, while not neglecting ship and troop support, Harris consistently and with increasing ademency gave first priority to pounding vitef targets in the interior of Germany. In this, he was uniformly and obstinately opposed by rep resentatives of land and navel services who demanded that more emphasis be given to bombing support on the battlefield and at sea. Considering wartime shortages, the threat to England and the touch-end-go outcome of most Allied operations, this divergence of view can be appreciated. In the end, as Berfirz felf end Germany collapsed, Harris was given fuIl and generous credit by all Alfred Ieaders for the accuracy of hie concepts. Indeed, it was the Bomber Command alone (of the three services) that carried the offensive into the German homelamd until mid-1943 when the weight of close cooperation of the US Eighth Air Force waa added to the scale. The cost of success was heavy: 55,888 officers end crewmen of the Bomber Command lost their lives or were missing ia action during the war years. FoIlowing the war, on 25 July 1945, a generrd election resulted in the passage. of governmental leadership from Churchill to Clement R. Attlea and his Labor Psqty. The impact of this change was particularly felt by Harris. His name was withheld from the Honors List, zmd official indifference was manifested over the immense contributionto victory made by the Bomber Command. A flood of letters, television programs and editorials surfaced, each decrying the Bomber Commend e wartime policy and denigrating Herris name. The unfairness of these omissions and attacks wae partially offset when Churchilf returned to power in 1951. However, it is this book, written by an ardent supporter and friend, which wifl do the most to establish Harris place in history. Unfortunately, he did not live to eae Bomber Harris in print. He died quietly at his home on / April 1984, k few months prior to the. publication of this bio~aphy. Dudley Sawsrd. Bomber Command chief radar officer, served under Harris ae a wing commander and group captain. He has @so$ written The Born bers Eye. 1.

Maj G@n Stan L. McClrdlan,USA,17etkd

OdNITZ: The Last Fiihrer: Portrait of a Nazi War Leader by Peter Padfield. 524 Pages. Harper $ ~ow
Publishers, N Y. 1984.$25.00.

In order to give the German people a government of honorable men to fulfil the ~ duty of continuing the war with all means, I, as Fuhrer of the nation, name the foGlowing members of the new Cabinet: Reichspresident, Dc$nitz; Reichschancellor, Dr. Goebbels; Partyminister, Bormann. .

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These words were written by Adolf Hitler in the early morning hours of 29 April 1945. By 1500 that same day, Hitler was dead by his own hand, and Grand Admiref Karl Donitz, commander in chief of the German navy, became the last Fuhrer of the Third Reich. Eight days later. it fell on his shoulders to surrender, unconditionally. all German forces to the Allies. Peter Padfield has drawn on the German archiives and many unpublished papers to explode some of the myths that have surrounded Donitz. A former Roy+ Navy officer, he has produced a book well worth reading by both mifitary and political historians. Donitz was born the second son of Emil and Anna Donitz on 16 September 1891. His mother died in 1895 when I)onitz was three years old. Ilis father never remarried but, instead, tried to be both mother and father to his two sons. Emil Donitzs outlook on life was implanted in the typical Prussian mold of the day. He taught his boys a strong sense of obligation to the state, the morrmchy and the German Reich, of which Prussia was the core. Young Donitz grew up with the conviction, as he expressed it, that each citizen had the duty to serve his state. This teaching was the bedrock on which his entire life was built, and it explains in part his complete devotion to Hitler and to the prerogatives of the Third Reich to rule Europe. Donitz was ruthless in his demands upon himself. his staff and his commanders to press the war to the fullest against the Alfies. He sent thousands of young men to their deaths in U-boats through the misguided belief, influenced by Hitler, that U-boat production would be increased and he could again take control of the seas. Upon his arrest late in May 1945. and during his trial, Donitz tried desperately to disassociate himself from the war crimes of the Nazi government. The 10-year prison sentence which he received appean to be a compromise between that preferred by the Soviets and that which was considered ap-

propriate by the Western Allies. This is a compelling account of the life and times of Karl Donitz. It recounts the influences of the corrupt Nazi regime on an officer of extraordinary military strengths end !eadership ability, but who was equally as weak in personal character.
Lt CotLaurenceT. 8yam, USArl, i%?tfred

AFGHANISTAN:Ths Sovist Invasion in Perspective: Revisedand EnlargedEditionby AnthonyArnold 179 Pages Hoover institution Press Stan. ford. Cald 1985 $1095 Anthony Arnolds compact yet comprehensive analysis of the events surrounding the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is brilliant and thought-provoking. Ueing a variety of sources, be clearly demonstrates the aggressive nature of the Sot,iet Unions postwar policy toward Afghanistan. Arnold possesses an extensive background in foreign intelligence matters, especially in the area of Soviet-Afghan relations. He puts this background to good uqe in detailing the various Soviet strategies directed toward the eventuaf takeover of that country. As each strategy proved ineffective. beginning with economic penetration and then political subversion, the Soviets became more determined to achieve their objective a determination ultimately leading to their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With the current war in that nation well into its sixth ye%, the outlook is grim for both sides. The Soviets and their Afghan allies have been unable to develop a nationaf political consensus in Afghanistan which would legitimize the Kabul regime, nor have they succeeded in crushing the Afghan resistance, the mujahidin, and its civifian supporters. The m ujahidin, despite severe losses. have become increasingly effective milittiily and have developed a grass-roots political infrastructure in parts of the country. Even so. the mujahidin act-

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BOOKREVIEWS
ing done, cannot drive the Soviets out of Afghauistsn. The solution to the war, states Arnold, is one in which the West (particularly the United States) can play a major role. He advocates increased military and nonmilitary aid to the mujahidin, coupled with a campaign to internationalize the war among the largely apathetic world community. Evsntuslly, the combination of domestic and internationef pressures from avsriety of sources wilf force the Soviet Union into accepting a negotiated settlement to the war. Regardless of how one feels about his proposal. Anthonys sympathy, respect and admiration for the Afghan people are quite evident although he never lets such feelings interfere with his objectivity. His analysis is etraightforward and direct, often brutrdly frank. Afghanistan: The Souiet Invasion in Perspective-is an excellent, well-written book which I would recommend to anyone seeking meaningful insights into the tragic war currently being waged against the Afghan people.
Capt Dav[dF McDermott,tlSAr7

EMINENTVICTORIANSOLIDERS:Seekers of Glory by ByronFarwell 367 Pages W W NorIon &Co NY 1985 $1795 Eminent Victonan Soldiers ie a collection of single-chapter biographicsf sketches of eight of the most famous of Queen Victorias generals. Two of these, Hugh Gough sod Charles J. Napier, were veterans of the Napoleonic Wsrs who, in old age, helped to expand Great Britains Indian Empire. As was so often the case, this expansion was not necessarily what Great Britain had in mind. The next generation is represented by Chsrlee G. Chinese Gordon. Frederick S. Roberte, Garnet J. Wolseley end H. Evelyn Wood. All four entered the eervice just prior to the Crimean War. Gordon is beet

known for hie quixotic stand and death in Khartoum. Roberts was the most famous end succeesfnl generef of the 19th-century Indian army. He later commanded the ermies which fought the Boer War and was the last commander in chief of the British army. Wolseley, an army reformer, conquered Egypt in 1882, failed to rescue Gordon in 1885 and wae the character portrayed by WU.lism S. Gilbert and Arthur Srdfivsrr as the Modern Major General. Wood was a protege of Wolseley. He began rnifitary service as a midshipmen in the Royel Navy, later entered the army, won the Victoria Cross and roee to the rank of field marshal. Today, he is remembered as much for his eccentric family (Kitty OShea was a sister) as for his military achievements. The firml characters, end perhaps the most eni~atic, are Hector A. Macdonsld and Horatio H. Kitchener. Macdonafd was a Scottish crofters son who rose from private to major generef-then committed suicide rather than face court-martiaf for afleged homosexusf acts. Kitchener won fame by conquering the Sudan and avenging Gordon. He went on to command in South Africa following Roberts departure, / was commander in chief in India and . achieved his greatest influence as war minister during the opening years of World

w= I.
All eight men were extraordinarily arqb~ f tious and brave to the point of foolhar ness. Most carried numerous scars, fo; % ,.. recognition in battle was a proven avemie to advancement. Only Roberts eeemq }0 have remained a genuinely likable personality y. Whatever their personal foibles or tqcticrd inefficiencies, they carried the qu~ene colors to the ends of the Earth and w&e largely responsible for the creation of the empire on which the sun never set. Byron Fsrwell tefls their etories with ~ sympathy and humor. He provides the in- formation necesesxy for the nonepecidist to understand the era in which these men rose to the top of their profession as well as the conditions of wars now long faded from

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93

memory. Those wars provided the stage upon which these eight Eminent Victorian Soldiers achieved ceIebrity. Specirdists end professional hietoriene will be critical of the absence of primary eources and footnotes. Notwithstending, the book is wefl-written, entertaining end worth the interest of the general reader. It is superior in eubstence and style to Ferwells previoue book, Queen Uctonas Little Wars, with adequate maps and a select bibliography. It is altogether a pleasant book.
Lt Cd R[chardM., Swain, USA, School 0/Admced MilitaT Studies, USACGSC

GRAVE NEW WORLO by Michael A Ledeen. 244 Pages Oxford University Press, N.Y. 1985 $17.95. Grave New World is a thought-provoking work that is certain to infuriate merry sectors of the US government end the US public. It also serves to reinforce the views of severzd other sectors in the United States. Michael A. Ledeen presents two basic premises in the work and then sets about to prove their validity. The first is that the increaee in international crisee during the past decade etems directly from the perception that the superpowers are no longer as clear as they once were about what they want end are no longer as prepared to pursue their intereste with the necessary means. This perception ie baeed on observing the irrationeJ international behavior of the Soviet Union and the United States in recent years end on the increasing internal incoherence of tbe two superpowers. The eecond premise followe that a major consequence of US end Soviet etrategic confusion is to enconrage other countries to take more irdtiative in devising their own strategies. To take en example, both Cuba end Israel now conduct policies that, in their power to alter world events, seem to indicate a global statue much greater then

either of the countries posseeees. Ledeen is extremely critical of the US policy elite-an elite that seems incapable of clearly defining and resolutely pursuing the national interest. He sherpIy attacks berrieters, judges, broadcasters and journalists, claiming those groups have vested power interests end are, in fact, making policy in the United States. Although one is inclined to think Ledeen has cited extreme caees, he makes many persuasive sr~m~nts. His treatment of the Soviet Umon M not as persuasive in that he does not present the depth of evidence needed to make his case. The book ie well done and obviously written with both concern end passion. Ledeen presents no solution ae to how a democratic government can effectively pursue its interests against nondemocratic adversaries, but his assertions for more rerdism in foreign policy end for more appreciation of the role the United States can play on the international scene are worth expIoring. The book is highly recommended for aO members of US society.
co! RobertF. Collins,USA. Scimrco, Colorado State Unikwrsity

Depafimant

of MilAaIv

RUSSIA: The Roots of Confrontation by Robert V. Damels Foreword by Edwin O. Relschauer. 411 Pages Harvard Umverslty Press, Cambridge, Mass 1985 $2500. Why have the United States and the USSR contently been at odds for 40 years? What are the chances that they will change in the near future (detente)? This is the subject of Professor Robert V. Deniels scholarly yet extremely lucid book. The simple answer ie that the leading nations of the world in power and economic strength never have end never will get along. Dsmiels provides a study in the comparative anatomy. end physiology of Ruseien cultural history .to show the roots of confrontation are far deeper and more complex than such a simplistic answer. Another ex-

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planation might be that the Russians believe in sponsored commurrism which is anathema to the United Statee. In fact, both Russian leaders and Americans accept the fact that communiem as a workable system is sdready on the ash heap of history. It survives onfy as a convenient rallying-point word for Rueeisn nationalism and for snti-Soviet resistance. The first half of Russia ihe Roots of Corsfrontation traces the history of Russia in a highly readable style from antiquity to the present. There is a continuing theme and emphasis on the diffuse origins of the many natiomdities currently within the Roman Empire. Drmiels builds a strong case that Russia is the last remaining colonial power that rulee othsr nationalities by centralized force: colonies that it acquired from contiguous nations, not from overseas. He uses this fact to explain the natural suspicion of the Russians that so dominatee their view of foreigners. He does not and here he is in keeping with other historians-believe that there is any likelihood of serious sepsratiem in the near future. The finsf 100 pages following the historical review will be of particular interest even as isolated reading for many who are familiar with Russian history. Here, Deniels summarizes his realistic conckrsione based upon the diametrically oppoeed cultursf histories of the two superpowers. He is not overly optimistic for detente. As a student of politice and diplomatic history, he indicates that the intermittent periods of detente coincide with the hareh facts of resfpolitik whenfor verioue reasons, both internal and external-it euited the two superpowers best intereet temporarily to work cautiously in hermony. This ie a rare combination of a book well-written, scholarly and historically informativethat addresses a subject that should have widespread interest to the readers of this j ournel.
RADM Ben Eiseman, USNR, Retjred

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: A Framework for Analyaia. Edited by Damel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Thomas J. Leney. 585 Pages. Lexington Books, Lexington. Mass. 1985.$32.00. This book, set in 20 chapters, is a comprehensive survey consisting of an array of national security essays written by academicians and analysis from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, as welf as the current decade. The editors, Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Thomas J. Leney, are Army officers assigned to the DepaMment of Social Sciences. US Military Academy, West Point. The book is intended to serve as a textbook not only in West Points nationaf security seminar but in similar courses at undergraduate institutions throughout the United States. Jts objective is to identify the important variables that shape national security posture and assist in understanding the relationship between ends and means. A centrsf theme of the book ie that the traditions view of nationsd security . . . involves more than the procurement f and application of military force. . . . Today a much broader definition of national [ secursty is needed one that includes eco,} nomic, diplomatic, and social dimensions, in addition to the military dimension. U.S. National Security is organized into seven parts. Pert 1, How to Analyze Na- ~ tiorwd Security, outlines a framework tlm sflows the reader to understand and ev d uate national security policy and to see th~ ~, relationship bet ween major categories of analysis. After presenting their framgwork, the editors introduce groups of readings in major themes that allow, the reader to apply the concepts to a vsrietiy~f cases. Pert 11, The National Security Environmerit, examines the defense policy of the Soviet Union, the nature of alliances, technology and the US approach to war. It addresses two fundamental questions. What are the characteristics of the national security environment that influences

MILITARY

REVIEW

March 1986

strategy and policy? How do the international and domeetic environments affect the development of a nations security policy? Two chapters entitled Deterrence and Defense and Toward a Strategy of Limited War comprise Part III, Strategy in the Nuclear Age. Topics discussed in Pert IV. The National Security System: Structure and Process, include organizational interests, the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and congressional power. Parts V and VI address. respectively, the diplomatic, economic and military dimensions of national security policy. Part V) 1, a concluding essay by the editors, describes US national security policy in each administration since World War 1I. The editors use their framework for analysis to identify vertical and horizontal continuities and discontinuities and to explain how and why thev occurred. This

chapter also makes some observations about future national security policy, prohIems the United States may need to address and the prospects of doing so efficiently. Many of the essays appearing in this edited volume are well-known to the serious student of nationaJ security. Suggestions for additional readings follow Parts 11 through VI and should prove valuable for those seeking additional reference material. This is an excellent primer that will provide a foundation for those interested in ascertaining why, how, when and where the United States should use its power to protect its values and interests. The cost of the book, however, will limit the target audience for which it is intended.

Cd JamesS Motley, USA Rehred

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A PEOPLESARMY Massachusetts SYddlers and Societyin the Sewn Years War DVFrea Anderson 274 Pages Lhmver S,IYof NormCaroma Press Ch.melHll, N C 1984 $2500 PHILSHERIOAN ANOHIS ARMY by PaulAndrewHulton 479 Pages Unwerwy o? Wbrawa Press Lmco!n Nen 1985 2 8 $2995 clombounc $1495 uaDerbouna THELONOSURRENDER by Burke Daws 320 Pages Random i
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81TTERWOUNOS GermanWctims of the Great War, 19141939 by RooertWeldooWhalen 245 Pages CornellUnwers, tv Press Ithaca N Y 1984 $2495 THE 8UTTON The PentagonsStrategicCommand and Control Systemby OanlelFora 271 Pages Smon & SChuSter N v 1985 $1695 THE MILITARIZATIONOF SPACE U S POhCY, 1945-1984 by Pad B Stares 334 Pages CornellUmvewty Press Ithaca d f 1985 $2500

Pages Westwsw Press Goulder COIO 1985 $1650 :2 KOMMANOO GermanSpecial ForcescdWorld War Two by James Lucas 245 Pages S1 Manln s Press N Y 1985 ~ $16 95 GREENNIGHT, RED MOURNINGby Rlchar5 E Oqden 304 ~
Pages Zebra Books N Y 1985 $350 ? UNITED STATES NAVY ANO MARINE CORPS SASES, OVER- ; SEAS Ealfed bT Paolo E Colefta 459 Pages Greenwooa ~ Press Westpon Corm 1965 $7500

ESCAPEFROMGERMANYby Aldan Crawley 352 Pages Ber. ~ mm Assoc! ales Lannam MO 1985 $995 ,:

March

1986

MILITARY

REVIEW