LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AS PRACTICED BY JOHN SINGLETON MOSBY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

A thesls presented t o the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulflllment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by RICK GUTWALD, MAJ, USA B.A., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas I986

Approved f o r public release; distribution i s unlimited.

i j f J - .j !I!) b

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: MAJ Rick Gutwald Title of Thesis: LOW intensity conflict as practiced by John singleton Mosby i n the American C i v l l War Approved by:

L l f Michael E. Hall, MA

.--bJr
/

A\d

MAJ Frederick A. Eiserman, MA, MMAS

fl 8
*

>WJ

,Thesis Committee Chairman

L,

Member, Graduate Faculty

s < 7 & LTC Walter S. Towns, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th day of June 1986 by: Phillp J. Brbokes, Ph.D.

,Member, Consulting Faculty

,Director, Graduate Degree

Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author nnd do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command al agency. ( m e s tp

ii

ABSTRACT
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AS PRACTICED BY JOHN SINGLErON MOSBY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, by Major Rlck Gutwald, USA, 177 pages.

.s

Thls study 1s an hlstorlcal analysts of three C l v l l War partlsan (Insurgent) operatlons conducted by the 43d Battallon, Vlrglnla Cavalry and I t s Confederate leader, John S .Mosby: the rald on Felrfax Court House, 8-9 March 1863; the attack on Loudoun Helghts, 9- 10 January 1864; and the B e g v l l l e rald, 13 August 1864. Each opemtlon I s analyzed by uslng the followlng factors: sltuatlon and organlzatlon; mlsslon and plannlng; executlon of the opemtlon; equlpment and loglstlcs; communtcatlons, command and control; results; the element of chance; and leadershlp. In add1tlon, Mosby's background and chamcter are also dlscussed and analyzed. Among the many concluslons that could be drawn from thls etudy ace: lntelllgence i s paramount to a partlsan unlt's survlval; partlsan actlvltles are not always acceptable to i t s supportlng government; C l v l l War partlsan operatlons are chamcterlzed by slmple mlsslon orders, hlt-and-nm tactlcs, surprise, stealth, speed, deceptlon, and audaclty; and partlsan operatlons have the potentlal t o physlcally and psychologlcally affect ell levels of the enemy's government. The study concludes that partlsan warfare 1s s t l l l vlable today and that the US. Army should expand lts focus to Include Its use.

1.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page

1. INTRODUCTION

....................

.. .. ............

2. MOSBY'S BACKGROUND
3. MOSBY'S OPERATIONS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

SECTION 1. RAID ON FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE.. SECTION 2. ATTACK ON LOUDOUN HEIGHTS..

27
72

. . ........

SECTION 3. BERRYVILLE RAID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

101

4. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

SECTION 1. ANALYSIS. ............................... SECTION 2. CONCLUSION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

130

. . .. . . .

151

..................................................... ........
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

161 164

iv

LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE Page

1. VIRGINIA AND WESTERN VIRGINIA .....................

2. UNION PICKET LINE, MARCH 1863 ......................
3. UNION FORCES IN THE VICINITY O F FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, MARCH 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26
69

70
71
98
99 100

4. FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE RAID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WINTER 1864 ....................

6. HARPER'S FERRY AND VICINITY ........................

7. ATTACK ON LOUDOUN HEIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. RICHMOND AND VICINITY, SPRING 1864.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

127

9. NORTHERN VIRGINIA, SUMMER 1864.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I28

10. BERRYVILLE, VIRGINIA,AUGUST 1864.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

SOURCES Nine figures were adapted from George 8. Davls, Leslle J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, Jhe - f fO C l V l l War. (New York:: The Fairfax Press, 1978). Figure 1, plate 163. Figures 2, 3, 5,8, and 9, plate 74,l. Flgure 6, and 10, plate 27,l. Figure 7, plate 42,l. Figure 4 was copied from M i l l t a y Historical Society of Massachusetts, (Boston: Houghton, Mlfflin, and Company, 1895). attached t o inside back cover.
V

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Today's world faces a growlng number of p o l l t l c a l - m l l i t a y struggles aimed at achieving soclal, Ideologlcal, polltlcal, economlc or psychological objectives. These struggles, whlch the U. S. Army labels 'low Intenslty conflict" (LIC), range from polltlcal protests t o the Insurgent actions of terrorism and revolution. Although LIC i s a relatively new term, insurgency--an element of LIC--is not new. And, whlle insurgency i s not uncommon I n hlstory, i t has never domlnated the worlds conflicts o r the world's attention more than It does today. Slnce World War I I , some form of insurgent actlon has affected nearly every nation of the world, lncludlng the Unlted States. The most notable examples include Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon, Granada, and many recent terrorist attacks. As a result of these and other experlences, the U. S.Army's interest in LIC has increased i n both the defensive and offenslve spectrums Defensively, the army i s interested in methods that preclude o r defeat insurgencies which ( 1 ) threaten a nation's internal securlty or (2) threaten the army's own rear areas. The recent establlshment of Ilght infantry divislons and special operations forces, such as the Delta Force, are two examples of the army's involvement In defensive LIC.

On the other hand, the army Is equally concerned about i t s participation

in offensive LIC. As a result, the army has establlshed several types of
offensive units for employment i n LIC scenarios. These include airborne

units, rangers, special forces, c i v i l affairs, psychological operations, ant1

the units previously mentioned. Having organizations capable of operating i n LIC situations i s not sufficient, the army must also develop a doctrine t o govern their employment. Perhaps history and, more specifically, this study can assist the army i n

Its doctrinal development. If the army understands what was attempted and
accomplished in the past, i t w i l l be more prepared for'the future. The focal point for this study i s the birthplace of American modern
battle, the American Civil War. A quick scan of Civil War references

urovides numerous historical examples of insurgent operations. One (11 these references,
,by Franklin M. Osanka,

contains

an example of C i v i l War insurgency that eventually provided the research

question for this thesis. The article, 'Irregular Warfare in Transition," bg

L t . Col. Joseph P. Kutger of the U. S. A i r Force, mainly concerns the changes

of guerrilla warfare during and after World War II. A few paragraphs,
nowever, discuss insurgent or guerrilla actions I n the Civil War The author writes: A century ahead of their time, the Virginia Confederates of thP Civil War stumbled upon one of the secrets of ultramodern wor. Their techniques of resistence w i t h i n occupied territory presaged that of the Russians during World War II. One better appreciates thR difficulties faced by [Gen. Ulysses S.1 Grant during the Wilderness-. Cold Harbor campaign, when i t i s realized that the Army of the Potomac moved southward almost l i k e a ship at sea--the waters closing i n behind i t - - f o r any line of supply that extended more than

a few mlles was certain t o be ravelled and tattered by the attacks of the irregulars. . . . . Undoubtedly the claims and counterclalms of the successc)s of the partisan bands [Virginia Confederates1 were exaggerated, but their effect and influence was substantial and merit far more attention than i s usually given i n any history of the C i v i l War.' Today, i n t e m p t i n g lines of supply--or, in present terminology, lines of communication--is s t i l l one of the army's major concerns. Defensivelg, the ormy wants t o preserve i t s own lines of communication on both the low intensity and the conventional battlefields. Offensively, the army strives t o destroy or interrupt the enemy's lines of communication. The Virginia Confederates, as Lt. Col. Kutger pointed out, were very successful i n destroying or interrupting the Union's lines of communication. Furthermore, he states that these Confederates elso frustrated the Union army in i t s attempts t o sustain the Shenandoah Valley offensive: That Grant was fully aware of the draln on his capabllltles caused by the guerrillas i s evident i n a message he sent t o lGen Phillip H.1 Sheridan on August 17, 1864. In violation of the then code of international warfare? Grant instructed: T h e families of most of Mosby's men are known, and can be collected. I think they should be taken end kept at Fort McHenry or some secure place, as hostages for the good conduct of Mosby and his men. Where any of Mosby's men are caught hang them without triaL-3

__ .. - . - .- ..... - . ..- __ . 'Joseph P. Kutger, "Irregular Warfare i n 'Transition,' i n Franklin M. Llsanka, pod8 r n Guerr i l l a Warfare , (New York: Freepress of Glencoe, 196%).
..

pp. 44-46. zLt. Col. Kutger i s referring t o a code of instruction on land warfare adopted by the Union and titled, -Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States In the Field.- Published in War Departmelit General Orders Number 100 on 24 April 1863, i t recognized partisans (IS

legitimate soldiers. Xlbid, p. 44.

Lt. Col. Kutger then introduces the major cause of Gen Grant's
frustrati on: John Singleton Mosby had long been a southern guerrilla leader. Formerly an officer In Jeb (James Ewe11 Brown] Stuart's cavalry, he requested and received a transfer t o the guerrillas i n 1862. . . . His men had been operattng in the Shenandoah Valley and were causing Sheridan substantial trouble?

Lt. Col. Kutger's article suggests that further research into the
operations of the Virginia Confederates i s appropriate. Therefore, this study concentrates on the operations of John S. Mosby's untt, the 436 Battalion, Virginia Cavalry.J The research question for this study Is: What were the technique!: that made flosby and his men SUCCeSSfUl; and might any of them merit att.eritlwi today? This study focuses on:

I . Providing historical information on partisan employment that ihe

army might find useful in present o r future offensive operations. Over a century ago, the Confederates employed partisans t o conduct 'hi t,-and. run" raids into the rear of the enemy. Today the army employs similar units snrt the objective i s s t i l l the same--conduct deep battle i n the enemy's r w r area in order t o destroy isolated units and disrupt lines of communica!icm Although the techniques identified i n this study were employed by 19th century partlsans, perhaps some of them are s t i l l viable today for trse I n

4lbid. p. 44. Vlosby's unit was originally known as flosby's Rangers. After joining the r o l l s of the regular Confederate forces i t became the 43d Battaliun, Virginia Cavalry.
4

low, mld, or high intensity warfare. This study provides a beginning for future research and analysis of how these techniques might be useful today.
2. Establishing a starting point for researchers i n detennlning how t o

counter partisan operations. If history can provide information on how and why the partisans were successful, then i t might also provide information about partisan weaknesses. Security and area defense problems confront today's army commanders i n much the same way as they confronted the Unlon's commanders. Furthermore, with the growlng problem of terrorism and guerrilla activity, perhaps information about partisan weaknesses could

assist anti-terrorist research.

The terms 'guerrilla,' "partisan,' and "insurgent' are common to low intensity confllct. The term 'guerrilla' usually refers t o a combatant who engages i n harrassment and sabotage as a member of an independent unit. An 'insurgent" i s a person who revolts against civil authority or an established government. 'Partisan' refers t o a member of a body of detached light troops making forays and harmsslng the enemy. Although there are differences i n the definitions of the previously listed terms, i n this study, the terms 'guerrilla' and 'Insurgent' have the some meaning as 'partisan.' The following are the major elements of this study:
1. It i s comprised of four chapters. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction

and provides the purpose and scope of the study. Chapter 2 provides background information Including Mosby's life and the creation of his unit. Chapter 3 i s divided into three sections, each of which describes and analyzes a major tactical operation of Mosby. The first section focuses on

Mosby's first major raid, the Falrfax court House raid in March 1863. The second section provides Information on Mosby's least successlul operation, the Loudoun Heights attack in January 1864. The final sectlon in Chapter 3 describes one of Mosby's largest and most successful raids, the Berryvllle rald in August 1864. Chapter 4 i s divided into two sections and provides the

overall analysis and conclusions. Finally, a selected bibliography IS

provlded a t the end of the study.
2. It describes the partisan technlques used by the 43d Battalion,

Virginla Cavalry, in offensive operations, thereby, increadng our understanding of what the 43d Battallon did and why i t was successful.

3. It provides information so luture analysts may draw conclusions

about contemporary applicatlons.
4. It analyzes Mosby's early l i f e to determine the Impact i t had on his

operations.
5. It f i l l s historical gaps resultlng from the absence of the 43d

Battalion's records and other historical documentation.6 6. It suggests reasons for the occurrence of some historical events.
7. It combines accounts of other hlstorlans.
8. It provides Information about other C l v l l War personnel. 9. It analyzes the results and eflects of Mosby's operations.

10. I t discusses weaknesses and strengths of the union army in dealtng

with partisan activities.

11. It discusses the effects of chance on tactical operatlons

6Mosby's clandestine headquarters was burned t o the ground by Union forces on 26 September 1864. James J. Wllliamson, m u . s ~ a n g a r s (New , Yo&: Ralph 8 Kenyon, t896), p. IS.

12. It outlines Mosby's leadership strengths and weaknesses.

13. It does not Include:

a. Historical events occurring outslde the C l v l l War. h Historical events involving partisan operations of organizetions lither than the 43d Battalion, Vlrglnlri Cavalry.

c. Attempts t o prove that Mosby or any of his men created any of the
techniques they employed. d. Attempts t o prove that any current U. S. Dartisan strategy evolved tis a direct result of operations of the 436 Battalion. In conclusion, this study w i l l dlscuss and analyze three partisan operations i n order t o identify the techniques and principles that the Vlrglnln part.lsans used and determine i f any of them might be relevant
I itdog

CHAPTER 2 MOSBY'S BACKGROUND John S. Mosby's battlefield successes would suggest that he had been H schooled soldier, destined for greatness from childhood. However, nothin!]

in Mosby's f i r s t twenty-eight years--through his f i r s t year i n the Civil War

--pointed t o greatness or even hinted of m i l i t a r y success. Nevertheless, some of the reasons for Mosby's success can be traced to his earlier years:

For example, many of his strongest character t r a i t s surfaced during his

childhood and some of these were important factors i n his successful operations. Therefore, before analyzing the operations of Mosby's Rariger's, Mosby's background and personality should be addressed. John Singleton Mosby was born 6 December 1833 i n Powhatari Courdy, Virginia, approximately twenty miles west of Richmond. His fattier
WRS

Alfred D. Mosby, a university-educated planter and slave holder, and his mother was Virginia, the daughter of Reverend McLauren, an EpiscopAl minister.' Mosby was so frail and sickly that the attending physician predicted an early death from consumption? Mosby, however, refused to givo i n t o this prediction or t o his weak health. Nature made him weak and spare, biit i t also made him stubborn and antagonistic. As the years passed, he remained
. I Williamson,

m u ' s Ranaers, p. 15.

2Kevin H. Siepel, W,The Life and Times of John Slnaleton Nosb!g (Nrur York: St. Martin's Press, 19831, p. xxviii.
8

physically delicate, a condition that prevented him lrom competing w i t h or even jolnlng w l t h the other boys In normal play. He not only resented nature's fate, but also resented the other boys who were physically superlor. Consequently, Mosby disliked athletics as well as most of the things the other boys liked. He continuously antagonized his peers by taking opposite points of view. His aggressively contrary behavior made him very unpopular

with the other boys and often started fights? Although he never won, the
strength of his resentment and stubbornness always made him willing t o light. Mosby replaced athletics w i t h books. He avidly read S i r Walter Scott, Washington Irving, and other authors' tales 01chivalry, honor, and heroic adventure? He especially enjoyed the partisan adventures of the Revolutlonaqj War leader, Francis Marion, known as the 'Swamp

Fox'?

These books filled Mosby's head with dreams of heroes and adventures. unfortunately, his frail body would not permit him to pursue his fantasies and, thereby, increased his frustrations and bitterness. He began t o identify more and more w i t h the victims in his adventure books. He pictured himself

in a constant struggle of survival against the physically stronger men. And,

as he struggled, he recognized his need for an equalizer, something that
could turn the tables on his 'villains.' He found i t i n the form of firearms. "When the war broke out,' Mosby said, 'I was glad t o see that the little men were a match l o r the big men through belng armed.% And, i n the C i v i l War,
p. 22. ZSiepel, 'Ibid, p. 23. SJohn S. Mosby, of ,C -o l edited by Charles Wells Russel (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 19171, p. 4. GSiepel, W,p. 23.
9

m,

MosbU's pistols. couoled wlth his stubborn demeanor and aooressiveness.

were more than -a matcn tor tne big men: While Mosby never had any formal military training, two factors in his
early life helped him become a cavalry trooper. First, Mosby grew up wlth horses and rode nearly every weekend. He possessed the horsemanship and riding experience that the c a v a l q needed. When Mosby joined the cavalry, however, he was considered a sloppy rider; he required considerable extra training; and, while he could remain In the saddle for long periods, some accounts suggest that he never became an expert horseman. Second, he enjoyed shooting and hunting, and appreciated different types of firearms.7 Mosby graduated from the Male Academy at Charlotte, Virginia. at the age of sixteen (see map at Figure 1, page 26). His good grades in Latin, Greek, French, algebra, geometry, and other routine courses earned him the right t o continue his education* Thus, in 1850, he entered the University of Virginia as a short, thin, frail-looking youth; one who would never exceed
125 pounds. His size, however, was out of proportion w i t h his character,

partlcularly his moral courage and sense of honor. Unrestrained by physical fear, he met attacks on his honor wlth the same determined spirit as the heroes in his adventure novels. For instance, in his third year of studies, he shot a fellow student whose slanderous statement had maligned his honor9 Years later, as the leader of the partisans, his desire t o avenge his being labeled a horse thief would provide major motlvatlon for his raid on Falrfax Courthouse.

__

7Mosby, Memoirs, p. 5. BSlepel, BepaL pp. 23-24. 9M0sby. m , pp. 7-9.

10

in flay of 1853, the nineteen-year-old Mosby was convicted of "unlawfully" shootlng the fellow student and was sentenced to one year i n jail.10 Ironically, while I n jail, Mosby befrlended the prosecutor and borrowed a few law books. After serving seven months of his sentence, he was pardoned by the governor of Virginia and began t o study law in earnest. Twenty-eight months later, Mosby was admitted to the bar by the same judge who had sent him to lail.ll in 1855, Mosby began practiclng l a w near Charlottesville, Virglnla. Two years later, he married Pauline Clarke, the daughter of a state legislator and former congressman. Later, the Mosbys moved t o Bristol, Virginia on the lennessee state llne and, by May of 1859, had thelr first child. May Vlrginia.12 By early 1861, seven states had seceded from the Union; Fort Sumter had fallen; the Virginia State Assembly debated whether to follow her seven sister states; and President Llncoln asked the cltizens of Brlstol and all Virginia to volunteer t o save the Union. Pro-Unionism, however, was very unpopular In Brlstol, Virginia. And, as one mlght expect, the contrary Mosby was pro-Union. lrrespectlve of his pro-Unlon sentiments, flosby later succumbed t o a friend's pleas t o add his name t o the rolls of a new m i l i t i a organization called the Washlngton Mounted Rifles--a Cavalry company. Mosby attended his flrst cavalry lesson, hated every minute of it, and
-. ._ lolbid. The student, George Turpln, was a bully who had made a number ilf uncompllrnentary remarks about Mosby. Turpln threatened Mosby w i t h a beating, but as the bully advanced, Mosby flred a gun and wounded hlm i n the neck. IlSiepel, & & I J , pp. 25-30. 12Ibid, pp. 5-7.
.

11

promised never t o return. He could see no good reasons for the repetitlolls d r i l l o r the stern discipllne. His negative attitude made the following impression on a friend: There was nothing about [Mosbyl then. . t o Indicele what he was t o be--he was rather a slouchy rider, and dld not seem t o Inkt! any interest I n m i l i t a r y duties.. . . We a l l thought he was rather an

indifferent soldier."l3
Two days after Lincoln's request f o r volunteers, the Virglnia State Assembly voted t o secede. Shortly thereefter, Mosby made hls ueclslovr anrl stayed w i t h the Washington Mounted Rifles. He said, "Virginia went o(ll of the Union by force of arms, and I went w l t h her.'l4

From that polnt on, Mosby attended cavalry d r l l l every day, and, I n ADril,
pulled his first detail as camp guard. He later remarked:
For t w o hours, in a cold wind, I walked my round and was very glad when my rellef came and I could go t o rest on my pallet of straw. The experience of my first nlght i n camp rather tended t o chill my military ardor and was far more distaseful than plcketlng near the enemy's Ilnes on the Potomac, which I afterwards did i n hot and colrl weather, very cheerfully; in fact I enjoyed it. The danger of being shot by a rifleman in a thicket, i f not attractive, a t least kept a vidette [sentinel] awake and watching. A t this time I was the frailest and most delicate man in the company, but camp duty was always irksome to me, and I preferred being on the outposts. During the whole time that I served as a private--nearly a year--I only once missed going on picket three times a week. The singe exception was when I was disabled one night by my horse falling over a cow lying i n the road.15

Mosby's unit tralned In camp untll July 1861 when It was ordered to join Gen. Joseph Johnston's Confederate army in Virginia's Shenandoah VallOU.

__

lzlbid, pp. 8-1 I . 14Mosby, Memorrs, p. 2 1. 'Jlbid, pp. 22-23.

12

__

Plosby later admittecl that he had learned much durlng his training. He finally began t o understand the value of discipline and to appreciate his commander, -we learned a good deal from ICapt. Grumble Jones1 . . . land the

Jones 6 had also arranged training1 was a good course of discipline for ~ 5 . ~ 1
lor each mnn i n Mosby's unit t o be outfltted with a Sharps carbine and a
sabre. Mosby was honored that the Confederacy provided the carbine because arms were scarce. The sabre, however, was a dlfferent matter. Mosby could see no real use for the sabre except l o r holding meat over a f l r P
to cook. He dragged the sabre wlth him throughout hls first year of servlce.

but when he became a commander, he discarded it. nosby later boasted t o be

[he fir s t commander t o do
~0.17

Upon i t s arrival i n the Shenandoah Valley, the Washington Mounted Rlfles joined the 1st Virginia cavalry Regiment, commanded by COL JEB Stuart
'1 wo days later, Mosby eXperitmCed his first tactical operation. His unit w w

scoutlng i n the Valley toward Martinsburg in western Virginia, when they wrprised two Union soldlers foraging.18 The two soldiers ran, but Mosby's

uiiit overtook them. Mosby received a canteen as booty and he later

r.emarkeU that It was the f i r s t canteen he had ever seen, so he treasuretl i t tllghly 19 Stuart was responsible for taking experienced horsemen and turning them into effective cavalry troopers. Therefore, he began training hls new recruits by keeping them in the saddle for most of the week of 20 July, ml, -. . - .. ___..... lblbid, p. 27. 171bid, p. xi. '*[he region of western Virginia separated from the State of Virginit! iii i061 and was admitted to the Union as the State of West Virginia in 1863 191tlld, p. 32.

I3

i n the last thirty-six hours of that week, pushed them 60 miles t o get t o Manassas, Virginia. Although Mosby was i n a forward posltion where fie could see most of the battle, he dld not get into the f i r s t battle of Manassas as soon as he would have liked because the Washington Rifles remained i n reserve.m However, when the Union lines finally shattered, Mosby's unit. was called upon t o pursue the fleeing enemy. They chased the defeatpi1 force for over six miles until darkness covered the Union retreat. Mosby's f i r s t taste of battle provided t w o lessons. First, he observed and survived the carnage of the f i r s t malor battle of the war. Second, he witnessed huw quickly the cavalry can terrorlze the enemy's exposed flanks and rear The loss a t Manassas severely demoralized the union. The army hfdd panicked and fled across the Potomac, and the citizens of Washlngton I)C feared a Confederate Invasion. Their fear was so strong that Gen. George 13 McClellan, the Union's new commanding general, spent the remainder of the summer and early fall organizing and maintaining the defenses around the nation's capital. The victorious Confederate army, however, was not quick enough t o pursue the Union forces into Washington. After the IJnion army had vacated Virginia, Stuart's troops pushed on t o the Potomac where they established the forward edge of the Confederacy. Mosby now rode pickid R S he preferred it--along the Potomac and closer t o the enemy. The pause iil the war also provided Mosby w i t h time f o r reading military Works Such (IS Noland's Emalplrmeat of C a v m , Napoleon's

m, and some books on

partisan warfare.2' Mosby apparently gained considerable knowledge from

- ._ . . ... . .. . . ... mThe f i r s t battle of Manassas was also known as the first battle of H ~ r l l Run. 21Siepe1, p. 42.
.

m,

14

the study of mtlitary history. Letters to his w i f e and his memoirs ofteri referred to vlgnettes from other wars. Evidently, Mosby learned from hi!; own battlefield experiences and from his readings as well.

In January 1862, Mosby was one of only two men in hls cornpan!) t o
volunteer for reenlistment without f i r s t receiving a furlough. Previouslg,

he was only one of two men who did not refuse t o wear uniforms (procured
by Grumble Jones) made of prison cloth22 Thls probably had some bearing on why he was soon given permission to visit his famlly, and why the new regimental commander, Col. Grumble Jones (Stuart had been promoted out the position), asked Mosby to become the regimental adjutant. Mosby accepted hls commander's invitation and, when he returned from furlough, he laced the new horror of having to conduct d r i l l and ceremonies as an
uf ficer.23
(If

The month of March began w i t h Mosby s t l l l trying t o learn hls duties R'J regimental adjutant and Mcclellan preparing his army for the advance on Richmond. On 9 March 1862, Gen. Johnston started to move hls Confederatr urmy southward from Manassas to protect Richmond from McClellan's nttack. As Johnston's army withdrew, the Federal cavalry mounted probes
10 monitor the progress of the Confederate army's withdrawal.

Consequently, Brig. Gen. Stuart's cavalry was asslgned to guard Johnston's

rear, not knowing i f the probing forcc!s were the advance o f McClellan's nr m!.j
IJI

just. Isolated bodies. The retreatlng Confederates did not know that

FIcClelian's main 1ort:e. i n Alexandria, Virginia, intended t o move down tht!

pot om^^

River by shiu to the Virylnia Peninsula.

22llbid, p 17.

231bid, p. 44-45, 4H.

Mosby volunteered t o ride behind the lines to find out which forces were facing Stuart's cavalry. Mosby and three other men forded the i c y Cedar RUII, carefully worked their way around the Union force, and discovered i t t o be nn isolated body. They also noticed that the enemy would be highly vulnerable t o an attack from the numerically superior Confederates. Mosbg and hls companions rode a l l night, recrossed the river, and reported their findings t o Stuart. Overjoyed at the report, Stuart offered Mosby B reward
for what he had done. The only reward Mosby wanted was the opportunll!] trr

do the same thing again. Acting on Mosby's report, Stuart's cavalry immediately attacked across the r i v e r and began collecting prisoners Stuart's report of the operation singled out Adjutant Mosby and a comuaninn, recommending promotion f o r both.24 l h i s i s the first instance of a herolc deed by Mosby. More important, i t demonstrates Mosby's understanding 0 1 enemy lines of communications and vulnerabilities.

In late April 1862, the Confederate congress passed an act reorgun!zing

the army along democratic lines: officers were t o be elected by the men of the unit. Mosby's unit, by popular vote, elected Fitzhugh Lee as i t s commander. Unfortunately, as adjutant, the cocky Mosby had previously delighted in antagonizing the regimental executive officer, L t . Col. Fitzhugh

I.ee. Therefore, Mosby tendered his resignation as adjutant and Lee qulckl!;
accepted i t . Mosby, a private once again, accepted Stuart's invitation t o become a courier.=

BY May, McClellan's Union army of I IO,OOO men had inched UP the

peninsula toward Richmond, Maj. Gen. Thomas -Stonewall- Jackson's 24ibid, p. 51-52. ?JMosby, Memoir$, p. 109.
16

Confederate army threatened Washington D.C., and Confederate Gen. Robert E i.ee had replaced the wounded Gen. Joseph Johnston as the commander of the army defending Richmond. Because of the closeness of the t w o opposing armies, Stuart's cavalry had l i t t l e t o do, and flosby was bored, homesick, and looking f o r opportunities t o become an officer in other unlts.26 In the middle of this boredom, Stuart asked Mosby about the possibility
of probing flcclellan's right flank t o get information to support 'Stonewall'

Jackson's attack from the north. Mosby dashed off w i t h four men to get the information that Stuart sought. After a few days, Nosby returned and reported what he had seen; addlng that he had penetrated McClellan's lines
so easily that a larger force could repeat the act and do extensive damage.

Stuart listened intently, and when Mosby finished, went t o Lee w l t h a proposal based on Mosby's observatlons. On 12 June 1862, Stuart began his celebrated ride around McClellan w i t h Mosby and two other men rlding i n advance. In four days, the Confederate cavalry rode a circle of over one hundred miles through McClellan's forces--pillaging Union camps, burning equipment and boats, taking prisoners, and virtually ignoring the fact that any major Union forces were nearby. The daring operatlon shook the confidence of the Union forces, confused McClellan, and damaged hls reputation as a commander. It also put Stuart's name on the llps of every Confederate and caused Stuart to seek a commission for his favorite scout, John 5.Mosby. In this operation, Mosby demonstrated his boldness, his ability t o scout, and his ability to recognize enemy weaknesses.

.. .. .

. . .. .XSiepel,

m,p. 54.
17

The month of July began w i t h a new general in command of the Union's Army of the Potomac, Gen. John Pope. Pope had claimed t o be a man who never rested. Pope also boasted that he would move so relentlessly agalnst the Confederates that he would not have time t o take care of his own rear And, as a result, hls dlsPatCheS would be inttiated from his saddle instead
of his headquarters.2' Mosby recognized Pope's vulnerability to partisan

activities and approached Stuart w i t h a proposition t o "take care of hts IPope'sl rear and communications for him.'= Stuart understood and agreeri

With Mosby's reasoning. Unfortunately, Stuart f e l t he could not afforu t o

give up the men Mosby needed for his partisan experiment. Therefore, Stuot I sent him t o 'Stonewall" Jackson, suggesting that Mosby might be able t o persuade Jackson t o give him the men. On 19 July, Mosby carrled a l e t t e r of introduction from Stuart (describing the bearer as "bold, daring, intelligent, and discreet") t o Jackson.Halfway t o hls destination, Mosby decided t o take the train so he could stop en route and visit his family. He sent his horse and equlpmerii ahead with a companion and waited for the train. As he laid down to rest, lie was surprised and captured by a detachment of Union cavalry. The capturlng officer's official report shows that Mosby gave his name as Capt. Mosby ihe was not a captain). He probably did so t o insure he received better treatment. On the other hand, he may have done so as part of a fantasy. The capture report goes on to describe the impression that Mosby made:
_-

m i d , pp. 57-58. %osby, Memoirs, p. 125. T h e War of -Rebellon.on of the Offlclal Recor&nl.he l ! ! i h n m CQn feder(128 vols., 1880-1901), series 1, vol. LI, pt. It, p. 594. (Cited hearafter as Pg.)
18

By his Sprightly appearance and conversation he attracted considerable attention. He i s slight but well formed; has a keen blue eye and a blond complexion, and displays no small amount of Southern bravado i n his dress and manners. His gray plush hat i s surmounted by a waving plume, which he tosses, as he speaks, i n real Prussian style. He had a l e t t e r in his possession from General Stuart commending him t o the kind regards of General Jackson.=

Mosby's capture must have disappointed and embarrassed him. First of

1.111, he had everything going his way from the successful ride around

McClellan, t o Stuart's letter of recommendation, to the possibility of starting a partisan unit. Second, his capture must have crushed his flamboyant and arrogant self-esteem. Not to mention that he was probably
Iidiculed by

his captors for being captured i n his sleep. One can only

itnagine how hard he must have searched for a way to recover his pride and escape his predicament. Fortunately, fate was on Mosby's side. He was taken to the Old Capitol I'rison in Washington and ten days later became part of the war's first prisoner exchange. He was taken down the Potomac t o Fort Monroe, Virginih, v;here he would have to Wait four days before moving up the James River 111

the place of exchange. While he waited, he noticed large numbers of

i:ansports and Union soldiers. He learned that these were Gen. Ambrose Iiiirnside's troops, who had just arrived from North Carolina. Mosby be1i e v f ~ l

I-IcCleIIan would advance on Richmond i f Burnside's troops were lo reinfor C H

liirri

i n the Virginia Peninsula. On the other hand, i f Burnside's troops sailed

up the Chesapeake, i t would mean they were destined to reinforce Pope.

I Insb!j realized that Gen. Lee must have this important information He R I S O
... . . ..... . .. 300K,vol. .

xni, pt

...

Ill, p. 490.
19

realized that he had found an opportunity t o avenge his capture. He contacted a Confederate sympathizer who secretly told Mosby that Burnside's troops were destlned to be moved north. Therefore, immedlately Rfter his exchange as prisoner, Mosby hurried t o Gen. Lee's headquarters, where he personally Informed Lee of the enemy's intentions. As a ~OSIJI!, Lee ordered Jackson to attack Pope's forces a t Cedar Mountain bofore Burnside's troops could arrive. Once again, Mosby demonstrated his abi Iilles
t o gather intelligence arid determine what was tactically important.

Although he scouted for Stuart and Jackson, Mosby saw l i t t l e actinn from August t o December 1862. Nevertheless, he still found opportunities
t,o harass the enemy. For example, Mosby wrote that he had led nine other

scouts in a charge on ten unsuspecting Union soldiers near Manassas, "The Yankees rnn and stampeded their whole regiment, thinking all of Stuart's cavalry were on them.'31 Mosby used these operations to continually remind Stuart of his potential as a partisan leader. Finally, after Stuart completed his Christmas raid on Dumfries, Virginia, he agreed t o l e t Mosby and nine men stay behind t o harass Gen. Hooker's rear (see Figure 2, page 69). Within two days, Mosby had captured twenty Union cavalrymen. Most of the time, Mosby captured the cavalrymen by himself, and, after turning them over t o his men, went off t o find more. He observed that many of the Union pickets lacked discipline and were especially vulnerable t o capture. Therefore, he searched

for these easy opportunities, often finding his victims asleep or playing
cards.
.

Mosby,

m, p. 146
20

A f t e r delivering hls prisoners t o Stuart and releaslng hls force of nine

tnen, he commented that he could have been more successful w i t h more men :;i.uart agreed and gave Mosby flfteen men. Thus, on 18 January 1863, Mosby started his partisan unit w i t h this nucleus of fifteen men.32 Mosby wasted l i t t l e tlme i n starting hls harassment of the vulnerable Ilnion pickets and outposts. In the beglnnlng, he could only get transient volunteer's, and then, only for short periods of tlme. Sometlmes they were cavalrymen I n need of horses--the Confederacy requlred i t s soldlers t o provide their own horses. sometimes they were wounded soldlers who were convalescing--nosby conducted forays from a hospital until one of the patients was killed in a raid. sometimes they were deserters from the Ilnlon---one of Mosby's best men was a former sergeant in the Union cavalry Somet.imes they were transfers from other units and sometimes they were men looking f o r adventure and the spolls of war--nosby let his men retaln !he booty they captured, simllar to the privateers of the sea. As Mosby's
r alding increased, so did his reputation. Consequently, he attracted greater

rlumhers of permanent volunteers Mosby conducted most of hls raids at night when the union plckets were
m s t vulnerable and his men were not. As his force became more

tlependable, however, he began t o exploit any opportunity the enemy w w l d give him, day or night Mosby's daylight raid on Herndon Station, Virglnla, m l y two months after he started his partisan career, provides a good exnmple of how much hls operations had improved. Un 17 March, i n Falrfnx ~32IOid,~p. 1 4 Y .Mosbys unit operated under the authority granted hirn 'Jg i k i g . Gen. Stuart. His unit WBS not authorized to orgenize as an o f f i c i a l I ommand until two months later.

County,Virginia, one of Mosby's scouts reported an enemy outpost, near Herndon Station, exposed t o attack (see figure 2, page 69). Mosby thought that the enemy would not expect them t o attack in the daytime because he and his men had been making a l l their attacks in Fairfax county a t night Consequently, they did Just that. Mosby's force of approximately 42 men maneuvered around t o the rear of the outpost and approached them from the direction of the Union camp. The 25 men of the Union outpost had expected t o see their relief approach from that same direction. Therefore, when Mosby's force appeared, the outpost believed they were friendly. They l e f t their horses tied t o a fence and continued t o lounge about. Mosby wrote: When we got within a hundred yards of them, an order t o charge was given. They were panic-stricken--they had no time t o untie their horses and mount--and took refuge i n the loft of the mill. I was afraid that i f they had time t o recover from their shock, they would t r y t o hold the mill against us with their carbines u n t i l reinforcements came. There was a pile of dry timber and shavings on the floor, and the men were ordered, i n a loud voice t o set the mill on fire. When we reached the head of the stairs, the Yankees surrendered. They were defenceless against the fire, and i t was nut their ambition t o be cremated alive. Not a shot was fired.= Mosby's raid on Hemdon Station netted one major, one captain, t w o lieutenants, twenty-one men, twenty-six horses and a l l their weapons and equipment; not one of Mosby's men was lost. Some of the Union soldiers, who had fled upon the i n i t i a l attack, alerted a nearby Union cavalry force that immediately pursued Mosby. Mosby's rear guard, however, intercepted the pursuing unit and forced their withdrawal. The operation ended w i t h Mosby's force escorting their captives t o the Confederate lines.
.

a l b i d , p. 163-164.

22

The Herndon Station raid demonstrates how effective Mosby's unit hnti become after only two months of operation. It also serves as a model f o r many of the raids Mosby conducted in later operatlons. l h i s does not mean that Mosby's operations always reached this level of success. On the contrary, many of his operations lost men in action or, on occasion, lolled completely. The Herndon Station r a i d does, however, show how Mosby interlaced his operations with deception, surprise, speed, and audacitg. Mosby's operations also reflect that he never overcame the insecurity o r sensitivity caused by his frail physique. Insecurity drove him t o volunteer
f o r d l f f i c u l t and daring operations. He was consumed w i t h the desire to

constantly prove himself. Therefore, these daring operations served t o appease this desire, and temporarily counterbalanced his feelings of Insecurity. Furthermore, Mosby's sensitivity probably fueled or even caused

his stubborn, antagonistic, and non-conformist tendencies. All these traits

combined t o establish a character more afraid of failure and of ridicule than
111

death. As a result, he became a fighter who would not and could no1 quit

tle overcame most of the obstacles he faced and he often twisted adversitg

in his favor. These obstacles include: ( 1 ) overcoming sickness and his

trrrctor's prediction of childhood death; (2) turning hls prison sentence Into
un upportunily to study law, (3) inducing the prosecutor to help him become

n lawyer and the sentencing judge t o swear him in; (4) rising from the rank
(if private to lieutenant in a year and counterbalancing his return t o ths rank
of private by becoming Stuart's favorite scout; and (5)manipulating his

capture by the Union into a successful intelligence gathering operation.

2.3

As stated earlier, many of Mosby's character t r a l t s helped him t o become a successful partisan leader. He also had one very Important physical trait, his piercing blue eyes. When Mosby was captured by the Union forces in 1862, the capturing officer included I n his official report that Mosby, 'has a keen blue eye.' Another source mentions, 'HIS eyes, which did not glance but pierced, gave him added control, perhaps hypnotlc, over his men.* wrote: No one would have been struck w i t h anything noticeable i n him except the eyes. These flashed at times in a way which mlght have induced the opinion that there was something i n the man, i f it only had an opportunity to 'come out."3J Mosby overcame his lack of physical stature by effectively using his piercing blue eyes. When one looked in Mosby's eyes, one knew he meant business. Consider this statement, by one of Mosby's men, describing his f i r s t meeting w i t h Mosby: He turned upon me suddenly, meeting my f u l l glance. A t that instant the secret of his power over his men was disclosed. It was i n his eyes, which were deep blue, luminous, clear, piercing; when he spoke they flashed the punctuations of his sentence.% John Esten Cooke, a former member of Gen. Stuart's staff,

MHerman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the &rth WQO, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1983). p. 445. =John Esten Cooke, jYQKlng of the Grqy, (New York: E. B. Treat and Company, 18671, p. 1 15. 36Virgil C. Jones, gpngg~U&.~, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944, pp. 13- 14.
24

This might explaln how Mosby could single-handedly capture two Union cavalrymen. escort them through another Union cavalry force, and have neither prisoner raise the alarm.37 In conclusion, this section described Mosby's background, outlined his important personal traits, and provided background informatlon about the incidents prior t o the formation of Mosby's partisan unit. The next three sectlons of Chapter 3 each describe and analyze one of Mosby's offenslve operations using the United States Army's 'Five Paragraph Operations Plantls

o model. Each section: ( 1 ) provldes the Union's and Confederate's

disposition and conditlon a t the begining of the operation; (2) outlines Mosby's Purpose, intent, and concepts; (3) describes the actual conduct of the operation; (4) identifies any important equipment o r supplies; (5) explains any relevant factors concerning command, control, or (;ommunlcations; (6) discusses the effects of the operation on both tho llnion and the Confederacy; (7) ldentlfies and analyzes the operational techniques of Mosby and his unit.

~7Williamson, Mosbgs Rongm, p. 73

25

Brlstol
L.

-.-.o-.*. _._._.

/.

CharlotteO

_ .- . - . _.- . -North Carolina

Ft. tlonro

Tennessee

SCALE IN MILES

FIGURE 1 VIRGINIA AND WESTERN VIRGINIA

26

CHAPTER 3

SECTION 1
RAID ON FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE

8-9 MARCH 1663

When Mosby began his partisan operations on 18 January 863, both the Union m d Confederate armies i n Virginia were a t a standstil Less than a

month earlier, they had fought the battle of Fredericksburg, where the Army

nf the Potomac had lost 15,000 men. Then, nature intervened. The harsh
winter weather had caused many of the roads t o become quagmires, preventing both armies from logistically supporting a major offensive. As a result, the t w o forces halted i n place, rested, rebuilt their combat strength, arid wnited u n t i l spring when the wagons, artillery, and infantry could move by road. The cavalry units, however, continued t o operate, but were limited

llg the scar,city of forage or, i n some areas, roads that were totally
Irnpassi ble.

The IJnion also used t h i s idle period as an opportunity t o reinforce i t s M e n s e s around the nation's capital lhese defenses consisted of a c o v e r i q force in Virginia and fortifications i n and around Washington (see figure 2, page 69) The twenty-five m i l e extension into Virginia provided a buffer Washington's m8in defenses and helped secure lines of communication tietween the capital and the Army of the Potomac, located SO miles south near Fredericksburg. The covering force consisted of a semicircular cliRin
f[Jl

27

of f o r t i f i e d positions extending south from the upper Potomac, through

Dranesville, Centreville, Occoquan, and back t o the Potomac l h e Union cavalry then filled the gaps between the fortified positions w i t h a picket line of outposts and patrols.' Near the center of this covering force area was Fairfax Court House This small village, approximately seventeen miles west of Washington nnll seven miles inside the picket line, consisted of a court house, a hotel, o church, and a small number of houses and businesses. It served as the county seat of Fairfax, Virginia, and the headquarters of Brig. Gen. Edwin H Stoughton, commander of the 2nd Vermont Brigade. Stoughton's infantry brigade was part of Ma]. Gen. Silas casey's division, which, i n turn, w ~ i s assigned t o the Union's Department of Washlngton.2 Fairfax Court House WAS also the headquarters of the cavalry brigade Commanded by Col P e r q Wyndham, a soldier of fortune who had served w i t h Garibaldi In I t a l y 5 Wyndham's brigade was also assigned t o the Department of Washington. Many of the subordinate units of Casey's division and all the units of Wyndham's brigade occupied positions neat- Fairfax. Brig. Gem Stoughton's brigade consisted of five infantry regiments from Vermont, an aggregate of

3900 men. Three regiments made their camps south of the courthouse
,

R:

'Slapel, p. 71. 2 m , vol. XXV, pt. II, pp. 181-183. The Department of Washington, also designated the XXll Army Corps, was the t i t l e designated f o r the Washington defense force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman. I t s main forces consisted of two infantry divislons. the equivalent of t w o brigades of cavalry, and a twelve regiment reserve. 3The Cavalry Brigade was later designated as the 3rd Cavalry BrigRde of the Department of Washington's Cavalry Division. vol. XXV, pt. II, pp. i e I - 1133.

m,

m.

28

Fairfax Station and two were camped farther south at W o l f Run Shoals (see figure 3, page 701.4 The 30th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment as part or the Department of Washington's reserve lorce, shared Fairfax Station w i t h the three Vermont Regiments. It had responsibility f o r the protection of the orange and Alexandria Railroad facilities at the Fairfax Station. rurthermore, four or five other Pennsylvania regiments provided security at varlous places along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Pnrtions of the 3rd Brigade of Casey's dlvlsion occupied the small town
of Centrevllle, seven miles west of Fairlax Court House, on the Warrenton

Turnpike. It. was situated on dominating bluffs and served as a malor fortified position In the Union's picket line. The 3200 man brlgade consisted of four New 'fork infantry regiments and two batteries of nrtillery--the 1 1 t h Massachusetts and Pennsylvania's Keystone Bettery 5 Fjecause the Third Brigade did not have organic cavalry, the artillery batterles would often be required t o perform cavalry functions. There werP tlmes, however, when a regiment from Wyndham's cavalry would
t c!mporarily augment the brigade.

Wyndharn's brigade wtls camped northeast 01Centrevllle, a t Chantllly

m d Germantown. It had the responslbillty for the plcket llne from

I entreville

through Chantilly t o the Ox Road His 2700 man brigade

umsisted of three cavalry r.eglrnents--- 1st West Virglnla, 5th New York, and

- . . - .. . .. . 46 G Benedict, C i v i l W g , (Burlington, V t : The Free I"r-ess Association, i8BB). vol. II, pp. 424-426. SJemes I.. nowen, Hassachusetts I n the War,~lH61-166~, (Springfiald. rlass: Howen and Son, 18931, p. 644.
. ... . . .

mm

t e l l it, and that day was one o f rejoicing among us all."n The publicity also provided Mosby w i t h more recruits. One week after his raid, Mosby reported,

"I have received several more recruits. . . . Public sentiment seems now
entirely changed, and I think i t i s the universal desire here for me t o remain."76 The success of this raid provided the following results: ( 1 ) the Confederacy learning that partisan warfare was both possible and fruitful;
(2) Mosby and his men becoming more confident in their abilities, as

demonstrated by the daylight attack on Herndon Station, mentioned previously; and (3) other units emulating the operation. In addition t o the above results, some Confederate units believed that any unit could accomplish partisan operations. For example, shortly after his raid, Mosby asked for more men i n order t o strengthen his unit and offset the increase i n Union security forces. He notlced that one Confederate cavalry unit had some cavalrymen who were used as infantry because they had no horses. He approached their commander and promised t o mount and equip the dismounted cavalrymen. A l l Masby wanted in return was their temporary use i n his unit. He also thought this was a reasonable proposition because
of the close proximity of the two units. Unfortunately, the other unit was

the 1st Virginia Cavalry and the commander was stlll Fitzhugh Lee. Not only did Fitzhugh Lee deny Mosby the opportunity t o use his men, he also decided that his men would conduct a l i t t l e partisan operation of their own. After

all, i f Mosby's unit could secure horses for his men, then his could do
likewise. Therefore, the dismounted cavalry and one of Fitzhugh Lee's nScott, Partisan L i fg, pp. 52-53. 76&, vol XXV, pt. I t , p. 667.

60

OlfiCerS were sent t o obtain horses and equipment from the Union cavalry. 'The result was, that the dismounted men were soon a l l captured; f o r i t was

not so easy as It appeared t o be t o gobble up Yankee cavalry, and get their

horses and eq~lprnent."7~ Two other benefits of Mosby's raid included hls exemption from being elected as commander, and the selection of his unit's name. As mentioned earlier, the Confederacy adopted the policy whereby the men of a unit voted f o r their officers. Mosby, however, was exempt, although his lieutenants did have t o be elected. This was probably tied t o the fact that wlthoul Mosby, the unit would not have existed. The second result was the name Mosby selected for his unit. Ma]. Gen Stuart had warned:
. . . you

w i l l proceed t o organize a band of permanent followers f o r

the war, but by a l l means ignore the term 'Partisan Ranger." It i s i n bad repute. Call your command 'Mosby's Regulars,' and i t w i l l give i t a tone of meaning and solid worth which all the world w l l l soon recognize, and you w i l l inscrlbe that name of a fearless band of heroes on the pages of our country's history, and enshrine i t i n the hearts of a grateful people. Let 'Mosby's Regulars" be a name of pride w i t h friends and respectful trepidation w i t h enemies.78 Stuart had sent his advice on 25 March 1863, after Mosby's Fairfax and Herndon Station raids. Mosby, however, completely ignored Stuart's strong recommendation and called his unit "Mosby's Partisan Rangers." First of all, Hosby liked the name "partisan ranger." He thought the soldiers would identify w i t h i t more, and, thereby, he would attract more recruits.79 But
..

.. . . -77Scott, Partisan Life, p. 53. vol XXV, pt. II, pp. 857-858 79Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. 167.

on the other hand, Mosby owed Stuart for everything--his command, his men,
supplies, and equipment. Nevertheless, he may have ignored Stuart's urgings because the success of the last t w o operations and the orders of President Davis provided him w i t h enough power t o disagree w i t h Stuart and get away w i t h it. There were t w o reasons for Mosby's success: luck and skill. The factors relating t o Mosby's luck are included in the following: First, Mosby was lucky before the raid started because his men returned from prisoner escort duty in time t o begin the mission on 8 March. Second, the presence of rain and mist favored htm by obscuring the enemy's observatlon. Third, when his

column separated in the woods, he was very fortunate t o regain his trailing
element i n time to continue. Fourth, when Mosby was in Fairfax Court House, he experienced the bad luck of Wyndham's absence and the loss of Lt.

col. Johnstone. But, i f he had not, by chance, discovered that Brig. Gen.
Stoughton was In town, his raid would not have been sensational and his commission and command may never have materialized. Furthermore, i f he had only captured Wyndham, as he originally planned, he probably would not have received the same notoriety. Fifth, stougnton's party adversely affected the Union forces' alertness. Sixth, on his return march, Mosby had diverted from his original route, taking a chance that the road to Centrevllle was clear. He was fortunate, once again, that the Union picket had been abandoned earlier than normal. Seventh, as the raiders passed Centrevllle, where Capt. Barker tried to escape, Mosby was fortunate that Barker3 horse stumbled and that the Centrevllle guards did not react to the subsequent Shot fired by one of Mosby's men. Finally, even Mosby commented that

62

swimming the torrent at Cub Run, and not losing a soul or horse, was miraculous Mosby was certainly fortunate that chance was on his slde, but as Clausewitz wrote, "War Is the realm of chance." Clausewitz added that chance has less impact on leaders who can make rapid and accurate decisions, who possess determination, and who have presence of m1nd.m Mosby was this type of leader, possessing a l l three of these characteristics. He made quick, bold, and accurate decisions when he decided t o pursue Stoughton's capture, and when he changed his e x i t route because he had just

lost a number of prisoners and horses i n the dark woods. He also made the
quick declsions not t o l e t the guards at Centreville o r the torrent at Cub Run impede his operation. Mosby displayed determination throughout his l i f e . This raid started and finished only because of that intense determlnation. The quality o f presence
of mind i s defined by Clausewitz as the "increased capacity o f dealing w i t h

the unexpected.. . . the speed and immediacy of the help provided by the intellect.'81 When Mosby told Stoughton that Stuart and Jackson were i n control of the surrounding area and when he answered Stoughton's question w i t h the l i e about Fitzhugh Lee's location, he demonstrated his presence o f mind. Mosby also used certain techniques or skills that reuuced the impact that chance had on his operation:
1 . Mosby set up a system of rendezvous points where his men would

meet f o r the next mission. On this raid, Mosby established the rendezvous soclausewitz, On war, pp. 1 0 1 - 1 0 4 . allbid.

63

point initially a t Rectors Crossroads and the next day a t Dover, where the mission finally started.
2. He knew the terrain and used I t t o hts advantage. Mosby already knew

where most, I f not all, the obscure trails were. He also used scouts who were more knowledgeable of the terrain than himself. 3. The rainy weather helped Mosbys operation by obscuring the Unions observation and reductng i t s alertness and discipline. The weather also slowed Mosbys operation. Mosby, however, correctly recognized that the inclement weather would be a much greater advantage than a hinderance
4. Mosby used as much intelligence informatton about the enemys

positions as he could obtain. He had positive information concerning the enemys locations and he probably knew how t o get through the picket llne without Ames assistance. Mosby may have placed Ames forward for two

reasons. First, he was a Yankee sergeant who had negotiated the picket ltne
a week or two earlier, and probably knew many of the techniques of the
Union pickets. As such, he may have had a better chance of avoiding the pickets or avoiding capture by the pickets. Second, i f Mosby had led his unit through the picket Ilne, and he was captured, the mission would have failed. Furthermore, who would take charge of the operation and lead the men t o safety? Ames was the one who knew the area best but some men were skeptical of his royalty and experience. Therefore, Mosby probably believed
that, should something go wrong, he would be required t o lead his men and

rescue the operation. Placing himself second i n the column was the best way to do that.

64

5. Mosby planned the mlsslon from start to finish. He probably started

thinking about i t as early as 28 January when Wyndham captured three of his men at Middleburg. He knew how he wanted t o get to Fairfax and how many

men he would need (he had to wait a day because he did not have enough). He
knew what he wanted t o accomplish and how he would return to friendly lines. His planning was flexible enough t o allow him t o change portions of the operation as new situations developed.
6. The raid's success demonstrated that Mosby's men were disciplined,

loyal, and technically proficient i n basic skills. The unit maintained noise, light, and weapon discipline, and the men behaved maturely and professionally. Mosby's unit followed him without any knowledge of the operation other than the fact that Mosby was leading them and that was sufficient for them Finally, the unit travelled cross-country at night, i n extreme darkness, without a compass or lantern to gulde them.
7 The fact that Mosby told his men nothing about the operation

demonstrated Mosby's strong regard for operational securlty. He made certain that the enemy could not learn about his plan before i t s execution. Un the other hand, he also took a chance by not informlng his men. The fact that his men did not know the mission's purpose or Mosby's intentions, prevented them from knowing what action to take i n an emergency. For example, when his column separated i n the woods, his men debated their next course of action. Fortunately, they made the right decision. But Mosby may have had other reasons for not informing hls men about the plan: First,
i f he had t o abort the mission he could s t i l l be relatively certain that the

plan was secure Second, he knew his men would trust him but they might

have some strong reservations i f they had known how dangerous the mission was or that Ames played a major role. Third, i f he had said he was leading his men on a very dangerous mission and i t aborted, his men macJ have had grounds to question his judgement i n the future. Finally, i f Mosby decided t o end the mission because he no longer believed i t would work or he determined that the plan was faulty, his men would be unaware that he had made an error in planning.
8. Mosby had planned t o conduct the operation entirely during the hours

of darkness. He knew i f his unit was still behind the union lines after

sunrise, they could eesly be identified as an enemy force.

9. Deception played a major part in the operation: First, the raiders
used dark gum coats t o help disguise their uniforms. Second, as they entered and exited Fairfax, they used the Fairfax Station Road t o deceive the enemy concerning their actual route. Third, Mosby deceived Brig. Gen. Stoughton into thinking that his situation was hopeless. Fourth, the raiders used the name of the 5th New York Cavalry t o cover their operation. Finally, while Mosby's men skirted the defenses of Centreville, he knew his men could deceive the Centreville outposts into believing that a Union patrol was passing. 10. MOSby used obstacles in his favor. If he could force the Union t o negotiate the same obstacles he faced, his pursuers would have less of an opportunity t o overtake his column. He probably believed that the

restrictive woods and Cub Run would have been as great a hinderance to the

Union as i t was for him.

66

I 1 The flexibility of Mosby's planning has already been stated, but he

was also flexible i n executing his plan. Examples include: changing the day
o f the operation, starting the mission later, capturing Stoughton instead or

Wyndham, deciding not t o burn the military stores, and changing his e x i t route.
12. Mosby avoided confrontations that could jeopardize the mission He

would rather use guile and intelligence than force. The raiders could have caused more damage, created more confusion, and had a greater impact by shooting and burning rather than just capturing. Another example was the incident at Centreville where Mosby could have used brute force t o penetrate the unsuspecting enemy rather than ride slowly around them. Mosby, however, intended t o complete his mission w i t h the same number of

men he started with. And the safest means of accomplishing that was t o
capture key personnel, i n f l i c t psychological damage, and restrict physical damage. This may appear t o contradict the stubborn, combative personality he demonstrated earlier, and perhaps i t does. But, the fact is, in his f i r s t two months of operation he and his men seldom killed or wounded anyone82 Mosby would rather capture than injure his enemy, and his men Conducted themselves accordingly. There are a number of significant reasons for his actions. First, capturing the enemy was more agreeable t o Mosby's chivalrous and noble character than wounding or killing. Second, when the enemy learned that Mosby would rather capture than k i l l , and that he treated his captives fairly, then his victims were less likely to rlsk their lives i n resisting his attacks. This i s especially true i f they have reason to hope f o r
.. .-. . .. . . .. . . . ..

82Williamson, Mosbu's Ranqers, pp. 13-51, In Mosby's f i r s t seven major operations, his unit captured 117 men, killed five and wounded none. 67

an immediate Parole. Third, the enemy's pursuit of Mosby Would be less ruthless i f they realized they were dealing w i t h an honorable and chivalrous

man. Finally, the civilian Population would tend to suppport Mosby more i f
he applied moderation t o his operations
13. Mosby used 100 percent of his personnel resources. A t this point in

~osby's partisan career, volunteers were scarce. Therefore, ~ o s b y had t o use evew man who volunteered his services. This probably taxed Mosby's leadership abilities because he had few men t o choose from and had t o select the right men f o r the right jobs. Mosby, however, did just that. He selected his best man for the most important mission, escorting Stoughton. He also selected the duties for the other men as scouts, o r guards, o r raiders. As a result, each man had an assigned task which he accomplished. In summary, this section on Mosby's raid of Fairfax Court House has identified the situations leading up t o the raid, the weaknesses and strengths of both armies, the actual operation of the raid, and i t s i m p w t on both the Union and the Confederacy. It also pointed out the role that chance played In the operatlon, some of Mosby's leadership qualltles, and finally, i t outlined some of the techniques that Mosby used t o make the raid a success. This raid was Mosby's genesis. After this, Mosby received many more recruits and conducted many operations, some of which were probably more important. However, no other operation would become as famous, o r as personally satisfying t o Mosby, as his raid on Fairfax Court House.

68

SHENANDOAH

Front Royal

Chancellorsville

10

15

20

L " " U " . * L - . L

SCALE IN flllES

FIGURE 2 UNION PICKET LINE, MARCH 1863

69

FIGURE 3 UNION FORCES IN THE VICINITY OF FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE MARCH 1863

70

FIGURE 4 FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE RAID

71

CHAPTER 3 SECTION 2 ATTACK ON LOUDOUN HEIGHTS

9- 10 JANUARY 1864

In January 1864, the military situation i n Virginia appeared surprisingly

similar t o the previous year w i t h Union and Confederate armies at a standstill due t o another harsh winter. Their locations were also the s m e as they were i n 1863, w i t h the Union's Army of the Potomac encamped on the north side of the Rappahannock River, and the Confederate army encamped on the south (see figure 5, page 98). Once again both armies were rebuilding and preparing for the war's resumption i n spring. While the situation looked the same on the surface, a closer examination would have revealed some serious battle scars. The war had resumed i n spring 1863, w i t h Lee's army winning the battle of Chancellorsville, Virginia, on 1-4 May and thus neutralizing another Union drive toward Richmond. The Confederates then attempted to exploit their success by launching a counteroffensive into Union territory. Lee's army pushed northward through the Shenandoah Valley and the narrow Maryland panhandle and collided w i t h Gen. George Meade's Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The collision, which lasted from 1-3 July, was costly t o the Union and devastating t o the Confederates. By midJuly, Lee's army was

72

back i n the lower Shenandoah Valley and, shortly thereafter, both armies reoccupled their positions along the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. In October and November, each army took i t s turn attacking i t s opponent's western flank. Lee had tried a wide sweep t o the left, through Culpeper and Warrenton, Virginia, but was checked by the strong defenses a t Centreville. The Union retaliated with a counterattack through the Culpeper area but was blocked by the Confederates a t the Rapidan River. By the end of November 1863, the armies were back where they had started, along the Rapidan and Rappahannock.1 By 1 Jaunuary 1864, the Union's main defenses were arrayed i n the following manner (see Figure 5 ) . ( 1 ) The Army of the Potomac had occupied defensive positions, for the winter, along the Rappahannock River. (2)The Department of Washington occupied defensive positions in and around Washington and west t o Centreville, Virginia. (3) Two divisions of the Department of west Virginia occupied defensive positions along the Potomac River. The First Division was centered on Harper's Ferry, and the Fourth Division was farther west at Martinsburg, West Virginia? (4) The remainder of Virginia was patrolled by Union cavalry brigades belonging t o
the departments and divisions.

Throughout 1863, Mosby's area of operations remained centered around Middleburg, Virginia, the same area that the Union cavalry patrolled. Mosby's operating area extended east of Fairfax Court House, north t o the Potomac River, and south t o Bealton Station, Virginia. The only exception t o
..

._

. . ..- -.

..-. -

'Fletcher Pratt, A Short History of the C i v i l Wo[, (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 195 I ) , pp. 254-259. vOI. X X X l I I, pp. 479-460.

2m,

73

this was when Mosby raided north into Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, while Lee

was a t Gettysburg.3
After Mosby's raid on Herndon Station i n March 1863, his unit continued t o harrass the Union forces. Between March and December, Mosby's Partisan Rangers were responsible for thirty-four Union soldiers killed; an unknown number of Union soldiers wounded; over 260 Union soldiers captured; over
572 horses and mules captured; one train and one bridge destroyed; and one

set of Union Gen. Joseph Hooker's battle plans captured. During the same
, \

period, Mosby's unit suffered twelve men killed, forty-four wounded and sixteen captured." In addition t o Mosby's raids, the significant events of 1863 that pertain
t o MOSby include: ( 1 ) On 24 March, a l l Confederate cavalry scouts and

particularly Mosby's unlt were forbidden by regulation t o grant paroles for prisoners of war o r deserters? (2) on 4 April, Mosby was promoted t o Major. (3) On 10 June 1863, Mosby's Partisan Rangers officially became the 43rd Battalion, Virginia Cavalry. Initially the battalion included a headquarters and sixty men men i n Company A.6 (4) On 24 August 1863, Mosby received a bullet wound in his thigh during a raid. After Mosby's wounding, Lieut. Thomas Turner assumed command of the battalion and conducted two successful operations. Mosby recovered from his wound and returned t o his command i n mid-September. ( 5 ) By 1 October, Mosby had enough men t o form a second company and, as e result, Company 8 was
.

3Williamson. m b u ' s Rangers, pp. SO- I 17. 4lbid. 5pB, vol. XXV, pt. II, p. 657. Wosby, War Reminiscences, p. 157. 74

established with sixty men. (6) On 15 December 1863, Company C was organlzed? The growth of Mosby's battalion was slow because he was forbidden t o recruit any men as conscripts who were eligible f o r regular service! Therefore, the volunteers he recruited and accepted were boys, too young f o r conscription; the fanners who were exempt from conscription; young men from Maryland; foreign soldiers of fortune; and old, ex-officers? Hosby said he preferred t o recruit: 'mere boys, most of them unmarried and hence without fear or anxiety for the effect their daring would have on their wives and children:lo When Mosby organlzed the companies of his battalion. he was still required t o permit hls units t o elect their officers. Mosby, however, felt this was a bad practice. He wrote: In compliance with law, I had t o go through the form of an election. But I really appointed the officers, and told the men t o vote for them. This was my rule as long as I had a command, and with t w o or three exceptlons their conduct vindicated my judgment.' 1
O n 1 January 1864. six days before the Loudoun Heights attack, Hosby

ordered his men t o rendezvous f o r a meeting in Rectortown, Virginia, a few

miles south of Middleburg. However, Rectortown was temporarily occupied

by a force of elghty Union cavalrymen, who were searching for Mosby. This
-

7lbid. The u i l t strength of Company C i s undocumented but was probably sixty men. Wepel, BepaL pp. 90-9 I . 9Munson. Remlniscencsa, p. 8. loJones, h m ~ o s b p. y , 3 1 1. 11Mosby. WarRemlnlscences pp. 157- 158.

75

force was a detachment from a battalion of Maryland's Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, assigned t o the defenses at Harper's Ferry. As Mosby's men rode toward the meeting site, they noticed the presence of Union troops and maintained their distance. Mosby, as more and more o f his men arrived, decided t o gather them f o r a raid against the intruders. Meanwhile, Mosby's Company 6,commanded by Capt. William Smith, was approaching the nothern end of town. They noticed the Union force departing the southern end of town and decided t o harrass i t s rear. By the time Mosby could gather enough men t o pursue the Union detachment, the thirty-two

men of Company B had already moved through the town and were on the
enemy's trail. The Union force, unaware i t was being followed, turned o f f the road and moved northeastward across the fields in the direction o f Middleburg. Smith's company also rode cross-country and came out on the enemy's l e f t flank. The lead scouts of smith's company immediately opened
fire and the remainder of the company charged into the Union flank. The

Union commander's horse was shot i n the f i r s t volley and, as a result, i t s rider was the f i r s t t o be captured. In reaction t o the Confederate charge, the Union cavalry broke formation and fled toward Middleburg. By the time Mosby arrived on the scene, Capt. Smith had the situation in hand w i t h four Union soldiers killed, twelve wounded, forty-one prisoners, and f i f t y horses captured. In the affair, t w o of Smith's men were wounded. The rout a t Middleburg was not representatlve of the Maryland unit's reputatton. on the contrary, the battallon--named 'Cole's cavalry" and commanded by Ma]. Henry A. Cole--was very experienced i n cavalry operatlons and usually successful. I t s f i r s t combat operation was i n the

76

Shenandoah Valley on 1 1 March 1862. It continued to operate In the Shenandoah until September when i t moved t o engage Gen. Stuart's cavalry at Leesburg, Virginia. On 2 September 1862, the battallon suffered heavily i n killed and wounded and withdrew to Harper's Ferry. In December 1862, Cole's cavalry resumed i t s operations i n the Shenandoah Valley and, later, during the Gettysburg campaign, harrassed the rear of Lee's Army. Cole's unit was credited w i t h burning one of Lee's bridges; intercepting orders from Lee to a subordinate, Gen. R. 5.Ewell; and capturing large amounts of Confederate supplies. The l a t t e r months of 1863 included their capture of a Confederate cavalry company, attacks on Gen. John 8. Imboden's brigade, and

u few raids i n the Shenandoah Valley. By 1 January 1864, the battalion was
the only Union unit i n the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, camped on the Virginia side of the Potomac.12
A few days after the raid on Cole's detachment, a blizzard h i t Northern

Virginia dropping heavy snow, and bringing b l t t e r cold. On the night o f 6 January, Lieut. Turner, of Mosby's Company A, embarked on an operation that would take advantage of the coldest night any Virginia resident could remember. With the temperature below zero, Turner led a raid on a Union outpost's grand guard, near Warrenton, Virginia. By 400 a. m. on 7 January, many of Turner's twenty men had had their hands and feet frost-bitten and
most could barely use their pistols.13 Nevertheless, the cold also affected

the Union outpost and provided them w i t h a false sense of security from ...- . . .. .. .. . . ._ 12L. Allison Wilmer, J. H. Jarret, and Geo W. F. Vernon, Roster of Mar y l a n d V o l u n tWar eer of s ,186 1-L, (Baltimore: Press of Guggenheimer, Well and Company, l198), vol I, pp. 655-660. 13J. Marshall Crawford, m y and His Men, (New York: G. W. Carleton and Company, 18671, pp. 148- i49.
77

Confederate raiders As a result, Turner and his men found the grand guard of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry asleep In their tents, totally unprepared for "visitors.' When Turner attacked, the commander of the surprised Union
fOt-Ce tried t o r a l l y his men, but

was immediately shot down. When the

shootlng mded, LleUt. Turner's raid had netted eight Union wounded, eighteen prisoners, and forty-three horses captured.14 Turner had no men injured in the fight. However, one man lost some toes t o frost-bite, another lost four fingers, and a third had both hands and feet frozen.lJ

O n the same day as Turner's raid, flosby received a message from Capt.
Frank Stringfellow, one of Gen. Stuart's veteran scouts. Stringfellow suggested that he and Mosby combine forces t o capture Cole's battalion. He had noticed that Cole's unit was conducting picket duty on Loudoun Heights, a high bluff opposite Harper's Ferry, on the Virginia side of the Potomac. A closer examination revealed that Cole's unit was only picketing one road, the turnpike t o Hillsboro. This meant that the battalion had to be vulnerable from other directions. Stringfellow searched f o r a vulnerable avenue, found
it, and wrote Mosby that the Maryland cavalry camp was in a position where

i t could be captured at nlght without f i r i n g a shot.16 The operation had t o be

a complete surprise, however, and had t o be executed i n such a way that the raiders could flee before Union help arrived from Harper's Ferry, only a m i l e away.

w,

'4Regimental History Committee, fllstpr?apr the Third P m u l v p n l a (Philadelphia: Franklin Printing Company, 1905), pp. 396-397. fJCrawford, , p. 150. 16lbid.
78

The idea was attrhctive t o Mosby f o r these reasons: First, the unit that Capt. Smith had easily routed six days earlier came from four of Cole's companies. Second, Lieut. Turner's quick victory I n the deep snow and b i t t e r cold demonstrated the Union's complacency and vulnerability during bad weather. Third, Hal. Cole was extremely unpopular w i t h the residents of the area.17 Fourth, Capt. Stringfellow was a well-known and respected scout and had worked w i t h Mosby before.18 Finally, i t had been almost a year

Since Mosby's unit had been organized. What better way t o celebrate his
unit's f i r s t anniversary than by successfully completing i t s largest and

most daring enterprise?

Mosby believed that Stringfellow's plan had merit, decided t o execute It, and called for I noontime meeting of his command at Uppervllle on Saturday,
9 January. He planned t o execute the attack a t night w i t h as many men as

they could muster. Mosby would meet Stringtellow and his men enroute and have Stringfellow lead the entire group t o Cole's camp. He knew that Cole had between 175 to 200 men and also knew the layout of the camp. Mosby would have his men surround the camp while the enemy was sleeping and, at his signal, the men would attack. Simultaneously, one squad o f Mosby's men would capture the picket on the Hillsborough Turnpike and Stringfellow's force would attack Cole's headquarters. The fact that there was no cavalry
a t liarper's Ferry would give them sufficient time t o complete the missioii
before local Union reinforcements could react.19

.. .

.. .

I7Jones, Ranger Mosby, p. 164. '8Williamson, Mosby's Ranaers, p. 107- 110.

1 9 m vol. ,

..

X X X I I I , pp. 15-16,

The temperature in Upperville was near zero on the morning of 9 January 1864. The snow was a foot deep and more was expected.m Mosby's men began arriving in town, but by noon, only 106 men were present.21 Perhaps Some of the men remembered what happened to their comrades who had lost toes and fingers the week before. Each company was equally represented and Mosby must have been satisfied w i t h the number because he gave the order t o mount a t three o'clock. Mosby's men rode north out of Upperville, through Union, Virginia, t o the small town of Woodgrove (see Figure 6, page

99). The column halted, entered the mansion of Ranger Henry Heaton, and
were greeted w i t h a blazing fire i n each room and a warm supper. Heaton had ridden ahead, a t Mosby's request, t o prepare his house for the riders. Mosby's men waited a t Heaton's home for three hours until Stringfellow's courier arrived, as prearranged. The courier brought a message informing Mosby that Stringfellow and hls men had conducted one l a s t reconnaissance and found everything favorable for the attack. Mosby's men mounted their horses and, with a clear sky, began their ride northward. The men rode for hours through the b i t t e r cold. Every so often a rider would jump from his saddle and trot alongside his horse i n order t o get his circulation going again. Other times, a rider would place the reins i n his teeth so he could warm his hands under the saddle blankets. Undoubtedly the

men were miserable, but they all remained silent.

Sometime i n the early hours of the morning, the column rendezvoused
w i t h Stringfellow and his men, and then continued their march A short
...

mCrawford, m y and His Men, p. 156. 2'Jones, Ranoer flosby, p.165. The r o l l s of Mosby's battalion averaged at least sixty men per company.
80

time later, the column stopped for about two hours and fed their horses while Mosby and Stringfellow rode on t o reconnolter the enemy's camp. When the t w o returned, the column mounted and resumed i t s march north t o the Potomac River. Upon interceptlng the frozen river, they turned l e f t and followed the river bank toward Harper's Ferry, a mile and a half away. Mosby's men were unaware of the purpose of their operation. Therefore, when they could see the fires from a camp on the opposite bank, they believed that was their objective. Later, when they heard the whlstle of a locomotive in the distance, they guessed that the camp had been too strong and they would attack the train instead.22

As the column neared Harper's Ferry, the men could identify the large
bluff of Maryland Heights across the river, an extension of the Blue Ridge Mountain chain. Soon, they were able t o see the high bluff of Loudoun Heights on the Virginia side of the river. As they neared this massive spur, the column turned away from the river bank, avoided a Union picket and headed directly toward the spur. Stringfellow led the column into a pine thicket and began a slow climb around the north end of the spur (see Figure
7, page 100). Now they could see the lights of Harper's Ferry

less than a

half-mile away. The column continued winding westward around the spur until they were directly above the bridge over the Shenandoah River. They moved out of the thicket and advanced farther t o the left, halting below a wooded c l i f f The men were allowed t o Close up and then each man dismounted and began t o scale the ~ l i f f . 2 The ~ climb was difficult for men And horses alike, and i f the men had not been able t o grab onto the shrubs
.. . . .

. .

. .. ... .. .

__ ._....

22Williamson, Mosbu's Ronqers, p. 126, 23Jones. Ranaer Mosby, pp. 166- 167.
XI

and trees, it would have been impossible. And impossible i s exactly what the Union soldters belteved. Mosby was the f i r s t to complete the climb. A t the top, he found a large expanse of Union tents, but no movement o r noise--it was four o'clock and m y ~ a s e le g ! Mosby wedged his men i n between the f i r s t row 01

tents, placed Capt. Smith in charge of gathering the remainder of the ralders, and quickly ran to look over the camp. When he returned, most of his men were at the top. Mosby gathered his subordinate leaders and gave them their instructions. Stringfellow would go t o the house, on the opposite end of the hill, where Cole had his headquarters. Capt. Smith's men were ordered to move t o the stables and secure the mules and horses.24 One of Mosby's most trusted scouts, R. P. Montjoy, was given the mission of returning to the bottom of the h i l l w i t h six men and capturing the picket at the camp's entrance.2J Mosby would take charge of the remaining men and capture the sleeping occupants of the tents.26 Before he released his subordtnate leaders, Mosby cautioned them to make certain that their men moved along the camp's perimeter, staying out of the center, t o avotd getting caught i n a possible crossfire. The leaders acknowledged their instructions, organized their men, mounted thetr horses, and moved into position. Mosby waited for his leaders t o get t o their destinations and then began

stationing his men along the f i r s t row of tents. Suddenly, from the opposite
end o f the hill, a gun shot broke the silence. Mosby tried t o hurry his men

24Scott, Partisan Life, pp 179-180. 25Williamson. Mosby's Ranaers, p. 127 =Scott, Partisan Life, pp 179-180.
~~~

82

along the tents before the Union soldiers had a chance to realize what was happenlng. But, a t that instant, opposite Mosby's position, a group of horsemen came charging over the h i l l into the center of the camp, yelling and shooting. Mosby ordered his mounted men t o charge and repulse the attackers, but by the time Mosby learned that the approaching horsemen were Stringfellow's men, six of them had been shot down?7 In the following moments, panic and confusion would sieze the entire camp. some o f the Union soldlers began f i r i n g through the tent flaps at the rangers. Mosby's men then rode through the camp riddling the tents w i t h bullets from their pistols. Orders and pleas sang out i n unison. The men i n the f i r s t row of tents were screaming, 'The camp i s yours! we surrender1 Stop flring!"28 In other areas of the camp, orders were Shouted, "Fire a1 every man on horseback! Men, do not take to your horses!'^ Capt. Smith shouted, "Fire the tents, and shoot 'em by the Iight!'m Some of the llnion soldiers had escaped their tents and, organizecl by their officers, began firing volleys from the edge of the camp, the stables, And the headquarters. Mosby and his officers tried t o rally his men t o organize a mounted charge, but the resistance had increased t o the point that many of the raiders would not enter the camp. The Confederates were a t a disadvantage. The Union soldiers knew that the mounted men were Confederates. Therefore, they could f i r e at anyone on horseback and be certain the target was enemy. The horsemen had a greater
. .. . . .. . .. . .. ..

271bid,

180.

28Crawford, m y and His Men, p. 159. 29Frank A. Burr and Richard J. Hinton, The Life of Gen. PhiliD H. Sheridan, (Providence, RI: J. A and R. A. Reid, IB8B), p. 140. solbid, p. 141.

dilemma. The Union soldiers were dismounted, but so were some of Mosby's

men. Therefore, when the horsemen returned fire, their target Could be

enemy or one of their own comrades. Furthermore, because of the confusion

caused by Stringfellow's men, the dismounted raiders could not be absolutely certain that a l l the horsemen were friendly. Also, when the Confederate's pistols required reloading, the men had great difficulty i n doing so. This was due t o the long period of time their hands were exposed
t o the extreme cold. Conversely, the Union did not have this problem. Some
of the Union soldiers were only exposed t o the cold for a short time, and

some, In the tents, were not exposed a t a l l . Therefore, the larger Union
force was able t o discharge a greater volume of f i r e Lieut. Turner, who had assumed command when Mosby had been wounded and who had led the ratd on the outpost only a few days earlier, was shot as he charged the camp. Two of his men helped him on his horse and escorted him to a house a few miles away. After the signal gun was discharged a t Harper's Ferry, Mosby realized that reinforcements would soon be enroute to the camp. He knew his

situation was hopeless. More and more men were dropping in the snow
around him and crying for help. As much as Mosby hated t o admit defent, he finally decided that his men had had enough, and shouted for his men t o withdraw toward HtllSbOrOUgh. Some of the men withdrew and some never heard the order. One of Mosby's men, Charlie Paxton, had been so badly wounded that he had been unable t o move. He screamed to his frlends, pleading for "God's sake not t o

84

leave him."31 Capt. Smith heard Paxton's pleas and tried t o pull him up onto his own horse, but was unable t o do so. Smith sent Ranger John Grayson, t o get another horse for Paxton. A third ranger, William Chapman, explains what happened: A few seconds after he [Grayson] l e f t there was a shot fired a t us from a group not twenty steps distant. Capt. Smith and I returned the fire, and then a volley was f i r e d a t us. The flash from the volley f o r a moment blinded me and a feeling of thankfulness that we had escaped, possessed me, when suddenly Smith leaped upward from the saddle and fell on the right side of his horse, . . . both feet hung i n the stirrups w i t h his head on the snow. I sprung from my horse and asked him how he was shot, but he gave no reply. I endeavored t o l i f t him into the saddle but he was too heavy for me. I . . . tried t o unbutton his overcoat but my hands had become so cold after removing my gloves t o go into the fight that I could not unbuttan a single button. I knocked his feet from the stirrups. mounted my horse and led his horse from the camp.32 When Grayson returned, he reported t o Chapman that Mosby had ordered a withdrawl. The two rode o f f t o join the remainder of their friends, leaving Smith dead and Paxton t o die.= The 34th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment. from Harper's Ferry, marched t o rescue Cole's Cavalry a t the -double-quick When they arrived,

they found much of the snow covered w i t h blood, but the attackers were gone: When night l i f t e d and day dawned upon that battle-field. . . . The dead lay upon the ground frozen s t i f f by the terrible cold. The severely wounded compleined bitterly o f the frost, and the bulletpierced tents of the men that did the fighting were f u l l of weary, powder-stained veterans, suffering sorely from the effects of .. ... . . . . . . .- . . __ . .. . -31Crawford, m y and His Men, p. 161 32Siepel. pp. 105- 106. 33See Appendix I for an interesting account of Tom Paxton's final hours

m,

85

frozen feet, of which they were unmindful until the battle was won . . . A large number of the [Cole'sl command was sent to the hospital w i t h frozen feet, and two amputations were necessary. suffering of these brave men did not stop w i t h the battle?' The

Mosby's column withdrew toward Hillsborough. Two miles from Cole's camp, a t the house of a Southern sympathizer, Mosby visited the severely wounded Lieut. Turner. "It was an affecting spectacle t o see the men gathered around the wounded officer, t o look for the last time on him whom they had followed i n so many fights."35 Lieut. Turner died five days later. Mosby's men returned to Woodgrove by dawn the next day, 1 I January. Mosby immediately dispatched Chapman and Montjoy t o return to Cole's camp under a flag of truce to recover Smith's body. Later that day, they reached the pickets guarding Cole's camp and made Mosby's request known. Ma]. Cole replied that he would give Smith's body to a citizen or Smith's family but would not, under any circumstances, give i t to Mosby. He added that i f Mosby really wanted the body, then "he'd better t r y again to surprise the camp on Loudoun Heights."36 A few days later, Smith's w i f e arrlved at Cole's camp and claimed her husband's body.37 During Mosby's attack on Loudoun Heights, Cole's battalion had four men killed, sixteen wounded, six captured, and f i f t y horses captured. Mosby's battalion had four men killed, seven wounded (of which four died later), and one captured.=

. -

- ._ 34Burr, Sheridan, p. 142. asScott, Partisan Life, p . l 6 l . "Jones, m y Ghosts, p. 2 13. 37Crawford. m y and His Men, pp. 164- 165 3 8 m , V O ~ .XXXIII, pp. 15-18.

Mosbys attack resulted i n an emotional victory f o r Coles battalion When the operation began, the Union battalion was a t a great disadvantage-i t had almost been captured I n toto. During the attack, however, three

factors allowed Coles unit t o overcome this disadvantage and repulse the raiders. First, the gun shot awakened the camp before Mosby could completely surround it. Second, the men and especially the leaders of the second row of tents refused t o surrender. Third, Mosbys plan required total surprise, and when the element o f surprise was lost he had no alternatlve plan.
In addltlon t o the emotional l i f t from i t s come-from-behlnd victory,

Coles battalion also received other benefits. ( 1 ) The battalion believed i t had repulsed a force of four hundred men, double i t s own size39 (2) F o r this fight, Coles battallon was later designated a regiment-the 1st Regiment, Potomac Home Brigade. (3) Maj. Cole became Col. Cole, the officer who rallied the men became a lieutenant colonel, and many others i n the battalion were promoted accordingly. (4) The battalion received 8 commendatory order from the General-in-Chief, Gen. H. W. Halleck, for i t s gallantry i n repelling Mosbys assault. The order was read t o the Union army and, It was the only instance during the Rebellion that such conspicuous commendation was awarded from the headquarters of the army t o anything like such a force as that commanded by Major Cole.40
The outcome of the attack was an emotional dlsaster f o r Mosby and his

men. They had come close enough t o taste- victory and then lost i t . Nosby must have been elated as he watched his men surround the f i r s t row of tents .. . . .- . . . .- . .. .. . . S9lbid, p. 17. 4 0 R ~ m ,Sheridan, pp. 143- I44
87

and the remainder of his men enroute t o the others. Conversely, his disappointment must have been devastating as he watched the perfectly executed operation turn sour. Mosby's unit lost two of i t s best leaders Lieut. Turner, the acting commander of Company A, and Capt. Smith, the commander of Company 8, "were without a doubt the two most efficient officers i n the Battalion.. . . Both men were universal favorltes."4' The Confederates knew that they had killed a t least one of thelr own men by mistake. The uncertainty of how some of the others died must have added t o their grief. Later, they conceded that three of their comrades were killed by friendly fire The Union refused t o return the bodies of their fallen comrades and subsequently arrested members of the family. When Hrs. Smith tried to claim her husband's body, her parents accompanied her. A l l three of Capt Smlth's family were ordered under arrest by the post commander, Unlon Brig. Gen. Jeremiah C. sulllvan. When Mrs. Smith and her parents were freed

two days later, Mrs. Smith had t o beg the post commander for her husband's
body. She finally received the body minus his personal effects and clothing42 The same time Mosby's operation went awry, some senlor Confederate

officers were recommending that partisan warfare be outlawed. The failure

._. - ... __. 41Williamson, t & & y m ~ e r s , p. 129. 'Wrawford, and His Hen, pp. 160- 167. Mr. Crawford cites Gen. James A. Mulligen as being the post commander of the area surrounding Loudoun Heights. The OR, vol. XXXIII, p. 479, reports that Gen. Mulligan was the commander of New Creek, West Virginia, some f i f t y miles away. Gen. Sullivan was the post commander of Harper's Ferry and was Hal. Cole's division commander. Therefore, Gen. Sullivan i s probably the post commander involved w i t h Mrs. Smith.
. . . .

m y

88

of Mosby's operation added credence t o this idea, thus adding to the anxiety
o f both Mosby and his men.

On 1 1 January, Confederate Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser wrote t o Gen. Lee that partisan warfare hindered the Confederate cause: Without discipline, order, or organization, they [partisans] roam broadcast over the country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror t o the citizens and an injury t o the cause. . . .Major-General IJubal A.1 Early can give useful information concerning the evils of these organizations. If he cannot, Ma]. Fen. Fitz. Lee can.43 Gen. Stuart forwarded Gen. Rosser's message t o Gen. Robert E. Lee w i t h an indorsement stating that most of the partisan units, except Mosby's, were detrimental. Gen. Lee forwarded his comments t o the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, recommending the partisan corps be abolished Considering the above, Mosby and his men must have believed their failure was as disastrous as the French defeat at Waterloo. Their degree o f despondency made them unfit f o r duty f o r almost a month!, Mosby waited

for three weeks before sending his report t o Gen. Stuart. In i t he pralsed his
deceased officers and wrote that his loss was severe, "more so i n worth than the number of the slain."45 Mosby maintained a low profile over the next three weeks, he and his men were genuinely distressed about the loss a t Loudoun Heights, ana Mosby flnd a l l partisans could not afford any negative publicity while the fate 01 partisan warfare was being decided i n Rlchmond. Mosby's l a t e report t o
.. .

v o l X X X l I I, pp. 108 I - 1082 44Siepe1, Rebel, p. 106 45@, vol. XXXIII, p. 16.
43B,

89

Stuart also supports this idea. Mosby delayed forwarding his report so that
i t would not add "fuel" t o Brig. Gen. Rosser's anti-partisan message. Mosby

also worded the report in a manner that de-emphasized his unlt's failures.
He began the 1 February report emphaslzing Lieut. Turner's successful 6 January operation. Then he explained how perfectly the LOUdOUn Heights raid went, emphasizing stringfellow's fallure as the reason f o r the operation's downfall. Next, he eulogized his gallant officers by emphasizlng their worth to the Confederacy: "two of the noblest and bravest officers of this army,
who thus sealed a l i f e of devotlon and of sacrifice t o the cause that they

loved." Finally, he ended his report on a positive note: In numerous other affairs w i t h the enemy between 75 and 100 horses and mules have been captured, about 40 men killed, wounded, and captured. A party of this command also threw one of the enemy's trains off the track, causing a great smash-up.46 Mosby must have been referring t o some of his earlier operations. His reference t o the forty men killed, wounded, or captured and the destruction
of the train are not supported by the records of the month of January 1864.

Gen. Stuart prepared and sent an indorsement t o Mosby's late report. In this indorsement, he lauds Mosby's accomplishments and dedicated service since 1861. Then he praises Mosby's deceased officers and, finally, he demands Mosby's promotion t o lieutenant colonel. Stuart worded his indorsement i n this manner i n order t o boost Mosby's morale and t o help Mosby keep his job as a legally authorized partisan. Gen. Lee had earlier sent his recommendation for Mosby's promotion and added that Mosby has greatly served the Confederacy and should be permitted t o continue37 O n 17
.
-.

Wbid, pp.15-16. 471bid, pp. 16, 1 1 13.

90

February 1864, as a result of Mosby's attack on LOUdOUn Helghts, and his superiors' efforts t o retain his "legal" partisan services, Ma]. Mosby became
L t . Col. Mosby.

Before the attack on Loudoun Heights, Mosby had been i n the habit of attacking the enemy's camps a t night and the results of these night operations had been excellent. A f t e r the attack on Cole's camp:

. . . he could not be induced t o entertain such a proposition, except under peculiar circumstances. This resolution was not arrived at so much from fear of the enemy's inflicting injury on him, as from the danger of his own men's firing into one another48
Once again, Mosby's success depended upon two factors: luck and s k i l l . l h e attack on Cole's camp had been well-executed up t o the time of the unexpected gun shot. Even after the shot had occurred, Mosby and his men could and probably would have completed their mission before the Union forces could react. This shot, however, became the catalyst f o r an uncontrolled chain reaction. As a result of the shot, Stringfellow's men rode into the camp and caused such confusion that the Union was provided the opportunity t o seize the initiative. Mosby had ordered that no one was t o enter the camp from the direction that Stringfellow used. Therefore, when Mosby and his men saw the riders charging toward them, firing and yelling, Mosby ordered his men t o return the fire and charge the camp. When his men intermingled w i t h the Union tents, the Union force took advantage
of the confusion and took control of the situation.

Why was the shot fired? No one knows f o r certain. One of Mosby's men believed that, "Stringfellow and his men came charging and yelling and
.I _ . -

4eCrawford,

m y and His Men, p. 167.

91

flrlng Into the camp, havlng made no effort or attempt t o catch Cole or the
other offlcers:49

Another Ranger offered these two posslblllties:

. . . In front of this house Eole's headquarters] where the offlcers were sleeping, there was a stable whlch was supposed t o contaln
the officer's horses, and around were several army wagons with mules tled t o them. Some few of. . . IStrlngfellow'sl men l e f t the ranks to secure the mules; and It was supposed by many of us that they spoke rather loud, and that the officers were aroused, and a shot was flred from the house; or by Stringfellow's men leavlng hlm after he got Into the house, . . . ascending the mountaln and charging into the camp.m One historlan, V. C. Jones, offered the possibllity of the shot being flred due to a "numbed finger pressed too tlghtly on a sensltlve trigger.51 Author Chrlstopher A. Newcomer, wrlting about Cole's battalion, says that the shot was flred by a stable guard, who had been posted a few moments earlier? There are no accounts of Stringfellow's slde of the story. Nevertheless,
It i s doubtful that Strlngfellow ignored hls lnstructlons or that hls men

were so undisclpllned that they spoke loudly or deserted him. Up t o this time, Strlngfellow and hls men had performed admlrably and professionally

in scouting, plannlng, and executing the operation. It i s also very unlikely

that Cole's headquarters or the entrance t o the camp were unguarded Furthermore, the plckets a t the base of Loudoun Heights had t o be relieved periodlcally. This suggests that a relief force, o r a t least a sergeant-ofthe-guard, was operatlng from the camp or, perhaps, from Cole's headquarters bulldlng. Also, Mosby never learned why the shot was fired, 49Hunson. Remlnlscences, p. 242. soCrowford, f l p g p m His Hen, p. 159. 51Jones, m m y , p. 168. =Jones, p. 397.

muGhosta.

92

although he must have interrogated the survivors of Stringfellow's group. Therefore, considering the above factors, the individual or individuals responsible for the shot may have been killed or would not admit t o firing prematurely. One possible scenario i s that one of Stringfellow's men observed a member of the camp's guard force, near Cole's headquarters. The guard noticed the Confederate, tried t o give the alarm, and was shot by Stringfellow's man. Believing that his shot would soon bring a reserve force and that surprise was now impossible, Stringfellow's man fled and stampeded his comrades. Thinking the operation was now a failure, Stringfellow's men raced to warn Mosby's men to withdraw, firing into the camp t o cause as much destruction and havoc as possible. As they rode into camp, the man who had shot the Union guard was killed by Mosby's men The shot was one element of chance that went against Mosby. As previously mentioned, a commander who i s intelligent, determined, and has presence of mind w i l l usually place chance i n his favor. This was true f o r

most of this operation. Before the shot was fired, luck had allowed the
entire operation t o be successful and uneventful. Mosby's plan, however,

was t o o rigid; too much of the operation depended on chance. Nosby's plan
depended entirely on surprise. He was so determined to capture the camp that he ignored any other courses of action. When Cole's camp was being surrounded and the f i r s t row of tents were as good as captured, Mosby believed that nothing would alter the operation's success. Mosby refused t o consider any alternatives. He failed t o use his presence of mind t o deal w i t h the unexpected. When the operation went awry, Mosby did everything

he could t o r a l l y his men and charge the camp. Unfortunately, chance had taken away any opportunity for recovery.
If Mosby had included the possibility of an incident interrupting his plan,

he s t i l l could have come away w i t h a successful operation. For instance, Mosby could have instructed his men earller to be prepared for an emergency. A t his command, his men could have withdrawn t o the camp's perimeter, occupied firing positions and fired volleys into the camp. In this case, the Union would have suffered many casualties and may have eventually surrendered. Mosby's men would have had ample time t o f i r e on the camp because Union reinforcements from Harper's Ferry would have taken almost an hour t o arrive.

Also, i f Mosby had not been so chivalrous and so determined t o capture

the entire camp, he could have set up an ambush whereby his men would set f i r e t o the tents and f i r e on the Union soldiers as they exited. This plan would have destroyed the Union camp, killed numerous Union soldiers, and probably would have ended in the camp's surrender. Nevertheless, S i r Walter Scott's heroes would not have conducted this type of operation and, therefore, neither would Mosby. Finally, the possibility exists that Mosby's force of I06 men was not large enough to successrully capture Cole's camp of 175 t o 200 men. On the other hand, his force was quite adequate

for an ambush.

Mosby used a number of significant techniques i n this operation:

1. He continued t o use his system of prearranged rendezvous points as a

means o f gathering his men.

94

2. He utilized men who were not part of his organization, but were

intimately familiar w i t h the terrain. Stringfellow's scouts were used t o guide Mosby' Rangers from the mansion a t Woodgrove to the Union camp site Mosby also took the opportunity t o reconnoiter forward while his men fed their horses.
3. He used concealment. The cold weather, snow, and moonless night

helped t o cover Mosby's movement to Cole's camp. He recognized, from an earlier operation, that the enemy would not expect the partisans t o conduct operations i n such weather.
4. Mosby used Stringfellow t o gain as much intelligence information

about the enemy as possible. Stringfellow's men learned where the Union pickets were and how Cole's camp was organized. Mosby also gained intelligence information by being the f i r s t t o scale the c l i f f into Cole's camp and, then, by running around the camp t o get a good picture i n his mirid
o f what he wanted to do.

5. Stringfellow, not Mosby, initially planned the operation. once ~ o s b y

arrived on the scene, he formulated his own plan, but only had a few nioments t o organize it. As a result, his plan lacked flexibility.
6. The movement t o Loudoun Heights i n the severe cold, demonstrated

his men's discipline. Although they were miserable, they did not talk and they followed their superior's orders. However, during the attack, many o f rlosby's men did not charge the camp as ordered. I f they had, more would

liave died, but they might have been successful i n stopping the r a l l y of t h e
Union troops.

95

7. Mosby planned to conduct the entire operation during the hours of darkness. He knew that darkness was a major factor i n the operation's success. Furthermore, he Stopped a t the mansion i n Woodgrove and waited

until 900 P.M to resume the march. He did this t o reduce the chances of
being seen by Union sympathizers.J3
8. The column employed two rest stops during the march to counter the

effects of cold weather.

9. He used obstacles i n his favor. The l o c a l Union cammander had not

considered that a force could approach the camp from the direction that the raiders used
10. Surprise was substituted for deception. The only deception that

Mosby employed was his route. it suggested that he was headed Somewhere other than Loudoun Heights. Nevertheless, surprise was the major factor and the Union force was caught totally unprepared.
1 I . Mosby avoided confrontations w i t h the enemy, wanting t o capture

the enemy without having to f i r e a shot. This was difficult to accomplish and may have interfered w i t h the overall success of the mission.

12. Mosby did not t e l l any of his men about the operation. Once they had
reached the c l i f f below Cole's camp, Mosby outlined some of the plan t o his subordinate leaders. However, he did not issue his entire plan until they had climbed the c l i f f and were physically In the camp. If his subordinate leaders had known about the plan earlier, they may have had time to formulate questions. F o r instance, "What happens i f we lose the element o f surprise, should we withdraw, charge, or defend i n place?" sTrawford, &&y

__

and His Men, p. 156.

(J 6

13 Mosby did not use 100 percent of his men. Of the approxlmate 180

men i n Mosby's battalion, only 106 were available. This was a problem that was peculiar to a l l partisan units due to travel distances and security problems. I f Mosby had had a l l his men, the mlssion may have ended
rli f f erent 1y . 14. The offlcers of the 43rd Battalion, as was often done i n the C i v i l

War, led their men from the front. As a result, they earned the men's devotion, but also suffered greater casualtles. Considering his personality, Mosby was Probably tempted t o personally capture Maj. Cole. However, he wisely situated himself w i t h his men at the critical point of the battlefield This section has shown the events leading up to the attack on Loudoun Heights, the situations of both the Union and Confederate armies, Mosby's operations, and the results of those operations. It has also identified the major part that chance played i n the outcome of the operation. Finally, Mosby's techniques were outlined t o show the parts they played i n the overall operation. The attack on Loudoun Heights was considered by John Esten Cooke as Mosby's only serious failure.54 Mosby, however, had lost the service of more men In other operations5J Actually, this operation was more a dtsappointment than a failure, but no one could ever make Mosby believe that.

. ..

. ...... ... -. . .

54Cooke, Wearing of the Gray, p. 123. 550n 30 May 1863, Mosby had five men killed, twenty wounded, ten captured and had a cannon captured. Williamson, Mosby's R m g m , p. 66.
97

WASHINGTON

Shoals

0 Oc

Bealton Station

AN

Chancellorwllls

Rlvsr

SCALE IN MILES

FIGURE 5 NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WINTER 1864

98

Shsnandol

I ; ' Union
-0

Mlddlsburg
Blue Ridge Mountain5

Aldie

Turnpike

0 Rectortown

a -

mountains River - 4 --Route to/frorn Loudoun Height 4 a a d

10

15

20

SCALE IN MILES

FIGURE 6 HARPER'S FERRY AND VICINITY

99

~~~~

FIGURE 7 ATTACK ON LOUDOUN HEIGHTS

100

CHAPTER 3 SECTION 3 BERRYVILLE RAID

I3 AUGUST 1064
Sprlng arrlved in 1864 w i t h the Unlon t y i n g to i n l t i a t e another offensive push toward Rlchmond, Vlrglnla. However, this partlcular sprlng offensive was dlfferent from previous years because Gen. Ulysses S.Grant, the Union's new General-ln-Chief, deslgned it as a coordlnated attack. Hls plan called for a l l his forces t o attack from different dlrectlons slmultaneously. Gen. Benjamln F. Butler would move up the James Rlver from the Atlantic coast; Gen. George G. Meade would move down the Rappahannock; Gen. Franz Slgel would attack up the Shenandoah Valley; Gen. George Crook would push from West Vlrginla; and as this entlre force descended on Rlchmond, Gen. Ambrose Bumside would guard the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and protect Washlngton. Granl's idea was t o use Heade's Army of the Potomac t o hold Lee's army statlonay, whlle Gen. Butler's force attacked his flank and Gen. Wllllam T. Sherman's army attacked other Confederate forces in Georgia.l The Army of the Potomac crossed the Rsppahannock Rlver on 4 May and fought Gen. Lee's army at the battle of the Wllderness near Chancellorsville on 5 and 6 May 1864 (see Figure 8, page 127). The forces then moved five lSlepel,

m,p. 112.
101

miles south of the Wilderness t o Spotsylvanla court House where, on 8 nay, the battle recommenced. During this fight, Grant had sent his cavalry, commanded by Union Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, to cut Lee's lines of communications. Sherldan experienced initial success in Lee's rear area and appeared to have an opportunity to strike Richmond. However, Gen. Stuart's cavalry rushed into defensive positions outside of the Confederate capital and repulsed the Unlon horsemen. Although the Confederate cavalry was successful in thwarting sheridan's attack, i t paid a heavy price by losing I t s best cavalryman, JEB Stuart.2

On 18 May, when the battle of Spotsylvania Court House ended, Gen.

Grant changed his basic plan of following Lee's army and decided t o make
Lee follow the Army of the Potomac. On 26 May 1864, Grant directed Meade's army t o outflank Lee and slice through the Confederate defense system that had stymied Gen. Butler's force. The Confederates, however, antlcipated Grant's southeastward move by reinforcing their defenses in

Grant's path. This maneuver stopped the Unlon advance a t Cold Harbor,
Virginia and required Grant's army t o make frontal assaults into Lee's

n 1 June, the Union began hammering at the Confederate lines defenses. O

and did not stop until 3 June when It lost five thousand men I n the flnal ten

minutes?
The thirty days of continual fighting cost the Union over f l f t y thousand soldiers while the Confederates lost slightly less than half that number. Although Grant's army had been defeated at Cold Harbor, i t had not been
-

qhomason, pp. 500-50 1. ZPratt, p v l l WaL pp. 286-301.

102

destroyed. ~ts t i l l had the ability t o maneuver whlle the Confederate force, t.ied to I t s defensive belt, could not.', Less than two weeks later, Gen. Grant resumed his southward move i n an effort t o outmaneuver Lee's army and sever Richmond's supply Ilnes. His forces attacked toward the railcenter of Petersburg, south of Richmond. Grant's Army was met en route by a small Confederate force under Gen Pierre G. T. Beauregard and was delayed long enough for Lee to occupy opposing defensive positions. On 15 June 1864, Grant launched a four-day series of attacks against Lee and suffered ten thousand casualties. In spite
of these heavy losses, Grant maintained his position and began a siege of

Petersburg that would last the next ten months. Although he did not defeat Lee, Grant did perform one import.ant service, he took away Lee's ability t o attack the North. Meanwhile, the Union force in the Shenandoah Valley was

also havlng

problems. On 4 Nay 1864, when Grant began his offensive agalnst Lee, Gen Sigel also started his push up the Shenandoah Valley w i t h eleven thousand Federal troops (see Figure 9, page 128). Opposing him was the commander
of the Confederate force, Gen. J. D. Imboden, w i t h 1,592 soldiers. lmboden

reolized that he was heavily outnumbered, but Lee could not release any reinforcements because Grant was pressing too hard.5 Therefore, lmboden had t o find ways of neutralizing Sigel's manpower advantage.
As Sigel's force crossed the Potomac and advanced southward up the

valley, two partisan ranger units moved Into his rear. one of these was a
small unit o f sixty men led by Capt. Jesse McNeill, and the other was a 4,.bid ;.. ... . .. .. 5Jones. Grau Ghosts, p. 232.

I03

portion of Mosby's battalion. Mosby had divided his command so he could simultaneously harrass Sigel's and Grant's lines of communications. By 1 4 May, Gen. Sigel had retreated northward down the Shenandoah Valley, lenviny equipment and burning bridges behind him. He had been defeated by Imboden's smaller Confederate force because he had not been able t o take advantage of his greater size. Sigel could only employ six of his twelve regiments against lmboden because the remaining six regiments were tr!jing to protect his rear against partisans? The Union, on 21 May 1864, replaced Sigel w i t h Gen. David Hunter, who, after beginning a new offensive on 26 May, was also driven back by the Confederates.7 This time, however, the Confederate force was a corps commanded by Gen. Jubal Early. BY 4 July, Gen. Hunter had completely withdrawn from the Valley and had provided Early w i t h the opportunity t o cross the Potomac into Maryland. Early took advant.age of this opportunity and raised havoc throughout Maryland. Meanwhile, Mosby also crossed the Potomac and helped Early protect his right flank by cutting all the communications between Harper's Ferry and Washington. Gen. Early attacked all the way t o the outskirts of Washington, but he depleted much of his strength by doing so. Consequently, on I 4 July, he returned to Virginia after the Washington defenses had repulsed his attack?
BY the beginning of August 1864, Gen. Grant and President Lincoln had

lost patience w i t h the Shenandoah Valley campaign. As a result, Grant

61bid. pp. 240-241.

Campaion 1865, (Boston:

19071,pp. 68-82.

W S ~ R l N D Q The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,

&

BJones, Ijraq Ghosts, pp. 256-265.

requested and received Gen. Philip Sheridan as the new commander of the forces in the Valley. Grant's message said, "I want Sheridan put i n command

of all the troops in the field, w i t h Instructions t o put himself south of the
enemy, and follow him t o the death. Wherever the enemy goes, l e t our troops go also."9 Presldent Lincoln approved of Grant's dispatch and added, 'Thls, I thlnk,
IS exactly r i g h t as t o how our troops should move; b u t . . . . I repeat t o you

[Grant], i t w i l l neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch over i t every day and hour and force it."lo On 7 August, Gen. Sheridan took command of the Union's Middle M i l i t a r y Division and assumed responsibility for West Virginia, the Shenandoah Valley, and Washington.ll Grant informed Sheridan that, due t o the upcoming presidential election, v i c t o r y i n the Shenandoah Valley was not only a military necessity, but

also a p o l i t i c a l one. He added that Sheridan

was expected t o "Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted f o r the use of your command. . . (What1 cannot be consumed, destroy."lz When Sherldan
began his campaign, he commanded 45,487 men divided among four m a j o r combat units: VI Corps commanded by Gen. Horatio G. Wright; V l l l Corps commanded by Gen. George Crook; X I X Corps commanded by Gen. W. H Emory and the Cavalry Corps commanded by Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.13

. . ....

_.

9Richard O'COnnOr, Sheridan the Inevitable, (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerri11 Compony, Inc, 19531, p. 191 1Olbid. ' l o f t , vol.XLIII, pt. I, p. '719. 120'Connor, SheridOD, p. 192. 13oR, vol. XLIII, pt. I , p. 974.

I05

By 10 August, the Union force had pushed forty-five mlles southward and forced Gen. Early, withl2,150 men, into defensive positions between Strasburg and Cedar Creek, Virginia.14 Sheridan had believed that Early would make his stand near the town of Winchester, but Early was not satisfied w i t h the terrain in that area. As a result, Early withdrew t o the Strasburg-Cedar Creek area, and Sheridan's army moved farther and faster than the Union had expected. Although he had started w i t h ten days of supply,lJ Sheridan knew that ( 1 ) attacking Early's defensive positions would deplete his supplies faster than planned; (2) his army would have d i f f i c u l t y

in supplying i t s e l f from Harper's Ferry; and (3) i f Early withdrew farther,

the Union force may not have enough supplies t o pursue him. Therefore, on
12 August 1864, Gen. Sheridan ordered Brig. Gen John R Kenly's infantry

brigade t o escort his army's supply train from tlorper's Ferrg t o Winchester and arrive by that evening. Kenly received the order a t 9:40 A.M., understood the urgency of Sheridan's request, and immediately began organizing the operation. He l a t e r commented:
. . . [I understood] the pressing nature of General Sheridan's order; . . I believed the army would be out of supplies that night; . . . I was

determined t o get the [wagon] train into Winchester by daylight [the] next morning, so as t o be ready t o Issue supplies Ithel next day, and . . spare no exertion t o get the train forward as promptly R S possib l e.16 Sheridan's order provlded Kenly w i t h information on how many unlts

were involved, how the train would be organized, and what route he should
take. The order directed that Kenly form the train i n the following order.
....

.. - .

.. . . .. . .

140'Connor, Sheridan, p. 195 vol. XL III, pt. I, p. 792. I6lbid, p. 625. 106

first, the train of the VI corps; second, the train of the XI X corps, third; that
of the Vitl Corps; and fourth, the Cavalry Corps train. The order dtd not

include instructlons concerning the location of his own brigade's train, so Kenly assumed i t should be the last i n Iine.17 Kenly's escort force was supposed t o consist of his own brigade of three infantry regiments--3d Maryland, 144th and 149th Ohio National Guard--and a battery of artillery.18 Therefore, he ordered his staff t o organize the escort force In this manner: Two companies of the 36 Maryland would precede the leading wagons and the remainder of the regiment would be distributed i n the tratn at a ratio of one company per every twenty wagons, counting from the head of the train. The companies of the 149th Ohio would

be distributed a t a ratio of twenty or t h i r t y wagons per company, counting

trom the last company of the 3d Maryland. The commander of the144th Ohio would provide and command two companies as a rear guard behind the last wagon. The remainder of his companies would be distributed a t a r a t i o of one company per every twenty wagons counting from the rear of the train Finally, when the artillery arrived, they would be divided into three sections Bnd placed i n the lead, center, and rear portions of the train.19 Unfortunately for Brig. Gen. Kenly, Sheridan's orders did not state how many wagons would have t o be escorted. Kenly remarked that at the ttme he issued the orders, he was totally ignorant of the number of wagons constituting the train. Although, he had seen numerous wagons at Harper's
.. ..

_.

t7ibid, p. 623. 18These two units of the Ohio National Guard were only mustered into service for a period of 100 days. They should not be confused w i t h present day National Guard units. 19lbid.
107

Ferry the previous day, so he did have some idea about the size of the
t r a i n.20

The starting point f o r the road march was two miles southwest of Harper's Ferry a t Halltown, and between eleven and twelve o'clock, the f i r s t

few wagons began to arrive (see Flgure lo, page 1291. Unfortunately, these
were the wrong wagons. By 1:30 P.M., the real wagon train began arriving from Harper's Ferry. Kenly had previously coordinated for his brigade t o assume their escort positions while the train was moving and, when the lead portion of the train reached Halltown, they integrated as planned As time passed, Kenly began noticing large gaps between the serials of wagons

as they arrived from Harper's Ferry. Therefore, between three and four
o'clock, he ordered the trair? to halt short of Charlestown, and not to resume until he personally gave the order. He was s t i l l unaware of how many wagons were expected or who was i n charge of the train's movement, but he did learn that the artillery battery was not w i t h the wagon train and coiuld
not be found.

When he finally met the quartermaster i n charge of the train, Brig. Gen. Kenly learned that the section for the Cavalry Corps had been causing the delays, that everything was now i n order, and that even the quartermaster officer did not know how many wagons were in the train-he guessed there were six hundred. Kenly gave the order t o move and by 4:20 P.M. the train was advancing through Charlestown. Although the exact number of wagons was not known, one officer reported that i t initially took two and one half hours for the lead

I oa

And rear wagons t o pass the same point. During the march, Kenly halted the train twice i n order t o permit the men t o freshen up and t o enable the train
t o close UP. Later, when the train arrived a t a stream on the northern edge

. uf tlerryvllle, Kenly ordered another halt so that the mules and horses could
be watered. Then the quartermaster officer took control of the parking and

watering while Kenly posted plckets around the train and sent advanced guards and vedettes into Berryville. 'The train resumed I t s march a t l1:30P.M. by enterlng Berryvllle end turning right toward Winchester. Two miles later, the column entered a short wooded trail in order t o detour around a tree that had blocked the road -This caused the column t o move very slowly because the t r a i l was hard t o define i n the dark woods. The train reentered the road, but a short time

later, i t encountered an old bridge that was considered too dangerous t o

cross. Kenly's men located a fording site and, once again, the train detoured from the main route. After approximately sixty wagons had passed, one o f the wagons broke down at the ford. The entire train was forced t o wait until the wagon could be repaired because there was no other bypasses available. A f t e r negotiating various other minor obstacles, the wagon train reached the Opequon Creek a few moments before daylight on 13 August Kenly had assumed that the t r a l l elements of the column had probably departed Berryville by three o'clock i n the morning.21 After crossing opequon Creek, Kenly led the train the final five miles

into Winchester. When he arrived a t his destinatlon, he was unable t o find

anyone who could t e l l him what t o do next. Therefore, he ordered a halt and
. . . ..

. ...

21 Ibid,

pp. 623-626.

I09

parked the wagons outside of Winchester. Kenly watched much of the

wagon train roll into the park over the next one and one-half t o two hours,
until his aide approached him. His aide informed Kenly that the train w m moving smoothly west of Berryville, but that the quartermaster was having serious problems organizing the rear o f the train. He explained that the officer responsible f o r the Conduct of the cavalry train had remained i n Harper's Ferry; that no one had taken charge of i t during the march; that the teamsters o f the cavalry train had unhitched the wagons a t Berryville; and that the quartermaster and the commander of the rear guard were trying t o get the train hitched and moving. Furthermore, while the train was stopped

a t Berryville, another wagon train, also belonging t o the cavalry, arrived

from Harper's Ferry without escort and Ioined the rear of Kenly's train. After hearing his aide explain the train's problems, Brig. Gen. Kenlg rode into Winchester, found Sheridan's representative, and transferred the responsibility f o r the train. When Kenly finished, someone approached him and reported that the rear of the train had been attacked. Kenly asked a few questions, mounted his horse, and rode toward Berryville to investigate About halfway between Winchester and Berryville, Kenly met his quartermaster. The quartermaster reported that while the rear of the train was hitching up, a Confederate force had attacked, captured some wagons, were subsequently driven off, and the train was now advancing towarrl Winchester. Upon hearing the quartermaster's report, Brig. Gen. Kenly placed the 3d Maryland into defensive positions along the opequon Creek and sent

I10

instructions f o r the remainder of his brigade t o be prepared t o rescue the

train

or react t o other future situations.22

That evening at ten o'clock, Gen. Sheridan reported the results of the wagon t r a i n attack t o Gen. Grant a t the end of a lengthy message:
.

. . I have a large number of 100 days' men whose t e r m s of service

expire in a f e w days. Can they be made t o serve f o r a longer period o r shall I a l l o w them t o be mustered out? Mosby attacked the rear of my train t h i s morning en route here f r o m Harper's Ferry, and burned s i x wagons.23 In the above message, Gen. Sheridan's comment about the 100 day's men referred to the various National Guard units employed by the Union. They were states' m i l i t i a who were mustered i n t o Federal service for one hundred days; and because of t h e i r short period of Federal service, they were o f t e n used f o r guard and escort duties. T w o of these units that Sheridan referred t o were escorting his wagon train. the 149th Ohio, whose one hundred days ended on 16 August; and the 144th ohlo, whose obligation ended on 19 August 24 The last p a r t of Sheridan's message called attention t o the r a i d on h i s supply t r a i n near Berryville The f a c t that Mosby was mentioned i n Sherldan's report i s signlflcant. When a commander of four corps, three federal departments, and over 45,000 soldiers, reports a minor detail about Mosby only destroying s i x wagons, then he i s also reporting that he haS considerable respect for o r fear of Mosby. Nevertheless, considering
.. . . ._ .. .-. .22lbid, pp 626-627. 231bid, p. 783. 24Whitelaw Reid, Ohio i n the War, (Cincinnati. Moore, Wilstach and Baldwin, 1868), vol. ii, pp, 674, 680.

.. .. ..

Mosby's actions over the l a s t f i v e days, i t i s surprising that Sheridan did not say more. For example, on the morning of 8 August 1864, Mosby and a small party
of rangers crossed the Shenandoah River, "went f o r a scout- i n Sheridan's

rear area, and returned w i t h a Union lieutenant and s i x soldiers a s prisrJners They also returned w i t h enough valuable information to warrant a return t:! the same area that night. That information provided Mosby w i t h the exar.!. disposition of Sheridan's headquarters and, therefore, he decided t o "pay the general a v i s i t " i n the same manner that he had "visited" Brig. Gen. Stoughton.zJ That night, Mosby And a f e w men worked t h e i r way i n t o Sheridan's camp by saying they were part o f a New Vork regiment. When they were w i t h i n three hundred yards of the house Sheridan was using as his headquarters, Mosby went forward t o reconnoiter. He saw a r a i l fence around the house but could not i d e n t i f y any more details in the dark. He selected one of his best scouts, John Hearns, t o s l i p inside the fence and ascertain the size of the force guarding the general. Hearns moved stealthily t o the fence end easily jumped it. When he landed, he was only inches f r o m s i x sleeping soldiers. He looked up and saw a sentinel advancing toward him, demanding the intruder's name. The raider said something about searching f o r h i s New York regiment and then jumped the sentinel. He wrenched the guard's musket away, but could not restrain h i m f r o m screaming, "Murder, murder
"

The sentinel's screams forced Hearns t o withdraw and Mosby t o give up t h e idea of capturing Sheridan.26 25Scott, Partisan Life, pp. 271-272. 26 Ib i d.
1 I2

This raid was Mosby's first disappointment since January When his battalion had attacked Loudoun Heights. Between February and August 1864, the 436 Battalion, Virginia Cavalry had been responsible for sixty-eight union soldiers kllled, over one hundred Union wounded, more than 573 Federal troops captured, and a t least 632 horses and mules captured. During the same period, the partisan rangers had approximately eight of their own men killed, seventeen wounded, and thirty-eight captured.27 The signlficant events pertaining t o Mosby's unlt from February t o August 1864 include: ( 1 1 On 17 February, the same day that Mosby was promoted t o Lt. Col., a number of the partisan rangers were captured as a result of treachery by a southern businessman.= (2) On 21 April, Confederate Secretary of war SeddOn announced that only nosby's and flctdeill's partisan commands could retain their legitimate ranger status (3) On 1 April, Mosby formed Company D. On the same day, he declared war on liquor production, saying that distilleries contributed t o the scarcity of graln and that liquor consumption demoralized the fightlng man.29 (4) On 28 July, Mosby Organlted Company E.30 on 1 2August 1864, after his aborted capture attempt, Mosby started searching for another way of attracting Gen. Sheridan's attention. He did not know that his abductlon attempt had already been noticed by the Union 27Williamson. r n y m g a r s , pp. 133-207. mlbid, pp. 135-137. Union forces were guided by a man named John cornwall In retaliation for a payment dispute involving some of Mosby's men. cornwall had appealed t o Mosby for satisfaction, but was overruled Also, the Union had reported capturing twenty-eight of Mosby's men, but an unknown number of prisoners were actually civilians. 2%iepel, Rebel, pp. 1 10- 1 1 1. 3oWilliamson, Mosbu's Ranaers, p. 197.

__

113

General. Sheridan had demonstrated the magnitude o f his concern for rlosby
by sending a message on 12 August ordering the 8th Illinois Cavalry

Regiment to, ". . . exterminate as many of Mosby's gang as they can."31

On the same day that Sheridan sent his "extermination" message, Nosby
called an afternoon meeting of his battalion at Rectortown. He had learned from one of his scouts that long supply trains were passing down the Shenandoah valley between Harper's Ferry and Gen. Sheridan's army. A f t e r
250 to 300 men had answered his call, Mosby told them that they were going

to "deliver a blow at Sheridan's rear and thus cripple him by cutting o f f his supplies."32 The Confederate force departed Rectortown that afternoon, passed through the Blue Ridge Mountains at Snicker's Gap, crossed the Shenandoah at Castleman's Ferry and, by midnight, had established a camp near Berryville. While they were bedding down for the night, Mosby's scout arrived and reported a very large train nearby Mosby selected a few men and departed f o r a closer look a t the wagon train while the remainder of the rangers slept.
As the small group advanced, they could hear the sounds of the train

many miles before they could see i t . Mosby and his men found the train, rode up t o the wagons, and individually mingled w i t h the drivers and horsemen. They asked questions about the train's destination, i t s composition, and when i t would halt. A short while later, Mosby withdrew his men from the train and, after finding out what his men had learned, sent one back to the camp w i t h instructions to bring the entire battalion forward. Mosby and the . .. . .. .. . . .. . . . .- .... . . .. . . . . 3 1 m , vol. XLIII, pt I . p. 776. 32Mosby. Memoirs, p. 290.

I14

Others remained and began studying the terrain t o determlne their best course of action for the attack Mosby had already learned from the personnel in the supply traln that they were planning a rest halt near the edge of Berryville. Therefore, he planned his attack t o coincide w i t h this halt. He would i n i t i a t e the attack w i t h the two mountain howitzers that Stuart had given him earlier i n the

year and follow up w i t h a cavalry assault. He selected a small knoll on the

east slde of the Berryvllle-Charlestown road as his artillery position. The howitzers would create l e e r and confusion i n the enemy and provide an advantage for his mounted rangers. Mosby planned t o divlde hls unit into four elements: two attacking squadrons, an artillery section of two cannon, and a reserve. One squadron, led by Capt. A. E. Richards and composed of Companies A and 6, would attack the lead elements o f the train. The other squadron, a combined force o f Companies C and D commanded by Capt.

William Chapman, would attack the train's rear. The new Company E would
stay w i t h the artillery, near the center of the train, and lunction as the reserve33 A t sunrlse on 13 August, Mosby could see the train and i t s large herd of cattle from his position on the knoll. He was only one hundred yards from
the guarded column of wagons, but the morning mist helped t o obscure his

presence. As the sun rose higher, so dld Mosby's anxiety. He saw that the mist was rapidly disappearing and that many of the teams were being hitched t o the wagons. Mosby knew he would lose his second opportunity t o

- . ... .... . . . . ... . . 331bid. pp, 290-291 I IS

attract Sherldan's attentlon i f his men dld not arrive soon He dispfltched a

courier to 1ocate his battalion and hurry their arriVal.

The battalion arrived a few minutes later and Mosby issued his instructions to his men, telling them to hurry into position. Mosby remained on the knoll and watched hls men dlsmount the howitzer parts from the pack mules. He looked back a t the wagon train and noticed that one element o f i t was moving. Then his men discovered that one of !he mountain hIowitzer5 had a broken carriage and was Incapable of firing. Mosby impatiently i i r g ~ i j his men to hurry w i t h the second howitzer They finished i t s assembly anrl were rolling i t Into position when: swarm of angry yellow jackets, living up to their reputation as home rulers, poured out of a hole i n the ground and began a stinging protest against invasion of their territory. The hardened artillerymen who could face shell f i r e without a quiver f l e d i n a l l dlrec!ions.34
. ..a

Mosby realized that his opportunity t o destroy the wagon train was rapldly departlng. Flrst, portions of the wagon train were already moving away from his attack position. Second, some of his attack force, within seventy-five yards of the wagon train, were visible t o !he Union escor-!s Therefore, i t was only a matter of minutes before hls men would be recognlzed as enemy. Third, Mosby's men had previously agreed that the signal to attack would be three rounds fired from !he cannon. And finally,
by the time Mosby could notlfy his men of the change i n plans, he would have
35

lost the opportunity t o attack. MJones, Ranoer Mosby, p. 197. E. Richards, "Mosby's Partizan Rangers," i n Adventures and Escal~s. i n the Civil War, (New York: The Century Company, 1904), p. 110.
35A.

I16

Fortunately for Mosby, his artillery f i r s t sergeant ran into the swarm,
grabbed a chain on the gun, and dragged i t down the hill. Wlthin a few moments, the crew rejoined the cannon and had i t ready t o fire. The f i r s t artillery round landed short, making the soldiers of Brig. Gen. Kenly's brlgade believe they were witnessing some friendly target practice.% Their thoughts quickly changed when the second round beheaded a mule.

The whole wagon train was thrown into panic. Teamsters wheeled their horses and mules into the road and, plying their black-snake whips, sent the animals galloping madly down the pike, crashing into other teams whlch, in turn, ran away. Infantry stampeded In every di recti 011.37
When the third round hit the wagon train, the two squadrons of rangers attacked the front and rear flanks of the train, -. . the whole Command charging from the sloDe, not i n columns but Spread out all over creation, each man doing his best t o outyell his comrade and emptying revolvers, l e f t and right."38 As Chapman's squadron hit the train's rear, the Ohio National Guardsmen took refuge behind 8 stone wall and poured volleys of musket f i r e into the rangers. However, they quickly retreated into the woods when the Confederates charged their positions. The raiders then

r returned to the wagon train and charged toward i t s front, riding over o
shooting a t any remaining infantrymen Meanwhile, Richards' squadron had attacked the lead elements of the train's escort forces and chased them Into Berryville's church The infantrq engaged the Confederates with a withering volume o f fire from the Church s
... , . . .. ....,.. . .

..

. .. .

. , ..

s l b i d , P. 1 I I . 37Munson, Reminiscences, p. 105

381bid.

1 I7

windows, forcing the raiders t o w i t h d r a w t o w a r d the wagon train. Capt Richards r a l l i e d the Confederates, charged the Church, and dislodged the Union defenders w h i l e s u f f e r i n g one ranger k i l l e d and t w o others wounded The c o n f l i c t stretched over one and one-half m i l e s and when the lJrliori resistance had f i n a l l y subsided, Mosby gave orders t o unhitch and Collect a:: the wagon teams that had not run away, and set f i r e t o the wagons. Mosby t o l d h i s men t o gather What they could take w i t h them and begin the t w e n t y - f i v e mile march back t o Rectortown. When they departed, they carried o f f more than t w o hundred prisoners, between f i v e and s i x hundred
hOrSeS and mules, two hundred beef c a t t l e and numerous other valuable

items.39 Additionally, they had destroyed seventy-five wagons and f i v e days of r a t i o n s and supplies f o r 2,200 Union cavalrymen40 The r a i d on the wagon t r a i n a t B e r r y v i l l e ended a t approximately eight o'clock i n the morning and by f o u r o'clock that afternoon, the spoils of t h i s operation were safely i n Rectortown. In the operation, Mosby lost t w o men k i l l e d and three wounded, w h i l e the Union l o s t seven k i l l e d and seven wounded?' Mosby's r a i d caused more damage than that described above. When the

1st Rhode Island Cavalry arrived a t B e r r y v i l l e t h i r t y minutes a f t e r the

raiders had departed, they realized that they had lost a l l t h e i r clothing, t h e i r regimental books and papers, and t h e i r regimental

In addition

3 9 m , vol. XLIII, pt. I, p. 1000.

4olbid, p. 621; Siepel, &kl, p. 118. 41Mosby, Memoirs, p, 291; Reid, Ohio i n the War, pp. 674,680; Rev Frederic Denison, Sabres and Spurs, (The f i r s t Rhode Island cavalry Veteran Association, 1876). p. 376. 42Denison, Sabres and Spurs, p.376.

I IR

to the Ahode island cavalry's losses, the 1st U. S.cavalry would also experience inconveniences f o r a long time. Besides losing i t s clothing and supplies, the regiment

also l o s t a l l of

the records, invoices, and receipts

that would p e r m l t It t o function logistically.43 The Unlon's luck during the operation was not a l l bad. For instance, Mosby's men had overlooked a heavy metal chest In one of the wagons they had burned. As soon as Mosby's raiders departed the wagon train, the owner
o f the box returned, put i t on a horse and rode off under escort. Mosby had

missed capturing a $1 12.000 payroll intended for Sheridan's army.44 The most significant result of Mosby's r a i d was i t s impact on Sheridan's operations. It was a m a j o r factor i n causing Gen. Sheridan's army t o w i t h d r a w on 15 August t o Halltown where he had started his offensive a week earlier. The day a f t e r Mosby's raid, Sheridan reported t o the Chief of Staff, Gen. Halleck, "This line cannot be held, nor can I supply my command begond that point with the ten day's rations w i t h which I started-45 Furthermore, Sheridan had not corrected his report of six wagons burned by nosby. That changed, however, when Gen. Halleck sent him a w l r e on 19 August asking, ". . . la scout1 says that Mosby t o l d him that he had captured one of your trains of seventy o r eighty wagons, w i t h 500 mules and horses
I s that true?"46 Sheridan replied that he had i n i t i a l l y been given bad

information about the raid, but only two hundred mules and f o r t y wagons were captured.
.. . .-.. . .. .

.. .

i3QC3,

vol. XLIII, p t . I, p. 621

44ibid, p. 485. 451bid, p. 792.

46lbid, p 841

I19

By 16 August, Mosby had gotten the att.ention of bot.h Grant. and Sheridst! That w a s the day Grant received Sheridan's message about Mosby's burning

six wagons. Grant sent two messages t o Sheridan in reply. The f i r s t read
The f a m i l i e s of most of Mosby's men are known, and can he collected. I think they should be taken and kept a t Fort McHenry, or some secure place, as hostages for the good conduct of Mosby and his men Where any of Mosby's men are caught hang them w i t h o u t tria1.47 Evidently Mosby played heavily on Grant.3 mind because he sent a second message t o Sheridan t w o hours l a t e r :
If you can possibly spare a d i v i s i o n o f cavalry, send them through Loudoun County, t o destroy and carry o f f the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under f i f t y years of age capable o f bearing arms. In t h i s way you w i l l get many of Mosby's men. A l l male c l t i z e n s under f i f t g can f a i r l y be held as prisoners of war, and not as c i t i z e n prisoners If not already soldiers, they w i l l be made so the moment the rebel army gets hold of them.'*

The next day, 17 August, Sheridan received Grant's f i r s t message nrid sent t h i s reply, "Mosby has annoyed m e and captured a f e w wagons. We hurig one and shot s i x of his men yesterday."49 The message reported t h a t Sheridan had executed Mosby's men on16 August, but he had not yet received Grant's message authorizing him t o do so (received 6:30A.M., 17 August) Mosby, a f t e r the C i v i l War, conducted extensive research i n t o Sheridav's message. Heconcludedthat Sheridan never had anyone hung on 16 August, and f o r certain, none of the men Sheridan reported as executing were

.. .. .. .

471bid, p. 8 I 1 481bid. 491bid, p. 822.

120

Mosby'sso It appears that Sheridan was only trying to appease his superior by telling him what he wanted to hear and avoiding what he did not want to hear. This explains why Sheridan only reported six wagons burned and why he did not elaborate on the reasons for his withdrawl i n the Shenandoah Valley. Furthermore, one hour after Sheridan was forced t o admit to Gen. Halleck that Mosby had inflicted considerable damage, he sent Gen. Grant the following message of assurance, "Guerrillas give me great annoyance, but I

am quietly disposing of numbers of them. The enemy appears to be uncertain

as to what course to pursue."Jl Once again, Mosby said he did not lose any

men to the Union general. Sheridan probably said these things i n order t o appease Grant and avoid his temper. Regardless of the reasons for Sheridan's and Grant's messages, the facts show that Mosby certainly attracted their attention with this operation Mosby's raid also cost Sheridan's army the service of combat soldiers a t
the front lines. In addition to ordering the 8 t h Illinois Cavalry to "break up

and exterminate any bands of Mosby's," Sheridan also spread many of his cavalry units throughout the area to guard against raiding parties.JZ The Berryville raid also helped Gen. Sheridan decide t o organize two ranger forces of his own, one was from the 2d Rhode Island Infantry and the other was a specialized independent unit of one hundred men?3 These were counterguerrilla forces designed to set counterambushes and countertraps,
. . ..... .. . ..... .. ... . .

..... .. .. .

.. .

Wiouthern Historical Society Paoers, ed. R. A. Brock (Richmond: Southern Historical Society, 1899), vol. XXVII, pp. 267-275. Sllbid, p. 841. 5 2 0 3 , vol. XLIII, pt. I, p. 831. 5303, vol. XL I II, pt. I, p. 860.
121

and depending on the situation, were permitted t o wear Confederate and Union uniforms. Unfortunately, they also had the tendency t o loot, were nicknamed 'Sheridan's Robbers" by their own army, and proved ineffective against Mosby.J4 The element of chance also had a significant impact on Mosby's raid. First, i f the cavalry train had been properly supervised, i t probably would not have unhitched i t s horses, and therefore, i t would not have been as vulnerable t o attack. Second, Mosby was fortunate that his cannon could
f i r e the three rounds necessary t o signal the start of the attack Of the two

cannons that Mosby had, one never fired and the second cannon malfunctioned soon after It fired the third "signal" round. Third, the Union escort was composed o f -100 days men." Prior t o this raid, Mosby had always been reluctant t o attack infantry units because they could defend quickly and strongly. The presence of cannon, however, provided him w i t h a combat multiplier that would tend t o negate the infantry's defensive advantage. Therefore, Mosby believed that a day attack against infantry might be successful. The fact that the escorts were from the Ohio National Guard was also a major advantage for Mosby. The militia knew they would be released from Federal service and be home w i t h their families within the week, Therefore, when the Ohio soldiers saw Mosby's rangers attack the train, they were more concerned w i t h staying alive and getting back 1.0 Ohio than protectlng the train. Finally, when the two ranger squadrons were waiting for the attack signal, Mosby was lucky that the Federal troops did not recognize his men as enemy and take away his element of surprise 54O'Connor, Sheridan, p. 194.

I22

Chance was in flosbys favor and not in the unions favor. The wagon

train was a hasty operation of many large units. Brig. Gen. Kenly had
insufficient time and information to conduct proper planntng and the units

i n the supply train were disorganized and undisclplined. As a result, they

provided the elements of chance and friction w i t h numerous opportunities t o interfere w i t h the operation. Actually, considering the outcome of the raid, the Union was fortunate not t o have suffered greater losses. On the other hand, flosby had a close-knit and relatively efficient unit and had sufficient time t o prepare his plan and execute i t . Therefore, chance and friction had less opportunity t o interfere w i t h the operation nosbys operatlonal techniques were, for the most part, largely responsible

f o r the success of this raid. The following 1s a l i s t of the technlques he

used:

I . Mosby used his system of rendezvous points as a successful means of

gathering his men f o r meetings or operations.
2. Mosby knew and used the terrain to his advantage, He personally

selected the artillery flrlng positions and the squadrons attack positions
He

also used the nights darkness i n masking his movement t o a fOrW8rd

3. He gained and used as much intelligence information about the enemy

assembly area and used the hazy weather i n obscuring hls attack position

as he could flnd. For example, Mosby used his scout t o determlne the location of the train, that i t was only guarded by infantry, and that the nearest cavalry unit was over two and one-half miles away.= Furthermore,

. .. .

... .. . ..

. .. .

. . . . .

SsCrawford, P & & y

and His Men, p. 239.

I23

Mosby personally gathered intelligence about the enemy by r i d i n g with the t r a i n and asking important questions about routes, security, and rest halts.
4. Mosby planned the operation from start t o finish, saw the t e r r a i n

where the r a i d would take place, and supervised the raid's execution. AI. t h i s point, t h i s was the largest u n i t Mosby had employed. His planning allowed for and made good use of h i s unit's size. Mosby's r a i d was a coordinated attack w i t h two maneuver elements, separated by more than a mile; a f i r e support element; and a reserve In order to control t h i s force, Mosby chose t o use h i s cannon as the t r i g g e r f o r the attack. T h i s was reasonable considering that he had two cannon. During the execution o f [IF operation, one cannon could not be f i r e d and the other had a temporary problem w i t h some "inhospitable" hornets. Therefore, one could speculate that Mosbyhadwishedhe had hadabackup signal.

5. The r a i d demonstrated that the rangers were s u f f i c i e n t l y disciplined

t o f o l l o w instructions, technically proficient i n scouting, and capable o f

conducting a coordinated attack.
6. Mosby used his most experienced u n i t s i n the attack and "saved" h i s

most inexperienced company, Company

E, as the reserve

7. Mosby informed his men of the purpose f o r the mission and explained

his plan. His men knew what was expected of them, and as a result, the operation went smoothly.
8. The r a i d employed the use of deception, surprise, and audacity. First,

Mosby deceived the members of the wagon t r a i n when he and h i s men rode along w i t h i t the night before the raid. Second, he had t o r e t a i n the element o f surprise because the enemy had a t least a regiment of infantry versu': his

unit o f 250 to 300 cavalrymen. Finally, the entire operation was audacious considering Mosby's night ride with the wagon train; the close proximity of the attack positions t o the Union forces; and the slow, twenty-flve mile march home w i t h one thousand prisoners and animals. Furthermore, the Union infantry had seen Mosby's cannon and squadrons of rangers nearby, but, because they were so close, the Federals never Imagined that they could be enemy.%
9. Mosby and his subordinate leaders led by example from the front of

their respective units and, as a result, limited the amount of confusion i n the operation.
10. Mosby understood the importance of his rald to the Confederate

cause and notified Gen. Lee by telegraph of i t s outcome?7 Thls was one o f t.he very rare instances that Mosby used the telegraph, but he wanted t o make sure that Lee knew that Sheridan had suffered a malor blow t o his logistics. In summary, this section outllned the thlrd and final operation of this study. It showed how the B e r r y v i l l e raid impacted on the union army's ieaders and soldlers, and how Mosby planned and executed a daylight, coordlnated attack. Finally, i t outlined the technlques that Mosby used t o make the operation a success. The Berryvllle raid was Mosby's largest operation as of August 1864 and one of the most important operations of his career. It was a major

reason why modern historians such as Bruce Catton and Vlrgil C. Jones
. .. .. . . . ..

SsRichards, "Mosby's Partizan Rangers," p. I 1 I 5 7 m , V O l . XLIII, pt. I , p. 1000.

12s

credited Mosby and other partisans w i t h prolonging the C i v i l War for eight

or nine months.58

5*Jones, Gray Ghosts, p. vii.

120

-_

I
I

Battle of the Wilderness

Chancellorwille
I

Spotsylvanla Court House

James River

Battle o f 15 June 1864

10

15

20

cwL+wcHHH Rallroad
~ ~

FIGURE 8 RICHMOND AND VICINITY, SPRING 1864

127

Bealton Station

DAN

Chancellorsvllle

Rallroad

SCALE IN MILES

FIGURE 9
NORTHERN VIRGINIA, SUI'II'IER 1864
128

FIGURE 10 BERRYVILLE, VIRGINIA, AUGUST 1864

I29

CHAPTER 4 SECTION 1 ANALYSIS The previous chapters of t h i s study described John S Mosby's l i f e and three of h i s unit's offensive operations, the Fairfax raid, the Loudoun Heights attack, and the Berryville raid. T h i s chapter analyzes and discusses the information f r o m those chapters and concludes w i t h a statement of findings. The analysis i s organized i n t o the f o l l o w i n g categories. 1. SITUATION AND ORGANIZATION.

2. MISSION AND PLANNING.

3. EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS.

4. EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS.

5. COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, AND CONTROL.

6 . RESULTS.

7. THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE.

8. LEADERSHIP.
1. SITUATION AND ORGANIZATION. Union forces, in the f i r s t t w o

operations, temporarily occupied defensive POSitlOnS as a r e s u l t of the harsh w i n t e r weather. The Federal army was, however, superior t o the Confederate army i n numbers and resources, and when spring arrived, i t resumed offensive operations. The Union's Situation a t the t i m e o f the

Benyville raid was different in that it was already into a summer offensive.
The Federal army occupied the 'enemy' tenltory of Virginia in all three

operations. This subjected the Union t o the disadvantages of exposed lines

of communication and of fighting in unfriendly or, a t least, unsympathetic

reglons. As a result, i t was constantly vulnerable to attacks on i t s supply lines and to intelligence gathering efforts from Confederate spies and sympathizers. In order t o alleviate the problems caused by these disadvantages, the Union army stationed guard forces in varlous locations
and also employed escorts as a means of securing i t s lines of

communication. Obviously, the best infantry and cavalry units would be used in combat, and the inexperienced and inferior units would be used as guards and escorts. Thls does not imply that all the guard and escort forces were composed of Inferior units, but rather that the routine missions of the less capable units were guard and escort. For example, the Ohio National Guard was composed of units of '100 days' men.' The Union commander would have been foolhardy to send these inexperienced and relatively untrained soldiers against the hardened and battlewise soldiers of the Confederacy. Nevertheless, i t would be wise to use them to replace the more experienced units in performing the less dangerous operations, such as guard and escort.
The Union's soldiers' levels of experience and professionalism varied i n

the same manner as the levels of the units did. some Soldiers Joined the army to fight for the Union's cause, some joined because i t was a means of employment, and others joined because they were forced o r coerced. When a

131

union soldier was captured by the Confederate cavalry in the first t w o years of the war, that soldier could be sent t o prison or be given a parole The former meant that he would be subjected t o the notoriously bad conditions of prison l i f e - - i n some cases i t was a fate worse than death. The l a t t e r meant that legally, he could no longer f i g h t for t.he Union The consequences of the parole also meant that t.he w a r was over for !he parolee and he could return t o h i s home and family. Obviously t h i s was appealing t o some of the less professlonal Union soldlers and i t provided the Confederates with an important advantage. The Union soldier would be less l i k e l y t o r i s k h i s l i f e resisting a Confederate attack when he knew thot instead of dying or going t o prison, he could be going home. Examples of t h i s situation were evident in the raids on Fairfax Court House and Herndon Station when most o f the Union soldiers quickly surrendered rather then resist. Additionally, the Confederates used the promise of a parole as a bargaining tool in order t o get the prisoner t o divulge important infol-mat.lon about h i s unit.

In 1863, t h i s situation changed when the Confederate cavalry was

forbidden t o grant paroles t o prisoners except those who were WOUnded. This meant that the Union soldier's resistance t o capture was greater because he knew he no longer had the option of a parole. It also meant that the Confederates l o s t one of t h e i r previous advantages. An example of t h i s situation was evident i n the attack on Loudoun Heights. The Union soldiers were surrounded and t h e i r opportunlty f o r escape was slight. I f they had had the opportunity for parole, they may have given up thinking that t h e i r situation was hopeless Instead, Cole's cavalrymen knew they faced Ueuth,

132

prison, or both and, as a result, resisted the attackers as w e l l as the freezing weather. The f a c t that a wounded soldier could receive a parole, did provide the Confederates w i t h an illegal opportunity t o get information about enemy units. They could bargain with the prisoner for information by assuring h i m that if the information he provided was s u f f i c i e n t l y valuable, they would declare t h a t he was "wounded" and give him a parole. Although the h i s t o r i c a l records do not demonstrate examples where t h i s occurred, the opportunity obviously existed. Regardless of the methods t h a t Mosby's men used, the f a c t was that even a l t e r the parole system was abolished, they continued t o receive valuable information f r o m prisoners. The B e r r y v i l l e r a i d demonstrated another reason f o r the lack of Union resistance. The infantry men escorting Sheridan's wagon t r a i n were '"I00 days' men" w i t h less than a week or Federal service remaining. They were, as a general rule, less professional, less experienced, and less motivated than t h e i r regular army contemporaries. Furthermore, they were more concerned w i t h returning home i n one hundred days than f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r obligation t o protect the train. As a result, t h e i r poor performance during !he r a i d allowed Mosby's mounted rangers t o defeat a stronger infantry force The Union forces, i n a l l three operations, were caught unprepared as a r e s u l t o f poor b a t t l e f i e l d discipline. In the Fairfax raid, Brig. Gen. Stoughton's troops, w e l l behind the cavalry picket line, believed they werr! secure f r o m enemy attack. They had not established a password and were not as a l e r t as they should have been. In the Loudoun Heights attack, Cole's

battalion had not established guard posts around their camp because theq believed the frigid weather, the snow, and the height of the mountain prevented attack. Finally, i n the Berryville raid, the Union escorts believed they were secure from attack because of their location behind friendly lines and the fact that their force was so large. The Confederates had an advantage over the union i n these operations because they could choose the time and the manner of attack. In order t o offset the Confederate advantage, the Union would have had t o maintaln i t s discipline a t a l l t.lnles because i t did not know nor could it choose when the enemy would a t t m k The Union's abillty to maintain i t s discipline and security was also mure d i f f i c u l t due the weather conditions and the time the at.tacks took place In
both winter operations, the attacks occurred between two and f i v e O'CiOL'k

i n the morning while the weather was cold and snowlng o r raining. In these t.wo cases, the environmental conditions were major factors i n causing the Union's security to be either very l a x or nonexistent In addition t o the firs! two operations, the environmental conditions of haze and mist helped t o obscure Mosby's positlon while he prepared for the Berryville attack Furthermore, he conducted his reconnaissance during the two t o f i v e o'clock time frame when union security was most vulnerable. Mosby used the weather t o his advantage. He knew that the weathpr conditions could interfere w i t h his operations, but he also knew that Initiative and surprise were on his side. Therefore, the weather would be greater hlnderance to the enemy than t o his own unit. In addition t o the weather, Mosby also used terrain t o his advantage. In
the f i r s t two operations, he selected routes into the enemy's area o f
B

operations that would protect his troops. In the Fairfax raid, he used the woods to obscure his movement and the flooded Cub Run to delay any pursult In the raid on Cole's camp, he climbed Loudoun Heights by Using a trail that the Union troops believed impossible to negotiate. In the Benyville raid, Mosby selected the best vantage points to locate his a r t i l l e n j and launch his attack. Not only did Mosby know the terrain, but he also gained as much information about the enemy as he could. When he captured Brig. Gen. Stoughton, Mosby used spies, deserters, prisoners, and personal reconnaissance to determine as much information as possible about the enemy's situation. In the attack on Loudoun Heights, Mosby used scouts from another unit and his own reconnaissance t o learn about Cole's Camp. Finally, when he attacked the wagon train, he again used scouts and his own reconnaissance t o find out the train's route and the location of i t s rest halt. The partisan ranger commander employed an excellent intelligence system which allowed him to decide which mission he would conduct. As a

result, he and his men rarely roamed the area 'in force' searching for
targets of opportunity. Normally, a scout would provide the preliminary information about a vulnerable Union force. Then Mosby would organize his men and move them to an assembly area. He would reconnoiter the area, select the manner of attack, and after rejoining his men, he would lead the operati on. Intelligence was very important for the partisan unit's effectiveness because i t had a small margin f o r error. If i t had used faulty Intelligence,

not Only would the operation have been in jeopardy, but the future of the

135

unit would have been a t stake. If the unit made a large blunder, i t could
quickly cease t o exist. intelligence was also more readily available tr, tho partisans concerning Federal unit locations, strengths, and plans Thi? wac. due t o the normal operations of the press and the various informal communications networks. Also, as Mnsby's unit grew in size, i t also grew i n intelligence gathering capability. Andrew M Scott w r i t e s i n h i s book. wrge!EY: Intelligence yield and popular support are o f t e n closely linked. AS popular support f o r a movement rises, the f l o w of intelligence i s l i k e l y t o increase. If popular support declines, there i s l i k e l y to he a decline in the amount and quality o f the intelligence available.' Mosby had noticed t h i s situation early i n h i s partisan career when he w r o t e Gen. Stuart about the local populace desiring him t o remain in the area as a partisan. Mosby recognized the importance of receiving support. o f the population. For example, when h i s men were o f f duty, they were m o s t l y scattered throughout the area, l i v i n g and working f o r c i v i l i a n f a m i l i e s and farms. If h i s men did not receive the support of the locals, h i s unit could be refused shelter, food, new recruits, medicine, intelligence, and forage Mosby also realized the importance of h i s c i v i l - m i l i t a r y relationship and conducted h i s operations s i m i l a r l y t o those outlined by Carl von Decker,
a German expert of partisan warfare, who w r o t e i n 1822:

The partisan must be welcome everywhere; t o t h i s end, he w i l l maintain s t r i c t discipline i n t h i s band and w i l l know how t o present himself i n a disinterested guise. He should be able t o have the elements t o f u l f i l l h i s needs brought t o h i m without having to take them; but when he must requisition them, he will ensure that 'Andrew N. Scott, Insurgency, (Chapel H i l l , NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 19701, p. 57.

I36

everything i s paid for in ready money so that he i s not classed w i t h freebooters. The country should consider h i m i t s liberator, shielding i t from enemy vexation, and gratefully o f f e r him i t s beSt.2
I f Mosby had not maintained h i s excellent rapport w i t h the civilians, he

would have had more situations l i k e the one in 1864 where the Southern businessman helped Union soldiers capture some of Mosby's men. The ranger leader could not maintain this rapport by himself, his men also had t o help h l m support h i s c i v i l - m i l i t a r y operations I f one o r t w o o f
his men would have mistreated civtlians, the reputation of the entire unit.

could have suffered the repercussions. This meant that Mosby's men had t o he s u f f i c i e n t l y disciplined t o f o l l o w his rules and not adversely affect the

unit's c i v i l -mlli t a r y re1ati ons.

Mosby's men did not have the same type of discipllne or organlzatlon the more conventional units dld. Most units would have thought the 43d Battalion was t o t a l l y undisciplined and in some cases they were right One
iif
86

Mosby's own men w r i t e s : The truth is, we were an undisciplined l o t . During the t w e l v e months of my service I learned but four commands--fall i n and count o f f by fours, march, close up, and charge. There was another movement With which w e were not altogether unfamiliar. an order technically known as the "skedadle," but I never heard the command given. The Rangers seemed t o know i n s t i n c t i v e l y when that movement was appropriate, and never waited f o r the word.3

-.

2r:arl von Decker, "Der Kletne Krieg im Geiste der neueren Kriegsfuhrung;' I ~ Walter Laqueur, The Gue rrllla R e a m, (Philadelphia. Temple Unlversity Press, 19771, p. 59. 3John H. Alexander, Mosbu's Men, (New York. The Neale Publishing Company, I907),p 19

They were undisciplined by conventional armies' standards but t h i s was not a conventional army. The Confederate battalion demonst.rated i t s own type of discipline i n a l l three operations The Fairfax r a i d was characterized by quiet, obedient soldiers who would f o l l o w t h e i r leader without question. When the raiders entered the village o f Fairfax Court. House, Mosby gave them instructions and they obeyed. The opera!ion
wnii!d

have been impossible without discipline. The Loudoun Heights r a i d wqs s i m i l a r in that the soldiers rode for hours in zero degree weather, maintained silence, climbed a snowy c l i f f when told, and did a l l t h i s without knowing what t h e i r mission was. In the Berryville raid, the t w o squadrons of rangers waited w i t h i n sight of the enemy until three rounds DI a r t i l l e r y were fired. ~ l these l demonstrate a measure of discipline, but i t i s s t i l l different f r o m that of conventional forces. As Andrew M. Scott explains: Insurgent movements typically place less emphasis on the f o r m a l i t i e s of m i l i t a r y courtesy than do conventional forces. Discipline depends less on formal obligations and fear of punishment and more on morale, devotion t o the cause, camaraderie, and peer group reinforcement. Insurgent movements lack the involved bureaucratic apparatus and procedures t h a t support discipline i n most conventional forces. Insurgency enforcement of discipline i s 1 ikel y t o be characterized by informelity, f l e x i b i l i t y , speed, and harshness!
A l l the rangers knew that i f they misbehaved, they would be barred f r o m

the unit and sent t o the regular ermy. They considered t h i s t o be the harshest punishment of all, es Ranger John Munson wrote:

4Scott, Insurgency, p. 12.

Mosby would not permit any man to commit a crime, or even a mlsdemeanor, i n his domain. One of our men, in a spirit of deviltry, once turned over an old Quaker farmer's milk cans, and when Mosby heard of it he ordered me to take the man over t o the army, which was then near Winchester, and turn him over t o General Early, with the message that such a man was not fitted t o be a guerrllla? The level of discipline in Mosby's battalion did not compare with that of conventional units. For example, when a conventional army conducted a frontal assault, the assaulting soldier did so as a result of strict discipline. Mosby's unit did not have that level of dlscipline. This was demonstrated durlng the Loudoun Heights attack when many of the rangers did not charge

the Union camp as ordered.

The only way Mosby and his subordinate leaders could approach the level
of discipline found in conventlonal units was t o lead by example and reward

bravery. All the operations shown in this study demonstrated that Mosby and his subordinate leaders led from the front and set the example. Ranger Munson agrees, 'Every man in Mosby's command understood that he was his Commander without question, and the result was a expected t o ~QUQ&
blind unwavering falth in their leader.% Mosby rewarded bravery by

bestowing rank or deciding who received the most spoils at the concluslon
of an operation.7

The 43d Battalion was composed of men from varied walks of l i f e with only a few things In common: they volunteered, they were brave, and they followed their leaders. They were divided into small companies of sixty men, and each had a commander and subordinate offlcers. Mosby did not and
e 8 of o Mo&yEueartlln, p. 22 SMunson, m clbld, p. 6-7, (Italics mine). 71bid, p. 9; Jones, B p n m y , p. 75.

139

could not requlre all hls men t o muster at the same time. As a result, the commander never really knew how many men he would get when he called a meeting. The battallon meetlngs were called at random locatlons and they usually experienced acceptable attendance because all the men were volunteers. None of the operatlons descrlbed how the partisan unit trained, and there was l i t t l e tralnlng by conventlonal standards. One training exerclse they dld employ was t o gallop past a tree at full speed, and fire

three bullets Into Its trunk In successton*

2. MISSION AND PLANNING. The three operatlons demonstrated that Nosby's overall mission was t o harrass the enemy's supply llnes and communications and, by doing so, force the enemy t o divert substantial numbers of troops from the front lines t o rear area and population control. The 436 Battallon did this by carrying off o r destroying munitions, supplies, clothing, horses, mules, and Cattle; by killing, woundlng, o r capturlng enemy soldiers; by seltlng provisions that the enemy had t o brlng up from far i n his rear and that he could not flnd near the battle area; by selzlng enemy dispatches and cutting communicattons; by capturlng generals; and by passlng on or seeking out important information about the enemy. Mosby's theory of action was, 'A line i s only as strong as I t s weakest point, i t was necessary for i t t o be stronger than I was a t every point i n order t o resist

my attacks.9
Mosby operated under Gen. Stuart, untll hls death, and then under Gen. Robert E. Lee. Both leaders permitted hlm t o use hls own dlscretlon and rarely interfered with hls operatlons. In the three operatlons, Mosby only etlunson, Remlnlscsnces 01a , 9Wllllamson, mwm, p. 26.
140

pp. 24-25.

conferred w i t h his superior about one mission, the Fairfax raid. In that situation, Mosby wrote t o Stuart that he was thinking about a raid into

Fairfax and Stuart urged him t o try. Nosby had carte blanche because he was
successful and because he was too far away for either of his superiors t o control him.

All three of the operations were planned in advance, and at least two
were planned t o be decisive, all-or-nothing, operations. In the Fairfax raid, the mission was t o capture Col. Wyndham and others and escape without firing a shot. In the Loudoun Heights attack, Mosby's plan was t o capture Cole's entire battalion without a shot. In both cases, Mosby did not have an alternate plan of action. Mosby always made preliminary plans, but rarely finalized them until he was a t the scene of the operation. He also did not
t e l l his men what the mission was going t o be until they arrived a t their

destination. When Mosby's men stopped a t the town square i n Fairfax Court House, he gave them their instructions. When he arrived a t the top o f Loudoun Heights, he personally reconnoitered the camp and then issued his

first instructions of the operation. Perhaps Mosby acquired these ideas

from reading Napoleon's

m.F o r example, one of these maxims states,

"1 never had a plan of operations."lo Napoleon implied that he was never

dominated by a hard and fast plan worked out i n advance. He also had -a
deliberate desire t o keep contemporaries, even the marshalate, i n the

clark."ll Furthermore, Nosby's desire t o conduct the decisive battle or operation was probably based on Napoleon's strategy of the decisive bnttlt?

Publishing CO. Inc., 1966). p lllbid

141

It should be noted, however, that Mosby's desire was no different than thfit

of most other C i v i l War leaders. Mosby's personality also affected h i s mission planning For example, !hr: Fairfax r a i d occured as a direct r e s u l t of Mosby's desire f o r revenge against Col. Wyndham.

3 EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS. All of Mosby's operations were

characterized by simple mission orders, decentralized execution, surpnsP. stealth, speed, and audacity. The f i r s t and l a s t operations employed deception and the l a s t operation used a coordinated attack All of Mosby's operations employed hit-and-run tactics, avoided frontal o r positional warfare, and employed operational security. The successful deception techniques included the wearing of gum coats, which helped t o conceal the ranger's identity; identifying oneself as a lJnion soldier; approaching the enemy f r o m behind i t s own lines; departing the scene of an operation i n a d i f f e r e n t direction than the actual e x i t route; and t e l l i n g a prisoner l i e s i n order t o destroy h i s hope f o r rescue. The Berryville r a i d employed artillery, a reserve, and t w o attack squadrons. Mosby combined f o u r of h i s companies i n t o two squadrons as B method o f centralizing the control o f h i s forces. This was significant and demonstrated the evolution of Mosby's command style. When Mosby conducted his Fairfax raid, he controlled twenty-nine men on h i s own, he f i r s t t o l d h i s men about. the mission when they were close t o entering thP vlllage, and he selected h i s leaders and assigned t h e i r tasks w h i l e they were in the village. In the Loudoun Heights attack, Mosby controlled over one hundred men, t o l d h i s men about the mission when they had entered t.he

I42

enemy's camp, assigned three small missions t o subordinate leaders, but s t i l l retnined the bulk of the force under h i s control The Loudoun Heights Httack toxed Mosby's span of control and taught h i m that large groups of men

are d i f f i c u l t for one man t o control, especially in the dark. A l t e r that

unsuccessful mission, Mosby never again conducted night raids w i t h large forces. In the Berryville raid, Mosby comblned h i s forces. explained the operation's purpose, and delegated almost a l l o f h i s control t o h i s subordinate 1eeders. Operational security was paramount t o the success and existence o f Mosby's battalion. Andreas Emerich, an 18th century German partisan, outlined the requirement for operational security when he w r o t e I n 1790
. [the partisans] are more unsettled and exacting than those of any other kind of troops, as they are never encumbered w i t h tents and as the security of the army largely depends upon t h e i r vigilance Conversely, i f the partisan ever allows himself t o be taken by surprise, he hBS no excuse. He may of course be attacked, even cut t o pieces, but he must never, e i t h e r in the f i e l d o r in h i s quarters l e t himself be taken by surprise.. . .12

Another technique of the 43d b a t t a l i o n was that i t avoided confrontation w i t h t h e enemy when conditions were not favorable for success or when i t llid not pertain t o the conduct of the present operation. In a l l three operations, hut especially i n the Loudoun Heights atthck, the rangers broke rilntact w i t h the enemy instead o f t r y i n g t o maintain it. Finally, all uperations were executed w i t h the objective of conserving the rangers' lives.
.. . . ..

..

.. .

'2Andreas Emmerich, "Der Parteiganger im Kreig," i n Walter Laqueur, & T Guerrilla Reader, p. 24.

4. EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS I-ogistics, t o a unit opera!.irig fit D

distance f r o m i t s own army, i s v l t a l t o i t s survival. Because o f it,$ clandestlne nature, the 43d Battalion usually had t o f i n d its own rnea:c. : ; ' existence. It could not r i s k using complicated supply operations, o r w i n g commercial channels such as trains f o r bulk freight. It SUrViVed, f o r the

most part, on supplies f r o m the local farmers and f r o m equipment and

supplies f r o m the enemy. James Williamson, one of Mosby's men, exp!sins t h e l r situation: Mosby's command was regularly organized under the Partizan Ranger Law, an act passed by the Confederate Congress, they were allowed the benefit of the l a w applying to Maritime prizes. All c a t t l e and mules were turned over t o the Confederate Government, but h o r w s captured were distributed among the men making the capture When i t i s borne in mind that the men had t o arm, equip and support themselves, t h i s did not leave a very heavy surplus, as we received but l i t t l e aid f r o m the government.'3 The i t e m s needed by the partisan included: good horses, four pistols, munitions, clothing, medical supplies, food, shelter, and forage f o r the horses. The rangers' horses came almost exclusively f r o m the Union. There were, however, good horses and bad horses. The Union o f f i c e r s usually had b e t t e r mounts than the enlisted ranks and, as demonstrated i n the F a i r f a r raid, the partisans always placed high p r i o r i t y on raiding the officer's stables. The partisans usually used f o u r Union pistols, two carried a t their w a i s t and t w o i n t h e i r saddle holsters, because they d i d not want t o charge i n t o the enemy and then have t o stop in order t o reload. The Berryville r a i d provides a good example of how the rangers used t h e i r p i s t o l s t o attack 13Williamson, Nosby's Ranaers, p. 22.
144

i n m y m e n i n the Qm. Mosby's men charged as f a s t as t h e i r horses could

run, averaging one hundered yards In less than ten seconds. They drew h t t e n t i o n t o themselves by yelling and screaming as loudly as possible. The enemy had time t o f i r e a few volleys from their muskets but hitting the rapidly closing rangers w l t h the heavy musket was d i f f i c u l t . The rangers began their charge from seventy-five t o three hundred yards away. This was important because the musket was usually sighted f o r targets a t three t o f i v e hundred yards away, causing a large disparity between l i n e of sight and the r i f l e d musket's bullet trajectory.14 Furthermore, aiming a t the rapidly Lharging horseman w h i l e standing in open terrain requlred the steady nerves
o f a hardened veteran. Once the infantryman had f i r e d and missed, he had to

!ry t o reload and shoot again using a d i f f e r e n t aiming point. Considering this, i t i s easy t o understand why b u l l e t s f r o m vulnerable infantrymen o f t e n missed t h e i r targets and why only a few rangers were wounded. h j d i t i o n a l l y , when the ranger was a t close quarters with the infantryman,
he could easily fire each p i s t o l six t i m e s and use his horse t o run the enemy

over. Meanwhile, the infantryman could only f i r e one round, reload, and try
t o quickly raise the heavy musket i n t o position f o r another close-in shot

When the ranger had expended h i s twenty-four rounds, he e i t h e r had the situation w e l l i n hand or had t o w i t h d r a w t o reload. Therefore, the twentufour rounds became the determining f a c t o r f o r the duration of the operation The partisans often acquired t h e i r clothing and medical supplies as a r e s u l t of t h e i r raids The only u n i f o r m requirement for the Confederate

I4Coggins, Arms and Equpment of the C i v i l War, pp. 38-39.

145

rangers was that something they wore had t o be gray. Consequently, !.iw remainder of the ranger's uniform usually looked more "blue" than "grqj
"

Shelter f o r Mosby's men often translated i n t o f a r m houses, barns, fir blankets i n open fields. Interestingly, one ranger usually selected h i 5 cami, i n a cemetery because Union soldiers seldom looked there Forage f o r horses was both an individual and group responsiblity. 7f:w times, the rangers formed details With the mission of supplying forage through local purchase, confiscation, o r by raiding Union supplies The equipment f o r Mosby's unit was d i f f e r e n t f r o m other cavalry u n i t s because the rangers rarely carried sabres o r carbines. James willianison explains why: In the s t i l l n e s s o f the night the clanking o f the sabres and the r a t t l e of the carbines s t r i k i n g against the saddles could be heard f o r a great distance, and would o f t e n betray us when moving cautiouslb i n the v i c i n i t y of the Federal camps. We sometimes passed between camps but a f e w hundred yards apart.15

5. COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL. The communication

system f o r Mosby's unit depended almost entirely on c i v i l i a n or rni1itnt.b couriers and was a secure, but s l o w means of passing information. Although Mosby reported the r e s u l t s of h i s Berryville r a i d t o h i s superiors by telegraph, he did not normally have the opportunity t o do so because his u n i t was usually i n enemy territory. The Berryville r a i d also demonstrated that. Mosby used a cannon as a means of communicating the s t a r t of the attack to his subordinates Some factors of command and control, such as leaders s e t t i n g the example, were mentioned earlier. The key technique was that Mosby always
.. . . . . .
.

... ..

. . . . -.

lsWilliamson, Mosbu's Ranaers, p. 21

146

selected a vantage point where he could best control the operation and his subordinate leaders did likewise Mosby overcame the Confederate's poor system of officer election by selecting his leaders and then telling hts men t o vote for them. But, he always gave the enlisted men the opportunity t o move t o a different company or leave the battalion i f they did not approve of his selections
6. RESULTS. The results of Mosby's operations were the same as the

ubjectives he outlined i n the following:

. . , t o destroy supply trains, t o break up the means of conveying

intelligence and thus isolating an army from i t s base, as w e l l as i t s different corps from each other, t o confuse plans by capturing dispatches, are the oblects of partisan warfare . The military value of a partisan's work i s not measured by the amount of property destroyed, or the number of men killed o r captured, but by the number he keeps watching. Every soldier withdrawn from the front t o guard the rear of an army i s so much taken from i t s fighting strength.16 The results of Mosby's operations had both political and psychological effects on the Union: the Fairfax raid drew comments and actions from every level of Federal leadership, to include the President; the Loudoun Heights attack resulted i n a commendation f o r Cole's battalion from General-in-Chief Halleck; and the Berryville raid resulted i n Sheridan's army withdrawing from the Shenandoah Valley and drawing reactions from many senior leaders including General-in-Chief Grant. The effects of the partisan units on the Confederate army were not always positive. The infantry end regular cavalry were lealous of the "freedom of the l i f e of the Partisan Ranger i n contrast w i t h the dull ruutine
.. - ._ - -. .16Burr, The Life of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, p. 3 15.

I17

and more r i g i d discipline of camp life."17 The regulars sometimes vented t h e i r feelings by antagonizing the rangers with the c a l l of "Carpet Kniyh!.s" o r "Feather-bed soldiers." There were also Confederate officers, who opposed partisan opera!ions, and they were successful i n persuading the Confederacy t o abolish a l l partisan u n i t s except Mosby's and McNeill's. Regardless of these o f f i c e r s ' opinions, Mosby's actions over the period January 1863 t o August 1864 demonstrated a considerable contribution t o the Confederate cause' over
118 Union soldiers killed, an unknown number wounded, over 1,157

prisoners, and over 2,200 horses, mules, o r c a t t l e captured. Gen. Robert E. Lee i n d i r e c t l y acknowledged Mosby's w o r t h t o the Confederacy by complimenting o r commending h i m more o f t e n i n h i s o f f i c i a l papers than he did any other subordinate.l* Other than Mosby's and McNeill's units, partisan units i n general had reputations as robbers, looters and brigands 7 THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE. Chance plnyed an important part i n each of Mosby's operations. With the exception o f Mosby's desire f o r the decisive b a t t l e and h i s reluctance t o i n f o r m h i s men of each operation's purpose, he usually had the element of chance i n h i s favor. Mosby's quest f o r the "all-or-nothing'' operation caused h i s plans t o be i n f l e x i b l e and required him t o depend, t o a great degree, on chance f o r success. The Loudoun Heights attack provides an excellent example of the disastrous r e s u l t s that can occur with an i n f l e x i b l e plan that depends t o o

17Williamson, Mosbg's Rangers, pp. 19-20. IBJones, Ranger Mosby, p. v i i i .

148

heavily on chance. Ironlcally, one of Napoleons maxims speclflcally said,

I.

. . chance alone can never bring S U C C ~ S S . ~ ~

usually, ~osbys reluctance t o keep his men informed about the purpose
of the operatlon did not prove dlsastrous. although i t could have had that

result. For example, the Fairfax raid would never have taken place i f the two separated columns of rangers had not rejoined w.
In most sltuations. Mosby placed chance In hls favor. He did thls through

good securlty; by conceallng hls strength and intentions; by uslng deception, surprise, stealth, and speed; and by using careful foresight and thorough plannlng. Furthermore, Mosby possessed the character traits needed tu effectlvely cope with chance. He could make rapid and accurate decislons, he was determined, and he possessed presence of mind. Both the Fairfax and the Berryville raids were successful because Mosby had taken steps t o reduce the impact that chance might have on the operation.
8. LEADERSHIP. Mosbys character and personal leadership tralts were

key t o the success of his unit. In the first two operations, Mosby led hls men through miserable weather and they followed without question. Furthermore, they had no idea where or why they were going, but i t did not matter, so long as Mosby was leadlng. O n the Fairfax raid, when the two ranger columns were separated in the woods. Mosbys men decided t o try t o advance in the rain and snow rather than turn back. Why dld his men do these things? Because Mosby was a good leader, and they trusted him.
Mosby earned hls mens respect for the followlng reasons: ( 1 ) he was

successful, and his soldiers easlly related t o success; (2) he was honorable

149

and virtuous, h i s men never questioned his integrity; (3) he was technically proficient in scouting and fighting, and he never asked any of h i s men t o do anything t h a t he would not also do; (4) he trusted his men and looked out f o r their well being; (5)he led f r o m the most dangerous point on the battlefield, the front; (6) he would use h i s small physisue t o challenge the larger men t.o equal h i s feats of daring; (7) he used h i s piercing eyes t o enforce h i s instructions; (8) he was intelligent; (9)h i s iron w i l l and resolve could bully and inspire h i s men into giving him t h e i r blind obedience; (10) he knew h i s men's strengths, t h e i r weaknesses, and what appealed t o them; ( 1 1 ) he demonstrated fearlessness and perserverence; and ( 12) h i s leadership style

was personalized, charismatic, and nonbureaucratic

Mosby acquired his leadership a b i l i t i e s i n a number of ways. A number
o f h i s traits--such as aggression, integrity, perseverence, h i s physics!

stature and h i s piercing eyes--were r e s u l t s of nature and h i s environtrient some t r a i t s were learned from h i s superiors, such as JEBStuart and Grumble Jones. Others were acquired from books, such as Napoleon's Maxims. Finally, Mosby developed many of h i s leadership t r a i t s through practical experience, a f t e r making mistakes on the job.

CHAPTER 4 SECTION 2 CONCLUSION

Thi study h

rovided historical accounts of t h C i v i l War's most

e f f e c t i v e partisan leader, John S. Mosby, and three of his m a j o r tactical operations. It has also identified, discussed, and analyzed the situations and circumstances that he and h i s Union opponents faced, the techniques he used t o be successful, and the lessons he and h i s enemies learned The discussion and analysis of Mosby's l i f e , f r o m his b i r t h i n 1833 u n t i l !he Berryville r a i d in August 1864, and h i s unit's operations provided the
f 011owing:

1. It analyzed Mosby's character and showed how his insecurity affected

h i s motivation and leadership.

2. I t used logical deduction and theories t o f i l l historical gaps caused

by the absence of historical documentation.
3 It provided reasons why some historical events, such as the b a t t l e o f

Cedar mountain, occurred.

4. It combined the piecemeal accounts of the three operations from

several historical references i n t o a single account of each operation

5. It provided information about other Civil War personnel and how they

were involved w i t h the three operations.

6. It described and analyzed the evolution and g r o w t h of the 43d

Battalion, Virginia Cavalry f r o m January 1863 u n t i l August 1864

7. I t described and analyzed the results and e f f e c t s ?hat the three

operations had on both the Union and the Confederacy This study also discussed the techniques that the partisans used i n their' operations, the lessons learned by both the llnion and Confederacy, the e f f e c t s of the element of chance, and the leadership t r a i t s of John S. Mosby The most apparent of these are condensed i n t o the following l i s t .
1. TACTICS and STRATEGY.

a. An army i s more vulnerable t o partisan a c t i v i t i e s when i t occupies regions that are generally unsympathetic t o i t s cause b. Rear area guard forces are usually less experienced, motivated, and professional then front l i n e combat forces. As a result, they are more vulnerable t o the e f f e c t s of partisan activities. Furthermore, that vulnerability increases i f the army's r e a r area occupies unsympathetic regions. c. Partisan u n i t s have the advantage of i n i t i a t i v e because they decide the t i m e and place of attack. d. Adverse weather has a greater negative impact on a conventional force's security, morale, and alertness than on those of a partisan force. A s a result, the conventional force i s more vulnerable t o partisan e c t i v i t i e s during adverse weather conditions. Furthermore, adverse weather favors the partisan by obscuring his a c t i v i t i e s f r o m observation. e. Partisan u n i t s w i l l use the most obscure and d i f f i c u l t routes available t o penetrate o conventional force's defensive perimeter

IS2

1. Partisans conduct preplanned operations as a result of information

they receive about the enemy situation. They do not usually roam the
countryside in large groups looking for targets of opportunity.

g. The partisan unit must acquire a level of discipline that w i l l

allow it to employ stealth, surprise, speed, and audacity in i t s operations.
h. Partisan units use prearranged rendezvous points as a means of

passing Information and organizing for operations.

1. The partisan unit's purpose i s t o harrass the enemy in order to

cause him to divert combat forces from the front.

J. A partisan operation in the C i v i l War was characterized by simple

mission orders, hit-and-run tactics, surprise, stealth, speed, deception, and audacity. k. A partisan unit i s capable of massing i t s forces for a conventional, coordinated attack when the situation favors such action.

I. The successful partisan only fights while the situation i s

favorable; he breaks off the conflict when the situation becomes unfavorable.

m. The partisan takes advantage of conditions that makes his

enemy's weapons least effective.

n. Partisan operations can have the potential to physically and

psychologically affect a l l levels of the enemy's government.
0 . Mosby planned hls operations

in advance as thoroughly as possible.

153

2. ORGANIZATION
a. A l l partisan rangers were volunteers, handpicked by the partisan leader. b. A partisen's a c t i v i t i e s may not always be acceptable t o t71s own government. 3. COMMAND AND CONTROL. a. By definition, partisan u n i t s are detached f r o m regular arm! units, and the commander of the regular army u n i t i s usually in the partisan leader's chain of command. In Mosby's case, however, the t i e s between h i s
unit and Lee's were very loose and Mosby usually had carte blanche i n

conducting his operations. b. The C i v i l War partisan depended heavily upon couriers f o r communications.
4 LEADERSHIP AND NOT I VAT ION.

a. The option of giving a parole provided the Confederacy w i t h strong interrogation tool and was also an incentlve f o r Union soldiers surrender.

to

b. A soldier's resistance increases when the option of receiving B parole i s removed. c. State m i l i t i a , who were only required t o serve one hundred days of active service (I00days' men), became less motivated i n performing t h e i r duties as they drew closer t o the end of t h e i r service obligation d. Successful partisan leaders compensate f o r the shortage of discipline by setting the example and leading f r o m the front

e Partisan leaders used promotions i n rank and the distribution of

.ipoils ns rewards f o r bravery.
f

Initially, Mosby kept his men uninformed about the specifics of a

pending operation. This supported operational security, but adversely n f f e c t e d h i s men's potential t o use t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e .

g. Some o f operations conducted by Mosby were a direct result of his

ileslre for personal vengence. h. Large numbers of partisans are d i f f i c u l t t o control a t night. The ?,ituotion c a l l s f o r more planning time, closer supervision, and a greater dependence on subordinate leaders than during the day. Consequently, large (iartisan u n i t operations are more successful i n daylight
1

Soldiers are the partisan unit's most valuable resource, t h e i r

conservation takes p r i o r l t y over all other objectives.

j. Mosby circumvented the Confederate army's o f f i c e r election

system by seiectlng h i s own o f f i c e r s . H i s unit's subsequent successes vindicated h i s actions.

k The partisfln leader i s responsible f o r t.he ini it's reputation 115

r+putstinn con vary from that of being liberators t o being looters ant1 bandits
1 Wen f o l l o w leaders who are successful

m. Mosby gained h i s leadership techniques f r o m the example of

athers, f r o m books, and by learning f r o m t r i a l and e r r o r
n L.eader-s can learn m i l i t a r y lessons f r o m books
11

A Partisan leader must have the a b i l i t y t o gain and hold the

support o f many types of people.

I -. 1 .

INTELLIGENCE
fl

lnt.elligence i s paramount t o t.he part,isari unit's survival

b Information about the enemy i s more readily available to the partisan t.han t o the conventional force

c The partisan leader w i l l try t o gain as much i n f o r m a t i o n a h w :

personal reconnaissance and the use of spies, scouts, prisoners o f war. deserters, newspapers, and c i v i l i a n s

l.:,~,

m e m y and terrain as possible. His means of information gathering incliude

II

AS Y

part.isan unit grows i n size and success,

it.

also r e c e i w :

croportional benefit-s i n c i v i l i a n cooperation and i n intelligence gather !ris

: I

a p b! it i e s
6 LOlilSrlCS.

a. The m a j o r i t y of the equipment and supplies used by thc part i

Werp

acquired as a r e s l i l t of h i s forays against the enemy. He also r e t r e i w l l ,

!o R lesser degree, equipment and supplies from h i s regular armq Most i i f his food and forage came f r o m the c i v i l i a n population.
b. The part-isan's equipment tended t o be l i g h t e r than t h a t o f trw

regular army and was more appropriate f o r t.he close-in fighting [)refr'.r!--c.o by the partisan. The l i g h t e r equipment also aided the partisan's speed c Partisan uniforms lacked u n i f o r m i t y and were often ac:.quird the enemy.
II
i,tft

so

e. In the case of the Amerlcan C l v l l War, a partlsan unlt's exlslence

depended on gelnlng and malntainlng an excellent rapport w l t h the civillen populatlon.
b. Shelter for the partisans was usually prOVlded by the clviltans. 8. DISCIPLINE.

a. Discipline directly affects a unit's combat effectlveness.

b. Severe punishment t o a Confederate partisan was his banishment from the pertlsan organizatlon and transfer t o a regular army unlt. c. The partisan unit must be sufficiently discipllned when dealing

with the clvilian populatlon in order t o prevent Its alienation.

d. The type and amount of discipline in a partisan unlt i s different from that of a conventlonel unit.
9.

m .
e. Wlth all thlngs equal, the element of chance favors nelther the
b. The less flexlble the plan o r unlt, the greater the potential f o r

partlsan unit nor the regular army unlt.

chance t o Interfere. The above list and the previous chapters have provided answers t o a portion of this study's research question, that is, What were the techniques that made Mosby and his men successful? As t o the other portion of the question, Might any of these techniques merlt attention today? the answer
i s yes. For example, durlng the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. Army learned that
e soldier became less motlvated in performing his duties as he drew nearer
t o the end of his tour of duty. The army should have learned that lesson

157

f r o m the "100 days' men" in the C i v i l War. Another example was that the army i n i t i a l l y had d i f f i c u l t y understanding how the W e t Cong operated. The W e t Cong were partisans, and they operated i n many of the same ways of the C i v i l War partisans. The army could have looked at i t s own h i s t o r y t o learn what i t needed t o know about partisans.

Most of the factors l i s t e d above are applicable t o the U,5. Army In both
conventional w a r f a r e and l o w i n t e n s i t y conflict, but the l i s t i s not ali inclusive. Additionally, Mosby's leadership t r a i t s closely align w i t h the army's leadership philosophy of "Be-Know-Do," and could be used i n other studies on leadership. Likewise, the numerous examples of the e f f e c t s of chance could also be used as a reference f o r other studies. Furthermore, there are many more lessons and techniques that could be i d e n t i f i e d i n t h i s study as w e l l as in future related studies. One purpose o f t h i s research was t o lay a foundation f o r further study i n t o partisan warfare, and i t has done that. Another purpose of this study was t o help the

U S Army develop a

doctrine o f partisan employment. It has provided some of the background information that the army needs t o help develop i t s doctrine, but more research i s needed. Even more important, however, i s the US. Army's reluctance t o acknowledge partisan warfare. In the l o w intensity arena, the army has seemingly concentrated i t s e f f o r t s on counterinsurgency, and hss v i r t u a l l y ignored insurgency, o r partisan warfare The Soviet Union, on the other hand, placed great stock i n partisan warfare during World War II and intends t o use it in the future. Moreover, the Soviets have been figh!ing against partisans in Afghanistan since 1979. Therefore, i r the United

1 SLI

States wants to help Afghanistan o r the partisans i n Angola and Nicaragua,

i t needs t o b e t t e r understand how and why they fight.

Additionally, the threat of partisan warfare could be used t o deter aggression. For example, the Soviet Union may be less l i k e l y t o invade and occupy portions of Western Europe i f i t were certain that i t would have to cont.end w i t h strong partisan organizations. Finally, the United States has not been threatened w i t h an Invasion o r enemy occupation slnce the C i v i l War, but i t would not be imposslble f o r that situation t o occur in the future. One o f the ways i t may have to defend i t s e l f i s through partisan operations. As a r e s u l t of these real and hypothetical situations, the U.S. Army should expand i t s focus t o include partisan warfare. That way i t can b e t t e r understand and possibly u t i l i z e an o l d f o r m of warfare t h a t Is s t i l l i n use today.

APPENDIX I EPILOGUE TO THE ATTACK ON LOUDOUN HEIGHTS

9- 10 JANUARY 1864

The L i f e of Sheridpll has a very interesting episode concerning Tom Paxton, the ranger abandoned i n the snow at Loudoun Heights: There were a thousand thrilling incidents connected w i t h this barefooted fight on the mountains, i n the snow, worth relating, and the conspicuous instances o f almost unexampled bravery would include almost every man i n the command. But there i s one touching incident necessary t o Join the woof and warp of thls narratlon. When daylight broke upon the scene there was a young Confederate soldier lying upon the field w i t h a fatal wound i n the neck, near the jugular vein. He was not more than twenty years of age, and a boy i n appearance as w e l l as I n years. . , . I A Union1 o f f i c e r , . . found him. He raised up the dying lad and asked him his name. "My name i s Paxton," replied the boy, i n broken tones. "My God! are you Mr. Paxton's son who lives a t the cross-roads towards Waterville?" eagerly inquired the officer. " I am," was the simple response. The humane act of his father i n 1862 was recalled, and, f u l l of emotion, the officer picked the lad up, carried him t o the hospital, laid him upon an easy couch, and summoned the doctor, who replied, petulant1y: "We can't care f o r those men until we look after our own Wounded.' "But this boy must be cared for," said the officer; and In as few words as possible he told the story of 1862, when five of thelr men belonging t o Cole's Cavalry lay wounded upon Paxton's farm a t the cross-roads. There was no more parleying, and the boy was a t once carefully attended to, but he was beyond human aid. A l l that could be done for

him to ease his last moments, was done. All the command f e l t terribly as they themselves had suffered and were suffering, that this boy was entitled t o every attention that could be shown him. "I do this," said Mr. Paxton in 1662, when he assisted i n taking the wounded men toward the river, "because I would want others to do the same by my boy, who i s i n the Confederate army, i f he should be wounded." The same officer and the same men who heard these words and received that favor, dealt the death-blow t o that son Yet his dying moments were made easier by them for the favor his father had done.'

. . -. .'Burr, The Life of Sheridan, pp. 143-144.

I62

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, John H. 12psbgsMen. New York and Washington: The NeolFc Publishing Company, 1907.
A personal narrative of what the author saw as a member of the

43d Battalion, Virginia Cavalry. In his preface, the author ndmitted t.hat his perception of the occurrences may differ from that of other members of the unit. And, while the book provides techniques used i n some of the 43ds operations, I had t o remind myself that the author had written this book over 40 years after the operations had occurred. Bakeless, John. Spies of the Confederacy. Philadelphia and Hew York. J. 8. Lippincot Company, 1970. Written by a former intelligence officer i n the U. S. Army who was fascinated by all forms of intelligence and spying. This book relates the exploits of the most famous Southern intelligence agents as well as the most obscure. The authors work was important t o my study i n that i t demonstrated how Mosby used spies i n his operations and, on the other hand, how Mosby and his men were used as spies.

I64

Baker, General L. C. m y of the Unlted States S w e t S e r w . Philadelphia: L. C. Baker, 1867. The author was responsible for the Union's clandestine activities I n the areas of spying and counterspying. The book descrlbes the part
that Antonia Ford played in the raid on Fairfax Court House.

Bates, Samuel P. W y j f Pennsylvania Voluntee rs. 4 vols. Harrisburg, PA: 8. Singerly, State Printer, 1869. Volume I V provides information about the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry's level of training, i t s inadequate equipment, and i t s operations during the Fairfax Court House raid i n March 1863. Benedict, G. G. Vermont i n the C i v i l War. Burlington, VT: The Free Press Association, 1888.
A short history of Vermont's regiments i n the Civil War It

provides background information on Brig. Gen. Stoughton's 2d Brigade and describes Mosby's Fairfax Court House raid. Boudrye. Rev. Louis N. Historic Records of the F i f t h New York Cavalry. Albany, NV: S.R. Gray, 1865. The author, who was the regimental chaplain, provides an account
of the daily operations of his unit. It also includes information on
tr

few of Mosby's raids Includlng the one on Fairfax Court House. Rowen, James L. -etts Son, 1893

i n the

Springfield, MA: Bowen end

This book provides condensed histories of each Unit that Massechusetts had in the war. It helped this study by identifying the

165

Union's forces near Centreville, VA a t the time of the FAirfax Court House raid. Burr, Frank A. and Hinton, Richard J. Jhe Life of Gen. Philip H. Sherlda? Providence, RI: J. A. and R. A. Reid, 1888. Although this book mentions very l i t t l e about the interaction of Sheridan and Hosby (misspelled as Moseby), i t does provide an excellent account of Mosby's attack on Loudoun Heights. Brock, R. A., ed. Southern Historical Society Paoers. Vol. XXVII. Richmond: Southern Historical Society, 1899. This volume contains Mosby's comments about the methods that Gen. Sheridan used to combat partisan operations. Mosby pointed out that Sheridan was not as ruthless as the reports i n the Official Record made him out to be. Chandler, David D. The Camoaigns of N a p . Publishing Company, Inc., 1966. New York: MacMillan

An excellent history of Napoleon, i t provided this study w i t h information about Napoleon's maxims. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Prlnceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Clausewltz's classic book on the theory of war provided this stuay

w i t h information about the elements of friction and chance.

coggins, Jack. A m r s e n d m of the C i v i l war. New 'fork: Fairfax Press, 1983.

Coggins' book describes the types and uses of various weapons and
Pieces of equipment in the C i v i l War. It provided t h i s paper w l t h
Information about infantry muskets, mountain cannon, and the conduct
of cavalry outposts and pickets.

Cooke, John Esten. Wearina of the Gruy. New York: E. 8. Treat and Company, 1067. This book was w r i t t e n by a former member of JEB Stuart's staff end mainly deals w i t h Stuart's campaigns. Two of the chapters explain how Mosby and his men were integrated into Stuart's operations and how they were perceived by a higher-echelon staff officer.

Crawford, J. Marshall. m
1867.

y and His Men. New York: G. W. Carleton & Co.,

A record of the author's personal recollections of the

achievements of the 43d Battalion, Virginia Cavalry. The author includes selected operations conducted by some of Mosby's lieutenants i n addition t o the the operations of Mosby. This book provides specific details of some of the 43d's operations that are not included i n other books. Some of the accounts include actual techniques of successful and unsuccessful operations.

167

Davis, George 6.; Perry, Leslie J.; and Kirkley, Joseph W. The 0f f i c i a l l l i l U l c Y B t l a S of the C i v i l War . New York: The Fairfax Press, 11r78 This book contains copies of maps used in the C i v i l War. Four detailed maps of the 436 Battalion's area of operations were particularly helpful t o my study. The maps include road intersections, railroads, towns and small hamlets. Denison, Rev. Frederic. Jjabres and Spurs. The First Rhode Island Cavnlry Veteran Association, 1876. The book provides the history of the 1st Regiment Khode Island Cavalry and describes the aftermath of the Berryville raid

Glazier, Capt. Willard. Three Years i n the Federal Cavalry. New York: R H Ferguson and Company, 187 I .
The author was a member of the 5th New York Cavalry during Mosby's raid on Fairfax Court House, and provided comments about that
raid and some of Mosby's other operations.

Hattaway, Herman and Jones, Archer. How the North Won. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983. A general history of the C i v i l War of which only a few paragraphs deal w i t h Mosby. The authors suggest that Mosby's piercing eyes had given him additional control over his men. Jones, Virgil C. BangerllQsby. Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1944. A biography of Mosby's l i f e centered on his exploits in the Civil war. This i s the f i r s t of two books and various articles that the author has writen about Mosby. Jones conducted extensive research,

I68

Including interviews of Mosby's children, in preparation for writing this book. It i s indexed and fairly well footnoted; however, the book's text includes quotations which are not footnoted, making me skeptical
of their authenticity. The book was very helpful in providing both

techniques of operation and background Information. Jones, V i r g i l C. company, 1956.

m .-

New York: Henry Holt and

This book describes a l l the major irregular operations of the Civil

War and shows how partisans f i t into the Confederacy's overall

strategy Kane, Harnett T. SRies for the Blue and Gray. New York: Hanover House, 1954. The t i t l e explains the theme of the book. One chapter focuses on how Mosby employed the spy, Walter Bowie, i n his operations. Kelsey, D. M. Deeds of Daringby Both Blue and Grpy. Philadelphia: Scammell and Company, 1893. Each chapter of this book describes an "adventure" from the C i v i l War. One of these stories was a short account of the Fairfax Court House raid. Kutger, Joseph P. "Irregular Warfare i n Transition." In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 39-52. By Franklin M. Osanka. New York: Freepress of Glencoe, t 962. The book contains various articles about guerrilla operations i n general. Kutger, then a Lt. Col. i n the U. 5.A i r Force, wrote the article
that prompted me to begin this thesis.

169

Laqueur, Walter. Guerrilla, A HisB r o w n and Co., 1976.

critical Wy, Boston

. .

!.tt.+!~,

A d e f i n i t i v e study of g u e r r i l l a warfare. The thesis deals w i t h

circumstances surrounding the appearance of g u e r r i l l a movemen!s, conditions f o r t h e i r success, motives, and the makeup of guerrillas. Only f i v e pages deal w i t h C i v i l War partisan operations, of which, four paragraphs concern m y subject. The author raises the premise thst. g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e prolonged the "agony of the south" by eight t o nine months. The examples he gave i n support of h i s premise also demonstrated the Union's f r u s t r a t i o n i n combating the partisans. Laqueur, Walter. The Guerrilla Reader. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977. W r i t t e n a f t e r the book, Guerrilla, i t i s e compilation of essays by numerous experts including: Clausewitz, Jomini, Marx, and Lawrence. I t outlines the t a c t i c s and objectives o f partisans as w e l l as the t r a i t s and techniques they used f o r success. It provides a model on the theory and practice of partisan operations and, therefore, helped me analyze the operations of Mosby's unit. M i l i t a r y H i s t o r i c a l Society of Massachusetts. The Shenandoah Campaiqns of 1862 and 1864 and the ADpomattox Carnpdgn 1865. Boston: M i l i t a r y H i s t o r i c a l Society of Massachusetts, 1907. Portions of the book describe the operations of Union Generals Sigel and Hunter p r i o r t o Sheridan's a r r i v a l i n the Shenandoah Valleg i n

1864.

I70

M i l i t a r y Historical Society of Massachusetts. Jhe V l r n n a i m -RQ. Boston: Houghton, flifflin, and Company,
1895.

This book provided the map of the vicinity of Fairfax Court House used i n Figure 4. Mosby, John S. The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby. Edited by Charles Wells Russell. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1917. First hand account of Mosby's operations by the guerrilla leader, edited by his brother-in-law. This book relates Mosby's reasons for conducting certain operations and provided numerous techniques of partisan warfare. The book excludes details of operations i n which Mosby was not a participant as well as the details concerning some of the more infamous operations. Mosby, John S. m y ' s War Reminiscences and Stuart's Cavalry CamDaigns New Vork: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1887. Mosby highlights some of his operations, but the much of the book i s really an attempt t o defend Stuart's absence at the battle of Gettysburg. Munson, John W. Reminiscences o f a M0SIJ y Guerrilla. New York: Moffat, Yard, and Company, 1406. This book was w r i t t e n i n a sensationalistic and romantic way some forty years after the C i v i l War. Although i t described most 01 the partisan ranger operations w i t h superlatives, i t did provide some insight into the unit's methods of operation

171

O'Connor, Richard. Sheridan the Inevltable. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1953.
A biography of P h i l i p H. Sherldan, concentrating on h i s m i l i t a r y

contrlbutions. It describes the operations of the union forces i n the Shenandoah Valley and Sherldan's attempts a t organizing partisan

units s i m i l a r t o Mosby's. It, however, completely ignores Mosby's

B e r r y v i l l e raid. Plum, W i l l i a m R. The M i l i t a r y Teleoraph during the C i v i l War i n the U n i M States. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, and company, 1882. The book provides the h i s t o r y of telegraphers i n the war. It described the Fairfax Court House r a i d as witnessed by a captured telegrapher. Pratt, Fletcher. A Short History of the C i v i l War. New 'fork: Pocket Rooks, Inc., 1951. T h i s short h i s t o r y provided t h i s study w i t h a generalized overview of the C i v i l War. Reid, Whitelaw. Ohio in the War. Vol. II. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, and Baldwin, 1868. The book provides the history of the one hundred days of service f o r both the 144th and 149 Ohio National Guard, two of the unit: involved i n the Berryville raid.

172

Regimental History Committee. l&&ry of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalrq Phtladelphia: Franklin Prlnttng Company, 1905.

A daily diary of this units operations i n the C i v i l War, !he book

provides an eyewitness account of Lieut. Turners 8 January raid on an outpost near Warrenton, VA. Richards, Adolphus E. Mosbys Partizan l a 1Rangers. In Famous Adventures and Prison Escapes of the C i v i l War, pp. 102-1 15. New York: The Century Co., 1904. This book contains several short essays from the C i v i l War, including: a diary of a Union woman i n the South, a locomotive chase i n Georgia, daring escapes from prisons and this essay by Richards. As one of Mosbys subordinate commanders i n the 43d Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, A. E. (Dolly) Richards was considered by some t o be as good a t conducting guerrilla operations as Mosby His article explains how the partisans divided into small units t o elude the Union forces; i t also describes specific details of a few operations. Scott, Andrew M. Insuraency. Chapel H i l l , NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1970. This book deals w i t h insurgency (guerrilla) operations and concentrated on these factors: political, sociological, psychological, economic, and military. The author analyzes the types of insurgency, develops a dynamic model of an insurgent organization, and discusses the strategy and tactics of insurgency. I found the insurgent model helpful i n analyzing the operations of the 43d Battalion.

Scott, Maj. John. P a r t i s a n I 1f e w i t h CoI. John S. No& and Brothers, 1867.

u. New York:

Harper

The author began t o Collect and w r i t e the h i s t o r y o f Mosby's unit, immedtately f o l l o w i n g Gen. Lee's surrender. His book

Is Compiled !!-corn

personal accounts of the members of the 43d B a t t a l i o n and from o f f l c i a l records. It also received Mosby's approval p r i o r t o being published. Interestingly, Scott w a s the author Partisan Ranger Law. Siepel, Kevin H. Rebel: The L i f e and Times of John Singleton Mosby. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

of the Confederacy's

A Mosby biography t h a t devotes equal a t t e n t i o n t o Mosby's C i v i l

War operations and his p o s t w a r l i f e . The author, in h i s research, i n t e r v i e w e d Mosby's grandchildren; received assistance f r o m the Mosby biographer, V i r g i l C. Jones; and studied numerous manuscript:: The book i s not as detailed i n C i v i l W a r operations as m o s t of the other books'l researched, but the author provides the best p o s t w a r biography of Mosby I have read. The book also provides an excellent b i bliograpy. Thomason, John W., Jr. JEB Stuart. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1430. The book i s a biography of the famous Confederate cavalry leader
It emphasizes h i s m i l i t a r y contributions and describes the

relationship between he and Mosby.

174

Williamson, James J. W y : s g m .

New York: Ralph 6 Kenyon, 1896

The author provides a record of operations of the 43d Battallon, Virginia Cavalry, compiled from the diary he maintained as a member
of that unit. He also supplements his book w l t h official reports from

Union officers as well as from Mosby. The book i s the best I have encountered in my study. The author describes almost every operation of Mosby and includes his observations, some unique illustrations, as

well as comments and points of view from Union participants.

Wilmer, L. Allison; Jarrett, J.H.; and Vernon, Geo. W. F. m y and Roster o f Maryland Volunteers, War of 1861-3. Baltimore: Press o f
Guggenheimer, Weil and Company, 1898. Provides a short history of the Maryland units i n the C i v i l W a r The book describes the organization of Cole's cavalry battalion and mentions the Loudoun Heights attack.

2. Government Documents.

U. S. War Department. The W a r of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 vols.
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901 The Official Record contains copies of reports by commanders and staffs of both the Union and the Confederacy. In particular, 1 used the volumes that concern Mosby, as a partisan leader, and the 43d Battalion, Virginia Cavalry. These volumes numbered 25, 27, 29, 33, 37, 43, and 46. Tho Official Record provided firsthand information about the operations analyzed i n my study.

3. Periodicals and A r t i c l e s .

C i v i l War Times I l l u s t r a t e d . 23 vols. A p r i l 1962-February 1985.

T h i s periodical contains essays, i l l u s t r a t i o n s , and speeches on various aspects of the C i v i l War. Some volumes, numbers 1 , 4, 5, and 13, include a r t i c l e s about Mosby and the 436 Battalion, Virginia cavalry. I found them useful in providing both techniques o f operation as w e l l as background information. Grant, Carl E. Partisan Warfare, MOdel 1861-65:' November 1958, pp. 42-56.
"

M i l i t a r y Review,

The author, then a Colonel i n the U. S. Army, w r o t e about the problems of the Union and the Confederacy i n determining the legal r i g h t s of partisan rangers t o conduct m i l i t a r y operations in the C i v i l War. H i s a r t i c l e includes the evolution of the Union's codes o f i n s t r u c t i o n of land w a r f a r e ( l a t e r superseded i n 1914 by the Rules of Land Warfare), and, among others, the value of Mosby's Partisan Rangers. The a r t i c l e w a s also useful as a source o f background i n f o r m a t i o n on partisan w a r f a r e in general.

.Jones, V i r g i l c. "The Problems o f W r i t i n g About the Guerrillas" Affairs, Spring 1957, pp.21-25.

m y

The author explains the problems he encountered i n w r i t i n g h i s

book, liray_Ehests and RebeI Raiders. He i s also the author o f m g g

L l ~ & y . The author outlined some techniques that were beneficial t o the conduct of m y research. I would recommend the a r t i c l e t o anyone interested i n conductlng research about guerrilla operations In the C i v i l War.

I77