CHFIPTER 2 : GENERFIL HEINZ GUDERIFIN

,....

PFIRT 18 The Man

E v e n when h e was a y o u n g m a j o r ,

Heinz Guderian's soldiers The r e a s o n f o r

a f f e c t i o n a t e l y c a l l e d him " H u r r y i n g H e i n z . " a p p e l l a t i o n and i t s appropriateness w i l l

this

becorne e v i d e n t as t h i s

chapter on t h e o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t s o f General Heinz Guderian unfolds. The s t o r y b e h i n d t h e n i c l t n a m e , houeuer, anticipates

t h e h e a r t o f t h e argument c o n c e r n i n g G u d e r i a n ' s p r i n c i p l e s o f operational art, w h i c h a r e d e u e l o p e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r by

' 5

e x a m i n i n g Guder i a n which focuses

operat ions through a prism o f analysis f i v e broad categories: a c t ion, (1)

on t h e f o l l o w i n g

combined arms o p e r a t i o n s , (4) comrnand a n d c o n t r o l ,

(2) offensive

(3) momentum,

and (S) r i s K .

The g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h i s operations
in

t o examine Guderian's the

w r i t i n g s and h i s c o n d u c t o f

1939 P o l i s h ,

1940 F l a n d e r s ,

and

1941 R u s s i a n Campaigns,

and

d e r i v e some s u b s t a n t i u e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e b a s i s f o r Guderian's conduct o f operational a r t . The c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e s b y But

summarizing t h e p r i n c i p l e s derived from t h e analysis. b e f o r e launching i n t o t h e substance of methods,

Gudsr i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n a l t h e man who

a brief
' 5

c h a r a c t e r and bacK9round SKetch of

was Germany

l e a d i n g p r o p o n e n t a n d commander o f

armored f o r c e s

i n W o r l d War

I 1 is in order.
H e i n z W i l h e l m G u d e r i a n Mas t h e s o n

B o r n a t K u l m i n 1989,

12

of

a German A r m y o f f i c e r

who t r a c e d h i s a n c e s t r y b a c K t o a He a t t e n d e d b o t h t h e

thoroughly Prussian,

landed g e n t r y .

Karlsruhe cadet school school near B e r l i n ,

i n Baden and t h e G r o s s - L i c h t e r f e l d e

graduating from the l a t t e r Metz,

i n 1307. f l f t e r

a t t e n d a n c e a t t h e War S c h o o l a

h e was c o m m i s s i o n e d a
infantry b a t t a l i o n

s e c o n d l i e u t e n a n t a n d a s s i g n e d t o an Hannover. BY i n t e r - w a r

in

standards t h e progress o f Guderian's career and t h e n h i s r i s e

was o r d i n a r y u n t i l H i t l e r ' s r i s e t o p o w e r ,

was q u i c K . Guder i a n In 1912,

'5

But even

if ordinary

i n i t s e a r l y p r o m o t i o n pace,
i t s d iuers i t y o f

c a r e e r was u n u s u a l f o r example,

assignments.

for

he s e r v e d w i t h t h e 3 r d Telegraph

B a t t a l i o n w h e r e h e became a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e l a t e s t w i r e l e s s r a d i o technology War and its tactical applications. D u r i n g World

I he s e r v e d s u c c a s s i v e l y as a s i g n a l s s t a f + o f f i c e r ,
b a t t a l i o n commander, quartermaster

General S t a f f o f f i c e r , officer,

and o p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e r w i t h a u a r i e t v o f u n i t s f r o m Between t h e w o r l d taught

company a n d b a t t a l i o n t o d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s .

wars Guder i a n c o m a n d e d a m o t o r t r a n s p o r t b a t t a l i o n ,

m o t o r t r a n s p o r t d o c t r i n e a n d t a c t i c s a t t h e B e r l i n War ficademy, a n d a s a c o l o n e l commanded t h e 2 n d P a n z e r O i u i s i o n ThanKs t o H i t l e r , b y

1938 G u d e r i a n uas a G e n e r a l o f

i n 1935. Panzer

Troops and had p l a y e d a l e a d i n g r o l e

A u s t r i a and t h e S u d e t e n l a n d .

in t h e occupation of

D u r i n g W o r l d War carry out operations

I 1 Guderian had t h e unique o p p o r t u n i t y t o

i n accordance w i t h d o c t r i n e he h e l p e d

13

develop

i n t h e pre-war

years.

In e f f e c t , h e t u r n e d t h e o r y i n t o Poland,

practice by p a r t ic i p a t i n s in t h r e e major campaigns--in

F l a n d e r s , and Russia--and s e r u e d in t h o s e campaigns

r e s p e c t i u e l v as an army c o r p s , p a n z e r g r o u p , and p a n z e r army commander. In s p i t e of g r e a t successes

in all t h r e e campaigns,
in

H i t l e r r e l i a v e d G u d e r i a n o f command of h i s p a n z e r a r m y

Decerrber 1 9 4 1 f o r f a i l i n g t o f o l l o w o r d e r s t o h o l d f o r w a r d
p o s i t i o n s o u t s i d e o f Moscow a t a 1 1 c o s t s .

< 1>

B r o u g h t bacK on
of

a c t i v e s e r v i c e i n M a r c h 1 3 4 3 as I n s p e c t o r - G e n e r a l F o r c e s , G u d e r i a n was
appointed

Armored

Chief of t h e Army General Staff in July

t h e day after t h e attempted a s s a s s i n a t i o n of H i t l e r

1 9 4 4 . He s e r v e d a s C h i e f o f t h e Army G e n e r a l S t a f f u n t i l M a r c h 1 9 4 5 when H i t l e r a g a i n d i s m i s s e d h i m . H e was c a p t u r e d b y A m e r i c a n f o r c e s i n May and d i e d

As

1945, h e l d

i n c a p t i v i t y u n t i l June

1948,

in

1954.

i m p r e s s i v e a s t h e s e f e w p a r a g r a p h s maKe G u d e r i a n ' s

career o u t t o b e , t h e y h a r d l y d o j u s t i c e t o t h e m a n ' s f u l l
c h a r a c t e r , p e r s o n a l i t y , and experiences. Guderian himself, f o r e x a m p l e , s h e d s s o m e l i g h t o n h i s own booK P a n z e r L e a d e r . assignment with t h e
WOPKS

intellectual

l i f e in h i s

There he p o i n t s out t h a t while on staff

fwmv T r a n s p o r t Department he s t u d i e d t h e
L i d d e l l Hart, and G i f f a r d Martel. ideas f o r t h e u s e of

o f J.F.C.

F u l l e r , B.H.

Paying special a t t e n t i o n t o L i d d e l l Hart's armored f o r c e s f o r long-range Of c o m n i c a t i o n ,

of

stroKes, operat ions against 1Ines

a n d a r m o r e d d i u Is i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o n s i s t i n g u n i t s . < 2 > While a s s i g n e d t o t h e

Panzer and panzer-grenadier

14

Staff

o f t h e 2nd D i v i s i o n a t S t e t t i n concentrat in9 his

i n 1924,

he t a u g h t
'5

history

and t a c t i c s ,

i n s t r u c t i o n on Napoleon

1806

Campaign and t h e h i s t o r y o f operations of 1914.

German and F r e n c h c a v a l r y t o p i c he sass, "as r e g a r d s

it

O f t h e former

t h e command o f very

troops

in conditions o f mobile warfare

is...a

i n s t r u c t i u e c a m p a i g n . "(3) S t u d i e s o f o r e r a t ions proved valuable,

German a n d F r e n c h because t h e y a i d e d

cavalry

he says,

development o f h i s t h e o r i e s , increasingly of preoccupied

" w h i c h were becoming e v e r use

w i t h t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l
in a footnote

mouement."(4>

It

i s noteworthy t h a t

i n Panzer
I'

L e a d e r - - p u b 1 i s h e d i n 1952--Guder i a n d e f i n e s
l y i n g midway

"operational

as

between t h e t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c . ( S >

The p o i n t

of

these observations thought

i s t h a t G u d e r i a n was a man who e d u c a t e d and h a d t h e doctrine for the

himself,

hard about h i s profession.

i n t e l l e c t u a l d e p t h and b r e a d t h t o shape f u t u r e German Arms, art.

i n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t s and t e c h n o l o g i e s

in operational
him:

H i s b i o g r a p h e r K e n n e t h MacKsey s a y s t h i s o f

G u d e r i a n was t h a t r a r e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a man o f i d e a s e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e a b i l i t y and v e r v e t o t u r n i n s p i r a t i o n i n t o r e a l i t y . No o t h e r g e n e r a l i n t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r - - a n d few i n h i s t o r y - - m a n a g e d t o i m p r e s s so w i d e and i n t r i n s i c a change upon t h e m i l i t a r y a r t i n s o s h o r t a t i m e , and l e f t s u c h a t r a i l o f c o n t r o v e r s y i n h i s WaKe. < 6 >

Hau i n g n e v e r e x e r c i s e d

i n d e p e n d e n t command, Lord Wauell's MacKsey

' 5

Guder i a n f a i l s t o for the

m e a s u r e UP t o F i e l d - M a r s h a l g r e a t commanders

standards

in history.

judgment,

nevertheless,

i s t h a t G u d e r i a n ' s t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l

acumen a n d

15

i n s p i r i n g combat l e a d e r s h i p p l a c e h i m on a p a r w i t h t h e G r e a t Captains of h i s t o r y . < 7 > Whether h e was o n a p a r w i t h t h e G r e a t H e i n r G u d e r i a n ' s l i f e d e s t r o y s t h e myth o f t h e

Captains o r n o t ,

d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n t h e t h i n K i n g man and t h e f i g h t i n g man. campaigns i n Poland, Flanders, and R u s s i a show,

Fls h i s

he was b o t h

t h i n K e r and f i g h t e r .

16

PART I I :

Operational

Tenets

C O M B I M O ARMS OPERATIONS

One o f career

t h e supremely

i r o n i c t w i s t s of in

Heinz Guderian's

has t o be h i s assignment t h e Truppenarnt

1327 t o t h e T r a n s p o r t C l a i m i n g he he auoided
it

Department of

i n t h e War M i n i s t r y .
matters o r wished t o ,

Knew n o t h i n g a b o u t t r a n s p o r t t h e a s s i g n m e n t UP t o t h e w i t h an a i r of spent

l a s t moment a n d f i n a l l y Yet

accepted

terminal resignation.

i t was t h e t w o y e a r 5 of troop

i n t h i s assignment

investigating the feasibility

t r a n s p o r t a t i o n by doctrinal

l o r r y t h a t allowed Guderian t o develop the operational art and t h e

base f o r h i s c o n c e p t i o n of

combined arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h w h i c h t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s . Once c o m m i t t e d t o t h e t a s K , f i n d on m o t o r i z e d w a r f a r e , Martel, and F u l l e r . < 8 > of

he r e a d a l l

the

l i t e r a t u r e he c o u l d

i n c l u d i n g a r t i c l e s by L i d d e l l Hart, he s t u d i e d c a r e f u l l y t h e Carnbrai

In addition,

errployment

tanKs a t t h e B a t t l e of

i n W o r l d War

I and

t h e e a r l y use o f c a v a l r y

i n t h a t same w a r .

Because o f h i s d e p t h Guderian t h e invited t o

o f Knowledge on t h e s u b j e c t o f s t u d e n t became G u d e r i a n t h e

rnotorized warfare,

i n s t r u c t o r when h e was

l e c t u r e on armored and m o t o r i z e d w a r f a r e on t h e M o t o r T r a n s p o r t Staff o f t h e B e r l i n War Academy.

So,

h i s assignment

t o the

1 7

T r a n s p o r t D e p a r t m e n t of Guderian

t h e Truppenamt

unexpectedly helped

i n a t l e a s t t w o ways.

First,

it forced h i m t o
use of armored

u n d e r s t a n d t h e h i s t o r i c a l and t h e n c o n t e m p o r a r y and rnotor i z e d f o r c e s , firmys thereby

rnaK i n s h i m b y d e f a u l t t h e German Second, h i s teaching duties

e x p e r t on t h e s u b j e c t .

required h i m t o conceive,

develop,

and t e a c h a r m o r e d and war. Unsurprisingly, who e n v i s i o n e d

motorized warfare doctrine f o r g i v e n h i s s t u d y of future forces,

a future

L i d d e l l H a r t and F u l l e r , fast-moving

in

wars t h e c l a s h o f

m e c h a n i z e d and a r m o r e d

Guder i a n 5 o p e r a t i o n a l d o c t r i n e c a l l e d f o r c o m b i n e d cooperation o f the a i r forces. the This,

arms o p e r a t i o n s and clo:e

in turn.

called for

a c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

c e n t e r p i e c e of

w h i c h l ~ o u l db e t h e t a n K .

13s e a r l y as 1 9 2 3 G u d e r i a n was c o n v i n c e d t a n K s o n t h e i r own

or

merely

i n conjunction w i t h

i n f a n t r y could never achieve

On t h i s t o p i c

decisive tactical or operational results. P a n z e r L e a d e r h e say::

in

MY h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , t h e exet-c i s e s c a r r i e d o u t i n E n g l a n d a n d o u r own e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h mOCK-ups h a d p e r s u a d e d me t h a t t a n K S w o u l d never be able t o produce t h e i r f u l l e f f e c t u n t i l o t h e r w e a p o n s o h whose s u p p o r t t h e y m u s t i n e v i t a b l y r e l y w e r e b r o u g h t up t o t h e i r s t a n d a r d s o f speed and c r o s s - c o u n t r y p e r f o r m a n c e . (3)

Here,

o f course,

Guderians p o i n t

i s t h e need f o r

equal

m o b i l i t y among t h e v a r i o u s a r m s . rnobil i t y d i f f e r e n t i a l s

He saw v e r y e a r l y t h a t

would c r e a t e seuere problems f o r t h e fast-moving

e f f e c t i v e conduct o f operations on a f l u i d ,

18

battlefield.

A more

irnportant p o i n t t o g r a s p , howeuer,

is

G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p among t h e u a r i o u s

arms o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d h e e n u i s i o n e d .
he says:

In a f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e

I t would b e wrong t o i n c l u d e t a n K s i n i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s : w h a t was n e e d e d were a r w u r e d d i v i s i o n s which would i n c l u d e a l l t h e s u p p o r t i n g arms n e e d e d t o a l l o w t h e t a n K s t o f i g h t with f u l l e f f e c t . < l 0 >

U n l i K S t h e F r e n c h , who a s l a t e as May

1340 e r n p l o y e d tanKs b y

P a r c e l i n g them o u t t o

infantry divisions

in b a t t a l ion-sized

s t r e n g t h , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t arrnored u n i t s s h o u l d b e t h e
c e n t e r p i e c e a r o u n d wh l c h c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h o u l d b e

built.

Large c o n c e n t r a t ions of tanKS, w i t h t h e i r f i r e p o w e r ,

rnobil i t y , a n d a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s m a l l

arms f i r e , s h o u l d

be used t o p e n e t r a t e t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s and s p e a r h e a d r a p i d l y i n t o O p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s of .job l i e s i n a n rapid aduance. enerny d e f e n s e s . Then

"the

infantry

' 5

i m m e d i a t e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e tanK attaCK by a Nor d o e s t h e f o o t s o l d i e r p a u s e u n t i l

t h e ground

s e i z e d b y t h e t a n K S is d e f i n i t e l y c l e a r e d o f t h e e n e m v . " < l l > The a r t i l l e r y ' s r o l e

is t o f i r e a s h o r t , c o n c e n t r a t e d

p r e p a r a t i o n t o d i s o r g a n i z e enemy d e f e n s e s a t t h e po i n t of penetration. ~ i n d s of B u t t o d o a l l t h i s , G u d e r i a n saw t h e n e e d f o r t w o rnechan i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n :

f o r c e s a n d a r m o r e d cornbat f o r c e s . To e n s u r e t h e t l m e l y r e c e i p t o f combat
tactical and o p e r a t i o n a l

information from ground u n i t s , Guderian foresaw t h e need

f o r a n d e m p l o y e d m e c h a n i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t s w h i c h were

19

f l e x i b l e , mobile,

and e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d .

In a d d i t i o n , s u c h

u n i t s h a d t o h a v e a wide r a d i u s of o p e r a t i o n and good r a d i o

communications t o report inforrnat ion about enemy un its.

T h e r e f o r e , e v e r y p a n z e r and p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r d i v i s ion had an o r g a n i c armored o r motorized reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n equipped

w i t h ' J e h i C l e s c a p a b l e of

m a x i m u m s p e e d s of 4 0 m i l e s p e r h o u r on
1 2 0 a n d 200

unimproved r o a d s and a r a d i u s o f a c t i o n between miles.

< 12>

M o r e o v e r , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t s u c h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e un i t s

ma:,

h a v e t o f i g h t o n c e i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, G u d e r i a n

envisioned t h e requirement a t times f o r reconnaissance b a t t a l ions t o be r e i n f o r c e d with engineers, motorized a n d h e a v y arms.

infantry,

< 13)

W i t h s o m e m i n o r mod i f i c a t i o n s , t h e a r m o r e d 1940 c o n s i s t e d of

and rnotor i r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n s of
5

i x cornpan i e s : H e a d q u a r t e r s ,

FIrmorrd C a r , A r m o r e d Heavy Weapons,

Reconnaissance,

L i g h t flrmored R e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,

a n d S U P P L Y .I n a d d i t i o n t o a 7 5 - m m

( S P ) G u n P l a t o o n a n d 81-mm

M o r t a r P l a t o o n , t h e H e a v y W e a p o n s Company h a d a n o r g a n i c engineer p l a t o o n of 5 1 men. Altogether, t h e Reconnaissance

B a t t a l i o n was a f o r m i d a b l e a s s e t a t a d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r ' s d i s p o s a l , c o n s i s t i n g of motorcycles, 1 3 3 w h e e l e d o r t r a c K e d u e h i c l e s , 22

a n d 342 r n e n . < l 4 > N o t o n l y c o u l d s u c h a u n i t b e

it

employed t o f i n d WeaKnesseS i n e n e m y t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s , b u t

c o u l d p e n e t r a t e t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s t o l o c a t e enemy r e s e r v e s and open r o u t e s f o r a d v a n c i n g f r i e n d l y f o r c e s . When n e c e s s a r y ,

Guderian thought, a reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n could a l s o

participate

i n a p u r s u i t , cover a withdrawal,

screen o r protect

20

a f l a n K o r t h e r e a r of

its parent u n i t . < l S > B u t here

it

is

u s e f u l t o remember t h a t a l l o f t h e s e p o t . e n t i a 1 m i s s i o n s o f t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n were d i r e c t e d t o w a r d o n e e n d : f a c i l I t a t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f armored combat f o r c e s , t h e s e c o n d t y p e o f m e c h a n i z e d arm. flccording t o Guderian, armored combat f o r c e s have t h e

mission t o d e l i u e r s u r p r i s e attacKs in c o n c e n t r a t e d s t r e n g t h
with

a view t o g a i n i n g o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n . < l 6 > For s u c h

f o r c e s t o be e f f e c t i u e , Guderian b e l i e u e d d i u i s i o n - l e u e l c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s b u i l t a r o u n d t h e t a n K were n e c e s s a r y . H e saw a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t w o t y p e s : p a n z e r

d i u i s Ion:.

(armored)

and panzer-grenadier
in

(motor ized

infantry

>

d i u is i o n s .

Panzer d i v i s i o n s

1340 were c o m p o s e d o f

a t a n K b r i g a d e o f two

r e g i m e n t s o f t w o b a t t a l i o n s e a c h , t o t a l I i n g s o m e 400 1 i g h t a n d
rned i u m t a n K s , and a p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r b r i g a d e o f t h r e e i n f a n t r y infantry

b a t t a l i o n s . < l 7 > These P r i m a r y t a n K and motorized

t h r u s t i n g f o r c e s were s u p p o r t e d by a n a r m r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e battalion, signal battalion, b a t t a l ion, a n t i-tanK a r t i l l e r y regiment, anti-aircraft

b a t t a l i o n , e n g i n e e r b a t t a l i o n , and

d i u is i o n s u p p o r t u n i t s
fl

(See C h a r t

>. < 18>

in

glance at Chart

I reflects a f a i r l y comprehensiue, euen

sophisticated,
1940.

c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e G e r m a n A r m y

I t a l s o reflects a seriousness about t h e requirement t o

i n t e g r a t e arms t o a c h i e v e d e s i r e d r e s u l t s i n c o m b a t . What C h a r t

1 d o e s n o t s h o w is t h a t G e r m a n A r m y u n i t s were o r g a n i z e d s o t h a t arms were i n t e g r a t e d at a l e u e l of Organization even lower

21

than division.

Armored p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r

regiments,

for

example,

w e r e o r g a n i z e d w i t h b o t h an a r m o r e d and r n o t o r i z e d
panzer-grenadier battalion. In addition, the resimental

commander h a d u n d e r h i s and a heavy 75-mm infantry

i r m e d i a t e comrnand an e n g i n e e r company

h o w i t z e r company c o n s i s t i n g o f t w e l v e 150-mrn

(SP)

h G w i t Z e P S and s i x

(SP)

howitzers,

an a m a z i n g

a r r a y of

potent la1 f irepower.

hlthough Chart organization,

I s u g g e s t s a w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d c o m b i n e d arms
5

i t does n o t r e f l e c t t h e panzer d i v i s i o n
potential. A summary

mobility or firepower found

o f t h e m a i n weapons

in t h e panzer d i v i s i o n suggests

i t was b o t h h i g h l y m o b i l e

and f o r m i d a b l y e q u i p p e d t o c o n d u c t c o m b i n e d arms c o m b a t w h i l e o n t h e move. UnliKe a standard infantry diuision, p a n z e r and

Panzer-grenadier were, therefore,

d i v i s i o n s h a d n o h o r s e - d r a w n v e h i c l e s and e n t i r e l y wheel o r tracK-mobile,

their various

u n i t s emjoying roughly comparable m o b i l i t y . t-econna i s s a n c e not,

Wheeled

motorized infantry,

and d i u i s i o n s e r v i c e s d i d m o b i l i t y mechanized t h e r e were

o f course,

enjoy the cross-country

u n i t s and armored b a t t a l i o n s d i d , not great disparities

b u t nonetheless,

i n mob il i t y among t h e s u b o r d i n a t @ diuisions.

e l e m e n t s o f p a n z a r and p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r d i v i s i o n was a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t usually f i e l d 75-mm, o v e r 300 t a n K s ,

The p a n z e r

combat o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h c o u l d

72 g u n s o v e r 75-mm,

72 g u n s u n d a r

a n d some 3000 m o t o r v e h i c l e s .

< 19)

The p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r

d i v i s i o n was s i m i l a r l y o r g a n i z e d w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t o n l y o n e b a t t a l i o n o f 48 t a n K S a n d

it had

12 f e w e r a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s b y

22

T a b 1 e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n . ( 2 0>
fl

final Point worth mentioning

i s t h a t t h e s e combat support to In a p a n z e r

d i v i s i o n s enjoyed a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h combat/combat combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t , or d i u is i o n , f o r infantrymen, "tooth-to-tail

," r a t i o .

i n s t a n c e , 2 7 % o f a s s i g n e d p e r s o n n e l were
a n d 2 4 . 7 % were t a n K e r s . W i t h e n g i n e e r , a r t i l l e r y , a n d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n t s a d d e d , 36.2% o f in combat/combat support

signal, anti-tanK,
t h e d i v is i o n
'5

s t r e n g t h was e n g a g e d
13.8% o f

a c t i v i t i e s while only

a s s i g n e d p e r s o n n e l were

P e r f o r m i n g c o m b a t s e r u i c e S u p p o r t f u n c t i o n s . ( 2 1 > BY c o m p a r i s o n ,
the

"tooth-to-tail''

r a t i o in American u n i t s

in

1 3 4 5 was 83.6%

t o

16.4%, r e f l e c t i n g o n l y s l i g h t l y m o r e t a i 1 . < 2 2 > ( T o d a y a n

Arner i c a n J - S e r i e s a r m o r e d d i u is i o n h a s a c o m p a r a b l e

combat/combat

support t o combat s e r u i c e s u p p o r t r a t i o of

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7 0 . 5 % t o 29.5%, r e f l e c t i n s c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e t a i l t h a n e i t h e r German o r A m e r i c a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i n W o r l d War II.

)

<23>

Predictably,

Guderian d i d not e n v i s i o n t h e employment of

p a n z e r a n d p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r d i u is i o n s i n s i n g l e d i u is i o n - 5 i z e

u n i t s . R a t h e r , h e a d v o c a t e d e m p l o y i n g s u c h d i u is i o n s i n
c o n c e n t r a t e d s t r e n g t h s of c o r p s a n d m u l t i p l e - c o r p s

o r army-size

tin i t s . H e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s i n u o l v i n g a t t a C K 5

t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s would r e q u i r e a great d e a l of

combat

power c o n s i s t i n g o f d i u is i o n s w h i c h c o u l d c o m p l e m e n t e a c h other: p a n z e r d i u is i o n s f o r

penetrations and deep t h r u s t s , and

motorized d i v i s i o n s f o r flanK security, holding terrain, and

23

p r o v i d i n g depth. formation formed of

Consequently,

he argued f o r t h e e a r l y t h e f i r s t of w h i c h was

corps-size

armored f o r c e s ,

in October

1935 a n d c o n s i s t e d o f t h r e e p a n z e r
a s X V I FIrmv C o r p s

diuisions.<24: Commander,

I n March 1938 G u d e r i a n ,

participated lst,

i n the occupation o f 2nd,

fiustria w i t h a

c o r p s composed o f SS-Le i b s t a n d a r t e October,

and 3 r d P a n z e r D i u i s i o n s and t h e

Infantry

Regiment

L a t e r t h a t year,

in

h e e n t e r e d t h e S u d e t e n l a n d w i t h a more f l e x i b l y C o r p s c o n s i s t i n g o f one p a n z e r a n d t w o Throughout these minor p r e l iminary i d e a s about t h e employment

c o m p o s e d X V I firmy

motorized diuisions. operat ions,

of

G u d e r i a n was t e s t i n g h i s

corps-size

armored and m o t o r i z e d f o r m a t i o n s

in preparation

f o r t h e r e a l t e j t h e b e l i e v e d s o o n w o u l d come. E a r l y p r o b l e m s
i n tanK maintenance, fuel supply, By and t r a f f i c management w e r e 1 9 3 3 G u d e r i a n was a n

i d e n t i f i e d and c o r r e c t e d . experienced commander

t r y

I September

o f c o r p s - s i z e armored and m o t o r i z e d
ideas

forces ready t o

out h i s

i n cornbat.
headquarters, when t h e

Because t h e c o r p s u a s p r i m a r i l y a t a c t i c a l

i t was e a s y t o t a s K o r g a n i z e a c o r p s f o r c o m b a t a n d ,
s i t u a t i o n required,

change t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n b y a t t a c h i n s o r

d e t a c h i n g d i u i s i o n s and s e p a r a t e b r i g a d e s o r r e g i m e n t s operations i n Poland

in

. Our

ing

1339 and

in France

in

1340,

Guderian tasK

U a r i o u s l y commanded a r m y c o r p s a n d a p a n z e r g r o u p , organized f o r beginning o f one p a n z e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n a t hand.

fit t h e

t h e P o l i s h Campaign h i s army c o r p s c o n s i s t e d o f I n a subsequent phase

and t w o m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n s .

24

of

t h a t same c a r n p a i g n h i s c o r p s ' c o m p o s i t i o n was c h a n g e d t o one

m o t o r i z e d and two p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s . ( 2 5 ) F o r t h e o p e n i n g phase of t h e campaign i n F l a n d e r s i n May

1948, h i s a r m y c o r p s

consisted of

t h r e e panzer d i u i s i o n s and t h e e l i t e (G-D), left which flanK

Infantry

Regiment Gross-Deutschland

i n i t i a l l y had t h e a n d l a t e r became t h e

rfiission t o P r o t e c t t h e c o r p s ' corps reserue.

S i n c e t h e p a n z e r g r o u p was s u b o r d i n a t e t o a n a r m y , was p r i m a r i l y a t a c t i c a l h e a d q u a r t e r s taSK o r g a n i z e d f o r

it t o o
a

P a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n o r phase of

an o p e r a t i o n and d i s s o l v e d

when n o t n e e d e d . < 2 6 > D u r i n g t h e s e c o n d p h a s e o f t h e c a m p a i g n France, corps, the G u d e r i a n commanded a p a n z e r g r o u p c o n s i s t i n g o f e a c h w i t h t w o p a n z e r and one m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n s . two For

in

i n i t i a l phase of

t h e R u s s i a n Campaign G u d e r i a n ' s Panzer an army c o r p s , an and

G r o u p 2 was c o m p o s e d o f t h r e e p a n z e r c o r p s ,
arm!,

troops,

i n c l u d i n g a wing o f c l o s e support planes, r e giment

independent a n t i - a i r c r a f t signal, and a i r

a n d a r t iI l e r y

ens i n e e r s , tasK

reconnaissance u n i t s . < 2 7 > Guderian's this f i r s t phase--crossing

organization for

t h e Bug R i u e r a n d t h a t h e was infantry

s e i z i n g t h e f o r t r e s s c i t y of not the

Brest-LitousK--reueals

l e a s t b i t h e s i t a n t t o s u b o r d i n a t e slow-mouing

d i u i s i o n s t o a panzer c o r p s s h o u l d t h e o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e such an o r g a n z i a t i o n f o r group's attacK combat. The r i g h t w i n g o f h i s p a n z e r f o r example, was c a r r i e d o u t b y one

i n t o Russia,

X X I V Panzer Corps,

w h i c h c o n s i s t e d of

two panzer d i u i s i o n s , and one infantry

motorized diuision,

one c a v a l r y d i u i s i o n ,

25

d i'J i s ion

( S e e Map

1)

The

infantry

inJ

i s ion secured crossing

t h e panzer

s i t e s o n t h e Bug R i v e r a n d a s s i s t e d t h e c r o s s i n g o f diuisions.

The c a v a l r y d i u i s i o n e x e c u t e d a s c r e e n i n g m i s s i o n

a l o n g t h e edge o f t h e P r i p e t Marshes on t h e p a n z e r g r o u p ' s r i g h t flanK. d iu i s ions, of X I 1 Army Corps, composed o f t w o infantry

attacKed t h e f o r t r e s s of

Brest -LitousK

in the center

Second Panzer G r o u p ' s zone of i n i t i a l phase.

On t h e

a t t a C K and was d e t a c h e d a f t e r
wing

this

left

Guderian employed X L V I I one infantry, one

Panzer Corps, motorized, infantry

w h i c h was c o m p o s e d o f

and t w o p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s .

Again.

the foot-mobile

d i u i s i o n ' s m i s s i o n was t o a s s i s t t h e c r o s s i n g o f t h e Panzer Group Reserue c o n s i s t e d o f

panzer d i v i s i o n s .

XLVI

Panzer and

C o r p s w i t h one p a n z e r d i u i s i o n ,

one m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n , about one-fourth of

I n f a n t r y Regiment Gross-Deutschland, Guderian'r mobile forces.<28> fill of

the foregoing obseruations point t o the conclusion

t h a t Guderian p r a c t i c e d abstract, namely, that

i n combat what h e t h o u g h t
armored f o r c e s

in the
in

s h o u l d be employed 1)

concentrations.

H i s main attacr:

( S e e Map

i n t h e opening no l e s s t h a n

phase o f t h e Russian Campaign--the two panzer d i v i s i o n s ,

l e f t wing--had

which were themselves s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t

Similarly, h i s primary supporting

c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s . attacK--the support,

r i g h t wing--also

h a d tido p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s . diuision for

In

e a c h w i n g h a d an

infantry

t h e p u r p o s e of

s e i z i n g c r o s s i n g s i t e s and p a s s i n g t h e more m o b i l e f o r c e s through, w h i l e t h e c e n t e r c o r p s war. t a s K o r g a n i z e d f o r t h e

26

Chart 2

26a

slower paced o p e r a t i o n s Brest-LitousK.

i n and a r o u n d t h e b u i l t - u p

area of

F i n a l I Ya , cavalry division protected the

w h i l e t h e Panzer Group Reserve

Panzer G r o u p ' s r i g h t f l a n K , followed the l e f t wing, Thus,

w h i c h G u d e r i a n recKoned h i s most from division--the group, smallest

vulnerable flanK. self-sufficient

organ izat ion--to

Guder ian c o n d u c t e d

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t w i t h d i u i s i o n s t h a t Were s e l f - c o n t a i n e d c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s . and g r o u p s f o r requirements. Moreover, he tasK o r g a n i z e d c o r p s

combat based o n t h e t e r r a i n and s p e c i f i c m i r s i o n H i s erreloyment o f infantry diuisions f o r the for he d i d

i n i t i a l p h a s e o f t h e R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n was u n u s u a l , n o t employ s u c h d i u i s i o n s f o r
i n May

h i s c r o s s i n g s o f t h e Meuse R i v e r
in July 1941. f i n d a s we s h a l l

1940 o r t h e D n e i p e r R i v e r

see,

t h e h i g h tempo o f

h i s o p e r a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y weighed h e a v i l y infantry diuisions.

a g a i n s t h i s use of

foot-mobile

If we r e g a r d t h e p a n z e r a n d p a n z e r - g r r n a d i e r d i u i s i o n s a s

t h e b a s i c c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s Guder i a n u s e d t o f l s x i b l y o r g a n i z e c o r p s and p a n z e r g r o u p s f o r combat, we t h e n h a v e o n l y

p a r t o f G u d e r i a n ' s t o t a l c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m b i n e d arms operations. To g e t a m o r e c o m p l e t e a n d a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e , we

need t o examine h i s employment o f

t h e Key c o m b a t SUP POP^ a r m s

of

a r t i l l e r y and t a c t i c a l The T a b l e o f

air. panzer-grenadier regiments

Organization for

(See C h a r t 2 ) a l r e a d y s h o u l d h a v e a l e r t e d u s t o a Key P r i n C i P l e f o r t h e employment o f a r t i l l e r y : sixty-six a r t i l l e r y tubes decentralization.

Of

the

i n a panzer d i v i s i o n ,

for

instance,

27

24, o r 36%, w e r e o r g a n i c t o t h e p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r
themselues.

r e g iments

The r e m a i n i n g 42 g u n s a n d h o w i t z e r s w e r e

in the

a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t o f t h e d i v i s i o n and were employed as t h e d i v i s i o n commander deemed e s s e n t i a l - - u s u a l 1 y d i u i s i o n ' s main e f f o r t . only t e l l part of artillery

in support of

the

The T a b l e s o f O r g a n i z a t i o n , Generally,

however,

the story. the

Guderian organized h i s

i n t u o phases:
For the

i n i t i a l p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e

exploitation. defenses

i n i t i a l penetration of the tactical

he u s u a l l y c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f t h e a r t i l l e r y under who c o o r d i n a t e d t h e c o r p s t h e fast-mouing exploitation

h i s c o r p s a r t 11 l e r y commander, artillery fire plan. Then, for

phase o f h i s o p e r a t i o n s , IooK a t a r t i l l e r y on
13 May

t h e a r t i l l e r y was d e c e n t r a l i z e d . the crossing o f

fl

annexes f o r

t h e Meuse R i v e r
X I X Army Corps

1940 i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o i n t .

Guderian's

O p e r a t i o n s O r d e r s p e c ifi e s t h e a 1 l o t m e n t o f C o r p s Flrt ill e r y as f o l 1 ows :

2nd Panzer D i v i s i o n ( s u p p o r t i n g a t t a c K on c o r p s f l a n K ) : f l r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 74, l e s s 1 1 1 ( H V Y ) B a t t a l i o n . l B t h Panzer O i u i s i o n ( s u p p o r t i n g a t t a c K on c o r p s f lanK A r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 90, l e s s I 1 1 ( H V Y ) B a t t a l i o n . 1 s t P a n z e r D i v i s i o n ( M A I N FITTACK i n c e n t e r o f s e c t o r ): finti-infantry units: F l r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 73. Artillery corps
):

A n t i - a r t i l l e r y u n i t s and p o i n t o f main e f f o r t : R e g i m e n t 49 a n d 5 o t h e r a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s . C o r p s A r t 1 1 l e r y Commander D l u i s ion. <29> loczted with

1 s t Panzer

29

T h i s O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat First,
it
15

is r e v e a l i n g i n s e v e r a l w a y s .

o b v i o u s t h a t G u d e r i a n w e i g h t e d h i s main attacK b y 1 s t Panzer D t v i s i o n had

its

a l l o t t i n g a r t i l l e r y as h e d i d .

o r g a n i c f l r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 73 a n d C o r p s F I r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 43 a s well as s e p a r a t e b a t t a l i o n s f r o m c o r p s a s s e t s and t h e heavy

b a t t a l i o n s o f 2nd and

1 0 t h P a n z e r D i u is i o n s .

Second, art il l e r y

u n i t s h a d s p e c i f i c tasKs t o p e r f o r m . F I r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 73, f o r
e x a m p l e , was a s s i g n e d an a n t i - i n f a n t r y role for t h i s operation, rcle. Third,

w h i l e A r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 49 h a d a n a n t i - a r t i l l e r y

c o n t r o l of a r t i l l e r y throughout t h e c o r p s f o r t h e f i r s t phase of t h e o p e r a t i o n - - c r o s s i n g t h e Meuse--was exercised by t h e

c o r p s a r t i l l e r y c o m m a n d e r , who was l o c a t e d i n t h e c o r p s ' m a i n zone

Gf

attacK,

1 s t P a n z e r D i v i s i o n ' s Zone.

A f i n a l point which

t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r c o mb a t d o e s n o t show b u t w h i c h t h e a n n e x d o e s s p e c i f y is t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s

i n 2nd and

1 0 t h P a n z e r D i v i s i o n s e c t o r s were t o be p o s i t i o n e d so t h a t a t l e a s t one a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n of t h e regiments s u p p o r t i n g t h o s e d i v i s i o n s would b e l o c a t e d so t h a t t h e y c o u l d o b s e r v e 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n ' s s e c t o r and d e l ivsr s u p p o r t i n g f i r e s needed.<30> In a d d i t i o n t o wh a t h a s a l r e a d y b e e n s a i d a b o u t G u d e r i a n ' s employment o f a r t i l l e r y ,
it

if

is i n s t r u c t i v e t o n o t e t h a t

a r t i l l e r y annexes t o operation orders rpecified not only t h e t a r g e t s c e r t a i n a r t i l l e r y u n i t s would e n g a g e , b u t t h e t i m i n g of such engagements and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e f i r e s of o t h e r

29

arms.

The a n n e x t o

i s t Panzer D i v i s i o n ' s o p e r a t i o n o r d e r f o r for example, specif ias the stage o f the infantry, air.

t h e Meuse c r o s s i n g , battle,

the time period, weapons,

and t a r g e t s f o r artillery,

anti-strongpoint

and t a c t i c a l

In t h e

p r e p a r a t o r y s t a g e of

t h e Meuse c r o s s i n g a r t ill e r y m i s s i o n s a l o n g t h e w e s t banK o f t h e Meuse. fires,

included harassing f i r e s anti-Pillbox t o be f i r e d schedule. fires,

and a n t i - a r t i l l e r y

and a n t i - f l a K

all

i n t h a t sequence a c c o r d i n g t o a p r e - a r r a n g e d t i m e
in concert

Moreover,

with tanKs,

anti-tanK,

and artillery

anti-aircraft

weapons e m p l o y e d

i n a d i r e c t f i r e mode,

f i r e s w e r e c o o r d i n a t e d s o t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y s u p p r e s s e d enemy a r t i l l e r y f i r e s and a n t i - a a s 5 a u l t teams, rcraft fires, cover, enabling the infantry

under close a i r (31)

t o move c l o s e t o t h e

Meuse a n d P r e p a r e t o c r o s s

What a l l t h i s s u g g e s t s
t o ensure h i s a r t i l l e r y f i r e where

i s t h a t Guderian tooK

special pains initially

s u p p o r t was c o n c e n t r a t e d

i t was n e e d e d t o a c h i e v e

a penetration o f tactical

d e f e n s e s and,

more

important,

was s y n c h r o n i z e d w i t h o t h e r
Fllthough c o n t r o l in

supporting f i r e s

t o a c h i e v e maximum e f f e c t .

the e a r l y stages o f

a n o p e r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y was c e n t r a l i z e d , d u r i n g which panzer u n i t s successes,

in

t h e m o r e f a 5 . t -mou i n 9 s t a g e s , exploited the

initial tactical

c o r p s a r t i l l e r y was

a t t a c h e d t o d i v i s i o n s t o supplement SUPPort: a l l otherwise,

d i v i sional organic f i r e for

c o r p s a r t i l l e r y would have remained, in reserve f a r behind attacKing

i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s , Even so,

panzer columns.

t h e moderate m o b i l i t y d i f f e r e n t i a l

30

between towed a r t i l l e r y - - b o t h battalions left

divisional

and c o r p s - - a n d

panzer

a fire

s u p p o r t g a p t h a t t h e Germans e l e c t e d t o the f i n a l elernent o f Guderian's

f i l l with tactical

a i r power,

c o m b i n e d arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . WorKing corps-size i n cooperation with ground t a c t i c a l t h e German FIir F o r c e , units of

and h i g h e r ,

o r Luftwaffe,

p e r f o r m e d t h r e e Key m i s s i o n s : tactical and s t r a t e g i c a i r ground u n i t s .

ach ievement o f a i r s u p e r i o r i t y , and c l o s e a i r

reconnaissance,

support of aircraft

Doctrinally,

Luftwaffe reconnaissance

were

" p l a c e d under t h e o r d e r s o f each armoured c o r p s i n addition, e v e r y c o r p s o f t h e German about ten

and armoured d i u i s i o n " :

FIrmY

a l s o had

i t s own a i r

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n of

p l a n e s . < 3 2 > U n a b l e t o Keep p a c e w i t h t h e e x p a n d i n g German FlrmY, Luftwaffe reconnaissance u n i t s r e v e r t e d t o Luftwaffe c o n t r o l by

1942 and were a l l o c a t e d t o g r o u n d u n i t s as needed. p e r i o d Guder i a n c o n d u c t e d o p e r a t i o n a l w a r f a r e t o December

During the 1939

(September

1941),

b o t h s h o r t and l o n g - r a n g e

a i r reconnaissance

squadrons operated under c o n t r o l of headquarters. ach i e u i n g a i r aircraft After accompl i s h i n g

h i s c o r p s and p a n z e r g r o u p
i r S t

its f

mission of

s u p e r i o r i t y b y d e e p s t r I K e S a g a i n s t enemy support f a c i l i t i e s , their German a i r f o r c e s t u r n e d

and a i r

t o t h e second of reconnaissance. Long-range i n d i c a t i o n s of

ground support miss ions--air

air

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e was s u p p o s e d t o o b t a i n e a r l y

enemy p l a n s w h e r e a s s h o r t - r a n g e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

was s u p p o s e d t o w a t c h o v e r t h e d e p l o y m e n t a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f

31

enemy g r o u n d f o r c e s u p t o t h e p o i n t i d h e r e g r o u n d f o r c e s made contact. expected. B o t h d a y a n d n i g h t a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e was p l a n n e d a n d Short-range r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ernphas i z e d c o o p e r a t i o n a r t il l e r y S P o t t i n g

w i t h mechan i z e d g r o u n d f o r c e s , p h o t o g r a p h i c and v i s u a l

and

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o f enemy movement . < 3 3 > 1

I n t h e P o l i s h C a r w a i g n German a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e f f o r t s o n September w e r e followed by s u r p r i s e airstriKes against the

P o l i s h FIir F o r c e .

BY 3 S e p t e m b e r ,

two days

i n t o t h e campaign,

t h e L u f t w a f f e m i s s i o n h a d s h i f t e d t o c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h army g r o u n d u n i t s b e c a u s e t h e P o l i s h Fiir F o r c e h a d b e e n s w e p t f r o m t h e SKY--and t h e groundl(34:

To e n h a n c e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h a r m o r e d g r o u n d f o r c e s , F i e l d - M a r s h a l W. F. von R i c h t h o f e n , Flanders, Commander o f F 1 i e g e r K o r P s introduced

V I I I i n t h e P o l ish, t h e p r a c t i c e of columns.

and R u s s i a n Campaigns,

e m p l o y i n g a TanK L i a i s o n O f f i c e r w i t h a r m o r e d i n c l o s e t o u c h by

T h i s o f f i c e r ' s t a s K was t o Keep

r a d i o with c l o s e - s u ~ ~ ~ a irr tc r a f t . < 3 5 > S t a n d a r d c l o s e - s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s i n c l u d e d bombing and s t r a f i n g artillery batteries, enemy made a s t a n d . o f strongpoints, the

and t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n s w h e r e v e r I n addition t o close-support,

the Luftwaffe dumps,

a t t a c K e d enemy d e f e n s e s barracKs, and f a c t o r i e s

i n depth by h i t t i n g depots,

"in order t o d i s l o c a t e the supply

o r g a n i z a t i o n . "<36>E v e n g r e a t e r d e p t h was a c h i e u e d b y a t t a c K i n g railways, stations, bridges, and r o a d j u n c t i o n s t o p r e c l u d e

In t h e Flanders

enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f Campaign, for instance,

coromitted u n i t s .

German a i r p o w e r was u s e d t o s e a l o f f

- 32

t h e b a t t l e a r e a by a t t a c K i n g F r e n c h r e a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a s f a r bacK as a l i n e a l o n g a n a r c r u n n i n g f r o m G i u e t t h r o u g h Hirson-Laon-Reims t o Verdun. I n t h e f i r s t few d a y s o f t h e

F l a n d e r s Campaign T h i r d A i r F l e e t attaCKed t a r g e t s t o a d e p t h of 185 K i l o m e t e r s , w i t h

its matn e m p h a s i s i n G u d e r i a n ' s s e c t o r ,

It
is w o r t h

the Charleuille-Sedan

a r e a o f t h e Meuse R i u e r .

not in9 t h a t t h e s t r a i g h t - 1 ine d i s t a n c e from Sedan, where G u d e r i a n c r o s s e d t h e Meuse w i t h h i s X I X A r m y C o r p s , F r a n c e is a b o u t 85 K i l o m e t e r s , t o Reims,

i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e d e p t h t o which

a i r s t r i K e s were c a r r i e d o u t i n s u p p o r t o f a d v a n c i n g g r o u n d
units.
of

T h r o u g h o u t t h e c a m p a i g n a i r a t t a c K s t o an a v e r a g e d e p t h

76 K i l o m e t e r s b e h i n d e n e m y f o r w a r d t r o o p s S t r u c K m o v i n g and r a i l r o u t e s . < 3 7 > and d e e p interdiction

columns, troop concentrations,

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e c l o s e - s u p p o r t

missions, t h e Luftwaffe Prouided attaCKing ground f o r c e s wi t h

f lanK p r o t e c t i o n when

r e i u i r e d . Two e x a m p l e s i n p a r t i c u l a r c o m e
XIX

t o mind. F i r s t ,

i n t h e F l a n d e r s Campaign when G u d e r i a n ' s

Flrmy C o r p s c l e a r e d t h e r u g g e d

Ardennes t e r r a i n and r a c e d f o r

Flbbeuille, he exposed h i s l e f t flanK t o French f o r c e s located s o u t h of t h e A i s n e R i u e r . Later,

i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign as

G u d e r i a n ' s Second P a n z e r Group a t t e m p t e d t o c o m p l e t e t h e

e n c i r c l e m e n t o f R u s s i a n f o r c e s i n t h e BrYanSK a r e a , h e e x p o s e d
h i s r i g h t flanK t o possible Russian CounterattacKs from along
t h e BryansK-L'gou

R a i l r o a d r o u t e . < 3 8 > In b o t h

instances,

however, Guder i a n employed t a c t i c a l close-support

a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and

a i r c r a f t t o l o c a t e a n d a t t a c K enemy u n i t s w h i c h

33

posed a t h r e a t t o h i s v u l n e r a b l e f l a n K S .

ms b r i e f a s i t i s ,
German a i r f o r c e s close-support

t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of

G u d e r i a n ' s use of

i n d i c a t e s t h a t b o t h a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and

a i r c r a f t P l a y e d a KeY r o l e fls a n

i n h i s c o n d u c t of
not

operational art.

i n t e g r a l p a r t o f Guder ian ' 5 - - t h o u g h c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s ,

o n l y Gilder i a n ' s - - c o n c e p t i o n o f tactical

a i r support enabled h i m t o

l o c a t e enemy u n i t s e a r l y o n for t h e purposes o f isolate the battle f o r w a r d and v i r t u a l l y I n G u d e r i a n ' s own

t o d e l i v e r f i r e s b o t h n e a r and f a r Supporting ground u n i t s area. Moreover,

in contact,

and t o

t h i s a i r s u p p o r t was w e l l

c o n t i n u o u s when o p e r a t i o n s c a l l e d f o r words: "The f l i g h t

it.

wings advanced t h e i r

bases

in rapid

succession close t o t h e f r o n t

l i n e s o f t h e p a n z e r s and

cooperated with them c l o s e l y . " < 3 9 > This for

is n o t m e r e r h e t o r i c ,
in the

i n r e c o u n t i n g h i s c r o s s i n g o f t h e Oneiper R i v e r Guder i a n m e n t i o n s t h a t
f ighter
50

R u s s i a n Campaign, l a i d out just

a i r s t r i p s were

b e h i n d h i s assembly areas

t h a t a i r Support

w o u l d be a v a i l a b l e f o r

impending o p e r a t i o n s . < 4 0 > indicates that

T h i s f i n a l p o i n t on t h e u s e o f a i r s u p p o r t G u d e r i a n p l a c e d a p r e m l u r n on t h e n e e d f o r superiority of

local a i r

that

is,

a i r s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r heavy c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of his

armorded f o r c e s w h i c h c o m p r i s e d t h e main e f f o r t

operations.

S u c h c o n t r o l o f t h e a i r was n e c e s s a r y t o a l l o w a i r c r a f t t o s u p p o r t advancing armored columns.

close-support

R e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e damage German a r m o r e d c o l u m n s s u f f e r e d a t t h e hands of i l l l i e d a i r p o w e r d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n C o b r a and t h e

34

Ardennes c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e

i n 1 9 4 4 show how r i g h t G u d e r i a n was

local a i r superiority

t o be concerned about maintenance o f during crucial phases o f operat ions.

Hau i n g e x a m i n e d G u d e r i a n 's c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m b i n e d a r m s o p e r a t i o n s b y l o O K i n s a t t h e c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s h e employed, combat,

h i s methods o f o r g a n i z i n g c o r p s and g r o u p s f o r

and h i s u s e o f

a r t i l l e r y and t a c t i c a l

a i r power,

it

r e m a i n s t o d r a w some c o n c l u s i o n s .

Three p r i n c i p l e s t h a t

lay

b e h i n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s s u g g e s t themselues. First, G u d e r i a n ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n c o m b i n e d arms i m p l i e s h e toOK

o r g a n i z a t i o n s b u i l t around t h e tanK t e n e t t h a t one s h o u l d :

i t as a

C o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n a l a r t w i t h c o m b i n e d arms d i v i s i o n s b u i l t a r o u n d t h e t a n k ; a l l o t h e r arms s h o u l d be i n t e g r a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y and t a c t i c a l l y t o support tanKs.

Second,

h i s e m p l o y m e n t o f a r t ill e r y

i n d i c a t e s h i s adherence t o

the tenet: C o n c e n t r a t e and c e n t r a l i z e c o n t r o l o f a r t i l l e r y f o r p e n e t r a t i o n o f t a c t i c a l defenses b u t decentralize control f o r f l u i d exploitation operat ions.

Third,

about a i r

o p e r a t i o n s he h e l d t h a t :

T a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t must s u p p o r t armored o p e r a t ions by m a i n t a i n i n g l o c a l a i r s u p e r i o r i t y over c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f a r m o r e d f o r c e s , and t h e n s h o u l d p r o u i d e p r o v i d e a l r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and close-support a i r s t r iKes.

These c o n c l u s i o n s a r e n o t e a r t h s h a K i n g , d e r i v e rnore o r o t h e r t e n e t s

and one c o u l d There a r e

i f h e made t h e e f f o r t .

35

l e s s e r p r i n c i p l e s , perhaps c o r o l l a r i e s ,
Present analysis,
Key

t h a t .jump o u t f r o m t h e

b u t t h e s e t h r e e a p p e a r t o be t h e a b s o l u t e l y

tenets o f

c o r r b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s b y w h i c h G u d e r i a n art. G u d e r i a n would have s a i d t h a t one c a n n o t attain in

Right

conducted o p e r a t i o n a l

w i t h o u t adherence t o t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , O p e r a t i o n a l dec is i u e n e s s .

W h e t h e r Guder i a n was c o r r e c t i s not here a t

t h i n K i n g t h i s about o p e r a t i o n a l a r t

issue.

o r wrong,
the t m K ,

Guder i a n t h o u g h t cornb i n e d arrns d i u i s i o n s b u i l t a r o u n d and f l e x i b l y s u p p o r t e d b y a r t i l l e r y and t a c t i c a l air

i s t h e f i r s t s t e p toward o p e r a t i o n a l success.

36

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

One d o e s n o t h a v e t o

looK f a r

t o support the c l a i m t h a t a r t c a n be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as

Guder i a n ' s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l offen$.iue rather than defensive. article "Armored F o r c e s "

A place t o begin is h i s

1937

i n which he e x p l i c i t l y says:

The m i s s i o n o f a r m o r e d c o m b a t f o r c e s i s t h e d e l i v e r y of s u r p r i s e attacKs w i t h concentrated s t r e n g t h , w i t h t h e view t o gaining t h e d e c i s i o n a t t h e p o i n t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e command.. . . T h e y a r e , t h e r e f o r e , e x c l u s i v e l y a n o f f e n s i v e a r m whose advantage over o t h e r ground f o r c e s c o n s i s t s i n t h e c a p a c i t y t o f i g h t w h i l e i n motion.<41:

This observation,

o f course,

1 i e s open t o t h e c h a l l e n g e t h a t of And t o t h i s

"Armored F o r c e s " m e r e l y r e f l e c t s Guder i a n ' s t h e o r y operational art, n o t what he p r a c t i c e d

in co&at.

t h e appropriate response War 11.

A l l

i s t o looK a t h i s o p e r a t i o n s
i n Poland,

i n World
or

r e f l e c t t h a t u h e t h e r h e was 1939 and l a t e 1941,

France,

R u s s i a between a t t a c K ing, fact,

H e i n z G u d e r i a n was never defending !

In

a t t a c K ing,

attacK ing--almost

h i s a t t e m p t t o e x e c u t e m o b i l e d e f e n s i v e w a r f a r e .lust
of

southwest

Moscow

i n December

1341 l e d t o h i s r e l i e f .

So,

he

never r e a l l y had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o conduct defensive operational it art, b u t g i v e n h i s t h e o r e t i c a l v i e w s on t h e s u b j e c t

i s s a f e t o s a y t h a t he w o u l d have been unhappy w i t h t h e conducting defensive operations for any length

Of

prospect of

37

t irne

.
G i u e n t h a t h i s o p e r a t i o n s were o f f e n s i v e i n c h a r a c t e r ,

Glider i a n 's o p e r a t i o n a l a r t c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a t t a C K S o n narrou f r o n t a g e s employing tanKs penetration in t h e s p e a r h e a d t o a c h i e v e

and o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h q u i c K l y , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g a
SUCCTSS.

f l e x i b l e reserve f o r p r o t e c t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of

F r o m t h i s a n a l y s i s f o u r t e n e t s of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n w h i c h g u i d e d G u d e r i a n i n t h e c o n d u c t o f h i s o p e r a t i o n s c a n be d e r i u e d . Strangely, the

1336 G e r m a n F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s
v i e w t h a t a t t a C K S s h o u l d be

appear t o c o n t r a d i c t G u d e r i a n ' s

c o n d u c t e d on a narrow f r o n t a g e , f o r t h a t m a n u a l s t a t e s : The attacK m u s t b e l a u n c h e d o n a b r o a d e r f r o n t t h a n t h a t i n t e n d e d f o r t h e breaK t h r o u g h , in o r d e r t o t i e a n d h o l d down t h e enemy o n e i t h e r s i d e . <42>

B u t t h i s passage can b e m i s l e a d i n g b e c a u s e

in a subsequent
IS

p a r a g r a p h t h e manual r e f e r s t o t h e d e c i s i v e attacK, Which d i s t i n g u i s h e d by:

( 1 ) narrow

zones,

(2) u n i f i e d

f i r e from all

arms, a n d (3) t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f f i r e s b y s p e c i a l l y a l l o t t e d
heavy manual i n f a n t r y weapons and a r t i l l e r y . < 4 3 > C l e a r l y , here the

is m a K i n g r e f e r e n c e t o a m a i n a t t a c K d e s i g n e d t o

penetrate tactical

defenses rather than a broad offensiue.

Guderian probably thought t h e broad offensive concept e n t a i l e d t h e concept of

a d e c is i u e a t t a C K i o t h e r w i s e , p e n e t r a t i o n w o u l d

n o t o c c u r a n d e n e m y r e s e r v e s would n o t b e t i e d down a l o n g a wide l i n e o f c o n t a c t .

So a t l t h o u g h n o t

inconsistent with t h e

German f i e l d r e g u l a t i o n s of

the day,

h i s c o n c e p t i o n of

38

n !

a
E
rd

/--I

38a

operational art confines

i t s e l f t o a d e c i s i v e a t t a c K on a

narrow f r o n t a g e by a c o r p s o r group t o ensure p e n e t r a t i o n of t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s f o l l o w e d by e x p l o i t a t i o n t o o p e r a t i o n a l

depths.

Guderian's concept

is b e s t c a p t u r e d b y h i s o f t r e p e a t e d

rnax i m :

" K l o t z e n , n i c h t K l e c K e r n ," b y w h i c h h e m e a n t

"Fist, not

F i n g e r s . " To e n s u r e p e n e t r a t i o n , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t a m a i l e d f i s t

was n e c e s s a r y . A t t h e t a c t i c a l l e v a 1 it r e q u i r e d a t a n K b r i g a d e
of f o u r b a t t a l i o n s which c o u l d c o v e r a z o n e of

attacK of

1 5 0 8 - 4 0 0 0 m e t e r s w i d e a n d 3000-4500 m e t e r s i n d e p t h . < 4 4 > A s h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n F l a n d e r s and R u s s i a show, h e t h o u g h t a r m o r e d heavy c o r p s s h o u l d be s i m i l a r l y c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r t h e purpose of

ach ieu ing breaKthrOugh a n d p e n e t r a t i o n t o o p e r a t t o n a l

depths.

A t t h e opening of

t h e F l a n d e r s Campaign

(See Map 2 ) , G u d e r i a n

c r o s s e d t h e Luxembourg b o r d e r w i t h t h r e e P a n z e r d i u is i o n s

a b r e a s t i n h i s X I X Army C o r p s . 2nd P a n z e r D i v i s i o n i n t h e n o r t h
attacKed through Viandeni 1 s t Panzer Division in the and

center--maKing

t h e main attacK--mOued

through Wallendorf:

10th Panzer Diuision, with

I n f a n t r y Regiment Gross-Deutschland
attacKed through Etternach.
i s a b o u t 20

protecting t h e corps l e + t flanK.

The d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n V i a n d e n a n d E t t e r n a c h

K i l o m e t e r s , g i v i n g e a c h d i v i s i o n a f r o n t a g e o f a b o u t 6.3 K i l o m e t e r s a s s u m i n g no v a r i a t i o n supportins dttaCKS. on Later,

i n w i d t h b e t w e e n main and

i n h i s c r o s s i n g o f t h e Meuse R i v e r

1 3 May G u d e r i a n c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s t h r e e p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s o n a
f r o n t around Sedan t o e n s u r e he p e n e t r a t e d In b o t h t h e s e

ten-Kilometer

quiCKly t h e F r e n c h d e f e n s e s i n h i s s e c t o r .

33

i n s t a n c e s Guder i a n c o n c e n t r a t e d an a r m o r e d c o r p s c o n s i s t i n g o f some 828 t a n K S o n a v e r y n a r r o w f r o n t a g e . < 4 5 > The o p e n i n g p h a s e o f Guderian's view that t h e R u s s i a n Campaign a l s o illustrates

a t t a c K s by armored f o r c e s s h o u l d be H i s Second Panzer Group a t t a c K e d panzer, two motorized,

c o n d u c t e d on n a r r o w f r o n t a g e s . i n t o R u s s i a on 22 J u n e four infantry,

1341 w i t h f o u r

a n d one c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n s a l o n g a l i n e o f

d e p a r t u r e o f a b o u t 88 K i l o m e t e r s . < 4 6 > A l t h o u g h t h e a v e r a g e frontage for this figure the l i n e of S e c o n d P a n z e r G r o u p wa5 8 K i l o m e t e r s p e r d i v i s i o n , i s misleading. departure, f i l l t h e t e r r a i n a l o n g t h e Bug R i v e r , tanKs, which

was n o t s u i t a b l e f o r

Guderian t h o u g h t should conduct t h e main a t t a c K s zones o f attaCK. Nor does

it address t h e depth o f

in narrow
h i s attacK,

which Guderian provided f o r consisting o f

by g i v i n g XLVI Panzer Corps,

1 0 t h P a n z e r D i u i s i o n a n d SS Das R e i c h D i u i s i o n , the mission t o follow his

and t h e G r o s s - D e u t s c h l a n d Regiment, panzer group's Brest-LitousK. l e f t wing,

w h i c h was t o p a s s t o t h e n o r t h o f

As Q i t d e r i a n saw

it,

"the e s s e n t i a l s of surprise

Conducting panzer offensives a n d mass d e p l o y m e n t Unfortunately,

were s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n ,

i n t h e n e c e s s a r y w i d t h and d e p t h . " < 4 7 >

G u d e r i a n n e u e r r e a l l y s t i p u l a t e s what t h e but surely

if p r e s s e d o n

n e c e s s a r y w i d t h and d e p t h m i g h t be,

t h i s p o i n t h e w o u l d r e p l y t h a t t h e w i d t h and d e p t h o f a t t a c K depends

a panzer
in

l a r g e l y o n t h e t e r r a i n a n d t h e enemy d e f e n s e s

t h e a r e a u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n $ t o s a y more w o u l d b e t o demonstrate t a c t i c a l ignorance. The g e n e r a l P r o P o s i t i o n w h i c h

40

emerges,

however,

i s t h a t r e l a t i v e l y narrow attacK sectors are t a c t i c a l zones o f defense. But t h a t

e s s e n t i a l t o p e n e t r a t i o n of i s o n l y P a r t of refer it, for

G u d e r i a n ' s words

"mass d e p l o y m e n t "

s p e c ifi c a l I Y t o a r m o r e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n s . Massing f o r c e s o n n a r r o w f r o n t a g e s does no good u n l e s s t h e and G u d e r i a n c l e a r l y t h o u g h t

r i g h t s o r t s of

f o r c e s a r e massed,

t a n K S s h o u l d b e t h e weapons a c o r p s o r g r o u p commander s h o u l d 5FleK t o c o n c e n t r a t e . subject. First, Two r e a s o n s d r o v e h i s t h i n K i n g o n t h i s

because o f t h e i r h i g h degree o f m o b i l i t y ,

armored u n i t s c o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d more r a p i d l y t h a n foot-mobile their

i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s . < 4 8 > Second,

o n l y tanKs,

w i t h

a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s m a l l arms f i r e ,

could penetrate

t a c t i c a l defenses

r a p i d l y without s u f f e r i n g unacceptable losses i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l depths o f an one c o u l d say t h a t

and t h e n c o n t i n u e t h e a t t a c K opposing f o r c e .

About t h e f i r s t r e a s o n ,

m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n s c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e j u s t as r a p i d l y as p a n z e r divisions. This

is true,

b u t Guderian understood t h e t h a t c o n c e n t r a t e d armored u n i t s have

p ~ y c h o l o g i c a ls h o c K e f f e c t

a t b o t h t h e l i n r o f c o n t a c t and a g a i n s t t h i n l y h e l d l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and r e a r a r e a s . t h e enemy w i t h s p e e d , KnocK t h e enemy o f f euents.

I n h i s booK The B l i t z K r i e g E r a a n d t h e German G e n e r a l

He t h o u g h t

it

imperative t o h i t

surprise,

a n d ShoCK f r o m t h e O u t s e t t o

b a l a n c e a n d t h e n Keep h i m r e a c t i n g t o

Staff,

L a r r y Add i n g t o n d e s c r i b e s G u d e r i a n
13 May a n d

's c r o s s i n g o f t h e

Meuse R i v e r o n

i l l u s t r a t e s how G u d e r i a n e m p l o y e d

41

armored f o r c e s . unfordable;
P il l b o x e s

A r o u n d S e d a n t h e Meuse

i s 60 y a r d s w i d e a n d

F r e n c h d e f e n s e s on t h e west s i d e c o n s i s t e d o f

a n d e n t r e n c h m e n t s w i t h a d e n s It!) o f e i g h t p i l l b o x e s o r o n e e v e r y 200 y a r d s o f infantry

and e i g h t m a c h i n e g u n s e v e r y m i l e , front.

F i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s were b e h i n d t h e s e To o v e r c o m e t h e s e d e f e n s e s ,

emplacements.

Guder i a n d i r e c t e d

close support a i r c r a f t t o attacK French a r t i l l e r y u n i t s f o r h a l f a day, a n d t h e n h a d German t a n K s r o l l d i r e c t l y t o t h e f i r i n g p o i n t blanK into the pillboxes. t o t h e panzer German

w a t e r s edge,

motorized infantry units--organic d i u i s ion--brought

UP

p n e u m a t i c b o a t s and b e g a n c r o s s i n g t h e

r i u e r . < 4 9 > U n d e r t h e c o m b i n e d s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e s o f t h e tatIK.5, anti-tanK and a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons, the i n f a n t r y quicK1y

established a bridgehead, Meuse.

enabling engineers t o bridge t h e t h e armored u n i t s

Once t h i s c r u c i a l s t e p h a d b e e n t a K e n ,

were t h e n

i n a p o s i t i o n t o c r o s s t h e Meuse a n d c o n t i n u e t h e passing through other divisions.

attack without later, was

As w i l l

be s e e n

Guder i a n t h o u g h t a v o i d i n s p a s s a g e t h r o u g h o t h e r u n i t s important. The m a i n p o i n t h e r e

immensely

i s t h a t Guderian

c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s a r m r up f r o n t t o a c h i e v e p e n e t r a t i o n a n d ensure t h a t

i t would be i n a p o s i t i o n t o r a c e i n t o t h e

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s o f t h e d e f e n d i n g enemy. One may w e l l wonder what v a l u e t h e r e Considerable, is

i n achieving

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h anyway. operations

i f Guder i a n 5

i n Poland,

Flanders,

a n d R u s s i a a r e t o b e t a K e n as

representat iue o f the potential benefits.

In t h e Pol i s h

42

Campaign,

for

instance,

Guderian recounts that

b y 4 September

1939 h i s X I X flrmy

Corps had pushed a c r o s s t h e P o l i s h C o r r i d o r

t o t h e V i s t u l a R i v e r and h a d t o t a l l y d e s t r o y e d t w o o r t h r e e
Pol ish i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s and one c a v a l r y b r i g a d e , o f p r i s o n e r s and h u n d r e d s o capturing

thousands of

g u n s . < 5 0 > The e m e r g e n c e

its

G u d e r i a n ' s X I X flrmy

Corps f r o m t h e flrdennes and

s u b s e q u e n t r a c e t o t h e E n 9 1 i s h Channe Campaign forces i s well Known.

dur ins the Flanders l o s s of major Flllied

The c o n s e q u e n t

north of

t h e flisne River proved devastating t o Flllied France, and l e d t o t h e s t r a t e g i c consequence The p o i n t a b o u t o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h is

a t t e m p t s t o defend

o f F r a n c e 's c a p i t u l a t i o n . i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f a c t flbbeuille

t h a t t h e d i s t a n c e f r o m Sedan t o a distance Guderian covered in

i s 238 K i l o m e t e r s ,

seven days, (51 > Similarly, Guderian's panzer t h r u s t s t o o p e r a t i o n a l depths tremendous numbers o f Russian forces in the

i n R u s s i a d e s t r o y e d t h e f i g h t i n g power o f Russian u n i t s . Two m a j o r e n c i r c l e m e n t s o f

w h i c h G u d e r i a n ' s S e c o n d P a n z e r G r o u p p a r t i c i p a t e d amp1 i f Y p o i n t about o p e r a t i o n a l payoff. O p e r a t i o n BFlRBflROSSfl, Second Panzer Group, independent infantry B e t w e e n 22 J u n e , 1341--just D-day for

a n d 23 J u n e consisting of regiment,

7 days--Guderian

'5

n i n e d i v i s i o n s and an into the

attacKed 440 K i l o m e t e r s

R u s s i a n h i n t e r l a n d and r e a c h e d t h e c i t y of Beresina River, gigantic thereby

BobruisK along the the

f o r m l n g t h e s o u t h e r n P i n C B r of

MinsK p o c ~ e t . I n t h e MinsK p o c ~ e t ,c l o s e d b y H o t h f r o m

t h e n o r t h and G u d e r i a n f r o m t h e s o u t h ,

32 R u s s i a n r i f l e

43

d i v i s i o n s and 3 tanK d i v i s i o n s were c a u g h t , Russian prisoners,

t o t a l l i n g 290,000 By 16 J u l y 1941

2900 t d n K S ,

and

1 4 0 6 guns.

( 0 + 2 5 ) G u d e r i a n ' s l e a d e l e m e n t s h a d e n t e r e d SmolensK a n d
c o v e r e d some 660 K i l o m e t e r s . < 5 2 > I n t h e S m o l e n s K POCKet G u d e r i a n 's p a n z e r g r o u p p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c a p t u r e o f prisoners, 2030 tanKs, 185,000

and o v e r 2000 g u n s . < 5 3 > These f a c t s f o r reaching Howeuer, i t must

support t h e understated c l a i m t h a t the payoff o p e r a t i o n a l depths quicK1y can be s i g n i f i c a n t . be remembered t h a t o p e r a t i o n a l success

is m e a s u r e d b y t h e
Unl i K e

operational o r s t r a t e g i c e f f e c t s operat ions b r i n g about. t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns operations Played d decisive p a r t goals of
i n which Guderian's

i n achieving the strategic

t h e c o l l a p s e o f armed r e s i s t a n c e and s u r r e n d e r o f t h e i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign h i s o p e r a t i o n s f a i l e d to

armed f o r c e s ,

i s ioned s t r a t e g i c goals, a c h i e u e H i t l e r 's e t i ' ~

t h e y may seem.
A final

howeuer s u c c e s s f u l

p o i n t about the o f f e n s i v e nature o f Guderian's

operational a r t which deserves mention operational reserve. was t h a t reinforce wherever reserve, The f i r s t

i s h i s employment o f

an

p o i n t on w h i c h G u d e r i a n

insisted

i t was l.K3T o n e o f

the functions o f the reserve t o

failure;

rather,

i t s f u n c t i o n was t o e x p l o i t S u c c e s s
important function of the

i t may o c c u r .
which

Another

i s amply d e m o n s t r a t e d b y G u d e r i a n ' s c o n d u c t of
security f o r strung out.

operations,

was t o p r o u i d e f l a n K Both of

a t t a c K i n g panzer colurrns. i m p a c t on G u d e r i a n ' s

t h e s e f u n c t i o n s h a d some

d e c i s i o n about whether t h e r e s h o u l d be a

44

reserve

in a particular situation,

and i f so,

what

i t s s i z e and

Composition s h o u l d be. Generally, t h e course of G u d e r i a n d i d e m p l o y an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e

in

h i s operations

in Poland,

Flanders,

and R u s s i a .

A t c o r p s l e v e l he u s u a l l y employed a r e g i m e n t - s i z e u n i t such as
the

l n f a n t r v Regiment G r o s s - O e u t s c h l a n d whereas a t t h e p a n z e r
l e v e l he K e p t a c o r p s - s i z e These, however, r e s e r v e whenever t h e

g r o u p o r army

situation permitted.

are o n l y broad The

generalizations t o which there are c ear exceptions. reasons f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n s may h e l p

1 l u m i n a t e G u d e r i a n 's

t h i n K i n s on t h e employment of

operational reserves.

A t t h e beginning of
Campaigns,

b o t h t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s

G u d e r i a n d i d n o t employ a r e c o g n i z a b l e r e s e r v e i n

h i s army c o r p s ,

i n each case f o r good r e a s o n s .

In t h e P o l i s h

Campaign h e a t t a c K e d

i n t o t h e P o l i s h C o r r i d o r e m p l o y i n g one w i t h h i s panzer the

p a n z e r a n d t w o m o t o r i z e d d i u is i o n s a b r e a s t , d i v i s i o n maKing t h e main e f f o r t corps sector. Here,

in t h e southern p o r t i o n of

Guderian d i d n o t erwloy a reserve f o r three First, he r e i n f o r c e d 3 r d Panzer D i v i s i o n , Second,

d i s c e r n i b l e reasons. h i s main e f f o r t ,

w i t h c o r p s t r o o p s such as a r t i l l e r y .

h i s corps southern boundary,

t h e Zempolno R i v e r , And t h i r d ,

p r o v i d e d some Infantry 3rd intents

protection f o r h i s southern flanK. Division, t h e Army r e s e r v e ,

23rd

had t h e m i s s i o n t o f o l l o w a l l

Panzer D i v i s i o n , and p u r p o s e s .

thereby providing a reserve for l a t t e r stages of

In the

t h e P o l i s h C a m p a i g n when

h i s XIX Army Corps a t t a c K e d f r o m East P r u s s i a t o w a r d

45

Brest-LitovsK,

Guder i a n e m p l o y e d t h e s e p a r a t e L o t z e n B r i g a d e ,

w h i c h was a t t a c h e d t o h i s c o r p s a s a r e s e r v e e l e m e n t p r o t e c t i n g the l e f t flanK o f his attacKing divisions. Similarly,

in the

F l a n d e r s Campaign G u d e r i a n a t t a c K e d corps reserve. the l e a s t of But again,

i n t o Luxembourg w i t h no not

t h e r e were good r e a s o n s f o r t h i s ,

w h i c h was t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s i x t y - f i v e

Kilometers

o f fill i e d f r o n t defended by t h e

r u n n i n g t h r o u g h t h e s o u t h e r n F I r d e n n e s was
inconsiderable force of only four French

c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n s a n d some o d d B e l g i a n u n i t s .

So t h e enemy

G u d e r i a n e x p e c t e d t o e n c o u n t e r was n o t f o r m i d a b l e sector.
Army

in his

Hdditionally,

f o l l o w i n g b e h i n d G u d e r i a n ' s c o r p s was X I V Guder i a n '5 p a n z e r

Corps,

p r o u i d i n g d e p t h and s e c u r i t y f o r He d i d , however, withdraw

d iu i s ions.

I n f a n t r y Regiment

Gross-Deutschland

f r o m h i s s o u t h e r n f l a n K a n d move

it

into
in

c o r p s r e s e r v e on t h e e v e n i n g o f t h e second day o f France.

operations

It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t Guderian e n v i s i o n e d Gross-Oeutschland
I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t ' s r o l e on t h e f l a n K o f X I X A r m y C o r p s a s being a reserve mission,

for

in h i s operations

i n R u s s i a he

f r e q u e n t l y e m p l o y e d a one o r t w o - d i v i s i o n followed

reserve which

t h e main a t t a c K echeloned t o t h e r e a r f o r b o t h depth

it followed.

and f l a n K p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e u n i t

T h i s was

P r e c i s e l y t h e f u n c t i o n o f X L V I Panzer Corps p h a s e o f BARB~IROSSH (See Map 1). That corps, as

i n t h e opening
c o n s i s t i n g of one

P a n z e r a n d o n e m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n a5 w e l l Gross-Oeutschland, followed

I n f a n t r y Regiment

Guderian's l e f t - w i n g corps,

46

46a

echeloned just
wing.

i n s i d e of

t h e n o r t h e r n most e l e m e n t s o f t h e l e f t

Note,

first, of

t h a t h i s Army G r o u p R e s e r v e was c o m p o s e d o f under a corps

one-fourth

Guderian's mobile forces Second,

headquarters.

i t s m i s s i o n was t o f o l l o w t h e c o r p s p r o t e c t t h e Army Group's left flanK,

maKing t h e m a i n a t t a c K ,

and be p r e p a r e d t o p a s s t h r o u g h t h e a t t a c K i n g c o r p s directed. As

i f so

i t debJelOPed,

w i t h i n two days Russian

COUntePattacKs a g a i n s t Second Panzer G r o u p ' s n o r t h e r n f lanK f r o m around B i a l y S t o K prompted Guderian t o commit t h e 2 9 t h b l o t o r i z e d D i v i s i o n f r o m Panzer Group Reserve t o s e c u r e t h e
flanK.<54> This f a c t suggests two P o i n t s about G u d e r i a n ' s

left

employment o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s First,

i n offens iue operat ions,

a t t h e army g r o u p l e v e l he a p p e a r e d t o c o m m i t r e s e r v e s He p r a c t i c e d t h i s t h r o u g h o u t
in Russia.

in d i v i s i o n - s i z e e l e m e n t s .
remainder o f t h e campaign Second,

the

Seldom d i d he commit a

complete corps.

h e a p p e a r s t o h a v e made a n e f f o r t t o

r e c o n s t i t u t e a r e s e r v e a s soon as p o s s i b l e . aboue,

In t h e case c i t e d
10th P a n z e r

he d i d n o t do t h i s b e c a u s e h e s t i l l h a d

D i v i s i o n and G r o s s - D e u t s c h l a n d an army r e s e r u e . Add i t i o n a l l y

I n f a n t r y Regiment a v a i l a b l e as

Guder ian ' s r e t e n t i o n o f a c o r p s - s i z e d w h i c h h i s PPmaPKS

r e s e r v e had an a n c i l l a r y f u n c t i o n Leader suggest. he says:

i n PanZer
1941

A b o u t o p e r a t i o n s a r o u n d Moscow

i n December

I decided to...assemble

X X I V Panzer Corps

in

47

t h e Ore1 a r e a as army r e s e r v e so as t o g i v e t h e u n i t s o f t h a t c o r p s a s h o r t r e s t and t o c r e a t e a n o p e r a t i o n a l , m o b i l e f o r c e a t my disposal. (55)

It

is c l e a r t h a t G u d e r i a n saw t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f
r e f i t t i n g and r e s t i n g h i s u n i t s .

a reserve

a s a means f o r throughout

His operations

t h e R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n show t h a t h e c o n t i n u e d t o

r e v i t a l i z e t h e f i g h t i n g power o f h i s u n i t s b y r o t a t ing t h e m i n t o a r e s e r v e s t a t u s when h e deemed a p p r o p r i a t e . t h e a n a l o g y o f r o t a t i n g t h e p o i n t marl Here perhaps

i s a r t : Guderian

recognized t h e p o t e n t i a l hazarards associated w i t h Keeping units i n combat w i t h o u t r e s p i t e . Guderian's statement about

a m o b i l e r e s e r v e h e r e was

e c h o e d l a t e r when h e s e r v e d a s C h i e f o f t h e A r m y A b o u t Rornmel's p l a n f o r says :

General S t a f f .

t h e defense o f t h e A t l a n t i c Wall he

It i s . . . a matter of considerable regret that R o r m l f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e need f o r possessing mobile reserues.<56>

G u d e r i a n ' s s t a n c e on t h e q u e s t i o n o f m o b i l e r e s e r v e s r a i s e s a s u b j e c t which has been i n t e n s e l y debated s i n c e t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g s on Normandy. This debate about whether a forward

d e f e n s e was b e t t e r t h a n o n e w h i c h r e l i e d o n m o b i l e r e s e r v e s i s not here a t thought issue, b u t G u d e r i a n ' s comment i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t he or

it proper t o conduct operational art--defensively

offensively--employ one-fourth

i n g an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e c o m p r i s i n g f r o m

t o one-third

of: t h e m o b i l e c o m b a t f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e .

I n defens i v e o p e r a t i o n s Guder ian t h o u g h t o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s

48

s h o u l d b e u s e d t o C o u n t e r a t t a C K t h e flanK.5 enemy.<57> O f f e n s i v e l y ,

o f an a t t a C K i n g

h i s c o n c e p t i o n was t h a t t h e r e s e r v e t h e d e p t h and f l e x i b i l i t y f l a n K S and m a i n t a i n t h e

g a v e t h e c o r p s o r a r m y commander necessary t o p r o t e c t vulnerable

momentum o f o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s b y c o m i t t whenever defenses. BY t h i s t i m e o f operational and w h e r e v e r

ins t h e r e s e r v e
i n t h e enemy

i t c o u l d e x p l o i t a weaKneSs

it s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e p t i o n
though not devoid o f defensive concepts,

art,

was p r i m a r i l y o f f e n s i v e four tenets:

i n c h a r a c t e r and c a n b e summarized by

M a i n a t t a c K s s h o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d on a n a r r o w frontage t o ensure p e n e t r a t i o n : "Klotzen, n i c h t KlecKern. Heavy c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f a r m o r f o r c e s s u p p o r t e d b y o t h e r a r m s s h o u l d s e r v e as t h e s p e a r h e a d o f main attacKs. Main a t t a c K s s h o u l d have as t h e i r o b j e c t t h e attainment o f operational depth t o cut enemy 1 i n e s o f c o m r n u n i c a t i o n a n d S t o p e m p l o y m e n t o f enemy r e s e r v e s . ( 5 8 )
fi m i x e d r e s e r v e o f t a n K s a n d m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y should f o l l o w t h e main e f f o r t t o e x p l o i t s u c c e s s and p r o t e c t t h e p a r e n t u n i t ' s most vulnerable flanK.<53>

quiCK

TaKen t o g e t h e r ,

these four

tenets describe the offensive art. He a p p a r e n t l y b e 1 i e v e d

essence o f Guderian each o f

's

operational

t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s was a Key e l e m e n t for

i n s e t t i n g up t h e
B u t a s we

c o n d i t i o n s necessary

o p e r a t i o n a l dec i s iveness.

49

w i l l now f e e , a l s o K e y t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i u e n e s s was t h e n e e d

t o g a i n a n d m a i n t a i n t h e momentum o f t h e a t t a c K .

MOMENTUM

P h y s i c i s t s g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e momentum q u a n t i t a t i u e l y a s t h e

mass o f a n o b j e c t m u l t i p l i e d b y

its v e l o c i t y o r s p e e d . For t h e

p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n is u s e f u l b e c a u s e i t
illuminates t h e essential ingredients Guder ian thought

necesSarY f o r o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s t o a t t a i n t h e d e p t h a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , d e c i s i v e n e s s necessary t o succeed. H i s s t u d y of offensiue operations conducted i n W o r l d War

I,

especially the

B a t t l e of C a m b r a i , l e d h i m a n d o t h e r t h i n K e r s t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n
that

s u f f i c i e n t mobile reseruas--exploitation

forces--were

neuer planned,

a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e , o p e r a t i o n a l d e c is i u e n e s s

was n e v e r o b t a i n e d .

I n p a r t t h e d i f f i c u l t y was t e c h n o l o g i c a l

b e c a u s e t h e r e were n o t a n K s f o r rnuch o f t h e war a n d , m o r e o u e r . s u p p o r t i n g arms s u c h a s a r t i l l e r y were n o t a s m o b i l e a s t h e

t a n K S a n d s o n o g e n u i n e c o m b i n e d arms team was p o s s i b l e .

advent o f t h e tanK, t h e a i r p l a n e , and t h e s e l f - p r o p e l l e d howitzer changed a1 1 t h a t .
of

The

Guder ian recognized

the

ign if icance men l i K e

the technological

changes a n d melded t h e

ideas of

L i d d e l l Hart, F u l l e r , and d e G a u l l e

i n t o a worKable d o c t r i n e .

O n e of t h e e s s e n t i a l
already seen,

i n g r e d i e n t s of t h a t d o c t r i n e ,

as w e have

i s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r o f f e n s i u e a c t i o n bv

50

c o n c e n t r a t ions o f armored f o r c e s . that, i n very crude terms,

Here t h e p h y s i c i s t m i g h t say panzer d i v i s i o n s

concentrations of

i n n a r r o w z o n e s o f a t t a c K c o n s t i t u t e t h e ma55 v a r i a b l e o f t h e
momentum e q u a t i o n . P r e s s i n g t h e comparison, we s h o u l d r e a d i l v

see t h a t G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t

a l l t h a t remained t o achieue the

d e s i r e d momentum was t o g e t m a s s e s o f t a n K s m o v i n g r a p i d l y toward t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . thought t h e success of Not s u r p r i s i n s l y , than. Gllderian

a panzer corps o r panzer group attacK

depended g r e a t l y on t h e speed w i t h w h i c h fact, he t h o u g h t t h a t a h i g h tempo o f

i t was c a r r i e d o u t .
a tempo t o

In

operations,

w h i c h t h e enemy was u n a b l e t o r e a c t ,

was a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t o t h i s s e c t i o n on

o p e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s . < 6 0 > The p u r p o s e o f

momentum i s t o show how G u d e r i a n g a i n e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d momentum and, i n consequence, l a y o u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of momentum u h i c h

g u i d e d h i s p l a n n i n g and c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t .

I t is c l e a r f r o m b o t h h i s w r i t i n g s a n d o p e r a t i o n s t h a t
G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t o n e s u r e m t h o d o f g a i n i n g momentum i n t h e f i r s t place i s b y s u r p r i s i n g t h e enemy. The r e q u i r e m e n t h e r e Guderian is

not for thought,

complete surprise: was a n e l e m e n t o f enemy

a l l t h a t was n e e d e d ,

surprise s u f f i c i e n t t o render the r e a c t i n g i n a manner c a p a b l e o f

defending

incapable of

d i s r u p t i n g t h e a t t a c K i n g commander's p l a n . sufficient merely t o have t a c t i c a l

N o r was

it

surprise,

f o r the effects What

c r e a t e d would n o t have t h e d e c i s i v e n e s s Guderian sought. was n e e d e d was some way o f

achieving o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e which irrelevant

w o u l d r e n d e r t h e e n e m y ' s r e a c t i o n s t o an a t t a C K

51

because of theoretical

their

laCK o f

timeliness.

Translated from the

into the practical,

t h e q u e s t i o n h e f a c e d was how formations

t o a c h i e v e ? . t l r P r i s e With massed armor tanKS and o t h e r v e h i c l e s . focus, of

with a l l t h e i r

To b r i n g t h e p r o b l e m i n t o c l e a r e r that a panzer d i u i s i o n

we n e e d o n l y t o d i g e s t t h e f a c t

1333 h a d o v e r
OCCUP!~

2600 t r a c K e d a n d w h e e l e d m ~ e h i c l e s a n d c o u l d miles o f r o a d s p a c e . < 6 1 ? The p r o b l e m , of

easily course, with

f i f t y

is

magnif ied

i f o n e wants t o c o n d u c t

a surprise attacK

a corpz. c o n s i s t i n g o f t h r e e s u c h d i u i s i o n s .
Guderian found the

In s p i t e o f

t h e magnitude o f t h e problem, a c h i e v i n g t h e s u r p r i s e and,

t w o rnothods o f

hence,

i n i t i a l momentirm h e

needed t o g a i n dec i s i u e r e s u l t s :
of

n i g h t movements and a v o i d a n c e units.

forward

passage t h r o u g h

infantry

I n e v e r y c a m p a i g n i n w h i c h G u d e r i a n p a r t i c i p a t e d h e made
e x t e n s i v e use of n i g h t movement t o conceal his intentions from

t h e enemy a n d g a i n s u r p r i s e . Pol ish, Flanders,

For t h e opening phases o f t h e a11 attaCK of h i s u n i t s were for instance, i n t o Poland moved into

a n d R u s s i a n Campaign;,

prevarat ions

i n u o l u i n g f o r w a r d movement

conducted a t n i g h t was n o t i f i e d t h e n e x t day

G u d e r i a n 's X I X Flrmy C o r p s ,

on 3 1 Flugust

1333 t h a t

it w o u l d a t t a c K

a t 0445 hours.

H i s corps subsequently

planhed attacK p o s i t i o n s d u r i n g t h e evening of jumped o f f on t i m e

31 Hugust and
preparations f o r
'J

1 September.<62> S i m i l a r l y ,

t h e o p e n i n g p h a s e o f O p e r a t i o n BfiRBfiROSSA r e q u i r e d a l l movement t o b e a c c o m p l i s h e d u n d e r s e t f o r 6415 hours, cover of

irtuall y
with

darltness,

H-hour

22 J u n e

1941.

Guderian thought t h a t

52

t o aid

in achieving surprise

intense but short a r t i l l e r y

' 5

p r e p a r a t i o n s . of fact,

a b o u t one h o u r

d u r a t i o n were a p p r o p r i a t e .

In

he weighed t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f d i s p e n s i n g w i t h t h e t h e o p e n i n g phase of BARBHROSSA, important

a r t i l l e r y Preparation for

t h i n K i n g t h a t p e r h a p s t h e s u r p r i s e e f f e c t was m o r e than the increase

i n German c a s u a l t i e s w i t h o u t t h e p r e p a r a t i o n . preparation

Ultimately,

h e d e c i d e d t o go w i t h t h e o n e - h o u r

becauz.e h e was

c o n v i n c e d t h e R u s s i a n s were c o m p l e t e l y

in the

d a r K a b o u t German o p e r a t i o n a l operations

i n t e n t i o n s . <63> S u b s e q u e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t movement

i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign

under cover of

d a r K n r s s was t h e r u l e r a t h e r t h a n t h e e x c e p t i o n

i n G i l d e r i a n 's c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n s . G u d e r i a n ' s , c r o s s i n g o f t h e D n e i p e r R i v e r on
<0+13' i l l u s t r a t r s n o t o n l y h i s u s e of

10 J u l y

1941

d a r K n e s s t o maSK h i s desire t o

i n t e n t i o n s and a c h i e v e s u r p r i s e b u t a l s o h i s f e r v e n t avoid passing through less mobile would infantry divisions, BY 7 ' J u l y

which
1941

i m p e d e h i s e f f o r t s t o g a i n mornrntum.
' 5

Guderian

Second Panzer Group had r e a c h e d t h e f o r m i d a b l e a n a t u r a l obstacle along which Russian

i f given

One i p e r R i v e r 1 i n e , forces

u o u l d be a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h a coherent defense

t i m e t o do s o . aver

G u d e r i a n ' s panzer t h r u s t s had c a r r i e d h i s u n i t s c o m p l e t e l ~o u t r u n n i n g t h e

450 K i l o m e t e r s i n n i n e t e e n d a y s , infantry

slower moving panzer group. infantry

d i v i s i o n s from t h e armies f o l l o w i n g h i s
i t would taKe

Estimating that

14 d a y s f o r

those

d i v i s i o n s t o c l o s e t o t h e D n e i p e r R i v e r and S e i z e h i s panzer corpz., G u d e r i a n d e c i d e d t o move

bridgeheads f o r

53

u n d e r c o v e r of of t h e D n e i p e r

darKness

i n t o a t t a C K p o s i t i o n s o n t h e west banK

i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r c r o s s i n g s on t h e m o r n i n g o f
his 1 7 t h and 18th Panzer

10 J u l y . T h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f

Divisions s o u t h o f Orsha and t h e

around Mogileu

1 0 t h a n d 3rd P a n z e r O i u i s i o n s

( S e e Map 3 )

tOOK

place smoothly d u r i n g t h e

n i g h t s of 8 and 3 J u l y . G u d e r i a n ' s s u r p r i s e crossing of t h e Dneiper caught t h e Russians off guard,

an advantage Guderian

e x p l o i t e d by o r d e r i n g h i s lead u n i t s t o c o n t i n u e attacKing during the night of

As s u g g e s t e d

10 J u l v . < G J >

e a r l i e r , t h i s exarwle also i l l u s t r a t e s

Guder ian

' 5

avers ion t o p a s s i n g mechan i z e d f o r m a t i o n s t h r o u g h

units.

foot-mobile

General u o n K l u g e , G u d e r i a n ' s

immediate

s u p e r i o r , o b j e c t e d t o G u d e r i a n ' s scheme for c r o s s i n g t h e Dneiprr without the support of wag. t o o r i n K y - - a infantry diuisions, claiming
it

p o i n t t o be addressed

in a later s e c t i o n on

r is^. F o r t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , G u d e r ian ls c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t
was t h a t w a i t i n g f o r t h e
i n f a n t r y u n i t s t o c a t c h up t o t h e

armor f o r m a t i o n s w o u l d d e s t r o y t h e m o m e n t u r n o f t h e a t t a c K ,
which Guder i a n deemed en.sent ial f o r s u c c e s s . Cons istent with

h i s e a r l i e r a r g u m e r n t s a b o u t c r o s s i n g t h e Meuse a n d f i i s n e R i v e r s i n France t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t p a s s i n g m o b i l e

units through

infantry units only

impeded g a i n i n g and

m a i n t a i n i n g momentum. he says:

In f a c t , a b o u t t h e c r o s s i n g o f t h e fiisne

1 d i d n o t c a r e for t h e i d e a of attacKing t h r o u g h t h e i n f a n t r y d i u is i o n s , s i n c e t h e i r numerous and l a r g e s u p p l y columns tended t o

54

blOcK t h e r o a d s . . . . < 6 5 :

In b o t h of

those e a r l i e r operations he argued successfully t h a t and horse-drawn 8Jehicles of the infantry and c o n t r o l b u t t o moue

t h e equipment

d i u i 3 i o n s n u t o n l y s e r v e d t o c o m p l i c a t e command a l s o clC8gged t h e r o a d n e t s ,

w h i c h were v i t a l l y n e e d e d

t a n K j a n d a r m o r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u e h i c l a s a l o n g . Flc i n t h o s e
e a r I i e r o p e r a t i o n s , G u d e r ian s s u p e r i o r - - u o n
case--relented, aid of the Kluge

in t h i s

and Gudsrian crossed t h e Oneiper without t h e t h e r e b y r e t a i n i n g t h e h i g h tempo

infantry diuisions,

a n d momenturn o f

o p e r a t i o n s he d e s i r e d . The payoff

later at
and u u e r

S r n o I e n s K , o f c o u r s e , was p h e n o m e n a l :

185,080 p r i s o n e r s

2000 t a n K s c a p t u r e d .
G u d e r i a n s t e c h n i q u e of n i g h t mouement r a i s e s a n worth examining:
words

issue

how d i d h e c o n t r o l s u c h m o u e m e n t ? H i s own

in

FIrmored F o r c e s p r o u i d e p a r t o f t h e a n s w e r .

C a r e f u l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e u a r ious approaches in friendly territory, especially for night mouements, w i l l add g r e a t l y t o a smooth t r a f f i c f l o w . Gulded by an ample number of r o a d s i g n s a n d t r a f f i c g u a r d s , t h e t P n K S may r e a c h t h e concentrat ion z o n e s q u i e t l y and w i t h o u t t h e use of 1 i g h t s . ( 6 6 )

Here G u d e r i a n
;uccess--study nets.
This

is ~ - 1 i g g e s t i n g t h e o b v i o u s f i r s t s t e p t o w a r d
t h e map, see t h e t e r r a i n a n d

its s u p p o r t i n g r o a d

is e x a c t l y w h a t h e d i d

in h i s operations because

rap i d c o n c e n t r a t ion of

armored format ions and d e e p e x p l o itat ion

i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s require s u p p o r t in9 road networKs, point Gudrrian clearly appreciated.

U s e of

traffic s i g n s and

5s -

g u i d e s a r e o t h e r common s e n s e S t e p s t o t a K e f o r n i g h t rnouement, b u t d e s e r v e arnpl i f i c a t i o n .

control during

Fllthough n o t

established r e g u l a r l y u n t i l t h e beginning o f the Russian Campaign, the Staff of German p a n z e r d i u i ; i o n s h a d an o f f i c e r O f f i c e r f o r M a r c h S u p e r v i s i o n (STOMFl). d e s i g n a t e d as BY t h e o p e n i n g

BRRBRROSSR, e a c h p a n z e r d i v i s i o n h a d a d e 5 i g n a t e d o f f i c e r i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s s e c t i o n whose ~ o s i t l o n t o d a y we m i g h t R e g u l a t i o n and C o n t r o l O f f i c e r C o n t r o l flnnex f o r an

worKing

c a l l t h e G-3,Traffic (G-B/TRACO).

The TRRCO w r o t e t h e T r a f f i c

D p e r a t iorl o r d e r and,

employ i n g a s s e t s f r o m t h e d i v i s i o n

r n i l i t a r y p o l i c e cornpany a n d d i u i s i o n r n o t o r c y c l e r n e s s e n g e r
platoon, ensured t r a f f i c moved i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t a n n e x The c r e a t i o n
in

support of

t h e o v e r a l l concept o f operation.!67> position attests t o the hence,

of this staff traffic

i m p o r t a n c e p l a c e d on n i g h t rnovernent f o r

r e g u l a t i o n and,

secrecy of

purpos.es o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n - - a 1 1 d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a c h i e v i n g o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e a n d mornenturn s o u i t a l t o o p e r a t i o n a l success. I n a d d i t i o n t o mouernent a t n i g h t t o a c h i e v e u n d e t e c t e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of armored f o r c e s and auoidance of passage

t h r o u g h o t h e r u n i t s t o g a i n momentum,

Guderian r e t a i n e d

mornenturn b y m o v i n g d i v i s i o n s a l o n g m u l t i p l e p a r a l l e l a x e s , bypass.ing p o i n t 5 o f r e s i s t a n c e , and a l w a y s e x h o r t i n g h i s

3

s u b o r d i n a t e commanders t o m a i n t a i n o p e r a t ions--speed, he t h o u g h t ,

h i g h terrGo o f

was a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l . immediately

Seldom, d i d G u d e r i a n a l l o w o n e u n i t t o f o l l o w

56

behind another.
Parallel

R a t h e r , he t h o u g h t t h a t m o u e m e n t a l o n g m u l t i p l e
it r e d u c e d t h e

a x e s was rnuch p r e f e r a b l e b e c a u s e

p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t h i s c o r p s o r p a n z e r g r o u p ' s attacKs would s t a l l o u t , and t h i s f o r d

i U

several reasons.

F i r 5 t r with multiple

is i o n s o r c o r p s a t t a c i~ ng a l o n g p a r a 1 lel axes, mutual

SUP POP^ a r r ~ o n g t h o i e f o r m a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y f l a n K s e c u r i t y , was possible. This point

is c l e a r l y

i l l u s t r a t e d by G u d e r i a n ' s

a t t a c K w i t h X I X A r m y C o r p s i n t h e F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n . He c r o s s e d
Luxembourg and t h e Meuse R i v e r w i t h t h r e e p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s abreast, with 1st Panzer Division 2nd and i n t h e c e n t e r d e s i g n a t e d as in

t h e main e f f o r t .

1 ' 3 t h P a n z e r D i v i s i o n s were

positions to protect the

attaCK5.

1st P a n z e r D i u i i i o n f r o m f l a n ~

F1 s e c o n d r e a s o n f o r u s e o f p a r a l l e l a x e s was t h a t S h o u l d o n e d i u i s i o n g e t h e l d up b e c a u s e of s t i f f enemy r e s i s t a n c e , t h e main p o i n t of called--could enjoying

attaCK--Or

schwerpunKt as it

is sometimes

b e s h i f t e d t o a n o t h e r d i v i s i o n o r c o r p s w h i c h was T h i s p r o c e s s of s h i f t i n g t h e s c h w e r P u n K t h a d
it

S U C C ~ : . ~ .

t h e a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t of c o n f o u n d i n g t h e enemy b e c a u s e cont inuall:, p r e s e n t e d h i m w i t h a new t h r e a t ,

requiring the

enemy commander t o r e a c t r a t h e r t h a n d e l i b r r a t e l y e x e c u t e h i s oidn p l a n . N o w h e r e was t h i ;

e f f e c t more pronounced t h a n i n t h e
i n a b i l i t y t o react

F l a n d e r s Campaign.

The F r e n c h h i g h c o r r r n a n d ' s

t o a changing s i t u a t i o n

i n a t i m e l y enough f a s h i o n i r well
What
iS

d o c u m e n t e d a n d n e e d s no f u r t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n h e r e . important f o r present purposes

i s t o u n d e r s t a n d how G u d e r i a n

57

r e t a i n e d t h e momentum o f
so f l e x i b i l i t y

h i s attacK: advance on m u l t i p l e a x e s

i n t h e p o i n t of m a i n e f f o r t c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d .
t h e c o n c e p t o f m u l t i p l e z x e s was n o t

BY i t s e l f , h o w e v e r , s u f f ic i e n t

G u d e r i a n a l s o d i r e c t e d h i s c o m m a n d e r s t o b y p a s s enemy s t r o n g p o i n t s and c e n t e r s o f resistance and l e t follow-on i n f a n t r y u n i t s r e d u c e s u c h p o c ~ e t s . As a n e x a m p l e , R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n G u d e r i a n was

'J

in t h e

iolently opposed t o having h i s

i n pocKet r e d u c t ion
POCKet

P a n z a r d i v is i o n s or c o r p s p a r t i c i p a t e operations. June

A f t e r c l o s u r e of t h e MinsK-BialYstoK

o n 27

1941, G u d e r i a n o p p o s e d

d e l a y i n g panzer elements f r o m

e x e c u t i n g subsequent operat ions which e n t a i l e d c r o s s i n g t h e Beresina River and s e i z i n g the f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e of t h e campaign, t h e area of S m o l e n s K - E l n y a - R o s l a v l . About t h i s

phase o f t h e o p e r a t i o n h e says:

M ! ! views c o n c e r n i n g t h e n e x t stage of t h e o p e r a t i o n s were a s f o l l o w s : t o d e t a c h t h e minimum a m o u n t of t h e Panzer G r o u p f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e R u s s i a n s i n t h e BialVstOK PocKet, w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e m a j o r P a r t of t h i s o p e r a t i o n f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f a n t r y armies: t h u s our r a p i d l y m o b i l e , m o t o r i z e d forces would b e a b l e t o push forward and seize t h e f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t iue o f t h e campaign.. C68>

..

E v i d e n t l y , G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e r n was t h a t v a l u a b l e a n d i r r e p l a c e a b l e c o m b a t power n e e d e d f o r a c h i e v e m e n t of o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s would b e d i s s i p a t e d by u s i n g p a n z e r and P a n z e r - g r e n a d ier d i u is i o n s t o r e d u c e e n e m y PocKets of resistance. Moreover, and t h i s
is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l ,

Guderian

58

t h o u g h t ~ . u c hp a u s e s

i n t h e tempo of o p e r a t i o n s would d e s t r o y allow t h e enemy t o e s t a b l i s h

t h e momentum of t h e a t t a C K ,

c o h e r e n t d e f e n s e s , and ser i o u s l v j e o p a r d i z e t h e a t t a i n m e n t of Key o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s ,

As t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i l l u s t r a t e s ,

G u d e r ian

'5

c o n c e p t i o n of

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t demanded a h i g h t e m p o o r s p e e d of o p e r a t i o n s .

I n t h e F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n h i s army c o r p s c o v e r e d 50 m i l e s i n t h e

f i r s t t w o d a y s of t h e c a m p a i g n ;

o n 20 Flay a l o n e ,

in excellent

t a n K c o u n t r y , h i s l e a d e l e m e n t s c o v e r e d 56 m i l e s . < B 9 > I n t h e seven days between

149 m i l e s , 13 May a n d 20 May

h i s panzer u n i t s covered

an a u e r a g e d i s t a n c e o f 2 1 m i l e s p e r d a y . S i m i l a r l y ,

i n t h e R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n h i s p a n z e r u n i t s C G U e r e d 273 m i l e s i n
the f i r s t 7 days, and by
16 J u l y

1941 < 0 + 2 5 ) h i s f o r c e s h a d

p e n e t r a t e d 413 m i l e s

into the Russian frontier.

Here t h e

s u e r a g e d i s t a n c e ? . a c h i e v e d u e r e 39 m i l e s f o r t h e f i r s t s e v e n d a y s , t h e maxirnurn d i s t a n c e i n a n y o n e d a y h a u i n g b e e n 72 i n T h e War

miles.<70> blriting about Guderian's operations Lords, John Strawson says:

T h e e s s e n c e o f B1 i t z K r i e g was.. . s u r p r i s e , s p e e d a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n . T h e t h r e e t h i n g s were o f c o u r s e s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g . They f e d u p o n e a c h other. Surprlse f a c i l i t a t e d speed; speed f o s t e r e d surprise; c o n c e n t r a t i o n enhanced b o t h . (71 >

T h i s is a n a p t c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n b o t h o f G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s a n d o f t h e d y n a m i c s a m o n g s u r p r i s e ? . s p e e d , a n d mass. A s s u g g e s t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n o n momentum,

mass

59

m u l t i p l i e d b y s p e e d g i v e s a mornenturn v e c t o r .

In o r d e r t o

act, i e u e t h e

i n i t i a l momentum, G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t s u r p r i s e
illustrate t h a t he

i n d i s p e n s a b l e , and h i s o p e r a t i o n a l methods

went t o great p a i n s t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e whensver he cciild.

A surprise

armor a t t a c ~ - - s u r p r i s i n g in

its l o c a t i o n , his

f o r c e compos it i o n , c h a n g ing d i r s c t i o n , P a n z e r u n i t s t o p u n c h t h r o u g h We2.K

and speed--enabled

d e f e n s i v e areas

into the

r e a r o f t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s . TaKen by t h e m s e l v e s , h o w e v e r , s u c h
P r o c e d u r e s w o u l d n o t , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t , b e s u f f i c i e n t . He t h o u g h t m a i n t e n a n c e o f m o m e n t u r n was e s s e n t i a l o p e r a t ionill objectives and, hence, if

seizure of

operational decisiveness

were t o b e a c h i e u e d .

T h e r e f o r e , h e s o u g h t t o moue Parlzer

d i v i s i o n s and c o r p s a l o n g p a r a 1 l e l axes t o w a r d o p e r a t i o n a l objectives.

I-LIPPOP~ one

P a r a l l e l movement would a l l o w a t t a c K i n g u n i t s t o

a n o t h e r , b y p a s s s t r o n g p o i n t s when n e c e s s a r y , a n d

c o n d u c t c o n v e r g i n g attacK5 when n e c e s s a r y t o s e i z e o p e r a t i o n a l ob.jectives. But

i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n a h i g h tempo of

o p e r a t i o n s , c o n g e s t e d a r e a s a n d enemy c e n t e r s of re5 i s t a n c e h a d
t o be bypassed. p o c K e t s of e n ~ e n t u a I:, l And m o b i l e f o r c e s c o u l d n o t b e t i e d U P r e d u c i n g o t h e r w i s e , s p e e d a n d momentum a n d ,

re5 istance:

the

i n i t i a t i u e ~ o u l db e l o s t .

To s u m m a r i z e b r i e f l y

, t h e following f iue tenets guided

G u d e r i a n i n h i s e f f o r t s t o g a i n a n d m a i n t a i n t h e mornenturn i n h i s c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n a l art:

Siirpr ise attacKs by

heavy c o n c e n t r a t ions of armored f o r c e s are essential f o r o p e r a t i o n a l success.

60

FIuo i d p a s s i n g t h r o u g h o t h e r f r i e n d l y f o r m a t i o n s b e c a u s e s u c h p a s s a g e s r e d u c e mornenturn.
flttacK o n r n u l t i p l e p a r a l l e l
sxes.

B y p a s s e n e m y s t r o n g p o i n t s w i t h mobile f o r c e s : u s e less m o b i l e f o r c e s t o r e d u c e a r e a s o f re5 i s t a n c e .

Keep m o o i n g a t t h e g r e a t e s t speed--re i n f o r c e s u c c e s s .

PGSSible

It

is a r g u a b l e t h a t o f t h e s e f i u e t s n e t s G u d e r i a n p r o b a b l y elements. flnd

r e g a r d e d s u r p r i s e a n d s p e e d as t h e two e s s e n t i a l s i n c e h e saw t h a t s p e e d o f

o p e r a t i o n s b e 3 e t s s u r p r i s e and

f u r t h e r arnpl i f i e s i t s e f f e c t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n e m y c o m m a n d a n d control structure,

it
i5

a l s o probably t r u e t h a t he thought

s p e e d was t h e a b s o l u t e l y Key p r i n c i p l e f o r s u c c e s s operations. It

is n o w o n d e r ,

in rnobile

then, that his troops

a f f e c t i o n a t e l y c a l l e d him "Hurrying Heinz."

61

cor#mrn

a n d CONTROL

Guderian's exercise of divisions

command a n d c o n t r o l

over

panzer

and p a n z e r c o r p s r e v e a l s h i s t e n e t s f o r force:

controlling his

h i g h l y m o b i l e combat leaderzhip style, because

and a l s o a i v e s a g l i m p s e o f and c h a r a c t e r . is This i s so

personality,

a command a n d c o n t r o l p h i l o s o p h y

intimately t i e d t o Guderian's

t h e commander's

l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e and p h i l o s o p h y .

command and c o n t r o l p r o c e d u r e s o f f e r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e r e were t h r e e t e n e t s f o r control for the s o r t of an a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t o f h e commanded:

he thought
command a n d (1) lead

mobile forces

from the front;

(2) have a s m a l l ,

h i g h l y r n o b i l e cornmand p o s t : t o the greatest

(3) e m p l o y w i r e l e s s - r a d i o
possible extent.

communications

I n h i s booK German G e n e r a l s o f

W o r l d War

I f ,

Major-General

F . W.

von M e l l e n t h i n t e l l s a s t o r y about Heinz Guderian which importance Guderian accorded h i s f i r s t lead from the front. in full. von

aptly reflects the p r i n c i p l e of Me1 l e n t h i n

'5.

command a n d c o n t r o l : story

i : w o r t h r e c o u n t in9

D u r i n g t h e Campaign i n F r a n c e , C o l o n e l D i n g l e r was d e t a c h e d b y t h e Army H i g h Command t o G u d e r i a n 's P a n z e r C o r p s as a 1 i a i s o n o f f i c e r . I n s e a r c h i n g f o r t h e g e n e r a l ' 5 command p o s t , O i n g l e r r a n i n t o a r t i l l e r y f i r e and g o t t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e German a t t a c k i n t h a t j e c t o r was n o t g o i n g a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n . I n a d i t c h a t t h e r o a d s i d e he s p o t t e d a d i v i s i o n a l cornmandrr t a K i n g c o v e r w i t h one o f h i s s t a f f

62

o f f i c e r s . He j o i n e d t h e r n a n d a s K e d w h e r e h e c o u l d f i n d General Guderian. With a laugh they t o l d h i m , " I f y o u w a n t t o 5PBa.K t o t h e g e n e r a l , g r a b a r i f l e a n d i n c h y o u r way U P t o t h e c r e s t i n f r o n t o f u s . H e ' s UP t h e r e among t h e men, taKing potshots a t the French."<72>

A l t h o u g h t h i s s t o r y o v e r s t a t e s t h e case and r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n u h e t h e r a c o r p s comniander s h o u l d b e s p e n d i n g h i s v a l u a b l e t i m e " t a K i t l 9 p o t s h o t z " a t t h e enemy, Guderian thought

i t s fundamental p o i n t

is c l e a r :

a l l commanders s h o u l d b e w e l l

f o r w a r d so t h e y

c o u l d e x e r c i s e command a n d c o n t r o l t h r o u g h p e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e . Guderian's forces, comments o n t h e cornrnand a n d c o n t r o l o f

1336-37

armored

idhich he r e c o r d e d i n

i n "Flrrnored F o r c e s

,"

r e f l e c t s t h a t h i s s e n t i m e n t j were n o t a f t e r - t h e - f a c t r e f l e c t i o n s on t h e c o n t r o l o f s u c h u n i t s . commanders must p o s t themselves f a r He s t a t e d : '"F111

in f r o n t ,

w h e r e t h e y may

c o n s t a n t l y s u p e r v i s e t h e advance o f t h e i r Personal tenet influence

u n i t s and b r i n g t h e i r into this

t o bear."<73? Guderian p u t t e e t h

as w e l l

b y s p e n d i n g much t i m e down a t r e g i m e n t s ,

battalions,

and companies t r y i n g t o assess t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e c h a n g i n g combat it is

"f inger

h i s s o l d i e r s and t h e d y n a m i c s o f

s i t u a t i b n . ( 7 4 ) The German p h r a s e f o r
s p i z e n g e f u e h l ," a n d
LiKe

i t rneans a f e e l

through the fingertips. Guderian believed t h a t for t h e ebb and f l o w Moreover, he

most of

t h e German o f f i c e r

corps,

t h e o n l y way a l e a d e r c a n h a v e a t r u e f e e l of a battle

i s t o be where t h e a c t i o n i s - - f o r w a r d . i n fast-mouing operations,

also

thought t h a t

the only place

63

f r o m w h i c h t h e c o m m a n d e r can e f f e c t i v e l y
by maKing t i m e l y d e c i s i o n s the battlefield.

i n f l u e n c e t h e act i o n
on

is f o r u a r d a t t h e c r i t i c a l s p o t ;
in P o l a n d ,

I n t ~ i r t u a l le ~ very operation

F l a n d e r s , a n d Russia G u d e r i a n l o c a t e d h i m s e l f

well-forward

with

t h e cornbat u n i t s w h e r e h e t h o u g h t h i s most t h r e a t e n e d formationi were. For example, i n t h e o p e n i n g p h a s e of his XIX

Army C o r p s ' 4 t t a C K

into Poland,

he a c c o m p a n i e d t h e 3 r d P a n z e r

Brigade of

t h e 3 r d Panzer O i u i s i o n , t h e c o r p s main e f f o r t ,

in

a n a r m o r e d command v e h i c l e .

In r e l a t i n g t h i s s t o r y , G u d e r i a n

p r o u d l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t h e was t h e f i r s t c o r p s c o m m a n d e r e v e r t o accompany t a n K s into battle

in t h a t f a s h i o n . < 7 5 > Although he

the

t h o u g h t t h a t many times

i n c o r n b a t t h e mere p r e s e n c e o f

commander m i g h t b e B u f f icient t o m a i n t a i n t h e h i g h tempo of o p e r a t i o n s he b e l i e v e d n e c e s s a r y f o r s u c c e s : , u n d e r s t o o d t h a t commanders, Guderian also had

e v e n i ~ e r ys e n i o r c o m m a n d e r s , immediately should

t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t Y t o taKe c h a r g e

inevitable

f r i c t i o n b e g i n t o s l o w t h e pace o f o p e r a t i o n s a n d j e o p a r d i z e

s u c c e s s . A n o t h e r example i n v o l v i n g t h e 3 r d P a n z e r D i v i s i o n i n
t h e Pol i s h Campaign t o his principle of P o l i;h

illustrates Guderian
leading forward.

' 5

cons istent adherence

fit o n e p o i n t e a r l y

in the

C a m p a i g n t h e 3 r d P a n z e r D i u is i o n 's a t t a C K s t a l l e d o u t
in t h e P o l i s h Corridor

along t h e Brahe River

when

its commander

was c a l l e d bacK t o

firmy

Group H e a d q u a r t e r s .

G u d e r i a n heard

a b o u t t h e s t a l l e d a t t a c K f r o m a y o u n g l i e u t e n a n t who b o l d l y t o l d Guderian the sad s i t u a t i o n at t h e r i v e r l i n e .

He

64

immediatslv

went forward,

p i c K i n g h i s way

among

i d l e German a n d

burned out P o l i s h uehicles, s i t u a t ion,

toOK c h a r g e o f a c o n f u s e d and

ordered reconnaissance u n i t s across t h e r i v e r , i n t o w h i c h he began m o v i n g i s no isolated

e s t i b l ished a bridgehead

anK5 a s inc ident ;

r a p i d l y as h e c o u l d . < 7 6 > This example G u d e r i a n h a d an uncanny c r i t i c a l place--at spizengefuehl he had s t a y e d headquarters. Several factors "lead forward" preached. ability

t o be a t t h e r i g h t P a c e - - t h e he e v i n c e d f i n g e r
50

the r i g h t tirnr:

a t every turn.

B u t h e n e v e r c o u l d h a v e done

if

i n and a r o u n d h i s c o r p s o r p a n z e r g r o u p

allowed Guderian t o p u t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f First, he p r a c t i c e d what he

into operation.

RY g o i n g f o r w a r d h e s e t t h e e x a m p l e ;

he v i r t u a l l y

forced h i s subordinate corps, commanders t o go f o r w a r d a l s o .

d i u i s ion,

and r e g i m e n t a l

One o f h i s m e t h o d s o f o p e r a t i o n forward

was t o m e e t c o r p s a n d d i v i s i o n a l c o m m a n d e r s a t t h e i r command p o c t s . formal There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t he e v e r

i n s i s t e d on

b r i e f ing;,

preferring

instead t o discuss the current a s i m p l e o p e r a t i o n s map. a

s i t u a t i o n and f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s o v e r Second, there

i s ample e v i d e n c e t h a t Guderian b e l i e v e d t h a t command a n d c o n t r o l

corollar'/ "Keep

t o h i s three-tenet

p h i l o s o p h y was
5tOt-l'

it s i m p l e . "

On t h i s s c o r e ,

Guderian recounts t h e

of

h i s encounter

with General uon Hindenburr Hindenburg remarKed t h a t

a t t h e c l o s e of
" ' [ i l n war

the

1933 m a n e u v e r s .

o n l y what

i<. s i m p l e can succeed.

I v i s i t e d the s t a f f o f the Cavalry

Guderian's r e f l e c t i o n

Curps.

What

I saw t h e r e was n o t s i m p l e . " '

65

on H i n d e n b u r g '

r e m a r K s was:
5

"He was qu i t e r i g h t . " < 7 7 >The i n fast-mov i n g

connect ion between

imp1 i c i t y and s u c c e s s

operations should be c l e a r : c ~ n v e v e dt h e c o m m a n d e r ' s

a simple plan which c l e a r l y o v e r a l l p u r p o s e and w h i c h

intent or

l e a v e s t h e e x e c u t i o n l a r g e l y UP t o s u b o r d i n a t e cornrnanders w i l l have a g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of any s o r t , s u c c e s s t h a n an e l a b o r a t e p l a n o f i r r e l e v a n t once t h e

W h i c h w o u l d s u r e l y become intervened.

f r i c t i o n o f idar Hfter t h e flrrnv change

t h e war

Guderian lamented t h a t H i t l e r ' s c o n t r o l over

in t h e l a t e r stages o f

H i g h Command

t h e war

led t o a

i n the standard "'procedure of

assigning m i s s i o n s ' by

w h i c h t h e s u b o r d i n a t e commander r e c e i v e d a m i s s i o n w i t h manner o f e x e c u t i o n l e f t t o h i s own

its

i n i t i a t i v e . " < 7 8 > This

p r o c e d u r e g a v e wa!, outdated by events.

t o r i g i d o r d e r s t h a t were f r e q u e n t l y

H t h i r d P o i n t i s t h a t h e a l s o Knew h e c o u l d
fluid o p e r a t i o n s b y r e l y i n g on

n o t command s u c h f a s t ,

i n f o r m a t i o n corning UP f r o m r e g iment t o d i v i s i o n t o c o r p s . Because t h e f r o n t s on w h i c h he advanced were r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w , h e was a b l e t o f o c u s the o p r r a t ion--the

f i r s t hand. <79>

h i s a t t e n t i o n on t h e c r i t i c a l a s p e c t of get c r i t i c a l informat ion

schwerpunKt--and

A f i n a l f a c t o r must h a v e been t h e degree of

confidence h e was a b l e t o h o l d i n h i s s t a f f ,

t r u s t and

espec i a l l ? h i s Gudrrian

chiefs of staff. maKes Post,

T h r o u g h o u t h i s booK P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

i t c l e a r t h a t h e s p e n t l i t t l e t i m e a t h i s m a i n command
where h i s c h i e f of s t a f f and t h e b u l ~ of his staff

66 -

o f f i c e r s worKed. for instance,

During t h e c r i t i c a l b a t t l e s around S n i o l e n s ~ ,
'5

d u r i n g which Guder i a n

a n d H o t h 's p a n z e r g r o u p s

e n c i r c l e d m o r e t h a n t e n R u s s i a n d i v i s i o n s a n d 2000 t a n K s , G u d e r i a n was a b s e n t f r o r n h i s p a n z e r g r o u p h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r twenty-two h o u r s . C 8 0 > Hence, h e r e 1 i e d h e a v i l y o n t h e

c o m p e t e n c e o f h i s c h i e f o f s t a f f t o r u n o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e h e was forward. An i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t t h a t s u p p o r t s t h i s view is that

G u d e r i a n made e v e r y e f f o r t t o taKe h i s c o r p s a n d g r o u p s t a f f s w i t h h i m a s h e mo'Jed f r o m o i i e c o m m a n d t o a new c o m m a n d . When h e

g a v e u p cornmand o f t h e X I X Flrrny C o r p s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e P a l i s h Campaign, G u d e r i a n tooK h i s s t a f f Then, with him f o r the

attacK

i n t o France.

when h e t o o K command of P a n z e r g r u p p e
t h e Campaign

G u d e r i a n f o r the s e c o n d p h a s e of
t o o K h i s s t a f f f r o m XI:!

in France, he

Army C o r p s w i t h h i r n . < 8 1 > I n e s s e n c e ,

LO

t h e y b e c a m e h i s new p a n z e r g r o u p s t a f f , z r n o o t h o p e r a t i o n s was b u i l t

t h e mechanism f o r

i n t o G u d e r i a n ' s own e s t a b l i s h e d This

s t a f f p r o c e d u r e s and t h e t h i n K i n g of h i s s t a f f o f f i c e r s .
is a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t b e c a u s e a s K e n n e t h MacKseY a r g u e s :

N e l t h e r t h e wider f r o n t a g e [of a g r o u p 1 n o r t h e i n c r e a s e d enemy r e s i s t a n c e made a n y d i f f e r e n c e t o G u d e r i a n ' s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n s . He h a n d l e d a Group as h e h a n d l e d a Corps--by p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p a t t h e f r o n t by w i r e l e s s - - a n d overcame t h e p a u c i t y o f t h e r o a d s b y WorKing h i s s t a f f a n d d r i v e r s t h a t much h a r d e r i n h i s e f f o r t s t o Keep i n t o u c h w i t h t h e t a n K s a t t h e s p e a r h e a d o f t h e a c t i o n . (82)

The salient f e a t u r e of

t h i s comrnent

is t h a t

it r e f l e c t s t h a t

G u d e r i a n commanded a n d c o n t r o l l e d a g r o u p o f

two t o four

COPPS

67

i n t h e sarne m a n n e r h e c o n t r o l l e d a c o r p s o f t h r e e d i u i s i o n s :
led from the front. m a t t e r e d uer!, For Guderian, size of the organization

he

l i t t l e .

Rut

i n order t o apply t h i s f i r s t

tenet o f

h i s command a n d c o n t r o l p h i l o s o p h y , tido o t h e r t e n e t s : emPhy a small,

LIST

Guderian had t o adhere to

h i g h l y r n o b i l e f o r w a r d command

p o s t a n d maKe e x t e n s i v e airplane. Consistent

o f w i r e l e s s cornrnunications and an

i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of

the p r i n c i p l e o f equal

mob il i t ? among c o m b i n e d a r m s u n i t % , G u d e r I a n deemed i t e z s e n t i a l t h a t he o p e r a t e o u t o f command p o s t . a zmall, mobile forward "rnaneuuer

a tanK
,

In

"Flrrnored F o r c e s " h e s t a t e s t h a t

b e i n g r a p i d and

i t being necessary f o r
h i s command,"

t h e commander o f

u n i t t o be a t t h e head of uehicler that

o n l y armored s i g n a l

p o z s e s s h i g h m o b i l i t y c a n be u s e d . < S 3 > t h e requ irement f o r h i g h rnob il i t y v i r t u a l l y

Furthermore,

d i c t a t e d t h a t h i s forward otherwise,

command p o s t b e s m a l l a n d a u s t e r e :

h i s cornmand p o s t c o u l d n e v e r d i s p l a c e r a p i d l Y a n d b e

r e s p o n s i v e t o h i s need t o remain w i t h t h e 5chwerpunKt. d e s c r i b e s h i s own command s t a f f

Guderian

a t t h e beginning o f t h e Russian

C a m p a i g n as a command s . t a f f c o n s i s t i n g o f t w o a r m o r e d w i r e l e s s trucKs,

a "number o f cross c o u n t r y u e h i c l e s , "

a n d some

r n o t o r c y c l i s t s . ( 8 4 ) C o m p l e m e n t i n g t h i s command p o s t a r r a n g e m e n t a n d h i s command a n d c o n t r o l p h l l o s O p h y was G u d e r i a n ' s u s e o f

light

l i a i s o n plane,

a Fieseler Storch

(Fl

156).

He f r e q u e n t l y

used t h i s d e d i c a t e d p l a n e t o t r a n s p o r t

h i m s e l f q u i c K 1 7 t o one influence the action.

of

h i s c o r p s so he c o u l d be on hand t o

68

H a v i n g e n h a n c e d m o b i l i t y t h r o u g h t h e use o f ParticularlY beneficial

a plane proved

i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign b e c a u s e o f t h e

'vast d i s t a n c a s h i s g r o u n d u n i t s c o v e r e d a t a r a p i d p a c e . Frequently, and h a l i e he would l e a v e h i s forward command p o s t b y p l a n e l a n d r o u t e t o meet h i r n

i t moue b y t h e m o s t e x p e d i t i o u s

a t a predetermined location, a r m o r e d command u e h i c l e . The f i n a l operate forward

w h e r e h e w o u l d o n c e a g a i n moue b y

c r i t i c a l element which allowed Guderian t o a5 h e d i d w i t h a s m a l l , C l e x i b l e command p o s t H i s t r a i n i n g and

in signal
unit5

was h i s r e l i a n c e o n r a d i o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . experiences a s a cornmander a n d s t a f f

officer

d u r i n g W o r l d War

I convinced Guderian t h a t w i r e l e s s
an o p e r a t i o n 1

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w o u l d be an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of d o c t r i n e Which e n v i s i o n e d t h e employment of a fluid, way fast-moving battlefield. Otherwise,

armored u e h i c es on t h e r e would be no

a c o r p s o r g r o u p commander,

whose p e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e was over

r e q u i r e d a t t h e f o r w a r d edge, some 300,000 men divisions.

c o u l d ever maintain c o n t r o l

i n f o u r c o r p s a n d a s many a s t h i r t e e n

There had t o be L secure, Hence,

w i r e l e s s means o f

cornmun i c a t i o n . diuisions, commander

' 5

Guder i a n e n s u r e d t h a t h i s p a n z e r

i n c l u d i n g most o f h i s t a n K s and a l l h i s s u b o r d i n a t e command p o s t s , were 1 inKed by w i r e l e s s

communications.

In t h e two armored c a r s which comprised h i s

secure w i r e l e s s

m o b i l e command p o s t h e h a d r e d u n d a n t communications, chief

of

e n a b l i n g hirn t o communicate r a p i d l y w i t h h i s and m a j o r s u b o r d i n a t e commanders. For h i s attaCK

staff

63

into France

in

1940 a l m o s t a l l o f

t h e tanKs

in h i s t h r e e panzer

d i v i s i o n s had r a d i o s which e n a b l e d t h e m t o r e c e i u e s h o r t "frag orders" in response t o rapidly changing circumstances. o f t h e F r e n c h tanK5 were in Guderian's judgment
69

cilntrast, o n l y about o n e - f i f t h
similarly outf itted.<85:

Moreover,

Command f a c i l i t i e s o n G e r m a n t a n K s were f i r s t c l a s s , a l w a y s b e t t e r than t h e enemy's.<86: There are,

i t seems, g o o d r e a s o n s t o h o l d t h a t G u d e r i a n

t h o u g h t t h r e e t e n e t s o f c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l were o f p a r a m o u n t importance i n t h e conduct of operational art.

F i r s t , a1 1 c o m m a n d e r s - - i n c l u d i n s o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l commanders--MUST l e a d f r o m l o c a t i o n s t h a t a r e well forward.

S e c o n d , a s m a l l , h i g h l y m o b i l e command p o s t , s u p p l e m e n t e d a t times by a n a i r m o b i l e c a p a b i l i t y , is r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l i n f a5 t -mo ,J i n g w a r f a r e

T h i r d , s e c u r e w i r e l e s s commun i c a t i o n s 1 i n K i n 9 t h e Key h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s a r e essential t o d e l i v e r t i m e l y o r d e r s in a r a p i d l y changing situation.

I t s h o u l d a l s o b e c l e a r t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s p l a y e d an role

important

i n b i n d i n g t h i s command a n d c o n t r o l p h i l o s o p h y t o g e t h e r .
l e a s t anions a r m o r e d a n d

C e r t a i n l y a commonly u n d e r s t o o d - - a t motorized off icers--doctrine forces played an

f o r t h e ernployrnent o f
R r i g o r o u s pre-war

armored training

important part.

P r o g r a m a n d a G e n e r a l S t a f f w h i c h s h a r e d a v i e w o n how t o f i g h t w e r e 3150 i n s t r u m e n t a l

i n a l l o w i n g Guderian and o t h e r

70

c o m m a n d e r s t o cornrnand a n d c o n t r o l
i t m i g h t be s a i d t h a t

i n t h e manner h e d i d .

Today

l e a v i n g t h e m a i n command p o s t a n d t h e plans t o staff officers engenders

formulation an e l e m e n t

and e x e c u t i o n o f of
r i s K

as w e l l

as t r u s t .

Guderiari p r o b a b l y would that war

i 5

h a v e a g r e e d w i t h t h i s b u t gone on t o p o i n t o u t

itself

i ; a PiSKy b u s i n e s s anyway.
subject of thic chapter.

How h e d e a l t w i t h r i s k

the f i n a l

71

R ISK

BY now

it

s h o u l d b e a p p a r e n t t h a t H e i n z G u d e r i a n was n o e1Jen L o r d W a v e 1 1 ' s ! others

from h i s

o r d i n a r y f i e l d commander by any s t a n d a r d s , T h e r e i s e v i d e n c e of foolhardiness,

w h a t some w o u l d c a l l r a s h n e s s ,

on G u d e r i a n ' s p a r t . e b s e n t i n g h i m s e l f twenty-two

m a i n command P o s t f o r

h o u r s while c r i t i c a l b a t t l e s f o r example,

raged d u r i n g t h e c l o s i n g of

t h e SmolensK PocKet,

leaves Guderian open t o c h a r g e s of taKlng unreasonable

opcrat ional
r islc.
Cross i n s t h e

Meuse,

Aisne, and One iper R i v e r s

without t h e support of

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s m i g h t be t h o u g h t
A m u c h more s e r i o u s c h a r g e m i g h t

f o o l i s h on G u d e r i a n ' s part.

be

l e v i e d a g a i n s t Guderian as r e f l e c t e d

i n G e n e r a l v o n BOCK'S

words t o G e n e r a l H a l d e r , C h i e f
the F l a n d e r s Campaign:

of

t h e General S t a f f , c o n c e r n i n g

YOU w i l l b e c r e e p i n g a l o n g t e n r n i l e s f r o m t h e f l a n K o f t h e M a g i n o t L i n e a s Y O U breaK t h r o u g h , and hoping t h a t t h e French w i l l watch i n e r t l y . You a r e c r a m m i n g t h e mass o f t a n K s t o g e t h e r i n t o t h e n a r r o w r o a d s of t h e A r d e n n e s as if t h e r e were n o s u c h t h i n g a s a i r p o w e r . And t h e n Y O U h o p e t o l e a d a n o p e r a t i o n as f a r as t h e c o a s t w i t h a n o p e n s o u t h e r n f l m K 2E16 r n i l e s l o n g , w h e r e s t a n d s t h e mass o f t h e F r e n c h

F1rrrw. < 8 7 >

T h i s s t a t e m e n t b y v o n BUCK r e p r e s e n t s a s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m o f

Guderian's operational art because e x t r a o r d i n a r y gambles

it

s u g g e s t s h e was t a K i n g

i n o p e r a t i n g t h e way h e d i d .

72

N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e s h o w s t h a t G u d e r i a n was no g a m b l e r : r a t h e r , h e was a n a b l e p r a c t i o n e r o f t h e appropr iate--tooK

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t who saw, we i g h e d , a n d - - w h e n

c a l c u l a t e d P i s K s and a d o p t e d measures t o m i n i m i z e t h o s e risKs. G e n e r a l 'Jon BOCK ' c c r i t i c i s m o f t h e F l a n d e r s o p e r a t i o n a l concept is a u s e f u l p l a c e t o b e g i n a n a n a l y s i s b e c a u s e

it

p o i n t s t o two c r i t l c a l a r e a s of G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s which e n t a i l e d t h e acceptance of

r isK:

concentrat in9 armored

f o r r n a t i o n s i n t h e p r e s e n c e of e n e m y a i r power a n d a t t a c K i n g with long exposed flanKs. Flccording t o S h e l f o r d B i d w e l l booK F i r e - P o w e r , could

OCCUPY

and DominicK Graham i n t h e i r

t h e f i g h t i n g e c h e l o n s of

a panzer d i v i s i o n

f i + t y miles of

r o a d s p a c e . j u s t i n admin i s t r a t i v e

march c o l u m n . ( 8 8 ) C o n s i d e r i n g t h e f a c t t h a t p a n z e r d i u is i o n s
had over 2600 w h e e l e d a n d t r a c K e d ' J e h i C l e s ,

t h e i r a s s e r t i o n is

p r o b a b l y t r u e , and whether

i n admin i s t r a t i u e o r t a c t i c a l march

o r d e r , armored a n d m o t o r i z e d columns rnoving a l o n g t h e narrow r o a d s of

a p l a c e l i K e t h e Flrdennes a r e l u c r a t i v e t a r g e t s f o r an

enemy w i t h a i r p o w e r . G u d e r i a n s u r e l y r e c o g n i z e d t h i s b u t t h o u g h t s e v e r a l f a c t o r s would o p e r a t e t o r e d u c e t h e
PiSK.

F i r s t , t h e r e were g o o d r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e n e i t h e r t h e F r e n c h n o r t h e B r i t i s h e x p e c t e d an attaclt
Ardenner-.
in strength through t h e

Moreover, because of t h e g e n e r a l l y poor

in t h e Flrdennes,

trafficability for vehicles

t h e r e was n o

r e a s o n f o r t h e A l l i e s t o t h i n K a n a t t a c K by t a n K 5 w o u l d e v e r come t h r o u g h t h e r e . T h e s e t w o f a c t o r s o f s u r p r i s e

73

alone--1ocat ion o f for

a t t a C K and f o r c e

corr@osi t i o n - - w e r e

reasons
an a t t a c K

Guder i a n t o c o n s i d e r

ma55

in3

armored iolurnns f o r

t h r o u g h t h e Rrdenne;. armored f o r c e s were

Furthermore,

he b e 1 i e v e d h i g h l y m o b i l e achie'Jing a t h i r d of the rate

one n i g h t

inherently capible of

e l e m e r ~ to f s u r p r i s e - - t i m i n g o f t h e

attacK--becau:.e

a t which t h e y c o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d .

I n t h e c0ur5.s o f

s e v e r a l p a n z e r and m o t o r i z e d d i v i i i o n s d i s p e r s e d a s s e m b l * / a r e a 5 fatc o n c e a l e d a t t a c ~p o s i t i o n s atticK. Here, than, behirjd t h e

c o u l d be moved f r o m 1 i n 6 o4 d e p a r t u r e t o rnornirg Campaietn i5.e h e that

fGr

a n u n e x p e c t e d e:+rl). i n t h e F1 i n d e r :

w ? r e t h r e e ways

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t h i s arrinot-rd f o r c e ? . c o u l d g a i n t h e z ! ; r p r thought e s s e n t iil f o r operitiona! 5uiros:. He r l i o !':new

r, i g h t riluverient

i n t o r e l c c t e d a t A : a c K F o : i + ior,?. + h e e ' J e r i i r , ? attacK. priority even

If

before

w o u l d s e r v e t o r e d u c e a n y r i s K o f a n enemy a i r t i r s t

He f u r t h e r r e a s o n e d t h a t s i n c e t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s
i n t h e c a m p a i g n was t h e 5 e i z u r e o f

air superiority,

Just

locally,

h i s p a n z e r coiurnns would have L i t t l e t o f e a r

from

F r e n c h o r B r i t i s h a i r p o w e r a s t h e y moved t h r o u g h t h e r e % t ri c t i v e A r d e n n e s t e r r a i n . Finaiiy, a i r reconnaissance l i g h t l y defended by

s h o w e d t h a t t h e e r d e t i n e s r e g i o n was o n l y four

F r e n c h c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n s a n d some B e l g i a n u n i t s s t r u n g o u t K i l o m e t e r f r o n t . t S S > Hence, t h e most d i r e c t i n the

~n a s i x t y - f i v e

approach toward t h e B r i t i s h - F r e n c h

center o f g r a v i t y

F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n was t h r o u g h t h e A r d e n n e s , German d i v i s i o n s , di'Jizions,

w h e r e some 45

i n c l u d i n s seven p a n z e r and t h r e e m o t o r i z e d and

w e r e t o a t t a c K . < 3 0 > G u d e r i a n Knew a l l t h i s ,

74

b e c a u s e he be1 i e v e d t h e element of

surprise and c o n c e n t r a t ion

a t n i g h t w o u l d g i v e h i s u n i t s an a d v a n t a g e , h e t h o u g h t t h e
c a l c u l a t e d risK e n t h i l e d b y c o n c e n t r a t i n g a r m o r e d f o r c e s

in t h e

p r e s e n c e of of

a i r p o w e r was r e a s o n a b l e . He a l s o t h o u g h t t h e s i z e

the o ~ ~ o s i n en ge m y f o r c e a n d t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g s i z e o f

G e r m a n y ' s own f o r c e s w e i g h e d h e a v i l y i n f a v o r o f a c c e p t i n g t h e
risl(, especially cunsidering t h e g i g a n t i c payoff
operation succeed. In o r d e r t o succeed, however, should the

t h o s e 45

d i u is i o n s h a d t o g e t t h r o u g h t h e A r d e n n e s b o t t l e n e c K q u i c ~ l y ,
5 0

s p e e d was e s s e n t i a l . I t was o n t h i s q u e s t i o n o f s p e e d t h a t G u d e r i a n ' s a n d v o n

BocK'z. a n a l y s e s d i v e r g e d .

Notice t h a t

i n h i s v i s i o n of a n

a t t a c K t h r o u g h t h e n r d e n n e s v o n B O C K d e s c r i b e d t h e a t t a c K as
" c r e e p i n g along.'' C l e a r l y , Guderian had no such t h i n g in mind.

I n f a c t , we h a v e a l r e a d y s e e n t h a t h i s w h o l e c o n c a p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was b u i l t o n t h e p r e m i s e o f g r e a t s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n z . . And a l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d was a s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s

f a s t e r t h a n t h a t w i t h which t h e enemy c o u l d d e a l .

So G u d e r i a n

e n u is i o n e d a c r i t i c a l p e r i o d o f m o v e m e n t t h r o u g h t h e A r d e n n e s d u r i n g idhich h e would b e v u l n e r a b l e : uulnerabilit!, b u t h e a l s o saw t h a t h i s

would be r e d u c e d by t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s SeiZUPe of

l o c a l a i r s u p e r i o r i t y and t h e s p e e d w i t h which h i s panzer f o r m a t i o n s moved t h r o u g h t h e f l r d e n n e s . As

i t t u r n e d o u t , of

c o u r s e , G u d e r i a n was r i g h t o n a l l c o u n t s . G e n e r a l von BOCK'S s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n , t h a t of long exposed

flanK5,

is more d i f f i c u l t t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t .

B i d w e l l and Graham

75

a p t l y describe the risK t h e German

of e x p o s e d f l a n K 5 b y p o i n t i r l g o u t t h a t

panzer u n I t 5 reached o u t 1iKe a t e n t a c l e

" n o more

t h a n 20 m i l e i u i d e a n d 200 m i l e s l o n g o p e n t o a t t a c K f r o m either flanK...."<91> S u c h a t e n t a c l e , o f c o u r s e , was

v u l n e r a b l e t o counterattacK o r a i r s t r a f i n g . And, a r o u n d Flrras o n ZL May

in fact,

1940 a B r i t i s h t a n K c o u n t e r a t t a c K

a g a i n s t t h e CS D i v i s i o n T o t e n K o P f Ciuderian'g

in a corps adjacent t o

sent shivers

UP t h e

German c h a i n o f c o m m a n d . < S 2 >

i n n o t o n l y the

Long e x p o s e d f l a n K s o f t h e s o r t G u d e r i a n h a d

F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n b u t t h e P o l i s h a n d R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n s as well
were c e r t a i n l y c a u s e s f o r a l a r m a b o u t t h e r i s K s u c h m e t h o d s

entailsd. t o flanK5.

Even

5 0 ,

G u d e r i a n h a d h i s way5 of d e a l i n g w i t h r i s K

O n e way h e d e a l t w i t h t h e r i S K o f c o u n t e r a t t a c K s t o exposed flanK5 h a s a l r e a d y been suggested--security rpeed. through

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t m a i n t e n a n c e o f momenturn t h r o u g h s p e e d

of o p e r a t i o n s w o u l d p r e v e n t t h e enemy f r o m p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r a n y
c o h e r e n t c o u n t e r a t t a c K p l a n + o r two r e a s o n s .

First, because h i s

a t t a c K s were a l o n g p a r a l l e l a x e s G u d e r i a n c o u l d c o n t i n u a l l y
z.hift the

s c h w e r p u n ~ to f

h i s

attacK t o a new l o c a t i o n , t h e r e b y

c o n f o u n d i n g an:? e n e m y c o u n t e r a t t a c K p l a n s a g a i n s t o n e o f h i s

attacv:i n s c o l u m n s .

S e c o n d , any o r d e r s g i v e n by enemy commanders

u e r e r e n d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t by t h e time e x e c u t i n g u n i t s r e c e i v e d
them because of t h e f a s t pace o f o p e r a t i o n s : t h e s i t u a t i o n had

s i m p l y c h a n g e d - - r e q u i r i n s new o r d e r s - - b y

t h e t irne t h e u n i t

began t o carry o u t its l a t e s t o r d e r s . B u t G u d e r i a n h a d o t h e r

76

ways of

d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t h r e a t of

flanK attaCKS.

During the 10th

campaign

i n France, f o r instance, h e r e f u s e d t o a l l o w

Panzer D i v i s i o n , on t h e corp5 s o u t h e r n flanK, t o be d i v e r t e d f r o m its m i s s i o n on t h e unconfirmed report t h a t French c a v a l r y

were m o v i n g t o w a r d i t s f l a n K .

I n s t e a d of

s t o p p i n g 1 0 t h Panzer

t o d e a l w i t h t h i s t h r e a t t o t h e c o r p s ' f l a n K , Guderian moved t h e d i v i s i o n a l i t t l e n o r t h and had toward

it follow a parallel route

i t s o b j e c t i v e w i t h a l l d u e s p e e d . < Y 3 > As i t t u r n e d o u t ,

t h e r e p o r t was f a l s e , b u t G u d e r i a n 's r e a c t i o n h e r e r e f l e c t s h i s u s u s l approach: ~ e r p moving t o w a r d t h e o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i u e ! G u d e r i a n a l s o r e d u c e d t h e risK t o h i s f l a n K S t h r o u g h h i s employment o f air power.

H e a l w a y s made w i d e s p r e a d u s e o f h i s
He found

a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e assdts t o watch e x p o s e d f l a n K s .

t h i s t e c h n i q u e e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l d u r i n g BARBAROSSf4 w h e n h e f a r outdistanced t h e follow-on i n f a n t r y armies. In a d d i t i o n t o h i s

air reconnaissance

u n i t s , Guderian used h i s close air s u p p o r t

in ,particular

a i r c r a f t t o p r o t e c t h i s e x p o s e d f l a n K s . Two c a s e s come t o m i n d .
F i r s t , as a l r e a d y n o t e d

in an earlier s e c t i o n on

c o m b i n e d a r m 5 w a r f a r e , as G u d e r i a n c r o s s e d t h e M e u s e R i v e r during operat ion5 in France, L u f t w a f f e u n i t s attacKed F r e n c h France,

t r a n s p o r t a n d r a i l c e n t e r s a+ f a r as R e i m s , o f 85 K i l o m e t e r s . T h e s e air attacKs

a distance

i n d e p t h c o n t i n u e d even

a f t e r G u d e r i a n t u r n e d X I X A r m y C o r p s west t o w a r d A b b e v i l l e a n d
t h e coast.
In f a c t , t h e L u f t w a f f e

pounded French u n i t s a l o n g

t h e A i s n e R i v e r a s G u d e r i a n made h i s s w e e p t o t h e c o a s t , thereby protecting h i s southern flanK from French

77

counterattacuz.

Similarly,

i n O p e r a t i o n BRRBRROSSFI G u d e r i a n
to protect

u i e d h i s a i r assets, b o t h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and cornbat,

hi:

panzer group

'5

r i g h t f lanK against a p o t e n t i a l R u s s i a n

c o u n t e r a t t a c K d u r i n g h i s e n c irclernent o f R u s s i a n f o r c e s i n t h e BryansK a r e a . < 3 4 > In a d d i t i o n t o a i r a s s e t s , G u d e r i a n u s e d organic unit:

as

well

t o Provide flanK protection. Guderian echeloned h i s operational

W i t h few e x c e p t i o n s , reserves

i n d e p t h so t h e y c o u l d p r o v i d e h i s a t t a C K i n g p a n z e r
FIs s u g g e s t e d e a r l i e r , h i s u s e o f

corps with flanK protection.

t h e Gross-Deutschland

I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t o n t h e l e f t f l a n K of

XIX R r m y C o r p s f o r t h e attacK

i n t o F r a n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t he saw

the threat to his left f l a n ~ and a t t a c h e d t h e Gross-Deutschland Regiment t o 10th Panzer Division t o p r o t e c t t h a t flanK.
it

In t h e

Russian Campaign,

ir c l e a r h e t o o K m e a s u r e s t o r e d u c e risK
1st Cavalry
is u n m i s t a K a b l e

t o u u l n e r a b l r flanK5. F i r s t , h i s use o f t h e

D i v i s i o n on t h e 2nd P a n z e r G r o u p ' s r i g h t f l a n K e v i d e n c e of a n a t t e m p t t o r e d u c e riSK.

He saw t h e P r i p e t

M a r s h e s o n h i s g r o u p ' s r i g h t f l a n K a s p r o s ~ i d i n g some protection, and he assigned t h e

1st C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n t o XXIV

P a n z e r C o r p s , t h e r i g h t w i n g , b e c a u s e h e Knew t h i s d i v i s i o n was
b e s t s u i t e d t o s c r e e n h i s r i g h t f l a n K . While on t h e r i g h t f l a n K
of

hi<. group h e had marshy t e r r a i n and a c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n

in

hi5 fauor,for good f o r t u n e .

h i s m a i n attacK o n t h e l e f t f l a n K h e h a d no s u c h Consequently, he a s s i g n e d XLVI Panzer Corps,

Group Reserue, t h e mission t o f o l l o w t h e l e f t w i n g , e c h e l o n e d t o t h e rear t o p r o v i d e d e p t h and f l a n K p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e main

78

attacK. <95> M o r e o v e r ,

i n a1 1 t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s G u d e r i a n was
less

K e e n l y aware t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r u n i t s - - a l b e i t mobile--following

h i s panzerz,

which would p r o v i d e f u r t h e r

d e p t h a n d f l m K p r o t e c t i o n f o r h i s own e x p o s e d u n i t s .
fl f i n a l

t e c h n i q u e Guderian employed t o p r o t e c t h i s f l a n Ks F r e q u e n t l y , he a n c h o r e d

c e n t e r e d on h i s a s t u t e u s e o f t e r r a i n . o n e of

h i s boundaries along a r i v e r l i n e or other obstacle, In P o l a n d h e p r o t e c t e d h i s c o r p s ' main

n a t u r a l o r manmade.

a t t a c K a n d t h e c o r p s ' s o u t h e r n f l a n K by a n c h o r i n g i t a l o n g t h e Zempolno R i v e r . I n F r a n c e t h e A r d e n n e s C a n a l , A i s n e , a n d Sornrne southern flanK.

R i v e r s a f f o r d e d some p r o t e c t i o n f o r G u d e r i a n ' s

H i s n o r t h e r n f l a n K was n o t ae v u l n e r a b l e b e c a u s e e n e m y u n i t s t o

ti i s n o r t h h a d Re i n h a r d t 's p a n z e r c o r p s t o w o r r y a b o u t . < 5 6 >

G u d e r i a n b e g a n t h e Russian Campaign w i t h t h e P r i p e t M a r s h e s Protecting h i s r i g h t flanK, and he used riuerlines wheneuer he

c o u l d t o p r o t e c t h i s f l a n K s , t h o u g h a g l a n c e a t a map o f R u s s i a s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e o r i e n t a t ion of r i v e r l ines d i d n o t especially f a v o r t h i s t e c h n i q u e . G u d e r i a n ' s a n s w e r t o risK o n h i s f l a n K 5

was f o u r - f o l d :

< l >speed of operations;

(2) u s e of

air power

for reconnaissance and

of operational reserves;

i n t e r d i c t ion:

(3) d e p t h a n d e c h e l o n w e n t

and

(4) u s e o f t e r r a i n s u c h a s

riverl ines for protection. Two o t h e r p o i n t s a b o u t r i s ~ acceptance deserve mention. fIn

operat ional t e c h n i q u e of

Guder i a n

' 5

w h i c h e n t a i l e d some r i s K i n f a n t r y armies. This

was h l s h a b i t o f ~ u t d i s t a n c i n g f o l l o w - o n

practice p r e u a i l e a

I n a l l t h r e e o f h i s m a j o r c a m p a i g n s b u t was

79

especiilly

common

i n t h e Rus.sian Campaign.

The t h o u g h t

here

is

t h a t by g r e a t l y separating himself armies,

from the slower

infantry

Guderian put h i s u n i t s out o f

s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e of being

other un:ts, cut off,

s u b j e c t i n g h i s u n i t s t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of Moreover, t h e spec i a l

s u r r o u n d e d and d e s t r o y e d .

capabilities of

i n f a n t r y u n i t s c o u l d n o t be b r o u g h t t o bear Here, Guder i a n

' 5

in

s u p p o r t o f t h e a t t a c K i n g panzer columns cross.ing o f t h e Dneiper River

i n R u s . s i a comes t o m i n d .
1941,

His lead

panzer d i v i s i o n s reached t h e D n e i p e r on 7 J u l y i n f a n t r y d i v i s . i o n s f r o m t h e army follow

but

ng h i s panzer group General von u n t i l those

w e r e n o t t o r e a c h t h e r i v e r f o r f o u r t e e n more d a y s .
Kluge wanted Guderian t o d e l a y c r o s z i n g infantry the Dneiper

dibJiSionS c l o s e d and c o u l d e s t a b l i s h bridgeheads

for a

secure--less none o f t h a t

r i S K Y - - c r o ~ s i n g o f t h e r i u e r . Guderian would have

and a r g u e d s u c c e s ; f u l l y that

i t was m o r e

irnportant
In

t o a t t a i Y : a c r o z . 5 t h e r i v e r w h i l e R u s s i a n d e f e n s e s w e r e weaK.

Panzer Leader he says he weighed c a r e f u l l y t h e r i s K s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s move b u t wa5 c o n v i n c e d t h e r i s K was. j u s t i f i e d , e s p e c i a l l y s ince panzer d i v i s i o n s infantry h a d t h e i r own m o t o r i z e d

and e n g i n e e r s w h i c h were e m i n e n t l y c a p a b l e o f inherent

e s t a b l i s h i n g a n d s e c u r i n g b r i d g e h e a d s . <3?> The comb i n e d a r m s o r g a n i z a t i o n o f divislons supporting t h e panzer

and p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r

helped reduce t h e r i s K o f arms. The o t h e r factor,

s e p a r a t i o n between of course, was G u d e r i a n ' s

standby s o l u t ion--speed,

speed,

s p e e d ! T h i s t e c h n i s u e was mines and

a c c e p t a b l e u n t i l t h e Russ.ians began t o use a n t i - t a n K

80

anti-tanK

guns i n c o n c e r t and in J u l y

i n g r e a t n u m b e r s as t h @ y d i d

in

t h e B a t t l e o f KursK

1343. T h e r e ,

i t u i l l be recalled,

o n e r e a s o n t h e German IX A r m y ' s . f a i l e d was t h a t t m K S a n d in the in

attacK

i n t o t h e KursK s a l i e n t

i n f a n t r y became separated, r e s u l t i n g

i r o l a t i o n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t a n ~ s . < 9 8 ?B u t t h a t was

1343, l o n g a f t e r G u d e r i a n h a d f i n i s h e d c o m m a n d i n g f i e l d
Hence, h e n e v e r f a c e d t h e Ru;sians when t h e y h a d

units.

p e r f e c t a d a m e i n s of s e p a r a t i n g t a n K s f r o m s u p p o r t i n g i n f a n t r y . (99:
NO d i s c u s s i o n

of

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t would be complete w i t h o u t in passing, of logistical cons iderat ions,

-ome

m e n t i o n , e ~ e ni f

f o r h i s t o r i c a l l y such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s have p l a c e d c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h t h e commander e x c e e d s o n l y at some r i s K . Although t h e r e is no r e a s o n t o be1 i e u e Guderian

' 5

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was a n e x c e p t i o n

in t h i s r e s p e c t , h e appears

n o t t o have been unduly concerned about t h e l o g i s t i c a l r i s K s h i s r a p i d tanK t h r u s t s e n t a i l e d . ob:.erved, Guderian

Rs K e n n e t h MacKsey

has

"was n o t i n t h e h a b i t o f v i s i t i n g t h e l i n e s

o f cornmun i c a t i o n ,)' w h i c h o f c o u r s e is e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s v i e w t h a t commanders b e l o n g f o r w a r d . < l 0 0 > T h r e e r e a s o n s can b e a d d u c e d w h i c h rnay h e l p e x p l a i n G u d e r i a n ' s a p p r o a c h t o t h e potential p r o b l e m of outrunning h i s logistical support.

F i r s t , p a n z e r a n d m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n s rnay h a v e c a r r i e d f u e l s u f f i c i e n t t o allow t h e m t o a c h i e v e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s b e f o r e a n o p e r a t i o n a l p a u s e f o r r e s u p p l y was

81

nclcessary.

For t h e Pol i s h Campaign

panzer and m o t o r i z e d
(725 K m S ) a n d

d i v i s i o n s drew f u e l s u f f i c i e n t f o r 456 m i l e s c a r r i e d one basic load of ammunition.

One a d d i t i o n a l

load of

a m m u n i t i o n was K e p t a t f o r w a r d r a i l w a y d e p o t s w h i l e t i d o m o r e w e r e K e p t r e a d y t o go o n r a i l w a y s i d i n g s . < l 6 1 > T h e s e f a c t s

suggeEt t h a t

i n h e r e n t b a s i c l o a d s a n d r a p i d e x p l o i t a t i o n of

c a p t u r e d r a i l r o a d s allowed Guder ian t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t ional objective% without a pause

in operations.
'5

In b o t h t h e P o l i s h

and F l a n d e r s Campaigns, Guder ian objectives--each o p $ r a t i n g ranges.

initial operational well w i t h i n h i s u n i t s '

w i t h i n 250 m i l e s - - w e r e

The wide e x p a n s e o f R u s s i a p r e s e n t e d a Guderian's first operational

d i f f e r e n t c h a l l e n g e , b u t even so,

o b j e c t i v e , t h e a r e a a r o u n d S m o l e n s K , was a b o u t 425 m i l e s f r o m his

1 i n e of
f ?

d e p a r t u r e , MaKing

it a close c a l l t o say t h e least.

s e c o n d r e a s o n w h i c h may a i d

in e x p l a i n i n g G u d e r i a n ' s uncanny a b i l i t y t o

a t t i t u d e t o w a r d l o g i s t i c a l risK read terrain.

l i e s in hi;

In a l l t h r e e of h i s c a m p a i g n s , G u d e r i a n a t t e m p t e d communication centers, railroads, and

t o s e i z e Key r o a d s ,

a i r f i e l d s t o e n s u r e h i s u n i t s c o u l d b e r e s u p p l i e d by r a i l , r o a d , o r a i r . R e f l e c t i n g h i s t h i n K i n g on t h i s s u b j e c t d u r i n g t h e c r i t i c a l b a t t l e s f o r Mojcow
"Our m o s t u r g e n t

in December

1341 he remarked, U n t i l we

t a s K now was t h e c a p t u r e o f T u l a .

were i n possess i o n of t h i s cornmun i c a t i o n 5 c e n t r e Cs i c 1 a n d i t s

a i r f i e l d we h a d n o h o p e o f c o n t i n u i n g t o a d n J a n c e . . . . " < l 0 2 >
if

Even

t h i s s i n g l e example of

Guderian's concern for

logistical

r i % K is p a t h e t i c a l l y

inadequate,

i t d o e s s h o w h e m a d e some

p l a n s t o a m e l i o r a t e what he r e c o g n i z e d as a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t .

A final
lies

e x p l a n a t i o n of

h i s handling of operational

logistical risK art itself. He

i n Guderian's conception of

seerned t o b e l i e v e t h a t

l o g i s t i c a l r i s K would be M i n i m i z e d by h i s operations. That is, quicK tanK

t h e v e r y speedy n a t u r e o f thrusts

i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s b e f o r e l o g i s t i c s became a factor would minimize t h e r i s K . O f course, such a

significant

m~iew p r e s u p p o s e s enemy c o l l a p s e o r c a p i t u l a t i o n b e f o r e logistical factors have t h e i r i n e v i t a b l e impact. Further,

Guderian had t h e infantry residual

luxury

i n h i s o p e r a t i o n s o f Knowing t h e r e were m o p p i n g u p any

arrnier f o l l o w i n g h i s mobile u n i t s ,

enemy r e s i s t a n c e w h i c h r n i g h t t h r e a t e n h i s

1 ines o f
which

communication.

I n b o t h t h e P o l I s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns,

were r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t campaigns t h e R u s s i a n Campaign, payoff was t r e m e n d o u s . Guder i a n

' 5

i n space and t i m e cornpared t o

a s s u m p t i o n s h e l d t r u e and t h e Russia, however,

The g r e a t e x p a n s e o f

s w a l l o w e d Glider i a n , following Campaign,

if o n e

h is p a n z e r g r o u p ,

and t h e

i n f a n t r y armies

thern.

In spite of

t h e outcome o f

t h e Russian i s defensible

G u d e r i a n ' s approach t o

lOsiStiCal r i s K

accepts h i s argument t h a t had H i t l e r n o t d i v e r t e d h i s i t s o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e of Moscou,

i t would

p a n z e r army f r o m

have had t h e t i m e and combat power s u f f i c i e n t t o cause a decisive Ruzsian collapse. G u d e r i a n ' s argument, on t h e s u b j e c t o f but This i s n o t t h e p l a c e t o Pursue illuminate h i s thinKing bold! three tenets

i t does h e l p

l o g i s t i c a l risK--be
' 5

I n a s s e 5 . s i n g Guder i a n

o p e r a t i o n a l methods,

83

of

r i s K come t o t h e f o r e ,

though others probably suggest

t h e m s e l v e s as w e l l .

F i r s t , t o a c h i e v e t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n and operational depth, accept r i s K w h i l e c o n c e n t r a t e d and t o e x p o j e d f l a n K s w h i l e m o v i n g : u s e a i r p o w e r , n i g h t mouement, r e s e r v e s and t e r r a i n t o r e d u c e t h i s r i s K . Second, r a p i d ach ievernent o f o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h r e q u i r e s one t o a c c e p t t h e P i S K o f w i d e s e p a r a t i o n between main a t t a c K and f o l l o w and s u p p o r t f o r c e s : reduce t h i s r i s K t h r o u g h speed o f o p e r a t i o n s , mornenturn, a n d employment o f o r g a n i c combined a r m organ i z a t i o n s . F i n a l 1'1, r e d u c e l o g i s t i c a l r 1 S K t h r o u g h r a p i d s e i z u r e of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n centers t o ensure rssuppl:, by r a i l , road, o r a i r .

These t h r e e t e n e t s r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed a t t h e beginning of t h i s s e c t i o n on P i S K : Was G u d e r i a n f o o l h a r d y or

b o l d i n h i s acceptance o f words on b o l d n e s s quest ion:

r i s K ? Here,

C a r l uon C l a u s e w i t z ' s

i n On War may s h e d some l i g h t or1 t h e

Even f o o l h a r d i n e s s - - t h a t is, boldness without a n y c*bj e c t - - i s n o t t o b e d e s p i s e d . . .Giuen t h e same a m o u n t o f i n t e l l i g e n c e , t i m i d i t y w i l l do a t h o u s a n d t i r n e s m o r e darnage i n war t h a n audacity....Boldness g o v e r n e d by s u p e r i o r i n t e l l e c t i s t h e rnarK o f a h e r o . . . . B o l d n e s s can l e n d w i n g s t o i n t e l l e c t and i n s i g h t ; t h e s t r o n g e r t h e wings t h e n , t h e g r e a t e r t h e h e i g h t s , t h e w i d e r t h e v i e w , and t h e b e t t e r t h e r e s u l t s : though a greater p r i z e , o f course, i n v o l v e s g r e a t e r r i s K s . < 1E3>

R e f l e c t i n g o n C l a u s e w i t z ' s remarl(;,

t h e r e a d e r may j u d g e f o r

54

hirnself

t h e answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed.

B u t s i n c e he

i s not

h e r e t o defend h i m s e l f , word:

we m u s t l e a v e G u d e r i a n w i t h t h e l a s t i n 5haping the 5 p i r i t o f

. large share [ O n War1 h a d s

general staff

generat ions of

Officers..

. .<1E)4>

85

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly t h e r e

i s much m o r e t h a t c o u l d b e s a i d a b o u t
'5

G e n e r a l He i n z G u d e r ian

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t t h a n has b e e n s a i d

h e r e a l r e a d y , t h o u g h b y now t h e r e a d e r m a y b e p r a y i n g t h a t nothing of t h e Kind

is i n s t o r e .

Indeed,

it

is n o t ;

but

it

would b e u s e f u l t o summarize t h e b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n s t o w a r d which

each o f t h e f i u e s e c t i o n s aboue--combined
operat ions ,offensive

arms
and

a c t i o n , momentum,

corimand a n d c o n t r o l ,

r iSK--Po i n t s .

Without enurnerat ing a g a i n t h e e i g h t e e n tenets operational art,

which d e f i n e G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e p t of

it

is

a c c u r a t e t o s a y h i s c o n c e p t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s w h o s e o b j e c t was t o e n v e l o p a n d d e s t r o y e n e m y forces. T h e s e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y g r e a t

speed of

momentum b o r n o f

a p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of:

a r m o r , o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h , a n d c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s e m p l o y i n g tanK;
the vicinity of

a t t h e s c h w e r p u n K t , w h i c h were c o n t r o l l e d f r o m
t h e forward committed u n i t s , rnd which e n t a i l e d

an acceptance of

r i s ~ t o C l a n K s a n d 1 i n e s o f commun i c a t i o n t o

a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l dec is i u e n e s s . It i c p r o b a b l y n o t a t a l l amaz n g t h a t a r e v i e w o f the

tenets a r r i u e d at bear a remarKable s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e

P r i n c i p l e s o f War. I n f a c t , we s h o u d b e s u r p r i s e d
i f t h e y were

86

n o t s imilar: otherwise,

an

incons i s t e n c y d e s e r v ing of
US.

e x p l a n a t i o n would c o n f r o n t

In some measure,

all the

P r i n c i p l e s o f War a r e r e f l e c t e d

in G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s . He command, economy o f f o r c e , i n one way or

e m p l o y e d mass, s u r p r i s e , u n i t y o f offensive, maneuver,

s i m p l i c i t y , and ob.iective

a n o t h e r . What t h i s a n a l y s i s s h o w s principles even

i s HOW G u d e r i a n p u t t h o s e
l e v e l o f war. F o r

i n t o action at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

i f o n e a g r e e s t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s o f war d o
i t r e m a i n s t h e tasK o f

not change,

t h e m i l i t a r y commander t o operational

apply correctly those principles t o a current

problem and a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d outcome. t h i s consistently well is more t h a n j u s t i n war, h e

T h e c o m m a n d e r who d o e s
1UcKY.

Considering a l l Whatever e l s e

the obstacles t o success

is b r i l l i a n t .

one might wish t o s a y about Heinz Guderian and h i s o p e r a t i o n a l methods,

i t r e m a i n s t r u e t h a t h e was s u c c e s s f u l

i n war, a n d

b r i l l i a n t l y so.

87

EFRFIOTES

I A c t u a l l y t h e r e i s more t o t h e s t o r y t h a n t h i s . G u d e r i a n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h u o n K l u g e was a f a c t o r w h i c h c o n t r i b u t s d t o h i s r e 1 i e f . See H e i n z G u d e r i a n , P a n z e r L e a d e r (blew YUPK: O u t t u n a n d Company, 1 3 5 2 1 , p p . 2 6 4 - 2 7 1 .

2 H e i n z G u d e r i a n , Panzer L e a d e r , t r a n s . C. F i t z g i b b o n Y o r K : O u t t o n a n d Coropany, 1 3 5 2 1 , p . 2 0 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a ; Panzer Leader. 3 Panzer Leader, 4 Panzer Leader,
P.

(Flew

21. 21. 21.

P.
P.

5 Panzer Leader,

6 K e n n e t h MacKseY, G u d e r i a n , C r e a t o r o f t h e 81 i t z K r i e g (New YUrK: S t e i n a n d D a y , 1375), p . 2 4 4 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s MacKsey.

7 MaCKSeY,
3 MacKseY,

pp.
P.

244-45.

62.
P.

3 Panzer Leader, 10 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

24. 24.

p.

1 1 He i n z G u d e r i a n , " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , " i n The I ' n f a n t r y J o u r n a l R e a d e r , e d . J.I. G r e e n e ( G a r d e n C i t y , New Y o r K : O o u b l e d a y , D o r a n a n d Company, 1 3 4 3 ) , p . 4 7 3 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s "Armored F o r c e s , " t h i s W O r K i s an a b r i d g e d E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n o f G u d e r i a n ' s " A c h t u n g ! P d n z e r ! ' I w h i c h was p u b 1 i s h e d i n Germany i n t h e W i n t e r o f 1936-137. 12 " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , "
p.
P.

461. 462.

13 " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , "

14 HandbooK a n German M i l i t a r y F o r c e s . War D e p a r t m e n t T e c h n i c a l M a n u a l , TM-E 30-451 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U. S. Government P r i n t i n g O f + i c e , 1945), P . 11-84.

15 "Flrrnored F o r c e s , 16 " h r m o r e d F o r c e s , "
17 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
PP. P.

462. 463.

p.

513-520.

88

18 R i c h a r d O i N a r d o , " T h e f i r m a r e d F i s t , " T a c t i c s (Sep-Oct 5 4 ) , p.32.

i n S t r a t e g y and

13 A c c o r d i n g t o HandbooK o n German M i l i t a r y F o r c e s , 1345 P a n z e r d i v i s i o n s h a d o n l y 103 t a n K S b y T a b l e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n .

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t t h a t was a U O e f u l l y i n a d e q u a t e n u m b e r . B e f o r e t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns, h e argued s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r l a r g e r f o r m a t i o n s of b r i g a d e s i z e . w h i c h he e m p l o y e d i n t h e P o l i s h a n d F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n s . A f t e r 1340 t h e n u m b e r o f t a n k s i n p a n z e r r e g i m e n t s a n d b r i g a d e s was r e d u c e d f r o m t h e 4 0 0 c i t e d e a r l i e r t o a s few a s 150 b y w a r ' s e n d .

20 R i c h a r d DiFlardo. "The Armored F i s t , " p . 3 2 . HandbooK o n German M i l i t a r y F o r c e s , p . 11-23.

See a l s o

2 1 M a r t i n Van C r e u e l d , F i g h t i n s P o w e r s e r m a n M i l i t a r y P e r f o r m a n c e , 1314-1345 ( W a s h i n g t o n , O.C. : O f f i c e o f N e t A s s e s s m e n t , 1380), P . 6 2 . 22 Van C r e u e l d ,

P.

64.

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