Professional Documents
Culture Documents
C R I S I S , 1975- 1 9 7 9 :
by
MARK A . C O Y L E , CPT, USA G e o r g e t o w n U n i v c r s i t y , 1968 M . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s , 1973
I\.S.,
F o r t Leavenwortti, 19R5
Kansas
MASTER OF MIi2r:rAw
ART A N D S C L E N C E
w%,Vw.
,
T h e s i s Committee Chairinari
I , JOSEPH
Msmber, G r a d u a t c F n c u l ~ y
Ph.
__
T h e opinions and conc1u:;ions e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r c t h o s e of t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do nor n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t the views o f t h e U.S. Army Command and General. S t a f f C o l l e g e o r any o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y . (References. -t o t h i s s t u d y s h o u l d i n c Lude t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t e m e n t . )
i!i
ABSTRACT
How d i d C h i n a and Viet Nam e a c h r e a c t t o t h e c r i s i s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s between 1975 and 1979? Why d i d t h e C h i n e s e u l t i m a t e l y wage war a g a i n s t the V i e t n a m e s e ? T h i s work i s a n h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d y t h a t a d d r e s s e s these c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n s .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s management r a s e s t u d i e s done by Allen W h i t i n g , Ole H o t s t i , A l t ! x n n d ( ~ rG e o r g e , and R i c h a r d Smoke Eorm a b a s e Eor d e v e l o p i n g the a n a l y s i s . J o u r n a l i s t i c r e p o r t s and government d o c i u w n t s c o n s t i c u t e t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l s u s e d . Iloth Hanoi a n d U e i j i n g Eelt t h a t t h e o t h e r posed a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t n i t s n a t i o n a l s ~ x u r i t y . Each s i d e s o u g h t t o c o m n u n i c a t e i t s c o n c e r n t o t h e o t h e r t h r o u g h a s e r i e s oE s i g n a l s . The s t u d y f o c u s e s m a i n l y on t h e p a t t e r n oE C h i n e s e s i g n a l s , a s B e i j i n g r e s p o n d e d t o w h a t i t c o n s i d e r e d i n c r e a s i n g l y u n a c c e p t a h l e b e h a v i o r b y Hanoi. 'She means of d e l i v e r y , t h e r h e t o r i c a l i n t e n s i t y , t h e l e v e l o f i s s u i n g a u t h o r i t y , and t h e r e l a t i v e t i m i n g oE t h e s i g n a l s a11 showed i n d i c a t i o n s o e s c a l a t i n g a s t h e c r i s i s became morc s e v e r e . 'The p a p e r p r o p o s e s a n i n d e x of i n d i c a t o r s by which t o j u d g e t h e p r o g r e s s o f c r i s i s d e v e l o p m e n t and c r i s i s c o n t r o l . One oE t h e c h i e E d i E E i c u l t i e s i n t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e d i s p u t e was a c o n f l i c t of p e r c e p t i o n s . Each s i d e was using a d i E e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e i n v i e w i n g i t s own and t h e o t h e r side's position. By u s i n g i n d i c a t o r s t o u n d e r s t a n d c r i s i s d e v e l o p m e n t more f u l l y , d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s may b e a b l e t o e x e r c i s e c r i s i s nlanagement more e f f e c t i v e l y .
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish t o acknowledge t h e s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n c e g i v e n me i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s s t u d y by LTC J o s e p h A. S c h l a t t e r a n d Dr. J o s e p h R. Goldman. LTC S c h l a t t c r - s d e t a i l e d k n o w l e d g e of C h i n e s e s t r a t e g y a n d S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s was i n v a l u a b l e i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e e v e n t s t h a t l e d t o t h e 1979 war. D r . Goldman--who h o l d s two Ph.D.s, i n h i s t o r y a n d i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e - - h e l p e d g i v e d i r e c t i o n a n d s c o p e to t h e s t u d y . 8 0 t h g e n t l e m e n c h a l l e n g e d me t o e x p l o r e t h e s u b j e c t i n g r e a t e r d e p t h a n d from p e r s p e c t i v e s I p r e v i o i . i s l y had n o t c o n s i d e r e d .
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
11
..
iii
iv
v
Chapter
1
INTRODUCTION
1
1
.................... and D e l i m i t a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
................
. 7
3 3 4
4
SUIWEY OF THE
................... LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.......................
Introduction
A n a l y t i c a l Models
5 5
7
.......................
......................
8
8
General M a t e r i a l s
8
9
3-
AMETHODOLOGY
i1
11 13 14 14
14 15
18
21
21
21
23
24
25 28
31
32 32 34 35 36
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 1976-1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
vi
...........
47
....................
47
Ileightening C r i s i s . Late February t o I.ote May 1978 C r o s s i n g a C r i t i c a l T h r e s h o l d . Late May and E a r l y June 1978 G s c a l a t i n g A t t a c k s . Mid J u n e t o Mid .July 1978 C o n t e n d i n g and N e g o t i a t i n g . t h r o u g h O c t o b e r 1978
....................
...............
Mid J u l y
48
51
54
......................
.................
56
60
Edging toward t h e P r e c i p i c e . Novembfr and December 1978 I ' r e p a r i n g f o r War. J a n u a r y t o Mid F e b r u a r y 197Y
j
..................
....................
62
CONCLUSION
.........................
GO
7'1
73 74
75
The D e c i s i o n t o
t o war
................
Til,? R e l e v a n c e of H i s t o r y
'The P c r c e p t i . o n s
(I
................. Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R v a c t i n g under S t r e s s Chinese I k t e r r e n c e
..................
7') 79
81
81
82 83
...................... S i .g n a l l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83 84
vii
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 C o n t e n t i o u s I s s u e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 87 D e l i v e r y Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 I n t o n s i t y Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 A u t h o r i t y Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Timing Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U t i l i t y of the I n d e x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 91 A Caveat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 UIRLIOGIUIHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An Examination o f the Indcx
viii
Chapter 1
INTKODUCTI ON
P r o b lern S t a tenieii t
The? piirpost' of t h i s s t u d y i s t o e x a m i n e t h e e v e n t s l e n d i n g up t o t h c I979 war b e t w e e n t h e IJeoplc's R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a ( P I X ) mid the S o c i a I . i s t IRi'piibI i c o f V i c t Nan1 (SKV) a n d t o a n a l y z e t h e s f e v i , n t s i n
t('r11ls
ot
tilt!
m y s t h a t China p r o t e c t s i t s s t r a t i ? g i c i n t e r e s t s i n
Sciut h e a s t A!; i a .
Background
intriguing situation.
H.C. o n , r c v e a l s a n i m o s i t y and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s .
'The i m p o s i t i o n of
An e x a m i n a t i o n
Communist r r g i m r s i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s d i d n o t c h a n g e t h i s .
c r i s i . s , e s p e c i a l l y a s t h e c r i s i s t e n d s t o b a r d war.
Research Questions
T h i s s t u d y o f t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e c r i s i s t h a t d e v e l o p e d a f t e r 1975
h a s China p e r c e i v e d i t s s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v i n g Viet
(2)
How d o e s t h e h i s t o r y o f S i n o - V i e t n a m e s c r e l a t i o n s e l u c i , d a t e
(3)
t o C h i n e s e i n t e r e s t s s i n c e 1975?
(4)
!dhat
(5)
heeded ' !
(6)
stress?
(7)
t o Gar?
U l t i m a t e l y , Ghat a r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r b h i c h China b i l l go
L i m i t a t i o n s and D e l i m i t a t i o n s
t h e main a c t o r s d i s c u s s e d ; b u t a t t e n t i o n i s g i v e n t o t h e S o v i . ~ t Union,
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d Cambodia i n terms of t h e r o l e s t h e y p l a y e d .
_Significance
of ttic S t u d y
i s i n t h e i , r warmaking p o l i c i e s i.s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r A i n c r i -
c a n s t r a t e g i c p1;inniiig i n !Cast A s i a .
Su bseqiient Chapters
t r i ? a t s b r i e f l y t h e Long h i s t o r y o f d i s c o r d t h a t
C h i n a and V i c t
Nan1
flict.
i n which t h ( ! C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p s o u g h t t o s i g n a l i t s d i s p l e a s u r e
Chapter 2
Introduction
A n a l y t i c a l Models
i n d e t a i l i n t h e i r work D e t e r r e n c e i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y :
and P r a c t i c e . behavior.
Theory
t e s t e d by h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s .
p o i n t s t h e way t o a g r e a t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e o p e r a t i o n oE d e t e r r e n c e through h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s .
Ole R .
- -
management g e n e r ; i l , l y assume m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r a t i o n a l d e c i s i.ons. T)ecisi.on i n c r i s i s i s slso t r e n t e d by Oran Young in The -__ Politics of
Force: --_
Young l o o k s a t --I l a r g a i n i n ) ; D u r i n g [ n t c r n a t i o n a l C r i ~ t ! ~ .
thf,
s p e c t r u m 01:
c o e r c i o n by which n a t i o n s t r y t o i n E l u e n c e o n e a n o t h e r .
The work of A l l e n W h i t i n g i s a l s o v a l u a b l e t o t h i s t h e s i s . w t l i t i r i g
h a s d o n e two d e t : i i I c d h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s o f t h e P R C ' s e n t r y i n t o
wars.
Crosses _-Chi.n;i _-
-.
the
--
ah:
'Phe D e c i s i o n t o E n t e r t h e
or ear^ war
n n a l y z c s t h v p r e l u d t . t o t h e PRC's
e v e n t s l e a d i n g u p t o t h e S i , n o - I n d i a n War of 1962.
s t a n d p o i n t ) , and t h a t t h e y g i v e c l e a r s i g n a l s t h a t a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n
A l l oE t h e s e works w i l l Iit?lp t o g u i d e t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h i s
research.
Documentary M a t e r i a l s
( P e o p l e - s D a i l y ) i s t h e n a t i o n a l PRC d a i l y n e w s -
_-
I t is o f s p e c i a l . v a l u e t o t h i s s t u d y .
thts
The o f f i c i a l , a u t h o r i t a -
Linr, o f
i.n t h i s p a p e r .
Ctlinese
h a v e j.ssut:d
o f c r i s i s , and i t r e n d e r s o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f
those adversaries. A d d i t i . o n a l l y , Ren Min Ki Bao performs the
t r a d i . t i o n a 1 f u n c t i o n o f n n e h s p a p v r i n r e p o r t i n g t h e news.
Tts v a l u e as
a s o u r c c o f r a b [ a c t , h o w v c r , m u s t bc t e m p e r e d by t h e r c a l i z a t i o n t h a t
--
_--
a l t h o u g h i t i s n a r r o w e r i n s c o p e and not u s e d as e x t e n s i v e l y a s a
v e h i c l e f o r p u b l i c announcements of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . B e i j i n g R a d i o , c h i e f l y a s m o n i t o r e d by t h e P o r c i g n B r o a d c a s t h f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e (VBIS), r e i n f o r c e s t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n s of Ken X i n R i I3ao and g i v e s news i t e m s . Xin Hua S h e _ -t l w PRC. Chinese (Neb China News Agency) i s t h e o f f i c i a l news s e r v i c e o f
__--
I t is a good s o u r c e f o r t r a c i n g e v e n t s a s r e p o r t e d from t h e
perspective=.
The PLK p u t s o u t a n e b s - a n d - v i e w s m a g a z i n e i.n E n g l i s h and o t h e r Loreign languages: B e i j i n g Keviev ( f o r m e r l y ___ Peking Keview). neijing ortcrl
PRC l e a d c r s h i p c o n s i d e r s t o be v e r y i m p o r t a n t .
P u b l i c a t i o n s i n Hong Kong:
The Sino-Vietnamese -
War by __
L i Man Kin.
This
work i s on t h e m a r g i n s o f b e i n g a d o c u m e n t a r y s o u r c e .
former
L i Man Kin i s a
-__
newspaper.
comings i n t h e war.
The work i s q u i t e u s e f u l i n a n a l y z i n g t h e m i l i t a r y
The t r e a t m e n t t h a t t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e r e c e i v e d a t t h e h a n d s o f
t h e V i e t n a m e s e was a f a c t o r i n t h e l a t e 1970s c r i s i s .
6
T h e PHCs F o r e i g n
_ . _ _ _ -
Vietnamese
The SKV's o f f i c i a l n e w s p a p e r s Nhan Dan ('The People) a n d Quan Doi
-_
Peop1e.s M i l i t a r y ) a r e s i m i l a r i n f u n c t i o n t o Ken M in Ki . $ 1-
respectively.
They a r e v a l u a b l e s o u r c e s f o r d i s c e r n i n g
t h e o f f i c i a l v i e w s of the H a n o i I i a a d e r s h i p .
Likr:wise,
the Vietnamese
C o m u n i s t s < ) t e n g i v e t h e i r warnings and s i g n a l s i n t h e s e o r g a n s . Tap C h i Gong Sail (<:ommunist P r a c t i c e ) i s H a n o i ' s theory. l e a d i n g .journal o f
I t i s vc!ry usel:iil i n h e l p i n g t h e r e a d e r u n d e r s t a n d l o n g r a n g e
~ g ~ n c yT . h e s e sources were e s p c c i a l l y u s e f u l d i l r i n g t h e a c t u a l
f i g h t i n g of F e b r u a r y a n d March of I979 b e c a u s e ac t h a t time the V i r t names<! p r e s c . n t o d c o n s i d t ! r a b l e c o v e r a g e o f t h e w a r . The V i e t n a m e s e h a v e s u b m i t t e d t h e i r b r i e f a g a i n s t C h i n a i n s e v e r a l s m a l l works: Cliinese Aggression Against Vietnam: T h e Root of t h e
problem, Thc C h i n e s e A g g r e s s i o n :
and "The T r u t h
T h e w works
a b o u t Victtnani-Cliin;l R e l a t i o n s o v e r t h e L a s t 30 Years."
'Third
Party TLCO US g o v e r n m c n t s o u r c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l f o r t h i s s t u d y .
The f i r s t i s C h i n a - V i e t n a m Horder T e n s i o n s :
A -
C h r o n o l o g y , 2 2 J u n e 1976-_.-
5 -Y Ma -
1981. -
T h i s work s u m m a r i z e s t h e i n c i d e n t s t h a t m a n i f e s t e d t h e
Tho s e c o n d s o u r c e is t h e
General Materials
J o u r n a 1s
S e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t a r t i c l e s d e a l i n g r i t h t h c S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e War
have appeared i n English language j o u r n a l s .
"China-s
'?unitive'
War On Vietnam:
A M i l i t a r y ~ s s e s s m e n t , " llsian
J e n c k s a s s e r t s t h a t tile main
w, August,
1979 b y LTC H a r l a n J e n c k s .
. .probably
For
D a n i e l T r e t i a k t h e r e a r e no " p r o b a b l i e s "
1.n h i s a r t i c l e December,
China Q u a r t e r l y , -
Parameters,
Nelson.
conLrxt of t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e .
U n l i k e T r r t i a k , he does n o t p e r -
tie
e f f o r t t o SuppOrt
Asian --
S t u d i c , s i s a good s o u r c e f o r a r t i c l e s , book r e v i e w s , a n d c t i r o n -
01 og i e 8 .
The w t s c k l y nebs m a g a z i n e F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review t o g e t h e r w i t h - i t s Asia Yi!arbonk
_ .
i s a n o u t s t a n d i n g s o u r c e o f m a t e r i a l on l i a s t Asia.
i t h a s e x c e l l c n t c o v e ~ ? i g eof t h e nebs o f tlic
P u b l i s h e d in Hong Kong,
r e g i o n . Thc a r t i c l e : ; o f l o r c o n s i d e r n b l c a n a l y s i s . Wen W r i P a o i s
I
--
ii
~t
h a s c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e PllC and e n j o y s a s e m i - o f f i c i a l s t a t u s .
As s u c h
i t is
:i
O ~ ~ ! K good S
c o v e r a g e o f e v e n t s i n 111dochina al1d is
q u i t e u s p f u l i n t r a c i n g Hanoi's
o p e r a t i o n s i n Cambodia.
D a v i d bi. P . E l l i o t t .
I n i t t h e a u t h o r s d i s c u s s t h e numerous p r o b l e m s
t h a t b e s e t t h e H a n o i r r q i m e a f t e r 1975 a n d h o b t h e V i e t n a m e s e h s a d e r s h i p reacted to
thrill.
I t i s e s p e c i a l l y good i.n a n a l y z i n g t h e C h i n a - C a m b o d i a -
S i n o - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s and t h e G l o b a l S c e n e ,
----
k r r y H a r d i n g q u e s t i o n w h d t h e r Bei.j i n g a n d H a n o i bere e v e r v c r y c l o s e ,
e v e n d u r i n g the h a l c y o n d ; ~ y s of i n t c r n a t i o n a l Communist c o o p e r a t i o n . Nguyen Van C a n h - s Vi.,tnnm Under Communism h o l d s t h a t t h e Communist r e g i m e i n Hanoi s e e k s d o m i n a t i o n o f a l l S o u t h e a s t A s i a .
It is britten
The Sino-Soviet -
Conflict:
A -G l o b a l _
P e r s p e c t i ve , e d i t e d by H e r b e r t
Ellison.
P i k e a s s e r t s t h a t since 1 Y i 5 Hanoi h a s b e e n C r y i n g t o b r e a k
b u t r a t h e r i s u s i n g the S o v i e t s as a balance a g a i n s t t h e C h i n o s c .
---
s u c c f s s f u l i n d e t e r r i n g V i e t n a m e s e s u b v e r s i o n in T h a i l a n d .
I0
Chapter 3
A METHODOLOGY
these
A Theory 0 1 D e t e r r e n c e
,If
'Theory and
a c t i o n he m i g h t t a k r
I
outueigh i t s b e n e f i t s . " George and Smoke c o n t e n d t h a t , i n t h e p a s t , l e a d e r s have p e r c e i v e d t h e c o n c e p t of d e t e r r e n c e too n a r r o w l y and t o 0 negatively. To be more e f f e c t i v e , i t m u s t become p a r t O F a b r o a d e r
on
p o l i c y o f i n f l u c o c e t h a t r e l i e s on p o s i t i v e i n d u c e m n t a s w e l l as t h r i ? o t s of p u n i s h m e n t .
T h i s i n f l u e n c e s h o u l d seek t o r e d u c e t h e l r v p l
'
The
What seems r e q u i r e d i s a r e s e a r c h methodology u h i c h i s c a p a b l e of d i l c r e n t i a t i n g and i d e n t i f y i n g t h e v a r i a t i o n s i n a n u m b e r o f rc??levant d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g v a r i a b l e s from one s e t O C d e t e r r e n c e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o n n o t h c r and n s s c s s i n g ttit!ir s i g n i l i c a n c e , whi1.c. remaining cumulable a c r o s s m u l t i p l e cascs.4 t i f o r g e and Smoke have c o n s t r u c t r d an a n a l y t i c g u i d e f o r d o i n g an h i s t o r i c a l case study of a crisis s i t u a t i o n . [ t is designed t o shed
...
l i g h t on t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s of s t a t e s a s c r i s e s develop.
(1) (2)
(3)
poses.
(4)
(5)
r e q u i r e m e n t s and c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t t h o s e o p t i o n s b r i h g .
(6)
fails.
(7)
(8)
E v a l u a t e the a d v e r s a r y s r e a s s e s s m e n t of i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n r e a c t i o n
5
to the deterrence signals.
The a u t h o r s p o i n t o u t s e v e r a l m i s t a k e s n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s o f t e n make
i n applying deterrence.
There i s a t e n d e n c y t o assume a o n e - o n - o n e
The
s c e n a r i o vhen a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f p l a y e r s a r e a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e d .
c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of e f f e c t i v e
12
strategy o r home s u p p o r t .
P e r h a p s most s r r i o u s of a l l , t h o u g h , is t h e
f:ict
tl1:lt
lesdcrs
bl10
w i s h t o d c t c r g e n e r a l l y assume t h a t t h e i r signal!;
6
s a r y i s making l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n s t h e r e f r o m .
Decisions under-Strcss
__
1965 and i n
C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , and War,
_ _
N a t i o n a l l e a d c r s become p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e S h o r t term
tliilt
t h e l o n g t e r m , and t h e y become c o n v i n c e d
t h e i r own o p t i o n s a r c
c r i s i s re so h
i t
i on
ttlan . j u s t one o r t l ~ co t h e r .
makc*s e v e r y e f i o r t t o s l o w t h e pact'
of c r i t i c a l e v e n t s .
F i n a l l y , Lhv
n a t i o n a l 1 e ; i d c r s h i p makes c e r t a i n t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d 8 O K f i n e s s e d by o u t s i d e f o r c e s .
13
H i s t o r i c a l Cnsc S t u d 2
I n t h o b o o k s , C h i n a Crosses t h e Yalu:
The I l e c i s i o n -
t o E n t e r the Indochina,
Korean War --
and T h e C h i n e s e C a l c u l u s of D e t e r r e n c e :
I n d i a and --
ra I s i m i I n r i t i e s 1951) a n d 1962
S e v e r a t s i m i L a r i t i e s e x i s t b e t b e e n t h f Korean and I n d i a n c r i s e s .
'The d o m e s t i c s i t u ; i t i o n i n the PKC was u n s c ? t t l e d .
B e i j i n g p e r c e i v e d an
immediate t h r e a t a l o n g i t s b o r d e r s .
Led i t s e l t o t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p .
p e r i o d o f months, a l l o w i n g I k i j i n g t o employ i , t s " c a 1 c u I . u ~o f d c t e r r e n c e " ; b u t c o n t i n u i n g enemy c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s c r e d i b i l i t y d r e b t h e PKC i n t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , tor which i t was n o t t o t a l l y p r e p a r e d . 9 E e i j i n g had t o c o n t e n d b i t h ~ o s c o b ' s m a n e u v e r s . " T h r e a t s and ' r h e i r D e t e r r e n c e as Seen from B e i j i n g " l 0
ina ally,
e r a l s t r a t e g y [ t h a t ] u n d e r l i e s p e r s i s t e n t p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r aimed a t
p e r s u a d i n g a p e r c e i v e d o p p o n e n t t h a t t h e c o s t s of h i s c o n t i n u i n g conf l i c t u a l a c t i v i t y b i l l e v e n t u a l l y prove u n a c c e p t a b l e t o him b e c a u s e o f
14
11
t h e C h i n e s c ~r e s p o n s e . "
He f u r t h e r c o d i f i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h r
c a l c u l t i s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f : o l l o w i n g schemc.
'I'lirt!nts and 'Thcir D e t e r r e n c e as seen from k i j i n g
1. '[Il(. ~ V O K S ( ! O U K d0mesti.c s i t u a t i o n , t h e morc! l i k e l y o u r e x t c r n a l situation will WOKS~II. a ) I\ s u p e r i o r power i n p r o x i m i t y w i l l s e e k t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f OUK domestic v u l n e r a b i l i t y . h ) 'Ih~o o r more powers w i l l combine a g a i n s t u s i f t h e y can ternp o r a r i l y overcome t h e i r oFn c o n C l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . c ) W e inust p r e p a r e f o r t h e w o r s t a n d t r y O K t h e b e s t . 2 . 'rhe! b c s t d n t e r r c n c e i s b e l l i g e r e n c e . a ) To be c r e d i b l e , move m i l i t a r y f o r c e ; words do n o t s u f f i c e . b ) To be d i p l o m a t i c , leave t h e encmy ' f a c e ' and a h a y o u t . c ) 'To he p r u d e n t , leave y o u r s e l f a n . o p t i o n . ' d ) If a t f i r s t you d0Il.t SllCCeed, t r y algain bllt IllOK? SO. 3 . Correct t i m i n g i.s e s s e n t i a l . a ) Warning must be g i v e n < ? a r t y vhen a t h r e a t i s p e r c ( ! i v e d h u t not y e t i.mi.nent. b ) Thr rhythm of s i g n a l s must p e r m i t t h e enemy t o r e s p o n d and US t o c o n r i r m the, s i t u a t i o n . c ) !Je m u s t c o n t r o l O U K inovrs and n o t r e s p o n d t o the, e n e m y - s c h o i c e . I.!
as p a r t of i t s d r t e r r e n c e c a l c u l u s .
t h r e t ! b r o a d categories:
he s i g n a l s c a n be d i v i d e d i n t o
( 2 ) t r o o p m a n e u v e r s , and
( 3 ) r a p i d a t t a c k s l o l 1 , o ~ e db y a gcneKal d i s e n g a g e m e n t a s t h e f i n a t
warning.
In t h e v e r b a l w a r n i n g s W h i t i n g t r a c e s a p a t t e r n of e s c a l a t i o n
Korea,
1950
a l w a y s s t a n d on
the s i d e o f t h e K o r e a n p e o p l e . "
25 Sep
a m b a s s a d o r K. M.
30 S c p
Ztiou E n l a i d e c l a r e s :
"The C h i n e s e p e o p l e
. . will
not' s u p i n e -
l y t o l p r n t e s e e i n g t t i c i r n e i g h b o r s b e i n g s a v a g e l y i n v a d e d by the? i m p e r i a l ists."
02 Oct
S t a t e s cross(!s t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , 10 Oct
The M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f C a i r s i n B e i j i n g f o r m a l l y a n n o u n c e s :
"Th(! C h i n e s e p e o p l e c a n n o t s t a n d by i d l y w i t h r e g a r d t o
. . . the
13
rndi.il,
1962
"The C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t c a n by no mfans s i t i d l y b y w h i l e i t s
0 5 Si?p
"The I n d i a n Government
. . . should
b r aware t h a t whocver p l a y s
w i t h Eire w i l l h u r t h i m s r . l f . "
13 Scp
Chinese
21 S e p
25 SeP
grc!ssivc l n d i a n t r o o p s ,
S 0 1 U t' L'
m e il SIJr c? s
0f
s e 1 f -d
e fensp
I'
03 O c t
"~.!~lrnever I n d i a
China i s
SLIK~
t o s t r i k e back."
11 Oct
"Should the I n d i a n s i d e s t i l . l n o t r e i n i n b e f o r e t h e p r e c i p i c e
yilr,
b u t continuc? t o s p r e a d t h e f l a m e s o f
t h e I n d i a n Govcrnnirnt must
16
T h e s i g ~ l a l sg i v e n b y t h e Chinese government o c c u r a t f a i r l y r e g u l a r
i n t e r v a l s and conform t o
ii
c o n s c i o u s rhythm a c c o r d i n g t o Whititlg.
'rhis
security.
t h p o t h e r hand, i f t h e o p p o s i n g s i d e r e m a i n s t h r e a t e n i n g i n I k i j i n g ' s
This
I n s h o r t , t h e PRC p o s i t s
p h a s e l i n e s i n i t s e s c a l a t i o n oE d e t e r r e n c e t o e x e r t a s much c o n t r o l
o v c r t h e s i t u a t i o n as p o s s i b l e , t o r e a s s e s s c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , t o
prc?pore f o r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a s n e c e s s a r y , and t o o v o i d a p r e c i p i t a n t s t u m b l i n g i n t o bar when i t m i g h t be p r e v e n t e d . When v t ' r b n l s i g n a l s d o n o t p r o d u c e t h e d e s i r e d r e s u l t , t h e PLA c o l m e n c e s m i l i t a r y movements i n t o t h e c r i s i s a r e a . The m i l i t a r y a c -
t i o n s , h o w v c r , a r e a l s o phased i n o r d e r t o g i v e o n e l a s t d e t e r r e n c e
'rill? f o l l o w i n g schelne
r e f l ~ c t st h e b u i l d up t o f u l l - s c a l e war i n
25 S e p
come t o t h e Yalu.
17
02 Oct
thr 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l .
26 Oct T h e PLA a t t a c k s S o u t h Korean t r o o p s n e a r t h e Y a l u .
02 Nov
07 Nov
2 6 Nov
front.
T h e PLA l a u n c h e s a m a s s i v e g e n e r a l o f f e n s i v e a l o n g t h e e n t i r e
I n d i a n C r i s i s , 1962
L3 S e p
b e i n g consumed b y f i r e .
2o SeP
30 o c t
tory.
15
20 Nov
T h i s i s a v e r y b r i e f o u t l i n e of W h i t i n g s t h e o r y of C h i n e s e d e t e r r e n c e and o f h i s two h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s a n a l y z i n g t h a t t h e o r y .
manner i n w h i c h n a t i o n s i n t e r a c t and t h e e f f i c a c y of t h e i r a c t i o n s .
given n a t i o n - s a c t i o n s d u r i n g a t i m e of
S e c o n d , t h e s t u d y examines
U e i . j i n g s ' s h a n d l i n g of t h e s e c r i s e s i n terms
or
i t s perception o f i t s
s r n s i t i v i t y t o V i e t Nani's
interests.
'Third, t h e p a p e r looks a t t h e
i n t e n s i t y , i r u t h o r i t y , a n d t i m i n g o f t h e s i g n a l s aris
considered.
An i n d e x o f i n d i c a t o r s i s d r a w n up t o t r a c e t h e Chines11
r(?sponses b i t h i l l thcse v a r i a b l e s .
F o u r t h , t h e s t u d y determines the
r i ! l a t i v e c f f i c a c y of U c i j i i i g ' s
a c t i o n s , e x a m i n i n g them i n l i g h t of
0 1 coiiiinunication.
Viftli,
the c o n c c p t of C h i n r s e
19
FXFERRENCES CITED
z
George 3 George 4 George 5 George 6 George
--
72-82.
7
O l e R. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War ( M o n t r e a l : Y c G i l l - Q u e e n s UP, 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 7 - 2 5 ; a i i 8 ~ t ~ T t lYT47Zisc, i e American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e K e v i e k , 59:2:365-66, J u n e , 1965.
--10
12 ~-
14
W h i t i n g , C a l c u l u s , p. 210. 15 W h i t i n g , Y a l u , pp. 93 a n d 1 1 7 ; and C a l c u l u s , p. 214.
20
Chapter 4
Background
X'Srndit ion -
o f T r ___ oubles
OE troubled reiatil,ns,
V ; e t n a m r s c c i v i l i z a t i o n grew up i n t h e Red R i v e r d e l t a i n t h e l a t t e r
h-1I.f o f tile c i r s t mil l c n n i u m BC, ctlilt. an expanliing
rlllpire
and i t r o m n i n e d t h c s o u t h e r n m o s t p r o v i n c e o f t h e C h i n e s e e m p i r e
u n t i l I\D 0 9 9 .
s i o n ; and the V i e t n a m e s e , f o r t h e i r p a r t , f r e q u c n t l y t r i e d t o a s s e r t
t h e i r indepcmdi!nco,
o f t e n r i s i n g up i n r e b e l l i o n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , thc!
a d o p t e d much o f i t [ o r t h e i r own.
T h i s , too, led to a
n o t u n t y p i ( : i ~ l c o l o n i a l phenomenon:
t o c a r d ttie c o l o n i z e r s .
ambivalent f e e l i n g s o f t h e colonized
C n t h e i r r o l e as l i t t l e b r o t h e r , t h e V i e t n a m e s e
b o t h adnlired and d e s p i s e d t h e i r b i g b r o t h e r , t h e C h i n e s e .
This duality
or p a s s i o n s was L o c o n t i . n u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e h i s t o r y o f S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e 2 K $! 1 3 L i o n s
Vict Nan g a i n e d i t s i n d e p e n d e n c e i n 9 3 9 , a f t e r t h e c o l l a p s e o l t h e
Tang d y n a s t y i n C h i n a ; a n d , s h o r t l y a l t e r tltc e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e Song d y n a s t y i n 9 6 0 , i t became p a r t o f t h e C h i n e s ( , t r i b u t a r y s y s t e m , which a l l o k e d C h i n a s i n f l u e n c e t o c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h a more i n d i r e c t n e t h o d .
A t t h e same t i m e , V i e t N a m began i t s own i m p c r i a l i s t d r i v e i n t o I n d o -
c h i n a , t h e r e b y d e v e l o p i n g a n o t h e r o n g o i n g theme i n S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a tions.
a l l y t h e m s e l v e s w i t h t h e p e o p l e s a s t r i d e Viet Nam<s a d v a n c e , v i z . t h e
B e t h e e n 1075
For a s h o r t
t h e Song o c c u p i e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t s o r VirtnameS<.! t e r r i t o r y .
Nam had t o f a c e two s u b s e q u e n t major i n c u r s i o n s
Viet
from t h e n o r t h .
Th<,
p e r i o d o f d i r e c t C h i n e s e d o m i n a t i o n was s h o r t , from 1409 t o 1428; b u t i t r e a f f i r m e d t o t h e Vietnameae t h a t China would a l h a y s s e e k t o d o m i n a t e 3 them %hen t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n te d i t s e l l . D u r i n g t h e L a t t e r p a r t of t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b o t h C h i n a and
V i e t ?lam were e x p e r i e n c i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s .
I n China t h e Ming
Qing d y n a s t y of t h e Manchus.
In Hanoi t h e T r i n h c l a n e a g e r l y s o u g h t t h e
p a t r o n a g e of t h e newly e s t a b l i s h e d Qing d y n a s t y , w h i l e i n t h e S o u t h t h e 22
The
c ! n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t a Cllincse c o n n e c t i o n a s t h e were
They s o u g h t t o
o c c u p p i e d t l i u c i t y l o r t h o w e e k s , but t h e y were s o o n d e f e a t e d by a
V i C A t n m e s e army 311d w i t h d r e w from the c o u n t r y .
In 1802 t h e Nguyen h e r e a b l e t o c o n c l u d e a s u c c e s s f u l b a r a g a i n s t
t h t ' l ' r i n h and u n i t e a l l o f V i r t Nam; I~ow(?vcr,i n d o i n g s o , t h e y had
a h s o r b i n g l n d o c h i n a b i t by b i t , s t a r t i n g w i t h t h o S o u t h , i n t h e m i d d l r
01
t h e n i n e l n e n t l i c1:ntury.
As t h e y a p p r o a c h e d C h i n a ' s b o r d e r s i n t h e
This
( G r o u i n g F r e n c h hegemony
5
one of t h e major c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s . )
~ o o p e r aito n - a gainst -
-C o l o n i a l ism
23
b h i c h was p a t t e r n a f t e r t h e C h i n e s e GMD.
L i k e w i s e , t h c Chines(! Commu-
o p e r a t i o n , however,
p e a t e d l y ; a n d , when GMD t r o o p s e n t e r e d n o r t h e r n V i e r Nam i n 1945 t o a c c e p t t h e J a p a n e s e s u r r e n d e r a t t h e end of World War 11, t h e y rampaged t h r o u g h t h e c o u n t r y s i d e and showed d e f i n i t e s i g n s of w a n t i n g t o s e t u p more t h a n a t e m p o r a r y o c c u p a t i o n .
T h i s o n c e more s t i r r e d V i e t n a m e s e
T h e Geneva C o n v e n t i o n
o f Korea and I n d o c h i n a .
I n a t t e n d a n c e a t t h e I n d o c h i n a s e s s i o n s were
the Peoples
t h e V i e t Minh,
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e PRC s u p p o r t e d
t h e p a r t i t i o n , a n d t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t i t p r e s s u r e d t h e Viet Minh
8
into accepting i t . Could t h e V i e t n a m e s e Communists have g a i n e d c o n t r o l 24
t h a t t h e C m m u n i s t f o r c e s i n Viet Nam were l a r g e l y e x h a u s t e d i n 1954 a n d 9 t h a t t h e V i e t Minh w r e 8 s e a g e r f o r p e a c e a s anybody e l s e . 'Thereforc, t h o deal may n o t have been a s bad f o r them a s t h e y w e r e t o a s s e r t l a t e r
w l i c o t h e y nlainLai.ned t h a t t h e y had been f i n e s s e d o u t of h a l l the c o u n -
try.
tr;ilizc!d" 10 viaw.
Tlit? Vit!tnanirsi? Communists g e n e r a l l y t r i . e d t o w a l k the l i n r between t h e i r h r e t h r ' c n i n Moscow and I l e i j i n g , and from 1950 t h r o u g h c a r l y 1 3 7 3
t h e y were i n d e e d a b l e t o t a c k r a t h e r s u c c e s s f u l l y between t h e C h i n e s r
and t h e S o v i e t s .
T t is p o s s i b l e t o d i s c e r n s i x p h a s e s o f V i e t n a m e s e
CommiinisL maneuvtsrs d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d .
F r o m 1'350 t o 1956, t h e y were on good terms w i t h b o t h of t h e Com-
nninist g i a n t s .
t h e h a l c y o n d a y s of i n t c r n a t i u n a l Communist c o o p e r a t i o n and s o l i d a r i t y . E l e v e r t h e l e s s , H o ' s r a g i m e was r a t h e r c l o s e r t o t h e C h i n e s e t h a n t o t h c S o v i e t s a t t h i s time. From 1950 t o 1954, t h e PRC was p r o v i d i n g a
m u n i s t s a l s o l o o k e d t o t h e C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p e r i e n c e a s a model f o r t h r Vietnamcse r e v o l u t i o n .
25
moved c l o s e r t o t h e S o v i e t s .
Hanoi began t o d e v e l o p a n
The North V i e t -
the a d v a n c e d a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s , n o t t h e C h i n e s e , c o u l d p r o v i d e .
D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e were f r e q u e n t v i s i t s of S o v i e t and C h i n e s e d i g n i . t a r i e s back a n d f o r t h between Hoscoh and H a n o i . F i n a l l y , t h e PRC's
d i s a s t r o u s Three Red B a n n e r s campaign from 1958 t o 1960 l a r g e l y d i s a b u s e d t h e V i e t n a n w s c of t h c e f f i c a c y of t h e Chinese model. T h e S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t came i n t o t h e open i n 1960. A t tIlc
Same
t o p l a y a m e d i a t i n g r o l e b r t w e n ?110scob and B e i j i n g .
r e c o u p some of i t s waning s t a t u r e w i t h t h e N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e by p r o m i s e s
of increased s u p p o r t .
Between 1963 and 1 9 6 5 , t h e DRV swung toward t h e PRC i n t h e S i n o Soviet dispute. Hanoi s u s p e c t e d t h a t Rhrushchev * s p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l
Le Duan,
T h e DRV o f t e n . j o i n e d r a n k s w i t h t h e PRC i n c r i t i c i z i n g
Soviet revisionism;
'The PRC t e n d e d
llOt
t o support t h i s ,
in
tIiC
ii
rather d i f f e r e n t ideologicat
As
V i e t n a m e s e r e s i s t a n c e t o a Communist t a k e o v e r s t i f f e n e d .
With t h i s p r o s p e c t , t h e No r t h Vi e t n a m e s c
Therefore,
the pt!riod o f
IJSSR.
T h e r e were s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i s .
in i t e~ nsified,
The N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e
27
s e v e r e s t r a i n s i.n S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s .
Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s i n
t h e PRC here a t t a c k e d and b e a t e n by Red G u a r d s , and S o v i e t arms s h i p ments t r a v e r s i n g t h e PRC by r a i l on t h c i r way t o t h e DRV here i n t e r 11 d i c t e d and l o o t e d . T h e n o t i o n o f t h e People:: War, i . e . p r o t r a c t e d w a r f a r e based on t h e Maoist model, has h e r a l d e d by L i n B i a o and became the s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y o r t h o d o x y d u r i n g t h e C u l t u r a l . R e v o l u t i o n .
In
s p i t e o f t h e b e l l i c o s e b l u s t e r of i t s r h e t o r i c , L i n Uiao-s formulation
Chincse
p o l i c y as best he c o u l d , wanted n o E o r e i g n v e n t u r e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d
Of
C h i n a s s e l f - i n d u c e d we:ikncss.
F i n a l l y , H;lnoi became p a r t i c u l a r l y
w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e US-USSR d e t e n t r . .
P a r i s Peace A c c o r d s
I j e i j i n g was c r i t i c a l . of Hanoi x h e n t h e l a t t e r a g r e e d t o e n t e r i n t o
The C h i n e s e were i n t h e l a s t g a s p s o f t h e
T h e y even t h r e a t e n e d t h e
Hci.jing a l s o s u s p e c t e d a S o v i e t
28
13
t h ( , Taiwan p r o b l ( m , i . e .
t h a t Hanoi e x e r c i s e p a t i e n c e .
of t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n a n d t o p u r s u e a somewhat more m o d e r a t e p a t h .
Thc C u l t u r a l . R e v o l u t i o n had t o r n C h i n a a p a r t a n d weakened i t c o n s i d erably. B e i j i n g bi,came n e r v o u s o v e r i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y a s i t w i t n e s s e d i n v a s i o n oC C z e c h o s l o v a k i a i n 1968, w h i c h b a s j u s t i f i e d by
C ~ I PS0vii.t
t h e v e r y d a n g e r o u s Brezhnev d o c t r i n e .
A s e r i e s o f Cierce b o r d e r c l a s h e s
Thr
t o o k p l a c e b e t w e r n t h e C h i n e s e a n d S o v i e t s d u r i n g 1969 a s b e l l . Chines(, l c u d e r s h i p
bas
now i n t e r e s t e d i n k e e p i n g t h e l i d on a v e r y
ecplosive situation.
t h e i r s t r a t e g y of r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d r e c o n c i l i a -
t i o n i n S o ~ r t h c n n t Asia.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e C h i n e s e may not h a v e b e e n t o o
i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r more c l e a r l y .
c e i v e d t o bt? t h e g r e a t t h r e a t t o C h i n a s
29
15
a s s i s t a n c e b u t no m i l i t a r y a i d . S t e p h e n D. Young, who s e r v ~ db i t h t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t i n V i c t N a m and w 8 s c l o s e t o Ambassador L ~ ~ s w o r t t l Hunker, has r e p o r t e d t h a t U ( ? i j i n g e v o n o E e r a d a i d t o Saigon i n t h e waning d a y s o f t h e w a r . A f t e r t h e P a r i s P c a s e Agreements were s i g n e d i n 1973, P e k i n g s e n t T h i e u a l e t t e r t h r o u g h t h e good o f t i c e s of S i n g a p o r e - s Lee Kwan Y e w . F e a r i u l o r thi? c o n s e q u e n c e s , T h i e u d i d n o t r e p l y . Then weeks b e f o r e t h e c o l l a p s e o f S a i g o n i n 1975, P e k i n g a g a i n a p p r o a c h e d T h i e u . Chis time t h e C h i n e s e u s e d his b r o t h e r as a c o n t a c t and o f f e r e d t o s u p p o r t S o u t h Vietnam a g a i n s t Hanoi i f C h i e u would o p e n a ew d o o r s t o power f o r t h e NLF [ N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ] . R e e l i n g from t h e c o l l a p s e o f tiis armies, T h i c u had no c o u r a g e f o r s u c h a d r a m a t i c g a m b l e . 1 6
Ihc H a n o i l e a d e r s h i p c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the I ) R V - s
i n t e r e s t s would be
C h i n a s w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t a d i v i d e d Viet Nan1 a t Geneva now saw history repeating itsel. Many i n Hanoi r e a s o n e d t h a t the PRC s i m p l y T h i s i s why t h e
f o u g h t below.
t o l e a v e the
30
A f t e r y e a r s of c o u r a g e o ~ ~r s esistance,
long-timt! p a t r o n ,
the) U n i t e d S t a t e s , was i t s e l e x p e r i e n c i n g a
to
s e r i e s o f u n p r e c e d c n t e d i n t e r n a l c r i s e s and c o u l d n l J t come
its aid.
C I I C ~ p r c c c d i n g p a r n g r a p h s d e m o n s t r a t e , a t r a d i t i o n of t h o u s a n d s o f y e a r s 19 i)! t r o u b l e s d i e s h a r d .
Sino-Vietnomcsi. r e l a t i o n s .
I n h i s s t u d y of
the S i n o - F r e n c h b a r o f thl'
13805, t k n r y M c A l i i a v y makes t h e f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n .
'The
whether N o r t h e r n e r o r
a l b a y s s o u g h t t h e i r own
T h a t t h e s e and o t h e r lessons
i m p e r p c t l y - - b y b o t h t h e C h i n e s e and t h e V i e t n a m e s e - - b a s
< ] . l u s t r a t e d p o i g n a n t l y by t h e e v e n t s t h a t f o l l o w e d t h e u n i f i c a t i o n o f
Viet Nam by H a n o i i n 1975.
31
il
b a s i c power r e o r i e n t a t i o n
US i n f l u e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n bas a t i t s n a d i r ,
On t h e o t h e r
s t r a t e g i e s d i d each f o l l o b t o s e c u r e i t s i n t e r e s t s and a c h i e v e i t s
goals?
china M a i n t a i n i n g a s e c u r e s o u t h e r n f l a n k was Uc!i,jing*s f i r s t s t r a t e g i c 21 i n t e r e s t regarding Indochina. W i t h Hanoi * s v i c t o r y i n 1 9 7 5 , B e i j i n g
e x t r e m i t i e s or t h e v a s t l a n d mass, v i z . ,
Southeast Asia.
i n S o u t h r e s t Asia a n d i n
32
t a k e on
iiii
anti-Chinesc posture.
What t h e C h i n e s a Eound u n a c c e p t a b l e ,
soutlierii [lank.
Nam and t h e r e s t o f S o u t h e a s L A s i a .
6100
For t h i s r i ? a s o n
t h e C h i n c s c L e a d e r s h i p bagan t o
t.11
dr:ci(lcd t u u s c r c ? s t r a i n t i n d e a l i n g w i t h l l a n o i . t h a t time b a s on t h i a i r s i d e .
They here r a t h e r c o n r i d e n t t h a t t h e
'They a l s o f e l t t h a t V i e t Nani-s p a t t e r n of d e v e l o p m e n t
C h i n a - s t h a n t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n - s and t h a t , a s a
OK
more a k i n
tii
r e s u l t , t h e Vietnamesi? k o u l d I.ook
~ ( > s c o k . 'Cti\?
g u i d a n c c morp t o D e i j i n g t h a n t o
bccoming i i i v o l v i ~ d i n H a n o i ' s
5,ork t o expand i . n t e r n a t i o n a 1 d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t t o b o l s t e r i t s p o s i t i o n .
T h i s would i n v o l v e c u l t i v a t i n g , e s p e c i a l l . y , Cambodia, t h e A s s o c i a t i o n o f
33
In a s s e s s i n g i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , l l a n o i was g u i d e d b y t h r e e
28
primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : history, i d e o l o g y , and t h e i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t . C h i n a h a d b e e n Viet Nam-s h i s t o r i c a l enemy, f o r a p e r i o d w h i c h s t r e t c h e d o v e r two m i l l e n n i a . This engendered a pervasive s u s p i c i o n
k i . t h i n Vietnamese t h i n k i n g t h a t c o u l d n o t b e e r a s e d e a s i l y .
by 1960 Hanoi had d e t e r m i n e d n o t f o f o l l o w t h e PRC p a r a d i g m 29 revolution. The war b i t h S o u t h Viet Nan1 nntl t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had a l s o i n f l u e n c e d Hanoi's thinking. The Viecnilmese Comnunis t s had S e e n
Of
Chinese c o n c e p t ~f p e o p 1 e . s
i n warfare.
and w a n t e d t o d e v e l o p i t s o m i n d u s t r i a l b a s e .
e x a m p l e of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i d n a p p e a l e d more t o them t h a n t h e C h i n e s e p a t t e r n of r u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t .
p r o b a b l y h o p i n g t o use t h e S o v i e t s t o k e e p t h e C h i n e s e a t bay.
R e g a r d h g t h e i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t , t h e Hanoi g o v e r n m e n t s a v i t s e l f
c a u g h t b e t w e n two h o s t i l e p o w e r s who were i n c o n c e r t , t h e PRC a n d t h e Khmer Rouge * s Cambodia. The V i e t n a m e s e p e r c e i v e d t h e P R C - s f o r e i g n
p o l i c y t o be a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n e s e t r i b u t a r y s y s t e m .
34
: i
modern i n : i n i f t ~ s t a t i o n o f ! : h i s t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n e s e c o n r i g u r a t i o n .
saw China a s d e s i r i n g a malleable V i c t n a m e s e h e d g e
Ilanoi
s t a t e t o act as a
b u f f e r a l o n g Chin:is
southern border.
F i r s t , i t would d e v e l o p n modus v i v e n d i w i t h t h c
g a i n priintiry i l i f l u e n c f ~i n Laos.
a ional security i n t e r e s t s
kitti
to
Ibi?
t h e most p r e s s i n g i m m e d i a t e f o r e i g n p o l i c y p r o b l e m i n d e a l i n g
e n c h o t h ( ! r iri m i d - 1 9 7 5 . forces.
N r i t h e r b a s v(.,ry p e r s p i c a c i o u s
the o t h e r .
[ ( ? e l o v e r a n u n f r i e n d l y Cambodia.
s i b i l i t y o f s i g n i f i c a n t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n V i e t Nam. h a s H a n o i t o go t o s e c u r e a p o w e r f u l p a t r o n ?
Yet where e l s e
The Vietnamese p e r c e i v e d ,
a c c o r d i n g t o H o l s t i , i s a s i g n of good c r i s i s management.
E v e n t s were
35
A P o l i c y of C a u t i o n , 1975-1977
'To a c c o m p l i s h t h e s c o b j e c t i v c s , t h e PRC l e a d e r s h i p p l a n n e d t o p u t
p r i m a r y e m p h a s i s on d i p 1 o m a t i c m a n e u v e r s , e c o n m i c b l a n d i s h m e n t s , and p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s programs.
W i t h s p e c i f i c r e g a r d t o Hanoi, B e i j i n g
s o u g h t t o a v o i d any c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t h o u l d e x a c c r b a t ? tlie S i n o -
33
V i e t n a m e s e d i s p u t e and p u s h t h c Victnamosc c1osr.r t o t h c S o v i e t s . C o n t e n t i o u s L s s u e s , 1975
(1) d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c p e r c e p t i o n s ;
( 2 ) a t t e m p t s by e a c h s i d e t o o u t -
maneuver t h e o c h e r ; ( 3 ) the s t a t u s o t Laos; ( 4 ) t h e d i s p u t e o v e r t h e S p r a t l y and P a r a c e l i s l a n d s ; ( 5 ) t h e c o n f l i c t o v e r t h e b o r d e r b e t k e e n China and V i e t N a m ; ( 6 ) t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e p r o b l e m ; ( 7 ) t h e S i n o Vietnamese r i v a l r y i n S o u th e a s t As ia ; ( 8 ) t h e q u e s t i o n of a i d ; ( 9 ) t h e Cambodian s i t u a t i o n ; and ( 1 0 ) t h e r o l e o f t h e S o v i e t Union i n t h e r e -
gion.
c o n t e n t i o n ; and i t p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n a l l o f t h e o t h e r problems.
T h e PRC p e r c e i v e d a power vacuum i n S o u t h e a s t Asia due t o t h e
36
i m m e d i a t e l y of
-_-_
c a u t i o n e d Hanoi a g a i n s t bcconiing t o o c l o s e t o t h e S o v i e t s .
35
back d o o r whiie k i c k i n g the wolf ( t h e U S ) o u t of t h e f r o n t d o o r .
0 1 1
September 1 9 1 5 PKC V i c e - P r e m i e r Chcm X i l i a n , k h i l c s p e a k i n g in Viet Nom, 36 warned Hanoi t o gilard a g a i n s t bc,coining a v i c t i m o r S o v i c t hegemonism.
Ln September t h e
'Cherr Drng X i a o p i n g
V i c t n n m e s r S c c r c t u r y - G e n c r a l j o u r n e y c d t o the P n C .
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e PRC.
w1.th
Ln O c t o b e r Le Duan v i s i t e d Moscow.
His m e e t i n g s
l i i s t e a d of p r e s s u r i n g h i m , the S o v i e t s o f f e r e d him a i d , t o t h e amount of 39 t h r e e b i l l i o n d o l l a r s over t h e next f i v e y e a r s . 'The q i i e s t i . o n of a i d became a v e r y sore p o i n t between the C h i n e s e and V i e t n a m e s e .
I n e a r l y 1975 R e i j i n g had g i v e n Hanoi c o n s i d e r a b l e a i d :
i n s u p p o r t o f Hanoi's
f i n a l o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t S n i g o n , and t o make up f o r
37
the l o s s o f W e s t e r n s u p p l i e s t o t h e S o u t h w i t h t h e d e t e a t o f t h e Repub-
l i c o f V i r t Rani.
r e c e i v i n g this i n the f u t u r e .
I n August 1 9 7 5 , h o s e v e r , B e i j i n g i n f o r m e d
Hanoi t h a t i.t was r e d u c i n g i t s a i d p a c k a g e t o $400 m i l l i o n p e r year. and 40 t h a t i t would be i n t h e form o f lo an s. Nor would t h e PKC s i g n a l o n g 41 term economic a s s i s t a n c e a g r e e m e n t , which Hanoi had been a n t i c i p a t i n g . B e i . j i n g was s i g n a l l i n g Hanoi t h a t i t h a d b e t t e r behove. Hanoi p e r c e i v e d
Hanoi-s v i c t o r y o v e r t h e S o u t h .
43
Chinese, a b o u t f o u r - f i f t h s o f whom l i v e d in t h e S o u t h .
S i n c e 1949
Beijing's
i n t e r e s t i n t h e O v e r s e a s Chines(: c o m m u n i t y i n g e n e r a l had
A s o t h e r p r o b l e m s de-
v e l o p e d b e t s e e n China and V i e t Nam, however, t h e PKC c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o o v e r l o o k a c t i o n s t a k e n b y llanoi a g a i n s t t h c O v c r s e a s C h i n e s e , f o r B e i j i n g p e r c e i v e d s u c h a c t i o n s a s a d i r c c t a f f r o n t t o the C h i n e s e leadership. For i t s p a r t Hanoi t h o u g h t i t had good r e a s o n t o t a k e The V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s
a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C h i n e s e l i v i n g i n Viet Nam.
There was a n i d e o l o g i c a l e l e m e n t
well.
44
t u r e by n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e C h i n e s e b u s i n e s s community. Additionally,
38
th(?re berc
Ctie
co!;sEul ~ : o u q i l c s t of t h e S o u t l i .
w i t t i t h e CanniunisI- t a k e - o v e r of t h e c i t y . The PRC f l a g was f o r b i d d e n t o 46 be! f l o w n . S h o r t l y b e f o r e dawn on 11 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 5 , V i e t n a m e s e Commun i s t p o l i c e r a i d e d t h e homes a n d businesses o f l a r g e n u m b e r s of O v e r s e a s CIii.nesi! i n S a i g o n and s e i z e d t h e i r p r o p e r t y .
$1i n i s t c r
0I
announcctl
t l i a t the Vietnamese
a p r o g r a m to w i p e
OlJt
compradore cut in
47
c . i p i t a 1is t s . I T h i s may h a v e been H a n o i s response t o Beijings
a i d a r m ~ n t he a r l i e r .
rcspondi.ng
to
I f i t w a s , t h e V i e t n a m e s e w e r e c e r t a i n l y not
The c l a m p cool
C h i n a a s s i g n a l as t h e C h i n e s e would h a v e them.
loadership continued t o a c t w i t h r e s t r a i n t .
T h e r e was no v i t u p e r a t i v e
period
its
well.
T h c s r e n c o m p a s s e d two a r e a s :
t h e maritimr regions
and t h c Innrl b o r d e r .
T h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e b i c k e r i n g o v P r o k n e r s h i p o f There
v a r i o u s i s l a n d s , e s p e c i a l . l y t h e P a r n c e l and t h e S p r i l t l y g r o u p s .
tras a l s o a r g u m e n t o v e r t e r r i t o r i a l waters i n t h e G u l f o f T o n k i n . T h e s e
maritime d i s p u t e s had some merit i n and of t h e m s e l v e s beCauSe t h e r e :;ions tion. i n q u e s ~ : i o nwould a p p e a r t o o f f e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r o i l e x p l o r a The l a n d b o r d e r i s s u e , h o w e v e r , was l a r g e l y a s t r a w man.
It
39
became t h e symbol of a l l t h e o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r c l a t i o n s , and i t developed i n t o t h c f l a s h p o i n t f o r d i r e c t m i l i t a r y confrontation. A c c o r d i n g t o tlic V i e t n a m c s c , b o r d e r El arc?-ups had begun 48 t o o c c u r a s e a r l y as 1974. D o u b t l e s s l y , b o t h s i d e s s o u g h t t o use the
b o r d e r c l a s h e s a s a s i g n a l ; b u t these s i g n a l s proved t o be i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e each s i d e p e r c e i v e d the b o r d e r maneuvers oC thc o t h e r as r e p r e 49 s e n t i n g t o t a l l y inamicable i n t e n t i o n s . Both sides began s t r a t e g i c maneuvers t o g a i n l e v e r a g e o v e r t h e o t h e r i n 1975. I l c i j i n g s o i ~ g l i t t o b u i l d a broad c o a l i t i o n t o s u p p o r t i t s
I t i n i t i a t e d 'a r a p i d r a p p r o c h e m c n t k i t h
p o s i t i o n i n Southeast Asia.
ASEAN.
The C h i n e s ( : a l s o e n c o u r a g P d Washington n o t t o h i t h d r a l v p r e -
c i p i t o u s l y from A s i a b u t t o c o n t i n u e t o m a i n t a i n a s t r o n g p r e s c n c c , 50 p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e P a c i f i c and I n d i a n Oceans. Although Hanoi, too, would soon t r y t o i n v o l v e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and ASEAN i n t h e r e g i o n , i t found t h i s t o be e x t r e m e l y i r r i t a t i n g i n 1975 i n Lhe i m n e d i a t e h a k e o f t h o war.
l n f r a m i n g i t s p o i n t o f r e E e r e n c e , howcver,
Beijing has c l e a r
A l l of
T h e Chinese h c r e c a r e f u l n o t t o be v i t r i o l i c
i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e Vietnamese.
H a n o i , t h o u g h , seemed t o be e x t r e m e l y
t r i p t o Moscolv i n O c t o b e r
o l 1975, E d i t h L e n a r t r e p o r t e d
40
Mnscou e f f o r t s t o d i m i n i s h C h i n a ' s In tiirn, th(! S o v i 1 . t ~ :ire b a c k i n g I l a n o i . s movu Lowards a s p e e d y r e u n i f i c a t i ( i n 0 1 Vietnam. F o r i t s p a r t , P e k i n g had hoped t h a t t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n ~ K O C ( ? S S b o u l d ho gradu:il.. The l a t e s t S o v i e t a i d a g r e e m e n t k i t h H a n o i g r a n t s t h e V i e t n a m e s e a n u n d i s c l o s e d amount of " c r e d i t s on c>asy tiirms." I t c a l A s f u r t h e " c o o r d i n f l t i o ( 1 o f t h e , twy c o u n t r i e s : de: v c l o p m e n t p l a n s and p r o v i d e s f o r S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s t o t r a i n V i e t namest5 in Viet Nam i n v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s o f cconomy, s c i e n c e , t e c h n o l o g y and c u l t u r e . " The S o v i e t Union w i l l " a s s i s t i n d e v e l o p i n g V i r t n a m e s i ! i n d u s t r y a n d a g r i c u l t u r e and s t u d y t h e t e c h n i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c ;Ispc!cts o f 1 ; i u n c h i n g S e v e r a l m a j o r c c o n o m i c p r o . j e c t s i n V i e t n a m . "5 1
The V i f t n a m f v c
. . support
...
T h a t V i s t Nam b o i i l d s e e k S o v i e t a i d a n d s u p p o r t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g ,
arid p e r h a p s tlie C t i i i i o s i ~ would tiAvc, t i 1 1 c r : ~ t e d a m e a s u r e o f S o v i e t -
wapon
fact? o f t h e C h i n e s e .
By t h e nnd o f 1 9 7 5 , V i e t n a m ' s
guised.
of a n I n d o c h i n a f e d e r a t i o n i n l a t e 1975.
W i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e Lao P e o p l e ' s
D e m o c r a t i c RepubOK
the
The PKC a c c e p t e d V i e t n a m e s e i n f l u e n c e i n Laos w i t h a c e r t a i n amount o f good g r a c e . Cambodia. Whnre B t ! i j i n g was d e t e r m i n e d t o make a s t a n d was k i t h
ii
I t was
poor c h o i c e .
C h i n a ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e Khmer
very
41
u n c o m f o r t a b l e p o s i t i o n ; and Communist Cambodias b e l l i g e r e n t i m t r a n s i g e n c c t o w a r d Viet Nnm was a l m o s t c e r t a i n t o lead t o w a r , ~ h i c h wou1.d p o s e C h i n a t h e dilenmin o f how t o r e s p o n d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there
M a o i s t model o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e .
bitti
Moscow.
anti-Vi.etnamese.
T h i s l a s t p o i n t has b o r n m i t by Cambodian a t t a c k s
a g a i n s t t h o Vietnamese a l o n g t h e b o r d e r and in t h e South C h i n a Sea i n 53 May and J u n c o f 1975. J u s t as t h e Vietnamesc seemed i n s e n s i r i v e t o Chinese concerns i n d e a l i n g k i t h the S o v i e t s , the Chinese l i k e w i s e d i d n o t SIIOW much a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r V i e t n a m c s e c o n c e r n s i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
Khmer Rouge l e a d e r s Khieu Sampham a n d I r n g S a r y v i s i t e d
Cambodians.
B e i . j i n g i n August of 1 9 7 5 .
promise of c o n s i d e r a b l e a i d , i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y hardware.
time when t h e r e w r e a c t i v e b o r d e r h o s t i l i t i e s betwcnn Cambodia a n d Viec 54 Nam a n d a t a time clien C h i n a was r e d u c i n g i t s a i d t o t l a n o i . The
Cambodians, f o r t h e i r p a r t , d e c l a r e d c o m p l e t e s u p p o r t f o r t h e p o l i c i e s 55 o f t h e PRC. By t h e end t h e e n d o f 1 9 7 5 , b o t h s i d e s had s t a k e d o u t t h e i r p o s i tions.
R e i j i n g had i s s u e d numerous s i g n a l s t o H a n o i b a r n i n g t h a t t h e
In g e n e r a l , B e i j i n g s c r i t i c i s m s o f Hanoi were r e s t r a i n e d a n d
The C h i n e s e w a n t e d i t c l e a r t h a t i t m s Noscob t h e y f e a r e d .
low-keyed.
42
t h e i r q u i c k r e d u c t i o n o f a i d t o llanoi and i n t h e i r u n q u a l i f i e d s u p p o r t
of Cambodia.
Had t h e y u s e d a b i t more c a r r o t t h a n s t i c k i n t h e s e e a r l y
Almost i m m e d i a t e l y Hanoi
Cm>ritent i o n Continues,
1976-1977
Tht. y v a r s 1976 and 1977 saw a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the p a t t e r n s e s t n b Listied i n 1975; y e t c r i s i s management seemed t o b e w o r k i n g . d e [ i n i t i ! ea:iing o f t e n s i o n s i n 1976. This
was
T h e r e was a
d u e t o some e x t e n t a t
Zedong, t h e f a l l . from g r a c e f o r t h e s e c o n d time o f Deng X i a o p i n g , and t l i r p u r g e of t h e Gang of Fo u r. Hanoi was busy s o l i d i f y i n g N o r t h e r n Even t h e
c o n t r o l o v e r t h e S o u t h a n d commencing p o s t - w a r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .
Khmer Kollge were i n a q u i e s c e n t p e r i o d i n t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . D u r i n g 1976 Hanoi hoped t o d c v e l o p a r e a s o n a b l y i n d e p e n d e n t f o r r i g r l p o l i c y by i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a a n d t h e West and by h o l d i n g the :;oviets a t a b i t o f a d i s t a n c e . Both C h i n e s e and V i e t n a m e s e p r e s s Economic a n d e d u c a t i o n a l
56
d e l e g a t i o n s o n c e more
W ~ K Ce x c h a n g e d .
A l t h o u g h B e i j i n g h a d hoped t h a t a n
t o Hanoi
M o r e o v e r , t h e V i e t n a m e s e seemed t o bc r e s p o n -
d i n g p o s i t i v e l y f o r a change.
On I J u l y 1976 Hanoi p u b l i s h e d a r a t h e r
harm message o f c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on t h e o c c a s i o n of t h e f i f t y - f i f t h
58
a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e f o u n d i n g o f t h e CCP.
On 10 Scptismber 1 9 7 6 , t h e
V i e t n a m e s e s e n t c o n d o l e n c e s t o B e i j i n g on the d e a t h o f Mao Zedong. 59 T h e i r message s t r e s s e d Sino-Vietnamese F r i e n d s h i p . F u r t tierniorc, t he V i e t n a m e s e were of c o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h c C h i n ~ s e i n t h e c m 60 b a l m i n g o f Mao's body and i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f h i s mausoleum.
I.Jlii12
remained.
__--
S o v i c t - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s a t t h e time.
Thr V i e t n a m e s e h a d b e e n e x -
high -handadni~ ss
M a r c h 1977
t h I ?
(14
cnnmission
On the
o i nl
01113
On tlie o t h o r h a n d , U e i j i n g w o 1 1 1 d
t i e s brrween
W ~ K .
a n g e r e d the Vif.tnamesi:.
once more.
A t l e a s t e i g h t h i g h r a n k i n g d e l e g a t i o n s from t h e S o v i e t Union
v i . s i t e d t h e SRV i n O c t o b e r .
T h i s r e p r e s c n t e d a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of S o v i e t Hanoi r e s p o n d e d w i t h a
Vietnamesi? c o o p e r a t i o n a c r o s s a b r o a d f r o n t .
The SRV
moved c l o s e r t o t h c USSR f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s .
d i f f i c u l t ies
H a n o i was i n f i n a n c i a l
In t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , S o v i c t
The g r o w i n g war w i t h
45
Hanoi h a s
p r o b a b l y s i g n a l l i n g I l e i j i n g of i t s c x t r c m e d i s p l e a s u r e bith Chincse
68
t h c r e was a g e n u i n e e E E o r t made by t h e C h i n e s c l e a d e r s t o u n d e r s t a n d
Viet Nams p e r c e p t i . o n s o f i t s i n t e r e s t s i n I n d o c h i n a .
At the b e h e s t o f
1977.
oE the most b i t t e r f i g h t i n g t o d a t e a l o n g
Vir!tnaoess-Cainbodian
border. cont K O I
.
A c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f c o o p e r a t i o n was
O u t s i d e of
With
I n d o c h i n a , t h e S o v i e t s had made ew i n r o a d s in S o u t h e a s t A s i a .
i n a r e s t r a i n e d manner. signals.
They had n o t r u s h e d t h e p a c e of c r i t i c a l e v e n t s .
h a d e x h i b i t e d s i g n s a t t e m p t i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d H a n o i - s Erame o f r e f e r e n c e .
46
C o n t e n t i o n Ueconirs C r i s i s , 1978-1979
'The y e a r 01:
o th6?
Si.no-!'iel:namese d i s p u t e .
T h i s s t u d y e x a m i n e s t h e r i s e of the c r i s i s i n s e v e n s t a g e s from
J a n u a r y 1978 t o F e b r u a r y 1979.
Tliroiigliout the month or J a n u a r y 1978 t h e bordcr war b e t w e e n Cambod i a and V i r t Nan1 rngi?d w L t h a nelj i n t e n s i t y .
O n 31 December 1 9 7 7 , l'linont
CIiinn,
strong regional
I ~ E K ~
O n t h e oLt1t.r h a n d , the C h i n e s e b e l i e v e d t h a t t h c V i e t n a m e s e
p l o t L i n g w i t h t h e S o v i e t s t o g a i n hegemony o v e r f i r s t I n d o c h i n a , t h e n 70 Over a l l Southenst Asia. N e i t h e r t h r PRC nor the SKV had a b a n d o n e d p o s i t i v e c r i s i s managemt,nt completely, however.
In r e s p o n s e t o a c o m p l a i n t f r o m Hanoi t h a t
t h e PKC p r e s s was o n e - s i d e d i n r e p o r t i n g t h e w a r , Ren Min K i Bao publ i s h e d : i c c o u n t s front b o t h the V i e t n a m e s e a n d Cambodian p e r s p e c t i v e s on 71 10 .January 1978. A f t e r a m a s s i v e , two-month p u s h i n t o Cambodia, t h e !'i e t namesf :innounced a p e a c e p l a n on 5 F e b r u a r y 1978.
It called f o r a
47
February peace o f f e r .
On 2 1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 i 8 , R a d i o Hanoi a c c u s e d t h e PRC
oT g i v i n g m a s s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d t o Cambodia a n d o r e n c o u r a g i n g the Khmer nouge t o c o n t i n u e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t thc SnV. To u n d e r l i n e t h c i r c o n c e r n , t h e y p o i n c r d o u t tlif l a r g r nunibt!r o f c a s u a l t i e s t h e y bere 71 taking. The C h i n e s e r e s p o n d p d p r e s e n t l y . A t ttif F i f t h N a t i o n a l p c o p l e * s C o n g r e s s , h r l d i n B e i j i n g from 28 P c b r u a r y t n 5 March 1 9 7 8 , H u a Guofeng d e c l a r e d t h a t ' h o c o u n t r y s h o u l d s e e k hegemony i n a n y r e g i o n o r 74 impose i t s w i l l on o t h e r s . " By t h i s time "hegcmony" had become a c o d e word a s s o c i a t e d
QS
On 5 March
B e i . j i n g s e n t a t e c h n i c a l m i s s i o n t o Cambodia.
c l e a r l y s i g n a l l i n g Hanoi t o k e e p i t s h a n d s o f f Cambodi.a.
m o b i l i z e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e c a p i t a l , c o n n e c t i o n s , and e x p e r t i s e t o s u p p o r t
thc Four X o d e r n i z a t i o n s .
In J a n u a r y o f 1978 a s p e c i a l c o n f e r e n c e on t h e
The O v e r s o a s C h i n e s e A f I a i r s
O v e r s e a s Chinese bas h e l d i n B e i j i n g .
-. I<en
__ Min
(:hiii(!sn i n
a r l i c L i t on 4 J a n u a r y 1978.
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h i s
a r t i c l e bas
ii
s i g n a l t o l l a n o i , t h e I'RC p r o b a b l y m e a n t i t t o be n o t h i n g
for
more t h a n
ii
w a r n i n g t h a t B e i j i n g was i n t e r e s t e d in p r o p e r t r e a t m e n t
a g a i n t h e C h i n e s e f a i l e d t o d e t e r t h e Vietnamese
On 24
Erom t a k i n g n c o u r s e o C a c t i o n of w h i c h B e i j i n g d i s a p p r o v e d .
:.lsrcli 1 9 7 8 , t h ~ 'SRV's bttsinesses
iri
s e c u r i t y p n l i c c b e g a n m a s s i v e r a i d s on C h i n e s r
r i ! p o r t s fronl V i e L Nam i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h c r e had b e e n b l o o d y c l a s h e s b e t w e n the s e c u r i t y pol i c e and t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e a n d t h a t many 82 Cliinesc had b e e n k i l l e d . The f i r s t wave of the g r e a t e x o d u s oC C h i n a s e frmi Viet N;im o c c u r r c d i n A p r i l a n d May of 1978. Almost 100,(~00
e t h n i c Cliinrse f l e d N o r t h Viet Nam a c r o s s the Land b o r d e r i n t o C h i n a . B e i j i n g perceived Hanoi's p e r s e c u t i o n of t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n c s e t o b e 83 primarily anti-Chinese r a t h e r than a n t i - f r e e e n t e r p r i s e . 'The f l a r i n g u p of t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e p r o b l e m e x a c e r b a t e d t w o other contentious issues.
W i t h l a r g e numbers o f Chinese c r o s s i n g from
'The
84
to increase.
On 1 2 May t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y of tlie PRC i n f o r m e d H a n o i
85
m a r k e d f o r H a n o i would now be u s e d t o a s s i s t t h e r e E l i g e e s .
49
Tn e a r l y May t h e C h i n e s e h(!gan t o s i g n a l t h e i r r i s i n g c o n c e r n o v e r
t h e i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t p r c s e n c e i n Viet Nam.
lliis Gas d o n e t h r o u g h a
___
On
-_-
a c t i o n , d e s i g n e d t o i n f l a m e S i no-V i e t name sc rc 1a t i o n s
Each s i d e t e n d e d t o b e o b l i q u e i n i t s c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e o t h e r .
The
l e v e l of v i t r i o l i n t h e r h e t o r i c % a s k e p t r e a s o n a b l y low.
Beijing
50
c o m t c r a t t i l c k a g a i n s t pro-Hanoi Khmer t r o o p s i n e a s t e r l l Canlbodia and 89 r o u t c d them. 'She V i e t n a m e s e had hoped t o a v o i d e s c a l a t i n g t h e i r d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Cambodia by b u i l d i n g a n a t i v e Khmer r e s i s t a n c e inovenlent, a n d nob t h i s r c s i s t a n c e moveiiienL had been d e a l t a c r i p p l i n g
blob.
O n thi! same d a y , I k i j i n g f i r e d
a p r o p a g a n d a b r o a d s i d e a~ the SRV.
The PRC i s s u e d a agency d i r e c t l y
iltcnient o f a c c u s a t i o n s t h r o u g h i t s o f f i c i a l tlanoi.
nebs
aj:ainst
A c c o r d i n g t o U e i j i n g , Hanoi b a s g u i l t y of h e i n o u s p e r s e -
liest t o d i e s u a d e t h r SRV t h r o u g h l r i e n d l y b l a n d i s h m e n t s b u t t h a t
YO
H:inoi had d i s r e g a r d e d a l . 1 p o s i t i v e s i g n a l s . The SRV r e . j e c t e d a l l o t 91 tht?s(! c h a r g e s I:ht! I n l l o b i n g d a y . Nevertheless, the Chinese l e a d e r s c , ) n t i n u r d t h e i r a t t a c k on t h e V i e t n a m e s e .
and by (:;illing f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s t o d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e s . t l e i . j i n g , tiow93 e v e r , r t . j e c t c d n e g o t i a t i o n s a t t h a t time. The PRC made a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t ttic SIN s u b s e q u e n t l y on 2 9 May, 30 May, 2 J u n e , 5 J u n e , and 7 94 Juni' 1978.
As a l w a y s , t h r C h i n e s e were p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r e h e n s i v e a b o u t t h e
$ : o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n V i e t Nam.
A ' 3 0 May a r t i c l e i n Wen Wei Pao blamed
___
Eloscow f o r thc! p e r s e c u t . i o n s o f t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e .
The S o v i e t s were
51
95
a c c u s e d o f making a s y s t r i n a t i c a t t e m p t t o s u r r o u n d t h c IHC.
Rcports
9G
Vict Nam (PAVN), a u n i t s t a t i o n e d a l o n g the China b o r d e r .
On 5 J u n e ,
V i e t n a m e s e c o n t i n u e d t o h a r a s s t h e O v e r s e a s Ctiini.se.
Ile h i n t e d t h a t tlic
Ktle
even d u r i n g t h e
97
aid. A n o t h e r s p a t e o f r e p o r t s were c i r c u l n t c d i n Hong Kong on 7 J u n e ;
t h e s e a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s had been u s i n g t h e f o r m e r American base 98 a t Cam Kanh Bay. Why d i d t h e PRC u n d e r t a k e a quantum e s c a l a t i o n of i t s s i g n a l s - - i n volume, i n i n t e n s i t y , and i n n e g a t i v i t y - - a t
t h i s time?
Bei.jing f e l t
For B e i j i n g ,
H a n o i - s m a l t r e a t m e n t o f i t s e t h n i c C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n amounted t o n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n a h i g h l y v i s i b l e , p u b l i c s l a p in the f a c e o f t h e PHC. The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p p e r c e i v e d s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s i n Hanois campaign. F i r s t , i t u a s i n s t i g a t e d by t h e S o v i e t Union t o a l i e n a t e Hanoi f r o m B e i j i n g so t h a t Moscow c o u l d become t h e sole p a t r o n of t h e SRV. This
for and s u s p i c i o n o f C h i n a t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r i e s of S o u t h e a s t A s i a ,
a l l of whom had l a r g e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e m i n o r i t i e s .
T h i s would open t h e
52
I00
do~>r f o r V i ~ tN a m t o d u m i n a t c t l w r e g i o n . T h i r d , t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of
thc f i r s t
Ccc:
and b r a z e n l y t r y i n g t o s u b v e r t a g o v e r n m e n t a l l i e d t o C h i n a .
PRC l e a d e r s p e r c w i v e d t h i , s a s n s l a p i n t h e f a c e o f C h i n a .
The t h i r d m a t t i ~ r has t h a t o f t h e e v c r i n c r e a s i n g p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e
01 t h c ? S o v i e t IJnion i n t h e SKV.
s i g n i f i c a n t s u p e r p o c e r m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n on C h i n a ' s R c i j i . n g p e r c e i v e d an i n s i d i o u s S o v i e t s t r a t e g y .
Moscor would e n c o u r a g e
i t s neighbors.
lnternally,
t h e V i e c n a m e s c economy would be i n a
V i c t Naru,
i t c o u l d t u r n o n l y t o Noscor.
t h a t H o l s t i d e s c r i b e s as d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g u n d e r s t r e s s . dc!cision-makers
'The I'KC
f e l t t h a t C h i n a ' s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s had b e e n c h a l l e n g e d
OK
They f r l t t h e i r r a n g e o f o p t i o n s t o be s h r i n k i n g .
53
L 03
soon without accomplishing any thing. J u n e a n d J u l y o f 1978 were c h a r a c t c r i z c d by c h a r g e s a n d c o u n t e r c h a r g e s , by b i t t e r r e c r i m i n a t i o n s on botll s i d e s . longer oblique i n expressing their concerns. The C h i n e s c s e r c no
After the a s s a u l t o E 9
The c e n t r a l theme
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e g r o w i n g war of w o r d s , more t a n g i b l e d e v c l o p m e n t s
were o c c u r r i n g . S p o r a d i c e x c h a n g e s o f f i r e began a l o n g t h e S i n o 106 V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r a t l e a s t a s e a r l y a s 27 J u n e . On 3 J u l y B e i j i n g 107 Most s i g n i t i c a n t was t h e SRV-S c u t o f f a l l C h i n e s e a i d t o t h e SRV. j o i n i n g t h e C o u n c i l f o r M u t u a l Economic A s s i s t a n c e (CMEA, COMECON) i n 108 l a t e J u n e o f 1978. T h i s was an e s p e c i a l l y r e v o l t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t f o r
the C h i n e s e .
I t r e p r e s e n t e d a t r i u m p h f o r Moscow, f o r i t bound Hanoi
tbnce-
How were t h e V i e t n a m e s e r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e
Hanoi
SRV
I ! ? n d e r s p e r c e i v e d Cambodia t o be C h i n a - s c a t s
paw i n
h.id become
yo
grcsat t h a t d i r e c t V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s h o u l d be T h i r d , t l i ~d e c i s i o n b a s inade t o
o r i e n t the SKV economy o r a new b a r and t o d e f e r d o m e s t i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n u n t i l t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s had s u b s i d e d . Fourth, t o accomplish Fifth, a t the
t h i s i t wou1.d be n e c e s s a r y t o g e t f u l l S o v i e t b a c k i n g .
t?xpansi.onism i n S o u t h e a s t Asia a n d C h i n a s c o n c e r n w i t h l o s s or f a c e d u e
io t h e mistre:itiilt!nt
01 O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e i n Viet Nam ant! t h e t h r e a t e n e d
55
s i g n a l s a s i n d i c a t o r s t h a t t h e PRC i V a s a d v a n c i n g t h e t r a d -
l n s h o r t , Hanoi p e r c e i . v e d n e i j i n g t o b c w o r k i n g d i r e c t l y
'The l e a d e r s i n llanoi a l s o c a n b e seen t o
a g a i n s t Vietnamese i n t c r e s t s .
b e r e a c t i n g in the f a s h i o n d e s c r i b e d by H o l s t i a s d e c i s i o n - m a k i r i g [under
stress.
OK
quick a c t i o n .
'They became c o n v i n c e d
T h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s werc i.n-
d a y s l a t e r Hanoi a c c e p t e d .
l t a p p e a r e d t h a r both s i d e s were w i l l i n g t o
I n i t i a l l y , the
In its
t h e SRV d e l e g a t i o n c a l l e d f o r a renewal of t h e
The C h i n e s e n e g o t i a t i n g team
a l s o p l e a d e d o r S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e f r i e n d s h i p hut t h e n l a u n c h e d i n t o a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e SRV O K i t s s h a b b y t r e a t m e n t of Viet Nam's c t h n i c 112 Chinese. O n 19 A u g u s t , a t t h e t h i r d s e s s i o n of t h e t a l k s , t h e main i s s u e o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s was a d d r e s s e d , the p r o b l e m of t h e C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s i n t h e SRV. Beijing's delegation presented a four-point
56
I)K~lgKain t o solvi:
tile'
[iroblem.
F i r s t , t h e SHV s h o u l d s t o p p e r s e c u t i n g
Second,
Ihnoi
Nam t o i i c c e p t V i p t l i a m l ~ s r c i t -
izenship.
'Third,
thi' V i u t n a m e s c s h o u l d make e v e r y e C f o r t t o r e t u r n
d i s p l a c e d Chinrse in V i < ! t Nam t o t h e i r o r i g i n a l homes w i t h o u t d i s c r i n i inntion. Beijj.iig w a n t e d p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e C h i n e s e who were camped F o u r t h , Hanoi
. i c t i o n s a g a i n s t them. tai<irig; a n y r k , t r i b i i t i v g l ~
After anottic,r s e s s i o n o f f r u i t l e s s t a l k s , t h e C h i n e s e s i g n a l l e d
four-point
I16
g u a r a n t t ? e the r i g l i t s of t h o s e C h i n e s e s t i l l r e s i d e n t i n Vice N a n .
Wheii t h c Vic!tnamesr
t e m p o r i z e d , t h o C h i n e s e became m o r e a d a m a n t . 19 S e p t e m b e r a n d on 26 S e p t e m b e K - - b u t
'Two
the
niorc, s e s s i w i s were h e l d - . - o n
o p p i i r t u n i t y a p p e a r e d t o h a v e been l o s t .
T h e s e l a s t two m e e t i n g s w r e
marked b y b i t t e r a c c u s a t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n by any c o n s t r u c t i v c
I17
d i a logiir.
f a i l u r e of t h e t a l k s and 118 a c c u s e d t h e SRV o f n e g o t i a t i n g i n bad f a i t h . l e f t Hanoi. A l t o g e t h e r there were e i g h t o f f i c i a l s e s s i o n s i n t h e S i n o V i e t n a m e s e t a l k s , s t r e t c h i n g from 8 August t o 26 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
There
T h c K h m c r Rouge i n v i t e d o u t s i d e o b s e r v e r s i n t o Cambodia
t o show t h e world t h a t t h e c h a r g e s o f g e n o c i d e had beeu e x a g g e r a t e d . The Cambodians a l s o r e s u r r e c t e d P r i n c e S i h a n o u k , bho began a p p e a r i n g a t o f f i c i a l functions. Hanoi b a s t a r from p l e a s e d k i t h t h i s neb m o d e r a t i o n
T h e V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s were c o u n t i n g on the
h o r r e n d o u s r e c o r d o f t h e Khmer Rouge t o j u s t i f y t h e i r o v e r t h r o x o f t h e P o l Pot r e g i m e . I r o n i c a l l y , t h e Khmer Rouge g o o d - w i l l o f f e n s i v e p r o b a b 120 l y h a s t e n e d H a n o i ' s i n v a s i o n of Cambodia. W h i l e t a l k s were g o i n g on i n H a n o i , problems k i t h t h e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s b e t w e e n t h e SKV a n d thr PRC c o n t i n u e d u n a b a t e d . c o n t i n u e d t o f l e e V i e t Nam. r a g e d on. Chinesc? r e t u g e e s
The Vietnamese-Cambodian b o r d e r c o n f l i c t
S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n Hanoi i n c r e a s e d r a t h e r t h a n d e c r e a s e d .
58
14 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
re.;nion o f t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e t a l k s .
At: t h a t mt!et:in):
t h e C h i n e s e had
t r i ( ! d t o b e a s m o d e r a t e a s t h e y f e l t t h e y c o u l d , b u t t h c V i e t n a m e s c had
nor responded f a v o r a b l y .
b e i n g s y s t c m a t i c n l l y o n 1 . i - C h i n e s e and a n t i - C a m b o d i a n .
122
O n t h e same d a y t h e 123 C h i n c s e c o n d u c t < ? d a r a i ( l a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r i n t o V i < ! t Nan].
S o v i e t Union f o r s t i r r i n g up a l l t h i s t r o u b l e .
notti s i d e s scranihlad f o r f o r e i g n s u p p o r t .
s t a r c h f o r t h e remai.ns o f i t s m i s s i n g i n a c t i o n .
l i e i j i n g , h o b e v e r , held a l l of t h e a c e s k i t h r e g a r d t o t h e American
conn(?ction.
I25
W i ~ s h i n g t o r i ~p s r i m e r ) . g o a l i n A s i a a t t h a t time. pri.nic t a r g e t f o r i m p r o v e d r e l a t i o n s .
0 1 1t d i s t a n c e
ASEAN a l s o b r c i i m e
:I
t hi! SI<V
I26
China's biggest foreign policy the
sunmwr of I 9 7 8 r n s t h e t r e a t y o f p e a c e a n d f r i e n d s h i p i t c o n c l u d e d w i t h
Japan. The t r e a t y was s i g n e d on 12 A u g u s t , and t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f
r a t i f i c a t i o n wcre r x c h a n g e d on 2 2 O c t o b e r 1978.
Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t
was t h e i n c l u s i o n i n t h e t r e a t y of t h e a n t i - h e g e m o n y c l a u s e d i r t . c t e d
n e o u s n e g o t i a t i n g and E i . g h t i n g .
59
OK
1:lexibility
Thc n e g o t i a t o r s on pnch
were a b o r t e d a f t e r l e s s t h a n t k o months o f n e g o t i a t i n g i n d i c a t e s t h e
p r e s s u r e o f time t h a t was p e r c e i v e d .
The i n t r a n s i g e n c e of b o t h s i d e s
r e v e a l e d t h e i r f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i r o p t i o n s had been s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d .
rh1?y bere e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
u n d e r s t r e s s a s c h a r t e d by H o l s t i .
Edging t o b a r d .the P r e c i p i c e , November a n d December ,- I Y I8 By t h e end o r O c t o b e r 1978, the s i t u a t i o n between Hanoi a n d B r i j i n g was e x t r e m e l y t e n s e . have been s t a b i l i z e d . Nevertht?less, evrn a t t h i s p o i n t , i t s t i l l could H a n o i , h o u e v e r , t o o k two s t e p s b e f o r e t h e y e a r s
end t h a t had an e x t r e m e l y d i s e q u i l i b r a t i n g t . f f e c t .
T h e f i r s t g r e a t s h o c k was t h e s i g n i n g o f the USSR-SRV T r e a t y of
F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o o p e r a t i o n on 3 November 1 9 7 8 .
Hanoi-s top l e a d e r s
j o u r n e y e d t o Moscow t o a f f i x t h e i r s i g n a t u r e s t o t h e t r e a t y .
Anti-PRC
s p e e c h e s were d e l i v e r e d i n t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e USSR by b o t h t h e V i e t -
namese and t h e S o v i e t s .
v i r t u a l l y every r e s p e c t :
T h e t r 2 a t y had a c l e a r a n t i - C h i n e s e t o n e i n
p o l i t i c a l , economic, i d e o l o g i c a l .
V i e t Nam
B c i . j i n g had bccn 127 d e a l t , q u i t e b r a z e n l y , b o t h t h e i n s u l t and t h e i n j u r y . Immediately f o l l o w i n g t h e t r e a t y , C h i n e s e s i g n a l s t o Viet Nam t o o k on a much more t h r e a t e n i n g tone.
60
O n I0 Novwahcr,
__
iin
t . d i L o r i a 1 condemninp.
incidents..
W e d o n o t want an inch of a n o t h e r c o u n t r y s
f o r t r o a r n n c r Iiws i t s I i m i t : s a n d t h e V i e t n a n w s c a u t h o r i t i e s a r c d e l u d i n g
I29
t l t m s ; e l v c s by t h i n k i n ] ; t h a t we a r e weak and c a n bc b u l l i e d .
On 2 4 Ueccmhrr Ren . Min R i Bao p i i b l i s h e d a n e d i t o r i a l t h a t a c c u s c d - -
__
01
tile
Sovir,:t U n i o n .
Phc ~ d i t o r i a l w a r n e d t h a t t h e PRC w i l l n o t a t t a c k u n l e s s
Dut
i t . i!; a t t a c k e d .
c o i ~ iti e r a t t a c k
i f i t is a t t a c k e d , i c w i l l c e r t n i n l y
130
That t h e V i e t n a m e s e kcre t a k i n g l i t t l e c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e s e s i g n a l s
h.ps
made e v i d e n t b y t h e s e c o n d g r e a t s h o c k .
O n 9 JanliaKy V i e t n a m e s e t r o o p s l a u n c h e d an
p e r c t ? i v e d t h e w o r s t - c a s e s c e n a r i o a s h a v i n g come t o
h a d t a k e n c o n t r o l of a l l I n d o c h i n a .
chatltnged i n Soiitlieast A s i a .
The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p had s i g n a l l e d
61
t h e i r c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e S o v i e t d a n g e r ; b u t t h i s had r a i l e d t o d e t e r the
VirtnamL: l+e. P r e p a r i n g f o r War, J a n u a r y t o >lid F e b r u a r y 1979
Hanoi.
I,
On 4 J a n u a r y 1979, t h e C h i n e s e a c c u s e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e o r I33
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t h o s h o c k s o f November
frenzied provocations."
t i o n s , w i t h i n c i d e n t s ilolr o c c u r r i n g d a i l y ; a n d t h o O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e p r o b l e m showed
110
s i g n s of a b a t i n g .
c o n t e m p l a t i n g bar.
The PRC h a d managed
CI
number of d i p l o m a t i c s u c c e s s e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e
C h i e f among t h e s e s u c -
d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o be i n s t i t u t e d on I J a n u a r y 1979.
or
imme-
d i a t e a d v a n t a g e , o r so t h o u g h t some i n E e i j i n g .
The PKC l e a d e r s h i p u a s
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n s e c u r i n g t h e s u p p o r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d J a p a n i n i t s d i s p u t e k i t h t h e SKV. Deng X i a o p i n g made his " t r i u m p h a l t o u r " of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s from 28 J a n u a r y t o 4 F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 9 . k a r n i n g s t o Hanoi. While i n Airlerica he i s s u e d s e v e r a l
us
support
62
ciinnot: i i l ! o w V i e t n a m t o r u n u i l d e v e ~ y w h e ~ e .Ln t h e i n t e r e s t o f
OUT
own c o u n t r y , w e may
133
be f o r c r d t o do what w e do n o t l i k e t o do."
"If ce
do.
..I
can
t i . 1 1 you t h a t c h a t t h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e s a y c o u n t s .
b:r
. . . Any
action taken
t h e Chinese i s t h r o u g h c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
r.ish a c t i o n .
t l w p r o b Leni."
A s to w h a t m e a s u r e s we u i l l a d o p t , we are s t i l l s t u d y i n g
135
vi!;it
tli;it
t o Japan ( 6 - 8 F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 9 ) .
On 7 F e b r u a r y Deng a g a i n
assorted
" V i e t n a m m u s t be p u n i s h e d f o r i t s e x p a n s i o n i s t a c t i o n
a g a i n s t Cariihodia
. . . action
w h i c h h a s b e e n i n s t i g a t e d by t h e S o v i e t
I36
Union.
'I
I n A u g u s t 1 9 7 8 he had b e e n s u c c n s s f u l in
#ow, he f o l l o k e d w i t h a n t i - H a n o i . s i g n a l s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
and Japan.
63
been m a k i n g o v e r t u r e s t o Tokyo and W a s h i n g t o n t o w a r d t h e end o r 1 9 i 8 , and Deng hoped t h a t t h e a p p e a r a n c e t h a t J a p a n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s were b a c k i n g ttie PKC would cause ttie V i e t n a m e s e t o t a k e course.
i-I
more m o d e r a t e
It did not.
T h r o u g h o u t J a n u a r y and i n t o F e b r u a r y , t h e PRC moved l a r g e numbers 137 of troops t o the border region. A c c o r d i n g t o Agence _ Fra_ n c e LPrcsse 9
--
u n i f i e d comnand u n d e r t h c l e a d e r s h i p o f G e n e r a l X i S h i y o u (Commander), G e n e r a l Yang Uezhi ( D e p u t y Commander), and G f n e r a l Zhang D i n g f a ( C h i e f 138 I n c o n c e r t b i t h t h i s , 1.i X i a n n i a n i s s u e d of S t a f f ) & a s e s t a b l i s h e d . one more v e r b a l G a m i n g t o t h e V i e t n a m e s f t o heed a l l of t h e p r e v i o u s I39 s i g n a l s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e had s e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e C h i n e s e were s i g n a l l i n g t h a t t h e e l e v e n t h h o u r b a s a t h a n d , t h e Vietnamese d o u b t e d t h a t B e i j i n g would a c t u a l l y l a u n c h a l a r g e s c a l e m i l i t a r y a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e SIIV. F i r s t , t h e V i e t n a m e s e c o u n t e d on Second, t h e con-
A Chinese a t t a c k bould
n o t be o f a n y m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e now t o t h e K h m e r Rouge.
T h i r d , Hanoi
knew t h a t t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n o f t h e PRC was i t s Four X o d e r n i z a t i o n s . The SKV l e a d e r s d o u b t e d t h a t C h i n a would r i s k s e t t i n g hack i t s economic p r o g r a m s by e n t e r i n g a c o s t l y war.
F o u r t h , Hanoi was well a w a r e of t h e
64
frame o f r e f e r e n c e .
Above a l l e l s e t h e P R C f e a r e d t h a t
t h e USSR was g a i n i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t g e o p o l i t i c a l a d v a n t a g e t o C h i n a - s
SOutll
t h r o u g h t h e a c t i o n s of t h e SKV.
T h i s c o u l d n o t go u n a n s w c r e d , Not o n l y d i d
ri>girne, w h i c h p r e s e n t e d a g e n u i n e t h r e a t t o t h e SRVs n a t i o n a l
iiitc!rcsts.
B e i j i n g had a l s o u n d e r e s t i m a t e d H a n o i s determination t o
The Cliinesc l e a d e r s d i d n o t
The t i n d e r - b o x PKC-SRV b o r d e r s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t e d b o t h a p r e t e x t
and
11.A
ii
flash point or a c t i v e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
On 1 7 F e b r u a r y 1979, t h c
i n v a d e d V i e L Nam.
65
KEFEREWCES CITED
'Chc name o f the! V i e t n a m e s c l a n d and p u o p l c lias c h a n g e d many times o v e r t h e c o u r s e o f h i s t o r y . For c l a r i t y a n d c o n s i s t e n c y , t h e terms "Viet Nam" a n d " V i e t n a m e s e " G i l l be u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s p a p e r r e g a r d l e s s of t h e p e r i o d u n d e r c n n s i d c r a t i o n u n l e s s a s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l name i s r e q u i r e d . 2 J o h n Y. Cady, S o u t h e a s t Asia: __ I t s t l i . s t o r ic a 1 Development - (Nee York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 1 6 - 1 7 . 3 C a d y , pp. 1 0 4 - 0 6 . 4 Henry McAleavy, R l a c k F l a g s i n Victnarn ( N e b York: Xncmil t a n , __ __ 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 2 6 - 4 1 .
_--
McAleavy,
pp.
233-43.
6
C a d y , pp.
7
558-61.
Origins 1 9 7 5 ) , p p , 81-86.
and
Bantam The N e w York T i m e s , e d . , P e n t a g o n Pnpers (Neb York: Books, I ~ ) ~ p . 4 7 - 4 9 . 9 D o u g l a s Pi.ke, H i s t o r y o f V i e t n a m e s e Communism, 1 9 2 5 - L Y 7 6 ( S t a n ford: H o o v e r I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 8 7 - 8 8 . 10 P e n t a g o n PHprrs, 4 7 - 4 9 .
The
..
11
S t a n l e y K a r n o r , Nao and C h i n a : From R e v o l u t i o n t o Revolution (New York: V i k i n g P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 4 3 9 . 12 T u r n e r .. .. DD. 2 9 0 - 3 0 4 : a n d G a r e t t i P o r t e r . "Vi.etnamese P o l i c v a n d t h e I n d o c h i n a C r i s i s , " The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t , e d . D a v i d W.P. E l l i o t t ( B o u l d e r : ! J e s t v l e u , 19811, pp. 7 2 - 7 7 . B o t h ' T u r n e r and P o r t e r t r a c e the twists and t u r n s i n Sino-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g this period. T u r n e r ' s treatment i s g e n e r a l l y more d e t a i l e d . The a n a l y s i s g i v e n here d o e s n o t follow e i t h e r s o u r c e e x a c t l y b u t d r a w s m o r e on Turner t h a n P o r t e r . 13 SRV, F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , "The T r u t h About Viet Nam-China R e l a t i o n s O v e r t h e Last T h i r t y Y e a r s , " F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e ( P B I S ) D a i l y R e p o r t , A s i a a n d P a c i f i c , S u p p l e m e n t , 19 Oct 79, p . 22.
--
66
14 S t a n l c y Knrnow, vietnaiii: 1583), pp. h<). I5 SL<V, "'l'ht! ' I ' ~ u c I \ ,p ". 26.
16
H i s t o r y (New York:
V i k i n g Press,
S t e p h e n U. Young, "Good Government i n H a n o i , " The American Bpect a t o r , 1 5 : 4 : 2 3 , A p r i l , 1982. 17 SlW, F o r c i g n M i n i s t r y , "The T r u t h , " T h i s i s the g i s t o f tlir, g e n e r a l argunient p r e s e n t e d i n the SllV F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s White Book. I8 Ken Min Iti Uno and Xin llua S h e , ed: On t h e V i e t n a m e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s 'White Book C o n c e r n i n g Viet Nam-China R e l a t i o n s T 8 7 . 7 c -t. l i n g : Fort3ign Language P r e s s , 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 1-38. I0 Karnoh, Viatnani, p p . 661-70.
-.
l . -
- ---
, --
21)
McAleavy, p. 2tKi. 2INayan Chanda, "An Old War B r i n g s New P r o b l e m s , I 1 Par E a s t e r n Economic Revieb (hereafter F E E R ) , 94:40:72, 1 O c t o b e r 1976.
22
--
Chanda, p. 72.
2 '3
FEEII, 9 9 : 9 : 1 2 - 1 3 ,
2 I+
3 March 1978.
I:I!EX,
87:11:Y,
14 March 1975.
25FEEft, 9 1 : 5 : 9 , 30 J a n u a r y 1976. 2h--L v o G o o d s t a d t , " A f t e r D e t e n t p , S h i v e r s o[ A p p r e h e n s i o n , " R 9 : % 8 : 2 6 - 2 7 , I 1 . J u l y 1975. 27 R o b e r t S i i t t e r , " C h i n a ' s S t r a t e g y 'Tocard Vietnam and I t s l11ipl i c a t i o u s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t , ~ d by . David E l l i o t t ( R o u l d e r : Westview P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 165. 28 Gareth ' 0 ~. t e r . " V i e t n a m e s e Policv a n d t h e I n d o c h i n a C r i s i s ," . ~ 1~ 'The T h i r d l n d o c l i i n a C o n f l i c t , e d . b y David E l l i o t t ( B o u l d e r : Westview ._ PWS, i 9 8 i T p . 69.
~
m,
'Third N a t i o n a l . C o n g r e s s o f t h e Viet Nam W o r k e r s ' Party ( H a n o i : r o r c i g i i L a n g u a g e s P u b i i s h i n g House, 196O), p. 31. 30 L'orter', p. 72. :I 1 t h e Problc!m Chinese Aggression Against Viet Nam: _ The _ Root.of -(Hanoi.: F o r c t g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g Housi?, 1 9 7 9 ) , csp. pp. 1-10. 32 M i c h a e l R i c h a r d s o n , "How t h r F i v e See I n d o c h i n a , " E R , 98:52:7-8, 30 December 1977. 33 S u t t t ! r , p. 3 3 .
~ ~~
__
__--
___
m,
67
34
nn:z$:z&,
35
76. .
hsian Strategy,"
m,
Ken H i n K i Uao
- - -'
011
2Y .IuI.y 1975.
38-
-War ( B e r k e l e y :
University
39
P o r t e r , p . 78. Trail,"
FEER, 98:49:38-39,
N i v i l o n , pp.
4038-09.
IEIV P r i n r i L i. (? s
41
FE I< R, , __
I'
9b :4 7 :40
42
SRV, "The T r u t h , "
p.
22.
43
V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The C h i n c s e i n South?!ist O x f o r d UP, 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. 1 6 m 9 .
Asia --
( F a i r Lawn, N.
J.:
44
P o r t e r , p. 85.
45 46 47 90:42:31-32,
W i l f r e d B u r c h c t t , " C r a c k i n g Down o f S a i g o n ' s C o i s p r a d o r e s , " 1 7 O c t o b e r 1975.
_ .
YEEK, -f
88:21:5, 88:26:26,
2 3 May 1975.
FEER
2 7 J u n e 1975.
m,
48FEER, 88:15:5, 11 A p r i l 1975. 49 P o r t e r , p. 84. 50 S u t t e r , pp. 168-69. 51 E d i t h L e n a r t , "Hanoi-s I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a g e - S e t t e r , " 90:47:22, 2 1 November 1975. 52 Nhan Dan, 12 F e b r u a r y 76; r e : P o r t e r , p. 79. 5389:33:13, 54
w,
B,
29 A u g u s t 1975.
56-
--
78.
25
57
FB 1s 58
N1l:lrl _ _
5Y
FUIS
60
FEER, Y4:52:5,
61
(1
24 December 1 9 7 6 .
__ FEEL<,
9 % : % 3 : 5 , h .June 1 9 7 6 .
2
3
__ F E E R , Y6:1&:5,
H A p r i l 77.
t1
66
Nhan . -
Dan, I 1 May 1 9 7 7 .
p. 96.
67
I'orter,
Qitcc,n's
.
___
YcCill-
..
" P v k i n g E s c a l a t e s t h e War of N e r v e s , "
1;'
3, 99:
1 I : 10- 1 1 ,
Ri I3a0, 1'.
10 J a n u a r y 1978,
in FUIS (PRC) 10 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8 .
100.
"Prkinp, E s c a l a t e s , " p p .
10-11.
74Cliilnda, " P c k i n # E s c a l a t e s , " p p . 10-1 1 . 75 Clianda, "Pekin): E s c a l a t e s , " p p . 10-1 1. 76 FEEK, . 99:13:5, 3 1 March 1978. 7; L'oKl:l?r', 11. 1 0 4 . 7 ti Sti,pht!ri F i t z g e r a l d , " P e k i n g ' s New P u l l a t t h e P u r s e - S t r i n g s , " FEER, 100:24:111-20, 16 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . - -. i 1) IKon M i i i K i B a o , 4 J a n u a r y 1978. 80-C l i a r i d ; ~ , "Comrades C u r b t h e C a p i t a l i s t s , " F E E R , 100:15: 1 1 - 1 2 , 14 A p r i l 1978.
--
__
69
81
Chando, " C h o l o n ' s M e r c h a n t s F e e l t h e I b r d c r l l a c k l a s h , " 100:18:10-11, j May 1 9 7 8 . 82 -FEER, 1 0 0 : 1 9 : . 5 , I 2 May 1 9 7 8 . 83 C h a n d a , " C h o l o n ' s Merchants," p p . 10-11. 84 FEER 1 0 0 : 1 7 : 5 , 28 A p r i l 1 9 7 8 .
I;F.EK,
"5---'
86
FBIS ( P I K ) , 2 4 Nay 1 9 7 8 .
19 May 1 9 7 8 .
91 92
2 4 May 1 9 7 8 .
F n l S ( A P ) , 25 Nay 1 Y 7 8 .
--
FBIS ( M I , 6 J u n r 1 9 7 8 .
U.S., D e f e n s e I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , C h i n o - V i e t n a m B o r d e r Tonsions: A - C h r o n o l o g y , 2 2 June 1 9 7 6 - 5 May 1 9 8 1 ( W a s h i n g t o n : D I A , 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 1 6 - 1 8 . 95 Wen Wei -P a o , 30 May 1 9 7 8 , i n YBIS ( P l t C ) , 2 June 1 9 7 8 . 96 L'BZS ( A P ) , 5 J u n c 1 9 7 8 . 97 FBIS (PRC), 5 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . 98 FBIS ( . W ) , 7 J u n e 1 9 7 8 .
99 .~
Chinese Residents, (Beijing: Foreign On V i e t Nam's E x p u l s i o n L a n g u a g e s P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 131-38 a n d 1 6 1 - 7 0 . 100 On V i e t Nam-s E x p u l s i o n , pp. 1 4 9 - 5 4 . 101 D a v i d R o n a v i o , " S t r a i g h t ' T a l k From P e k i n g , " E,100:23:10-1 I , 9 June 1978. 102 FBLS (PKC), 12 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . 103 FBIS (PRC), 2 6 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . 104 U.S., DIA, C h i n a - V i e t n a m B o r d e r T e n s i o n s , p p . 1 8 - 2 4 . 105 Nhan Dan, 2 0 June 1 9 7 8 , i n P o r t e r , p. 106. --
_- -
70
I06
1:UIS (PI{<:), 7 J u l y 1978.
107
I ox
I\LI~;LIS
Fb:ER, .-
IO1:28:5,
14 J u l y 1978.
Ro1:i.r Uoyes, "Moscob J o l t s I t s A l l i e s , " __ FEEK, 101:33:9-11, 18 107 8. 109 Tht! Viet Nam Workers P a r t y (VWP) c h a n g e d i t s name t o t h e Viet Main C o m u n i s t P a r t y (VCP) i n December 1976. I10 P o r t e r , p. 105. P o r t e r r e p o r t s t h e s e d a t a from p e r s o n a l interviews t V i t h VCP 1'oIi.tbiiro members. Ill FBIS ( I ' I K ) , I 9 J u l y 1978.
f
I12 ..-
1:UlS ( A P ) ,
43.
11'1 70
.
I
I
I 6
IFUrs (I'ltc),
1078.
FnrS ( I ' R C ) , 12 Silptember 1 9 7 8 ; and On _ Viet _ - Nam's E x p u l s i o n , PI). 8 9 - 9 3 . 1I7 On Viet: _ . Nam's E x p u l s i o n , pp. 9 4 - 1 3 0 . IIR FI\IS (I'KC), 27 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
E x p u l s i o n of C h i n e s e I l e s i d e n t s i s t h e P R C ' s c o m p i l a t i i i n of documents i n E n g l i s h t h a t relate t o t h e O v e r s e a s Chinese p r o b l c m i n V i e t Nnm. I t g i v e s B e i j i n g ' s o f f i c i a l v e r s i o n of the n e g o l - i a t i o n s arid t h e e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e SRV's h o s t i l i , t y t o t h c e t h n i c C h i n e s e r e s i . d e n t i n Viet Nam. I20 P o r t e r , p. 108. I21 U.S., I)[)\, C h i n a - V i e t n a m B o r d e r T e n s i o n s , p p . 24-33. I22 Re11 Min H i Ilao, 14 S e p t e m b e r 1978, i n FBIS, I 9 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
119 O n Viet Nam's
~~~
-__
___
__
FIlI!;
123 ( A P ) , 4 O c t o b e r 1978.
29
71
127
Moscow,"
I 28
Re11 M i n R i Bao, 10 Noveiiiber 1 9 7 8 , i n FIILS (PKC), 1 3 November 1978, q u o t e d i n D I A , C h i n a - V i e t n a m Uordfr T e n s i o n s , p. 34. 129 FBIS (PRC), 14 December 1 9 7 8 , q u o t e d i n D I A , p. 37. I30 FIIIS (PRC), 26 December 1 9 7 8 , q u o t e d i n D I A , p. 38. 131 __ FEEK, 103:3:5, 19 J a n u a r y 1979. 132 FBIS ( A P ) , 3 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 ; a n d F B I S (PKC), 5 J a n u a r y 1979. 133 The Neb York Tim%, 31 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , i n D a n i e l T r e t i a k , " C h i n a - s V i e t n a m War a n d i t s C o n s e q u e n c e s , " China Q u a r t e r l y , 80:749, Decomber, 1979. I34 The Rer. York -Times 31 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , i n I ' r e t i a k , p. 743. 9
~~~
_--
p.
1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 9 , i n T r r t i a k , p.
743.
( T o k y o ) , 8 F e b r u a r y 1979, i n T r e t i a k ,
Chanda, " B l i t z k r i e g on Cambodia," 1979; a n d FBIS (AFP) 2 1 F e b r u a r y 1979. I 38 F B I S (PKC), 21 F e b r u a r y 1979. 139 PBIS (PRC), 2 1 F e b r u a r y 1979. 140 P o r t e r , pp. 109-110.
s, 103:?:14-15,
12 January
72
Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
The __
U e c i s i o n t o Go t o War
A numbcr o f
conditions , p r e v i i i l e d t h n t i m p e l l e d t h e Chinese l t s n d e r s t o t a k e t h e s t e p s
w h i c h 1cd t o thr: i n v a s i o n of t h e
snv
i n F ~ b r u a r yof 1979.
First,
Inore p a s s i v e r e a c t i o n would o n l y h e i g h t t ? n t l l r t h r e a t .
O V ~ Kt h e
o f ; i n i m o s i t y b e t w e e n th t! C h i n e s e a n d t h e V i e t n a m e s e .
o p r n l y clial1engc.d B r i j i n g ' s
t h e c t h n i c C h i n c , s e i n V i e t Nam, by i t s d e l i v e r y of a n t i - C h i n e s e s p e e c h e s
i n Moscou, b y i t s p r e s s u r e on the s o u t h e r n b o r d e r of t h c PKC, i n v a s i o n o f Cambodia. Third,
and by i t s
t h e p r e s e n c e o f a h o s t i l e s u p e r p o u r r , the China d i d
S o v i e t [ I n i o n , on t h e w a n e r a i s e d t h e s t a k e s c o n s i d e r a b l y .
g l o b a l S o v i e t maneuver t o a c h i e v e a s t r a t e g i c The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p f e l t o b l i g e d t o r e a c t
73
L h ( * K e l e v a n c c of H i s t o r y
'This i s n o t t o
a s s e r t d e t e r m i n i s m , b u t r a t h e r t o :iffirm thal- t h e p a t t e r n s o f t h e p a s t
may g i v e a c l u e t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e p a t t e r n s o f t h e p r e s e n t and f u t u r l . .
W h i l c ? t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e d i s p u t e may h a v e scemed a b e r r a n t t o t h e c o n -
from an h i s t o r i c a l p c r s p e c t i v c , i t c e r t a i n l y lvns
s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e in the r e g i o n h a s b e e n t o s e c u r c ~ i t s
s o u t h e r n r e a l m s - - h i s t o r i c a l l y and c u r r e n t l y .
Viet Nam's s t r a t e g i c o b -
T h i s , t o o , h a s been an h i s t o r i c a l a s h e l l
'These o b j e c t i v e s of C h i n a and o f V i e t Nam
o f a p o h e r f u l t h i r d - p a r t y p r e s e n c e i n V i c t Nam has s e r v e d t o i n t e n s i f y
China's concern.
F r a n c e , J a p a n , a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have a l l been
t h a t of t h e o t h e r s , China opposed t h e m a l l a l i k c .
74
The -.--__I e r c e p t i o n s o f D e t c r r e n c e
Whi l a , ,
19;)s
iis
was s i m i l a r t o i t s l i a n d l i n g oE t h e K o r e a n and I n d i a n e m e r g e n c i e s
bpi
d e s c r i b e d by A1 Len W h i t i n g , t h e r o w e r e i m p o r t a n t v a r i a t i o n s a s
SOW
1.
In
I)rtisdcr p o l i c y
or
c r i s i s management.
Beijing s t i l l believed t h a t
t o i ~ i , q np o i t , r n woiiLd c o n s p i r e t o g a i n a n a d v a n t a g e o v e r C h i n e , a n d the'
Chines<% lead<>rs i c r c s t i l l c o n v i n c e d o r chr. i m p o r t a n c e o f t i m i n g in
d e l i v e r i n g tlicir s i g n a l s .
On the o t h e r h a n d , t h r C h i n e s c a p p e a r e d t o
br
c a s e in t h e e a r l i e r
s t a g e s 01
tlic. c r i s i s . t h e IRC r x e r c i n r d m o d e r a t i o n i n d e a l i n g k i t h
F r o m 1975 t o mid-1!178,
V i e t Sam.
or r e f e r c n c e .
lhry
L?VBII
seemed t o b e h i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t
t:ic !:ietnamc:;e
China.
w e r e bound t o c x h i b i t a m e a s u r e of h o s t i l i t y t o h o r d t h e s p r e a d of S o v i c t
l l e i i i n g s o v e r r i d i n g g o a l h a s t o prt!clude!
i n f l u e n c e i n thr! a r e a .
approach.
To a c h i e v e t h i s t h e C h i n e s e a t t e m p t e d a b a l a n c e d
They l a u n c h e d d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d .
1lei.j i n g s
rand d e m a r c h e y i e l d c d s i g n i i c a n t r e s u l t s d u r in g
tII(.
1970s,
t h e PRC r e d u c e d c o n s i d e r a b l y
i t s s u p p o r t or i n s u r g e n c i e s .
As t e n s i o n s w i t h H a n o i g r e w , B e i j i n g h a s
c a r e f u l t o k e e p i t s c r i t i c i s m s o E the V i e t n a m e s e low-keyed a n d o b l i q u e .
I
ti.nue i t s a i d progroin h i t h t h r SKV. Importaiitly, lleijing e x h i b i t e d
c e s s f u l c r i s i s management a s d e s c r i b e d by I i o l s t i .
Thc! C h i n e s e sah t h i s t o b e the b e s t a p p r o a c h f o r a number o f
reasons.
stable.
i n Late 1975.
i t s f u l l a t t e n t i o n and r e s o u r c e s on d o m e s t i c d e v e l o p m e n t .
On the i n t p r -
dox a p p r o a c h of i n t e r s t a t e d i p l o m a c y .
D e i j i n g has p u r s u i n g a p o l i c y o f
I t p l a c e d a p r e m i u m on r e s t r a i n t i n C h i n a - s f o r e i g n
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e C h i n e s e made a s e r i o u s e r r o r i n a l l y i n g
t h e m s e l v e s r;itti t h e Khmer Rouge. The P o l Pot r e g i m e a n t a g o n i z e d t h e The Cambodians l o o k e d upon t h e V i e t from t h e
Vietnamese f r o m t h e v e r y s t a r t .
l)ei-sp'?ctiv~ Of
ii
smii1ler c o u n t r y w h i c h fanred b e i n g d o m i n a t e d by i t s
i s o l a t i o n oC Cambodia f r n m t h e i n t c r n a t i o n a l community e n g e n d e r e d i n t h e
POL P o t regime
he c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i t s only e f f e c t i v e r e s p o n s e t n Viet
S i n c e B e i j i n g r e a l l y could do l i t t l e t o con0
N a n was nnc o f h o s t i l i t y .
t h e i r oun i n d e -
F i r s t , t h e h i s t o r i c a l t r e n d was o n e o f
e c o n o m i c l 1 ? v e r s g e on H a n o i , b u t Hanoi was i n no p o s i t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e .
the V i e t n a m e s e
l'I7Os:
d e s i r i n g c l o s e r d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , c o u r t i n g t h e I'KC i n the
w i t h tl1i.s.
l n s l i o r t , Hanoi p e r c e i v e d a d i s t i n c t l a c k s y n e n e t r y i n t h e
llanoi looked a t i t s r e l a -
r * ! l a t i v r p o s i t i o n s t o t h e PKC a n d t h e SHV.
fishermm.
'Tht\
C h i n e s e c o u l d e x e c u t e t e n s i o n or s l a c k a s t h e y saw
77
f i t , b u t t h e Vietnamese could only s t r u g g l e t o extend the l i n e . otticr coursc of a c t i o n hould rcsult i n t h e i r being r r e l e d in.
Any
From t1ii.s f r a m e oC r r l e r e n c e , Hanoi d e v e l o p e d i t s obn " c a l c u l u s o f dc?terrencc." disadvantage, S i n c e t h e SRV l e a d e r s t h o u g h t t h e y were a t s u c h a g r e a t t h e i r c a l c u l u s h a s one p r i m a r i l y o f b e l l i g e r e n c e . They
T h e V i e t n a m e s e r e s o r t e d t o t h e r h e t o r i c of
The SRV m a i n t a i n e d s t e a d y p r c s s u r e a l o n g i t s
In addition to
t h i s , t h e V i e t n a m e s e were a b l e t o s i g n a l . t h o i r d i s p l e a s u r e t o B e i j i n g by
the h a r s h m e a s u r e s t a k e n a g a i n s t the O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e .
B e c a u s e Hanoi
suffer d e v a s t a t i n g consequences.
A s a r e s u l t , the V i r e n a m r s c l e a d e r s d i d n o t
a p p e a r t o t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d hliy China d i d pose a t h r e a t and t o a c t i n a hay t o reduce t h a t t h r e a t . i n l a m e t h e issue. I n s t e a d , they took a c t i o n s t h a t could o n ly
They began m a s s i v e p e r s e c u t i o n s o f t h e O v e r s e a s
Each
70
R . .e a c t i n g
tinder S t r e s s
niuch more b e l l i g e r c n t l y .
Likfwise,
c t i o s ~c ~ l ~ a r a c t ~ r ii s c ts o f n c t i o n t h a t t y p i f y d e c i s i o n - m a k i , n g u n d e r s t r e s s
ils
d e s c r i b e d by Ole I l o l s t i .
CeeI i n g c o n s t r a i n e d b y i t r a t h e r t h a n u s i n g i t t o chei.r a d v a n t a g e .
t h o u g h t t h e range 01:
t o understand Hanoi's
frame o f r e f e r e n c e and
t h i s led t o oprn
now put a s i d e .
Ultimately,
C ti i n e s t- D e t e r r e nc e
limited i n both
t a ( : t i c a l a n d strategic o b j e c t i v e , limited i n t
imt!.
l i m i t e d i n means, a n d - - e s p e c i a l l y - appreciation
oE i t s l i m i t - x d a b i l i t y t n p r o j e c t i t s power.
For B e i j i n g t h e l i m i t e d ,
The war w i l l be q u i c k .
c o u n t r y or o v e r t h r o w i t s government.
is determinr!d t o d o i s q u i t e l i t e r a l l y
punish i t s adversary.
The PLA u i l l i n f l i c t m a s s i v e c a s u a l t i e s on t h e
enemy army, and i t w i l l n o t s p a r e any c i v i l i a n s who happen t o g e t i n t h e bay, e i t h e r . Xaximum p h y s i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n b i l l be v i s i t e d upon s e l e c t When
a r e a s of t h e enemy's c o u n t r y t h a t a r e o f s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c c .
t h i s h a s o c c u r r e d , t h e PLA b i l l c l e a r o u t .
T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what
3
heavy c a s u a l t i e s o n the V i e t n a m e s e ( e s t i m a t e d a t a b o u t 50,000) and wrought m a s s i v e damage on t h e n o r t h e r n b o r d e r r e g i o n s o t h e S K V , most 4 n o t a b l y on t h c c i t y o Lang Son. T h i s E o l l o b e d t h e p a t t e r n t h a t had been e s t a b l i s h e d b i t t i the I n d i a n War o f 1962, a l t h o u g h t h e I n d i a n War b a s f a r l e s s b l o o d y and d e s t r u c t i v e . There i s c o n s i d e r a b l e d c b a t e as t o b h e t h e r t h e PRC "bon"
or "lost"
5
t h e Chinese s u f f e r e d considerably themselves.
d e t e r r e n c e p o l i c y o f t h e PRC.
Use s t r a t a g e m s and d i s p l a y s t o d e t e r t h e
80
opoonr!nt
s h o r t ot' b a r .
When r a r i s employed a s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f s t r a t -
e g y , c011cl1rdc i t ns q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e . o f t h e enemy.
tapestry.
W l i i 1 . e i t would be a m i s t a k e t o e q u a t e t h e t h o u g h t o f S u n z i
would a p p o a r t o c x e r c i s v much i n f l u e n c e i n C h i n a .
a s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t by an a g g r e s s i v e
c x p r c ~ s s i o no i i t s n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y coiipled w i t h a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p
w i t h the S o v i e t U n i i i n .
c r e d i b i l i t y openly
ar,d ~ - e [ ) e a t e d l yo v e r s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s .
H:lIIOi
R e i j i n g sought t o dtlter
pl,litical,
' S
1InnCceptable bt!h.ivior
through
21
series o f s i g n a l s :
ci: onom i c
psycho lo g i c a 1, d i p loma t i c
a n d u 1t inia t e 1y m i 1i t a r y
The Cli i -
n e s r r e r e t r y i n g t o r e p a i r the t a p e s t r y .
An Index of l n d i c a t o r n
t h i s i n d e x c o n s i d e r s the c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s t h a t t r i g g e r e d a Cliinesp
reaction.
On t h e o t h e r . h a n d , i t e x a m i n e s t h e C h i n e s e s i g n a l i t s e l f i n
terms of i t s d e l i v e r y , i n t e n s i t y , a u t h o r i t y , a n d t i m i n g .
__
Oblique ModtLrate Signalling A t t h e be):inning o f 1978, t h e PRC was c o n t i n u i n g i t s c a r r o t - a n d s t i c k p o l i c y of r e l a t i v e r e s t r a i n t . The main mode of s i g n a l l i n g was
On 4
J a n u a r y 1978, B e i j i . n g i n d i c a t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e i t p l a c e d on t h e O v e r s c a s
81
7
O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e A f f a i r s Cornmi s s i o n a t m i n i s t c r i a l l e v e l .
T h i s was
r a t t i e r m i l d i n t o n e and i n d i r e c t i n n a t u r e , a v o i d i n g p o i n t i n g t h e f i n g e r t o o s p e c i f i c a l l y a t Hanoi.
On 10 J a n u a r y t h e PllC p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s o f
C h i n e s e , Cambodia, a n d S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e - - i n a v e r y m o d e r a t e f a s h i o n .
I n d i r c c t Acc u s a t o r y S i pi1 a I 1i ng
o T r e f u g e e s became t o r r e n t i a l .
on 11 May
a c t i o n s were a n t i -
C h i n e s e r a t h e r t h a n a n t i , - c a p i t a l i s t and t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union was b e h i n d 9 the w h o l e problem. By b l a m i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n - - i t s number one enemy-B e i j i n g was i n d i c a t i n g t o Hanoi i t s r i s i n g c o n c e r n o v e r t h e i s s u e , and
i t sas a l s o g i v i n g t h e V i e t n a m e s e a bay o u t .
On 1 2 May B e i j i n g an-
China.
s y m b o l i c (nnd o f t e n t a n g i b l e ) g e s t u r e .
The s i g n a l s bere c h a r a c t e r i z e d
b y c h a r g e s and a c c u s a t i o n s of V i e t n a m e s e m a l f e a s a n c e .
82
The PKC l a u n c h e d a d i r e c t
'There was no l o n g c r an e f f o r t Lo k e c p t h e
T h e c l i a r g e s n o 1ongc.r emariatt!d s i m p l y
a c c u s a t i o n s o b l ique and i n d i r e c t .
Nor they s e r e b e i n g a s c r i b e d
A 1 1 of' t h e major i s s u e s
Vietnamese p e r s e c u t i o n
Ovcrs"as
Chinese, o f
Vi<stnnnirse o g g r u s s i m a g a i n s t Cambodia, and o t V i e t n a m e s e c o i l u s i o n w i t h I1 ttic, tiovicts. On l ). J u n t , thc C h i n e s e 1:oreign M i n i s t r y 1 " v e I l e d a n o t h e r sc.ritss o c .I ~ .c ' ~ u s a t i o nast t h c SKV, and t h i s t i m e i n niuch m o r e a c r i m o n i o u s 12 tt. rnii no l o g y . I l ~ i j i n gh a s now e s c a l a t i n g i t s a t t a c k s i n a u t h o r i t y , in i i l t c ? n s i t y , a n d i n twspo. gt!sture.
WIIQsn
'The r h e t o r i c was a g a i n a c c o m p a n i r d b y t h e
launched a v i c i o u s c o u n t e r a t t a c k
011
Th(,
I(tlmrr I<ougz+
24 May.
ttii,
13
ciiI:tinh: o i f a l l a i d iis o i 3 J u l y .
Accu sn t v r y
O n 19 J u l y 1 9 7 8 t h e PRC F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y c a l l e d f o r v i c c -
ministerial n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h H a n o i .
O v c r s e ; l s Chintssc i s s u e . .
Thr c c n t r n l t o p i c was t o b e t h e
Thc t a l k s r a n from A A u g u s t t o 26 S e p t e m b r r ,
Tlie PllC p r o b a b l y i n t e n d e d t h e
ilntl
b u t n o t h i n g has ~ e ; i l I y n e g o t i a t e d .
LO
signalling bas
83
While t h e t a l k s b e r e i n p r o g r e s s , B e i j i n g c o n t i n u e d t o s i g n a l by
o t h e r means a s b e l l . A n o t h e r mass media b a r r a g e a g a i n s t t h e SRV t o o k
p l a c e on 14 S e p t c m b e r , a g a i n c o v e r i n g a l l of t h e main issues o f c o n t e n -
I5
tion. Nor was t h e s y m b o l i c g e s t u r e abandoned.
T h i s t o o k on a n o t
A s t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s connnrnced
Later i n
I n October, hocever,
Once more, t h e V i e t n a m e s e
--
ways.
w a r n i n g s ; and t h e b o r d e r p r o b l e m - - t h e most v o l a t i l e f l a s h p o i n t - - w a s
84
be).ng e m p h a s i z e d a s a p r i m a r y c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e .
China bas s i g n a l l i n g
tii.it s a r
uiis
not
OIIL
:I
o f the q u e s t i o n s i n c r v i o l a t i o n of- P n C t c s r r i t o r y
c l ~ C r~
S U S
a o i i l d constitute'
b e l l i under i n t e r n a t i o n a l lab.
On 13 I k c e i a b e r 1978, Li. X i a n n i a n warned Hanoi t h a t C h i n a s f o r 19 be arrince h a s i t s l i m i t s . A g a i n , a b a r n i n g had been p r e s e n t e d ; e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n L , a n e s c a l a t i o n o f t h e i s s u i n g a u t h o r i t y had occurred. X i a n n i a n was a v i c e - p r e m i e r oE t h e LRC a n d a member of the S t a n d i n g C o r n n i t t e e of t h s P o l i t b u r o o f the PKC. leadcrs.
C l l i n n s mo!iL
1.i
He b a s one o f C h i n a s h i g h e s l
s c r i o i i s t h r e a t t o d a t c b a s made o n 2 4 1)eccmbrr I Y 7 8 .
I n an eEfort
d e t r r Hanois
On 31 Dect~mber 1 9 7 8 , B e i . j i n g t o o k t h e s y m b o l i c a c t i o n o f recalling
%I
a n d , on 4 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , t h e PKC mad<. a n o t h e r 22 g c , s t u r e by c i i t t : i n g o f f r a i l s e r v i c e between C h i n a and V i e t Nam. i t s m b a s s a d o r t o Hilnoi;
was
engaged i n
On 5 J a n u a r y 1979, Deng X i a o p i n g e x p r e s s e d c o n d e m n a t i o n o f tlic SRV 24 i n v a s i o n o f Cambodia. Once morc, a t o p PRC l e a d e r hod s p o k e n n u t . 25 On 7 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , t h e PLA c a n c e l l e d a l l k a v e s . No* a d i r e c t
m i l i t a r y g e s t u r e had b e e n made. The PKC i s s u e d m a j o r a c c u s a t i o n s and w a r n i n g s r e g a r d i n g V i e t n a m e s e barder provocations, s u b s e q u e n t l y , on 8 J a n u a r y , 1 2 J a n u a r y , 1 5 J a n u a r y , 26 18 . J a n u a r y , 20 J a n u a r y , 27 J a n u a r y , and 29 J a n u a r y 1979. Thi? a u t h o r -
85
h a r d l y go u n n o t i c e d .
A l s o , h e may h a v e s a v o r e d e n g a g i n g i n a b i t of
r e t a l i a t i o n i n k i n d f o r t h e liarsli r e m a r k s madf by t h e V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s
Deng i s s u c d
d u r i n g Deng's
s t o p i n Tokyo ( 6 - 8 F e b r u a r y ) .
On 7 F e b r u a r y h e m a i n t a i n e d
return.
They k e r c p u b l i s h e d on 10 F e b r u a r y , I 1 F e b r u a r y , 1 5 F e b r u a r y , and I 6 29 February 1979; and t h e y i n c l u d e d a f i n a l . a d m o n i t i o n from L i X i a n n i a n 30 a d v i s i n g Hanoi t o t a k e h e e d of a l l C h i n a ' s p r e v i o u s s i g n a l s . 'These t h r e a t s c e n t ~ r e don what c o u l d b e the i m m e d i a t e , 1 c g i t i m a l . c c a s u s b e l l i, V i e t n a m e s e v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e PKC-SRV b o r d e r . B e i j i n g s e t up a command
region.
An E x a m i n a t i o n o f t h c I n d e x
Contentious Issues
The PllC c o n s i d e r e d t h r e e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s t o be a t t h e h e a r t o t
i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the SRV:
V i c t Nam's c h a l l e n g e t o C h i n e s e c r e d -
c l o s e n e s s t o t h r S o v i e t Union.
PRI:-SI{V
the,
A E o u r t h major c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e , t h e
ail
l a l i d I ~ o ~ ~ Pd i Ks p u L c , i l l u s t r a t c d
i n t e r e s t i n g phenommon in
si.gnnllinfi procoss.
:I
111 and of i t s e l f , t h e b o r d e r i s s u e b a s r e l a OK
t i v t l l y minor; only
s t r a t e g i c value
became
ii
wiis
t e s t o f n a t i o n a l b i l l and a f o c a l p o i n t f o r e x p r e s s i n g thr I t t o o k on an
l h o s t i l i t i e s $:enl?rated by t h e o t h e r c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s .
By s t r c s -
i t s s i g n a l s c a n hc seen.
(1)
I n d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n s o f c o n c e r n by d i p l o m a t i c g e s t u r e s and
t h r o u g h thiril p a r t y m c d i a . (2)
(3)
messages.
(4)
(5)
h i g h e s t PRC o f f i c i a l s .
87
I n t e n s i t y Index
A s t h e c r i s i s c o n t i n u c d , t h e i n t e n s i t y l e v e l of the s i g n a l s i n creased.
(2)
(3)
i t a r y ilc t i v i t y
.
har.
((11 Open, l i m i t e d
A u t h o r i t y Index
i n t h e c r i s i s here
c r o s s e d , h i g h c r l e v e l s o f a u t h o r i t y were i n v o k e d .
(1)
T h i r d p a r t y media and normal d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s .
(2)
(3)
isterial levels.
(4)
P u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s by t h e h i g h e s t PRC o f f i c i a l s .
Timing I n d e x
I n h i s s t u d i e s of t h e Korean and I n d i a n b a r s , A l l e n W h i t i n g h a s
paid s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e timing of Chinese s i g n a l s . They were
88
'Thf,
task
is t o s e p a r a t e [major s i g n a l s Crom s u p p o r t i n g s i g n a l s a n d i d e n t i f y m a j o r
!signal blocks.
othi!r
s u c h c r i t i c a l markers.
Examining t h e o t h c r i n d i c e s o f i n d i c a t o r s
C h i n e s e s i g n a l s d u r i n g thl! y ~ a r
$:an h e l p t o e s t a b l i s h t h e t i m i n g i n d e x .
]prior
ti) t l i i .
p a t t e r n s i m i l a r t i ) t h a t d i s c e r n e d by W h i t i n g i n h i s s t u d i e s o f t h e I'KC's
l p ~ ~ ~ ib~ a ris i . s
(1) 1978.
(2)
S p o r a d i c s i g n a l l i n g d u r i n g p e r i o d oC r e s t r a i n t p r i o r t o May
Soviet-Vietnamese,
treaty
011
o n 25 December.
(4)
11s H o l s t i . has i n d i c a t e d ,
thi? b i g g e s t p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t t h a t c a n
inert'
The i n d e x o C i n d i c a t o r s d e v e l o p e d h e r e may
a d v a n c i n g an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how c r i s e s come
about.
G r e a t e r u n d c r s t a n d i n g w i l l n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t i n i t s e l f ti> b e t t f r
89
One o f
s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s t o s k i . l l f u 1 c r i s i s management i s t h e
The
i n i s p e r c e p t i o n n f o n e s o b n a n d o n e s o p p o n e n t s r a n g e oS o p t i o n s .
i n d e x of i n d i c a t o r s may be a p p l i e d t o s t u d y t h e c o r r e l a t i o n or a c t i o n and s i g n a l .
I there i s a p a t t e r n o f a s s o c i a t i o n b e t b e e n p a r t i c u l a r
The s m a l l power o f t e n c a n f o r c e
The
i t s b i l l on t h f l a r g e r power t o a n c x t e n c h a r d l y e x p e c t e d .
become
T h i s c a n lead t h e American d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o f o r m u l a t e
Greater
a s p e c t s of t h e Sino-Vietnamese c r i s i s t r e a t e d here.
90
list4
i n these h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s may p r o v e I l r l p t u l i t a p p l i e d t o
u s c of
r ? v o l u t i o n a ry w n r f a r e i n SoutlitAas t A s i a .
means e x h a u s t i v a .
I t m a y be h e l p f u l , however, in s h e d d i n g s ~ n i e l i g h t on
l a n d s c a p e o f hiiw C h i n a rc'ilcts i n i n t c ~ r n a t i o n a lc r i s e s .
'The i n d i v i d u a l s t e p s o r s t a g e s w i t h i n t h e v a r i o u s i n d i c e s d o n o t
e x c l u d c elem?nt:; r u m o t h c r s t e p s a n d s t a g e s .
'They do p o i n t t o what c a n
b e c ~ n s i d e r e d t h e p r i m a r y mode o f s i g n a l l i n g f o r a g i v e n p e r i o d .
Dif-
fercirit means oI' d e l i v e r y , d i f f e r e n t e c h e l o n s o f a u t h o r i t y , a n d d i t f e r o n t amounts o f i n t e n s i t y may b e wrapped up i n v a r i o u s s i g n a l s t h a t a r e b e i n g i s s u e d d u r i n g I:he same p e r i o d . i n p o r t a n c e : I t h i s i.s u s u a l l y - - b u t thermore,
ii
on a lower s t a g e .
91
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5
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5Y-60.
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7
19 79.
Information January
--
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U S
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f f i i s c I n L e I 1i y , eiice Agency , Cti i na - V i f ! t i i a m Bor de r 're[is io [ i s : 1981 ( W a s h i n g t o n : DIA, 19827, p p . 4022 J u n c 1976-5
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