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A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. A r m y Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s for the MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE
86- 35 10
Name o f c a n d i d a t e Title of
R o b e r t L. Jordan.
J r , , MAJ. USA
A p p r o v e d by:
, ,
T h e s i s Committee Chairman
Member,
Graduate F a c u l t y
MAJ,'Raymond
F. "Arment 1 1 1 , MA
,
B r u c e W. Menning, Fh.D.
Member, C o n s u l t i n g F a c u l t y
,
Philip'J. Brookes, Ph.D.
The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s o f t h e U.S. A r m y Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r government agency. ( R e f e r e n c e s t o t h i s study s h o u l d i n c l u d e the foreaoina statement.)
ii
ABSTRACT
Jordan J r .
T h i s s t u d y a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y t h e m a j o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and equipment d i f f e r e n c e s between a S o v i e t M o t o r i z e d R i f l e Regiment and t h e OPFOR M o t o r i z e d R i f l e R e g i m e n t . Analysis also includes basic tactical doctrine at the regimental level.
Research i n d i c a t e s t h e r e a r e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between the t w o o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n r e g a r d t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and e q u i p m e n t a p p e a r a n c e and c a p a b l l i t i e s . A n a l y s i 5 of t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e and e m p l o y m e n t d o e s n o t r e v e a l a n y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r ences.
i i i
fiCKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I w o u l d l i k e t o thank m y w i f e and c h i l d r e n f o r t h e i r m o t i u a t i o n ,
t h e i r f a i t h , and t h e i r time.
iu
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page T I T L E PAGE
..............................................
i
ii
....................................
i
.
................................................ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................ TABLE O F CONTENTS ....................................... L I S T OF FIGURES ......................................... (DIAQRAMS & I L L U S T R A T I O N S ) CHAPTER 1 . INTRODUCTION 1-1 BACKGROUND .............................. 1-2 PURPOSE ................................ 1-3 SCOPE .................................. 1-4 CHAPTER END NOTES ....................... CHAPTER 2 . ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4
iii
iv
V
vi i
...........................
............................. ..............................
.......
2-5
.....................
......................
2-6
CHAPTER 3
2-25
EQUIPMENT
3-1
......................
CHAPTER 4
TACTICS 4-1
4-2
4-3
4-1
4-6
4-11 4-13 4-13
.....................
......................
4-15
.
I
.
'
5-2
5-3 5-4
........................... ...........................
5-1 5-1
5-5
APPEND IX A
5-3
5-5
5-6
. B.
Bibliography
aw
......................
aw
ui
L I S T O F FIGURES PAGE
FIGURE
SUBJECT/TITLE MOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT ( S O V I E T ) SOVIET MRR SUBORDINATE U N I T S NATIONAL T R A I N I N G CENTER (NTC) J-SERI ES BATTALIONS MOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT (OPFOR) OPFOR MRR SUBORDINATE W I T S OPFOR MRR HEADQUARTERS OPFOR MRB OPFOR TANK BATTALION OPFOR ARTILLERY B A T T A L I ON OPFOR RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OPFOR A I R DEFENSE BATTERY OPFOR ELECTRON1C WARFARE PLATOON OPFOR HIND-E SECTION OPFOR ENGINEER COMPANY OPFOR AUGMENTATION INFANTRY COMPANIES SOVIET M I - 2 4 HIND-E OPFOR VISMOD HIND-E ZSU-23-4 122mm SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER BRDM-2 AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE BTR-60PB MT-LB T-72 TANK COMPARISON T-72 TANK BMP COMPARISON BMP INFANTRY COMBAT V E H I C L E MEETING ENGAGEMENT FORCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON
1 2 3
4 5
2-2
2-3
2-7 2-8
2-9 2-10 2-1 1 2-1 2 2-1 3 2-1 4 2-15 2-16 2-1 7 2-18 2-1 9 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8 3-1 1 3-12 3-15 3-1 6
6
7 8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
4-1 I
. .
CHAPTER
I NTRODUCT IO N
1-1.
BACKGROUND: The Airland Battle doctrin (FM) for th Un i t e d
S t a t e s Army,
a s o u t 1 i n e d i n F i e l d Manual
1985,
100-5
d a t e d 28 O c t o b e r t h e U.S. Army.
out1 ines
contemporary Because
challenges
One
i s training.
training is truly
c o r n e r s t o n e o f success,
leaders a t a l l An
l e v e l s must maximize e v e r y
t r a i n i n g a n d p r e p a r i n g f o r war
strengths combat
enemy
order
accompl i s h
this,
leaders must
A c c o r d i n g t o FM 1 0 0 - 5 :
T o d e t e r m i n e t h e t a c t i c s t o use commanders m u s t s t u d y t h e enemy O R W I Z A T I O N , EQUIPMENT, a n d TACTICS how the enemy fights. More importantly they must u n d e r s t a n d s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f t h e enemy f o r c e t h e y a r e about t o f i g h t . 1 (emphasis
tacticians
analyze
the
factors (METT-T),
of in
mission, the
enemy,
of
and t i m e
conduct array
defensive
operations,
they
their
combat f o r c e s
i n accordance w i t h d o c t r i n a l
ratios.
B r i g a d e and
real i s t i c especially
1-1
The Defense
following
quote
from
the
Office
of
the
Secretary
of
Report,
S o v i e t M i l i t a r r P o w e r 1985, c l e a r l y d e s c r i b e s t h e the Soviet threat. objective of S i n c e W o r l d War 1 1 , the United States the
implications of primary
security
has
the
been
m o t o r i z e d and a i r b o r n e
98 o f w h i c h a r e o p p o s i t e t h e N o r t h A l a n t i c T r e a t y
30 of w h i c h a r e
The s i z e ground
ground
in
forces
is
seems
The
combat
Europe
clearly
Although
t h i s t h e s i s i s o r i e n t e d on t h e t a c t i c a l
i n Chapter
1983,
o f Army R e g u l a t i o n ,
change
1,
dated 1 August
the
National T r a i n i n g Center
(NTC)
p r o v i d e s b a t t a l ion t a s k Asia,
f o r c e s an One
I S
training provided a t
h i g h l y t r a i n e d O p p o s i n g F o r c e (OPFOR).
The m i s s i o n o f
t h e OPFOR
i s:
A.
B.
P r o v i d e r e a l i s t i c f o r c e r a t i o s a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c u r r e n t S o v i e t d o c t r i n e and t a c t i c s t o r o t a t i o n a l
units,
( b r i g a d e s and b a t t a l i o n s
task forces).
1-2
1-2.
PURPOSE: about
The the
purpose Soviet
of
and
thesis OPFOR
is
to
provide
rifle of on
information regiments
motorized the
(MRR).
The
primary and
is
on
with
areas
organization,
equipment,
emphasis
This study w i l l to
serve
as a t r a i n i n g r e f e r e n c e
the
document
u n i t s scheduled
train at
NTC, a n d i t
will
i s not
intended t o -2,
-3,
detract
from
the
value
of
Field
Arm)
FM 100-2-1,
w h i c h s p e c i f y t h e c u r r e n t U.S.
SCOPE :
The
intent numerous
It
of
this
thesis
is
to
synthesize
from and
regarding address
or
decision areas An
combat with i s
support, of an
other force. to
enemy
intentional
restriction
analysis
generic Soviet motorized r i f l e regiment. Chapter 2 addresses the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 5.tructur.e o f b o t h the S o v i e t a n d t h e OPFOR M R R s . with organic tanlts,
A S o v i e t MRR i s a c o m b i n e d arms f o r c e
fighting vehicles (personnel support
infantry
carriers), forces.
artillery,
combat s u p p o r t ,
and combat s e r v i c e
r i f l e division,
tank division.
i s one m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t i n a
there are two types of motorized
Additionally,
r i f l e r e g i m e n t s , BMP a n d BTR.
1-3
designed
to
replicate
the
Soviet only
BMP-equipped
MRR.
this
study
w i l l
address
the
BMP
regiment.
i d e n t i f i e s and a n a l y z e s t w o o r g a n i z a t i ons.
the
significant
d i f f e r e n c e s between
used to rep1 i c a t e
i s on
The
3
p r i m a r y focus of
t h e BMP a n d t a n k .
Chapter
also i d e n t i f i e s a n d a n a l y z e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n
the major items o f equipment. tactical of
of
conduct
defensive
operations,
of
Chapter 4 i s l i m i t e d i n scope
most
the
missions
frequently
and
portrayed
the
Chapter
also
identifies
analyzes
significant
differences. Chapter
analysis
5 provides
in
summary 2,
of
the and 4.
identification Chapter
and also
conducted
chapters
3,
c o n t a i n s some o u e r a l 1 c o n c l u s i o n s a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
1-4
CHAPTER 1
END NOTES
1 U . S . A r m y , FM 1 0 0 - 5 , O n e r a t i o u ( F i n a l U . S . A r m y , 28 O c t o b e r 1985. p a g e 2 - 2 6 .
Draft), Washington,
D.C.,
1-5
2-1.
p4-rRODUCT 1ON;The
purpose of
of
this chapter
the Soviet
i s t o analyze
the
organizational MRR
structure
both
MRR
and
the
OPFOR
.
T h e Sov i e t s h a v e o r g a n i z e d a n d e q u I p p e d t h e I r g r o u n d forces t o support t h e i r offensive doctrine. Moreover, Soviet organization and equipment are being s t r e n g t h e n e d and m o d e r n i z e d c o n s t a n t l y t o i m p r o v e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s t o f i g h t e i t h e r a n u c l e a r or a n o n n u c l e a r war. A n u c l e a r exchange i n Europe c o u l d e a s i l y e n t a i l t r e m e n d o u s damage t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . Therefore, i t would be c l e a r l y i n t h e S o v i e t s i n t e r e s t t o have t h e a b i l i t y t o f i g h t and w i n a war i n Europe q u i c k l y , The b e f o r e e i t h e r a i d e made u s e o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . S o v i e t s h a v e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e o n l y way t o w i n s u c h a war i s by o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . The S o v i e t c o n c e p t of t h e o f f e n s i v e e m p h a s i z e s s u r p r i s e a n d h i g h r a t e s of advance combined w i t h o v e r w h e l m i n g f i r e p o w e r . A t the heart of S o v i e t combat d o c t r i n e i s t h e c o n c e p t of combined arms.1
OPFOR
MRR a t
the
NTC
is
designed
to replicate
the
Soviet
equipment
MRR m
The
common m a n e u v e r
Soviet
ground f o r c e s .
a n t i tank, organic
of
Motor I z e d
r i f 1 e,
tank,
a r t i 11ery,
antiaircraft
engineer,
signal,
t o t h e MRR.
based
Although upon
division,
thc
structure,
i t i s capable of
independent operations.2
2- 1
The S o v i e t MRR s t r u c t u r e i s d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 1 . structure composition support of the with BMP regiment clearly provides mobility,
flexibility,
firepower,
.
true strength o f that a l l the of t h e MRR o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure
1 ies
The
the assets o f
organic. motorized
habitual
relationships
artillery,
c o o r d i n a t e d and c o h e s i v e e f f o r t
MRR m i s s i o n .
FIGURE 1 MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT
I
REGIMENTAL HEADIIUARTIRS
i ' ,
MOTORIZE0 RIFLE
I
TANK BATTALION
1.15
i
SP HOWITZER BATTALION f12Z.nml
,''i
ANTITANK MISSILE
RECONNAISSANCE
1
i
'1
L
SOURCE: FM 100-2-3, The S o v i e t Army: T r o o p s . EauiDment. page 4-26.
Oraanization.
and
2-2
T h e MRR amount of
structure power
depicted
What
in Figure
force
1 represents
vast
to
combat
s i z e of
doe0 t h i s equate
on t h e ground?
will be
What q u a n t i t y and t y p e of
combat v e h i c l e systems
arrayed against
U.S.
Army
brigade
or
battalion equate
task
to
force?
Soviet
MRR.
at
100%
strength.
would
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 209 c o m b a t v e h i c l e s y s t e m s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d b r e a k o u t of
in Figure 2
The
t h e s u b o r d i n a t e e l e m e n t s o f t h e S o v i e t MRR a r e s h o w n
.
FIGURE 2 SOVIET MRR SUBORDINATE U N I T S
QUANT I T 1 ES 209
..............................
MRR HEADQUARTERS
MRB ( 3 , M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B n s )
.....B M P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 MRB (120mm M o r t a r s ) .............. GA 2-66 ( T r u c k ) ............. 18 TANK BATTALION ................... TA.lK....................... 40
.......... 18 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY .....BMP o r BRDM ................ 3 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY .....Z S U - 2 3 - 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 4 ANTI-TANK M I S S I L E BATTERY ........ BMP o r BRDM ................ 9
ARTILLERY BATTALION SP H o w i t z e r RECON COMPANY RECON COMPANY
..............122mm
...................BMP.........................
4
....................... RECON COMPANY .................... MOTOR CYCLE ................ ENGINEER COMPANY ................. BTR-60..................... ENGINEER COMPANY ................. MTU/M T-55 ( b r i d g e ) ......... SIGNAL COMPANY ................... BMP........................ SIGNAL COMPANY ................... MOTORCYCLE........ .........
....................
BRDM
2-3
4
3
3
types
and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
for numerous
structure
of
a n MRR
factors the
reasons.
i s an
Intelligence aspect of
important
operations.
of
the
IPB p r o c e s s ,
threat
evaluation, in order
r e q u i r e s K n o w l e d g e a n d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f enemy f o r c e s
to
accurately
apply
the
technique
of
doctrinal
temp1ating*3 a n MRR
knowledge of considering
is
of
the
enemy u n i t .
a
Frequently intelligence
to
a
higher
headquarters
As
subordinate
form
of
percentages.
an
example,
an
intelligence
report
might
e s t l m a t e t h e s t r e n g t h of
an a t t a c k i n g m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t a t report
t o have
85%.
For
the
intelligence be a b l e
m e a n i n g or
relevance,
to
t h e s t a f f must
to r e l a t e
the
intelligence
100%.
report
the
t h e enemy u n i t a t be able
T h e S-2 ( i n t e l l i g e n c e
to
to
describe report
the
commander of
the
of
the
intelligence
in
terms
numbers and
types of An
and p o s s i b l e
of
action.
additional
t o c o n s i d e r when
organizational priority.
s t r u c t u r e a n d combat power
a
of
t h e enemy
is target
When
tactical
commander
establ ishes a
priority
of
d i c t a t e which
enemy c o m b a t s y s t e m h a s of t h e 209 c o m b a t
of
priority. in be an a Figure
I n an assesc.ment
depicted could
As
2,
many based
variations
on
target or
or
priorities
the
situations
circumstances.
BRDM
might
have
if
priority
tank.
Additionally,
t h e enemy w e r e a t t a c k i n g a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n
2-4
reinforced have a
by
an
a n t i tank
ditch,
the
(bridge)
might
it
priority leaders
than at
another
Therefore, company
is to an
important understand
the
battalion structure
level of
organ i z a t i onal
composi t i or1
MRR
2-3.
.
THE OPFOR MRR;
The OPFOR i s c o m p r i s e d p r i m a r i l y o f u n i t s i s the l o c a t i o n o f the
s t a t i o n e d a t F o r t I r w i n , C a l i f o r n i a , which NTC.
The 1 s t B a t t a l i o n , 7 3 d A r m o r .
FORSCOM u n i t o r g a n i z e d u n d e r
t h e J - S e r i e s TOE.
The S u p p o r t B a t t a l i o n o f
t h e NTC i s a l s o a FORSCOM u n i t .
s e r e s he1 i c o p t e r s w h i c h a r e v i s u a l l y m o d i f i e d (UISMOD)
r e p i c a t e a HIND-E he1 i c o p t e r .
(2)
The e l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e d e t a c h m e n t p r o v i d e s c r e w s
2 0 3 d Mi 1 i t a r y l n t e l 1 i g e n c e B a t t a l i o n ,
2-5
d.
.
FOHSCOM p r o v i d e s a u g m e n t a t i o n o f two i n f a n t r y
c o m p a n i e s a n d one e n g i n e e r company.
( 2 ) R e s e r v e component u n i t s f r e q u e n t l y augment t h e
OPFOR MRR w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s o l d i e r s , s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m 5 t o 50, ( t h e number v a r i e s
b a s e d upon p e r s o n n e l a v a i l a b i l i t y a n d
mi 1 i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n a l spec i a1 t y ) .
(3)
based f o r w a r d a i r c o n t r o l
The command a n d c o n t r o l r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y o f
a l t e r n a t e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o m a j o r maneuver b a t t a l i o n s .
regiment i s d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 4.
2-6
FIGURE 3
NATIONAL T R A I N I N G CENTER ( N T C )
S E R I E S BATTALIONS
cx.i
I
7 -
HHC
- Mech I n f Co
Anti-tank
Co
1 s t B a t t a l i o n 73d Armor
l a
HHC
2-7
FIGURE 4
PIOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT
2-8
T h e OPFOR MRR d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 4 r e p r e s e n t s a v a s t
amount the
of
combat power
.
a
What
s i z e of
t o on
ground? arrayed
What q u a n t i t y and t y p e o f c o m b a t v e h i c l e s y s t e m s w i l l b e
against
at to
U.S.
Army The
brigade
or at
battalion
tasK
training
equate
the
NTC?
OPFOR MRR.
combat the
100% s t r e n g t h
systems. ejements
approximately
201
of
vehicle
on
battlefield
The
breakout
subordinate
of
OPFOR MRR a r e d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 5
FIGURE 5
OPFOR MRH SUBORDINATE U N I T S OPFOR MRR U N I T S MRR U E H I CLE TYPE(J1 SMOD) TOTAL................. BMP QUANTITI ES 201
3
...................
..B M P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
....................... T A N K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 122mm SP H o w i t z e r . . . . . 1 2 A R T I L L E R Y BATTALION .................. A R T I L L E R Y BATTALION .................. BMP................... 2 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY ......... ZSU-23-4 .............. 4 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY .........EMP ................... 4 RECON COMPANY ........................ BMP ................... 4
RECON COMPANY
........................
BRDM BRDM
..................
..................
* ..............
BTR-60
6
1
..................... .....................
2-9
...
12
A V I A T I O N SECTION
T h e s e a r e n o t VISMODs.
I N o r 1-73 AR)
exercist h e MRR
i n g command a n d c o n t r o l
t h e MRR.
The o n l y p o r t i o n s of
h e a d q u a r t e r s p o r t r a y e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a r e t h e c o m b a t v e h i c l e s
of
the
MRR c o m m a n d e r ,
the
S-3 o p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e r ,
and
the
S-3
air.
T h e S-3 a i r p e r f o r m s t h e d u t i e s o f
officer air
(ADO).
controller
close
Additionally,
two messenger
are
.
the
For
safety
motorcycles structure
not the
offense.
6 d e p i c t s the
of
3 - BMP
2
Motorcycles
2-1 0
(MR5).
to
MRR a s s e t s ,
(tanks,
air
defense,
t h e MRE c o n s i s t of
31 EMP.
i n e a c h MRB,
and t h e r e a r e
i n e a c h MRC,
and t h e r e a r e t h r e e BMP i n e a c h
The s t r u c t u r e of
t h e MRB i s s h o w n i n F i g u r e 7.
FIGURE 7
OPFOR
MRB
Ha
I - 5MP
MRC
(1
10
- BMP
p e r MRC C d r )
( 3 p e r MRP)
( 1 p e r squad)
2-1 1
The OPFOR MRR h a s one has three tank The companies, tank
The tank
tank
platoons
company. the
companies
a habitual form a
relationship arms
motorized r i f l e
battalions
combined
1 tanK three
tank companies,
are four
tanks per
i n t h e company h e a d q u a r t e r s .
The s t r u c t u r e o f
b a t t a l i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e 8.
FIGURE 8
OPFOR
TANK
EN
HQ
1 -T-72
Tank Co
13
T-?2
( 1 p e r TK
CO CDR)
( 4 p e r TK PLT)
2-1 2
The
a r t i l l e r y battalion.
The
artillery
b a t t a l i o n has t h r e e a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s , which c o n s i s t of s i x
122mm
BMPs the
self in the
propelled howitzers,
(122mm
SP
Howitzers), the
and
two
b a t t a l i o n headquarters.
(6-31
Within
I N and
t w o maneuver b a t t a l i o n s '
1-73 A R )
platoons
each
provide
one-BMP
and six-122mm
SP H o w i t z e r .
t h i r d battery of
it
is
notional. i n F i g u r e 9.
shown
FIGURE 9
OPFOR
ARTILLERY
BATTALION
HQ
BMP
A r t i l l e r y Battalion
(6
(12
- 122mm SP
Howitzers
are actual)
(6
2-1 3
The
OPFOR
MRR
has
one
reconnaissance
company.
The
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company c o n s i s t s o f f o u r EMPs a n d f o u r ERDMs w h i c h a r e d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r equal ERDM each. two Within the s e c t i o n s or teams o f the scout and 1-73 one EMP a n d one p l a t o o n s of AR) form the the
OPFOR r e g i m e n t
maneuver
battalions
(6-31
IN
Dur I n g t h e ear 1 y y e a r s of
OPFOR also employed
the N a t i o n a l scouts.
motorcycle
FIGURE OPFOR
10
RECONNAISSANCE
COMPANY
.. p:-.;
-I-I 1
1
. . .
r------
_._ -. - 0. ,.._____...__--.I
I
O f
I--- d' 1
:
I
, , ; 77/ '.
.:
1
1
BMP BRDM
EMP
BRDM
1 1
BMP BRDM
1
1
EMP
BRDM
2-14
The OPFOR MRR h a s one a i r d e f e n s e b a t t e r y . b a t t e r y consists of aircraft missiles. similiar guns, and
The a i r d e f e n s e anti-
t w o p l a t o o n s : one p l a t o o n o f ZSU-23-4
one platoon
of
SA-7/GRAIL,
surface-to-air
The S A - 7 / G R A I L to the
i s a man-portable redeye
U.S.
Army
or
stinger
systems.
systems.
The U.S.
are
transported carriers.
visually Both of a
modified
and
M106A2
systems
have
the
outward
appearance
system other
characteristics than
BMP,
but
t h e y h a v e n o weapon
i s employed i n
t h e SA-7/GRAIL. because
The S A - 7 / G R A I L there is no
l i e u of
the
SA-P/GASKIN
mu1 t i p i e
integrated
1 aser The
engagement s y s t e m ( M I L E S ) s t r u c t u r e of
a v a i l a b l e t o r e p l i c a t e t h e SA-9.
11 BATTERY
DEFENSE
.I.
ZSU-23-4
BMP SA-7/GRAI L
2-1 5
The
OPFOR MRR h a s o n e
electronic
warfare
platoon.
The
t w o BRDMs ( w i t h o u t w e a p o n three
radio
radars,
jammers,
and a g r o u n d r a d a r e m i t t e r . are
U.S.
Army
PUS-5-6
models.
of
radio
is a
jammers;
t h e XM-330
i s an FM r a d i o j a m m e r
and t h e XM-834
is
radar
lock-on
signals to a i r c r a f t .
T h e r a d a r s i g n a l s f r o m t h e GRETA r e p l i c a t e
and
the
Soviet
SA-6,
SA-8,
the
ZSU-23-4 Army,
weapons
systems.
The
GRETA s y s t e m i s t r a n s p o r t e d on a U . S .
a n d i s n o t e q u p p e d w i t h a UISMOD.
M548 t r a c k e d c a r r i e r , t h e OPFOR
The s t r u c t u r e o f
e l e c t r o n i c war a r e p l a t o o n
i s s h o w n i n F i g u r e 12.
12
WARFARE
PLATOON
* D O ..........
__
r 1
2
_-__ t ..........
I
- M548 C a r r i e r
GRETA
Jammer (XM-834)
2-16
The aircraft.
OPFOR MRR
is
augmented w i t h
one
section
of
HIND-E
o f f i c e r and employed i n s u p p o r t of
MRR a t t a c k s a n d d e f e n s e o f
the main b e l t .
i n s u p p o r t o f m o t o r i z e d r i f l e b a t t a i o n s i n an advance t o c o n t a c t
or w i t h u n l t s
are visually
in
the
defense and
of
The air
modified,
(AGES),
equ p p e d
engagement
systems
which
(MILES).
each a i r c r a f t The
dupl i c a t e
57mm r o c k e t s , i s depicted in
30mm c a n n o n .
OPFOR HIND-E
F i g u r e 13.
FIGURE
13
SECTION
OPFOR
HIND-E
b .
HIND-E
Aircraft
AT-6 M i s s i l e
57mm R o c k e t s
30mm Cannon
2-1 7
OPFOR
MRR
is
augmented
with
one
FORSCOM e n g i n e e r
of
The e n g i n e e r types of
U.S.
units
the
Army time
(approximations,
to the
based
upon a v a i 1 i b i 1 i t y a t
the
attachment
OPFOR):
two
D-7
bul I d o r e r s ,
two
backhoes,
two
heavy
equipment
transport
t r a i l e r s (HETs), above
The e n g i n e e r of defensive
described
is
and i s n o t e m p l o y e d i n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
engineer
asset,
the
armored
vehicular
launched
is
b r i d g e (AVLB),
i s employed i n o f f e n s i v e
operations. engineer
T h e AULB forces
provided employed
by
the
1-73
AR.
When
combat
are they
in
support
of
offensive
operations
i s an e i g h t w h e e l
carrier the
capable
of
transporting company
is
a crew
shown in
of
ten.
structure
of
OPFOR
engineer
Figure
14 COMPANY
2 - 0-7 B u l l d c * z e r s
2
2 4 1
6
Backhoes
- HETs
5 t o n Dump T r k s AULB BTR-60
*
are actual
The
BTR-605,
used t o
transport
engineer
soldiers,
Soviet equipment.
2-18
The companies.
OPFOR
MRR
is
augmented
with
two
FORSCOM airborne,
infantry
air
The c o m p a n i e s ,
r e g a r d l e s s of
type
assault, m e c h a n i z e d or l i g h t
infantry
a r e employed to support
t h e OPFOR i n a d i s m o u n t e d r o l e . FORSCOM b e c a u s e t h e
T h e a u g m e n t a t i o n i s t a s k e d by
infantry soldiers
i n 6-31
The
by
supported
the
The
missions.
carriers
They
and
are
in
Soviet
t r a n s p o r t i n g t e n men. OPFOR a u g m e n t a t i o n
the
infantry
FIGURE 15
12 10
- BMP ( M 1 1 3 - MT-LB
UISMOD)
I n f Companies
( a p p r o x Im a t e s t r e n g t h of
men p e r c o )
116
T h e MT-LBs,
are
2-4.
d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e differences
following significant
and s h o u l d b e taken
planning, preparation,
The
he OPFOR MRR i s
15 page 2-19.
The soldiers battalion/
is
difference significant
represented from a
by
335
dismounted perspective
i f a U.S.
infantry at the
training
task force l e v e l .
A s an e x a m p l e ,
task force
i s d e f e n d i n g a g a i n s t a S o v i e t MRR,
567 i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s t o p r o v i d e s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e f r o m t h e
BMPs i n a m o u n t e d o r d i s m o u n t e d a t t a c k .
However,
t h e OPFOR c a n
2-20
replicate capability.
only
40%
of
the
Soviet
MRR
dismounted
infantry
Vehicle the
ability
to replicate
be d i s c u s s e d
c a p a b i l i t i e s of
this w i l l
The 1 i m i t e d number o f
p o r t r a y a S o v i e t MRB o r MRC d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n .
t h e S o v i e t MRR e n g i n e e r c o m p a n y .
The p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n c e s a r e i n e q u i p m e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d a p p e a r a n c e , w h i c h a r e a d d r e s s e d i n c h a p t e r 3.
A n t i t a n k Bat t e r v i T h e a n t i t a n k ( A T ) b a t t e r y o f t h e S o v i e t
MRR i s n o t r e p l i c a t e d by t h e OPFOR. U n i t s t r a i n i n g a t the t h i s c r i t i c a l weapon
is organized
NTC n e e d t o b e a w a r e o f
system
t h e absence of
T h e S o v i e t r e g i m e n t h a s a n AT b a t t e r y w h i c h t h r e e AT platoons, t h r e e AT
as f o l ows:
detachments,
equipped
w i t h a t o t a l of AT
n i n e BRDM
2 vehicles.
The weapon s y s t e m i s t h e
5. SPANDREL m i s s i l e s y s t e m w h i c h h a s a maximum r a n g e o f 4 , 0 0 0
Each
in
meters.7
vehicle
has
total and
of
15 m i s s i l e s , available
with
for
five
mounted inside
traversable
turret
ten
reload for
in
the
vehicle.
Soviet
tactical
doctrine
in the
calls
employment o f defense.8
o f f e n s e and
Therefore,
these
135 m i s s i l e < . i n
v a s t open t e r r a i n a t F o r t I r w i n i s e s p e c i a l l y n o t e w o r t h y .
2-21
from
structural
perspective.
The
major
s h o r t c o m i n g s of
of
apability
and a r t i l l e r y p l a oon o f
ZSU-23-4
p l a t o o n i s not a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y e d .
on
a
mounted
ERDM-2
with
four
missiles
cannisters vehicle.
t o 2,500
and
four
additional t h e SA-9
missiles
carried
inside
The r a n g e of meters.9
exceeds t h a t of
t h e SA-7 b y 1 , 5 0 0
the Soviet
MRBs e a c h h a v e a n o r g a n i c a n t i a i r c r a f t p l a t o o n e q u i p p e d w i t h n i n e
SA-7 G R A I L t r a n s p o r t e d i n t h r e e BMPs.10
In total,
t h e a n t i a i r c r a f t a s s e t s o f a S o v i e t MRR would
e q u a t e t o 47 s y s t e m s .
4 4 27
ZSU-23-4
SA-9/GASKIN SA-7/GRAIL
(16 m i s s i l e s )
( 9 p e r MRB)
Whereas,
t h e OPFOR MRR a s s e t s e q u a t e t o 20 s y s t e m s .
4 4
ZSU-23-4
SA-7/GRAIL (16 m i s s i l e s )
thus p r o v i d i n g g r e a t e r l a t i t u d e f o r t h e employment o f
U . S . c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t ( C A S ) and h e l i c o p t e r s u p p o r t .
2-22
122mm SP a r t i l l e r y
Two o f and
six
122mm SP h o w i t z e r s .
r e p l i c a t e d by the
OPFOR battery
t h i r d (notional)
f i r e
is
c a l c u l a t e d and
indirect
control
the
reduced
battlefield. 1 2 0 m M o r t a r B a t t e r i e s : The S o v i e t MHR h a s t h r e e m o r t a r b a t t e r i e s o r g a n i c t o e a c h MRB. m o r t a r s towed b y a GAZ-66 t h e OPFOR MRR a r c (notional) battery,
of
truck.11
all
notional.
the
122mm SP h o w i t z e r
engagement,
however,
i s a r e d u c e d number o f v e h i c l e s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . M o t o r c y c l e s : The S o v i e t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company h a s t h r e e m o t o r c Y c l e s - 1 2 The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f the OPFOR reconnaissance companies are t h e S o v i e t and same
WI
the
th
the
e x c e p t i o n of
the motorcycles.
The OPFOR e m p l o y e d m o t o r c y c l e e i n
t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r o l e v e r y s u c c e s s f u l l y d u r i n g t h e 1982 t o 1984
time period.
in injury to
However, personnel
as a r e s u l t and damage
of to
accidents, equipment,
which the
resulted OPFOR no at
longer the
reconnaissance. of this
Units
training
NTC
aware have
significant mobility,
Motorcycles speed.
obviously
excellent
As a r e s u l t of
t h e i r s i z e a n d mobi 1 i t y t h e y a r e d i f f i c u l t
t o a c q u i r e a n d engage w i t h d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t f i r e s .
2-23
0 5 op h Y
Soviets prefer motorized r i f l e units to assau t mounted. The f a c t o r s f a v o r i n g m o u n t e d a s s a u l t a r e : NBC c o n t a m i n a t i o n . Open t e r r a i n . R e d u c e d enemy a n t i t a n k c a p a b i l i t y . Weak enemy d e f e n s e s . I f a dismounted a t t a c k i s planned, a dismount l i n e i s d e s i g n a t e d , w i t h i n a b o u t 400 m e t e r s f r o m t h e FEBA. W i t h BTRs i n d e f i l a d e t o p r o t e c t r i f l e m e n f r o m m a c h i n e gun f i r e and u e h i c l e s f r o m a n t i t a n k f i r e s . Factors f a v o r i n g dismounted a s s a u l t are! S t r o n g enemy a n t i t a n k c a p a b i l i t y . W e l l p r e p a r e d enemy d e f e n s e s . Fords or bridges. Obstacles or m i n e f i e l d s . Rough t e r r a i n : no h i g h s p e e d a u e n u e s o f a t t a c k . Maximum f i r e p o w e r needed.20
i n d i c a t e s those r e c o g n i t i o n f a c t o r s
w h i c h a r e t h e same f o r a.
b.
t h e OPFOR B M P ) .
c.
d.
e.
f.
Low s i l h o u t t e .
Sharp s l o p i n g f r o n t . The s h o r t b a r r e l o f
I
g.
t h e 73mm c a n n o n .
*
mounted
h.
D i s t i n c t i v e p o s i t i o n l n g of
t h e AT-B/SAGGER,
above t h e 73mm c a n n o n . il
* *
F l a t t u r r e t c e n t e r e d on t h e h u l l .
3-1 4
2-5.
CONCLUSIONk
structural
d i f f e r e n c e s between
the aggregate,
to a
commander
MRR h a s d e f i n i t e
organizatlonal
peculiarities.. be c o g n i z a n t of
training at
These d i f f e r e n c e s
training analysis of
l e s s o n s l e a r n e d upon c o m p l e t i o n
include
the
the
reduced
defense
assets, the
all
which
122mm
1 imit SP in
shortage
of
howitzer regard
mortar of
significant the
factor
number
battlefield. through
However, the
since of
these
missing
replicated their
rules
engagement
fur
fires,
adversely a f f e c t note
is
lessons of
Another
factor
the
absence
2-24
CHAPTER 2
END NOTES
1U.S. A r m y , FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 3 , T h e S o v i e t Army TrooDs: OraanU.S. Army, 1984. i z a t i o n . and E q u i p m e n t . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., p a g e 1-3.
2m., p a g e s 4-8.
3U.S. Army, I n t e l 1 i a e n c e P r e p a r a t i o n of t h e B a t t l e p a g e s 1-5, f i e l d . U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 3 . a n d 1-9.
1-8,
4The a u t h o r w a s a s s i g n e d t o t h e NTC d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d May 1 9 8 2 t h r u J u n e 1 9 8 5 , and p e r f o r m e d d u t i e s as o b s e r v e r c o n t r o l l e r w i t h TRADOC, O p e r a t i o n s G r o u p , a n d b a t t a l i o n S-3, a n d XO o f 6 t h E n , 31st I n f a n t r y . 5U.S. A r m y H e a d q u a r t e r s N a t i o n a l T r a i n i n g C e n t e r , TACSOP. O f f i c e o f t h e D e p u t y Commander f o r T r a i n i n g , 1 9 8 5 . p a g e 2. 6FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 3 , p a g e 4-22. The d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d e l e m e n t cons i s t of seven p e r s o n n e l . T h e d r i v e r and a s s i s t a n t s q u a d l e a d e r remain w i t h the v e h i c l e to provide f i r e support. ' I-*b i d
I
p a g e s 4-16,
5-80,
a n d 5-87.
%.S.
p a g e s 5-95,
5-101,
a n d 5-103.
p a g e s 4-24
l1U., p a g e s 4-5,
l 2 U . , page 4-15.
2-25
CHAPTER E Q U IPMENT
3-1.
JNTRODUCTION: i t e m s of
The
purpose
of
this chapter
t o that
is
t o compare
A
the major
OPFOR e q u i p m e n t
of all
a S o v i e t MRR.
t y p e s of
is
vehicles
the
the
OPFOR;
however, t h e T-72
the
the
primary The
focus
on
BMP
personnel attempts
carrier
to
and
tank.
OPFOR MHR a t
by
t h e NTC
1 imi ted
rep1 i c a t s
Soviet
equipment
using
quantities of Mi 1 i t a r y
203d
large
I n t e l 1 igence
using
Army v e h i c l e s .
3-2.
indicate actual 1y
accuracy Sou i e t
which
the
OPFOR The
equipment
resemble s
e q u i pmen t
photograph
r e p r o d u c t i o n s o f OPFOR e q u i p m e n t a r e f r o m an OPFOR V i s u a l l y Modified NTC.1 The Mi-24/HIND, Soviet which HIND-E (UISMOD) Vehicle Recoanition Guide, prepared
at
the
is
one
of
three
versions
of
the of
is
multipurpose
helicopter,
capable
The
or
IS
armament
a
consist
of
32
57mm r o c k e t s ,
12.7mm
23mm c a n n o n ,
and f o u r ,
AT-6/SPIRAL
missiles. one
is
aircraft size
the very
large
and
aircraft the
easily recognizable.
The o t h e r
3- 1
aircraft when
to remain
stationary
in
l i n e of
sight
with
the
target
employing the
the
AT-6
The the
privlary
differences are
that
between the
OPFOR
HIND-E
actual
HIND-E
Soviet version
i s much
has f i v e
main r o t o r
blades,
and
due
t o MILES-AGES
a
equipment The
availability
Soviet
and
ha5
30mm
cannon
versu5
23mm
cannon.
OPFOR
aircraft
p h o t o s a r e shown
i n F i g u r e 1 6 and 17.
SOURCE:
FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,
AVIATORS
RECOGNITION MANUAL, p a g e 1 - 4 8
3-2
FIGURE 17
B.
A.
B.
3-3
is a self-propelled
antiaircraft There
system
are
and
virtuallr
the OPFOR tanK.
between
version
OPFOR VISMOD
i s m o u n t e d on
a n M551 S h e r i d a n
T h e OPFOR a n d S o v i e t ZSU-23-4
SOVIET ZSU-23-4
SOURCE:
FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,
AVIATORS
R E C O G N I T I O N MANUAL,
p a g e s 3 - 4 8 & 4P.
3-4
T h e S o v i e t 122mm s e l f - p r o p e l l e d
an
howitzer team o f
( 2 S 1 o r M1974)
is
important
p a r t of
the
combined arms
the
Soviet
MRR.
The
i n d i r e c t f i r e mode.
t h i s h o w i t z e r p r o v i d e the c a p a b i l i t i e s
BMPs a n d
of
to
maneuver
with
tanks SP
on
the
battlefield.4 same
two
UISMOD as
version the
the
122mm
has
the The
basic major
characteristics
actual
Soviet
vehicle.
the t u r r e t of
is
is
i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the vehicle.
to
the
in
the
the
The rear.
on
Soviet
The
vehicle 1ZZmm SP
lower howitzer
farther also
OPFOR
mounted
the
PI551
FIQURE 1 9
1 2 2 m m SELF-PROPELLED
HOWITZER
SOVIET 122mm SP H o w i t z e r
SOURCE:
page 64.
.................................................................
OPFOR UISMOD 122mm SP H o w i t z e r
3-5
T h e S o v i e t ERDM h a s m a n y a p p l i c a t i o n s ;
however,
i s most
commonly e m p l o y e d
in a reconnaissance r o l e .
S o v i e t ERDM-2 7.62mm
machine
vehicle machine
is
vulnerable fire.5
to
The
artillery primary
i s that
fragments
and
.50
gun
actual
not
have
system
or
The
turret.
SOURCE:
p a g e 41.
3-6
i s
and c a r r i e s
Vehicle
consists BTR-60
of
14.5mm
i s vulnerable
vehicles
to
indirect
and s m a l l
arms
fire.6
B T R - ~s ~ eries
used by t h e OPFOR a r e a c t u a l S o v i e t v e h i c l e s .
do
not
have
any
weapon
systems;
they
are
transport
purposes o n l y .
The S o v i e t BTR-60PB
i s shown i n F i g u r e 2 1 .
SOURCE:
FM 100-2-3,
3-7
The S o v i e t MT-LB
i s an a m p h i b i o u s a r m o r e d t r a c K e d v e h i c l e ,
When t h e MT-LB
of
two
i s employed a s a
carrier
i t
has
crew
and
can
carry
ten
The v e h i c l e machine
i s vulnerable
fire.7
t o a r t i l l e r y f r a g m e n t s and
OPFOR M T - L B ~ are
caliber
gun
The
actual
As w i t h
t h e BTR-60 and
soldiers,
have
no
weapon
system.
The
SOURCE:
FM 100-2-3,
3-8
There structure.
are
tanks
in
the
Soviet
force in the
The T-64
i s deployed p r i m a r i l y
The T - 7 2
t o non-Soviet
Warsaw
and s e v e r a l
i s r e p l i c a t e d by a UISMUD a t t h e
entered the service in 1974.
medium t a n k
tank
a r e i l l (The a s t e r i s k
i n d i c a t e s those r e c o g n i t i o n f a c t o r which a r 4
t h e same w i t h t h e OPFOR a n d t h e S o v i e t T - 7 2 ) . a.
b.
C.
S i x large die-cast,
e v e n l y spaced r o a d wheels.
d.
e.
f. 9h.
i.
I n f r a r e d l i g h t t o the r i g h t of
j.
3-9
of
the
OPFOR
tank
t h a t of
t h e S o v i e t T-72. capability,
has
or
ditch
crossing
e x c e e d s t h e OPFOR t a n k by a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o f e e t . 00me V I SMO items of special Soviet equipment T-72 tanks are not are
Additionally, OPFOR
r e p l i c a t e d by t h e with the
The
equipped
KM T-S
platoon,
mi n d c e a r i n g p l o w . t h r e e p e r company, T-72
The b a s i s o f
issue
i s one p e r t a n k
f o r a t o t a l o f n i n e w i t h i n a MRR.12 The s o v i e t
s a l s o e q u i p p e d w i t h a s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g smoke a n d a g r e n a d e
A c o m p a r i s o n o f S o v i e t a n d OPFOR T - 7 2 The S o v i e t a n d OPFOR
l a u n c h e d smoke c a p a b i 1 i t y .
3-10
FIGURE 23
V E H I C L E CHARACTERISTICS
SOU1 ET 1 4
HEIGHT ( t u r r e t ) LENGTH ( h u 1 1 )
9 ft 8 in
20 f t 6 i n
7 f t 5 in 20 f t 6 i n
W IDTH
ROAD WHEELS SUPPORT ROLLERS SPEED MAX GRADE ( s l o p e ) 15 TRENCH CROSSING V E R T I CLE STEP TURRET ELEVATION ( d e g r e e s ) CREW S P E C I A L EQUIPMENT
9 f t 2 in
5 each
0
10 f t
6 each
3 each
43 mph 60% 7 ft
33 i n
50 mph
58 %
8 ft
32 i n
I 1
in
-8
t o +19
-s
t o +18
f o u r men none
ARMAMENT:
T h e M I L E S e q u i p m e n t on t h e OPFOR t a n k r e p l i c a t e s t h e same t y p e , b a s i c l o a d , r a t e s of f i r e , p r o b a b i l i t y o f h i t a n d k i l l a s t h a t o f an a c t u a l S o v i e t T - 7 2 .
.+
3-1 1
F I G U R E 24
T-72 TANK
S O V I E T T-72
MEDIUM TANK
SOURCE;
A.
B.
FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,
S O V I E T TROOP C@NTR@LLpage 2 1 .
OPFOR 'JISMOD T - 7 2
TANK
3-1 2
o b s e r v e d by
in
(Broneuaya the
armored
first
vehicle),
provided
Soviet
lowest tact'ca1
r e p l i c a t e d by t h e OPFOR a t BMP-2 BMP-2
is not
the
which
is
the
the
t h e NTC w i t h a UISMOD. it
is significant
Although
addressed here,
i s an
improved v e r s i o n o f
the
BMP-1.
The
in
t h e BMP-2 a r e e x t e n s i u e . 1 7 Since much d e b a t e the introduction of the BMP in 1967 t h e r e the h a s heen
Of
about
employment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e S o v i e t s was t h e
system.
Was
primary conccrn to
basic question.
the
v e h i c l e t o be u s e d a s an a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r o r an i n f a n t r y fighting Institute indicates employment uehicle? for a A 1976 r e s e a r c h Russian training in combat. report East and study from the
U.S.
Army
Advanced
and
European
Studies
variety the
of
BMP
methodr The
philosophies indicated
of
for
that
m a i n t a i n freedom o f
a n d c o n s i d e r new t e c h n i q u e s f o r
1973
Yom
Kippur
war
proved
to
be
disasterous t o charge
experience for
t h e BMP.
The d o c t r i n e a t
that
time w a s
o n t o enemy p o s i t i o n s w i t h weapons s y s t e m s f i r i n g ,
t o include port
f i r e d s m a l l arms, w h i l e s o l d i e r s r e m a i n e d mounted.19
3-13
HEIGHT
turret)
9 ft 8 in
22 f t 2 i n
6 f t 6 in
22 f t 2 i n
LENGTH ( h u 1 1 )
W IDTH
ROAD WHEELS SUPPORT ROLLERS MAX GRADE ( s l o p e ) 2 4
9 ft 2 in
5 each
0
9 f t 9 in
6 each
3 each
60%
58 %
7 ft
33 i n
-8
6 f t 7 in
32 i n
-4
t o +19
3 7
S P E C I A L EQUIPMENT
none
u e h smoke
ARMAMENTI
*-
3-13
F I G U R E 26 BMP I N F A N T R Y COMBAT V E H I C L E
SOU I ET
SOURCE:
A.
FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,
AVIATORS
R E C O G N I T I O N MANUAL,
p a g e 7-36.
8.
S O V I E T TROOP CONTROL,
page 2 1 .
OPFOR V I S M O D BMP
3-1 6
3-3.
~ I G N I F DII F~ FERENCES/NWLY S I S C
The d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n
As
t h e equipment of
a r e s u l t o f c o m p a r i n g t h e e q u i p m e n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e OPFOR and t h e taken Soviet MRR t h e following are s i g n i f i c a n t during the planning, a n d s h o u l d be and
into consideration
preparation,
e x e c u t i o n o f t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC.
HIND-E:
HIND-E syst;rn.
The
p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n c e s between
the
OPFOR VISMOD
gives
aircraft of
slight both
Soviet
version.
pictures
aircraft
c l e a r l y show t h e v i s u a l
differences
i n regard
a n d t h e number o f r o t o r b l a d e s .
The m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e OPFOR a n d t h e S o v i e t BRDM i s t h e f a c t weapon that The t h e OPFOR UISMOD d o e s n o t h a v e a t u r r e t a n d absence the of the turret detracts of from the
system.
of
accuracy vehicle.
rep1 i c a t i n g
true
appearance
the
Soviet
The l a c k o f a 14.Smm m a c h i n e gun makes t h e v e h i c l e more however, when assessing the structure of the OPFOR
vulnerable; MRR,
to fight.
a M I L E S e q u i p p e d 7.62mm m a c h i n e g u n .
c a p a b i l i t i e s t h e BRDM i s a v u l n e r a b l e v e h i c l e on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .
3-1 7
BTR-60
AND
MT-I B:
the
The
actual
Soviet
BTR-60 transport
and
MT-LB
v e h i c l e s e m p l o y e d by only. are
OPFOR a r e
u s e d for
purposes
and t h e y
A s t h e BRDM t h e y a l s o l a c k a M I L E S w e a p o n s y s t e m ,
vulnerable
to
direct
and
fires. BTR-60
The and
loss
the
of
firepower
is
more
significant
MT-LB
m a x i m u m of s i x and MT-LB,
T-72 TANK
tank c l o s e l y p a r a 1 l e l s t h e
t h r e e major d i f f e r e n c e s the lack of special
The
mobility
of
and
equipment,
of
w h i c h d e t r a c t f r o m t h e a c c u r a c y of T h e OPFOR t a n k T-72.
is
performance inches
the
two f e e t the
and t h r e e
higher
Soviet
Because o f
excess h e i g h t
the
could
OPFOR u e h i c l e . degree of
T-72
T-72s
equal
t r e n c h a n d gap c r o s s i n g c a p a b i 1 i t y than wi
or
is
almost
greater which
the
1 an
OPFOR
UISMOD
T-72.
of
obstacles have
an
last
less e f f e c t
difference
i s special
to
equipment. the
OPFOR PIRR d o e s
not
replicate
nine mineclearing
plows,
f o u n d i n a S o v i e t MRR.
countermobility
of
obstacles
H o w e v e r , as w i t h t h e S o v i e t T-72s
superior
3-18
m o b i l i t y mentioned e a r l i e r , effective actual against MRR. the the OPFOR Another OPFOR
are an
have in
of
less
effect to
on
Soviet i s
regard smoke
special
equipment capabi 1 i t y ,
T-72's
generating The
both
g r e n a d e - 1 aunched.
t h e smoke c a p a b i l i t i e s o f
more vulnerable t o d i r e c t f i r e
Units the of training at tank the
NTC n e e d t o
consideration
weaknesses the
OPFOR lessons
into
assessing
value The
learned
from
their
training in
in
will
be m o r e Soviet
easily T-72
defeated
w i l l
the
NTC
actual
be
has
noteworthy T-72
the
with
OPFOR BMP i s h i g h e r ( b y 3 f e e t
and 2
inches).
Additionally
the
OPFOR BMP h a s a r e d u c e d t u r r e t e l e v a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y , dismounted The infantry personnel, and the and cannot to
self-generate self-generate
additional
height
inability
i n reference t o the
t w o m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s a r e t h e OPFOR
inability turret
to
carry
infantry The
personnel to
and
the
degradation
elevation.
inability
transport
from employing
page 3-14
turret
above.
A s n o t e d i n F i g u r e 25 page 3-15,
+33 d e g r e e s
can
elevate
while
the
OPFOR V I S M O D
The
14
degree
is
an
important from
factor
because
i t high
precludes ground at
the
EMP thus
engaging
targets
on
close
ranges, the
limiting
its
self
defense
capability
i n much o f
battlefield of
3-4.
FONCLUSIONS:
a Soviet
between
and
OPFOR MRR.
I n an
MRR
has
significant and
equipment need
shortcomings. to be aware of
a the
result
commander
staff
of
training
at
the drawn
NTC.
from
These lessons
also a f f e c t
conclusions
l e a r n e d upon c o m p l e t i o n o f The
training at
include shortcomings o f
HIND-E,
BRDM,
BTR-60,
a n d MT-LB,
the
OPFOR MRR e q u i p m e n t
i s markedly
inferior
t o t h a t o f a S o u i e t MRR.
3-20
CHAPTER 3
END NOTES
cR
l T h e OPFOR V i s u a l l y M o d i f i e d (VISMOD) V e h i c l e i s a p o c k e t s i z e document, 11 papes i n l e n g t h , designed t o , 'prouide U . . S . Army personnel w i t h a r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e r e f e r e n c e w h i c h w i l l a i d i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f UISMOD V e h i c l e s u s e d by t h e OPFOR a t t h e N a t i o n a l T r a i n i n g C e n t e r , Cal i f o r n i a . " The document p r o b a b l y a c h i e v e d t h e d e s i r e d p u r p o s e when i t was f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1982. Howeuer, i t i s i n d i r e need of revision.
2U.S. A r m y , FM'100-2-3, O r a a n i z a t i o n . and Eguipment. pages 5-80 and 5-81.
1934.
. , page 5-93. 4w., pages 5-49 'w.,page 5-15. 6u., page 5-16. 7u., page 5-28. ~
and 5-53.
~ , page . 5-39.
91bid., 18.
llU.S.
page 5-40.
l o R a y Bonds,
h page L
FM 1-402, Aviator's R e c o o n i t i o n Guide, page
Army,
14FM 100-2-3,
pages 5-32,
15The c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e S o v i e t T-72 tank and t h e S o v i e t BMP, t o ascend and decend a grade a r e e x p r e s s e d i n d e g r e e s . To compare t h a t c a p a b i l i t y w i t h t h e M551 Sheridan, t a n k , UISMOD BMP and T-72, t h e degree was c o n v e r t e d t o a p e r c e n t a g e by use o f the a r i t h m e t i c tanqent f o r m u l a . ( t h e t a n g e n t o f 30 d e g r e e s = 57.735= 58%) 16Dau i d C . 126. 3-21 I s b y , W e a ~ o n s and T a c t i c s o f The S o v i e t A r m y L page
1 8 M a j o r James K . Mc Cast i n , Jr., S t u d e n t R e s e a r c h R e p o r t , Combat I n f a n t r y V e h i c l e s (BMP) I n Combat. 1976. 19Ray B o n d s , Weapons o f t h e M o d e r n S o v i e t G r o u n d F o r c e s . page
47.
20FM 100-2-1, 21FM 1-402, page 5-27. p a g e 7-36. pages 1-1 t h r u 1-8. a n d 5-21.
p a g e s 5-18,
5-19,
3-22
this chapter
i s to
compare
of
doctrine
Soviet to
MRR,
in
the
conduct
and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , T h i s chapter
t h a t of
i s l i m i t e d i n scope
t o an a n a l y s i s o f the OPFOR at
m i s s i o n s most
frequently
p o r t r a y e d by
.
The Soviet art of war includes three components: s t r a t e g y , o p e r a t i o n a l a r t , and t a c t i c s , each o f w h i c h has i t s d i s t i n c t i v e s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s f o r t h e conduct o f armed combat on v a r i o u s s c a l e s . S t r a t e g y i s t h e h i g h e s t domain o f t h e a r t of w a r , . . .
O p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n c l u d e s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t s of p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the conduct o f o p e r a t i o n s ( a c t i o n s ) by t h e l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s . . . T a c t i c s i s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t s of p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f combat by t h e s u b u n i t s , u n i t s , and f o r m a t i o n s o f the v a r i o u s s e r v i c e s o f the Armed F o r c e s . . ( e m p h a s i s added)
The s t r u c t u r e of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h o u g h t i s s u b d i v i d e d i n t o three major categories; m i l i t a r y doctrine, m i l i t a r y science, military arts2 The f o c u s h e r e i n and war
is at
the
level intent to
of
Additionally, at the
i s to
OPFOR MRR
determine
whether t a c t i c a l
employment a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t s S o v i e t r e a l i t y .
The S o v i e t s c a t e g o r i z e combat a c t i o n s i n t o t w o m a J o r f o r m s of combat, offense into three and defense.3 The attack offense against
is
a
further defending
subdivided
categories:
enemy ( c o n d u c t e d f r o m t h e m a r c h or f r o m a p o s i t i o n i n d i r e c t
4-1
contact),
m e e t i n g engagement,
and p u r s u i t .
thesis the
forms
the
offense
majari ty
t h e NTC t a k e
or
hasty is
prepared to a
This prepared
thesis
discussion
defensive
W I
thdrawal
perspective,
I n r e g a r d t o echelonment,
tactical missions of employed. a.
b.
a n d how t h e y w i l l
be
The f i r s t
c.
enemy d e f e n s e s . 5
The m i s s i o n s o f
a.
b.
c.
d.
D e s t r o y bypassed f o r c e s . Replace or r e i n f o r c e f i r s t e c h e l o n f o r c e s S 6
4-2
fixed
and not
s e c o n d e c h e l o n should b e u s e d t o e x p l o i t
success,
3:l
or
greater Soviet
for
the
conduct
of
offensive
operations.
When t h e
commander
computes h i s s t r e n g t h the
or combat power
defending force and the combat forward desired
in order
he
t o e s t a b l i s h a s u p e r i o r r a t i o over
all of his organic, attached,
considers
combat at
support edge of
forces. the
Therefore, a r e a may
his actual
be
less
battle
overall
r a t i0.7 The "The found first i s at final level the area of where consideration any r e a l which is that of flexibility. might be
tactical
flexibility
regiment,
i s the
smallest
fully
combined Soviet
arm3 U n i t . " 8
I t is d i f f i c u l t
t o s p e c u l a t e t o what
degree
i n t h e e x e c u t i o n of postulate
be
tactical level or
is
at
what to
Soviet
unit
commanders w i l l
permitted
However,
t w o f a c t o r s have a v e r y d i r e c t
of
flexibility: of which
the
Soviet
concepts
of
initiative,
both
are
~ x t r e m e l y dependent
r e c o n n a i ssance.
4-3
Norms a r e
the
performance
standards which
are r e l a t e d
to
The e x i s t e n c e o f n o r m s p r o v i d e s t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r b a t t l e d r i l l s a t the subunit can measure level ( b a t t a l i o n and l o w e r ) . Tactical commanders. compute
levels
of
combat
readiness
and
accurately
combat
(HE,
and
chemical), warfare
air
support combat
rotary), s.upport
electronic elements.
other
combat
I n i t i a t i v e i s s t r e s s e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d a g r e a t d e a l by S o v i e t
mi 1 i t a r y writings.
The d e c i s i v e n e s s o f o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s i s even more pronounced in modern c o n d i t i o n s . . . A g g r e s s i ue and d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n s make i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s t o f r u s t r a t e t h e enemy's p l a n s , impose t h e i r w i l l on h i m , s e i z e a n d k e e p t h e i n i t i a t i v e , a n d a c t w i t h the utmost determination.10
An
article
by
General
in
Vorennyr of
(Military surprise, of
Herald),
stresses
concepts
and a c o n t i n u o u s o f f e n s i u e . states,
t h e most
passages i n h i s a r t i c l e
"Therefore the
t h e most
i m p o r t a n t and the
holding of
initiative
active
reconnaissance."ll
i n f o r m a t i o n t o s u p p o r t p l a n n i n g based
Consequently good
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e w i 1 1 a l l o w t h e S o v i e t o r OPFOR commander t h e
4-4
oppor r u n t y defense
to
seize
the
initiative
in
the
is
offense the
or
the of
.
ty.
Closely
related
to
initiative
concept
f l e x ibi I
are : a.
b.
A h i g h l i g h t o f some o f
the concepts o f
f l e x i b i l itr
c.
d.
e.
f.
"These
are one
not that
descriptive
is
of
rigid
offensive The
level
doctrine,
b o t h m o b i l e and f l e x i h l e . " l 3
t o be r e l a t e d m o r e t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level. However
tactical
the
degree
of
flexibility,
i n i t i a t i v e , or l a t i t u d e p e r m i t t e d a t
the t a c t i c a l
l e v e l r e m a i n s t o be s e e n a n d s h o u l d n o t b e d i s r e g a r d e d . Intelligence c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s are S o v i e t combat o p e r a t i o n s . throughout the Soviet text The v a l u e o f Taktika indispensable aspect intelligence
by
of
i s stressed General
(Tactics)
Major
Reznichenko (1984 e d i t i o n )
a s e v i d e n c e d by t h i s q u o t e :
is especially important in modern Reconnaissance combat. I t i s the most important type o f combat s u p p o r t , s i n c e w i t h o u t r e 1 i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h e enemy, the terrain, and the radiac and chemical o i t u a t i o n , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o employ f r i e n d l y f o r c e s and equipment correctly, to perceive the enemy's i n t e n t i o n , and t o f o r e s t a l l h i m i n o p e r a t i o n s . Owing to the large volume of intelligence tasks, reconnaissance i s conducted c o n s t a n t l y and a g g r e s s i v e l y v i a t h e i n t e g r a t e d employment o f f r i e n d l y f o r c e s a n d e q u i p m e n t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e c o o r d i n a t e s a n d l o c a t i o n of enemy t a r g e t s w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e a c c u r a c y a n d p r o v i d e t h e t r o o p s w i t h t h e s e i n good t i m e , and t o p r o v i d e t h e commander w i t h t h e t i m e l y i n t e l l i g e n c e d a t a t h a t h e n e e d s f o r p l a n n i n g a n d command a n d c o n t r o l d u r i n g combat.14 4-5
4-2.
OFFENSE;
C h a p t e r 5,
FM 100-2-1,
Jhe
S o v i e t Army
O p e r a t i o n s and T a c t i c s ,
c o n c e p t s and
t h e OPFOR MRR c o n d u c t i n g a r e g i m e n t a l
primarily position
from
in
the direct
march
but
on
occasion
will
contact.
Addi t i onal 1 y ,
scenario
of
the
division
effort. the
The
scenario
Army
control
cell
at
the
NTC
It
duties of
U.S.
i n t e l 1 igence center
indicators (TOC),
operations
task to
forces. portray
provides
divisions locations,
efforts, a n d combat
possible support
and p o s i t i o n s o f time
This
allows
for
t e m p l a t i n g of the brigade
enough d e t a i l e d
intelligence for
de t b r m i ne t h e a p p r o x ima t e t ime o f a t t a c K
.
first of all
The s c e n a r i o g u i d a n c e a n d o r d e r s t o t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t o u t l i n e three major areas i n the planning process: the boundaries f o r the regiment, and I a s t , second, the
immediate and
an e s t a b l i s h e d 1 i ne o f d e p a r t u r e t h e OPFOR opposing
with
intelligence
b r i g a d e or task force.
A s a r e s u l t the regimental
4-6
planning METT-T
process
is
initially
driven
by
the
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of and time).
(mission,
enemy,
terrain,
troops
available,
Refinement o f t h e p l a n i s d e r i v e d f r o m a g g r e s s i v e reconnaissance. The reconnaissance. rep1 i c a t e OPFOR MRR the the adheres to the Soviet concept of
When
scenario division
permi ts,
select
elements (or
portions
of
reconnaissance
company
25 km f o r w a r d o f t h e MRR.
size) are a l s o e m p l o y e d as
19 km
e c h e l o n m e n t a n d f i r e p l a n n i n g a r e a l l b a s e d upon i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s and time d i s t a n c e f a c t o r s . determines the qualilty fire of the attack. are The Good i n t e l l i g e n c e time sequencing of synchronized
CAS a n d
indirect
preparations,
carefully
i t s b a t t a l ions,
norms.
prescribed
deviations
the
commander b a s e d
OPFOR
attacks
the
commander
of
the
tank
b a t t a i on
s u p p o r t t h e MRBs a n d t h e a r t i l l e r y b a t a l i o n o p e r a t e s a s p a r t o f
4-7
of
the
t h e MRBs.
three
The
air
defense OPFOR
battery adheres
i s a l s o assigned
to The and the tactical
to
MRBs.16
in
The
procedures
described
FM
above,
100-2-1.
l7
considerations
discussed
echelonment
r i g i d l y f o l l o w e d by t h e OPFOR d u r i n g t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e a t t a c k .
Many f a c t o r s o r v a r i a b l e s on b o t h s i d e s a f f e c t s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e o f t h e OPFOR MRR a t t a c k . One o f the the most
The p r i m a r y s o u r c e d o c u m e n t s f o r
SOP a r e FM 100-2-1,
Reference.
Motorized R i f l e Unit,
1985, a n d t h e R u l e s of E n g a g e m e n t . l *
conforms to.
The OPFOR T a c t i c a l
SOP
o t h e above s t a t e d r e f e r e n c e s and i s s t r i c t l y a d h e r e d
t h e OPFOR m i n i m i z e t h e r e q u i r e levels. Additionally,
B a t t e d r i l l s performed by
C.J. D i c k
The f i r s t
command a n d c o n t r o l
a i d e d by
rap
decisions;
and t h i r d ,
subordinate
1s
The
a m e e t i n g engagement.
d e f i n i t i o n s o f a m e e t i n g engagement a r e
4-8
similiar,
b u t n o t t h e same.
Soviet d e f i n i t i o n applies
t h e m e e t i n g engagement.
A m e e t i n g engagement o c c u r s when b o t h s i d e s s t r i v e t o r e s o l v e a s s i g n e d m i s s i o n s by a t t a c k i n g . Troops i n a m e e t i n g engagement a i m t o r o u t t h e a t t a c k i n g enemy i n a short t i m e span, seize the initiative, and c r e a t e favorable conditions for subsequent aggressive operations. A m e e t i n g engagement c a n t a k e p l a c e on t h e march, i n an o f f e n s i v e when r e p e l I i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a n d c o u n t e r t h r u s t s o r when e x p l o i t i n g s u c c e s s ~ s a n d e n g a g i n g enemy troops, a n d i n d e f e n s e when m a k i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a n d c o u n t e r t h r u s t s o r e l i m i n a t i n g enemy a i r b o r n e or amphibious.20
When t h e OPFOR MRR i s g i v e n a m i s s i o n t o c o n d u c t a m e e t i n g engagement
establishes a s i t u a t i o n which
i s vague f o r b o t h f o r c e s .
a battalion
is
moving OPFOR
The
MRB
conduct i ng as an
meet i n g advance
subordinate l e a d element
elements i s the
combat the
reconnaissance security
patrol element
CRP moves
forward of
forward
(FSE) w h i c h i s d e p l o y e d f o r w a r d o f
t h e advance g u a r d m a i n body.22
( 1 0 km f o r w a r d o f FSE)
( R e p o r t s a c t i o n s t o commander).
b.
c.
d.
Q.
4-9
The FSE p e r f o r m s t h e f o l l o w i n g m i s s i o n s : m a i n body) a. A d v a n c e s a t maximum s p e e d . E n g a g e s enemy l e a d e l e m e n t s . Develops the s i t u a t i o n . Seizes/holds terrain favorable
(5-10
KM f o r w a r d o f t h e
b.
c.
d.
main body. The
for
the
employment
of
advance
guard
main
body
commander t h e MRR)
performs
the
following
missions: a.
b.
(20-30
km f o r w a r d o f
P l a n s the f i g h t . I s s u e s o r d e r s t o CRP a n d FSE. Coordinates f i r e support. C o n t r o l s the a s s a u l t . the execution of with the
c.
d.
the
notional
f i r e
close
of
air
support
and
indirect
for
the
combat
structure
the
MRB
c o n d u c t i n g t h e m e e t i n g engagement a p p e a r s i n F i g u r e 2 7 .
4-1 0
FIGURE 27 MEETING ENGAGEMENT FORCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON SOVIET23 BMP OPFOR24 BMP
- 31
13
31 13
T-72
T-72
ZSU-23-4
ZSU-23-4
18
ATGM
ATGM
REMARKS:
1. F o u r of t h e 3 1 PMPs w i l l u e n e r a l l ~ b e BMP UISMOD. M 1 1 3 w i t h o u t BMP w e a p o n s , u s e d t o t r a n s p o r t d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y : 2. S i x o f t h e 1 8 , 122mm SP h o w i t z e r s a r e a c t u a l l y r e p l i c a t e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , t h e r e m a i n i n g 1 2 a r e n o t i o n a l . 3. 1 2 0 mrn M o r t a r s a r e n o t i o n a l . 4. BRDM/AT-5, ATGM a r e n o t r e p l i c a t e d . A n a l y s i s of Soviet t a c t i c s a n d t h e OPFOR TACSOP, indicate a direct parallel in regard i n concept
t o t h e m e e t i n g engagement,
a n d e x e c u t i on.
4-3.
DEFENSE i
C h a p t e r 6 , FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 1 ,
O p e r a t i o n s and T a c t i c s ,
by
Soviet
divisions the
and
units.25
great
depth
and o p e r a t i o n a l
adheres
defensive and
operations.26
to
the
concepts
NTC
b a t t a l i o n and c o m p a n y d e f e n s i v e m i s s i o n s .
The d e f e n s i v e m i s s i o n s
a r e b o t h h a s t y and p r e p a r e d a n d a r e c o n d u c t e d i n t h e d a y a n d a t
4-1 1
night.
OPFOR p r o c e d u r e s f o r
p r e p a r a t i o n , and e x e c u t i o n o f
the defensive m i s s i o n s
defensive area.
c.
sites.
d.
The l o c a t i o n o f
" f i r e sacks"
( k i 1 1 zones)
a n d ambush
e.
t o be m o r e common t h a n n o t a l l o w tlme f o r
The h a s t y d e f e n s e w i l l
The m i s s i o n o f h a s t y d e f e n s e
i s more t r a n s i t o r y . and a t t a c k
The enemy 5 i t u a t i o n i s c l e a r e r ,
i s imminent.
c.
defense;
The t e r r a i n may be u n f a v o r a b l e f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a
i t may be b e t t e r s u i t e d f o r t h e a t t a c k e r .
Time w i l l be c r i t i c a l . 2 9
d.
4-1 2
OPFOR s u b o r d i n a t e
elements
are
required than
to establ ish
ones. are
defensive
prepared
principles
Soviet
tactics
4-4.
S I G N I FICAM and
D I FFE R E N C E W W L Y S I S :
chapter
3
Clnl i k e
chapter
2 of
(Organization) tactical
(Equipment),
the
comparison
S o v i e t a n d OPFOR
e x i s t r e s u l t from organizational
will
the
An a n a l y s i s o f revealed FM an
have in
extremely
close
parallel tactical
those
100-2-1.
Further analysis o f
concepts o f
motorized r i f l e u n i t )
p a r a l l e l a n d a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h o s e e x p r e s s e d i n FM 100-2-1. 4-5. CONCLUSI ON; between the There a are no major and the differences OPFOR MRR. in An tactical overall
employment analysis of
Soviet
tactical
m i s s i o n s p e r f o r m e d by t h e OPFOR r e v e a l s
t h a t t h e y a c c u r a t e l y r e p l i c a t e t h e t a c t i c s o f a S o v i e t MRR.
If
it
is logical
to
assume
that
the
tactical
philosophy
d e s c r i b e d i n T a l c t i K S by G e n e r a l R e z n i c h e n k o w i l l the S o v i e t Forces, i t
is fair t o assume t h a t
b e f o l l o w e d by
Army
t h e U.S.
4-1 3
will
U.S.
adhere t o t h e d o c t r i n e Armys
in F M 100-5,
Operations.
Because t h e
FM
100-2-1, it
-2,
-3
series
its
TACSOP,
is realistic
t o conclude t h a t
t a c t i c s e m p l o y e d by In
t h e OPFOR a r e v e r y s i m i l a r
t o t h o s e e m p l o y e d by t h e S o v i e t s .
so f a r a s p o s s i b l e ,
and accurately
the
t a c t i c s e m p l o y e d by t h e what might be
OPFOR a r e v a l i d
on a future
replicate
expected
b a t t l e f i e l d. T h i s a n a l y s i s should serve as a p o s i t i v e preparing t o t r a i n a t learned future, at the NTC t h e NTC. can be The t a c t i c a l to the indication to units. c o n c e p t s and lessons. battlefield
of
applied
the
4-1 4
CHAPTER 4
END NOTES
l R e z n i c h e n K o , U.G., LTG, T a k t i k a , 1984. T r a n s a t e d by C S I M u l t i l i n g u a l S e c t i o n , N a t i o n a l Defense H e a d q u a r t e r s Ottawa, Canada, R e v i s e d a n d p r o c e s s e d f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n b y he S o v i e t A f f a i r s Pub1 i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , D i r e c t o r a t e o f S o v i e t A f f a i r s , A i r Force I n t e l l i g e n c e Service. page 3. An e a r l i e r e d i t i o n o f t h i s book f i r s t a p p e a r e d i n 1966. The s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f T a k t i k a , 1984, i s n o t e w o r t h y b e c a u s e i t i s an e x c e l l e n t u n c l a s s i f i e d i n d i c a t i o n of the e v o l u t i o n a r y changes i n S o v i e t t a c t i c s . 2U.S. Army, FM 100-2-1, The S o v i e t Army: O p e r a t i o n e a n d U.S. Army, 1984, page 2-1. Tactics. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.,
3w., page
4 -* 1bid
9
2-5.
t h r u 2-12.
9
6 ~
7
8 9 ~
~ , page . 2-11.
. page , 2-12. ~
page . 2-11.
page 5-22.
20Reznichenko, T a K t i k a ,
page 135.
21The s c e n a r i o f o r c e s a m e e t i n g engagement b e t w e e n a U.S. t a s k f o r c e a n d a r e i n f o r c e d OPFOR MRB. The MRB r e p l i c a t e s t h e T h e MRR m a i n b o d y i s n o t i o n a l a d v a n c e d g u a r d o f a MRR m a i n body, a n d d o e s n o t e n t e r i n t o t h e m e e t i n g engagement s i t u a t i o n b e c a u s e p o r t i o n s of the r e g i m e n t a r b employed elsewhere p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n MRB o r MRC d e f e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n .
22FM 100-2-1,
page 5-32.
. page , 5-34.
p a g e s 72-74. t h r u 6-9. p a g e s 155 t h r u 1 9 6 .
p a g e % 6-1
26Reznichenko, T a k t i K a .
27A t h o r o u g h c o m p a r i s o n o f T a k t i K a , ( 1 ? 8 4 ) , FM 100-2-1, S o v i e t A r m y , O p e r a t i o n s a n d T a c t i c s . t h e OPFOR Maneuver U n i t b y Red T h r u s t a n d t h e NTC, OPFOR TACSOP a l l r e v e a l e d a d i r e c t para1 l e l i n t a c t i c a l c o n c e p t s and p r o c e d u r e s . cL8FM 100-2-1, page 6-2.
Thr
4-1 6
5-1.
JNTRODUCTION:
I n 1 i g h t o f c h a p t e r s 2,
3,
and 4,
the reader
intent of t h i s thesis:
4.
P r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e S o v i e t a n d OPFOR MRR.
B. A n a l y z e t h e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n , equipment, and t a c t i c s .
C.
P r o u i d e commanders a n d s t a f f s a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d "9 o f t h e OPFOR. t o Keep i n m i n d t h e t w o p r i m a r y t r a n I n g
I t i s also significant
missions of
t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t :
A.
this the
thesis relates
to
two
impact have
will
the
differences
between
on
planning,
preparation, relate
execution of unit's
training?
How do t h e s e
differences
to
combat m i s s i o n ?
5-2.
S I M I l A R I T I ES; The a p p r o a c h u s e d i n t h i s t h e s i s e m p h a s i z e s
The n e g a t i u e f o r m throughout to
stressed
i d e n t i f y weaknesses.
t h e r e a r e numerous of
s.
5- 1
Army w h e r e
r e s o u r c e s and
performance o f the
U.S.
of
trained
and
dedicated Some
capable
repl icating
Soviet
MRR.
of
the
important
s i m i l a r i t i e s are:
MRR S t r u c t u r e ;
closely parallels
The
organizational of a Soviet
structure The
of
the
OPFOR combat
that
MRR.
major
elements are r e p l i c a t e d .
Therefore,
t h e OPFOR MRR
i s capable o f
An
immediate
training super i o r
to
advantage
f~ r c e .
i+
a numer i c a l 1 y
forces combat,
Th i s and
factor
tests
task of
ability combat
integrate and
synchronize
all
aspects
support,
combat
s e r v i ce r u p p o r t
.
The OPFOR s u b u n i t structure of t h e MRR the b a t t a l i o n combat During each of unit the the
Subun i t S t r u c t u r c :
c a n be
a n d company conducted
14-21
days
of
simulated through
that
rotates
the
NTC
are
approximately against
60-75%
training
missions forces.
performed The
OPFOR b a t t a l i o n
a n d company
size
training
Tactics :
tactical
employment
of
MRH
and
its
c o n c e p t s d e s c r b e d i n FM 100-2-1:
5-2
reconnaissance,
prebattle
and
battle
formations,
and
unit
d i s p o s i t i o n s and a c t l o n s i n t h e defense.
in
the
opportunity
to
test
U.S.
tactical
Souiet.
I
I n the aggregate,
realistic
U.S.
t h e NTC
experience structure,
exposure
organizational
equipment and t a c t i c s .
C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e knowledge and
e x p e r i e n c e o f l e a d e r s and s o l d i e r s I s enhanced t o a g r e a t d e g r e e . They learn more about their potential enemy and are
better
p r e p a r e d f o r combat
i n the f u t u r e .
5-3.
from
91FFFRENCES; The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f d i f f e r e n c e s m u s t be v i e w e d
the perspec t iues. First of all, to what degree
w i l l
d i f f e r e n c e s i m p a c t upon u n i t p e r f o r m a n c e a n d l e s s o n s l e a r n e d f r o m the will training the experience at t h e NTC? upon Secondly, the what relevance combat?
d i f f e r e n c e s have
preparing
unit
for
Infantry;
The
total of the
number number
of
dismounted in a
OPFOR f a l l s s h o r t approximately
347.
available affects
MRR
This
adversely
the
a b i l i t y t o a c c u r a t e l y r e p 1 i c a t e an a t t a c k i n g S o v i e t MRR.
infantry soldiers in the OPFOR MRR represent some
567
220
i n a S o v i e t MRR. impact
of
tremendous
Soviet
MRR's
s u p p r e s s i ue
f ires
during
assaul t
Additionally, diminished.
t h e p o t e n t i a l of This
a dismounted a s s a u l t t o be kept
i s equally during
s h o r t c o m i n g needs
i n mind
t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC.
U n i t s t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC n e e d t o b e
s-3
prepared
to
fight
Soviet
force
with
significantly
larger
number o f d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y p e r s o n n e l .
pir
Defense:
The t o t a l
t h a n 50% o f
T h e r e f o r e , u n i t s t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC w i l l
t h a n a g a i n s t a g e n u i n e S o v i e t MRR when e m p l o y i n g c l o s e
(CAS)
employment operations.
assets w e l l
combat
additional
27
air
systems
available effect
t o a S o v i e t MRR w i l l
air
s e v e r e l y reduce support.
a c c r u i n g f r o m U.S. of combat
Therefore, to reduce
and e x e c u t i o n
support
elements
Soviet
d e f e n s e c a p a b i 1 i t i e s w i 1 1 have t o be i n t e n s i f i e d .
1 2 m
sP
OPFOR
does
not to
assets organic
T h e r e a r e t w o p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e OPFOR's
to
represent the
A
all
18
122mm
SP
howitzer
and
18
120mm m o r t a r s . battlefield is
First,
d e n s i t y of more
v e h i c l e s or concern
t a r g e t s on i s the
the
reduced.
important
inability
to portray
formations. indicators
Key
d i s p o s i t i on.
training at of
reconnaissance
elements
t h e NTC n e e d t o b e a w a r e o f
t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g because
t h e i r a b i l i t y t o l o o k deep
5-4
and
area
of
influence.
They
will
see
large
formations
of
uehicles,
b u t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i l l n o t be t o t a l l y a c c u r a t e .
M o t o r r y c l e s t The S o v i e t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company i s a c c u r a t e l y por t r a r e a t t h e NTC by t h e OPFOR w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f Units training at the three this
m ot or c yc es.
shortfal which w i
t h e NTC n e e d t o be aware o f
a n d e s t a b l i a h a u n i t s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e (SOP)
I enhance t h e i r c o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n t o r e a c t t o
motorcycle reconnaissance. Antitank Battery: b a t t e r y which The absence of has nine The OPFOR c a n n o t r e p l i c a t e weapon systems equalling significant the S o v i e t AT 135 m i s s i l e s . in the vaot
this
unit
i s extremely I n any a c t u a l
t h e NTC. t h e AT-5
confrontation,
the 4,000
wi 1 1
degrade
the s t a n d o f f
capabi 1 i t y o f
Units w i l l i n order to
negate
a n d uolume
f i r e s w h i c h a r e n o t r e p l i c a t e d a t t h e NTC.
FauiDmont: T h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s s i m i l i a r i t i e s a n d d i C f e r e n c e s
between the Souiet a n d OPFOR MRRs in equipment representation. a s p e c t s and
Units training at i n t h e l i g h t of
t h e NTC n e e d t o a n a l y z e e q u i p m e n t
a n a l y s i s assess the u a l u e o f
lessons learned f o r
f u t u r e combat o p e r a t i o n s .
5-4,
n o t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a r e made: a. That t h e AT b a t t e r y b e r e p l i c a t e d .
A possible solution
w o u l d b e t o v i s u a l l y m o d i f y t h e HUMMU u e h i c l e .
5-5
b.
OPFOR.
of
t h e M551 S h e r i d a n t a n k ,
f r o m t h e 6-31
n e w l y f o r m e d a r m o r b a t t a l i o n o f t h e 1 7 7 t h AR B r i g a d e . a l l o w t h e 6-31 t h e OPFOR.
I N t o p e r f o r m the dismounted i n f a n t r y m i s s i o n f o r
c.
d.
e.
increased.
f.
T h a t equipment
i m p r o u e m e n t s / m u d i f i c a t i o n s be a p p l i e d t o
t h e VISMOD T-72
a n d BMP f l e e t t o g i v e t h e v e h i c l e s a s e l f - g e n e r a -
p r e p a r i n g t o t r a i n a t t h e NTC.
s-5.
the
CaCCl USION : I n t h e a g g r e g a t e ,
OPFOR and the Soviet
MRR a r e
should
a g a i n s t the background o f
the d i f f e r e n c e s noted.
5-6
in
the
U.S.
when
t h e enemy was
m o s t commonly
those
be
o p p o s e an o t h e r used
and r o l e s would
reversed.
U.S. Army d o c t r i n e a n d t e c h n i q u e s .
The c u r r e n t OPFOR MRR a t t h e NTC i s a q u a n t u m l e a p f o r w a r d trigon. the The OPFOR MRR The a structure OPFOR
MRH
from
closely
the
era
of
the
circle of of
replicates replicates
that that
Soviet Soviet
MRR. to
MRR
greater
the
anything greatest
previously
attempted. to the
Additionally, quality of
contribution
training
Army i s t h e OPFORs
I t i s obvious,
from the d i f f e r e n c e s
icate a
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l and equipment d e f i c i e n c i e s s r i o u s l r a b i l i t y t o p o r t r a y the f u l 1 there combat are two combat power compensating for the
Additionally, be viewed as
factors OPFOR.
multipliers
tactical
e x p e r i e n c e of
t h e OPFOR commanders,
staff,
They a r e f i g h t i n g i n e x c e s s o f 200
t h e i r knowledge of difficult
to
quantifv,
definitely
d e f i c i e n c i e s n o t e d i n equipment and o r g a n i z a t i o n .
5-7
Units preparing to
train
at
t h e NTC n e e d t o m a x i m i z e
Of
the
t r a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t y by K n o w l n g t h e OPFOR.
equal
importance future
is
the
necessity
to
maintain
focus
on
possible
a unit
that
trains at
t h e NTC w i l l
be
b e t t e r p r e p a r e d f o r combat.
5-8
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
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OPFOR M
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I , ,
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ruu-L-1,
Jp
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"New Sou i e t BMP-2 Unue i 1 e d . A r m o r Magaz i n e S t a f f M a a a z i n e , J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 6 , p p . 24-25. Armor Magazine S t a f f . "T-72." December 1 9 8 1 , pp.30-33.
"
Armnr
A r m o r Maaaz i n e , Nouember-
DicK,
P a r t 1."
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M c C a s l i n , J a m e s K. " C o m b a t I n f a n t r y V e h i c l e s (EMF') I n Combat J o u r n a l of t h e U.S. A r m y I n n s t i t u t e f o r A d v a n c e d R u s s i a n and E a s t E u r o p e a n S t u d i e s , 1 9 7 6 . Smith, Perry. " A i r c r a f t S u r u i v a b i 1 i t y Equipment T r a i n e r s . " A v i a t i o n D i a e s t , M a r c h 1 9 8 6 , p p . 3-8.
."
I NI TI A L D I STR I BUT I O N LI ST
1.
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH L I B R A R Y U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER N CAMERON STAT1 O ALEXANDRIA, V I R G I N I A 22314 DR. BRUCE W. MENNING SOVIET STUDIES O F F I C E U . S . ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027
2.
3.
4.
LTC GARRETT R . FONDA COMBINED ARMS T A C T I C S DEPARTMENT U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027
M A J RAYMOND F. ARMENT III COMBINED ARMS T A C T I C S DEPARTMENT U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 COMMANDING GENERAL N A T I O N A L T R A I N I N G CENTER AND FORT I R W I N , FORT I R W I N , C A L I F O R N I A 92310-5000 COMMANDING GENERAL COMBINED ARMS T R A I N I N G A C T I V I T Y FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 CALIFORNIA
9.
6.
7.
Appendix B