Tyre Explosion Investigation - Lightning Strike OTRACO

FINAL REPORT
TO

HAMERSLEY IRON

ON

CATASTROPHIC TYRE INCIDENT ON HAULTRUCK
06H1

AT

CHANNAR ON APRIL 10, 2004

Report compiled by: Tony Cutler, Technical Manager

Report date: 29 June 2004

Hamer sl ey I r on Fi nal Repor t 06H1 I nc i dent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................1
1.1 Otracos experience regarding tyre fires and explosions.....................1
1.2 Acknowledgements ...............................................................................1

2. INCIDENT, FINDING & RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................2
2.1 Incident .................................................................................................2
2.2 Finding ..................................................................................................2
2.3 Recommendations.................................................................................3
2.3.1 General ...........................................................................................3
2.3.2 Prevention.......................................................................................3
2.3.3 Emergency procedure.....................................................................4

3. TYRE EXPLOSION MECHANISMS ........................................................5
3.1 Difference between tyre blow-out and tyre explosion .........................5
3.1.1 Tyre blow-out..................................................................................5
3.1.2 Tyre explosion.................................................................................5
3.2 Improved understanding of tyre explosion mechanisms.....................6

4. INSPECTION OF TRUCK, SITE, TYRES & RIMS .................................8
4.1 Inspection of truck ................................................................................8
4.2 Inspection of site .................................................................................11
4.3 Inspection of exploded tyre.................................................................11
4.4 Inspection of other tyres off truck......................................................15
4.4.1 Charring to liner of position 2 (right front) tyre .........................15
4.5 Inspection of wheel rims.....................................................................16

5. INVESTIGATION PROCESS..................................................................17
5.1 Initial investigation ............................................................................17
5.2 Ongoing investigation.........................................................................17

APPENDICES
Appendix I Dynasphere Lightning Protection System.........................19
Appendix II EM Tyre explosion incidents database.............................21
Appendix III Recommended Emergency Procedure Guidelines ..........30

Hamer sl ey I r on Fi nal Repor t on 06H1 I nc i dent

1. INTRODUCTION
On April 10, 2004 a parked Terex/Unit Rig MT4400 (240T) haultruck was found, after
a lightning storm at Pilbara Irons Hamersley Iron Channar minesite, with a
catastrophically failed outside rear tyre (40.00R57 size) and severe damage to the
truck. The truck had been parked because of the impending lightning activity and the
operator had been taken to a safe area until the storm had passed. No one was injured
in the incident.

Otraco, responsible for tyre management at Pilbara Irons Hamersley Iron and Robe
River sites
1
, has conducted an investigation into the incident. This report chronicles
that investigation, its findings and recommendations.
1.1 Otracos experience regarding tyre fires and explosions
Prior to this incident, Otraco has led the investigations into six incidents involving
earthmover (EM) tyre explosions. Our first investigation was the Tasmanian
Cleveland Tin fatality in 1981, and our most recent the Chilean Radomiro Tomic
fatality in 2000.

As a result of the Cleveland Tin investigation, Otraco established the principal tyre
explosion mechanism (pyrolysis
2
); we have recently, with the technical assistance of
two universities in Chile
3
, established a second, very rare tyre explosion mechanism
(diffusion
4
). In 1987 we organised, together with the Western Australian Mines
Department and Mt Newman Mining Company, the first conference on earthmover
tyre fires and explosions.

Causes of tyre explosions in cases previously examined by us have included the use of
an oxyacetylene torch to loosen corroded wheel nuts, a haultruck having contacted
overhead power-lines, dragging brakes initiating a haultruck tyre fire, and wood
packing material being left inside a haultruck tyre.

Apart from cases that we have personally investigated, Otraco has maintained a
database of tyre fires and explosions that have come to our attention since the early
1980s. Information from these records has assisted us with our investigations, and has
allowed us to better understand tyre explosion mechanisms and to formulate
recommendations related to tyre fires and explosions.
1.2 Acknowledgements
Otraco is grateful to Mr Grant Kirby, Principal of Lightningman Pty Ltd, for providing
technical expertise in relation to lightning strikes.

We also thank personnel from Hamersley Iron, particularly Mr Mike Westerman
(Production Superintendent Paraburdoo/Channar) and Leanne Pearson (Mining
Safety Training Officer Paraburdoo/Channar) for material provided, and
Paraburdoo/Channar based personnel from Terex who supplied valuable information
and technical assistance as well as some of the photographs used in this report.

1
Otraco also manages tyres for the Argyle, Newman, Fimiston, Telfer, Murrin Murrin, Tarmoola, Cadia and
Saraji mines in Australia, Kelian mine in Indonesia, and Escondida and Mina Sur mines in Chile.

2
Pyrolysis is the chemical decomposition of a compound caused by high temperatures.
3
Universidad de Santiago and Universidad de Chile.
4
The diffusion process is based on a difference in the chemical composition of elements present.
1

2. INCIDENT, FINDING & RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 Incident
A Terex/Unit Rig MT4400 (240T) haultruck, unit number 06H1 was parked in an
isolated
5
lay-by on the Channar minesite at approximately 1726 hours on April 10,
2004, because of impending lightning storm activity in the area
6
. The trucks operator
was picked up and taken to a safe area until the storm had passed.

When an operator returned to the truck at approximately 2023 hours (three hours
later), the operator found that the position 3 (left outside rear) tyre had failed
catastrophically and that severe damage had been caused to the truck including
damage to the main hydraulic tank, the operator cabin and to the walk-platform over
the engine. The doors to the electrical cabinet on the walk-platform had been blown
open, and the covers of both rear wheel motors had been blown off and were lying on
the ground. Because of the isolation of the lay-by in which the truck was parked, it
was not known if the truck has been struck by lightning or if some other condition had
caused the catastrophic failure of the tyre.

Subsequently, while the truck was being repaired and undergoing further
examination, damage to electrical wiring and circuitry components was discovered. It
was also found that the inner liner of the failed position 3 tyre had undergone
extensive pyrolysis. The inner liner of the position 2 (right front) tyre had also suffered
pyrolysis, although not as severely as for the position 3 tyre. The position 2 tyre had
not failed.
2.2 Finding
The conclusion of this investigation is that the truck was struck by lightning whilst
parked in the lay-by during the lightning storm and that its position 3 tyre exploded.

The tyre explosion was due to the auto-ignition of an explosive mixture of flammable
gases that had built up inside the air chamber of the tyre following pyrolysis of the
rubber inner liner material lining the air chamber. The pyrolysis was causing by
electrical earthing of the lightning current-flow via the tyre. It is probable that the
tyre exploded simultaneously with, or within seconds of, the lightning strike.

The air-blast from this tyre explosion caused the observed damage to the truck
components.

The electrification of the truck, due to the lightning strike, caused the damage to the
trucks electrical wiring and circuitry.

While the inner liner of the position 2 tyre had also undergone pyrolysis (although not
as severely as for the position 3 tyre) the position 2 tyre did not explode. This was
because one or more of the conditions required for an explosion to occur (adequate
oxygen, an explosive concentration of flammable vapour, a source of ignition, and

5
Far from any offices or other manned facilities.
6
The Channar mine employs Storm Tracker, a lightning detector unit monitored in the mine control room, to
measure the distance of lightning activity from the mine. With the assistance of Storm Tracker, the mine shift
supervisor determines if and when mining equipment should be parked for safety reasons.
2

sufficient molecular energy to sustain the explosive reaction) did not occur in the case
of this tyre.

Channars site policy to park haultrucks and other rubber tyred equipment during
lightning activity was sensible and fortuitous. Without doubt, it avoided certain injury
(and possible death) to the driver of 06H1 in this incident.
2.3 Recommendations
2.3.1 General
The exploded tyre, off position 3 of 06H1, should be scrapped.
The position 2 tyre, which did not fail but whose inner liner has suffered
partial pyrolysis, should be returned to service on a rear position. Otraco will
monitor the tyre in service:
a) to determine whether it loses inflation pressure at an unacceptable rate
(the main function of the inner liner is to prevent excessive permeation
of the inflation air into the tyres carcass), and
b) for any indication of subsequent carcass separation.
Should there be any significant problem in either area, Otraco would
subsequently recommend whether the tyre should be permanently removed
from service.
All other tyres and rim components off 06H1 may be returned to service.
2.3.2 Prevention
Channars policy to monitor lightning activity and to park mining equipment
and remove operators to a safe area if lightning activity approaches the mine
has proven, through this incident, to be a prudent procedure. We recommend
that it be continued.
Consideration should be given to parking trucks in an area (eg. close to the
mine office) that could be readily monitored for lightning strike.
Consideration should also be given to the installation of a system that renders
an area safe from lightning strike, eg. Dynasphere System or similar, as is
installed in the Alpha 16 ROM pad area
7
at Pilbara Irons Robe River
Pannawonica operation (refer Appendix I).
It would be very useful to have a system that could detect whether a unit of
equipment (or a particular area of the minesite) has been struck by lightning
in the event, for example, of a parked and unoccupied haultruck being struck
by lightning creating the danger of a tyre explosion at some time after the
lightning strike
8
(eg. after the driver has returned to the truck). Otraco
understands
9
, however, that no such detection device is commercially available.

7
At Pannawonica, five terminals, each fitted to a 22 metre high pole, are installed at the ROM area providing a
lightning safe zone of approximately 55 metres effective radius per terminal. Lightningman Pty Ltd (phone:
+61-(0)8-9316 1902), who provided lightning related expertise for this investigation, can supply further details.
8
From Otracos records of lightning strikes and tyre explosions, this scenario appears to be unlikely because
reports indicate that almost always (if not in all cases to date) tyre explosions have occurred simultaneously
with or within seconds of the lightning strike, rather than several minutes to several hours later, as usually
occurs with other heat/energy-initiated tyre explosions, such as those caused by power-line contact, truck or
tyre fire, oxyacetylene heating of wheel components, etc. However the possibility of a delayed tyre explosion
following a lightning strike cannot be ruled out.
9
As advised by Lightningman Pty Ltd.
3

2.3.3 Emergency procedure
Otraco has recently revised its recommended general emergency procedure
guidelines covering incidents of Truck/Tyre Fire and Truck Electrification. A
copy of the revised guideline is attached as Appendix III.
In the event of a suspected truck electrification or tyre explosion, all relevant
data, including photographs, should be collected immediately to assist in the
incident investigation and to further the industrys knowledge regarding tyre
explosion mechanisms.

4

3. TYRE EXPLOSION MECHANISMS
3.1 Difference between tyre blow-out and tyre explosion
A tyre blow-out (also referred to as a tyre impact or tyre burst) is totally different from
a tyre explosion. This difference is often not adequately understood in the mining
industry.
3.1.1 Tyre blow-out
A tyre blow-out results when the casing/carcass of the tyre cannot hold the inflation
pressure (typically 100 psi to 150 psi for large haultruck radial tyres during operation)
contained within the tyre. This usually occurs when the tyre casing is weakened due
to an operational injury (eg. running over a rock) or due to a manufacturing defect.
While a tyre blow-out usually occurs when a truck is in motion, it can, rarely, occur
when the truck is stationary.
3.1.2 Tyre explosion
A tyre explosion is a chemical explosion involving energy many orders of magnitude
greater than that of a tyre blow-out. A shock wave creating pressures typically in
excess of 1,000 psi is what causes the tyre to rupture in a tyre explosion. While a tyre
explosion may occur when the truck is in motion or stationary, most explosions have
occurred on stationary trucks.
3.1.2.1 Pyrolysis related tyre explosion
The most common cause of tyre explosion involves pyrolysis of a section of rubber
compound (usually the inner liner of the tyre that lines the tyres inflation chamber)
due to a heat/energy source. The most common heat/energy sources arise from:
equipment contact with high voltage overhead power-lines,
equipment or tyre fires,
application of heat to wheel components (eg. using an oxyacetylene torch to
loosen corroded wheel nuts), and
lightning strike.

Pyrolysis of rubber can produce flammable gases (eg. styrene and butadiene). An
explosion will occur if the following conditions exist concurrently:
there is an explosive concentration of flammable gases
10
,
there is an adequate concentration of oxygen to support combustion of these
gases,
there is an ignition source, and
there is sufficient molecular energy to sustain the explosive reaction.

If the other three conditions exist, then the flammable gases will explode if there is a
hot-spot of sufficient temperature to auto-ignite the gas mixture. A flame or spark is
not required if the hot-spot temperature exceeds the auto-ignition temperature of the
gas mixture.

10
All ignitable gases/vapours have Lower Explosive Limit (LEL), also referred to as a Lower Flammable Limit
(LFL) although these terms are not equivalent in the strictest sense below which the ratio of gas/vapour to
oxygen is too low for combustion to occur (the lower explosive limit of styrene is 0.9% by volume). Most (but
not all) ignitable gases/vapours also have an upper limit of concentration (UEL or UFL) beyond which ignition
also will not occur. Above this concentration, the mixture is too rich to burn.
5

3.1.2.2 Diffusion related tyre explosion
Tyre explosions have also been known to occur without the involvement of pyrolysis of
rubber in the tyre. This second process is called diffusion. At least one tyre explosion is
known to have been caused by leaving a large amount of packing wood inside a
haultruck tyre. Wood gives off methanol (wood-alcohol) in the tyres inflation chamber
by a process of diffusion. The abrasion between the wood and tyre inner liner during
operation of the tyre adds small particles of carbon and rubber to the methanol gas,
which can increase the volatility of the mixture. Methanol vapour is 11% more dense
than air so it will collect at the bottom of the tyre, increasing its concentration; the
explosion vapour range of methanol vapour is 6% (LEL) to 36.5% (UEL) by volume.
This mixture, under the pressure conditions of eight atmospheres (120 psi) inside the
tyres inflation chamber, requires a temperature of less than 65 degrees Celsius (which
is within the normal temperature range of the inflation chamber of the tyre during its
normal operation) to auto-ignite.
3.2 Improved understanding of tyre explosion mechanisms
Otraco has investigated, in detail, six previous incidents involving EM tyre explosions.
However this investigation has been the first involving lightning strike.

The results of this investigation have added considerably to our knowledge of the
mechanics of tyre explosions particularly in the case of lightning strike, which is
among the four most common causes of EM tyre explosions (along with power-line
contact, truck/tyre fire and the application of heat to rim or wheel components).

Most tyre explosions involving the application of heat or energy, apart from lightning
strike, occur several minutes to several hours after initial application of the energy,
whereas there are documented cases of lightning strike initiated tyre explosions
having occurred at the instant of the lightning strike.

The large area of inner liner that suffered pyrolysis in the exploded tyre on haultruck
06H1 provides the probable reason for this. In most (non-lightning) events only a
small area of inner liner (immediately adjacent to the heat source) undergoes
pyrolysis; hence a significant period of time is required to build up an explosive
concentration of flammable gas from this pyrolysis. In the case of lightning strike,
enormous amounts of energy may be involved (typically millions of volts and
thousands of amperes of electrical current
11
) which can cause instantaneous pyrolysis
of a large portion of the inner liner of a tyre producing the required concentration of
explosive gas and a simultaneous explosion.

For a detailed explanation of the pyrolysis tyre explosion mechanism, we refer the
reader to Otracos April 1990 report to Argyle Diamond Mines (ADM) concerning the
explosion of a tyre on a 150T haultruck following contact of the truck with overhead
power lines
12
.

11
The National Lightning Safety Institute (NLSI), an international organisation dedicated to providing lightning
safety information to the public, notes that lightnings characteristics include current levels approaching 400
kA with the 50% average being about 25 kA, temperatures to 15,000 C, and voltages in the hundreds of
millions.
12
The ADM report is available from Otraco. General release of this report was authorised by Argyle Diamond
Mines Pty Ltd in 1990 in the interests of safety and the dissemination of information relating to tyre explosions
and their causes.
6

Otracos September 2000 report to Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile (Codelco)
concerning the explosion of a tyre on a 240T haultruck details the diffusion tyre
explosion mechanism
13
.

13
The Codelco report is not yet available for general release.
7

4. INSPECTION OF TRUCK, SITE, TYRES & RIMS
4.1 Inspection of truck
Terex/Unit Rig MT4400 unit number 06H1 was found in the condition shown in
photos 1 to 5, when an operator returned to the truck at approximately 2023 hours on
April 10, 2004 after the lightning storm.

The position 3 (left outside rear) tyre had failed catastrophically at that stage it was
uncertain whether the tyre had blown-out or exploded
14
. Both wheel motor covers, on
the position 3 (outside left) and position 6 (outside right) rear tyres had been blown
out of their retaining clips and were lying on the ground beside the respective tyres.

Photo 1 Truck 06H1 immediately after the incident was discovered (note blown-off
left wheel cover, blown-out headlights & piece of ruptured tyre in foreground)

There was severe damage to the truck. The hydraulic tank positioned vertically
immediately in front of the left rear tyres had been badly deformed. The drivers cabin
was badly damaged, including the windscreen and rear windows having been
deformed/blown-outwards. The walk-platform covering the engine had been deformed.
The electrical cabinet on the walk-platform was deformed and the doors had been
blown
15
open. All of this damage appears to have been caused by the air/shock-blast
from the ruptured tyre; there was no evidence of pieces of ruptured tyre (small pieces
were spread about the site) having caused this damage through direct contact with the
damaged truck parts.

14
A tyre explosion is totally different from a tyre blow-out (also termed an impact or a burst) discussed in
Section 3 of this report.
15
It is possible that this occurred due to a reduction in air pressure (as is often associated with explosions or
similar catastrophic discharges) outside the electrical cabinet, rather than due to an increase in air pressure
inside the cabinet. The same pressure differential scenario may have applied in relation to the drivers cabin.
8

As far as Otraco is aware, no obvious point of lightning strike to the truck was noticed
t the time of discovery of the incident.

a

Photo 2 Exploded position 3, left outside rear tyre (note torn mud-flap in foreground)

Photo 3

Damaged hydraulic tank & blown-off left wheel cover (the right side wheel
cover was also blown off)

9

Photo 4 Damaged drivers cabin (note outwardly deformed windscreen & rear window)

Photo 5 Buckled walk-platform (note blown-open doors on electrical cabinet)

After the truck had been transferred to the Paraburdoo haultruck workshop for repair,
Terex personnel discovered heat damage to electrical wiring and faulty circuitry
components. This damage was, according to the Terex personnel, consistent with an
external source of electrification.

10

The point or area of lightning contact to the truck was never identified
16
.
4.2 Inspection of site
An inspection of the site of the incident produced large quantities of small pieces of
inner liner that had been expelled from the rupture zone of the tyre. All of these inner
liner particles had suffered heat decomposition.

Otraco found some pieces of tyre 50 metres or so from where the tyre exploded. We
were advised that particles had been found, immediately after the incident, up to 100
metres from the tyre.
4.3 Inspection of exploded tyre
The exploded tyre, that was fitted to position 3 (left outside rear) of truck 06H1 was a
Michelin 40.00R57 XDR (E4 rock lug tread pattern) Type B4 (standard tread
compound) tubeless tyre
17
.

Details of the tyre are:
Serial number: ZVI9164T9A
Remaining tread depth 56/61mm (approximately 40% worn)
Tyre life at time of failure: 60,807 km (5,191 hr)

What was particularly interesting, following close examination of the inner liner of
this tyre, was that while most of the inner liner exhibited signs of heat degradation,
there was a distinct elliptical shaped section of inner liner that showed no sign of heat
damage whatsoever. This elliptical section was approximately 2 metres long (in line
with the centre tread of the tyre) and 1.2 metres wide (from one sidewall to the other).
It was located in that section of the tyre that formed the bottom of the tyre at the
time of the tyres explosion. Liquid sealant is used to minimise air loss and to reduce
rim corrosion in all haultruck tyres on site (approximately 80 litres is used for a
40.00R57 tyre), and this sealant would have covered an elliptical section (of
approximately the dimensions noted above) of inner liner at the bottom of the tyre. It
appears that the sealant protected the area of inner liner that it was covering in the
stationary tyre prior to the explosion from the heat degradation (pyrolysis) suffered
by the rest of the inner liner of the tyre, as shown in figure 1. There was also a pre-
existing separation in the tyres casing; this separation was not related to the
explosion.

Pre-existing casing separation

Front of truck

Figure 1 Elliptical zone (yellow) of inner liner, at bottom of tyre, unaffected by heat degradation

16
As discussed in Section 5 of the report, this phenomenon is not unique to this incident.
17
Bridgestone tyres were fitted to the two front positions and Michelin tyres to the four rear positions.
11

Photos 6 to 11 show the exploded tyre and sections of inner liner cut from it. Photo 6
shows the point of rupture at the site of the pre-existing casing separation.

Photo 6 Position 3 (exploded) tyre: Exterior view showing point of rupture

Photo 7 shows the view of this separation/rupture point from inside the tyres air
chamber. The ruptured steel casing cords are visible.

Photo 7 Position 3 tyre: Interior view showing point of rupture at the pre-existing
casing separation

12

Photo 8 shows the outline (marked with chalk) of the elliptical shaped area of inner
liner that was at the base of the tyre (at the time of the tyre explosion) and hence
protected from pyrolysis by the liquid sealant in the tyre.

Photo 8 Position 3 tyre: Chalk line delineating elliptical zone of sealant protected
inner liner (no pyrolysis) & zone of pyrolysis (outside the ellipse)

Photo 9 shows areas from which sections of inner liner were cut for more detailed
examination.

Photo 9 Position 3 tyre: Sections of inner liner removed at the pyrolysis/no pyrolysis interface

13

Photo 10 shows two sections of inner liner one cut from the zone of pyrolysis outside
the elliptical zone protected by the sealant, and the other cut from the protected (non-
pyrolysis zone) within the elliptically shaped area.

Photo 10 Position 3 tyre: Inner liner from zones of pyrolysis (left) & non-pyrolysis (right)

Photo 11 shows a single section of inner liner that covers the interface between the
zones of pyrolysis and non-pyrolysis inside the tyre.

Photo 11 Position 3 tyre: Inner liner showing areas of non-pyrolysis (left) & pyrolysis (right)

14

The elliptical area of inner liner that had not undergone pyrolysis was intact;
the ruptured area of the tyre was totally contained within the zone of pyrolysis.
4.4 Inspection of other tyres off truck
Apart from inspecting the exploded position 3 tyre, Otraco removed, stripped and
inspected the five other tyres. Sections of the inner liner of the position 2 (right front)
tyre had also suffered pyrolysis. The four remaining tyres showed no signs of
pyrolysis, heat or other relevant damage.
4.4.1 Charring to liner of position 2 (right front) tyre
The position 2 (right front) tyre had suffered partial pyrolysis of its inner liner;
however it had not exploded
18
. This tyre was a Bridgestone 46/90R57 VRDPz (E4 rock
lug tread pattern) E1A (standard tread compound) tubeless tyre.

Details of the tyre are:
Serial number: S3R002154
Remaining tread depth 69/76mm (approximately 21% worn)
Tyre life at time of incident: 16,782 km (1,327 hr)

Photos 12 and 13 show the inner liner of the position 2 tyre.

Photo 12 Position 2 (partially pyrolised but unexploded) tyre: Inner liner showing
finger marks through carbonised rubber residue

18
It is common in cases of truck electrification, through either lightning strike or contact with overhead
powerlines, for a tyre or tyres to suffer some pyrolysis of the inner liner but not explode (even though one or
more other tyres on the truck may have exploded). In the case of the unexploded tyres it is most probable that
one or other of the conditions of an explosive concentration of gases or of an ignition source (eg. a hot spot of
sufficient temperature) have not occurred concurrently.
15

Photo 13 Position 2 tyre: Inner liner close-up showing signs of pyrolysis

4.5 Inspection of wheel rims
There was no significant damage to any of truck 06H1s six wheel rims.
16

5. INVESTIGATION PROCESS
5.1 Initial investigation
Otracos initial investigation, and that conducted by another party, suggested that the
position 3 tyre had ruptured due to a blow-out rather than due to a tyre explosion.

The main reason for this, despite the incident having occurred during a lightning
storm and the considerable damage to the truck, was that the tyre had ruptured in the
area of a significant pre-existing casing separation (approaching a metre in length).
The condition of the inner liner of the tyre, which appeared burnt and powdery, was
deemed to have been caused most probably from operational conditions (eg. heat from
the braking system, etc).
5.2 Ongoing investigation
However Otracos ongoing investigation uncovered evidence that conclusively points to
a tyre explosion. The reason that the tyre had ruptured at the area of the pre-existing
casing separation was because this was the weakest point of the tyre
19
, and hence the
natural point of rupture.

The following observations are relevant:
The inner liner of the position 3 (exploded) tyre was burnt (had undergone
pyrolysis) over its whole surface apart from an elliptical area, of approximately
2 metres by 1.2 metres centred circumferentially along the centre tread section
of the tyre. The inner liner material within this elliptical shape exhibited
normal inner liner physical appearance and texture. It was located precisely in
the area of the tyre that comprised the tyres footprint at the time of the
explosion
20
. The tyre had liquid sealant in it
21
, which was expelled from the
tyre as it exploded and was splattered widely over the trucks chassis and
components. The sealant apparently protected this elliptical section of inner
liner in the footprint area of the tyre from pyrolysis.
Sections of the inner liner of the position 2 (right front) tyre had also undergone
pyrolysis (although not to the same extent as for the exploded tyre); however
the position 2 tyre had not exploded.
The four other tyres on the truck appeared in a normal condition for
operating tyres; their inner liners showed no sign of degradation, apart from
what would normally be expected in an operating tyre.
During repairs to the drivers cabin, heat damaged wiring was discovered that
was consistent with the truck having been electrified from an external source.
There was also damage to circuitry in the trucks electrical cabinet.

In every case, known to Otraco, of an earthmover tyre explosion following mining
equipment electrification (whether by contact with high voltage overhead power-lines
or through lightning strike) the exploded tyre has shown signs of pyrolysis of its inner

19
Where there is no pre-existing damage/weakness, a tyre explosion usually results in shoulder section
rupture(s) generally to both shoulders directly opposite to (180 degrees in circumference from) the point of
initiation of the explosion; i.e. the shock waves initiate from the ignition zone, travel in opposite directions
around the circumference of the tyres inflation chamber, and meet opposite the ignition zone rupturing the
shoulder areas of the tyre.
20
This was readily determined based on the known orientation of the tyre at the time of the incident.
21
The standard amount of sealant used in a 40.00R57 tyre is 80 litres.
17

liner. In some cases only one tyre has exploded; in other cases more than one has
exploded. It is common for unexploded tyres to show signs of inner liner pyrolysis; it is
also common for some unexploded tyres to show pyrolysis while other unexploded
tyres on the same truck show no signs of pyrolysis or any other indications of having
high voltage/current earth via them.

In cases investigated or recorded by Otraco of electrical current from an external
source grounding to earth via an earthmover tyre, we have noted the following:
The electric current usually passes over the surface of the tyre (whether this be
the exterior surface, eg. the tyres sidewall; or the interior surface, i.e. the inner
liner) rather than through and along the internal casing structure of the tyre
whether it be the steel-cord/rubber casing material of a radial tyre or the nylon-
cord/rubber casing material of a bias ply tyre.
In cases where the current passes over the surface of the inner liner it appears
then to transverse the casing from the inner liner to the tread surface, and
earth at the tyres contact zone on the ground.
In these cases there is often a small earthing mark (sometimes as small as a
centimetre in diameter or less) visible on the inner liner at the point where the
current passed from the inner liner, through the thickness of the tyres casing
and tread, to ground. However there is often no indicator mark on the tread of
the tyre where the current exits to ground.

While the number of earthmover tyre related electrification cases examined by Otraco
has been small in absolute terms, our observation that electrical current, particularly
from lightning strikes, tends to earth via the surface of a material rather than through
its internal structure appears to a commonly observed phenomenon in the case of
materials that are generally regarded as being poor electrical conductors (such as
tyres).

Lightning strikes may or may not cause noticeable damage at the point of contact with
a vehicle. In the case of a lightning strike to a haultruck at the Pannawonica mine in
January 2001, the point of strike (the position 6, right outside rear, wheel rim) was
evidenced solely by a burn mark that could be wiped away by hand, leaving no
permanent visible damage.

We found no clear evidence of the point/area of the lightning strike to truck 06H1;
however, given that there was considerable rainfall at the time of the incident, any
evidence could have been obliterated, consistent with the Pannawonica case (and other
documented lightning strike incidents worldwide).

18
Hamer sl ey I r on Appendi x I

Appendix I Dynasphere Lightning Protection System
Robe River has a Dynasphere Lightning Protection system installed at the
Pannawonica Alpha 16 ROM pad. The system comprises five air-terminals, each
installed on a 22 metre high freestanding pole (refer photo 14). The overall protection
zone afforded by the five air-terminals is shown in figure 2.

Two of the five air-terminal poles

Photo 14 Two of the five Dynasphere Air-Terminal poles used at Pannawonica
Alpha 16 ROM pad

Figure 2 Lightning protection zone (within red circles) afforded by the five air-terminals
19
Hamer sl ey I r on Appendi x I

Thunderstorms are an almost daily event during summer at Pannawonica, and the
Dynasphere system protects most of the Alpha 16 ROM pad against lightning strike
(the ROM pad is elevated and hence particularly exposed).
This allows ROM operations to continue safely during lightning storms. Alternatively,
equipment operators can park within the protected zone of the ROM pad if it is thought
to be too dangerous to leave this area.

20
Hamer sl ey I r on Appendi x I I

Appendix II EM Tyre explosion incidents database
This list of EM tyre explosions is by no means comprehensive. Numerous other EM tire
explosions have almost certainly occurred. The list represents incidents for which
Otraco has received confirmation of at least some of the factors responsible for the
explosion and of the consequences of the explosion.

Cleveland Mine, Tasmania, Australia
Year: 1981
Tire: Michelin 26.5R25 radial tire
Position: not applicable (wheel not attached to truck)
Truck: Wigtruck underground haultruck
Source: Oxy-acetylene heat applied to rim

Events
The tire exploded approximately 10 minutes after heat was applied to frozen wheel
nuts using an oxyacetylene torch. The fitter applying heat was killed
instantaneously; another was seriously injured.
Otraco conducted an investigation at the request of the mine. It was established
that heat being applied to the wheel nuts was transmitted via the rim to the bead of
the tire causing pyrolysis of a section of the tire's liner near the bead. The released
gases exploded a short time later (estimated at around 10 minutes after heating
started).
The tire was ruptured circumferentially around a 90 arc on one shoulder just
below the line of the breaker belts. The rupture occurred diametrically opposite the
zone of pyrolized liner.
Subsequent chemical analysis of the liner rubber established that pyrolysis
commences at about 250C releasing an explosive mixture of styrene and butadiene
vapours which auto-ignites at approximately 430C. Only 20gm of liner material
would have needed to pyrolyze to yield an explosion pressure equal to the burst
pressure of the tire (350psi).

Intercor Mine, Colombia, South America
Year: 1986
Tire: 36.00x51
Position: Not known
Truck: Wabco 170C
Source: A wheel fire initiated by a brake problem

Events
The tire fire was initiated by a brake problem. The truck was driven into the
maintenance area with the wheel on fire and was allowed to continue burning for
20 to 30 minutes before extinguishment. The outside of the tire was reported to be
cool enough to touch when the tire exploded some 30 to 35 minutes after the fire
had been extinguished.

Three people were killed.

21

Drayton Mine, NSW, Australia
Year: 1986
Position: 1, Left front
Truck: Komatsu HD1200M haultruck
Source: Contact with 33kv overhead power lines

Events
The tire exploded approximately 10 minutes after the truck contacted a 33kv
overhead power line. The truck had tipped its load under a 33kv power line
touching the line. The truck earthed via the left front tire, starting a grass fire. The
driver, who was unaware that his truck had contacted the line, drove back to the
loading point two kilometres away. As he applied his brakes at the loading area,
the tire exploded.

The explosion tore off the truck's access ladder and air cleaner, throwing these
items 175-200 metres. The truck cabin door was bulged and the windows blown out.
The driver was not hurt.

The tire was ruptured in a similar manner to the Tasmanian tire, except that it
burst on both shoulders. The rupture occurred through about 90 of arc opposite the
area in the crown of the liner where pyrolysis had occurred.

Otraco postulated that electrical earthing occurred through the rim across to the
steel bead, via the steel body cords to the crown area corresponding with the ground
contact patch, and then through the tread rubber to earth. Michelin, at the 1987
Tire Fire and Explosion Seminar conducted by Otraco, WA Mines Department and
Mt Newman Mining, suggested that the current path was probably from the rim
through the tire liner and then through the casing and tread to earth.

Kalgoorlie, WA, Australia
Year: 1987
Tire: 37.25x35
Position: Not known
Equip: Cat 637 scraper
Source: A tire fire caused by diesel spillage

Events
The tire exploded after a diesel spillage caught fire. A man who attempted to put
the fire out was injured.

Ipswich, Qld, Australia
Year: 1987
Tire: 27.00R49 radial tire
Position: Not known
Truck: Cat 777 haultruck
Source: Lightning strike

Events
The tire exploded after lightning struck the truck.

22

Leigh Creek Mine, SA, Australia
Year: 1987
Tire: Bridgestone 36.00-51 bias ply tire
Position: 4, Left inside rear
Truck: Terex 33-11 haultruck
Source: Not established (possibly internal heating due to tire separation)

Events
The tire exploded after the truck had been parked up for 3.25 hours. The truck had
worked the previous shift.

Within 10 minutes of the tire exploding, it caught fire. The fire could not be
extinguished and the truck was completely gutted. The remaining tires burnt out
but did not explode. Tire fragments were thrown distances of up to 200 metres. No
one was injured.

After the examination of numerous possible causes, ETSA (the mine operator)
concluded that carbon dust on the tire's liner may have undergone slow combustion
due to a combination of high ambient temperature and localised heating at the site
of a cut or ply separation. The combination of rubber pyrolysis and sufficient heat
led to the explosion.

Newman Mine, WA, Australia
Year: 1987
Tire: Bridgestone 36.00-51 bias ply tire
Position: 3, Left outside rear
Truck: Dresser (Wabco) 190T haultruck
Source: Apparent misuse of service brake combined with broken park brake line

Events
The tire exploded after catching fire due to a dragging brake. The fire was fuelled
by escaping hydraulic oil. The left wheel motor caught fire. The driver stopped and
evacuated the truck but did not shut it down. The fire quickly spread to the left
front and left outside rear tires. The left outside rear tire subsequently exploded.

The force of the explosion blew the outer flange off the rim. Tire fragments were
hurled distances of up to 100 metres. The exploded tire was largely destroyed by
fire. No one was injured in the explosion.

Bougainville Mine, Papua New Guinea
Year: Several incidents involving tyre explosions occurred pre-1989
Tires: 36.00x51s
Position: Various
Truck: Euclid R170 haultrucks
Source: At least one incident involved a tyre fire resulting in a tyre explosion

Events
There were several tyre explosions on Euclid R170 haultrucks, one of which
resulted in a fatality. In at least one case the truck tyres had been inflated with
nitrogen (it is probable that either air had been inadequately flushed from the tyre
during inflation with the nitrogen, or air was subsequently added to the tyre such
23

that the oxygen concentration was greater than the 5.5% by volume limit necessary
to support combustion or an explosion).

Pine Creek Mine, NT, Australia
Year: 1989

Events
According to eyewitnesses, the tire exploded at the same instant that the truck was
struck by lightning. The tire was reportedly propelled 45 metres from the truck.
The bead seat band was thrown 40 metres hitting a Bobcat loader causing sufficient
damage to the loader that it was subsequently scrapped. The lock ring was thrown
70 metres imbedding itself in the wall of a transportable hut.

A section of liner, reportedly 90 from the area where the tire ruptured, was
pyrolyzed. The bead bundle of the exploded tire was completely severed at the point
of rupture. There was no visible damage to the tread of the tire, however the
undertread belts were subsequently found to be separated for 60% of the tires
circumference.

Inspection showed that two other tires, the right front and the right outside rear,
had also suffered pyrolysis of the inner liner.

Argyle Mine, WA, Australia (refer photo 15)
Year: 1989

Events
The haultruck was carting material from the mine area to a rehabilitation area.
While pulling away from the tip point with its body up, the truck contacted 33kv
overhead power lines. The driver braked to a stop and was advised to remain in the
cabin because the truck was still in contact with the power lines. The position 1
(front left) tyre exploded approximately 12 minutes after initial contact with the
power lines. The tyre was projected off its rim and through a steel mesh fence
bordering the road. It landed 7 metres from the truck. Rim components (lock ring,
bead seat band and outer flange) were hurled distances of up to 40 metres from the
truck. A section of tyre weighing several kilograms was thrown over 100 metres
hitting a transportable hut. The truck was considerably damaged by the explosion.

The truck driver, who was sitting in the truck cabin at the time of the explosion,
was cut by broken glass. Fortunately, the air blast from the explosion was directly
mainly in a sideways direction out from the tyre and not in an upwards direction
towards the drivers cabin. Three observers were shaken by the explosion.

24

Mt Pleasant Mine, WA, Australia
Year: 1990
Tire: Bridgestone 24.00R49 radial tire
Position: 5, Right inside rear
Truck: Not known

Events
The tire exploded 8 minutes after the truck had contacted 33kv overhead power
lines.

The tire was severely damaged by the explosion rendering little evidence of the
precise failure mechanism, viz. arcing or pyrolysis. However the two tires on the
left rear showed signs of arcing a hole on the liner, but neither pyrolysis of the
liner nor any visible evidence of arcing of the external tread.

Nottingham, England
Year: 1990
Tire: Not known
Position: Not known
Equip: Not known, thought to be a front end loader
Source: Oxy-acetylene heat applied to wheel brakes

Events
The tire exploded while workmen were using oxy-acetylene cutting equipment on
the brakes of the machine in an engineering factory.
The blast tore the roof off a nearby building.

Two men were killed instantaneously; a third died shortly afterwards. Other
workers further away were hurled to the ground but escaped serious injury.

Candelaria Mine, Chile, South America
Year: 1999
Equip: Dresser 685 haultruck
Source: Thought to result from an internal separation of the tire

Events
The tire exploded rupturing both shoulders of the tire. The tire caught fire after the
explosion. No major damage was reported to either the haultruck or the wheel rim.

The tire had been checked half an hour before the explosion. Both this tire and its
mate had been found to be seriously under-inflated; both had been reinflated to the
correct operating pressure before the explosion.

No injuries were reported to either the driver or any persons within the immediate
area.

Alumbrera Mine, Argentina, South America
Year: 1999
Position: Not known
25

Equip: Cat 793 haultruck
Source: Contact with overhead powerlines

Events
Tire exploded after the truck contacted overhead powerlines. No-one is believed to
have been injured.

Radomiro Tomic Mine, Chile, South America (refer photo 16)
Year: 2000
Source: Packing wood left in tyre

Events
The position 1 (left front) tyre exploded as the truck was braking at a waste dump.
The air-blast from the explosion crushed the drivers cabin, killing the driver.

Freeport Mine, Irian Jaya, Indonesia (refer photo 17)
Year: 2002
Tire: Bridgestone 50/90R57 radial tire
Position: 5, Right inside rear and Position 6, Right outside rear
Equip: Komatsu 930E-I haultruck
Source: Contact with high voltage overhead power lines

Events
The truck was dumping underneath high voltage power lines when the truck body
contacted the power lines. The right rear tyres exploded consecutively
approximately one minute after contact with the power lines; tyre sections were
expelled up to 20 metres from the truck. The front right tyre caught fire.

The truck driver, hearing the explosions, evacuated his truck immediately and was
not injured.

Peak Downs Mine, QLD, Australia (refer photo 18)
Year: 2003
Source: Failed wheel hub resulting in truck fire

Events
The truck caught fire following a position 5 (right inside rear) hub failure causing
the position 5 wheel to become loose. The wheel rubbed on the chassis and other
brackets causing heat. The wheel severed the brake cooling line bringing oil in
contact with hot surfaces causing ignition. The operator felt a vibration. When he
pulled up he noticed flames. He operated the fire suppression and exited the truck.
The emergency squad attended the scene. During the fire, the position one tyre
exploded, blowing the hub off. The wheel hub flew a considerable distance landing
on a lower bench.

No one was injured.
26

Yandicoogina Mine, WA, Australia (refer photo 19)
Year: 2003
Position: 1, Left front and Position 2 Right front
Source: Burst diesel fuel line

Events
A diesel fuel line apparently burst spraying fuel onto a turbo-charger causing a
truck fire that then spread to the tyres, resulting in both front tyres exploding. The
explosions caused serious damage the position 1 tyre explosion caused the driver
side ladder to be blown back up the front of the truck and the position 2 tyre
explosion blew this wheel assembly completely off the truck, landing a considerable
distance away. The truck was subsequently burnt to the ground.

No one was injured.

Channar Mine, WA, Australia (refer photo 20)
Year: 2004
Equip: Terex/Unit Rig MT4400 haultruck

Events
The haultruck was parked due to an impending lightning storm. When an operator
returned to the truck three hours later, the position 3 tyre was discovered to have
exploded causing severe damage to the truck.

No one was injured.

Other incidents
There have been reports of EM tyre explosions in Zambia and Canada although little
information is available regarding these incidents. There have almost certainly been
EM tyre explosions in other countries with a significant mining industry (notably the
USA) however no specific incidents have come to Otracos notice.

Lack of safety awareness
In some of the cases documented above, people have attempted to fight truck or tyre
fires using portable extinguishers or have inspected trucks immediately following
contact with overhead power lines totally unaware of the potential for a delayed tyre
explosion.

The two worst incidents (each involving three fatalities) followed:
a) In one case, deliberate application of heat to wheel brakes while a tyre
was still fitted to the wheel. Note that deflating the tyre, prior to applying
heat to the wheel, would not have avoided the tyre explosion.
b) In the other case, people standing around a tyre that had been
extinguished and which subsequently exploded some 35 minutes after
extinguishment of the tyre fire.

27

Photo 15 Argyle Mine 1989

Photo 16 Radomiro Tomic Mine 2000

Photo 17 Freeport Mine 2002

28

Photo 18 Peak Downs Mine 2003

Photo 19 Yandicoogina Mine 2003

Photo 20 Channar Mine 2004
29
Hamer sl ey I r on Appendi x I I I

Appendix III Recommended Emergency Procedure
Guidelines

Introduction
Haultruck tyre fires and explosions are becoming more common worldwide
probably due to a general industry push for increased productivity and the
growing population of bigger trucks and tyres (tyres tend to approach their
operating limit more quickly in large truck applications). Certainly bigger tyres
create the potential for larger, more dangerous explosions.

The industry standard haultruck electrification and tyre fire emergency
procedure, upon which many site specific procedures are based, was developed by
Otraco in the late 1980s. Major changes are required to it to take account of the
industrys updated knowledge of tyre explosions; these changes have been
included in the revised emergency procedure shown over-page.

Procedures in place on some minesites, and pressure relief valve products
currently being marketed, demonstrate a dangerous lack of understanding of tyre
explosion mechanisms (eg. deflating a tyre does not remove the risk of explosion).
This, together with experience of typical operator reactions to haultruck
electrifications and truck or tyre fires, and the lessons learnt from a recent
fatality, has prompted Otracos review of the procedure.

There is no point in having a procedure that does not take account of human
nature and what actually happens on most minesites. It is also important to
incorporate improved understanding and knowledge gained from the plethora of
tyre explosion incidents, many that have resulted in fatalities, over the past few
years. For example, if the driver of an affected truck can evacuate his or her
truck quickly (generally within five minutes of the initiating incident occurring,
eg. contact with overhead power lines) he or she is likely to be able to have
cleared the hazard area before a tyre explosion occurs. The longer a driver stays
on the truck, the greater the risk of being injured.

The following procedure should be taken as a guideline only in formulating the
specific emergency procedure for any minesite. A risk analysis should be
conducted for the particular minesite and a specific procedure should be produced
for the minesite in light of that risk analysis. It is equally important that
everyone working on the minesite is inducted in the procedure, and that regular
refresher courses and training exercises are conducted.
30

January 23, 2004

Recommended Guidelines for
Truck Electrification and Tyre Fire Emergency Procedure

1. Warning
A tyre can explode at any moment after the application of heat to the tyre or
rim, eg. through truck electrification or tyre fire.

Deflating a tyre, including the use of a pressure relief-valve device, does not
remove the risk of a tyre explosion.

2. Truck Driver
Upon becoming aware of truck electrification (eg. from lightning, power lines
etc.) or a tyre fire, the driver should:

a. Advise Mine Control, for example:
State "Emergency; Emergency; Emergency",
Identify yourself with your call sign and name, and state your
location,
State the nature of emergency (eg. tray in contact with power
line).

b. Park the truck quickly, if possible in an area where it has the least
exposure to manned facilities or passing traffic, so that:
The truck is clear of any power lines with which it came into
contact,
There is an evacuation path in front of the truck,
If possible, a water truck will have easy access to any wheel
affected by fire.

c. Shut down the truck.

d. If there is a fire, activate the fire suppression system (if one is fitted).

e. Evacuate the truck as follows:
Exit the cabin, preferably via the passenger seat door.
Get off the truck via an emergency evacuation system
22
if one is
fitted; otherwise via a standard access-way (furthest from any
point of truck or tyre fire).
Once on the ground move quickly away from the truck in a
direction coincident with the longitudinal axis of the truck (ie.
moving in the direction that the truck is facing). Move to a point at
least 200 metres from the truck.

22
Eg. an emergency ladder or stairs, or an electrically insulated slide, fitted to the front
centre of the truck. In the case of a ladder or stairs, the driver should jump, from a
platform at the bottom of these, to the ground so that he or she is not simultaneously in
contact with truck and ground to avoid possible electrocution.
31

Do not attempt to extinguish a tyre fire with a portable
extinguisher.
At all times avoid contact with any power line lying or hanging
over the truck or ground.

3. Mine Control
Upon notification of truck electrification or a tyre fire, Mine Control should
contact the Controlling Supervisor apprising him or her of the situation.

4. Controlling Supervisor
The Supervisor should:

a. Notify the Emergency Services Officer of the situation.

b. Inform the Tyre Shop Supervisor of the situation.

c. Establish adequate road blocks for the area at a minimum distance of
200 metres from the park up location.

d. Dispatch a water truck to the road block and assume control of fire
fighting and/or cool down operations (if necessary).

e. Obtain specific particulars from the truck driver in regard to time frames,
strength of flames, heat, sparks and the amount of smoke from the
tyres, etc.

5. Water Truck Driver
The Water Truck Driver should, on notification from the Controlling
Supervisor:

a. Provide a water service as requested by the Controlling Supervisor.

b. If directed, reverse the water truck in, onto the affected wheel at all
times shielding the water truck drivers cabin with the body of the water
truck.

Under no circumstance should the water truck driver proceed anywhere
near the affected unit until he/she has received authorisation from the
Controlling Supervisor.

32

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