The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

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Introduction Both Bergson and Churchland believe that they have overcome the traditional philosophical mind-body problem which has its roots in Descartes dualism. Bergsonian dualism attempts to circumvent the difficulties of ordinary dualism by offering a modified dualistic account. Churchlands eliminative materialism position does not confront the mind-body problem in its traditional formulation, that is, it does not acknowledges any domain of properties that are ...metaphysically distinct from the ob ective physical properties addressed by orthodo! science. " #s such, in the language of the mind-body problem, what we term mind is essentially reducible to body. $t maintains, contra-Bergson, ...that consciousness, with all its functions, is born out of the interplay of material elements.%&atter and &emory p.'()

*his essay will argue that Bergsons dualistic solution to the mind-body problem is problematic. $t will do so on the basis that many of his e!amples, and much of his

"

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

argumentation, do not necessarily lead to a dualistic solution but are e+ually well catered for form the perspective of eliminative materialism.

$t might be asked, why, in order to establish the ob ective of the essay, bring the work of Churchland to bear upon Bergsons dualistic hypothesis, rather than that of any other materialist, *he answer to this revolves around the issue of the brain, and the severe demolition of its functional importance it receives at the hands of Bergson in order to establish a workable dualistic solution. Bergsons attempt to circumvent the problems of original dualism has drastic conse+uences for the office of the brain which is reduced to the position of being purely ...an intermediary between sensation and movement...%&&"''). $ will argue that this relegation of the brain is unacceptable to the twentieth-century philosophy of mind debate.

*his is precisely the point at which the work of Churchland is so forceful since in its impact on Bergson. Churchlands theory of the brain not only demonstrates how completely inade+uate Bergsons brain-model is, but it smoothly integrates with his eliminative materialistic position making much progress in providing a naturalistic understanding of the mind. $n re-establishing the functional importance of the brain Churchlands account goes much of the way in e!plaining perception, representation sensory +ualia and, implicitly, memory.

*he organisation of this essay will be as follows- chapter one will provide a critical e!plication of Bergsons dualistic account in his attempts to circumvent the problems inherent in original dualism. $n doing so the key issues will be clearly drawn out in order to allow chapter two to engage with them in the most fruitful way. Chapter two (

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

will then e!amine how Churchlands eliminative materialist position, with its importing of the latest findings from neuroscience %empirical study of the brain) and artificial intelligence, provides a materialistic account which is able to absorb and answer the arguments and proofs Bergson uses to establish his dualistic hypothesis.

Chapter 1 : Bergsonian Dualism - A circumvention the problematic nature of original dualism? .hat is the nature of Bergsonian dualism, #t first glance Bergson appears to tackle the traditional Cartesian formulation of the mind-body problem head on, in that he tries to establish how two radically different substances - matter and spirit interact. #s Bergson writes in the introduction to &atter and &emory he affirms the reality of both matter and of spirit. /aturally this implies the irreducibility of one to the other, or the irreducibility of spirit.

0owever, a closer comparison between Cartesian and Bergsonian dualism reveals differences. Descartes substance dualism posits a total cleavage between what a human essentially is, a thinking thing or a mind, and the body- $ am a being whose whole essence or nature is to think, and whose being re+uires no place and depends on no material thing(. *he term substance is usefully defined by #rmstrong as

...something which is logically capable of independent e!istence... 1. $n the Cartesian frame-work mind and body have this independence. Descartes, however, was unable 1

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

to resolve how the two components of dualism combine other than by notoriously unsatisfactory recourse to the pineal gland as the point of transactions...2. ...psychophysical

But, in Bergson we seemingly have a dualistic account which

surmounts the difficulties

Bergson selects for his starting point, a different dualistic dichotomy3 one which he believes will allow a circumventing of the problems of the Cartesian formulation. &emory, he says, ...is ...the intersection of mind and matter. %&atter and &emory p."1) and the ...the classical problem of the relations of soul and body ...4centre5 upon the sub ect of memory.%&&"1). &emory then is one aspect of Bergsonian dualism. #s 6ilkington notes *he independence of mind 4has been5 narrowed down to ... the independence of memory...7. *his move of narrowing down cannot be passed over without comment. *he significance becomes apparent in what constitutes our real e!perience- in our real e!perience, ...there is no perception which is not full of memories.%&& 11) - memory is posited as one component of our real e!perience. 8ssentially, the second part of the dualism is matter, but as can be seen from the previous +uote, perception has somehow been shifted to e+uate with matter3

something which Bergson achieves through his unusual definition of matter, which is a new .. way of looking at matter%&&"").

$t could be said then, that Bergson attempts to forge a workable dualism by utilising two theories3 one of memory which was against the notion of the ...nineteenth-century orthodo!y...4of5... associationism9, and one of matter which is mid-way between idealism and realism %&&:). ;urthermore, Bergson writes that in a dualism starting from pure perception, where ...sub ect and ob ect coincide... 2

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

%&&(("),

the difficulties for understanding the link between mind and body are less

formidable. 0ow so, #s mentioned, our real e!perience is a composite of perception and memory - this is Bergsons choice of dualistic dichotomy. 0e understands perception and memory to be separated by a difference in kind and that to confuse and mi! pure perception with memory is a metaphysical error %&&2<). 0e thus posits the notions of pure perception and pure memory which e!ist only in theory in order to see how pure perception might arise from matter3 if this is established it would neatly clarify Bergsons notion of sub ect and ob ect coinciding %&&(("), since perception would be one half of our composite of e!perience and, at the same time, essentially matter i.e. at the level of pure perception the sub ect-ob ect relation way of looking at things is dissolved - they coincide.

*he difference between Cartesian substance dualism and Bergsonian dualism now starts to resolve. $n Bergsons framework there is no absolute cleavage between both halves of his dichotomy of perception and memory. *he composite is the reality and there is nothing to oin back together as in Cartesian dualism. *his is part of the Bergsonian method, to divide composites according to their natural articulations of difference in "ind'. 6ure perception e!ists only in theory - effectively, not at all3 pure memory as described by Bergson does e!ist, but it is ...preserved in a latent state...
%&&"2")

and thus ine!tended and powerless. &emory, although different in kind, is

not an independent substance from matter- it could not e!ist in isolation as in Cartesian dualism. *his difference-in-kind form of dualism can be understood to be ...a toning down of the popular hard contrast of =matter with spirit>... < *his further implies that there is more to being human that the pure Cartesian thinking thing or

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

substance. But we are still left with a difference in kind, which still implies an irreducibility of memory to matter.

.hat is it that Bergson has to prove then, in order for his dualism to be tenable, ;irst it is necessary to show how perception is so closely related to matter as not to be different in kind from it3 then, since there is a difference in kind between perception and memory their mechanisms of interaction need to be e!posed and e!plained. *o summarise the import of this we can say that, along with his two new theories of matter and memory, the notion of pure perception becomes the key to the reconciliation of mind and body- .e can understand that spirit can rest upon matter, unite with it, in the act of pure perception. %&&((?)

$t is important to consider the Bergsonian material universe, since from this he derives an account of the act of perceiving. *his universe is supposedly one of common sense where matter is an ...aggregate of images %&&:). *he term image here shuns the philosophical notions of reality in favour of so called common sense. $t re ects both the idea that matter is an idealist construct of the mind, and also that there is anything more to it, or standing behind it, than meets the eye - as in @ants phenomenonAnoumenon division. *he common-sense image e!ists ...as we perceive it... %&& "?) with its primary and secondary +ualities undifferentiated and e+ually real %although this definition of image slips to one of vibrationsAmovements3 an issue which will be tackled later). *his holds for all matter including the body, brain and nervous system etc.- they are all images. #ll these images act and react upon one another in a predictable law like manner as in, for instance, two billiard balls striking one another- if their mass, velocity and angle of incidence are known the collision is a 9

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

predictable out come. Biving matter, however, at the level of the macro-unity of the entity, is different in this regard. # stimulus does not necessarily lead to an

instantaneous and predictable output, movement or action, or any response at all3 there is no necessity of reaction as in the billiard ball case. Bergson, here introduces the notion of indetermination of response or action as ...a true principle... or, as Dewey states, ...indeterminateness is introduced as a specifying feature... :. $ would propose that, in the conte!t of the notion of a Cone of indetermination, we could say that inanimate matter and living matter are differentiated by the former having a Cone of indetermination of radius Cero, and the latter having a radius dependent upon its comple!ity %&&1(). *he indetermination of the being, which is itself ...suggested by the structure of the nervous system... %&&11) allows for an ever greater sophisticated response the more comple! it is. *here is a sliding scale of difference in degree only between inanimate and animate %living) matter. #s the centre of indetermination of a being is diminished, as in the lower orders of life for e!ample, the reaction to a stimulus becomes more immediate, and ...the more immediate the reaction is...the more perception becomes a mere contact...the process of perception ... 4approaching5 ...mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary movement %&&1(). .e can now see why a billiard ball doesnt perceive - it has no centre of indeterminationD 0ere, Bergson is e+uating the nervous system of a being with action3 between perception and reaction there e!ists only a difference in degree and not kind. *his is further borne out in Bergsons distinction between the refle!ive function of the spinal cord and perceptive function of the brain, where he posits only a difference in degree and not kind.

'

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

.hat is Bergsons pure perception, how is it e+uated with matter and how does it arise, Briefly outlining Bergsons overall suggestion first. 0e states that the material universe is awash with already e'isting representations, but they are virtual, not actual i.e. unactualised %&&19) . Eirtual would seem to suggest that, in terms of a visual representation, the light rays which can potentially form a picture or actualised representation, have not yet struck a screen so to speak, and formed an image. *his has some credibility if we consider that Bergson talks of a Cone of indetermination as playing in some part a screen %&&1:). 6erception itself is a kind of cut-out or detached picture %&&19)3 a reduced component part of the virtual representation which has been isolated and halted i.e. made actual %struck the screen of indetermination)3 effectively turned into a perception. Fo, as 0arward notes ...perception itself, in so far as it is an image, 4is5 posited ... to begin with."?

6erception arises ... when a stimulation received by matter is not prolonged into a necessary action%&&1(), and this is achieved by living matter having a Cone of indetermination. *his, Bergson e!plains, is to do with utility. 6erception has a pure utilitarian origin %&&"7<), it is not speculative %&&(<)3 it arises because the body performs actions and feels affections or, as Dewey states, a living body has special interests"". *his interest causes a centre of indetermination to filter e!ternal influences. *hose in which its ..functions find no interest... %&&19) are allowed to pass through, the rest isolated into a perception. .e could say that there is an attunement to the environment, which is utilitarian in an evolutionary sense, with connotations of survival being ensured by the gearing or adaptation %&&<2) of the organism to the environment3 this being the ...general aim of life %&&<2). 6erception is the isolation of that which interests the living being in terms of the action it can effect on e!ternal <

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

ob ects or e!ternal ob ects on itself i.e. possible or virtual action. 6erception shows, in the image world, the eventual or possible action of my body %&&((). *hus the filtering phenomenon is effected by a beings centre of indetermination, which is itself a measure of the fle!ibility, in terms of sophistication, of what stimulus can be put into contact with what motor apparatus.

Fo nothing is added to perception by the brain, rather, the reverse happens6erception is ...a problem of selection and elimination... "( or, as already mentioned, a filtering. *o clarify this point still further, we can say that perception is not a cognitive creation of the brain. Bergson believes this is an important point, since in passing from the unactualised representation %imageApresence) to the actualised %perception) we have a diminution %&&17) which allows perception to be linked with matter and made e!ternal. $t is e!ternal in the sense that Bergson understands perception as no longer being a mental creation occupying an inner realm. 6erception is not within us or in the brain3 that is, it is not a cognitive creation of the brain. #lthough the brain is obviously a material thing and, as such, it forms a link in the chain of perception as Bergson describes it. 0e states that the whole of the mechanism of perception can be described as follows- e!ternal images reach organs of sense, modify nerves, propagating their influence to brain...*he movement will pass through cerebral substance and e!pand into voluntary action. %&&2?). 6erceptions do not depend on the molecular movements of the cerebral mass %&&(7) and in this sense only are they e!ternal- 6erception, in its pure state ... is a part of things. %&&92). *his makes sense of the idea that ...sub ect and ob ect combine... %&&((") in a dualism starting from pure perception. 6erception is effectively shifted to be e+uated with matter, with no difference in kind e!isting between them. Dewey neatly sums up Bergsons position :

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

on perception. 6erception, he writes, ...is concerned directly with physical things...4it has5...no mental states intervening...#bove all, perception is primarily a fact of action, not cognition."1.

*he idea of diminution being the pivot to allow perception to be made e!ternal is a hard one to swallow. $n making perception e!ternal and part of matter, Bergson is opposing all tradition- of theories of mind-body in materialism and original dualism3 and theories of reality in idealism and realism - all of which situate perception in the inner realm or associate it with the mental. $t has important conse+uences for what we are to take as the function of the brain, which will provide an important point of contention for the validity of his dualistic solution of the mind-body problem, from the perspective of eliminative materialism. *he reason being that, the function of the brain is relegated to central telephone e!change the purpose of which is to ... allow stimulation to choose its effect...to allow communication or delay it... its office is limited to the transmission and division of movement. %&&1?). $t is the brain that allows a wide centre of indetermination of movements of the body image. 6erception does not come from the brain, it only appears like it %&&2"), i.e. the brain is not an organ of representation3 a stimulus may travel to the brain but, once there, it does not change itself into a representationAperception %&&1") but it is routed to a motor mechanism by law of utility. Fo, on this understanding, we have no inner

representations of the outer world upon which processing work of any kind is done.

0aving seemingly established within his own theoretical frame-work, that perception ... is really a part of matter... %&&((() and not in the brain, in the form of a cognitive construction or mental creation, and therefore, that the brain is not an "?

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

organ of representation, the brain suffers further marginalisation in Bergsons theory of memory- as memory is banished from the brain along with perception. Gbviously this is a crucial step for Bergsons dualistic hypothesis3 he has to show that memories cannot be stored in the brain, since the brain is part of the material universe - an image - and ...images do not create images... %&&(1). #s 0arward states, he has to show that ...our e!perience is the meeting of two 4independent5 reals, spirit in the form of memory and matter resolved into motion."2.

Bergson differentiates between two different ways in which the past is preserved i.e. two different forms of memory- in motor mechanisms and independent recollections %&&'<). *hese are the two e!treme forms of memory in their pure state, which in our real e!perience are normally combined. Bergson goes so far as to aver that these two forms of memory are different in kind %&&<?A<"). &otor memory is constructed and held the in nervous system, %&&:2) whereas independent recollections or pure memory is not deposited in the cortical cells %&&"":)- ...there is not, there cannot be in the brain a region in which memories congeal and

accumulate.%&&"(9). $n this instance our concern is mainly with the latter since this is the realm distinct from matter, or to be more precise, Bergson posits for this type of memory a difference in kind from matter. 6ure memory, now isolated by Bergson, is posited as interacting with its dualistic counterpart - perception - in two waysmemory covers ...with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perceptions... and that it ...contracts a number of e!ternal moments into a single internal moment... 3 the latter leading to the ...sub ectivity of sensible +ualities... %&&12). DeleuCes neat terming of these as recollection-memory and contraction-memory respectively, indicates the bi-directional flow or tension between perception and memory"7 ""

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

$t will be useful to e!amine what proofs Bergson uses to establish the differences between these two pure forms of memory, especially true memory in its independenceAdifference in kind. #lso, a tracing of the full evolution of the two ways in which this latter from of memory interacts with perception, which is different in kind, will be attempted. $n proceeding in this way the nature of true memory as Bergson understands it can be drawn out3 why it is posited as being different in kind from matter and, given this difference in kind, how it is supposed to interact with matterAperception to constitute our e!perience. #lso, the following analysis will assist in ascertaining if Bergsons whole pro ect cannot also be interpreted and fitted into a materialistic position3 one which has the advantage of unifying contemporary understanding of the brain. *his will be attempted in chapter two.

Bergson instances the idea of learning a lesson %&&':), such as playing the guitar, to draw a distinction between the two forms of memory. $ can have ten lessons in playing a particular melody. 8ach time $ become more proficient, until after the final one $ have mastered it. $ now have two things- the ac+uired skill of playing the melody and a memory of each of the successive lessons. *he former he suggests as being stored in the body in the form of a mechanism, perhaps by a particular connection or arrangement of neurones3 but the point is it has been materially registered and stored. $t is a habit or action lived and acted not represented, %&&<") and one could forget that its was an ac+uired skill since it seems so innate. *he individual memories of the lesson however, are representations, and as such are independent of the brain3 they are ...absolutely independent of matter.%&&"'').

"(

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

*his being the case it immediately +uashes the obviously tempting +uestion, where are they,, as this is a +uestion that only makes sense in spatial terms. $t might be more appropriate to ask when were they,. *his is precisely one aspect of Bergsons method which is to state problems in terms of time rather than of space. "9 #s 6ilkington notes, Bergson considers all the events of ones life to be stored up 4preserved5 and it is essential to his theory that he regards the totality of ones past as being preserved..."'. $ndeed Bergson regards the past which we are unaware of as being ust as real as the space beyond our immediate visual vicinity which we can not see- 4*here is no5 reason to say the past effaces itself as soon as perceived than to suppose material ob ects cease to be when we cease to perceive them %&&"2(). .ithin this conte!t the idea that Because it has been shown that one thing is within another, the preservation is not thereby made any clearer. %&&"2:) makes sense. DeleuCe notes"< that Bergson sees the past or pure recollection as preserved in itself. 6erhaps, at the risk of confusing things, it could be likened to space preserving itself in itself3 that is space is not in anything else.

#part from the necessity of making pure recollectionsAmemory independent of the brain for Bergsons hypothesis, what proof does he offer that they do not reside in the brain, ;irstly, he writes that ...the physiology of the brain was more and more successful for localising sensations and movements in the brain, but never ideas...%&&"(1). Fo, sensation and movement can be traced back directly to a specific part of the brain %i.e. have a spatial location)3 any damage to these areas uni+uely and consistently affects a particular sensation or movement. But Bergson points out that this is not so with pure memoriesArecollections. *his obviously defeats the simplistic idea that memory images are ready made and have an abiding place in the brain "1

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

%&&"(7).

Fecondly, although Bergson opens up a difference in kind between the two

forms of memory, securing the independence of pure memory, the latter is dependent upon the former in terms of its actualisation- ..memories need, for their actualisation, a motor ally...%&&"(?). *his allows Bergson to maintain that, in instances of psychic blindness, deafness etc.%defects of recognition) caused by brain damage, no memories have been destroyed, rather, their actualisation has been interfered with due to damaged motor mechanisms. ;inally, in auditory recognition, %&&""') if there is an associated image for the recognition of each word ...you must assume that there are as many auditory images of the same sound as there are pitches of sound and +ualities of each voice.%&&""'), in other words an almost infinite amount.

*he two ways in which Bergson forges an operational link between pure memory and pure perception - which are different in kind - resulting in concrete perception, will now be traced and pieced together by way of an e!ample. %i) recollection memory covers ...with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perceptions....%ii) contraction memory ...contracts a number of e!ternal moments into a single internal moment... or, it is a ...synthesising act of absorbing data into consciousness and binding them together with memories...":3 the latter leading to the ...sub ectivity of sensible +ualities...%&&12). *hese will now both be considered separately.

*aking point %i) first- recollection memory covers (...with a cloa" of recollections a core of immediate perceptions...). Bet us assume $ have a perception which is diluted to the point of being pure. *his fulfils this criterion of pure memory needing a motor ally to attain actualisation, since perception is virtual action %nascentAsketched out). Certain pure recollections or pure memories which e!ist in the virtual state and are "2

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

attached to the past, therefore une!tended and powerless, spontaneously go out to meet %&&::) the perception. 6ure memory ...attains to a realised image as it e!pands... %&&"12)3 e!pansion indicating there is no abrupt transition in terms of une!tendedAe!tended %&&("1). 8ven at this point of actualisation from pure memory to memory image there is a profound difference i.e. a difference in kind %&&"2?). By the term memory image Bergson seems to mean a literal image %if we are considering visual images), one which has become conscious. *his is obviously the case when we note that memory images ...go out to meet the perception, and feeding on its substance, ac+uire sufficient vigour and life to abide with it in space%&&"?1)3 and that ...a memory image can interpret out perception so thoroughly that we cant discern what is perception and what is memory.%&&"?1)- in other words a memory image could stand in for a perception, as in a hallucination. *hese memory images become ...more and more capable of inserting themselves into the motor diagram... %&&"(9) allowing concrete perception which is ... only defined and distinguished by its coalescence with a memory image... %&&"('). Fo that is the full process, but what is it that is actually happening, 6ure memory is virtual - a genuinely e!isting psychological state which is unconscious and une!tended3 the perception is e!tended. Bergson appears to be positing a smooth transition from the ine!tensive virtual state to the actualised e!tensive state whereby the two e!ist compounded together. *his is confirmed by the case of sensation %different in kind to perception)3 the dawning memory of a sensation %une!tended) is itself the sensation coming to be, and

sensation is e!tended and localised, being of the body. .hat about point %ii)- contraction memory (...contracts a number of e'ternal moments into a single internal moment...) or is a ...synthesising act of absorbing data into consciousness and binding them together with memories... (? which supposedly "7

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

leads to our sub ectivity of sensible +ualities, .hat is meant here by an e'ternal moment or, more vaguely, an item of data, $t is referred to variously as ...a plurality of moments...%&&12), ...the real..%&&12) - as in contraction of the real, ...billions of vibrations... %&&(?1), ...the continuous flow of things...%&&("?). #ll these are certainly suggestive of vibrations. But 0arward draws attention to the fact that an e!ternal moment is also a pure perception(" and, Bergson does indeed refer to concrete perception as ...a synthesis, made by memory, of an infinity of pure perceptions...
%&&"<().

0arward presses this point to its conclusion- it means that Bergson treats pure

matter in two ways %a) matter as an (aggregate of images) whereupon a

perception is then (..a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous..) and %b) matter resolved into the numberless vibrations of physical science where a pure perception e+uates to a single vibration. $t would seem Bergson needs to treat pure perception as %b) - vibrations, in order for him to produce a sensible e!planation for contraction memory3 but as 0arward rightly points out, Bergson leaves the matter ambiguous, allowing for himself the double meaning of %a) and %b) oscillating between them as and when his e!position re+uires. 0owever, if we select %b) and return to the idea that our sensible +ualities are effected by this contraction, %and it is certainly easiest to think of contractions operating upon vibrations) let us see what sense can be made out of it. Bergson gives a clear e!ample of this with a musical note
%&&(?1).

#n audio tone is perceived in concrete perception as a +uality. But if its

fre+uency is lowered ...to tally with the habits of our consciousness... %&&(?1) the +uality resolves itself into repeated vibrations. Fo it appears Bergson is suggesting that pure memory holds the successive, individual pure perceptions, or the individual single vibrations, of sound, light or whatever3 and it is the holding together which actually constitute their +ualities. "9

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

*here is no consciousness without memory, and no continuation of a state without the addition, to the present feeling, of the memory of past moments. $t is this which constitutes duration. $nner duration is the continuous life of the present(( $f this is the case there seems to be an odd lacuna in the theory. Fuccessive vibrations from what ever source, and collected by what ever sense, go through an electrochemical reduction or encoding. *hat is, memory does not effect contraction on, say, light vibrations directly in order to form the +uality of any particular colour3 the vibrations upon reaching the eye are encoded in the form suitable for the nervous system- sets of electrochemical spiking fre+uencies (1. But perhaps Bergson posits contractions in terms of this natural medium of communication of the nervous system, Hust what contraction memory is contracting and how it gets a handle on it, since pure memory is different in kind, is very unclear. $f we allow vibrations then the problem is, are these vibrations the vibrations of the physicists - the light vibrations, sound vibrations etc., #s already said, they cannot be. $f the vibrations being memory which prolongs the past into the

contracted are the electrochemical signals of the nervous system then we could say the original vibrations of the physicist have already been contracted by the bodys nervous system before pure memory can get its hands on them, so to speak. *his ambiguity in the contraction mode of memory is critical for Bergson dualistic hypothesis, since it is the meeting between matter and memory, and it does not appear to be satisfactorily resolved. 0arward, in reference to Bergsons analysis of perception, describes it as being more of a metaphorical description than analysis, ...intended rather to stimulate the readers imagination than convey precise ideas.(2. 6erhaps the same could be said "'

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

of the way theoretically pure memory supposedly interacts with theoretically pure perception.

$n the preceding paragraphs we have seen how Bergson tries to outer perception from the brain, to make it part of the material universe, already present but in a virtual state. *he brain is said not to create it, as such, but make it actual by virtue of the fact that the brain constitutes a centre of indetermination of action. $n this way the functionality of the brain is greatly reduced. .ith memory Bergson attempts a similar move- he differentiates between two forms of memory - motor and pure, to the e!tent he avers they are different in kind. *hen through a series of apparent proofs and arguments he seemingly establishes that pure memory cannot be attributed to a cerebral condition of the brain. $n a consideration of the two ways in which this pure memory is supposed to come together with perception a serious difficulty became apparent in contraction memory, in terms of what was supposed to be contracted and the e!act mechanism of the contraction. $t was seen how this difficulty also drew another one with it, in that Bergson duplicitously oscillates between two alternative definitions of matter to suit his thesis.

$n the following chapter $ will consider if Bergsons proofs for establishing pure memory as being independent from matter %and which conse+uently lead him to adopt a dualistic stance) cannot actually be e!plained away by Churchlands eliminative materialist account with its sophisticated theory of the material brain. ;rom this it naturally follows to consider if perception also might be able to be absorbed back into the brain, that is, to make the brain wholly responsible for in terms of a mentalAcognitive construction. #nd, since Churchlands position incorporates a "<

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

empirically detailed theory of the brain, $ will consider how ustified Bergson has been in minimising the functional importance of the brain. ;ollowing on the reinstation of the functional importance of the material brain by Churchland, his e!planation of our sensory +ualia will be considered as a model superior to the apparently flawed contraction memory suggested by Bergson.

Chapter 2 - The liminative !aterialist response to Bergsonian Dualism *he following +uestions, all of which arise naturally from the termination of chapter one, will be set as a guide in probing Bergsonian dualism from the

eliminative materialists perspective3 the ultimate ob ective being to establish firm answers- %i) Can we really allow Bergson to limit the office of the brain as being nothing more than a central telephone e!change the purpose of which is to ... allow stimulation to choose its effect...to allow communication or delay it... its office 4being5 limited to the transmission and division of movement, %ii) $s Bergsons ":

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

e!planation of our sensible +ualities in terms of the contraction of pure perceptions or vibrations credible, %iii) $s the banishment of both perception and memory from the material brain tenable, .ith this +uestion we have to be careful not to turn Bergson into a Cartesian dualist in terms of implying separate domains3 as discussed in chapter ", Bergson maintains that perception is not ...in the brain-matter... %&&1<) in the form of a cognitive construction since perception is part of matter and the brain is not an organ of representation but only a link in the chain of perception . #lso pure memoryArecollection is virtualAdifferent in kind to matter, and is not stored in the brain. Bergsons interpretative proofs based on clinical empirical data %chapter ") for this latter point will also be considered. #ll of these +uestions are types of issue which can be tackled satisfactorily from the eliminative materialist perspective and particularly so through the work of Churchland, who introduces much empirical information from the arena of neuroscience in order to construct new theories of the mindAbrain.

Before attempting to answer these +uestions, and by way of introduction of the eliminative materialist perspective, a brief overview of the role of language in the conte!t of the mind-body problem will be considered. Both Bergson and Churchland display a startlingly similar discontent with the misleading functionality of language employed in divining the nature of the inner-self, or mental life. ;or Churchland Banguage appears as a biologically idiosyncratic mode of social interaction...it is mastered thanks to the ...versatility and power of a more basic mode of activity...%/eurocomputational 6erspective p."9 - $talics added). Bergsons discontent with language is remarkably similar- he clearly brings out the utilitarian aspect of

language in suggesting that the u!taposing or spatialising inherent in language is fine (?

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

and necessary for normal daily life(7, but is inade+uate and distorting in discoursing upon mental life in general.

0owever, this is where the similarity ends, since, for Bergson language is completely inade+uate but Churchland is implying that we need a different language. Churchland, from his eliminative materialist position, holds that the everyday language we use - what he refers to as folk psychology %;6) - for e!plaining psychologicalAmental phenomena constitutes a false theoryAconceptual framework, and that this language, will be eliminated or superseded by an alternative conceptual frame-work %/C6") allowing a profoundly deeper, more accurate rendition in mutual understanding and introspection. *his view is e!tremely radical since it means that ...mental processes as traditionally conceived do not e!ist. (93 they do not e!ist in the sense that, ;6 talk about mental states is similar to talk about the suns rising and setting, when the real scientific e!planation is the rotation of the earth. (' *he new framework, he argues, will be realised by empirical science - neuroscience in particular3 essentially a materialistic account of the functioning of the brain. ;rom this perspective, the traditional mind-body problem is an illusory construct due to the misleading conceptual framework of ;63 thus it does not deserve a direct answer since it is a badly formulated +uestion. Iather, what does need to be provided is a materialist account of the working of the mind. *his eliminative materialist account turns out to be essentially +uantitative and scientific3 it is therefore in complete opposition to Bergsons methodology of holding the mind to be +ualitative and not addressable in +uantitative terms. $t could be said that Bergsons problem with language is that it is +uantitative in nature and for that reason inappropriate to

("

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

discourse upon mind, whereas for Churchland, ;6 is too vague in its +uantitative terms and needs to be more rigorously +uantitative.

#s we have seen already, Bergsons attempt to affirm the reality of both matter and spirit has, from the contemporary point of view, resulted in an unpalatable

marginalisation of the brain. Churchland holds no such affirmation of spirit and matter - +uite the opposite3 the idea that there can be any domain of properties that are ...metaphysically distinct from the ob ective physical properties addressed by

orthodo! science.(< is anathema to him. Churchlands methodology in providing an account of mind is to operate with a bottom-up, reductive approach. $mporting into the eliminative materialist position the empirical findings of the neurobiological branches of science, which themselves smoothly integrate with the rest of the physical sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology, he tries to establish an e!planation for the many features of mind. *he conviction being that all these features can be reduced to the neurobiological level thus sweeping aside ;63 the assumption is that there will no smooth unification between ;6 and the sciences. Ieturning to the +uestions set at the beginning of this chapter, and first

considering the problem of sensorimotor coordination, we find a note of agreement between Bergson and Churchland in acknowledging that sensorimotor coordination is a basic problem for life in general to solve. Bergson terms it thus*he afferent nerves bring to the brain a disturbance, which, after having intelligently chosen its path, transmits itself to motor mechanisms created by repetition. *hus is ensured the appropriate reaction, the correspondence to environment - adaptation, in a word which is the general aim of life. %&&<2 - $talics added) ((

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

Churchland writes that, ...sensorimotor coordination is the most fundamental problem that any animal must solve, a means of solution...must surely arouse our curiosity... different creatures will have different means of locating ob ects, and different motor systems to effect contact with them, but all of them will face the same
%/C6'<A:")

problem of coordinating positions...

Bergsons phrase intelligently chosen its path is odd in two ways- it suggests that it is the stimulation that chooses rather than the organism, making the brain passive rather than active3 but, more importantly, it glosses over the how of the

...appropriate reaction, the correspondence to environment.... But, Churchland supplies a credible and empirical how by introducing into philosophical debate on the nature of mind the recent findings of neuroscience. *hese findings are immediately at odds and undermining of the notion of the brain being nothing more than a ...a central telephone e!change...3 since the brain is portrayed as a active, powerful representational and computational organ. Iepresentation being a capacity Bergson consistently denies the brain of being capable.

.ithin Churchlands schema, sensorimotor coordination or the Bergsonian ...appropriate reaction... is basically a computational problem, such as may be found in moving a robotic arm in a paint spraying plant for instance. 6roblems of this computational nature obviously re+uire a representation on which to compute - no computation can take place without data, and the data in this instance is some form of representation %/C6"?() of the e!ternal environment. 0owever, when we talk about (1

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

representation here, this does not imply a kind of sub ect-ob ect stance, whereby the sub ect regards the ob ect which is the dataArepresentation. Iather, the sub ect or self is constituted by the dataArepresentation and the processing performed on it- i.e. representation J computation K self. .hat kind of representation and computation does Churchland suggest for a biological life form though, 0e proposes % /C6:() neural state-space representation and coordinate transformation computation3 and this on the basis of hard empirical evidence derived from studying the small scale architecture of the brain, and subse+uent successful modelling of the neural network structures found, in non-biological substrates such as electronic and software.

Ftate-space representation and coordinate transformation need a little e!planation. Ftate-space representation is the method of modelling ..various aspects of reality..%/C6':). $n Churchlands sensorimotor two-dimensional crab e!ample %/C6<(-:?) the position of the crabs prey %input) is represented by its eye angles %one aspect of an e!ternal reality) in a two-dimensional state space or coordinate space, which would be implemented in a connection of neurones. *he same goes for the motor output of the simple two-dimensional arm. *his constitutes the state space representation. .hat about the coordinate transformation, *he coordinate transformation puts these two state space representations into a functional relationship with one another which, mathematically, is relatively comple!. *he transformation is achieved by the way the two state spaces are effectively wired together. *his provides a simplified e!ample of how sensorimotor coordination is achieved.

$t might be argued that this amounts to nothing more than the ...motor mechanisms constructed by repetition... that Bergson makes reference to, but it can (2

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

be seen that we are already talking about an internal representation that is approaching what constitutes a cognitive construction of perception. ;urthermore, Churchland pushes the idea of this form of representation and computation way beyond the case of simple two-dimensional sensorimotor coordination. *his is made clear in Churchlands consideration of the various peripheral input transducers of the senses which are highly suggestive of utilising state space representation. *hese transducers such as the eye, tongue, olfactory bulb etc. respond to the various aspects of reality, in a way which can be seen as a +uantitative breaking up of the input continuum in +uestion, rather like a kind of spectrum analysis3 this is followed by a recombination in a suitable n-dimensional state space, thus constituting our +ualitative sense of a particular input. ;or instance, in terms of the colour aspect of vision, the eye has three sets of colour receptors that respond to three different key wavelengths of light. *hese three input channels, so to speak, can be, Churchland suggests, internally represented in a three-dimensional state space. .hat bears this idea out is that, assuming similar discrimination along each a!is of the different sensory state spaces, then for every e!tra channel the input transducer in +uestion has - such as the four channels for taste in comparison to the three for colour - ...the variety of different taste sensation will be greater that the variety of different colour sensations by roughly an order of magnitude... %/C6"?7) and Churchland notes that this is the case. *hus a ...genuinely reductive account of one domain of sensory +ualia... has been provided. %/C6"?7)

0ow does this account of sensory +ualia for colour compare to Bergsons, #s discussed in chapter ", Bergson talks of sensory +ualities in vague metaphorical terms as being a contraction of the real3 and when Bergson slips into his secondary mode of (7

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

treating matter as vibrations this becomes a contraction of vibrations, where vibrations are the ...matter resolved into the numberless vibrations of physical science... - as referred to by 0arward in chapter ". *his has a strange, perhaps coincidental, resonance with Churchlands state space schema, in that we e!perience the threedimensional colour state space +ualitatively- the state space is a comple! threedimensional +uantitative representation, but our e!perience of it is +ualitative. *he +ualitative here could perhaps be seen as a contraction or compression of the comple! +uantitative representation. But what is important is that Churchland has effectively put a +uantitative and reductive e!planation behind the mental state of the sensation of colour - something Bergson is generally against, that is, talking about the inner +ualitative mental states in +uantitative terms. 0owever, when Bergson talks about contractions of vibrations, is he too, not really putting a +uantitative

e!planation behind a +ualitative inner mental state, $t would seem so.

$t will be noted that in the state space e!amples given so far, there is an important difference. $n the sensorimotor e!ample two state spaces were connected by a functional relationship and their inputs and outputs were derived from, and in, the e!ternal world respectively. $n the state space e!planation for colour the input is from the e!ternal world and the output effectively ends in the brain. Fo we can say that the inputs to and outputs from functionally interrelated state spaces can take three modese!ternalAe!ternal %sensorimotor e!ample)3 e!ternalAinternal %colour vision)3 and, importantly internalAinternal. *he importance of the latter arises from Churchlands e!trapolation that this form of representation and computation may be responsible for, ...the higher cognitive activities...%/C6:"). $n positing this Churchland is now pushing his processing schema even further, e!tending it beyond the sensorimotor (9

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

coordination and sensory +ualia e!amples already given. #s he writes, in any ...creature of comple!ity, we can e!pect a long chain or hierarchy of internal systems interacting with one another, systems that are the maps of other internal systems and whose outputs drive the activities of further internal systems.... %/C6:9). *he higher cognitive activities are listed as language use and propositional knowledge3 should the representational and computational modes suggested by Churchland be responsible for these areas then the +uest for a fully reductive account of mind in neurobiological terms would be achieved.

#rguably this account of Churchlands, in terms of e!tending state space representation and coordinate transformation to the heights of all higher cognitive activity is admirably plausible and awaits only the progress of empirical science to confirm it. *he plausibility can be based upon evolutionary grounds. Fuch an elegant biological representational and computational solution has ample evidence for being an evolutionary solution for the sensorimotor coordination problem. ;urthermore, as the biological implementation, has no dimensional limitations %/C6"??) in its

...mathematical operation or physical realisation... - which suggests potentially phenomenal representational and processing power it is difficult to see how

evolutionary forces of natural selection would not seiCe upon this schema of sensorimotor coordination and develop it into something which accounts for human intelligence and possibly consciousness3 a high level of intelligence being an e!cellent faculty for survival, in terms of the evolutionary notion of survival of the fittest. #nother pertinent factor conspires to give this reading- the ...massively parallel nature... %/C6:?) of the representationalAcomputational model suggested. *his gives rise to two evolutionary favourable factors in terms of survival. ;irstly, great speed of ('

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

operation is achieved, even in a biological substrate, which is far from ideal in this respect %/C6:?)3 and secondly, great redundancy is effectively built into the system, thus allowing for the failure of a great many neurones that implement the structures with little loss in performance %/C6:?). *his last point could be said to be a necessity for any biological life which is to be evolutionary successful.

.hen we consider the issue of memory, so important in Bergsons work, we find little mention of it by Churchland. ;or Churchland it is not a focus of concern, but it is obviously implicit in any schema of processing data - the data has to be held whilst processing3 also, those state spaces - implemented by connections of neurones - which effectively process it have been organically grown, and must in some manner count as a form of memory. .e have with Churchland, contrary to Bergson, a model of memory which is materialistic and suggestive of being distributed throughout the entire brain.

/ow, Bergson is adamant that memory is not in the brain and that it does not have a cerebral condition to it, %&&21) instancing various proofs and arguments, %chapter" p.'A<) to support this. 0owever, if his ob ections can be answered by utilising return memory and

Churchlands materialistic account of mind we can safely

memories to the material brain3 and it would seem that they can be met. Briefly restated, Bergsons proofs are- %") individual memories cannot be located in the brain and do no appear to be totally destroyed by limited degrees of brain damage3 %() since he maintains that memories for their actualisation need a motor ally then and memories apparently lost can be accounted for in terms of damaged motor

mechanisms interfering with their actualisation3 %1) in recognition, %auditory being (<

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

considered) if there is a memory image for each word then the +ualities of pitch and sound of each voice would re+uire an almost infinite amount of storage.

#s far as auditory recognition is concerned, Churchland too is against the idea that this could be achieved by matching against a simple list or set of store memory images. *he range of acoustic variation among acceptable and recognisable vowel sounds, for instance, %/C6"91) is enormous and defies analysisArecognition by a simple list. But after having said this Churchland does provides us with a physical system, based on the brain architecture, in the form of a multi-layered neural network which can ...recognise such intricacies.%/C6"92) #n e!ample being the trained neural network for the discrimination of echoes between mines and rocks. *his network is effectively using state space representation and coordinate transformation as discussed above, and once trained can perform a discriminatoryArecognition task whose comple!ity is on a par with word recognition, without recourse to huge lists or previously stored memory images. *his network, once trained, effectively embodies "nowledge about certain aspects of its environment, and this knowledge is stored as ...a carefully orchestrated set of connection weights... between the synapses of the neurones that make up the network3 and, it might be added, it is also distributed throughout the network and not to be found located in one place. *his effectively answers Bergsons point %1). ;or recognition to take place we do not have to have a store of all possible images, auditory, visual or otherwise, and yet recognition or memory can still be implemented by a physical or material system.

.hat about point "- individual memories not being able to be located in the brain and being resistant to brain damage. Could we perhaps say that memories are (:

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

effectively stored materially in the brain, but in a distributed sense, i.e. materially stored but not spatially located, *hat is, they are not to be located anywhere as such, but are effectively embodied in the ...connection weights...of large populations of neurones. *his would account for memories being resistant to destruction of areas of the brain. # suitable analogy of storage is suggested by idea of holographic photography- if we take a plate-glass holographic representation of, say, an orange, and break it into numerous fragments, each fragment retains the whole image but in reduced +uality. 0owever this analogy must be immediately discounted since we are back in the position of suggesting ready made and stored memory images, and both Bergson and Churchland are against this. Churchland has said of his trained neural network that it only embodies "nowledge not memory images.

# distinction between memory and memories needs to be opened up. $n the above network memory has a material foundation but memories do not. Bergsons use of the virtual and actual in relation to memories or memory images seems to have some useful e!planatory power. $n the preceding paragraph $ said that memories are effectively stored, materially, in the brain3 there is no getting beyond this for a materialist position. ;or effectively we could say virtually or potentially, that is, they are stored as Churchlands information or "nowledge in brain like networks, but not as ready made things.

.hat then enables this materially stored information or "nowledge %potential or virtual memories) to actualise itself from this virtual state into memory images in consciousness, ;irst of all we could say that it does take a consciousness3 for a Bergsonian virtual recollection to change form virtual to actual it needs consciousness 1?

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

to become actualised in. Lnfortunately consciousness would count as one of the higher cognitive functions Churchland makes reference to, and in this area his schema is only speculative. #lso we are considering only a simple model of a neural network which cannot be said to be conscious.

But bearing this limitation in mind the following passage is helpful...the whole problem of how to retrieve relevant information is transformed by the realisation that it does not need to be retrieved. Information is stored in brain-li"e networ"s in the global pattern of synaptic weights. #n incoming vector activates the relevant portions.... of the trained network by virtue of its own vectorial make up...
%/C6":7-$talics added)

/ow we are still trying to answer point "- individual memories not being able to be located in the brain and being resistant to brain damage but we must also consider point ( at the same time- memories! for their actualisation! need a motor ally! and that memories apparently lost can be accounted for in terms of damaged motor mechanisms interfering with their actualisation. Churchlands notion of an incoming vector activating relevant portions of a trained network is akin to Bergsonian actualisation via a motor ally3 in Bergsons schema the incoming vector would be a motor stimulusAally but in Churchlands schema this can be a motor ally or an internal stimulus - as in the stimulus of state spaces already mentioned, either e!ternal or internal. Continuing with the analysis, we could suggest that various areas of the brain are activated by incoming vectors - motor, e!ternal, internal or otherwise - and the result of all the component parts of the stimulation is responsible for forming a 1"

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

memory image in consciousness. $n other words individual memories are actively created or recreated out of the information or "nowledge stored in Churchlands ...brain like networks... as a result of the particular pattern of stimulation.

*o sum up the import of this idea it can be said that Bergsons notions of virtual and actual as applied to memory images or recollection can be left standing, since they are +uite insightful3 and that memory does have a material basis or cerebral condition to it in the form of information or "nowledge, but that memories, as such, have only a very tenuous material foundation- they could not e!ist apart from the material brain but would seem to be a creation of its dynamic activity. *his answers point " and point (- since within Churchlands schema memories do not necessarily need a motor ally for the actualisation - they could be actualised internally - but in some instances they may well have.

$t would seem that Bergson latches onto the simplistic and essentially false notion of memories being stored as ready made images, only to easily knock it down and then use this to suggest that memory and memories are independent from the brain, or not stored in the brain, or do not have a cerebral basis. $t has been clearly shown that a purely materialistic account with a little more sophistication than a naive simplicity can amply deal with Bergsons ob ections when it comes to memory. &emories however must be considered as outlined above, i.e. as active creations of a functioning human brain through stimulation of "nowledge containing networks, and in this respect Bergsons virtualAactual schema is metaphorically insightful3 but this

stimulation does not need to be considered as only a motor ally when we consider Churchlands schema. 1(

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

Conclusion $ have attempted to show how Bergsons dualism of difference in kinds attempts to divorce both perception and memory from the material brain - it is not the brain that is responsible for them - in a way which is contemporarily unacceptable, especially in the professional community associated with the philosophy of mind. .e have seen how he needed to fabricate the idea of pure perception in order to collapse the distinction between perception and reactionAmechanical impulsion3 thus siding perception with matter in terms of there being no difference in kind between perception and matter. *his he does in order to demonstrate how pure memory posited as different in kind from matter - then combines with perception in order to produce our e!perience. *his is his dualistic hypothesis.

*he ob ective of this essay was e!pose Bergsons dualistic solution to the mindbody problem as problematic in that much of his argumentation and evidence can e+ually well be interpreted from the eliminative materialistic position. Churchlands brand of eliminative materialism also has the added advantage in that his theory of the brain, which fully integrates with his eliminative materialist position, is superior to Bergsons inade+uate model. $t incorporates the latest findings from the research of neuroscienc - the empirical study of the brain - and feed back from #$ research which has successfully modelled many of the structures found by neuroscience in the material brain. Churchland effectively reinstates the importance of the material brain

11

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

enlarging its office from the mere transmission and division of movement which Bergsons dualistic thesis limits it to.

.ithin Churchlands schema we have seen that perception and memory can be relocated in the brain in the sense that it is the material brain that is responsible for them. 6erception, contra-Bergson, can be understood to be in the brain in the sense of a cognitive construction and representation. *he basis for this is that the brain is effectively a powerful parallel and distributed processing organ3 that it uses states space representation and coordinate transformation in its processing feats.

.hen it comes to memory, much of Bergsons dualist argumentation for suggesting it is independent of the material brain can be ade+uately met by Churchlands eliminative materialism. &emory, as distinct from memories, has been shown to be the responsibility of the brain. *his is in the sense of knowledge or information being embodied within the connection patterns and weights of large populations of neurones. 0owever, in considering recollections, memories, or memory images, it has been shown that there is what could only be described as a very tenuous material basis, since these could be said to be an active creation of the working brain based on the stimulation of its information containing networks.

12

The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

"otes and #eferences

17

"

Churchland, op.cit., p.'2. ( ;lew, #. * Dictionary of Philosophy ":<2, 6an Books, p :".
1

#rmstrong, D.&. * &aterialist Theory of The &ind Ioutledge M @egan 6aul, ":'9, p.'.
2

;lew, op. cit., p.:(.

7

6ilkington, #.8. Bergson *nd +is Influence - * ,eassessment Cambridge Lniversity 6ress, ":'9, p."(.
9

ibid., p.'.
'

DeleuCe, N. Bergsonism Oone Books, "::", p.((.

<

;awcett, 8.D. = $E- =&atter and &emory> > &ind, (" no.<( %":"()- ("1.
:

Dewey, H. =6erception and organic action.> The %/ovember,":"()- 99'.

"?

-ournal

of

Philosophy,

:,

no.(2

0arward, H. = E$ - Discussion. .hat does Bergson &ean by 6ure 6erception,> &ind, (<, no.""( %":":)- 29'.
""

Dewey, op. cit., p.97".

"(

ibid., p.97?.
"1

ibid., p.97".
"2

0arward, H. Gp. Cit., p.29:.

"7

DeleuCe, N. Bergsonism Oone Books, "::", p.7(.

"9

ibid., p.1".
"'

6ilkington, op.cit., p.:.

"<

DeleuCe, op. cit., p.72.

":

6ilkington, op. cit., p <.

(?

ibid., p <.
("

0arward, H. =.hat does Bergson &ean by 6ure 6erception,> &ind, (', no."?9 %":"<)- (?7.
((

Bergson, 0. *n Introduction To &etaphysics 6rentice 0all, ":2:, p.2?.

(1

Churchland, 6.&. * .eurocomputational Perspective. The .ature of &ind and /cience &$** 6ress, "::1, p."?2.
(2

the /tructure of

0arward, H. op. cit., p.(?'.

(7

Bergson, 0. op.cit., p.(:.

(9

Brown, F. et al. Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-0entury Philosophers Ioutledge, "::9, p."2<.

('

ibid., p."2'
(<

Churchland, op.cit., p.'2.

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