H45: Fortun v.

Macapagal-Arroyo (March 20, 2012) Facts The consolidated petitions by Philip Sigfrid Fortun and other petitioners challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946 (Nov.24, 2009) declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent such suppress and similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Then on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This is for her to acquire greater authority to put order in Maguindanao. Two days later (December 6, 2009), President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Sec.18 Art.VII of the 1987 Constitution required her within 48 hours from the proclamation to submit her report to Congress in person or in writing of her action. December 9, 2009 Congress in joint session convened pursuant to Sec.18 Art.VII of the 1987 Constitution -to review the validity of the Presidents action. Two days later (December 12, 2009) President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1963 lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Congress was not able to act since there is nothing to review anymore. Issue: Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is constitutional Ruling: The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of mar tial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Since President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 by issuing Proclamation 1963 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act, petitions have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. Also President Arroyo withdrew her Proclamation 1959 in just 8 days, such have not been meaningfully implemented. No military took over, no issuance of any law by the President and no indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question having become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and academic.

H46: Gonzales vs Hechanova Facts: Rufino Hechanova, respondent Executive Secretary, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice and created a rice procurement committee for the implementation of the said importation. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 3452 which allegedly amend or repeals RA 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. Issue: WON RA 3452 prevails over the executive agreements WON executive agreements can be invalidated by our courts Held: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As said the executive agreements regarding the rice importation from Vietnam and Burma are unlawful, as well as null and void as they are inconsistent of the provisions of RA 3452. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in questi on. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

H47: Akbayan Citizens Action Party (Akbayan) v. Aquino (2008) Facts Petitioners - non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government (JPEPA), is the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into the negotiations of the JPEPA. The House Committee requested respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino) to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not comply with the request. Congressman Aguja also requested for the same document but Usec. Aquino replied in a letter that the copy will be given once the negotiations are completed. House Committer now requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with "all documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers etc." but Sec. Ermita said that it would be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a work in progress for about 3yrs. A copy of a draft JPEPA will be forwarded as soon as the text is settled and complete. Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA Director General and Tariff Commission Chairman but the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the document and according to NEDA, his request will be forwarded to Usec. Aquino who would be in the best position to respond to the request. House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of JPEPA but it was not pursued because House Speaker Jose de Venecia requested to hold its issuance until the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents. The Final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to public since September 11, 2006 but petitioners were claiming that initial drafts were kept from public view. Issues: 1. 2. 3. 4. Whether or not the petitioners demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, since it was accessible already to the public (September 11, 2006). Whether or not respondents claim of executive privilege to the demand for copies of the offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations is valid. Whether or not Diplomatic negotiations can be recognized as a privilege in this jurisdiction. Whether or not the Executive branch had waived its privilege since it did not assert its privilege during the hearings of the House Special Committee.

Ruling Standing petitioners have a right to file petition for mandamus since it is anchored upon the right of people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right. It is sufficient that they are citizens which possess the right.

Mootness it is moot and academic to the extent that petitioners seek disclosure of the full text of the JPEPA since it was already made accessible to public but it is not entirely moot because petitioners also seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA but also the offers made by the Philippine and Japanese negotiations As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being valid. For it was justified that such information includes matters of diplomatic character and in this case the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents. Diplomatic negotiations have been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction since the promulgation of the Courts resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus wherein it stressed that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information." It is also in PMPF v. Manglapus where the Court adopted the principle that offers exchanged by parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but also with other foreign governments in future negotiations. The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Moreover, petitioners have failed to present a "sufficient showing of need" to overcome the claim of privilege in this case. Under Sec. 21 of Art. VII (Executive Department) the power to enter treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of treaty. Congress may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations and only the Senate can concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President. Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

H48: Pimentel Jr. vs Office of the Executive Secretary President is the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign relations. However, it has limitations as provided in the constitution: that it has to be concurred by the Senate for ratification.

Legal basis: Art. 8, Sec 14 of the Constitution no treaty shall valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of the Senate. EO 459 Ramos provided guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements After the treaty has been signed by the Phil. Representative, the same shall be transmitted to the DFA. DFA shall prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the president has ratified the treaty, DFA shall submit it to the Senate for concurrence. Signature primarily intended as means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good faith of the parties. Ratification formal act by which the state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative, generally held as an executive act undertaken by the head of the state.

Facts:

The petitioners prayed for the writ of mandamus to compel Executive Secretary and DFA to transmit the signed copy of the Roman Statute to the Senate. The Roman Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concerns and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. Issue: WON the Executive Secretary and the DFA has ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Statute signed by the member of Phil. Mission to UN even without the signature of the President? Ruling: NO. The President has the sole authority in the external relations and countrys sole representative with foreign nations. According to the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the senate. The role of the senate is limited only to the giving or withholding its consent to the ratification. It is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the senate or having secured its consent. (See page 637, last paragraph.) SC has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the president in his performance of duty. It cannot compel the executive department to send the copy to the senate. Petition is dismissed.

H49: Santos vs Macaraig Facts: Rosalina de Perio-Santos, petitioner was appointed on June 24, 1986 by Pres. Corazon Aquino, to the position of Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the United States and other International Organizations with station in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 6, 1987, petitioner sought a leave of absence from the DFA to spend Easter holidays in New York. However, before the petitioner could leave for New York, she received instructions to proceed to Havana as a delegate to the UNCTAD G-77 Preparatory Conference and she was entitled with allowances of SFr 2,996 pursuant to her official trip. Petitioner bought 2 discounted tickets for herself and her daughter. Upon return to her office in Geneva, petitioner claimed reimbursement for the discounted tickets for SFr 1,567 instead of the SFr 2,996. On September 16, 1987, DFA questioned the petitioner on why government funds were used for the plane ticket of her daughter and compelled the petitioner to refund the amount used for her daughters plane ticket. Petitioner then returned the whole SFr 1,567 and thereafter claimed payment of the entire SFr 2,996 entitled allowance. Her co-workers filed administrative charges against her involving funds of the said mission. Though the Committee found prima facie case of dishonesty she was found guilty of misconduct, a lesser offense. Upon her appeal, President Aquino issued A.O. 122 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty (instead of misconduct) and was removed from her post and replaced by Narcisa Escaler. Issue: WON Petitioner was rightly removed from her post Held: The court did not find substantial evidence showing that the petitioner was guilty of either dishonesty or misconduct. Her failure to disclose the fact that her discounted tickets included the fare of her child was harmless and inconsequential as the 2 tickets were in fact inseparable for the purpose of the discount. Using the discounted tickets she saved money for the Government, an act which was to be commended instead of condemned. However, the court does not have the power to reverse the order of her recall from the post. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary on the part of the President and has the right of choice which she may exercise freely. The court cannot order the reinstatement of the petitioner to her former position in Geneva as that would be tantamount to a usurpation by the Court of the power of appointment, which is the exclusive prerogative of the President. It would violate the system of separation of powers which inheres in our democratic republican form of government.

H50: Qua Chee Gan vs Deportation Board Power to order the arrest of alien may not be delegated to Deportation Board by the President. 2 ways to deport an alien: a. by order of the President through Sec 69 of RAC and, b. by the Commissioner of Immigrations under Sec 37 of Act No 613.

Legal Basis: Sec 69, Act No. 2711 or the Revised Administrative Code foreign power that resides here in the Philippines cannot be deported unless the agents of the president has proven and investigated the ground for which the action is contemplated. EO 33 President Quezon created the Deportation Board (DB) which receives complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable and investigates the complaint according to Sec 69. It is the agent of the president. President Roxas required all respondents in deportation proceedings to file a bond with Immigration to insure the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board (1947). EO 398 -- President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board and authorized it to issue warrant of arrest an alien complained of and to hold him under detention during his investigation unless he paid for the bond (1951). Commonwealth Act No. 613 or Immigration Act of 1940 grant to the Commissioner of Immigrations to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground. Facts: Special Prosecutor Galang charged before the DB the petitioners for having purchased dollars amounting to $130,000 without license from the Central Bank on 1952. Following the issuance of the charges, a warrant for the arrest of the aliens was issued by the presiding member of the DB. They were able to file surety bond of P10K and cash bond also of P10K, thus they were released. Petitioners filed motion to dismiss the case but it was denied. The DB, as agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the case and authority to issue warrant of arrest, conduct investigation and issue surety and cash bonds. Issue: WON the arrest and order to fix bonds against the aliens are valid and constitutional. WON the President can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before the definitive order of the deportation has been issued. Ruling: NO. The fact of delegation is warranted by discretion of the officers performing the act. The delegation of the implied power of the president is inimical to the liberties of the power. Ministerial powers may be delegated because it does not need to render jurisdiction but official functions that needs discretion may not. The arrest and order to fix bond according to EO 398 UPON filing the charges against an alien is illegal and unconstitutional. However, the order to arrest an alien by the President, whom was proven to commit a ground for deportation after investigation, is valid.

H51: Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora (2000) Facts On March 14, 1947 Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement (formalized the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel). On August 30, 1951 the Philippines and the United States entered in to a Mutual Defense Treaty (parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft). When the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was about to expire in 1991, the Philippines and the U.S. tried to negotiate for a possible extension but the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship. On July 18, 1997, the U.S. panel (US Defense Deputy Asst. Sec. for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell) met with the Philippine panel (Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino, Jr.) discussed possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement which led to consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations that culminated in Manila (January 12 & 13, 1998). President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA. (October 5, 1998) President Joseph Estrada through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. (October 6, 1998) President through Exec. Sec. Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. Joint public hearings were held by the two Committees. (May 3, 1999) Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending concurrence of Senate to the VFA. (May 27, 1999) Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 approved by Senate by 2/3 vote and it was re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18. (June 1, 1999) VFA (provides for mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces & defense personnel may be present in the Philippines) officially entered into force. Issue: Whether or not the VFA is constitutional and whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement. Ruling Locus Standi petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA but the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance, the court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions. Applicable Constitutional Provision Sec.25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution (requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of treaty duly concurred by Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress). Nothing in the said article requires foreign troops pr facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. Requirements of Sec. 25, Article XVIII to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country: a. b. It must be under a treaty Treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum

c.

Recognized as a treaty by another contracting state.

All of these were complied since the treaty was concurred by Senate through Resolution No. 18 and no national referendum is needed since the Congress did not require it. The letter of US Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the US Government means that it recognized the agreement as a treaty. Ratification held to be an executive act (President) through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. Power to ratify is vested in the President and Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence to the ratification. No abuse of discretion may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement. President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Power to concur with treaties is vested with Senate alone. WHEREFORE petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

H52: Vinuya vs. Romulo In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole Facts: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape(comfort women) by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. The petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void because the comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. The same was prohibited under the jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible. Thus, such waiver was a breach against the governments obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. In addition, they claim that the Philippine governments acceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as funds for the AWF were contrary to international law. Issue: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. Held: From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

Moreover, in the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligation of the Philippines, the petitioners failed to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jis cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

H53: Constantitno Jr vs Cuisia Facts: The Financing Program was the culmination of efforts that began during the term of former President Corazon Aquino to manage the countrys external debt problem through a negotiation -oriented debt strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors. Pursuant to this strategy, the Aquino government entered into three restructuring agreements with representatives of foreign creditor governments during the period of 1986 to 1991. During the same period, three similarly-oriented restructuring agreements were executed with commercial bank creditors. On 28 February 1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, chaired by respondent Pelaez, negotiated an agreement with the countrys Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank creditors, on the Financing Program which respondents characterized as "a multi-option financing package." Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as a package offered to the countrys foreign creditors consisting of two debt-relief options. The first option was a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount. The second option allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into any of three kinds of bonds/securities: (1) new money bonds with a five-year grace period and 17 years final maturity, the purchase of which would allow the creditors to convert their eligible debt papers into bearer bonds with the same terms; (2) interest-reduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years; and (3) principal-collateralized interest-reduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years. Issues: WON the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program as beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution WON assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents Held: Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution provides: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. On the issue of delegation of powers, Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional52 and legal53 imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contract is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance. If the

President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government

H54.A: Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989) Facts February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via people power revolution and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino was declared President under a revolutionary government but still the country was besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish within the short space of 3yrs. to return to the Philippines to die. The petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Mrs. Aquino considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the country decided to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Issues: 1. 2. Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Ruling Power of president is not limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The prime duty of the Government to serve and protect the people is among one of the guiding principles of Constitution. Thus, the President in making decisions should consider such principles. The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. Mrs. Aquino just exercised her powers as protector of the peace under the Constitution when she barred the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The President did not act with grave abuse of discretion since the Court had found the existence of factual bases for the Presidents decisions from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented. The Court cannot also deny documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country which leads to the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

H54.B: Marcos v. Manglapus 178 SCRA 760 (1989) Facts (September 15, 1989) decision, dismissed the petition by a vote of 8 to 7 - President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in her decision to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. September 28, 1989 - former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii but according to the statement of President Aquino, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners arguing that to bar them from returning is to deny them of all the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution and that the President has no power to bar a Filipino from returning to his own country also there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Issues: 1. 2. Whether or not the Marcoses right to return can be invoked under the Constitution. Whether or not the President has the power to bar a Filipino from his own country and if so, is there a basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

Held: We deny the motion for reconsideration. Solicitor General motion for reconsideration is moot and academic for the deceased Mr. Marcos and that the right to return of Marcos remains still affects the right to stab ilize the country. Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit. Court in all motions for reconsideration, the petitioners must show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court but in this case petitioners were not able to establish such compelling reasons. Marcos death has not changed the fact about the threats to the government. The President cannot be denied of her executive power which has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution. The powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution is not similar with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution (to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6). Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

H55: Laurel vs Garcia Roponggi is a property of public dominion, not patrimonial. The President cannot convey valuable real property of the government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. Legal basis: Art. 420, 2 paragraph of the Civil Code provides for the enumeration of the properties which belong to the state. Sec 63, RA 6657 or CARP law refers to properties alienable and not those reserved for public service not Roponggi.
nd

Facts: The President subject the Roponggi property, land acquired by the Philippines through reparation by Japan in the damaged they caused during WWII, for auction. The petitioners prayed for writ of prohibition to compel the respondents to disclose their reason behind the auction. The land in Tokyo is classified as a public dominion and not of private ownership. It is intended for public service and not subject to appropriation, outside the commerce of man and cannot be the subject matter of any contract. Issue: WON the president and her agents have the authority and jurisdiction to sell the Roponggi property? Ruling: NO. The property was acquired from reparation of the lives and properties wasted during the WWII, thus it is not a simple and ordinary property. The contention of the respondents that the Roponggi property ceased to be under the public dominion since it was not utilized for 13 years. The intention of the respondents now is to convert it to private use as manifested by their overt acts. The fact that Roponggi has not been used for a long time does not automatically convert it as a private property. Conversion only happens when there is a formal declaration on the part of the government, withdrawing the property from being such. The Court said that the constitutionality of the EO was not the issue, but the purpose of the respondents to sell Roponggi which is to finance CARP. SC did not acknowledge Roponggi is alienable and of private ownership as the respondents contends based on CARP. If the resolution is otherwise, the property can be sold and the proceeds will go to the funds of CARP. The writ of prohibition in selling Roponggi and Restraining order are made permanent.

H56: Train vs City of New York Legal basis: Title II, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 makes available federal financial assistance for municipal sewers and sewage treatment works. Sec 207 of the same authorizes appropriation of not to exceed specified amounts for each of three fiscal years Sec 205 of the same sums authorized to be appropriated in Sec 207 shall be allotted by the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Facts: The President ordered the administrator to limit the allotment: o No more than $2B of $5B for 1973 o No more than $3B of $6B for 1974 The respondent city sought declaratory judgment that the administrator is obliged to allot to the state the full amount authorized and order him to make allotments. Issue: WON the President has the power to direct the administrator in the allotment of the funds as the legislature has provided. Ruling: NO. It was clearly provided that the Administrator is given the authority to allot t he said funds. The phrase not to exceed meant that the grant of funds already allotted would not total to the maximum amount authorized to be appropriated. Sections 205 and 207 authorize the Administrator to give discretion as to the timing of expenditures and not to the ultimate amounts, the power to allot only extends to sums appropriated under Sec 207. The power to control was to be exercised at the obligation phase.