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    Utah's application to Supreme Court for stay pending appeal of decision in marriage case.

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    Utah's application to Supreme Court for stay pending appeal of decision in marriage case.

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    1K views101 pages

    Application For Stay Pending Appeal

    Uploaded by

    Equality Case Files
    Utah's application to Supreme Court for stay pending appeal of decision in marriage case.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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    ante Supreme Court of the United States Gary R, Herber, in ts official capacity as Governor of Utah, and ‘Sean D. Reyes, in his official capacity as Attomey General of Utah, “Applicants, ‘Derek Kitchen, Mouel Sbeity, Karen Archer, Kate Call, Laurie Wood, Kody Partridge, ‘und Sherrie Swenzen, in her official eapacity as Clk of Salt Lake County, Respondents, Application To Stay Judgment Pending Appeal DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE SONIA SOTOMAYOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Brian L. Tarbet ‘Monte Neil Stewart Chief Deputy Utah Attorney General Counsel of Record Philip . Lott Craig G. Taylor Stanford E. Purser STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC ‘Assistant Utah Attomeys General Special Assistant Attomeys General UTAH OFFICE OF THE 12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100 ATTORNEY GENERAL Boise, Idaho 83713, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor (208) 345-3333 P.O. Box 140856 Stewart@STM-Law.com Salt Lake City, Utah 841 14-0856 (801) 366-0100 ‘Counsel for Gary R. Herbert ‘and Sean D, Reves December 31,2013, a ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. 7 BACKGROUND wrens JURISDICTION REASONS FOR GRANTING THE STAY I 4, m1. Ther is song ikeibood that cera wl be prantd if the Court of Appeal firms ‘There isa strong likelibood thatthe district court's decision will be overtumed and the injunction held invalid, ‘Absent sy, theres a iketnood—inded, a cerainty of irepable ham. TV, The balance of equities favors a stay. CONCLUSION. 7 APPENDIX ‘App. A Memorandum Decision and Order (District Court) App.B Judgment ina Civil Case (District Cour) App.C Order on Motionto Stay ‘App.D Order Denying Emergency Motion for Stay ‘and Temrorary Motion for Stay Al Bl ‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Andersen v. King County 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) Baker v. Nelson 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971)... Baker v. Nelson 409 US. 810 (1972). Baker v. Nelson ‘No. 71-1027, Jursdictcnal Statement at 3 (Oot. Term 1972). ares. EStoms Ine Group Hosp Med. & Sirians Plan 501 US. 1301 (1991), Bond v. United States 564US,__, 131 $.C1.2355 (2011). Bowen. Gilllard 483 US. 587 (1987)... Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) Conbright v. Frommert ‘$56 US. 1401 (2009), Deawer v. United States 483 U.S, 1301 (1987), Béelman v. Jordan 415 US. 651 (1974).. Elrod v. Burns 427 US. 347 (1976). FCC\. Beach Conme'ns ‘508 U.S. 307 (1993). Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health 798 N.E24 941 (2003) 1B 116 1B 2,20 18 2,9 ms 13: BB Heckler v. Lopez 463 US. 1328 (1983).. Hellerv. Doe 509 US. 312 (1993). Hemandez v. Robles 855 NE2A | (N.Y. 2006). Hollingsworth v. Perry SIDUS. 133 $.Ct. 2652 (2013). Inre Marriage of 1B. & HB. 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. Dallas 2010) 15. Legalzaion ssstance Projet of Lo Angeles Coumy Fe of Labor SIOUS. 1301 (1993), Karcher v. Daggett 455 US. 1303 (1982), Kitchen v, Herbert No, 2:13-cv-00217-RJS, at 25 (D. Utah filed Mar. 25, 2013). Lawrence v. Texas 539 US, 558 (2003)... aon. Secretary of the Dep of Chive & Family Ser. ‘358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir, 2004) Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967) Lucas v. Townsend 486 U.S. 1301 (1988). eiceneeces Maryland v. King 567 US.__, 133 S.Ct. 1 2012). - [New Motor Vehicle Ba. v. Orrin W. Fox Co. 434 US. 1345 (197 )csnsnsesnnrnen ‘Ohi ex rel. Popovic v. Agler 280 U.S. 379 (1930). 4 8 vonsPassim 7,21 3.45.6 R 7 n 19,22 vo 19,22 ‘Planved Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott STLUS, _, 134 S.C1 506 (2013). Roman v. Sincock 377 US. 695 (1964) Rostker v. Goldberg 4448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980). ‘San Diegans for the Mr. Soiedad Nat’! War Memorial v. Paulson ‘548 US. 1301 (2006), : Sosna v. lowa 419 US. 393 (1975) Tully v. Grifin, Ine 429 US. 68 (1970) Turner v. Saftey 482 US. 78 (1987) son United States v. Lara 541 US. 193 (2004). United States v. Windsor SI0US. _ 133 $,Ct 2675 (2013) Vance v. Bradley 440 US. 93 (1979) Washington v. Glucksberg ‘521 US. 702 (1997) Williams v. North Caroline 3ITUS. 287 (1942). Zablockt v. Redhail 434 US. 374 (1978). CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 28USC. § 1254. 2BUSC. § 1651. 28US.. § 2101. 19,22 6,7 20 1B 20 ‘passin sw AS vo Hy 12 9,20 n Aticle I §29 ofthe Utah Constitution... . sons $ STATUTES Utah Code § 30-1-2.. seco 7 so 348 Utah Code §30-1-4.1 oS OTHER AUTHORITIES Douglas W, Allen, High Schoo! Gradhation Rates Among Children of Same-Sex Households, 11 Rev Econ. Household 635 (2013).. saris Henry B. Bille, Paternal Deprivation (1974). - ce avid Blakenhorn, Fatherless America: Conftonting Qur Most Urgent Social Problem (1995)... 16 Gay Couples in Utah, Surprised But Glad, Rush to Marry After Ruling Permits It,N.Y. Tits, Dev. 20, 2013. 3 Brenda Hunter, The Power of Mother Love: Transforming Both Mother and Child, (1997) 16 ‘Loren D. Matks, Same-Sex Parenting and Children’s Outcomes: A Closer Examination of the -AnerieanPaeloical Asolo’ Brion Lesbian an Gy Parenting, 4 Se. Se Res DBS QOD enn z soso IT Sara MeLanaun & Gary Sandfr, Growing Up with Soa Pre: What Hus, What Hels (1994). 15 Matthew O’Brien, Why Liberal Neutclty Prohibits Same Sex Marriage: Rass, Political Liberalism, ‘and the Family, 2012 BRIT-I.AM. LEGAL STUD. 411 i 16 DAVio PorENoe, Lire Wrrhour FaTH=R: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD & MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN & SOCIETY (1996) 16 ‘Mark D. Regnerus, Parental Same-Sex Relationships, Family Instability, and Subsequent Life Outcome for dal Chen Answering Crit ofthe New Fay Sractares Say with tonal Analysis, 4 Soc. Sei. Res. 1367 (2012) sen 15417 Leonard Sax, Why Gener Mates: What Parents an Teachers Need to Know About the Bnergng ‘Science of Sex Differences (2005) 15 GORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION (W-B. Allen ed., 1988) 24 |W. BRADFORD WILCOX, ET 4.., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS (2d ed, 2005).. ‘To the Honorabe Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice ofthe Supreme Court of the United ‘States and Circuit Juste fr the United States Cour of Appeal forthe Tenth Citeit ‘Applicants rspsctfully apply for an immediate stay pending appeal of a judgment and injunction entered by the United States Distt Cour forthe Dist of Uta, invalidating and ‘enjoining enforcement of Utah’s marrage laws to the extent they limit mariage to man-woman unions. Similar requests for a stay have been denied by both the district court and the Tenth Cieuit INTRODUCTION “This case squarely presents the question that this Court expresly left open lst Tem in United States v. Windsor, $70 USS. _, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), namely, “whether the States, in the exereise of their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,.... may continue to utilize the trditional definition of marriage.” 1d. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J. dissent see also id. (“This opirion and its holding are confined to... lawsul marriages” between people ‘of the same sex) (majority opinion); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 US. _, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013) (ectning to etch issu on jusisdtional grounds) In part for reasons of federalism the Windsor majority he that the federal government, i administering federal programs, cannot consitionally dsregerd State laws allowing same-sex marriages. Windsor. 133 S.Ct. at 2693, 2695-96, On that basis it invalidated Section 3 ofthe Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), And in s0 holding, the majority recognized that DOMA's policy of non-accommadation was a substantial “federal intusion on state power to define marriage 1d t 2692. Dy contest, this cose involves not just » refuel by the federal goverment to sccommodate a State's definition of marrage, but an outright abrogation of such a defnition— by@ single federal cout wielding a feral injunetion and acting under the banner ofthe federal Consttation. If Windsor and Hollingsworth warranted this Court's review, surely there is a 1 likelihood that this eae will too—prtcularty ifthe Tenth Cireuit upholds the district cour’ injunetion barring exforcement of Utah's traitional marrage laws, and thus creates a circuit contlict withthe Eighth Circuit. See Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 485 F-34859, 867-69 (Bin Cir, 2006) (rejecting @ right to same-sex. mariage under the Fourteenth Amendment). And if DOMA’s non-ecogntion was an impermissible “federal intsion on state power” to define merage, surely there is atleast a good prospect that a majority ofthis Court, will utimately hold the district counts far more intrusive onder and injunetion invalid, and in so doing vindicate the prerogative of Utah and its citizenry to retain the traditional definition of mariage if they so choose, That prospect i enhanced by the fct tha, in contrast with Windsor, ‘the distct court's ling found no animus behind Utah's mariage laws Remarkably, however, unlike the Ninth Circuit in Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct, at 2652, which presented the same underlying constitutional issue, both the distct court and the Teth Circuit refused to sty the district cous injunction pending a definitive resolution ofthis most, fundamental of federalism questions. As a result of the distict courts injunction, numerous same-sex marriages are now occurring every day in Utah. And each one isan affront not only to the interests of the State and is citizens in being able to define marrage through oxdinary democratic channels, see, eg, Bond v. United States, S64 US. _, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011), but also to this Cour’s unique role a8 final arbiter of the profoundly important constitutional question tat it 90 carefily preserved in Windsor. A stay is urgently needed to preserve these prerogatives pending appeal and, if necessary. his Courts ultimate review, and to rinimize the enormous disruption tothe State and its citizens of potentially having fo “unwind” thousands more same-sex marriages should ths Cour ultimately conchide, as he Sate suongly ‘maintains that the district court’s judgment and injunction exceed its constitutional authority BACKGROUND Plaintffs-Respondents’ (Plaintiffs) complaint attacks a provision of the Utah CConstittion and two associated statutes that limit marriages in Utah to man-woman unions. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunetve Relief, Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-v-00217-RIS, at 25 (D. Uiah filed Mar 25, 2013) (“Compl”). Antic I, § 29 of the Utah Constitution, adopted under the name “Ametdneut 3” by 66% of Ua votes in the 2004 statewide election, provides between @ man and a woman” and that “fajo that “{mlatage consists only of the egal over domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as 9 mariage or given the same orsubstanally equivalent legal effect.” Uah Const. rt 1,§ 29, The Utah Code lists mariages “between persons ofthe sre sex” mong the unions “prohiited and declared void." Utah Code 6 30-1-265). Ui aw likewise proclaims “te policy ofthis state to recognize as mariage only the legal union of @ man and a woman .." Id at § 30+-4.1(1(a). In their complaint Respondents chiefly sought a declaratory judgment that these provisions “violate the Due Process and Equal Protetion Clauses ofthe Fourteenth Amendment” as well as “a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement or application of Amendment 3 and any other Utah law that bors same-sex marrage... and compeling Utah to recognize the marrage of [Respondents] ‘Archer and Call a manage in he State of Uiah Compl at Cross-motions far summary judgment were filed by the State's representatives! and by "The complaint and previous filings included former Utah Attorney General John Swallow as @ defendant, His resignation from office effective December 3, 2013 necessitated his removal from the case, Attorney General Sean D. Reyes, who took the oath of office on December 30, 2013, succeeds Mr. Swallow and the substitution i indicated in the cation. Also, to remove any questions concerning the status of County Clerk Sherrie Swensen in this litigation, she correctly stated in her Answer that she “has a ministerial duty to abide by the las of the State of Utah, and is required by statue to issue marriage livenses in accordance with existing Utah state law,” that she “has no disevetion egarding the issuence of marriage licenses,” that she “will continue to abide by and administer” Utah’s marriage laws a8 they may exist after further legislative or judicial action, and that she “has no diseretion regarding the issuance of 3 Respondents. The district court heard argument on those motions in a four-hour hearing on December 4, 2013. At its conclusion the court wondered aloud whether it would be able to issue 1 decision before the next status conference, scheduled for January 7, 2014, Yet a scant two weeks later—on December 20, 2013—the dis et cour issued a 53-page to mancwoman unions enhance the lislinood that a majority of this Court wll do so as wel By contrast, a State that allows same-gender marriage necessarily loses much of its ability to encourage gender complementarity as the prefered parenting arrangement. And it thereby substantially increases the likelihood that any given eild will be raised without the everyday influsnce of is oF her biological mother and father—indeed, without the everyday influence of father ora mothe tall ‘Tobe sare, Windsor hos tha State is constituionelly permited to decid tat this risk is offset, for example, by the risk tat chilren being raised in families headed by same-sex couples wil fl demeand by ther fais inability to seth term “marrage” See 133 S.Ct at 2694, But the Windsor majority does not suggest—and we think the Court unlikely 0 hold 18 after carefully considering the manifest benefits of gender complementarity—that a sovereign State is constitutionally compelled to make that choice. To hold thet the Constitution allows a federal cout to second-guess such fundamental (and sometimes difficult) policy choice, lying ast does atthe very heart ofthe State's authority over matters of domestic relations, would bea remarkable “federal intrusion on sate power," i. st 2652—one that would make # mockery of ‘the Windsor majvty's rationale for invalidating Section 3 of DOMA. Accordingly, there is a good probability that the Court will avoid thet result and, accordingly, reject the district court's analysis and (if isnot overtumed by the Tenth Circuit) invalidate the injuneton at asue here TIL, Absent a stay, theres ikelibood—indeed, a certainty—of irreparable harm, The injunction also imposes certsin—not merely lkely—irearable harm on the State and its citizens. Members of this Court, acting as Circuit Justies, repeatedly have acknowledged that “any time a States enjoined by court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives ofits people, it suTers a fo of ireparable injury.” New Motor Vehicle Bd. Orrin W, Fox Co, 434 US. 1345, 1351 (1977) Rehnquist, 1, in chambers); accord Maryland v King, 61 US, _, 133 $k. 1, 32012) Roberts, C1, in chambers) (granting a stay); Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, ST1 US. _, 134 S.Ct. $06, $06 (2013) (Scalia, 1, concurring in denial of application to vacate stay). That same principle supports a finding of irreparable injury inthis case. For the distiet court's order enjoins the State from enforcing not only an crdinary statute, bute constitutional provision approved by the people of Utah inthe core exercise oftheir sovereignty. 1, That States have a powerfil interest in controlling the definition of marriage Within their borders is indisputable. Indeed, the Windsor majority acknowledged that “each state as a sovercign has a rightful and legitimate concem in the marital status of persons 19 domiciled within its borders,” Windsor, 133 S.Ct at 2691 (quoting Williams, 317 US. at 298), and emphasized that “{Jhe recognition of civil marriages is central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents and citizens.” 1d. (emphasis added). Every single marriage performed between persons of the same sex as a result ofthe district courts injunction—and in defiance of Utah law—is thus an affront to the sovereignty of the State and its people, Each such marriage openly flouts the Stae"s sovereign interest in controlling “the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders”, based on the unreviewed judgment ofa single district court. Utah's sovereign interest in determining who is eligible for a marriage license is bolstered by the principle of federalism, which affirms the State's constitutional authority over the entire field of family relations. As the Windsor majority explained, “regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province ofthe Sttes.”” 133 S.Ct. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Jowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (emphasis added). The istrict court’s decision breactes the principle of federalism by exerting federal control over the Aefinition of marriage—a matter within Utah's “virtually exclusive province.” Id AA federal intrusion of this magnitude not only injures the State's sovereignty: it also ininges the right of Utahns tc government by consent within our federal system. For, as Justice Kennedy has explained: ‘The Constitution is tased on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the governed. Theit consent depends on the understanding that the Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the citizen the protection of two governments, the Nation andthe State. Each sovereign must respect the proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and duties as to both. United States v. Lara, S41 US. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see ‘also Bond, 131 S.Ct, at 2364 ("When government acts in excess ofits lawful powers” under our system of federalism, the “lbe-ty [ofthe individual] is at stake.” Here, the district courts extraordinary decision to overturn Utah's mariage laws—and 20 its refusal evento stay its order penting further review—places in jeopardy the democratic right of millions of Utahns to choose for themselves what marriage will mean in their community 2. Overturning Utah's marriage laws also has grave practical consequences. Hundreds of marriage licenses have been issued already, with many more couples expected to apply for licenses in the coming days. Assuming the Tenth Circuit and/or this Court ultimately holds Utah’s Marriage Amendment to be valid, as the State strongly maintains it should, the State inevitably will confront the thomy problem of whether and how to unwind the marital status of same-sex unions performed before reversal of the district court's decision, ‘Considerable administrative and financial costs will be incurred to resolve that problem, and the ‘State's burden will only increase asthe number of mariage licenses issued fo same-sex couples continues to grow. See Legalization Assistance Project, $10 US, at 1305-06 (O'Connor, J, in chambers) (citing the “considerable administrative burden” on the goverment as a reason to rant the requested stay). Only a stay can prevent or at least mitigate that indefensible result ‘The State's responsibilty for the welfare ofall its citizens makes it relevant, as well, that Respondents and any other same-sex couples who choose to marty during the period before the ‘Tenth Circuit and this Court resolve this dispute on the merits will likely be ireparably harmed without a stay. They and their children will likely suffer dignitary and financial losses from the invalidation of their marriages if appellate review affirms the validity of Utah's marriage laws ‘The State thus secks a stay, in part, to avoid needless injuries to same-sex couples and their families that would follow if the marriage licenses that they obtain as a result of the district court’ injunction are ultimately found invalid—simply because the district court refused (as did the Tenth Circuit to stay that injunction pending appellate resolution ofthe central legal issue in this case cavs ly brushing aside the State's substantial concerns, the district court found that the a State would not suffer ireparble injury absent a stay, and the Tenth Circuit proffered no analysis of the State's allegations of injury at all. In pat the district court reasoned that enjoining a state aw did not impose an ineparale injury in this case because that principle was invoked only by cours dispose to rule on the merits in fovor of the party seeking a stay, and because the dstrot court knew of no practice within the Tenth Circuit of automaticaly granting a stay when a state law is held invalid, See App. C a 45. But the disict court misead this, Cours decisions invoking New Motor Vehicle Board, none of which limited the significance of enjoining estate law to eases where that law was believed tobe valid Both lower courts, moreover, evidently misapprehende the import ofthe district coun’ injunction: It cannot be serioudy contested thatthe State wil suffer ireparable harm from the distct cour’s nullification of Utah's constitutional definition of mariage absent a stay, given that such harm repeatedly has been found when a federal court enjoins the enforcement of cdinary struts. See New Motor Vehicle Bd, 434 U.S. at 1345 (relocation of auto dealerships); “Maryland, 133 S.Ct, a $ (collection of DNA samples from arestees); Planned Parenthood, 134 S.01 at 507 (Breyer, J, dissenting from denial of aplication to vacate the stay) (estctions on ‘physicians tigi vo perform abortions TV. The balance of equities favors a stay. Although the case fora stay is not “close,” here too, “the relative harms to the applicant and tothe respondent” stongly lt the balance of emits in favor of a stay. Hollingsworth, $88 US. a8 190 As previously explained, the State and its citizens will suffer ieparable injury from ‘aling the enforcement of Utah's definition of mariage: Every marrage performed uniting ‘persons of the same sex is an effront to the sovereignty ofthe State and to the democratically ‘expressed will of the people of Utah; the State may incur ever-increasing administrative and 2 {financial costs to deal with the marital status of same-sex unions performed before this case is finally resolved; and same-sex couples may be irreparably harmed in their dignitary and financial interests if their marital status is retroactively voided. Any one of these injuries qualifies as ‘mreparable. Together they estabish exceptional harm. ‘Agninst all this, Respondents have recited the rule that “(the loss of First Amendment ‘freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes ireparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 US. 347, 373 (1976). That rule is inapposite here: While violation of an established constitutional right certainly inflicts ireparable harm, that doctrine does not apply ‘where, as here, Respondents seek to establish a novel constitutional right through litigation ‘Because neither constitutional text nor any decision by a court of last resort yet establishes their ‘sought-after federal right to sam:-sex mariage, Respondents suffer no constitutional injury from awaiting a final judicial determination of their claims before receiving the marrage licenses they seek. See Rosther, 448 US. at 1310 (reasoning that the “inconvenience” of compelling Respondents to register for the draft while their constitutional challenge is finally determined -does not “outweigh! ] the gravity ofthe harm" to the government “should the stay requested be refused”). ‘Nor, moreover, can Respondents change the slate of the law by obtaining marriage licenses on the yetountested authority of the distrit court's judgment. Con tutional eights do not spring into existence by mass political activity triggered by the decision of a single district court judge, Our constitutional tradition relies instead on the certainty and regularity of formal constitutional amendment, or j ial decision-making by appellate courts, which would be subverted by deriving a novel constitutional right to same-sex marriage from the number of people who assert it or the aumber of days its exercise goes unchecked. See George Washington, Farewell Adares: (Sept. 19, 1796), reprinted in Georce Washinoron: A. a ‘Contection S18 (WB. Allen ef, 1988) (“The basis of our politcal systems is the right ofthe people to make and toate their Constitutions of Goverment, But the Constitution which a any time exists, “til changed by an explicit and authentic act ofthe whole People is saredly cbiigstory wp all). Song tipping the balance in favor of sty i the public's overwhelming interest i maintaining the status quo pending a regular and orderly review of Respondents’ claims by the Court of Appeals and ths Cour. See Hollingrworth, SSB US. a 197 (granting stay, in pat because its absence “could compromise the orderly, decorous, rational traditions tht cours rly upon to ensure the integrity of their ow judgments"). A stay wil serve the public interest by preserving this Couns ability t address maters of vital national importance before ediionl inreparable injury is inflicted onthe State and its citizens. Forall these reasons the balance of equities favors a stay. CONCLUSION ‘The Applicans respectfully request thatthe Circuit Justice issue the requested stay of the distiet cour’s judgment and injunetion pending appeal. IF the Circuit Justice is either disinclined to grant the requested relief or simply wishes to have the input ofthe full Court on this application, Applicants respectfully request that it be refered tothe fll Court. Respectfully submited, 7 Brian L. Tarbet ‘Monte Neil Stewart Chief Deputy Utah Attomey General Counsel of Record Philip 8. Lott Craig G. Taylor Stanford E. Purser ‘STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC Assistant Utah Attomeys General Special Assistant Attorneys General UTAH OFFICE OF THE 12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100 ‘ATTORNEY GENERAL Boise, idaho 83713 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor (208) 345-3333 P.O. Box 140856 Stewart@STM-Law.com Salt Lake City, Utah £4114-0856 (801) 366-0100 Counsel for Gary R. Herbert ‘and Sean D. Reyes 25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE hereby certify that on the 31st day of December, 2013, 1 served the foregoing Application for Stay via email and United States mail on the following counsel of recor: Peggy A. Tomsic tomsic@meplaw.com James E, Magleby magleby@meplaw.com Sennifer Fraser Parish parish@meplaw.com MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P-C. 170 South Main Street, Suite 850 Salt Lake City, UT 84101 Ralph Chamness hamness@sleo.org Darcy M. Goddard staoddard@sleo.ore Salt Lake County District Attomeys 2001 South State, $3700 Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 APP. APPENDIX ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS [MENDRANDUM DECISION AND ORDER (DISTRICT COURT) JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE (DISTRICT COURT) ORDER ON MOTION TO STAY (DISTRICT COURT) ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY ‘AND TEMPORARY MOTION FOR STAY (TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS) APPENDIX A IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION DEREK KITCHEN, MOUDISBEITY, KAREN ARCHER, KATE CALL, LAURIE WOOD, and KODY PARTRIDGE, Plain, MEMORANDUM DECISION ‘AND ORDER GARY R. HERBERT, JOHN SWALLOW, Case No, 2:13-

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