Cuba

1NC Appeasement
Lifting the embargo emboldens adversaries, causing miscalc and allied proliferation.
Brookes 9 (Peter is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. KEEP THE EMBARGO, O April 15, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_Oul9gWKYCFsACA0D6IVpvL)
In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin

America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The
embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

Emboldening Iran causes more nuclearization and nuclear conflict

Kroenig and McNally 13 Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, Iranian Nu kes and Global Oil, The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)
But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Irans nuclear program, most agree a nuclear -armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent not containa nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound . It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.10 President Obamas fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Irans primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is

determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responsesparticularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it
with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of inverted deterrence against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up

its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large risk premium to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditio ns in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4$15 per barrel (roughly 415 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20$30 per barrel and spikes of $30$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Irans surface fleet in response to Irans mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Husseins short -lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldnt be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015 Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange . Even if Irans leaders are less reckless and

suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange ; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear
war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent

from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war.

Extra Embargo Link

Lifting the embargo emboldens others
Suchlicki 7 (Jaime is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami. Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban, April 11, 2007, FrontPageMagazine.com) Lifting the travel ban without any major concession from Cuba would send the wrong message to the enemies of the United States: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will forget and forgive, and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights
and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While the U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Supporting regimes and dictators that violate human rights and abuse their population

is an ill-advised policy that rewards and encourages further abuses.

AT: Iran prolif = stabilizing (i.e., Waltz)

Kroenig and McNally 13 Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, Iranian Nukes and Global Oil, The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.) Some well-known analysts dismiss all such scenarios outright. One prominent academic continues to insist that nuclear weapons are stabilizing under virtually all circumstances, and that Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons would actually reduce regional tensions and prospects for conflict. 17 [Fn. No. 17: Kenneth Waltz, Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2012).] We respectfully but completely disagree, as do, we believe, the vast majority of those experienced in the policy world in the United States and abroad. We disagree in part because we do not think that most analysts have factored in the impact of Iranian proliferation on the global economy via the oil market. Pundits have frequently made a major point that confrontational policies toward Iran could damage the global economy, but they have all but ignored the likely longer-term global economic consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. This is myopic analysis, and it will not do. We do not claim that the economic implications of an Iranian nuclear breakout are the only or even the major factors that need go into U.S. policy judgments. But it would be a mistake to minimize the broad implications for international security of a severe and protracted global economic collapse emanating from the implications of Iranian proliferation. Alas, that well describes the state of the debate at present; it does minimize longer-term economic implications. That is one more reason why we strongly support President Obamas stated position. For the sake of global peace and security, the United States must be willing to take whatever steps necessary, including the use of military force, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Cuba
Cuba is a rogue state government abuses and holds on to power
Hanson and Lee, 13 Stephanie Hanson, and Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor Council of Foreign Relations A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute.
Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region. What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and

journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havanabased nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human
Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.However, CFR's Sweig says that Ral Castro's tenure as president and the reforms he has brought to the country have indicated a willingness to normalize relations with the United States again. "It's not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner," she told CFR.org in a 2012 interview. "I believe we have one in Havana but have failed to read the signals."

Venezuela

Appeasement Link
The plan is a major concession to Venezuela
Christy, 13 (Patrick Christy is a senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative. U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuelas Democratic Opposition, June 13, 2013 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition)
On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obama administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a "new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions . Since the death of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman than a democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power and discredit his critics in recent months. First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the fraudulent April 13th presidential elections, as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full audit "would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries that contain voter signatures and with digitally recorded fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and Supreme Court the two government institutions able to challenge election results it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount. [See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.] Second, Maduro's government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime. Last month, Globovision, one of Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting station faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live video coverage of opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned. Third, the regime and its allies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition legislators on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces. More recently, Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the sovereignty of the homeland." In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. [See a collection of political cartoons on defense spending.] While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by Mara Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Given The Current Deficit Crisis, Should Foreign Aid Be Cut?] Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make

clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals especially those related to institutional corruption could further erode public confidence in the current government. By resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protg's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.

Appeasement/Retrenchment DA Link
Reich, 12 (Otto, president of Otto Reich Associates LLC and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Is the United States Losing Influence in Latin America? Latin America Advisor, December 17, 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179) Does the United States have influence in Latin America? It has enormous potential influence, by virtue of being the remaining global superpower and by the geographic, historical and other ties that connect us. Sadly, however, in the past four years the U.S. government has apparently decided that Latin America is not worth the time or effort to use that influence for good purposes. The problem may not be insufficient attention but rather misplaced priorities. How else to explain the counterproductive policies directed at the region's most hostile countries while neglecting the friendliest nations? The primary purpose of any nation's foreign policy is to advance its national interests; U.S. interests are advanced by having free, democratic, secure, prosperous and friendly neighbors. In the past four years, the United States has tried to appease the anti-American alliance gathered under the ALBA umbrella, a group of failed or failing states united by anti-Americanism, Marxist economics and authoritarian methods. These are Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Argentina (Argentina is not yet an ALBA member, but it imitates one). In the same period that the United States exhibited unlimited patience with ALBA countries they have, individually or collectively, for example: expelled U.S. ambassadors and other diplomats; confiscated U.S. properties; cooperated with Iran and terrorist groups; held an American civilian hostage for three years and counting; stamped out individual freedoms; packed or neutered legislatures and judiciaries; voided the separation of powers; and generally made a mockery of democratic institutions, all in the name of '21st Century Socialism.' Meanwhile, it took the administration three years to ratify a free-trade agreement with Colombia and with Panama, two friendly and strategically important countries; it has not begun or promoted any new free-trade negotiations in the region; it has weakly assisted Mexico's war on narcotics and organized crime; Chvez, Castro, Correa, Kirchner, Morales, Ortega and other despots still enjoy the fruits of their authoritarianism. If we really have influence in the region, why not use it?."

Mexico

Appeasement Link
We need a hardline approach towards Mexico
Camarena 13 (Rodrigo Camarena of The Guardian, Mexico needs tough love from the US, not just hope for change http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/06/mexico-obama-trip-tough-love-from-us)
Missing in this sunny narrative is the validation of the Pea Nieto government by its most important ally, the United States. International monitors continue to highlight Mexico's unabated human rights violations, limits on the press, and high homicide rate, while the foreign business press gives its cautious, yet steady, approval of Pea Nieto's work. In this context, the President Obama's forward-looking speech to the Mexican public could not have been more welcomed by the Pea Nieto administration. As Obama remarked: "The young people of Mexico, you honor your heritage, thousands of years old, but you're also part of something new, a nation that's in the process of remaking itself I've come to Mexico because I think it's time for us to put the old mindsets aside, it's time to recognize n ew realities, including the impressive progress of today's Mexico." And yet this refashioned Mexico continues to show the same dysfunctions of its very recent past. Take Pea Nieto's truce with opposition parties, the Pacto Por Mexico (Pact for Mexico), for instance. The pact, responsible for the president's successes in passing major structural reforms, has recently come into danger of unraveling, after reports of a vast vote-purchasing scheme, which was allegedly orchestrated by Pea Nieto's party and other officials during recent elections in the state of Veracruz. Hallmarks of Mexico's apparent corruption can also be found in the lauded overhaul of Mexico's educational system, which only passed after the sudden incarceration of the head of Mexico's teacher's union (a longtime bulwark against educational reform and no stranger to controversy herself). The government's campaign against hunger has also raised eyebrows, for both its gamified approach to poverty (you can "like" sponsor's products on Facebook and a kilogram of dehydrated milk will be donated to a family in need) and the participation of PepsiCo and Nestle in development of low-cost nutritional supplements for Mexico's 7.4 million citizens living in extreme poverty. While President Obama's effort to move the conversation beyond border security and organized crime is important for the long-term, the visit failed to address Mexico's difficult relationship with transparent governance

and representative democracy. As the US seeks to reshape its relationship with its southern neighbor, it would do well to keep a close watch on the new administration's muddled positions on public safety. The US should not just talk about the future it should reinforce the democratic principles that will truly drive Mexico's change today.

Containment Bad
Patrick and Forman 2 (Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, 2002, Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy) The case studies suggest that for the United Stales as a whole, the costs of resorting to extraterritorial sanctions outweigh the benefits. The short-term diplomatic costs are glaring because few foreign policy measures seem to inspire the outrage of extraterritorial sanctions. Foreign governments perceive them as a public affront to sovereignty and a heavy-handed, unilateral form of coercion that violates the norms of conflict resolution among allies and trading partners. Extraterritorial sanctions are the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. While they are on the table, absent a waiver or other type of compromise worked out by the executive branch, foreign governments have great incentives to defy the United Stales, or, more often, simply to refuse to make any progress in other areas of mutual concern. The risks of escalation are more profound than the short-term diplo-matic costs. Extraterritorial sanctions provoke a visceral negative reaction that makes target governments less sensitive to rational assessments of costs and benefits. Put differently, these sanctions inspire "chicken" games in which each side, playing to a domestic audience, has incentives to show it is willing to bear costseven to rupture long-standing positive relation-shipsrather than back down in humiliation. Cooler heads tend to prevail and compromises tend to be worked out in extraterritorial chicken games, but it would be imprudent to count on this as a foregone conclusion. Policy-makers should appreciate ilia; resorting to extraterritorial sanctions is a risky rather than prudent foreign polity. The costs to reputation are hard lo measure, but likely are very signif-icant. The fact that the U.S. government resorts routinely to unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions means that U.S.-based firms are, through no fault of their own, less reliable suppliers and customers than their counterparts in other advanced industrial states. The pipeline episode of 1982 prompted some European firms to "design out" U.S. components from their industrial systems. Whether the ILSA sanctions will inspire similar behavior in the energy sector remains to be seen. For the U.S. government, extraterritorial sanctions bring significant costs in terms of diplomatic reputation. These sanctions create or reinforce an image of the United States as arbitrary, imperial, and arrogant, and as more prone to dictate to other states unilaterally than to cooperate multi-laterally. This problem is magnified by the contemporary structure of international politics. The United Stales is the dominant power in a unipolar setting, and that fact alone makes many other states uneasy about the Country's disproportionate influence. U.S. officials have recognized what the State

Misc

Unilateralism Link
Unilateral action by the US causes unpopularity in Latin America Hakim 6 (Peter Hakim, January, 2006, Is Washington Losing Latin America?, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031841, Foreign Affairs Vol. 85 no. 1, pp. 39-53) Disappointment with the U.S.Latin American relationship is a two-way street. Anti-Americanism has surged in every country in Latin America. People in the region, rich and poor, resent the Bush administrations aggressive unilateralism and condemn Washingtons disregard for international institutions and norms . A recent Zogby poll of Latin Americas elites found that 86 percent of them disapprove of Washingtons management of conflicts around the world. Only Cuba and Venezuela are openly hostile toward the United States, and most Latin American governments continue to seek close ties with the United States, including free-trade arrangements, immigration accords, and security assistance even though many of them no longer consider the United States to be a fully reliable partner or want to be Washingtons ally. The regions leaders are well aware of the overwhelming political and economic strength of the United States and are pragmatic enough to work hard to maintain good relations with the worlds only superpower. But they view the United States as a country that rarely consults with others, reluctantly compromises, and reacts badly when others criticize or oppose its actions.

Perception Internal Link

Hardline perception necessary for success internationally US must be perceived as credible
Hirsh, a former Foreign Editor of Newsweek, is writing a book about American foreign policy, SeptemberOctober 2002 [Foreign Affairs, Bush and the World, pg. L/N] It is true that this is a different kind of war. In terms of hard power, the threat is small compared to the hegemonic challenges posed by Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. But in ideological terms, the challenge that the Islamists pose is similar -- a point Bush himself made when he declared in his September 20 speech that the terrorists are "the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century." They may not have tanks and planes, but they do have a substantial support base in the mainstream Islamic world and the "superempowerment" that globalization has granted to small groups of fanatics. Pakistan, one of the United States' chief allies, is also now a chief launching pad for al Qaeda. Suicide bombing is a way of life in the Palestinian territories, where bin Laden's picture hangs prominently on many walls. Saudi and Persian Gulf oil money continues to fund Salafism, which has a nesting ground and sympathetic roosts around the world. Its message is carried daily by al Jazeera, the pan-Arab "news" station, and even in many U.S. mosques. The hegemonists are right about one thing: hard power is necessary to break the back of radical Islamic groups and to force the Islamic world into fundamental change. Bin Laden said it well himself: "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like a strong horse." The United States must be seen as the strong horse. The reluctant U.S. interventionism of the 1990s made no headway against this implacable enemy. Clinton's policy of offering his and NATO's credibility to save Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo won Washington little goodwill in the Islamic world.

Cohen Terminal Impact

U.S.s showings of weakness will cause instability throughout the world and allow other countries to take U.S. hegemony.
Cohen 13 ( Eliot Cohen of the Wall Street Journal, and director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins, Eliot Cohen: American Withdrawal and Global Disorder)
In Mr. Obama's second term the limits of such withdrawal

from conventional military commitments abroad will be tested. In East Asia, an assertive China has bullied the Philippines (with which the U.S. has a 61-year-old defense pact) over the Spratly islands, and China has pressed its claims on Japan (a 53-year-old defense pact) over the Senkaku Islands. At stake are territorial waters and mineral resourcessymbols of China's drive for hegemony and an outburst of national egotism. Yet when Shinzo Abe,
the new prime minister of an understandably anxious Japan, traveled to Washington in February, he didn't get the unambiguous White House backing of Japan's sovereignty that an ally of long standing deserves and needs. In Europe, an oil-rich Russia is rebuilding its conventional arsenal while modernizing (as have China and Pakistan) its nuclear arsenal. Russia has been menacing its East European neighbors,

including those, like Poland, that have offered to host elements of a NATO missile-defense system to protect Europe. In 2012, Russia's then-chief of general staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, declared: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will
be taken if the situation worsens." This would be the same Russia that has attempted to dismember its neighbor Georgia and now has a docile Russophile billionaire, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, to supplant the balky, independence-minded government loyal to President Mikhail Saakashvili. In the Persian Gulf, American policy was laid down by Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address with what became the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." America's Gulf

allies may not have treaties to rely uponbut they do have decades of promises and the evidence of two wars that the U.S. would stand by them. Today they wait for the long-promised (by Presidents Obama and George W. Bush) nuclear disarmament of a revolutionary Iranian government that has been relentless in its efforts to intimidate and subvert Iran's neighbors. They may wait in vain. Americans take for granted the world in which they grew up a world in which, for better or worse, the U.S. was the ultimate security guarantor of scores of states, and in many ways the entire international system. Today we are informed by many politicians and commentators that we are weary of those burdens though what we should be weary
of, given that our children aren't conscripted and our taxes aren't being raised in order to pay for those wars, is unclear. The truth is that defense spending at the rate of 4% of gross domestic product (less than that sustained with ease by Singapore) is eminently affordable. The arguments against far-flung American strategic commitments take many forms. So-called foreign policy realists, particularly in the academic world, believe that the competing interests of states tend automatically toward balance and require no statesmanlike action by the U.S. To them, the old language of force in international politics has become as obsolete as that of the "code duello," which regulated individual honor fights through the early 19th century. We hear that international institutions and agreements can replace national strength. It is also saidcovertly but significantlythat the U.S. is too dumb and inept to play the role of security guarantor. Perhaps the clever political scientists, complacent humanists, Spenglerian declinists, right and left neo-isolationists, and simple doubters that the U.S. can do anything right are correct. Perhaps the president should concentrate on nation-building at home while pressing abroad only for climate-change agreements, nuclear disarmament and an unfettered right to pick off bad guys (including Americans) as he sees fit. But if history is any guide, foreign policy as a political-science field experiment or what-me-worryism will yield some ugly results. Syria is a harbinger of things to come. In that case, the dislocation, torture and death have first afflicted the locals. But it will not end there, as incidents on Syria's borders and rumors of the movement of chemical weapons suggest. A world

in which the U.S. abnegates its leadership will be a world of unrestricted self-help in which China sets the rules of politics and trade in Asia, mayhem and chaos is the order of the day in the Middle East, and timidity and appeasement paralyze the free European states. A world, in short, where the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must, and those with an option hurry up and get nuclear weapons.

Rogue Nations The U.S Must Use Force to Intimidate Rogue Nations
Henrikson, 99 (2/1/99, Thomas H. Henriksen is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, and insurgencies.Using Power and Legitimacy to Deal with Rogue States, http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159) Terrorist rogue states, in contrast, must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go down the same path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi Germany to propagate its ideology across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest, and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue states push the world toward anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to President Carter, cited preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduring framework of global geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival." Former Secretary of State George Shultz has cogently linked force and diplomacy in practice and in word. He persuasively argued the principle while in office and later in his memoir that force should be used not as a last resort but as an integral component of diplomacy. In defending the 1983 combat assault on the island of Grenada to rescue American hostages and halt the spread of communism in the Caribbean, for example, he wrote in Turmoil and Triumph, his personal account of his years in the Reagan administration:The use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, are legitimate instruments of national policy and should be viewed as such. . . . The use of force obviously should not be taken lightly, but better to use force when you should rather than when you must; last means no other, and by that time the level of force and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over.

Heg High
US Hegemony still high
Mead 09 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only Makes You Stronger, February 4, 2009, Free Republic, http://freerepublic.com/focus/f news/2169866/posts
And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones. Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central . Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the

financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals.

Aff

No Impact to Appeasement
No risk of aggression rogue states wont challenge us
Kagan 07 senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, Aug/Sept. End of Dreams, Return of History. Hoover Policy Review. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html)
The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative

effort at balancing. China s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military
power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively

confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the
older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States.

Foreign Policy failures dont destroy US credibility-- History Proves

Kagan, 10 senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and adjunct professor of history at Georgetown University. [Robert Kagan, 2010 End of Dreams, Return of History, Hoover Institution Stanford University pg. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136] foreign policy failures do not necessarily undermine predominance. Some have suggested that failure in Iraq would mean the end of predominance and unipolarity. But a superpower can lose a war in Vietnam or in Iraq without ceasing to be a superpower if the fundamental international conditions continue to support its predominance. So long as the United States remains at the center of the international economy and the predominant military power, so long as the American public continues to support American predominance as it has consistently for six decades, and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain as the Chinese describe it: one superpower and many great powers.
By the same token,

No Impact to Iran
No domino prolif in the middle east- most countries are a decade away and are dissuaded by the US
Johan Bergenas- Research Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center- August 31, 2010, Dismantling Worst-Case Proliferation Scenarios, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66738/johan-bergenas/the-nucleardomino-myth

a nuclear domino effect remains a myth. In the Middle East, there are no signs that the nuclear dominos will fall anytime soon. Although many governments believe that Iran could be one to three years away from developing a nuclear bomb, all other Middle Eastern countries (besides Israel) are at least 10 to 15 years away from reaching such a capability. This time frame gives Washington ample opportunity to establish or reaffirm security pacts with countries that might be tempted to develop their own nuclear weapons programs in reaction to a potential Iranian bomb. In fact, that work has already begun. In July 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the possibility of the United States extending a "defense umbrella" over the Gulf region and shoring up those countries' military capabilities if Iran goes nuclear. More generally, the United States is trying to reinforce a culture of nonproliferation in the Middle East. In late 2009, Washington concluded an agreement with the United Arab Emirates to forego the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel -- crucial steps in the development of nuclear weapons. (In return, the United Arab Emirates will receive help developing a civilian nuclear-energy program.) Similar overtures are being made to both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, states that are pursuing civilian nuclear-power programs to diversify their energy supplies. Another achievement came during the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, when the United States endorsed the convening of a regional meeting on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The summit is due to be held in 2012 and, although Israel's nuclear weapons complicate matters, could serve as another step toward cementing a nonproliferation culture in the region. These are major accomplishments in preventing proliferation in the Middle East, and they contradict the worst-case scenarios about a nuclear Iran. Yet they have done little to reassure those who expect a chain reaction of proliferating states.
The fruit of these efforts to prevent rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation, then, is the very reason

Prefer our ev- your authors dont understand Iranian politics

Johan Bergenas- Research Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center- August 31, 2010, Dismantling Worst-Case Proliferation Scenarios, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66738/johan-bergenas/the-nucleardomino-myth Such mistaken beliefs are due in part to the West's poor understanding of Iran. After more than 30

years of severed diplomatic, cultural, and educational relations with the country, the West knows little about Iran's leadership, national aspirations, and culture. Because of this, policymakers have a difficult time thinking about the implications of a nuclear Iran and resort to simplistic grandstanding, reprising outdated political fears that lack historical nuance or modern perspective. The exaggerated fears have been useful, too: had the United States not presented Iran's nuclear
aspirations in the darkest of lights, it may not have been able to gain support for four rounds of UN sanctions against the Islamic Republic in the last few years. No impact to Iranian prolif --- theyll use their weapons for deterrence John Mueller 10, professor of political science at Ohio State University , Jan/Feb, Think Again: Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons "Iranian and North Korean Nukes Are Intolerable." Not unless we overreact. North Korea has been questing after nuclear capability for decades and has now managed to conduct a couple of nuclear tests that seem to have been mere fizzles. It has also launched a few missiles that have

hit their presumed target, the Pacific Ocean, with deadly accuracy. It could do far more damage in the area with its artillery. If the Iranians do break their solemn pledge not to develop nuclear weapons (perhaps in the event of an Israeli or U.S. airstrike on their facilities), they will surely find, like all other countries in our nuclear era, that the development has been a waste of time (it took Pakistan 28 years) and effort (is Pakistan, with its enduring paranoia about India and a growing jihadi threat, any safer today?). Moreover, Iran will most likely "use" any nuclear capability in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego-stoking) and deterrence. Indeed, as strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling suggests, deterrence is about the only value the weapons might have for Iran . Such devices, he points out, "should be too precious to give away or to sell" and "too precious to 'waste' killing people" when they could make other countries "hesitant to consider military action." If a nuclear Iran brandishes its weapons to intimidate others or get its way, it will likely find that those threatened, rather than capitulating or rushing off to build a compensating arsenal, will ally with others (including conceivably Israel) to stand up to the intimidation. The popular notion that nuclear weapons furnish a country with the ability to "dominate" its area has little or no historical support -- in the main, nuclear threats over the last 60 years have either been ignored or met with countervailing opposition, not with timorous acquiescence. It was conventional military might -- grunts and tanks, not nukes -- that earned the United States and the Soviet Union their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War.